

M A P

43° 23' 33"

D O F C

the most reliable

authorities.

Edward J Erickson

# A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare

B L O O M S B U R Y

**A Global History  
of Relocation in  
Counterinsurgency  
Warfare**



# A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare

Edited by  
*Edward J. Erickson*

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC  
LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC  
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc  
50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK  
1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA

BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks  
of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in Great Britain 2020

Copyright © Edward J. Erickson, 2020

Edward J. Erickson has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,  
1988, to be identified as Editor of this work.

Cover Image: Map of the island of Cuba : compiled from the most reliable Spanish  
authorities. 1855 (© Everett Collection Historical / Alamy Stock Photo) Portrait: General  
Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marques de Tenerife (© Library of Congress / Getty Images)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted  
in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,  
recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission  
in writing from the publishers.

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any  
third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this  
book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any  
inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but  
can accept no responsibility for any such changes.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN: HB: 978-1-3500-6258-0

PB: 978-1-3500-6259-7

ePDF: 978-1-3500-6260-3

eBook: 978-1-3500-6261-0

Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

To find out more about our authors and books visit [www.bloomsbury.com](http://www.bloomsbury.com)  
and sign up for our newsletters.

# THE COVER IMAGE

## General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau and the evolution of a Template for Destruction

It is unlikely that any reader will recognize the stern image of Spanish General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau (17 September 1838 – 20 October 1930) which appears on the cover of this book. Weyler served as a governor general in the Spanish Philippines and in Cuba. In an otherwise distinguished career, General Weyler's brutal suppression of the Cuban rebellion in the mid-1890s led to the Yellow Press bestowing the nickname 'Butcher Weyler' on him. Although the removal of rebellious populations in modern history had occurred before General Weyler (see Chapters 1 and 2), it was his policy of what he called *reconcentración* that established relocation as a formal military approach to counterinsurgency. We might call Weyler and his counterinsurgency campaign in Cuba as the point of origin of relocation as a formal strategy in counterinsurgency.

How did General Weyler's *reconcentración* work? In Chapter 3, Major Mark Askew explains its major components. But, to summarize, Weyler faced a mounting rebellion and did not have enough soldiers to defeat it. He built fortified lines of blockhouses and barbed wire called *trocha* across Cuba thereby cutting the island into sectors. Within these sectors Weyler then forcibly relocated the civilian population into temporary camps and then proceeded to hunt down the rebels (who were weakened by the loss of logistical and moral support from the people). General Weyler's *reconcentración* then became what I call a 'template for destruction' for the forcible relocation of people in the twentieth century. I used the phrase 'A Template for Destruction' as a chapter heading in my book *Ottomans and Armenians, A Study in Counterinsurgency* (2013) to describe the impact of Spanish, American, and British campaigns of relocation in counterinsurgency in Cuba, the Philippines, and South Africa. Sadly, the very words 'concentration camp', coined by the British in South Africa, mirrored Weyler's *reconcentración* and, as the reader will observe, an approach to counterinsurgency based on forcibly relocating people continued into the 1970s.

Edward J. Erickson  
Norwich, New York



# CONTENTS

*List of maps* ix

*List of contributors* x

Introduction *Dr Edward J. Erickson* 1

- 1 Exile without end: The Acadian expulsion  
*Major Christine Keating* 17
- 2 The Long Walk of the Navajo: Relocation in the  
American Southwest *Dr Jonathan F. Phillips* 39
- 3 War answered with war: The Spanish in Cuba  
*Major Mark Askew* 59
- 4 A howling wilderness: America in the Philippines  
*Dr Ethan H. Harding* 83
- 5 Methods of barbarism: The Boer War *Dr John Sheehan* 95
- 6 Uneven repression: The Ottoman state and its  
Armenians *Maxime Gauin* 115
- 7 From the Pale: The Russians and the Jews  
*LtCol Kevin D. Glathar* 141
- 8 They are our enemies: The Japanese-American  
internment *Dr Edward J. Erickson* 157
- 9 A collective measure: Population resettlement in  
the Malayan Emergency *LtCol Gregory J. Reck* 185
- 10 *Centres de Regroupement*: The French in Algeria  
*Dr James N. Tallon* 209

- 11 Counterinsurgency at the ‘rice roots’ level:  
South Vietnam’s Strategic Hamlet Campaign  
*Dr Nathan R. Packard* 225
- 12 Resettlement in the Portuguese Colonial Wars:  
Africa, 1961–75 *Dr Kalev I. Sepp* 255
- Conclusions: Relocation in counterinsurgency warfare  
*Dr Edward J. Erickson* 267
- Appendix: Relocation statistics* 277
- Index* 279

# MAPS

- Map 1 A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare 2
- Map 2 French Acadia 18
- Map 3 The Long Walk of the Navajo 40
- Map 4 The Cuban Insurrection 60
- Map 5 The Boer War 96
- Map 6 Ottoman-Armenian Relocations 116
- Map 7 The Pale 142
- Map 8 Japanese-American Internment 158
- Map 9 British Malaya 186
- Map 10 French Algeria 210

# CONTRIBUTORS

**Major Mark Askew** is a strategist with US Army Central Command. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Military History from the US Military Academy at West Point and a Master's Degree in History from Texas A&M. He has taught Military History and Military Theory at the US Military Academy at West Point and is currently ABD at Texas A&M. His research interests include the US Army, strategy, war and society, and military occupations.

**Dr Edward J. Erickson** is a Professor of International Relations at Antalya Bilim University in Antalya, Turkey. Dr Erickson is retired regular US Army officer and a retired professor of Military History from the Marine Corps University. He has a PhD in history from the University of Leeds and has published numerous books and articles about counterinsurgency in the early twentieth century.

**LtCol Kevin D. Glathar** is a retired regular US Marine Corps officer who deployed around the globe and participated in joint and coalition humanitarian relief and contingency operations in Albania, Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Croatia, Iraq, Japan and the Philippines. He is a graduate of the US Naval Academy, US Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, US Army Command & General Staff College and the Joint Forces Staff College. He has a Masters in Military Arts and Science and taught at the Marine Corps University. His research areas of interest are in religious history, cognitive warfare and counterinsurgency.

**Maxime Gauin** is a French historian, and he is a PhD candidate (ABD) from Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. He is well-published in academic journals, and his research focuses on contemporary aspects of the Armenian question and Franco-Turkish relations.

**Dr Ethan H. Harding**, lieutenant colonel (US Marine Corps, Retired), served as an armour officer and a Middle East and North Africa regional affairs officer. He served in Afghanistan and Iraq and also served as Deputy Director of Warfighting at the USMC's Command and Staff College. Dr Harding earned his doctoral degree from Kings College London in the UK. He has authored numerous articles and a book, *Identifying the Pillars of*

*Stability Operations: Using Social Science To Bridge A Gap In Operational Doctrine.* His research interests include military history, asymmetric warfare and international relations.

**Dr Lisa Johnson-DiMarco** is a biologist and illustrator. She has a Bachelor of Science degree from SUNY Cortland and a doctoral degree from New York Chiropractic College. Lisa is currently teaching earth science, physical science, life science and biology to middle and high schoolers. She has taught biology courses at SUNY Cortland and New York Chiropractic College. Lisa began using various digital media to create illustrations and animations for use in her classrooms which later transitioned her to creating illustrations for publication.

**Major Christine Keating** is a brigade executive officer in the US Army Military Police Corps. Major Keating served in Iraq and Afghanistan. She holds a Bachelor of Science degree in International and Strategic History from the US Military Academy at West Point and a Master's Degree in Brazilian History from Brown University. She lives in Olympia, Washington, with her husband Daniel and their four children.

**Dr Nathan R. Packard** is an Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia. Dr Packard received his PhD (2015) in History from Georgetown University. He also holds an MA (2014) in National Security and Strategic Studies from the US Naval War College. Dr Packard is a lieutenant colonel in the US Marine Corps Reserve and a veteran of *Operation Iraqi Freedom* having served as an adviser to an Iraqi infantry battalion in Al Anbar Province in 2007.

**Dr Jonathan F. Phillips** is Dean of Academics at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC) in Quantico, Virginia. Before joining the faculty at MCCSC, Dr Phillips held positions at the University of South Carolina, Texas A&M University and Old Dominion University. He earned his doctorate in history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His scholarly interests include US military, war and society, and civil-military relations.

**LtCol Gregory J. Reck** is the Special Operations Forces Chair, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. In this capacity, he is USSOCOM's representative to the USMC's Professional Military Education institution and is responsible for the integration of Special Operations theory and knowledge into the curriculum of the individual colleges. He has three master's degrees ranging from literature to defence analysis with a concentration in Terrorism and Terrorist Financing from the Naval Postgraduate School. He has publications pertaining to psychological operations and special operations.

**Dr John Sheehan** teaches history and cultural anthropology for SUNY Cortland and LeMoyne College. He has published several books and refereed articles since receiving his doctorate in 2000 from St. John's University in Queens, NY. His publications and presentations reflect his training in interdisciplinary and multicultural history.

**Dr Kalev I. Sepp** has taught history at the US Military Academy at West Point, NY, and the US Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, Calif. A former US Army Special Forces officer, after earning his PhD from Harvard University, he served as a Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense, and as a policy adviser in Iraq and Afghanistan. His research interests include irregular warfare, influence operations and strategy in undeclared wars

**Dr James N. Tallon** is Associate Professor at Lewis University in Romeoville, Illinois. He has a PhD in Near Eastern Languages and Civilization from the University of Chicago and has published several articles about the Middle East, the Balkans and the Islamic World in the twentieth century.

# Introduction

*Dr Edward J. Erickson*

*This is the forest primeval; but where are the hearts that beneath it  
Leaped like the roe, when he hears in the woodland the voice  
of the huntsman?*


*Where is the thatch-roofed village, the home of Acadian farmers—  
Men whose lives glided on like rivers that water the woodlands,  
Darkened by shadows of earth, but reflecting an image of heaven?  
Waste are those pleasant farms, and the farmers forever departed!  
Scattered like dust and leaves, when the mighty blasts of October  
Seize them, and whirl them aloft, and sprinkle them far o'er  
the ocean.*

HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, 1847

*Evangeline, A Tale of Acadie*

## Prologue

American poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's epic poem *Evangeline* begins with the dramatic opening phrase '*This is the forest primeval*' (emphasis mine) and the rest of first stanza frames a question 'What happened to the people who lived here?'. Some readers today might recognize Longfellow's epic poem for its contribution to American literature but few will note its roots in historical fact. In truth, the story of the Acadian expulsion or 'exile without end' was an early and pragmatic variant of a campaign of counterinsurgency by relocation. Even fewer readers will note that the Acadians, who were the French inhabitants of the colony, exiled to Louisiana would become known as 'Cajuns' (Map 1). This study begins with the case of the British exile of the Acadians as the proximate start of deliberate removal of populations as a military policy in modern war.



MAP 1 A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare. The global scope of relocation in counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla, counter-indigenous and counter-fifth column campaigns is evident on this map. Campaigns of relocation have occurred in four of six continents inhabited by humans.

After the British conquest of French Acadia (composed mostly of the modern Canadian province of readers Nova Scotia), the restive French inhabitants resisted British occupation. Together with local Indian tribes, the French Acadians periodically waged guerrilla war against the British and helped supply the French fortress at Louisbourg. In addition to irregular warfare, some Acadians formed military units and even bested the British in small conventional battles. As a military solution to what had turned into a persistent rebellion, the British chose a counterinsurgency strategy of what was then called ‘expulsion’ and, in 1755, began the first of a series of permanent relocations.

## The Sepp thesis

This book is an outcome of research that I conducted while working on *Ottomans and Armenians, A Study in Counterinsurgency* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) and, as that book evolved, I became aware that relocation as an operational approach in counterinsurgency had been a not uncommon form of counterinsurgency warfare. As late as 2016, when I presented this book proposal to the acquisition editors at Bloomsbury Academic, I believed I had an original topic that had not been academically theorized into a coherent thesis statement. Much to my surprise and after contracting this book with our publisher, one of my contributors (Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Harding, USMC) made me aware of the earlier work of a now well-known scholar. I would be remiss if I did not now identify him and acknowledge his groundbreaking thesis.

In 1992, US Army Major Kalev I. Sepp presented an MA thesis to the faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College. Major Sepp titled his thesis *Resettlement, Regroupment, Reconcentration: Deliberate Government Directed Population Relocation in Support of Counter-Insurgency Operations*.<sup>1</sup> The thesis was released for unlimited public distribution by the Defense Technical Intelligence Center (DTIC) on 1 June 1992. As a federal government DTIC publication, Major Sepp’s thesis is in the public domain and easily accessible online. Readers who are interested in the subject of relocation in counterinsurgency warfare are invited to read the thesis in full.

Major Kalev Sepp’s thesis is, to my knowledge, the first unified examination of the problem of relocation in counterinsurgency operations. His research question was straightforward and intellectually elegant: ‘Does government-directed population relocation help win counter-insurgencies?’ Major Sepp was the first scholar to study holistically the issue of relocation in counterinsurgency warfare, and he examined a number of case studies which appear in this book; these are the Second Anglo-Boer War, the Philippine Insurrection, the Malayan Emergency, the Kenyan Emergency, the

Algerian Insurrection, the Vietnam War and Portuguese Colonial Wars. He also included a number of smaller non-operational level relocation efforts, which include the Greek Civil War (1944–9) and the Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946–54). Retiring from the US Army as a colonel, Dr Sepp is now a senior lecturer in the Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and he is a recognized expert in the fields of strategy, counterinsurgency and intelligence. I am pleased to note that Dr Sepp is a contributor to this book.

The answer provided by Major Sepp in 1992 to his problem statement was: ‘Historical evidence strongly suggests that forced resettlements at the direction of a government threatened by insurgency, when carefully planned, adequately resourced, and efficiently administered have contributed to defeat of the insurgents by physically and morally isolating them from the population they required for support.’<sup>2</sup> As will be demonstrated in this book, Major Sepp was largely correct but sometimes this was a short-term operational and tactical gain achieved against a longer-term strategic dilemma. In many cases there were negative strategic effects which had to be dealt with by successor administrations and governments. *A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare* continues the inquiry that Major Sepp began in 1992. It has no single stand-alone thesis – rather our book is designed as a broad survey examining the military decision making which led to the major forcible relocations of a defined group of people thought to a threat to security in wartime.

## Relocation in modern counterinsurgency warfare<sup>3</sup>

Eight of the cases examined in this study are what we would today call campaigns of counterinsurgency, but our book’s title belies the inclusion of four additional cases involving what might be termed a counter-indigenous campaign (the Native Americans in the United States), a counter-guerrilla campaigns (the Second Anglo-Boer War), and two counter-fifth column campaigns (the Jews from the Pale in 1915 and the Japanese-Americans in 1942). In all twelve cases, though, a unifying theme emerges – people were forcibly relocated in wartime as an operational approach to the problem of an actively or potentially hostile population either in revolt or in league with the enemy. The distinctions between the twelve cases in this book, as well as the similarities, are an important part of the narrative and are explained more fully below. We hope that through comparison and contrast more nuanced understandings will emerge for the reader.

At the dawn of the twentieth century, counterinsurgency policies based on the deliberate removal and forced relocation of civilian populations by governments emerged as viable and acceptable practices in Western warfare.

Three wars, in particular, set important precedents for the Western world in the way in which militaries dealt with guerrillas and irregular insurgents. These wars involved Spain in Cuba (1895–8), the United States in the Philippines (1899–1902), and Britain in South Africa (1899–1902), and all three saw the evolution of similar strategic, operational and tactical practices by the Western powers. At the strategic level, the powers sought the destruction of insurgent and guerrilla forces in order to end insurgencies and, in the case of the Boers, end a conventional war that had entered a guerrilla warfare phase. Operationally, the powers employed campaign designs that focused on separating the guerrillas from their principal sources of support, which were the friendly civilian populations, thereby enabling the military defeat of the weakened irregular forces. At lower tactical levels, military commanders isolated the irregulars by establishing fortified lines that cut their operational areas into manageable sectors and then removed the civilian populations. Simultaneously, they swept the sectors clean of enemy forces by driving the insurgents and guerrillas to destruction against fixed barriers. To varying degrees these campaigns were successful.

Relocation as a strategy and operational approach in war would reappear in various forms over the next seventy years. In the First World War, the Ottomans relocated some 400,000 Armenians to camps in the Euphrates valley while the Russians relocated well over a million Jews from the Pale (their western provinces and Poland). In the 1950s, the British in Malaya relocated over a quarter million ethnic Chinese into New Villages under the auspices of the Briggs Plan. At about the same time during the Kenyan Emergency, the British relocated over a million Africans to detainee camps. The French relocated over three million Algerians in the late 1950s to *Regroupement Centres* under the infamous *Quadrillage* system. The South Vietnamese employed the same principle in Vietnam, in the 1960s, by relocating hundreds of thousands of villagers into what they called Strategic Hamlets. In the last cases of the twentieth century the Portuguese would use this approaching in attempting to hold on to three of their African colonies. The number of people relocated in these campaigns is truly staggering (see Appendix).

In a somewhat different context, in 1942, the United States removed Japanese-American citizens from California to internment camps in the Nevada deserts in order to deal with a perceived fifth column threat to national security. Like the experiences of Jews from the Pale, this was campaign of fear-based pre-emption rather than an actual armed threat. Nevertheless, whether the process was called exile, relocation, deportation, detention or internment – and whether the destinations defined as concentration camps, zones of protection, *Regroupement Centres*, relocation camps, internment centres, new villages, strategic hamlets or reservations<sup>4</sup> – the basic strategy of relocation employed to weaken or pre-empt a threat, either kinetically or non-kinetically, remained the same.

## Terminology, language and historical neutrality

*A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare* presents a chronological survey of the major forced relocations of people which were conducted as a deliberate operational approach to the problem of internal threats in modern wars and conflicts. The intent of the editor and the contributors is to tell the story, to the greatest extent possible, in an objective and historically neutral narrative. Our aim is not to justify decisions but to explain why these events unfolded as they did. However, to some readers, this study may appear to be sanitized or skewed by the use of euphemistic language. To others it may appear as an apologia for heavy-handed tactics against harmless civilian populations, and some may even categorize this book as a study in genocide denial. Our book may also be criticized by some readers for the selection of cases which are either included or not included. Importantly the twelve cases of relocation comprising this book were the direct result of war and conflict and, while there were certainly pre-existing prejudices in all cases, it was war that created the conditions and enabled the decisions leading to the forced relocation of people.

We believe that it is critical to understand the terminology used in this book as well as why certain words are used and why other words are not. Some readers may find the term 'relocation' to be far too mild for these events. In truth, inflammatory vocabulary and verbiage is often the enemy of balanced historical interpretation. In the context of this study 'relocation' is used to convey the deliberate and forcible mass movement of a population to somewhere within their own country (or in the case of the Acadians to another colony). This is different than deportation, which means being sent somewhere without the government's intent to return them to their homes (in the relocations of the Acadians and the Navajo, this was the case). Other similar terms include, but are not limited to, resettlement, transfers, evacuations, expulsion and displacement. Readers interested in this topic and its definitions may wish to read the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (commonly known as the Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949)<sup>5</sup> with the caution that this treaty pertains to occupying powers and not to internationally recognized states operating within their own territory. The term 'relocation' in this study is chosen for its neutrality and for its general applicability to all the cases presented in this book. The focus of the book is to explain why a defined group of people were moved deliberately and forcibly in wartime rather than to examine their grievances or whether or not they were an actual threat.

Readers must also keep in mind that, in most cases, the ruling power was not an 'occupying power' in the modern sense. For example, Cuba in 1895 was a Spanish colony, Malaya in 1951 was a British colony, Algeria in 1955 was an actual province of the French Republic, and the government of the Republic of Vietnam was an internationally recognized legitimate government. In such circumstances the affected people were considered

legal inhabitants or citizens of the lands in which they lived (although we recognize that the people themselves may not have considered themselves as such). However, it may be argued, persuasively I believe, that in the cases of the Acadians, the Native American Navajo, and the Boers, the affected people may be accurately considered as the population of an occupied area.

Likewise, we recognize that the term ‘counterinsurgency’ itself is a modern term which was not in general use until the mid-1950s. Certainly no person in the time of the French and Indian Wars, or even as late as the First World War, or any historian of these events before the case of the Malayan Emergency would use this term. With that said, this study uses the overarching term ‘counterinsurgency’ as a unifying approach to describe the reactions of a state to forms of unrest that include insurgency, rebellion, irregular warfare, Fifth Column activities, and coordination by revolutionary groups with the enemy. There are also many definitions for the term ‘insurgency’, but the purposes of this book, insurgency is defined as an organized movement aimed at the weakening or overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.<sup>6</sup> However, in many of the cases in this book, the insurgent objective was as varied as self-determination, autonomy or independence.

A word associated with some of these cases is the term ‘genocide’ which is, by United Nations convention, defined as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.<sup>7</sup> The convention, signed in 1948, was an outcome of collective global revulsion and anger over the Holocaust. It is important to keep in mind that the UN treaty was specifically written to implicate and punish individual perpetrators rather than to assign responsibility to nation states or to specific governments. Some of the cases in this study, to a greater or lesser extent, have genocidal outcomes which are repugnant to twenty-first-century readers. However, none of the cases examined in this study began with a plan designed to exterminate a group (either in whole or in part), although this outcome occurs in several of the cases.

We must also define certain military terminology used in this study. ‘Strategy’ is an overarching term, and according to Professor Lawrence Freedman, an established specialist on security studies and strategic thought, ‘There is no agreed-upon definition of *strategy* that describes the field and limits its boundaries.’<sup>8</sup> Freedman continues with his own definition which we shall use in this study, ‘One common contemporary definition describes it as being about *maintaining* a balance between ends, ways, and means; about *identifying* objectives; and about *resources and methods available* for meeting such objectives.’<sup>9</sup> The term itself may be used at any level and in any field; for example, there are strategies for investments, strategies for winning the Super Bowl, and strategies for passing the motor vehicle driving test. In the context of this book, we will limit the term to the strategic level (or national level) of war. For example, the failure of negotiations between Britain and the Boer Republics resulted in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).

In the initial phase of the war, British strategy balanced the objective of forcing mining concessions by forcing the Boers to surrender (the ends) using a conventional offensive military campaign (the ways) employing about 27,500 men under the command of second rate commanders (the means).<sup>10</sup> This strategy failed because of insufficient resources necessary to subdue the Boers, who were far more effective than the British thought them to be. In the second phase, the British brought down another 180,000 men and their best commanders, handily defeating the Boer regular army and occupying the Boer Republics. However, the Boers did not surrender and reverted to a guerrilla warfare strategy. In turn, the British strategy for the war's third phase further revised the means by increasing its forces to over 200,000 men and adjusting the ways to a draconian counter-guerrilla campaign. There are, therefore, three distinct strategies for the British direction of the Second Anglo-Boer War.

Another term which is applicable to this study is 'campaign' as well as the 'operational level of war'. A campaign is a series of battles or engagements designed to achieve a strategic purpose or objective. The operational level of war (like the word strategy) is poorly defined, but in this study, we define it as the level of war at which major forces are employed in campaigns. The operational commander is almost always a theatre or field army commander and his mission is to arrange the sequence of actions which will produce the military conditions necessary to achieve the strategic goals.<sup>11</sup> This study addresses operational decisions which result in military campaign plans designed to forcibly relocate entire populations in order to change the ends, ways, and means equation.

## The cases in this study

*A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare* presents a chronological survey of the major forcible relocations of people which were conducted as a deliberate operational approach in modern conflicts of counterinsurgency. It is a military history rather than a cultural, social or humanitarian history, and, as such, the study will not render judgements on the morality or ethics of decisions or actions; nor will we render judgements on humanitarian concerns. Each chapter is a campaign analysis and is written to inform the reader of the military decisions, the military plans and their execution, and the military outcome. Each contributing author will address the question, 'From a military point of view, was the campaign successful or unsuccessful?' In effect, each chapter seeks to analyze the operational and tactical effects of the campaign (i.e. did it do what the commanders thought it would do?) and assess the strategic effect (i.e. did the campaign achieve or contribute to its intended strategic outcome?). Because the scope of the study is narrowly defined (as well as because of the word count limitations)

the human and social consequences of the campaigns, and our memory of these events today, will be presented only in very brief form.

In our opening chapter, 'Exile without End, The Acadian Expulsion', Major Christine Keating informs us of the first use of forcible relocation as a counterinsurgency approach in modern warfare. By 1713, the British had occupied most of the French colony known as Acadia (modern Nova Scotia and the Maritime provinces of Canada). Over the next forty years the French inhabitants waged a quasi-guerrilla war against the occupation. Frustrated at their inability to deal with the Acadians with military means, the British decided to exile the French population. This secured the colony and access to the fortress of Louisburg. Starting in 1755, over 7,000 French Acadians were sent into Permanent Exile.

Dr Jonathan Phillips's chapter 'The Long Walk of the Navajo, Relocation in the American Southwest' moves us forward to 1846–68 for the US Army's removal of the Native American Navajo and Apache nations to the Bosque Redondo reservation, in the famously mischaracterized 'Long Walk of the Navajo'. More accurately the 'Long Walk' was a 'forced march' resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Native Americans. Dr Phillips's chapter pays particular attention to the evolution of a vocabulary and its effects on the development of policy. In addition to ending a Native American uprising, the United States also saw the Navajo relocation as a way of civilizing and Christianizing the tribes through a legal framework of treaties. This chapter highlights the importance of an evolving meme-like vocabulary in identifying the population in question as hostile. While there were other instances of the US government relocating Native Americans, Dr Phillips has selected this case as representative of the whole.

In 'War Answered with War, The Spanish in Cuba', Major Mark Askew presents the first professionally planned campaign of forcible relocation in Spanish-controlled Cuba. Faced with a mounting insurgency in Cuba that the Spanish were unable to suppress, General Valeriano Wyler implemented what he called *la Reconcentración*. Wyler deliberately sought to separate the population from the rebel guerrillas. Over 500,000 Cubans were forcibly removed from their homes into camps while the weakened guerrillas were destroyed. In the process perhaps over 150,000 Cubans died in captivity. Wyler is notable for establishing something of a template for dealing with insurgencies and guerrillas through the tactics of forcible relocation.

Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Harding's chapter 'A Howling Wilderness, America in the Philippines' complements Major Askew's work in nearly contemporaneous terms. Unable to quell a gathering rebellion on the islands of Luzon and Samar, and hit hard by the massacre of American soldiers at Balangiga, American commanders launched a population removal campaign. Over 600,000 Filipinos were removed from their homes to Zones of Concentration after which the American commanders conducted search and destroy tactics to eliminate the guerrillas. Thousands of civilians died in the process while the rebellion on Samar and Luzon was crushed.

Dr John Sheehan's chapter 'Methods of Barbarism, The Boer War' presents insights into the historical and cultural background of the most well-known population removal of the age when British commanders removed the entire Boer civilian population from their homes into concentration camps. Dr Sheehan details why and how Generals Roberts and Kitchener designed an approach which separated the people from the guerrillas. After doing this they divided the Boer Republics into sectors with blockhouses and barbed wire and they hunted the Boer commandos to surrender. About 115,000 Boer civilians were forcibly relocated and many thousands died in camps from diseases caused by overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and malnutrition.

In 'Uneven Repression, The Ottoman State and Its Armenians', Maxime Gauin addresses the forcible relocation of Ottoman-Armenians in 1915. In May 1915, the Ottoman government reacted to an emerging Armenian rebellion in its six eastern Anatolian provinces by removing some 400,000 Ottoman-Armenian citizens in order to separate what was thought to be a supporting popular base from Armenian revolutionaries. In the process of doing this thousands of Ottoman-Armenians were killed or died en route in what has come to be known as the Armenian Genocide. Thousands more died in the camps while the nascent rebellion was crushed. Dr Gauin demonstrates that the relocations were a military campaign against small, but determined, groups of rebels who were encouraged and supported by the Allied powers.

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Glather's chapter 'From the Pale, The Russians and the Jews' reveals the little-known relocations of Russian Jews during the First World War. When Russia went to war with Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1914, there were over a million Russian citizens, who were Jewish, in the area known as the Pale (today eastern Poland and Belarus). The Czarist government and its military commanders believed that many Russian Jews were sympathetic to the enemy and were, therefore, a direct threat to the war effort. Over the course of the first year of the war the Russian government removed them east into the interior in order to eliminate the possibility that they might assist and support the advancing German army. Many were treated very brutally and the relocations resembled lethal pogroms in some locations. Making this case singularly unique, rather than being detained in camps, the relocated Russian Jews were distributed in towns and cities well behind the war zone.

In 'They Are Our Enemies, The Japanese-American Internment', Dr Ed Erickson examines the military rationale for the well-known removal of over 100,000 Japanese-Americans to Internment Camps in 1942. Regarded as a potential fifth column after Pearl Harbor the US government presumed the Japanese-Americans were a threat to the war effort and, as such, their removal was deemed necessary in the purported interests of national security. The evidence justifying removal at the time was specious and nothing has surfaced since to change that fact. Indeed, the intelligence was deliberately packaged in such a way as to condemn the entire West Coast Japanese-

American population as a dangerous enemy fifth column. Unquestionably racism fed the relocation decision but that should not obscure the fact that, in a military sense, the removal was a carefully planned theatre-level counter fifth column campaign.

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Reck introduces us to the post-war world of decolonization with the British experience in ‘A Collective Measure, Population Resettlement in the Malayan Emergency’. Faced with a failing counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya, the British turned to General Gerald Templer to implement the Briggs Plan, which was based on the removal and relocation of 225,000 ethnic Chinese from their homes to New Villages. Colonel Reck demonstrates that the resettlement program under the Briggs Plan facilitated the successful conclusion of the counterinsurgency efforts by means of isolating the insurgents from the population, legitimizing the government, and creating a more inclusive Malaya.

Dr James Tallon’s chapter ‘*Centres de Regroupement*, The French in Algeria’ introduces us to the largest relocation of peoples in this study. In one of the bitterest and most violent counterinsurgency campaigns of the twentieth century, the French instituted a strategy called *Quadrillage*, which quartered insurgent areas of Algeria into manageable sectors. Integral to this was the forcible relocation of over 3,000,000 Algerians into camps called Regroupement Centres where they could not assist or support the insurgents. Arguably, in combination with harsh tactics the insurgency was largely contained by 1958.

Dr Nathan Packard’s detailed examination of ‘Counterinsurgency at the “Rice Roots” Level, South Vietnam’s Strategic Hamlet Campaign’ extends many of Britain’s counterinsurgency approaches into a different context. The program was not a stand-alone relocation campaign per se, and it had a number of objectives including separating guerrillas from the people, establishing security and safety for rural villagers, and increasing opportunity for participating in government to be achieved by relocating them involuntarily to secure villages. By design the program isolated and weakened the Viet Cong, who were in many areas reliant on the local villages for support but, at the same time, its heavy-handed implementation alienated much of the rural population. Some 400,000 Vietnamese were relocated forcibly over the life of the program (1961–3), but in the end, the program proved counterproductive to building support for the government.

In ‘Resettlement in the Portuguese Colonial Wars, Africa, 1961–75’, Dr Kalev Sepp concludes this study with the final cases of mass relocation used as a counterinsurgency approach in three Portuguese African colonies. This exposition of the little-known Portuguese experiences in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea focuses us on the lack of connectivity between the act of relocation and achieving a durable strategic purpose. Moreover, according to Dr Sepp, the most important outcome of the Portuguese relocations was the ‘generation of time’ which allowed Lisbon enough time to find a political solution.

## The cases not in this study

Some readers may question why certain cases have been excluded from this study. In particular, the infamous Imperial German campaigns against the Herero and Namaqua in German South West Africa may strike readers as worthy of inclusion. While these were bloody in the extreme, resulting in what many term as genocide, the Germans relocated the surviving tribesmen and their families to concentration camps *after* the rebellion was crushed.<sup>12</sup> These peoples were not moved in a way designed to change the operational equations in a counterinsurgency campaign. Similarly, the infamous American relocation of the Cherokees known as the ‘Trail of Tears’, conducted by the Jackson administration in the 1830s, was not the result of war or military activity. There is also the singularly unique case of the Holocaust and the deportation of 6,000,000 European Jews to extermination camps. In this case the Nazi state did not relocate Europe’s Jews for military reasons nor were they moved because they were considered to be a wartime threat. The fact that Germany was at war had nothing to do with the decisions to relocate and exterminate people. The Nazis did what they did for political reasons based on an ideological position of racial superiority but not for reasons of operational imperatives.

The largest and thematically most important campaign of forcible relocation that is excluded from this study is the case of the Kenyan Emergency (1952–63) which is also called the Mau Mau Rebellion. Our book’s word limits have forced the editor to exclude the Kenyan Emergency – not because it is unimportant – but because the relocations mirrored the British experience in Malaya. While the context, people, terrain, and politics of Kenya were different than Malaya, the Briggs-Templer New Villages/‘hearts and minds’ approach to the Malayan Emergency were mirrored by General Sir George Erskine’s (the British commander in chief of East Africa) campaign in Kenya. To a certain extent, if the reader understands relocation in the Malayan Emergency, he or she will understand relocation in the subsequent Kenyan Emergency.

The rebellion began in 1952 mostly among the Kikuyu tribe, who had been economically disenfranchised through losing their small plots of land to large plantations owned by white Europeans.<sup>13</sup> In late 1953, General Erskine, with the concurrence of the governor of Kenya, forcibly relocated Kikuyu tribal members out of the Aberdares highlands into brand new settlements, using techniques of the Malayan ‘Briggs Plan’. This process became known as ‘Villagization’, and after a difficult start, it yielded positive results. Erskine’s new villages were built according to a common plan under close government supervision. The displaced natives had to construct their new homes with locally available materials and prepare village defences, which was an acceptable approach in the resettlement areas chosen by the government. They also provided their own security by joining the Tribal

Police and Kikuyu Home Guard volunteers. Eventually, the incorporation of schools, clinics, churches and government welfare projects into the villages helped speed the program along. When Villagization was considered complete in late 1954, about 1,000,000 Kikuyu (some 80 per cent of the entire tribe) had been resettled. In the end British suppressed the Mau Mau uprisings and restored economic normalcy and the rule of law. In most ways the British secured a similar end state in Kenya as they had secured in Malaya.

There are also the cases of the Greek Civil War and the Hukbalahap Rebellion, but those operations were essentially conducted at tactical-level involving smaller numbers of people and smaller percentages of the population.<sup>14</sup> In the case of the recent Sri Lankan Civil War, the absence of a mature literature makes the reasons for the relocation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) unclear today.<sup>15</sup> In separating which cases ‘made the cut’ the editor weighed the scope of the relocations relative to the extant population, the variances in the particular approaches, as well as the consideration of the operational versus the tactical levels of war. In arriving at the number of cases presented in this study, we have achieved a broad, but thorough, survey of the problem of forcible relocation used as an approach in counterinsurgency warfare (as well as examining the closely related categories of counter-indigenous irregular, counter-guerrilla, and counter-fifth column warfare).

## Conclusion

Historically and militarily speaking, campaigns of forcible relocation have been designed to weaken the strength of insurgent, indigenous, guerrilla and ethnic populations thought to pose a danger or a threat to the power controlling the territory. In almost every case the levels of brutality, both intentional and unintentional, led to large numbers of civilian casualties from the relocated population. The world has not seen a counterinsurgency campaign based on forcible relocation since the 1970s, and the reader might reasonably ask why. We might speculate that the operational and tactical ‘return on investment’ today makes such an approach uneconomical or unpopular politically. We certainly have better understandings today of potentially unfavourable strategic consequences. We might also speculate that our contemporary world is something of ‘a kinder and gentler place’ (in part a result of post-1945 international accords) or that an absence of total war (as seen in the First and Second World Wars) makes a relocation-based approach less useful in guarding humanitarian concerns. We might also speculate that the post-colonial world has removed many of the imperatives leading to campaigns of counterinsurgency. And, finally, we might note that the character of insurgency itself has evolved into a newer form in the

twenty-first century. While all or some of these might make decision making leading to a counterinsurgency approach based on forcible relocation more difficult – none of these situations automatically preclude a relocation-based approach. In the end, all we can state with surety is that the continuing absence of population removal as an acceptable or useful method of warfare in the future is not a certainty.

## Notes

- 1 Kalev I. Sepp, *Resettlement, Regroupment, Reconcentration: Deliberate Government Directed Population Relocation in Support of Counter-Insurgency Operations*, MA Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1992. In this book the editor uses the proper French spelling ‘Regroupement’ however the Sepp thesis is cited correctly.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 114–15.
- 3 The use of the term ‘modern warfare’ is malleable and is defined here as the period after the rise of nation states (or about 1648).
- 4 For recent work on the subject of concentration camps by journalist Andrea Pitzer, see Andrea Pitzer, *One Long Night: A Global History of Concentration Camps* (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2017).
- 5 See the International Committee of the Red Cross website (Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries), Article 49. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, Available online: <https://ihl.databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C&action=openDocument> (accessed 24 January 2018).
- 6 U.S. Army, *FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 5 December 1990), Glossary-4. This particular publication defines insurgency as ‘an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict’. However, in many of the cases in this book, the insurgent objective was as varied as self-determination, autonomy or independence.
- 7 Office of the High Commissioner (UNHCR), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, Available online: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf> (accessed 24 January 2018).
- 8 Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xi; emphasis in original.
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 Field Marshal Lord Michael Carver, *The National Army Museum Book of the Boer War* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1999), 10–11.
- 11 David Jablonsky, ‘Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I’, *Parameters*, Spring 1987: 65–76.
- 12 Pitzer, *One Long Night*, 78–81.

- 13 The following paragraphs have been extracted from Sepp, *Resettlement, Regroupment, Reconciliation: Deliberate Government Directed Population Relocation in Support of Counter-Insurgency Operations*, 58–60.
- 14 See Sepp, *Resettlement, Regroupment, Reconciliation: Deliberate Government Directed Population Relocation in Support of Counter-Insurgency Operations*, 33–41 and 42–7 for an excellent short summary of these campaigns.
- 15 Estimates regarding the total number of IDPs range from 350,000 to 800,000.



# 1

## Exile without end: The Acadian expulsion *Major Christine Keating*

*But Contrary to their expectation the Gate was shut and they  
confined as Prisoners.<sup>1</sup>*

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN WINSLOW

Grand Pré, 16 September 1755

### Introduction

The small church in the village of Grand Pré sat nestled at the heart of the community. For its Catholic, French Acadian congregants, the church represented the heart and soul of their efforts to make their land productive, to live peacefully with their Mi'kmaq neighbours and to remain free of earthly obligation to foreign rule. But on 5 September 1755, the church would become something else entirely: that symbol of salvation would become the prison in which 418 Acadian men and boys were held captive by British colonial troops. Lured there by the orders of Colonel John Winslow for a proclamation, it was there that the Acadian men would discover that they and their families were to be ripped from their land and deported, dispersed throughout the more southern British colonies in North America. Taking only what they could carry, their homes would be burned, their cattle commandeered, their farms settled by white families from New England.