ANARCHAFEMINISM

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To Elena Pulcini, *maestra e amica*, philosopher of the care of the world.

*In memoriam.*
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began writing this book many years ago and, as often happens with books that have long been in the making, it is hard to acknowledge all the people and encounters that have been influential for its development. Furthermore, the last part of the writing process coincided with the Covid-19 pandemic. During these times of segregation, not only I did not have “a room of my own,” which, as Virginia Woolf reminds us, is the necessary condition for writing: living in a small New York apartment with two children, I did not even have a “desk of my own.” This, among other issues, meant that I did not have access to my New School office, where all my books are located. Without the support of my family, who let me occupy a desk often at their expense, and of the incredible research assistance of Austin Burke, who shared with me their personal electronic sources, and who always provided intelligent and prompt feedback along with them, the writing process would not have been materially possible. For a constant dialogue and invaluable support, I am indebted to them in a degree that can hardly be expressed in words.

I am grateful to Lizabeth During for her friendship and for lending me her own home library, where I found a physical copy of many of the feminist books that, at the moment of writing, were stuck in my office, as well as the quiet necessary for writing. Thinking is always a collective process, but you need silence to hear the many voices in your head. I am incredibly thankful to her for providing me with that space and for the many feminist conversations which often took place along with, and as, a delicious meal. Other friends and colleagues who have deeply influenced this work in a way that goes well beyond the practice of quoting explicit sources include: María Pía Lara, my sister in imagination, whose support and feedback on my work has been invaluable throughout the years; Elena Pulcini, who taught me what to “care for the world” means; Patricia Gherovici and Jamieson Webster, my psychoanalytic and dancefloor soul-mates; Simona Forti, amica da sempre; my friend, and psychoanalyst of the feminine, Jill Gentile; my New School colleagues, Cinzia Arruzza,
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Among my New School colleagues, I also thank Lisa Rubin, with whom, during the process of finishing this book, I have begun building a new “Gender and Sexualities Studies Institute” (GSSI). This institutional space has been an incredible framework for bringing together all the exciting and path-breaking work on gender and sexuality currently being done at the New School. I am incredibly grateful to all those who supported its creation and to the colleagues and students who make its daily life. Among them, I should mention all the GSSI student assistants with whom I am in constant conversation: Austin Burke, K. Eskin, Elijah Sparrow, and Giuseppe Vicinanza.

Besides the direct intellectual sources of this book, I would like to acknowledge the practical sources of inspiration, which come from the many feminist battles and social movements of the last forty years, but also from the personal struggles of the femina who have been the closest to me since when I was born. Among them, I have to mention all the women in my own family, who struggled to survive in a very patriarchal Italian small town, and in particular: my grandmothers, who overcome the violence of the war, included that which took their partners away and forced them to raise four and five children respectively on their own; my mother, Pedrini Alvarina, who had to abandon her studies to become a door-to-door vendor to support her three children, and whose love for and dedication to us taught me very early on what it means to “care”; and my sister, Elena Bottici—also known by her musician name “El Conchitas”—who, even though just two years older, paved the way for me and other women of our generation who left and found themselves elsewhere. It is thanks to her that, from a very early age, I realized that another way of being woman was not just possible, it was real, because she was there.

A note on style. This book was written originally using the Harvard quotation system, one that references sources by naming only the author and the date of the publication in question. That is the system I used in all of my previous philosophy books. While writing this book, I progressively
realized the tension between an anarchafeminist philosophy and a quotation system that reduces sources to their “family name,” which in most cases also means “the name of the father.” I lived with that tension until Chapter 8, when I finally decided to switch to a modified version of the Chicago style, one where author(ities) are quoted with both their first and their family name. I am grateful to my research assistant Lucas Ballestin, who took on the burden of revising all the chapters that had already been written, and to Austin Burke, who continued that process.

As I wrote this book, I developed an anarchafeminist lens that, among other things, made me aware that, in mainstream writing practices, whenever we want to summarize the name of an author, and avoid repetition, we consistently reduce it to their “family name”: why the last and not the first name? Why should Simone de Beauvoir become “de Beauvoir,” and thus be subsumed into the name of her father? We want a short cut, and we find one in the “family,” which, in most cases—in the West at least—also means the patrilinear and patriarchal family. In this book I have tried to resist this reduction and, particularly after the discussion of naming in Chapter 6, decided to quote sources with their full name. When that became too repetitive, I alternated quoting the first and the family name. This may disorient some readers, while others may feel this looks “unprofessional;” other still may reflect on how such a state of affairs is the result of a few millennia of patriarchy. The form is the content. It is the same anarchafeminist philosophy that made me reluctant to assume any of the authors’ gender, except in cases where the self-identification was clear. I have therefore used specific pronouns where such self-identification was evident, but made recourse to “they” when I could not, and did not want to, guess.

The earliest formulation of ideas exposed in this book were presented in a keynote lecture for the 2nd Annual “Thinking the Plural”—Richard J. Bernstein Symposium (Muhlenberg College, September 25, 2015) and, in a subsequent version, as Thesis Eleven Annual Lecture (La Trobe University, Melbourne, July 26, 2016). I started thinking about this book even before, but the key idea came to me in 2015 while preparing the lecture for the Richard J. Bernstein Symposium: as I pondered over the meaning of the plural in Bernstein’s work, I realized that, in my long-standing engagement with Spinoza’s philosophy, I was actually trying to find an ontological framework that would allow me to think the plural in a similar way through a feminist lens. There is more of the relationship between the philosophy of transindividuality and pragmatism that I need
to explore in the future. But first I had to find my own voice, so here is a first step in that direction.


A first version of the introduction was presented at the Night of Philosophy in New York City on January 26, 2018, and then at the UNESCO Night of Philosophy on November 15, 2018. An extract of the talk was published in Libération on November 15, 2018, whereas a full version appeared on Public Seminar on March 7, 2018. A Spanish translation of the latter appeared on September 12, 2018 in Reporte Sexto Piso and an Italian translation in Per cosa lottare. Le frontiere del progressismo, edited by Enrico Biale and Corrado Fumagalli (2019), Milan: Fondazione Giacomo Feltrinelli.

Other talks and conferences where parts of this book have been presented and discussed include: the lecture “Rethinking the Human Through the Philosophy of Transindividuality,” at the International Conference Reimagining the Human, Institute of Philosophy, Vilnius University, September 19, 2021; “Anarchafeminism and Transindividuality,” a paper delivered at the International Conference New Materialisms, Center March Bloch & ICI, Berlin, April 8–9, 2019; “Anarchafeminism,” Guest Lecture, Philosophy Department, Clemson University, March 7, 2019; “Anarchaféminisme,” Guest Lecture, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, November 23, 2018; “Anarcoféminisme,” Guest Lecture, Philosophy Department, Università La Sapienza di Roma, October 22, 2018; “Anarcoféminismo ed ontologia del transindividuale,” Invited Guest Lecture, Centro di Ricerca Politiche e Teorie della Sessualità, Università di

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Verona, March 2, 2018; “The imaginal and the transindividual,” lecture at the international conference Zooethics, MIT Program in Art, Culture, and Technology, April 27–8, 2018; “Anarchafeminism and the ontology of the transindividual,” Invited Guest Lecture, Philosophy Department, University of San Diego, April 2018; “Bodies in plural,” Guest Lecture at IBERO University, Mexico City, February 20, 2018; “Anarcofeminismo,” Guest Lecture at the Universitat Autonoma Metropolitana, February 19, 2018; “Imaginal economies and feminist subversions,” Invited Lecture at the international conference Imagining the Future: Financial Capitalism and the Social Imagination, University College London, July 11, 2017; “Feminist struggles and insurrectionary memory: A Panel,” Documenta 14, Athens, June 30, 2017; “Feminist imagination,” an Invited Lecture, Sydney University, July 25, 2016. I am grateful to all the colleagues who invited me to present my work and for all the comments and feedback received on these occasions.

Last, but certainly not least, for reading and commenting on parts, or the entirety, of this manuscript, I am grateful to Richard Bernstein, Austin Burke, Benoît Challand, Simten Cosar, Robert Cremins, Nancy Fraser, Jill Gentile, Todd May, Maura McCreight, María Pía Lara, Ross Poole, Dimitris Vardoulakis, McKenzie Wark, and Jamieson Webster. My thanks to Maura McCreight and Laura Anderson Barbata for their help with images and solving related copyright issues. A special thanks to my Bloomsbury editor, Liza Thomson, for her enthusiasm and support, to her assistant, Lucy Russell, for her relentless patience, and to Lisa Carden for her careful and beautiful copy-editing.
Introduction: feminism as critique

It has become something of a commonplace to argue that in order to fight the oppression of women, it is necessary to unpack the ways in which different forms of oppression intersect with one another. No single factor, be it nature or nurture, economic exploitation or cultural domination, can be said to be the single cause sufficient to explain the multifaceted sources of patriarchy and sexism. Intersectionality has consequently become the guiding principle for an increasing number of feminists, both from the global north and from the global south. Some have even claimed that intersectionality is the most important contribution by women’s studies so far.¹ As a result, while intersectionality is embraced as a buzzword by many actors on the ground, most publications in gender theory have engaged with the concept in one way or another—whether to promote it, to criticize it, or simply to position oneself with regards to it.

Yet, strikingly enough, in all the literature engaging with intersectionality, there is barely any mention of the feminist tradition of the past that has been claiming the same point for a very long time: anarchist feminism or, as we prefer to call it, “anarchafeminism.” The latter term has been introduced by social movements trying to feminize the concept, and thereby give visibility to a specifically feminist strand within anarchist theory and practice. This anarchafeminist tradition, which has largely been neglected both in academia and in public debate, has a particularly vital contribution to offer today. Recovering that tradition is the reason why we started writing this book.

To begin, along with queer theory’s path-breaking work aimed at dismantling the gender binary of “men” versus “women,” it is pivotal to

vindicate once again the need for a form of feminism that opposes the oppression of people who are perceived as women and who are discriminated precisely on that basis. Notice here that we are using the term “woman” in a way that includes all types of women: women who have been assigned the female sex at birth (AFAB), women who have been assigned the male sex at birth (AMAB), not less than feminine women, masculine women, lesbian women, trans women, queer women, and so on and so forth. Despite the alleged equality of rights, women, and all of those who are perceived as belonging to that category, are still the object of consistent discrimination. The most striking sign of the continued oppression of women is the data about gender violence, that is, the sheer amount of violence constantly inflicted on women and bodies that are perceived as such. According to some estimates, there are somewhere between 140 to 160 million women missing from the global population—meaning that, as a consequence of sex-selective abortion, infanticide, and inequalities of care, the world population is characterized by a macroscopic hole: that of all the “girls” who went “missing.”

Far from being an issue of the past, feminism, the struggle against the oppression of all “femina”, is therefore more imperative than ever. By “femina,” the Latin term from which feminism derived, we mean all those who are excluded from the “first sex,” that is from the category of “man” (homo), as defining both a specific sex and the gender neutral position for humans in general. In comparison to cisgendered males, all other sexes and genders are “second” because none of them can aspire to be both one specific position and the neutral term. For instance, in the US alone,

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2 We use the term Assigned Female At Birth (AFAB) and Assigned Male At Birth (AMAB) to signal the fact that by speaking about “male” and “female,” we implicitly accept the state-sanctioned view according to which our gender corresponds to the sex assigned to us at birth. Notice here how the (almost always binary) gender system and the state apparatus are tightly linked, since it is through our state-issued ID, such as passports, that a gender identity is attached to our lives.


4 In this sense, homo works like the Italian term “uomo,” the French “homme,” and the English “man.” We borrow the term “second sex” from Simone de Beauvoir’s influential book of the same name, which insists on this peculiar position of men, who can be both one single sex and the unsexed humanity more in general: “The relation of the two sexes is not that of two electrical poles: the man represents both the positive and the neuter…” Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (New York: Vintage, 2011), 5.
nearly one out of six transgender people have been incarcerated at least once in their life time.5 Gender violence affects not only women who were assigned female at birth, but also includes transwomen and other gender-nonconforming bodies who are the target of a worldwide femicide. The term “transmisogyny”6 has been coined, for instance, in order to point out how transphobia and misogyny can go hand in hand and actually mutually reinforce each other. Along with “femicide,” that is, the killing of single females, there is an ongoing “feminicide,” that is, a comprehensive and systematic discrimination and outright killing of femina that often takes place with state complicity, either in the form of delayed punishment or through impunity.7

There is, therefore, an urgent need for feminism, but the latter must be supported by an articulation of women’s liberation that does not create further hierarchies, and this is precisely where anarchafeminism comes in. While other feminists from the left have been tempted to explain the oppression of women on the basis of a single factor, or have imprisoned women’s liberation into the framework of a narrow understanding of “womanhood,” anarchists have always been clear in arguing that, in order to fight patriarchy, we have to fight the multifaceted ways in which multiple factors—economic, cultural, racial, political, sexual, etc.—converge to foster it. Including, we might say, the very factors that lead us to privilege certain notions of womanhood over others.

This neglect, if not outright historical amnesia, of an important leftist tradition is certainly the result of the ban that anarchism suffered within academia in particular and within public debates in general, where

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5 Nearly one in six transgender people (16 percent) have been incarcerated at some point in their lives—this rate is far higher than that for general population. For transgender women, the figure raises to 21 percent, while nearly half of Black transgender people (47 percent) have been incarcerated at some point (https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/NCTE_Blueprint_for_Equality2012_Prison_Reform.pdf, accessed on May 21, 2021).


7 By drawing inspiration from Latin American movements, the Kurdish women’s movement has for instance used “feminicide” to mean a comprehensive, structurally anchored war against women, both in armed conflicts and in everyday life. See, for instance, “100 reasons to prosecute the dictator,” Kurdish Women’s Movement of Europe” (TJK-E), https://100-reasons.org/call/ (accessed on March 24, 2021). It is a war that takes place on a physical, military level as well as on an ideological and psychological level. See also the extraordinary flash mob called “un violador en tu camino” / “a rapist in your path,” which has been created by the Chilean collective Las Tesis and has subsequently become a feminist anthem worldwide (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aB7r6hdo3W4, accessed on March 25, 2021).
anarchism has most often been deceitfully portrayed as a mere call for violence and disorder. This ban is based on a semantic conflation between “anarchy” as absence of government and “anarchy” as disorder. Anarchy does not mean disorder; it means searching for an order without an “orderer,” that is, for a form of spontaneous sociality that does not issue from a command. Those who understand anarchy as merely synonymous with disorder conflate the meaning of “order” as the existence of some patterns of behavior (without which no society is possible) with that of order as “command,” without which societies are not just possible—they are also desirable. The neglect of the anarchafeminist tradition has thus been enacted to the detriment of conceptual accuracy, inclusiveness, and, as we will see, political efficacy.

Our proposal is to remedy such a gap by formulating a specific anarchafeminist approach adapted to the challenges of our time. The point is not simply to give visibility to an anarchafeminist tradition, which has been an important component of past women’s struggles, and thereby to reestablish some historical continuity—although this alone would certainly be a worthwhile endeavor. Besides historical accuracy, recovering anarchafeminist insights has the crucial function of enlarging feminist strategies precisely in a moment when different factors increasingly converge to intensify the oppression of women by creating further class, racial, and cultural cleavages among them.

At a time when feminism has witnessed bitter divisions between cis- and transfeminism, when feminism as a whole has been accused of being mere white privilege, this task is more crucial than ever. The emancipation of (some) women from the global north can indeed happen at the expense of other women from the global south, whose reproductive labor within the household is often used to replace the labor previously performed by the now allegedly “emancipated” women. It is precisely when we adopt such a global perspective, all the more necessary today because of the global entanglements of social reproduction, that the chain linking gendered labor across the globe becomes visible and the timeliness of anarchafeminism all the more manifest. We need a

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8 See Jack Halberstam, Trans*: A Quick and Quirky Account of Gender Variability (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018) for a reconstruction of some of these controversies, as well for an invitation to overcome them. Cis- is the term opposite to trans- and thus the term used in LGBTQI+ communities to mean those women who have not transitioned from the gender that was assigned to them at birth.
multifaceted approach to domination. In particular, we need an approach able to incorporate different factors as well as different voices coming from all over the globe. As Chinese anarchafeminist He Zhen wrote at the dawn of the twentieth century in her *Problems of Women's Liberation*:

The majority of women are already oppressed by both the government and by men. The electoral system simply increases their oppression by introducing a third ruling group: elite women. Even if the oppression remains the same, the majority of women are still taken advantage of by the minority of women. [...] When a few women in power dominate the majority of powerless women, unequal class differentiation is brought into existence among women. If the majority of women do not want to be controlled by men, why would they want to be controlled by women? Therefore, instead of competing with men for power, women should strive for overthrowing men’s rule. Once men are stripped of their privilege, they will become the equal of women. There will be no submissive women nor submissive men. This is the liberation of women.\(^9\)

The relevance of these words, written in 1907, shows how prophetic anarchafeminism has been. Liberation does not mean that women should come to share the privileges that some men enjoy, but it means “no submissive women nor submissive men.” In these words lies thus a first answer to our question: why anarchafeminism? Because it is the best antidote against the possibility of feminism becoming a privilege and, thus, a tool in the hands of a few women who dominate the vast majority of them. In an epoch when the election of a woman president is presented as liberation for all women, when feminism can become a tool for corporate branding, the fundamental message of anarchafeminists of the past is more urgent than ever: “Feminism does not mean female corporate power or a woman president: it means no corporate power and no president.”\(^{10}\) In other words, it means the liberation of all women.

Although recovering forgotten anarchafeminist voices of the past is an important task for today’s feminists, this is not our central aim. This book

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began as an attempt to recover the anarchafeminist tradition, but ended up becoming something else. The more we searched for the “anarchafeminist tradition,” and the more we tried to identify the “anarchafeminist canon,” the less interested we were in it. While researching for this book, it became clear that the concept of an “anarchafeminist tradition,” let alone that of an “anarchafeminist canon,” is fraught with internal tensions, if not with an outright contradiction. The idea of a “tradition” implies the intentional transmission of a certain body of thought from one generation to the other, which, in turn, implies the existence of a relatively stable body of works that are meant to be “classical” and thus worth transmitting. Even more so, the idea of a “canon” implies that such a body of thought and practices has been transcribed into a series of books, which are accepted as genuine and foundational, if not as sacred. But the term “anarchy” gestures at the getting rid of hierarchies, whether they are political, canonical or ideological. Even the notion of a “classical anarchism,” as we will see, often becomes a tool to perpetrate exclusions and policing a supposed anarchist “canon,” which ends up being largely Eurocentric and androcentric. Is there not a performative contradiction in trying to construct an anarchafeminist tradition, let alone a canon?

The more we delve in that space, the more such a tension becomes evident. The “anarchafeminist” philosophy is scattered in a constantly shifting set of books, works and ideas that can hardly be enclosed into a given canon. Furthermore, many anarchafeminist authors are not even primarily interested in branding themselves as such. Some simply focus on specific issues, while others chose opacity as a strategy. As a consequence, whereas reading and engaging with groups that identify themselves as anarchafeminist is always useful, we have actually found some of the most productive anarchafeminist insights in writers, philosophers and activists who do not identify themselves as such. The same holds for the many and varied other forms of anarchism. For

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11 For instance, in George Crowder’s reconstruction of “Classical Anarchism,” the term “classical” become the justification for limiting his reconstruction of anarchism to the ideas developed by four men (Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin), thereby completely erasing the contribution of all other genders to what is “classical” in anarchist thought. See: George Crowder, Classical Anarchism: The Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). It is indeed significant—yet all too often forgotten—that “classical” and “class” derive from the same Latin root “classis,” a term initially denoting simply any class, but, increasingly, and particularly through the French term “classique,” denoting whatever belongs to the class par excellence.
instance, while there are relatively few self-identified “Black anarchists,” so much of the literature in the Black radical tradition and in Black feminism expresses anarchist ideals and sentiments, as some have noted. So how to reconcile such a tension? How can the two possibly go together?

The tension disappears when we ponder over the meaning of “anarchy” itself, and over “anarchism” as the philosophy and praxis of anarchy. If anarchy means, as we will see, absence of an archē, that is of a ruler and of an overarching principle, and thus invites us to search for an order without an orderer, then it is clear why most anarchists are not primarily interested in classifying themselves in one way or another, let alone in constructing an anarchist “canon.” Most anarchist thinkers were mainly interested in dismantling any archē and thus they fought on the specific battlegrounds of their time and space, without necessarily engaging in the (academic) exercise of identifying traditions and canonical texts. It is therefore perfectly possible to develop a form of “anarchoblackness” and not desire to identify a specific “Black-anarchist tradition,” in as much as it is possible to develop anarchafeminist ideas without calling oneself as such, nor being aware of the existence of such a tradition. This is probably the strength of anarchafeminism, because it protected it from the ossification into an orthodoxy, but also its weakness, because many of its contributors have more easily fallen into oblivion.

In this book, we want to transform the weakness into a strength, that is use the versatility of the anarchafeminist philosophy as a way to create a dialogue between texts, political projects, and philosophical ideas that are not usually associated. In doing so, we will refer to both theorists and activists who define themselves as anarchafeminists, but also to others who do not so. This book is thus less a faithful reconstruction of all anarchafeminist theories than an attempt to individuate an anarchafeminist philosophy that responds to the challenges of our time. More than a label to classify texts or people, or a philosophico-political program to be written once and for all, anarchism is a method, one that questions all forms of hierarchy and therefore invites us to investigate the way in which they mutually reinforce each other. When applied to

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12 As Marquis Bey observes, this is also true for Black anarchism: while there are relatively few self-identified “Black anarchists,” so much of the literature in the Black radical tradition and in Black feminism expresses anarchic sentiments. See, in particular, Marquis Bey, Anarcho-Blackness: Notes Towards a Black Anarchism (California: AK Press, 2020), 8.

feminism, the prefix *anarcha* has the function of underlining that neither sex, nor class or race, nor cis- or heteronormativity, nor whatever other single item we can pick from our gender bookshelves, can ever aspire to be the unique factor, the decisive origin, the *archē* that explains, and thus also explains away, the pluralistic nature of the oppression of women.

This is the meaning of “anarchafeminism” that we find in historical texts by anarchists who considered themselves feminist, but also in those by theorists and activists that have embraced these ideas without necessarily using that label: what they had in common was the awareness that there is something specific in the oppression of women, but also that different forms of oppression reinforce each other, so one cannot get rid of one of them without addressing all others. In sum, they share the conviction that one cannot be free, unless everybody else is also equally free.

It is this anarchafeminist awareness, for instance, that led Emma Goldman, one of the sources of inspiration for this book, to reject the label “feminism” and only embrace that of “anarchism.” For her, as we will see, anarchism was the teacher of the unity of life, and thus of the fact that all forms of oppression meet in a single point, whereas “feminism,” in the New York of the early twentieth century, was mainly associated with a movement made up of middle-class women who had no vested interest in overcoming class exploitation, and other forms of domination. Hence, Emma Goldman’s philosophy addresses the question of the liberation of women through the concept of anarchism, refuses the label of “feminism,” but, as we will see, nevertheless harbours clear anarchafeminist insights.

The term “anarcha-feminism” was, on the contrary, used explicitly in 1970s by feminist social movements who looked at a different type of feminism, and saw themselves as anarchist, emphasizing the important convergence between the two—a convergence perceived as so poignant that some activists argued that “feminism practices what anarchism preaches.” Indeed, many feminists of the 1970s shared anarchist goals such as ending all forms of hierarchy, capitalism, gender stereotypes, and interpersonal violence, and often used techniques traditionally used by anarchists, from the recourse to consensus building in affinity groups to

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the emphasis on “the personal is political” or what anarchists traditionally called “prefigurative politics.”  

However, as we will see, it is undeniable that not all forms of feminism have historically been anarchist. For many self-defined feminists, feminism means reaching equality between men and women, and thus searching for the legal and political conditions necessary for women to come to enjoy the same position of power enjoyed by men. But not all men are equally placed in the hierarchy of power, so when feminism aims at reaching equality with men, what is meant is actually a few of them. In this way, feminism can easily become a form of elitism, that is an attempt by (some) women to come to enjoy the same privileges of some men. On the contrary, in this book we understand feminism not as struggle for equality with some men, but as a struggle against the oppression of all women, as well as a struggle against the oppression perpetrated through the imposition of a narrow understanding of “womanhood.”

As a consequence, feminism is not a movement concerned just with women’s issues, but rather a form of critique of the entire social order, one that in the current predicament is inseparable, as we will see, from the “modern/colonial gender system” that reduces gender roles to biological dimorphism and pathologizes those who deviate from it. Gender norms and binary dichotomies of “men” versus “women” are oppressive for everybody, not just for those assigned the female sex at birth, despite the fact that men can profit from a gender binary system with men on top much more than women can. This is because everybody participates in the production and reproduction of gender roles.

Considering feminism as a lens for a general critique of the social order also has the function of deepening our understanding of oppression through an analysis of internalized modes of domination. Feminist theorists of the past have been able to unpack the mechanisms of domination in a very subtle way. While it is certainly true that there is something unique about the oppression of women, it is also true that discerning such peculiarity can illuminate the mechanisms of domination more generally. For some feminists, the insidious nature of domination is

16 On the definition of feminism as a movement to end sexist oppression, we follow bell hooks, Feminist Theory from Margin to Center (Boston: South End Press, 1984), 17–31.
derived from the erotic dimension of power or what other anarchists have called “the dilemmas of voluntary servitude.” As Étienne de La Boétie once observed, the main reason certain rulers remain in power for so long is that the multitude willingly obey. It would be enough for the majority of people to simply stop obeying in order to bring about the dissolution of such a power. Why do people keep submitting to them? Why does patriarchy persist? If we look at feminist literature, we can find various insights as to the mechanisms whereby women have willingly reproduced the very same gender roles and stereotypes that have oppressed them for so long. Simone de Beauvoir, for instance, more than seventy years ago, pointed to this problem: there have been other cases where, for a shorter or longer period of time, one category of humans managed to prevail over another, and most often it was numerical inequality that enabled this privilege to come into being and persist over time, but in the case of women that is clearly not the case. It is not that women are a numerical minority and therefore become oppressed, but the other way around: because of widespread feminicide and inequalities, a significant number of women went missing from the global population. Thus, the reason why such oppression persists must lie elsewhere. For Simone de Beauvoir, it is because “the man who sets the woman up as an Other will find in her deep complicity”: “refusing to be the Other, refusing complicity with man, would mean renouncing all the advantages an alliance with the superior caste confers on them.” There is thus something peculiarly insidious in gender domination, so unpacking the way it works can also act as a magnifying glass to help unpack mechanisms of domination more generally, and thus to prepare the ground for their subversion. Feminism should not be just an addendum to a more general critique of the social order, but rather one of its starting points.

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20 We follow here Karl Marx’s 1843 definition of critical theory as the “self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age,” but, following Nancy Fraser, we consider feminist struggles as a crucial component of them, and thus not as something that can be added later on, when general theory has done its work. See, in particular, Nancy Fraser, *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis* (London: Verso, 2013), 19–51. As we will see later on, we combine historical materialism with a transindividual philosophy and a monist ontological framework that enable us to formulate critique as a form of immanent critique. On critique and a Spinozist philosophy of immanence, see also Martin Saar, *Die Immanenz der Macht. Politische Theorie nach Spinoza* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013), in particular 424–6.
A variety of critical theorists who combined an historical materialist analysis with a psychoanalytic lens did important work in unpacking how structures of dominations can be internalized and reproduced, even by those who are most oppressed by them. To paraphrase Erich Fromm, both historical materialism and psychoanalysis are very helpful in this enterprise because they both converge in “deposing consciousness from its throne.” Whereas most of the canonical works in critical theory have done so through a Eurocentric philosophical framework and an androcentric psychoanalysis, the type of critique that we will pursue in this book must be understood as an exercise in an “interstitial global critical theory.” The latter is a form of critique that is global in the sense that it takes the globe as its horizon, but also interstitial because it focuses on how the global intersects with regional, national, and even microlocal forces in creating specific configurations of oppression. The metaphor of the “interstices” is a way to move beyond the logic of binaries that counterpoises universalism versus particularism, the global versus the particular, while also keeping in mind the performative contradiction one may risk when doing critical theory by taking only European or Western experiences and sources as the basis for critical theory. We can still retain some lessons from European histories and intellectual traditions, but they have to be put in a global context, that is, one where, as we will see, relations of colonialism, imperialism, and the “coloniality of gender” emerge. Notice also that “global” does not mean “universal”: the point of an “interstitial global critical theory” is precisely to argue that one can combine a global gaze, focused on the inequalities rooted in global phenomena such as capitalism and colonialism, with a focus on interstices, where a number of different factors can intervene, thus creating specific intersections of oppressions that are not universal. “Critical theory” without qualification would be a universal. The idea of a “global critical theory” already introduces a qualification, because it suggests that theory is done from a certain perspective, i.e. that of the

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22 We have elaborated this methodology more at length in Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, “Towards an Interstitial Global Critical Theory,” in Globalization (forthcoming, 2021).
globe as its horizon of operation, while not claiming or implicitly assuming any universality. Global does not mean “total” either, because an interstitial global critical theory is not meant to address all current and possible forms of oppressions at once. No emancipatory theory can ever be all-encompassing, because any theory cannot but reflect the positionality and the limits of the knowledge available to the theorists in that moment in space and time.

The approach used in this book is thus best described as “critical-colonial,” thereby meaning that no critique of the social order can today be effective without taking into account insights from the de-, post-, and settler-colonial studies. Being critical involves questioning the conditions in which theory is produced. And that is where the contribution of post-colonial, de-colonial, and settler-colonial theories, with their emphasis on the persistence of the “racial schema” and the “psychology of colonialism,” become crucial: presenting a form of critical theory that does not take into account the extent to which theorizing itself is influenced by the persistence of colonial modes of thought and unconscious patterns of feeling means falling into a performative contradiction, where one professes to exercise a critique, but fails to do so because, by systematically ignoring the unconscious racial schemes shaping one’s own theorizing, one cannot avoid reproducing them. This is the reason why decolonization cannot be done all at once, but requires a “decolonial attitude” that is relentless in progressively unpacking the different layers of domination accumulated over time. Furthermore, for us theorists of European descent operating in the Americas, we also deem it crucial to add a critical settler-colonial perspective to the de- and post-colonial emphasis. Being located in the United States, a country marked by the overall “coloniality of power” generated by “the colonial/modern Eurocentred capitalism,” but also by the specific settler-colonial history and present-day context of the

24 We have elaborated the concept of a “critical-colonial approach” in Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, “Europe after Eurocentrism?,” Crisis & Critique 7, no. 1 (2020), 59.
United States,\textsuperscript{28} we believe it is pivotal that a critical theory produced in these conditions begins by addressing them first hand. How is the settler-colonial structure of the United States impacting the way in which knowledge is produced? How does that structure shape what gets to count as “critique”\textsuperscript{29} and what does not? Why are Indigenous philosophies so systematically excluded from critical theory? These are questions that should in our view be addressed by any critical theorist operating in a settler-colonial context, but also by whoever cares about the globe as the horizon for rethinking the critical project. As Eduardo Mendieta puts it, critical theory is inseparable from decolonial thinking, understood as “an exercise in \textit{epistemic insubordination} that challenges the \textit{epistemic privilege} that has been accorded and delegated to certain knowledge producers and withdrawn and refused to other knowledge producers.”\textsuperscript{30}

Consequently, an interstitial global critical theory cannot prescind from a critique of the Eurocentric biases that so much radical theory still carries within itself. As Ina Kerner, among others, argued, methodological Eurocentrism (or Occidentalism) is what automatically leads to posit a more or less autonomous European (or Western) history of progress and to implicitly use that history and developments as the global norm or yardstick to approach all others around the globe.\textsuperscript{31} In this sense, Eurocentrism does not simply imply ethnocentric universalism, that is, presenting claims that only hold for a particular ethnos as if they were universal. It also implies neglecting that such ethnocentric universalism relies in turn on the opposition between universalism and particularism, and thus forgetting that cultural relativism is not the opposite of Eurocentrism but the \textit{other} side of it: they both share the implicit assumption of a globe divided into essentialized group differences (whether they are national or geo-political), as well as their hierarchical


\textsuperscript{29} Nelson Maldonado-Torres, for instance, emphasized that in \textit{The Wretched of the Earth} Frantz Fanon refers to the African tradition of public self-criticism and builds on it; and yet, Fanon is rarely mentioned in the canon of critical theory thinkers. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “What is Decolonial Critique?,” in \textit{Philosophy and Coloniality}, a special issue of the \textit{Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, Vol. 41, no. 2 (2020), 162.


organization, with some of them portrayed as universal and other as merely particular. Thus it is possible to find Eurocentric theories being produced in Europe, or the West, as well as in the peripheries of it, where, given the hegemony exercised by Europe over the past 500 years, Eurocentric modes of thinking can very well be internalized even by those who are most oppressed by it. Unpacking methodological Eurocentrism is thus pivotal for an anarchafeminist philosophy aimed at addressing the liberation of not only some (white) women, but all the *femina* around the globe, despite their interstitial differences.

Adopting an anarchafeminist lens entails taking the entire globe as the framework for thinking about the liberation of women, but also questioning any form of methodological ethnocentrism, that is, privileging certain women and thus certain national or regional contexts. If fighting the oppression of women means we have to fight all forms of oppression, then statism, nationalism, and Eurocentrism are no exceptions. If one begins by looking at the dynamics of exploitation by taking state or geopolitical boundaries as an unquestionable fact, one ends up reinforcing one of the greatest sources of the very oppression one was meant to question in the first place. Today, adopting anything less than the entire globe as our framework is at best naïve provincialism, and at worst obnoxious ethnocentrism. But such global gaze must be accompanied by a decolonial and deimperial attitude that takes into account how differences have been constructed and how universalist claims have most often worked as mere ideological cover for “Eurocentrism,” and thus as a justification for the narcissism of those still caught in the missionary position of the “white man’s burden.”

Whereas several feminist theories produced in the global north have failed to understand the extent to which the emancipation of white, middle-class women happened at the expense of a renewed oppression of working-class people of color, and have thus elaborated their own models for women’s liberation without giving voice to those placed in the margins of modern/colonial gender system, anarchafeminists are by definition called to adopt an inclusive perspective. Although some individuals who

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32 Ina Kerner, “Postcolonial Theories as Global Critical Theories,” 615.
33 We use “deimperial,” instead of “non-imperial” or “anti-imperial,” for reasons that will become clear in the course of this book. For now, notice that, like “decolonial,” the term suggests an attitude of progressively turning away from imperial cognitive scheme, including internalized ones.
defined themselves as “anarchist” in the past may have failed to so do, as a concept and as a method, “anarchism” calls for a focus on the processes of production and reproduction of life independently of all hierarchies, including state boundaries, with their racial and colonial cleavages.

A side remark: note that, although one can use labels such as Latin American or Chinese anarchafeminism, we believe that those labels must be used as ladders to be abandoned in the process of thinking through them. The vitality of the anarchafeminist tradition consists precisely in its capacity to transcend state boundaries, methodological nationalism, and even the Eurocentric biases that persist throughout a lot of the radical theory produced in the global north. It is very revealing, for instance, that most of the feminist tools circulating in Western academia, whether rooted in post-structuralist feminism, radical feminism, or even socialist feminism, derive from theories produced in a very small number of countries. To combat this Eurocentric trend, it is pivotal to bring to the center of the discussion texts produced by anarchists worldwide. This alone can insure a form of feminism beyond Eurocentrism, and beyond ethnocentrism.

As Chandra Tolpade Mohanty argued, it is crucial for feminism to flag up the experiences, texts, and struggles produced by the most marginalized communities within global capitalism, and thus by poor women of all colors in both affluent and neocolonial nations.34 Although oppression can be internalized even by those who are most oppressed, it still remains that the voices of those who are most marginalized enjoy the “epistemic privilege” of being able to provide the most inclusive viewing of systematic power: we need perspectives that enable us to “study up” the global structures of power, and not simply to “study them down.”35 By focusing on the micro-politics of marginalized women anti-capitalist struggles, one can indeed come to grasp the macro-politics of global capitalism through a bottom up, interstitial approach.

This also implies reading and engaging with theories and praxes produced outside of the West, but cannot be reduced to a mere politics of diversity. Adopting a decolonial and a deimperial attitude does not mean to simply invite “diverse” people to the dinner table, that is, to an already predetermined set of questions, issues, and authors: it means opening up

35 Chandra Tolpade Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, 231–6.
the possibility of changing those dinner plans completely. In other words, it does not mean to just add exotic names as “multicultural add-on” to our already established theoretical endeavors. It means to follow a “bottom-up epistemology” and thus not only to invite a plurality of voices to the table but also to grant them the opportunity to create a different menu. We take the notion of bottom-up epistemology from Boaventura de Sousa Santos, who emphasized how epistemologies of the South can help us to affirm and valorize the differences that remain after the hierarchies between centers and peripheries, north and south, affluent and non-affluent countries, have been eliminated. As such, rather than an abstract universality, “bottom-up epistemologies” promote a “pluriversality,” that is, a kind of thinking that encourages decolonization, creolization, or mestizaje through intercultural translation, and that thereby also questions the dichotomy of “universal” versus “particular.”

If we take the globe as our framework, and adopt a decolonial and deimperial attitude, the first striking datum to emerge is that people across the globe have not always been doing gender, and, moreover, even if they did do it, they have done it in very different terms. It is only with the emergence of a worldwide capitalist system that the gender binary of (masculine) “men” versus (feminine) “women” became so hegemonic worldwide. This does not mean that sexual difference did not exist before capitalism, nor does it imply that we should indulge in the nostalgia of a gender-fluid past. It simply means taking note of the historically situated nature of the current gender regime, and, in particular, of the fact that binary gender roles were not as universally accepted as the primary criteria by which to classify bodies as they are today. Modern colonialism and capitalism made the mononuclear bourgeois family, with its binary gender roles, hegemonic, while it endowed the modern sovereign state with a formidable bureaucratic apparatus able to inscribe that gender binary on us through state ID, passports, demography, and healthcare systems, among others.

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36 In his “Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and Decoloniality,” Nelson Maldonado-Torres insists that we need to decolonize every building block of what gets to count as knowledge (18–21). See also his critique of the neoliberal politics of diversity in the academy in Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “What is Decolonial Critique?,” 157.

Socialist feminists have long been emphasizing how capitalism needs a gendered division of labor because, being predicated on the endless expansion of profit, it needs both the extraction of surplus value from waged productive labor as well as unpaid reproductive labor, which is still largely performed by gendered bodies. Put bluntly, capitalism needs “women.” It relies on the assumption that when women are washing their husband’s and children’s socks, they are not “working” but merely performing their nature-ordained function. As anarchafeminist Maria Mies, among others, has emphasized, perceiving women’s labor as simply the necessary calling of their “womanhood” instead of seeing it as the actual work it is, is pivotal to keeping the division between “waged labor,” subject to exploitation, and “unwaged labor,” subject to what she called “super-exploitation.” This form of gendered exploitation is “super” because, whereas the exploitation of waged labor takes place through the extraction of surplus value, the exploitation of women’s domestic labor takes place via denying their work the very status of work.

By building on socialist-feminist insights, and combining them with Aníbal Quijano’s thesis of a “coloniality of power,” Maria Lugones put forward the very useful concept of the “coloniality of gender.” With this concept, Lugones emphasizes how the “men/women” binary and the racial classification of bodies went together, both systems having been developed by Europeans through the colonial expansion that accompanied the formation of global capitalism. Within the American context, Lugones shows how gender roles were much more flexible and variegated among Native Americans before the arrival of European settlers. Different Indigenous nations possessed, for instance, a third gender category to positively recognize intersex and queer subjectivities, whereas others, such as the Yuma, attributed gender roles on the basis of dreams, so that

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39 Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour (London: Zed Books, 1986). Maria Mies does not use the expression “anarchafeminism,” but defines feminism itself as “an anarchist movement which does not want to replace one (male) power elite with another (female) power elite, but which wants to build up a non-hierarchical, non-centralized society where no elite lives on the exploitation and dominance over others” (ibid., 37).

40 Maria Lugones, “The Coloniality of Gender.”
a female-born woman who dreamed of weapons was considered and treated, for all practical purposes, as a man. As we will see, there is today large evidence showing that there has been a systematic intertwine of capitalist economy, racial classification of bodies, and gender oppression. In other words, although cultures have varied significantly in their attitudes towards homosexual behavior and different gender embodiments, queer eros flowered in a variety of forms before the era of European colonialism and imperialism started to promote the binary gender system. It is therefore imperative to systematically explore the link between patriarchy, homophobia, and colonialism. This is what we will do by investigating the different forms and shapes of the “coloniality of gender.”

It is manifest, and yet all too often forgotten, that to classify people on the basis of their skin color or their genitalia is not an a priori of the human mind. Classifying bodies on the basis of their sex, as well as classifying them on the basis of their race, implies (among other things) a primacy of the visual register. The emergence of modernity is inseparable from the emergence of both the racial and the gender system, so the two cannot be separated. According to Oyèrónké Oyèwùmí, both gender and racial classification rely on a form of “oculocentrism,” on a primacy of sight as the major source of information gathering, that is typical of the West, particularly when looked at from the perspective of the Yoruba pre-colonial cultures. As Oyèwùmí points out in The Invention of Women, the Yoruba cultures, for instance, relied much more on the oral transmission of information than on its visualization, and they valued age over all other criteria for social hegemony. For the Yoruba obinrin (or “anatomical

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43 Oyèrónké Oyèwùmí, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
females,” as Oyèwùmí translates it), colonization meant being inferiorized as a race, as a gender, and, through the exclusion from waged work, as a class. Whereas before colonization, the Yoruba language did not even have the terms to classify people into “men” versus “women,” with the consequent inferiorization of the latter, after the arrival of the European colonizers Yoruba obinrin started to be relegated to a position of systematic inferiority, and thus perceived as “women.” “Women” are those who do not have a penis, those who do not have power, and those whose role is defined in relation to men, who are both a specific gender but also the neutral. None of this was true of Yoruba obinrin prior to European colonization.  

Therefore, questioning the coloniosity of gender also means questioning the primacy of biological determinism as well as that of the visual classification of bodies: it is by seeing bodies that we say “here is a woman!” or “that is a man!” But it is also within such a visual register that we have to operate to question narrow heteronormative and cisnormative views of womanhood and thereby open new paths toward subverting them. To summarize the content of this book in one sentence, we could say: “Another woman is possible; another woman has always already begun.”

At this point of the argument, one may already object: why insist on the concept of feminism and not just call this anarchism? Why focus on women? If the purpose is to dismantle all types of oppressive hierarchies, should we not also get rid of the gender binary which, by opposing “women” to “men,” imprisons us in a heteronormative matrix?

We should be immediately clear that when we say “women,” we are not speaking about some supposed object, about an eternal essence, or, even less so, about a pre-given object. Indeed, to articulate a specifically feminist position while maintaining a multifaceted understanding of domination, we need a more nuanced understanding of “womanhood.” By drawing insights from feminist readings of Baruch Spinoza’s philosophy of the unique substance and from an ontology of the transindividual, we will argue that bodies in general, and women’s bodies in particular, must not be considered as objects given once and for all, but rather as processes. We are not things, we are relations. Women’s bodies are bodies in plural because they are processes, processes that are constituted by mechanism of

44 Oyèrónké Oyèwùmí, The Invention of Women, 34.
affecting and associating that occur at the inter-, supra-, and the infra-individual level. To give just a brief example of what we mean here, think of how our bodies come into being through an inter-individual encounter, how they are shaped by supra-individual forces, such as their geo-political locations, and how they are made up by intra-individual bodies such as the air we breathe, the food we eat, or the hormones one may take. And, in their turn, think of how such infra-individual bodies connect us with supra-individual ecosystems, modes of production, and structures of (re)productions.

Notice here the benefits of such an ontological shift towards transindividuality as the prism through which individuality must be understood. First, instead of elaborating a form of feminism and then adding ecology as something different from feminism itself, here the two positions are unified from the beginning because, in a philosophy of the transindividual, the environment is not something separated from us, but rather, the environment is us⁴⁵—literally something constitutive of our individuality. It is not that such a transindividual philosophy is new, since, as we will see, it has been circulating for a while. But we can no longer ignore our transindividual nature, and thus the chains of inter- and infra-actions between different species and ecosystems. The price that we may now pay for such ignorance is going extinct as a consequence of global warming or the next pandemic created by a zoonotic disease. If there is one thing that the Covid-19 catastrophe made patent is that we cannot be healthy on our own, because our being is intimately inter, supra-, and even infra-dependent on that of all others—including other living organism, such as other animals and plants, or non-living ones, such as viruses.

Second, when women’s bodies are theorized as processes, as sites of a process of becoming that takes place at different levels, we can speak about “women” without incurring the charge of essentialism or culturalism. As we will see, in this monist ontology, there is no place for the opposition between sex (nature) and gender (culture), an opposition that has plagued so much of the feminist debates in the West, because there is no place for

⁴⁵ We borrow this expression from Stacy Alaimo’s Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 11, who, in turn, takes it from Harold Fromm.
body–mind dualism, and for “nature” to be conceived as static and inert, and thus opposed to an always changing “nurture.”

Third, by adopting this transindividual ontology, we can also situate the concept of woman outside of a hetero- or cisnormative framework, and thus use the term in such a way that it includes all types of women: feminine women, masculine women, AFAB women, AMAB women, lesbian women, bisexual women, transwomen, ciswomen, asexual women, queer women, and so on and so forth. In sum, “women” come to encompass all bodies that identify themselves and are identified through the always changing narrative of “womanhood.”

To conclude this point, the transindividual framework will allow us to answer the question “what is a woman?” in pluralistic terms, while also defending a specifically feminist form of anarchism. Developing the concept of women as processes also means going beyond the individual versus collectivity dichotomy: if it is true that all bodies are transindividual processes, then the assumption that there could be such a thing as a pure individual, separate, or even opposed, to a given collectivity, is at best a useless abstraction and at worst a deceitful fantasy.

This is also the reason why we used the pronoun “we” in writing this book: we want to signal from the very beginning that the thinking recorded in these pages is not the result of an individual mind. It is the result of a transindividual life, a life which began almost a half a century ago in a small town of the Italian peninsula and is currently continuing in a big city in the Americas, a geographical location also known as the territory of Turtle Island according to its pre-colonial name. We use the “we” to signal the transindividual nature of the process of thinking deposited in these pages, but also to recover a practice of writing that is typical of our native language, Italian, where the use of the plural is a common practice.

Most of this book is written through the rhetorical devise of the “transparent subject,” that is, it is written as if the subject who is writing

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46 The rejection of such a dichotomy of sex (nature) versus gender (nurture) does not imply that the two terms could not be transformed and used in a different context. For instance, within certain LGBTQI+ communities, the distinction can be used to mean the difference between sexual orientation or sexualities (thus lesbian, gay, queer, etc) and atypical gendered forms of embodiment, such as that of trans-women or trans-men. This usage, however, questions even further the traditional dichotomy of sex (nature) versus gender (nurture).

were not an embodied, gendered, and racialized being. That is the writing strategy used by mainstream philosophical writings today, at least in the West. In this book, we will use that writing mode, but also disrupt it through “intermezzos,” where an embodied, gendered, and culturally located voice comes through language itself. The purity of the “transparent subject” performed in the first three chapters will thus be interrupted by a *Stabat mater* fragment that will both make that performance evident, as well as glance at another possible type of writing. Whereas the chapters of this book follow the common order of an already established syntax, intermezzos will follow the free writing of a body in search of meaning beyond the conventional syntax. This reflects our belief that an anarchafeminist philosophy should be able to recognize the philosophical legitimacy of a multiplicity of writing styles, including those that are most alien to the (Eurocentric) model of the philosophical treatise, and that some may consequently deem as not proper theory or philosophy.

The first part of this book will introduce anarchafeminism as the philosophy that is able to keep together two fundamental claims: that there is something specific in the oppression of women, and of *femina* more in general, and that in order to address that oppression we need to tackle all other forms of oppression. To this end, we will discuss the Black feminist literature on intersectionality and analyze its relationship with anarchafeminist theories and ideas (Chapter 1), we will delineate the sort of anarchism “beyond Eurocentrism and sexism” that will accompany such a project (Chapter 2), and finally situate anarchafeminism between feminism and queer and trans-theory (Chapter 3).

The *Stabat mater* intermezzo will open Part II, which will tackle the question of how one can develop an expansive concept of womanhood, and thereby invoke a monist philosophy of transindividuality as the best philosophical framework to do so. Chapter 4 will explore how the philosophical outlook provided by the feminist interpretations of a seventeenth-century Marrano philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, can provide insights as to the transindividual nature of all bodies as well as to the monist philosophy that they presuppose—one where there is no opposition between bodies and minds, both being expressions under different attributes of the same unique and infinite substance. This will in turn provide the basis for arguing that there cannot be any strict separation between the subject and the object of knowledge, and that therefore a philosophy of transindividuality is also a transindividual philosophy (Chapter 5), that is, one where the philosophical discourse