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The Druze Community and the Lebanese State

Between Confrontation and Reconciliation

Yusri Hazran

The Druze Community and the Lebanese State

One of the fundamental questions of Middle Eastern studies, and Lebanese studies in particular, is the history of the relationship between the Druze community and the state in modern Lebanon. Arguing that the Druze community has been politically alienated from the Lebanese state, this book explores the historical and political origins of this alienation.

The Druze Community and the Lebanese State contends that the origins of this alienation lie in the state's national ideology, its political confessional system, and the Druze's historical background during the medieval period. Moreover, this book examines the extent to which the Druze's attitude vis-à-vis the Lebanese state has been influenced by their historical rivalry with the Maronites. Particular emphasis is placed on the political and ideological practices adopted by the Druze leadership and intelligentsia as they dealt with the changes taking place in their community's political status following the political settlements of 1920 and 1943 (the establishment of Greater Lebanon and the National Pact, respectively).

A welcome addition to existing literature on Lebanon, this book will be an essential reference tool for students and researchers with an interest in nationalism, identity and Middle East politics more broadly.

Yusri Hazran is an Associate Fellow at the Truman Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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To my best friend, my daughter Duha.

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Having shed the shackles of religion, I then began studying at the Department of Islam and Middle East at the Hebrew University. Memories of Lebanon remaining imprinted on my mind, however, these—and the conversations I had with Lebanese Druze on the Druze contribution to Lebanon's history, the division of the community between the Junblati and Yazbaki factions and its conflict with the Maronites—led me to write my MA thesis on the social and political thought of Kamal Junblat, the most revered Druze leader of all time. My PhD continued this direction, dealing with the complex historical experience of the Druze in modern Lebanon. The more I have written on Lebanon, the more my curiosity about the country has grown.

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Note on Transliteration

The English transliteration of the Arabic in the text generally follows the IJMES, the diacritical marks being added in the footnotes. People and place names with accepted English spellings follow the English usage.

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Introduction

Lebanon has been historically and remains a relatively minor player in shaping the political history of the Middle East. At the same time, however, in the nineteenth century, Lebanon did serve as an intellectual center in which various streams of thought and novel conceptual movements arose, heralding in their rise the emergence of new transformative and revolutionary trends in the region. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Lebanon has also seen the burgeoning of three processes—Syrianism, Arabism, and Phoenicianism. The latter has been responsible for the firm ideological foundation of the Lebanese National Movement. The influence exerted by these three processes—particularly in the first decade of the twentieth century—was not confined to Lebanon but was decisive in fashioning the modern Middle East more generally.[1]

The large body of literature devoted to Lebanon has also been disproportionate to its regional status. This phenomenon can be attributed to three factors: a) Lebanon's ethnic and cultural uniqueness, which has consistently constituted a focus of scholarly interest; b) the political ferment Lebanon has experienced since its independence, especially its two civil wars; c) the rich and well-developed tradition of creativity and literature, particularly since the second half of the nineteenth century. Lebanon's political history has been discussed from seemingly every possible angle: the history of the princeship during the Middle Ages; the bloodbaths in Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century; the political and conceptual development of Lebanese nationalism; Lebanese political culture; the confessional regime; the two civil wars of 1958 and 1975; and so on. Lebanon's sectarian character has also been extensively studied. Numerous works have been published on the principal religious communities, including the Maronite Christians and their role in the development of Lebanese nationalism, the changing relations between the Sunnis and the Lebanese state, and the process of politicization undergone by the Shiite community since the end of the 1960s. To date, however, no comprehensive or thorough attempt has been made to analyze the part played by the Druze community in modern Lebanese politics. It is the purpose of this volume to fill this gap.

Modern Lebanon: A General Survey

Modern Lebanon was created in 1920 by the merging of four districts (Tripoli, Sidon, Beirut, and the Biqa') into the Ottoman Sanjak of Mount Lebanon. Contrary to the view that the French inaugurated this step out of clearly colonial motives, Zamir's comprehensive study demonstrates that the process was initiated by the efforts of the political and religious Maronite leadership, which exerted considerable pressure to

ensure its success, at a time when French politicians were unsure whether the new entity was deserving of existence.[2] Nevertheless, the creation of Lebanon and broadening its boundaries could not come about without France's direct support and involvement. Although Lebanon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (the Mutasarrifiya period of 1861–1914) had a clear Christian majority, the enlargement of its territory in 1920 by the annexation of regions principally populated by Muslims upset its demographic balance. As a result, the newly heterogeneous populace challenged the Christian Maronite ethos which had traditionally prevailed in Lebanon.[3]

In 1926, Charles Dabbas became the first president of the Republic of Lebanon. The choice of a figure from the Orthodox community was made in order to address the sensitivities of the Muslims and Druze, both of whom were apprehensive of a Maronite hegemony being established in the new state.[4] However, this step was insufficient to diffuse the tension between the national Maronite movement and those representing the Arab nationalist cause in Lebanon. Following the signing of the Lebanese-Syrian treaties in the 1930s, the Muslim populace became increasingly willing to recognize the Lebanese state, relinquishing irredentist tendencies regarding the hinterland.[5]

The way towards a Christian-Muslim compromise—which subsequently came to be known as the "National Pact"—was paved by France's defeat in the Second World War and the fall of Emile Edde's camp in 1943. The National Pact, considered the cornerstone of Lebanese political life and the most significant political agreement in the history of modern Lebanon, was intended to define the two principal dimensions of Lebanese society—the national and the constitutional—and represented the first real attempt to create a common denominator between Christians and Muslims. In Zamir's words, it was hoped that the pact would bridge the gap between the two dichotomous aspects of Lebanese national identity—Lebanese-Christian and Arab-Muslim.

The compromise reached took the form of the Sunni political establishment's recognition of the legitimacy of an independent Lebanese state's existence within the framework of Christian hegemony in exchange for Maronite Christian recognition (at least in part) of the state's Arab character. It was likewise agreed that the political power in the independent state would be distributed according to the proportional confessional community representative system (the confessional system). This allocated political power to the various confessional communities on the basis of the size of their power base. The Christian communities were promised a majority in parliament at a ratio of six Christians to five Muslims, which was meticulously observed in the various electoral laws promulgated from 1943 to 1972.

The top three executive posts in the governmental hierarchy were also divided between the three principal communities. The presidency (with its extensive powers) was preserved in the hands of the Maronites, the premiership was allocated to the Sunni community, and the parliamentary speakership promised to the Shiites. It was further determined that the government would include members of the six largest confessional communities in the state and that the deputies to the parliamentary chairman and prime minister would come from the Orthodox Christian community.[6]

The Taif agreement signed in 1989, which brought the civil war to an end, did not annul the confessional system but merely revised its form. The parliamentary mandates were distributed equally between the Muslim and Christian communities, the traditional allocation of the top three executive offices was retained and the prime minister's authority expanded, at the expense of that historically held by the president.[7] The Taif agreement also signaled the beginning of the rehabilitation of Lebanese political institutions.

Syria played a decisive role in this process, which was the principal element leading to the cessation of the civil war. The massive presence of the Syrian army on Lebanese soil, the bilateral treaties signed, and the international Arab consensus combined to guarantee Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, enabling Damascus to serve as the country's true political center, enjoying virtually full control over the different branches of the Lebanese establishment.

Three primary elements have distinguished the Lebanese state from other political entities: its multi-communalism, its cultural plurality, and its peculiar political system. Lebanese society is the most pluralistic in the Middle East in terms of the number of confessional communities it contains—today, eighteen different religious groupings are recognized by the government as separate confessional communities. In a certain sense, Lebanon thus constitutes a microcosm of the ethnic and religious heterogeneity characteristic of the region as a whole.[8] Lebanon has also served as a meeting place of Islamic and Western cultures for centuries. The interaction between these two civilizations created a dual cultural model exemplified in the saying that while Lebanon wears an Arab face it retains its own unique identity.[9] This cultural duality is expressed in virtually every sphere: a Western, rather traditional, way of life; bilingualism; a tendency towards dichotomous thinking; and so on. The confessional political system without doubt constitutes one of the most prominent hallmarks of the Lebanese state.[10] Apart from the post-Ba'ath Iraq no corresponding political system exists either in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world, particularly with respect to its structure.

But the Lebanese state has also been characterized by its bloodstained history. Within the space of three decades, from independence in 1943 to 1975, Lebanon suffered two civil wars, the first in 1958 and the second erupting in 1975 and lasting for around fifteen years. The latter was of a particularly cruel nature, shaking Lebanon's foundations and threatening its territorial integrity. The violence also undermined the internal Lebanese political consensus and brought about the collapse of the state's political and military institutions. The second Lebanese civil war and its events and causes have been the subject of a large body of literature. Two primary schools of thought exist regarding the origins of the war. One group claims that the causal factors lie buried in the political and social structures prevalent in Lebanon, the intervention of foreign powers merely aggravating intercommunal conflicts nourished by internal factors.[11] The second displays a far greater measure of optimism regarding the vitality of the Lebanese state. Against those who stress the centrality of the establishment's internal dispositions, scholars, writers, and above all Christian politicians of this persuasion maintain that the Lebanese communities had succeeded in constructing a model of coexistence and harmony over a period of centuries and that it was the intervention of foreign elements in internal Lebanese affairs that was at the root of all Lebanon's problems.[12] In either case, the outbreak of two civil wars within three decades is witness to the fact that the political regime of the country was immersed in a profound crisis.

Origins of the Confessional System in Lebanon

Since much has been said and written concerning the Lebanese confessional system, it will suffice here to remark on three points relating to its character, historical origins, and social foundations. Despite the fact that the regime has no parallel, many social scientists maintain that the Lebanese political regime exemplifies "consociational democracy."[13] This concept denotes a democratic state which recognizes the sectarian,

social, ethnic, and cultural divides extant within it and develops a mechanism whereby the elites of the various groups can cooperate.[14] Even following the outbreak of the war and the collapse of Lebanon's political and military institutions, numerous studies have been published which continue to employ the consociational model as the framework for examining Lebanese politics.[15]

Lebanon with its current boundaries was created in 1920 by the French imperialism as a realization of the political aspirations of the Lebanese national movement: seeking hegemony and power for the Maronite community and constructing Lebanon as a homeland of Christians in the East. The political system elaborated between the years 1861–1943 was organically related to these ambitions, but also to secure a realm of relative representation of the non-Christian communities in the power structure. From the Maronite-Druze conflagration of 1841–60 to independence in 1943, Lebanon witnessed three different but connected political systems: the Mutasarrifiya of 1861, the Lebanese constitution of 1926 and the 1943 National Pact. As a matter of fact, the entire system of power sharing (which prevailed up to the Taif accord in 1989) was shaped out of these three institutions, whose common denominator was the principle of confessionalism, which in the Lebanese context meant to institutionalize religious ascription as the foundation of participation in public life.

During the pre-colonial era, the political developments and institutions within Lebanon were shaped mainly by two forces: political feudalism and the emergence of the Maronite church. These forces combined in the institution of the Administrative Council, within which political power was allocated commensurate with the numerical size of each religious group. In this context, it is important to mention the Mutasarrifiya system, which created two significant precedents by enabling formal political expression to be given for the first time to the confessional pluralism which existed in Mount Lebanon at the time and introducing the principle of proportional representation, a system which made its most notable mark on the composition of the Administrative Council.[16] This system, called the confessional system, manifested the social stratification of the new local elite. In this sense, confessionalism is a product of modernism, "a culture of the elites, who fought to keep their privileges in act and to maintain a hierarchical social order."[17]

From a social perspective, the Lebanese political system has since its establishment been based on the power held by the heads of the prominent families, known as "Aqtab." New members who had achieved status by means of their wealth or office in the Ottoman or French administrative systems or by virtue of their religious prominence were also included.[18] With the creation of the Greater Lebanon in 1920, the social structure of the confessional power-sharing system was reinforced by an urban absentee landowning class and a professional-commercial bourgeoisie, composed mainly of Sunnis and Christians. In the absence of a unifying secular institution or political tradition, these new forces were gradually integrated into the political system through the 1926 constitution and the National Pact. This elitist structure was reliably reflected in the membership of the parliament and government. A 1972 study demonstrated that, although the number of parliamentarians who came from an aristocratic background had consistently declined since the end of the French mandate, from 1922 to 1972 a group of only 271 families had produced all the individuals who had served in parliament.[19] In terms of social and professional background, the vast majority of parliament members from 1943 to 1972 were of feudal, upper middle class, and middle class origins, and in terms of occupation fell largely into four categories: landlords, lawyers, businessmen, and those of free professions.[20] In his foundational study of 1968, Michael Hudson described the

Lebanese political system as a balance between four components: confessional communities, families, regions, and offices.[21] Resumption of political life following the end of the second civil war in 1989 did not produce a significant change in the make-up of the political elite and most deputies elected in 1992, 1996, and 2000 have belonged to these same social strata.[22]

Michel Cheha, often described as the architect of the 1926 constitution, enunciated the major ideological tenets upon which the independent Lebanese state was founded.[23] Lebanon's religious diversity and pluralism must be acknowledged and institutionalized if Lebanon sought statehood and harmonious coexistence; this was to be achieved through a parliamentary representative institution based on the principle of confessionalism. Further, Cheha, a banker and journalist who belonged to the Beirut business class, advocated a free economic system for the Lebanese state and minimum interference in common life.[24] Indeed, Cheha's political and economic ideas cannot be divorced from the social environment in which he evolved. According to Cheha, the Lebanese state apparatuses should avoid seeking national and social integration and need not provide appropriate representation to the Lebanese masses. The National Pact and the 1926 constitution were constructed as instruments to put into action the goals and objectives formulated by Cheha.[25] Both article 95 of the constitution and the National Pact allocated confessional groups proportional representation and hierarchical supremacy in the state's institutions depending on the sects' numerical strength in the population.

Although the Lebanese political system was subjected to several modifications, most importantly following the Taif accord, the principle of confessionalism was preserved. The Lebanese electoral system has also been used to control the masses and to prevent the development of a force able to challenge the elite. The proportionality of representation for different communities and geographic regions has produced an inner contradiction in the electoral system, since standing for parliament is confessional while the right to vote is not. Moreover, votes are cast for individual candidates, not for parties, which has frustrated the development of a modern party system in Lebanon.[26] Even authors theorizing the confessional system have acknowledged that ideology has been relegated to a secondary position in Lebanon's electoral competitions.[27] The confessional system has also contributed to limiting participation in the political process to a small circle of elite families and politicians. The founding fathers of the Lebanese Republic viewed confessionalism as an adequate means of political representation, serving both as a governing arrangement and as part of the process of nation-building, while also anticipating that it would be capable of peaceful evolution. Instead of allowing its development in this regard, however, the ruling elite that dominated Lebanon since 1943 converted it into a tool for political control and exclusion. Further, sectarianism was extended to all fields including educational, social, and philanthropic institutions which were organized along sectarian lines. In fact, what Makdisi calls "the culture of sectarianism" has prevailed over public life in Lebanon.

Although external factors were crucial in accelerating the eruption of the long-running civil war (1975–89), the sources of the war can be found in the segregation of political institutions, the intersection between economic interests and family and sectarian lines, and the reigning elites' politics of exclusion. Evidence of this can be found in the political behavior adopted by the leading forces of the Druze community vis-à-vis the Lebanese state during the period preceding the second civil war. Although they found a way to participate in this political game through "political consociationalism," it should not be assumed that they recognized the legitimacy of the existing system.

Alienation at Home: Theorizing the Political History of Lebanon

Since 1967, the Arab world has witnessed the increasing institutionalization of the territorial state. This phenomenon emerged against the backdrop of the colossal failure of collective ideologies, especially pan-Arabism, together with the creation of an Arab consensus regarding the institutionalization of the idea of territorialism.[28] At the same time, the rise in "statehoodness" of the modern Middle Eastern state does not necessarily point to the measure of internal coherence of the "national community" of the region's states. It is no secret that all states in the Arab world suffer from issues of legitimacy and that the alienation between the masses and their governing political regimes is a hallmark of most states in the region.[29]

In a certain sense, Lebanon is an excellent example of the institutionalization of the idea of territorialism side by side with the weaknesses characteristic of territorial states. On the one hand, the preservation and rehabilitation of the Lebanese state as a political entity following the fifteen-year civil war demonstrates its strength and viability as a territorial state in the Middle East. On the other, however, it was unable to find a way to develop as a cohesive national community or a strong central power. Moreover, the history of independent Lebanon clearly indicates that one of the foundational elements in Lebanese politics is "political alienation." Studies by Barakat and others indicate that this phenomenon is both characteristic and widespread, primarily within the non-Christian communities.[30]

Since the theoretical model of "political alienation" serves as a cornerstone of our examination of the Druze' relationship to the state, it is worth making some remarks about it here. Alienation might be defined as subjective experience of feelings of dissatisfaction and rejection of the established order.[31] The model of "political alienation" relates to two principal aspects of alienation. The first is a description of the social processes or conditions which give birth to this phenomenon; the second is a function of the behavioral patterns that the alienation process induces within the individual. A recent study published by the Israel Democracy Institute reveals a growing tendency toward alienation and estrangement from politics in western democracies. But the case here is entirely different and more complicated. While the above study assesses the current political atmosphere, in this study the alienation models will be applied to a past historical reality. The discussion of alienation here will avoid plunging into the debate on alienation in social philosophy; here the term refers mainly to the political alienation that implies a breakdown in the individual's attachment to the government.[32] Alienation in social philosophy has been always related to Marx's theory of alienation which considers that commodification—the process of turning labor into wage labor—is the source of all alienation.[33] In his article "On the Meaning of Alienation," the American sociologist Melvin Seeman indicates that analysis of the phenomenon is always conducted from the player's perspective. In other words, it represents a socio-psychological description of the state of the individual who demonstrates the signs of alienation.

According to Seeman, five forms of alienation can fall within the broader phenomenon of "political alienation." They are powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement.[34] Samuel Long's formulation of political disaffection can be considered a modified version of Seaman's typology; hence, in Long's definition alienation is interpreted as combining feelings of inefficacy, discontent, cynicism, estrangement, and hopelessness.[35] Marvin Olsen defines alienation as a sense of dissociation or dislocation that the individual experiences in relation to prominent aspects

of his social environment.[36] Although they hail from different theoretical backgrounds, Wright and Renshon refer to political alienation as estrangement from a political system or a lack of confidence in political institutions and a feeling of political inefficacy. I. Kim has elaborated on the same operationalization.[37] According to Ada Finifter, all theoretical and empirical attempts to explicate the concept of alienation aim to specify particular modes of alienation. Consequently, he distinguishes between four main ways that alienation is expressed: political powerlessness, political meaninglessness, anomie, and political isolation refer to rejection of political norms and goals that are widely held and shared by other members of a society.[38]

David Schwartz, who accepts Seeman's definition in principle, emphasizes the value dimension of the individual's relationship to the political system. Thus, alienation develops when an individual begins to perceive the existing order as possessing a nature that he cannot align with his value system. In other words, in its original state, alienation describes a situation in which the individual ceases to identify with the existing political order.[39] For David Schwartz, political alienation is caused when "individuals perceive a fundamental conflict between their basic politicized values and those exhibited in the polity." Moreover, he points to three variables which create a sense of political alienation within an individual: "perceived threat from value conflict, perceived personal political inefficacy, and perceived systemic inefficacy." Political alienation, he says, "represents the sum total of these variables."[40]

Lal Goel and Lester Milbrath distinguish between two principal types of alienation. They designate the first as "normlessness," defined as the individual's rejection of the basic principles governing the institutions of the political system. The second is "cynicism"—a feeling of dissatisfaction with the rule of the political leaders of a certain country.[41] Also, the model of political cynicism suggested by Schyns and Nuss can be very relevant for understanding the disposition of the Druze in Lebanese politics. Political cynicism is "an individual's attitude, consisting of the incompetence and immorality of politicians, political institutions and/or the political system as a whole."[42]

Offering a counterpart to the studies described above, T. Scheff argues, in a new study, that alienation as a concept has a "single, clear and researchable meaning," and that this model might be applicable to both interpersonal and societal phenomena.[43] But I question this idea, given the Druze historical experience with the Lebanese State where expressions of alienation extended beyond political activism.

The Lebanese sociologist Halim Barakat adopts the founding premises of his predecessors while proposing a unique model that emphasizes three aspects. These are 1) the perception of alienation in terms of a process rather than as a permanent pattern of variations; 2) the distinction between three aspects of alienation—its origins, the nature of the experience, and its consequences; and 3) the definition of alienation in terms of the discrepancy between reality and utopia, between that which is real and that which is desired. Here he points to two central causes of alienation: "over-control" of the individual by his society and institutions and "under-control" of these factors by the individual. For such an individual, the gap between reality and utopia creates an existential and experiential mode characterized by rejection of and discontent with his community or society. An alienated person is a person who is dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions, orientations, goals, means, and values of society. To the extent that the gap between reality and utopia continues to widen, so too will the individual's sense of alienation.[44]

The implications of alienation on an individual's behavioral patterns constitute the second significant aspect to which the theoretical model relates. Barakat and Schwartz

point to three potential consequences that the process of alienation has on the behavioral patterns of the alienated individual:

a) **An apathetic attitude or regression/withdrawal**. This tendency is exhibited when the alienated individual discerns that he is incapable of either changing reality or adapting to it. The feelings of dissociation and helplessness that derive from this circumstance lead the person to isolate himself or herself from the community or to move towards complete dissociation, the most acute form of alienation.
b) **Conformism**. Paradoxically, alienation can make an alienated person more willing to develop an adaptive attitude towards society. Two conditions create this tendency: the individual feels completely helpless in relation to existing reality and also sees no correspondence between the level of sacrifice and the scale of anticipated achievement that would accompany a rebellious act. The process of forced adaptation creates a cognitive dissonance within the individual which develops either into a tendency towards conformity or a tendency towards rebellion, when such possibilities exist.
c) **Revolutionism or reformism**. This activist behavioral pattern is two-dimensional; the individual aspires to effect a drastic change in the existing social or political order. Such a behavioral consequence is commonly the product of radical tendencies induced by alienation.[45] Schwartz stresses that the behavioral outcome of alienation is not absolute but depends upon three primary external variables: the social background, the alienated individual, and the process of alienation itself.[46] Thus, for example, while Maurice Zeitlin's research on Cuba suggests a strong link between a high level of alienation and violent social protest, the study by Claude Fischer and William Erbe of American society found the reverse: the processes of alienation were not factors in people adopting political activism, and led instead to political apathy.[47]

C. Herring himself came to the conclusion that the behavioral consequences of political alienation cannot be determined; "not only do the alienated vary from the non-alienated, but also they vary substantially among themselves."[48] The reaction generated is influenced by the level of alienation and other external variables.

Based on this thinking, it was not alienation from the confessional system that drove the Druze to withdraw from Lebanese political institutions, nor did it lead either to persistent political activism or to a rejection of conventional modes of political participation. In fact, the behavioral effect of the Druze's alienation between the years 1943 and 1975 was varied and inconsistent, alternating between revolutionary attitudes and political-ideological activism. In the absence of the conditions for revolution, alienation found expression at various levels such as political and ideological protest movements, critical debates against the political structure, and efforts to rewrite the history of Lebanon. Herring draws theoretical conclusions that are useful and appropriate tools for understanding the complexity of political alienation among the Lebanese Druze. The question of how the politically alienated react to their alienation is still a matter of dispute. While some studies have shown that political alienation could lead to a decline in political participation, others indicate that political alienation is positively correlated with political participation.[49]

We can see that theory has only limited ability to explore and explain the dynamics of historical processes when we apply theoretical models to historical studies; an example is the attempt to implement the collective behavior theory that was dominant up to the early 1970s. This theory distinguishes between two distinct kinds of action:

institutional-conventional and non-institutional-collective behavior. Turning to the case under discussion, we find that in their relationship with the Lebanese state, the Druze have combined the two patterns: an example of institutional-conventional behavior is their participation in the parliamentary election and government and an example of non-institutional behavior is Kamal Junblat's alliance with the anti-establishment left and the Palestinian Resistance Movement. Although the Druze involvement in Lebanese politics and their relationship with the state do not follow any particular model, theories of alienation can sharpen our understanding of the Druze political experience and help to explain more effectively the political positions and behaviors they have adopted since Lebanon's independence.

Main Issues

Before commencing, a quick survey of the study's structure and main premises is in order. This book grapples with fundamental questions of Lebanese studies, namely the history of the relationship between the Druze community and the state in modern Lebanon. Arguing that the Druze community has been politically alienated from the Lebanese state, this book explores the historical and political origins of this alienation. It demonstrates that the origins of this alienation lie in the state's national ideology, its confessional political system, and the Druze's historical background during the medieval period. Furthermore, this study will show the extent to which the Druze's attitude vis-à-vis the Lebanese state has been influenced by their historical rivalry with the Maronites. Particular emphasis is placed on the political and ideological practices adopted by the Druze leadership and intelligentsia as they dealt with the significant changes taking place in their community's political status following the political settlements of 1920 and 1943 (the establishment of Greater Lebanon and the adoption of the National Pact, respectively).

Until the late 1970s, the Druze systematically mobilized revolutionary ideologies to challenge the Maronite-Sunni political hegemony. The Druze in Lebanon had developed a strong attachment to their native soil, even claiming that they were the indigenous Lebanese and the real founders of the Lebanese historical entity. By the same token, they fought tirelessly in the name of Arabism, secularism and socialism to end the confessional system and to erase the position of privilege that the Maronites enjoyed. Throughout the period under consideration, the Lebanese Druze were the staunchest advocates of revolutionary change in politics and society. Hence, a great part of this study will be devoted to presenting the political outlooks of the leading Druze forces towards the political-confessional system, the state's national ideology, and Lebanese historiography. Kamal Junblat's role as the most powerful leader of the Druze in Lebanese politics starting in the late 1950s will be discussed in detail. Analyzed over the course of three decades, Junblat's political activity sheds light on the intricate relationship between the Druze community and the Lebanese state—a relationship most often characterized by antagonism, discontent, and ambivalence. Junblat's political career clearly illustrates the paradoxical attitude of the Druze towards their state: a deep affinity for their land coupled with an alienation from the political establishment.

Rather than presenting a conventional description of the period under discussion, I will discuss the political behavior patterns of the Druze leadership by focusing on formative events in the history of independent Lebanon, such as the crisis of 1943 and the establishment of the National Pact, the Druze affinity with the Parti Populaire Syrien

(PPS) during the 1940s, the 1952 coup d'état, the first civil war of 1958, the appeal towards Arab nationalism, the emergence of the Palestinian resistance movement in the late 1960s and finally the eruption of the second civil war and the subsequent collapse of the Lebanese state. Accordingly, the following discussion is intended to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Druze's relations with the Lebanese establishment between Lebanon's independence in 1943 and the eruption of the second civil war in 1975.

This book is divided into seven chapters in addition to a short introduction, conclusion and an epilogue. The first five chapters, which proceed in chronological order, explore the development of the political relationship between the Druze community and the Lebanese state between 1943 and 1975, focusing on formative events in Lebanon's modern history.

The opening chapter provides a general overview of the Druze community in Lebanon, its historical background and the structure of its political leadership during the period under discussion. It also addresses the Druze's political behavior during the French mandate, focusing on their attitude towards the establishment of Greater Lebanon and the "adjustment effect" of the colonial Mandatory power. The chapter ends by discussing the Druze's reaction to the profound changes that followed France's collapse and the British invasion of Syria and Lebanon in June 1941.

Chapter 2 looks at two key processes that reveal the Druze's ambivalent attitude toward the Lebanese state. One is the leading role the Druze played during the November 1943 crisis, which was undoubtedly a turning point in Lebanon's struggle for independence. The second is the emergence of the Druze opposition to the confessional system, as reflected in the establishment of Junblat's Progressive Socialist Party and the recruitment of Druze into the Parti Populaire Syrien. This tendency reached its climax in the 1952 coup d'état, at which point Junblat emerged as the pivotal leader of the opposition movement.

The major part of **Chapter 3** will be devoted to the first civil war of 1958, its origins and its aftermath in the context of community-state relations. Compared to the second civil war, the 1958 civil war has attracted relatively little attention from scholars of the Middle East. This chapter will attempt to fill the gaps in our knowledge of the role the Druze played in this war. Two factors justify an in-depth review of the Druze' involvement in the first civil war. First, this war was in fact the most serious crisis the Lebanese state had faced up to that point since its independence in 1943. Second, the Druze, particularly Junblat's faction, played a central role in the war. Further, Junblat himself arose as the most radical leader of the opposition and his constituency in al-Shuf formed the core of the rebellion and the scene of the war's most ferocious battles.

Chapter 4 approaches the Chehabism era of 1958–70. There is no dispute that Chehab's rise to power opened a new chapter in the relationship between the Lebanese state and the non-Christian communities. His policy, known as Chehabism or al-Nahj, was based on three major principles: reconciling Muslim communities, modernizing governmental institutions, and applying a policy of economic growth in the rural areas. This chapter will address the ramifications of the Chehabi policy for intra-Druze politics and the Druze' orientation toward Arab nationalism, demonstrated most dramatically by Junblat's assimilation within the Nasserist camp. The chapter will also explore how Chehab's policy of reconciliation towards the Druze led to the decline of the pragmatic forces represented by the Yazbakis and enhanced the radical revolutionary camp led by Junblat. Finally, it will address how the failure of the policy of cooptation and

the rise of radicalization affected Junblat's political behavior and thought despite his thorough integration into the government.

The major task of **Chapter 5** is to study the historical and political elements that placed a Druze leader—Junblat—at the forefront of the struggle against the Lebanese establishment during the 1970s. The discussion of Junblat's activities will include four main issues: his efforts to eradicate the Chehabi establishment, the alliance with the Palestinian Resistance and the anti-establishment Left, the systematic attempts to win over the Muslim population, and finally the Druze response to the secular revolutionary discourse put forward by his party. Junblat often said that his cooperative relationship with the Palestinian Resistance and the Left resulted from purely ideological considerations and was a natural alliance between revolutionary movements, all of whom fought against reactionary forces to change the status quo. This study, however, will argue that such alliances were equally bound up with the Druze's status as a minority group within the confessional system and their desire to end the Maronite hold over the state. The analysis of the second civil war will be limited to the strategies the Druze employed and the political alternatives they presented.

Chapters 6 and 7 each focus on a particular theme important to the topic: political confessionalism and Lebanese historiography, respectively. The discussion of these two issues will not be limited to the period of 1943–75, but will include a review of essays and other publications published in Lebanon until recently, thus providing a wider perspective and making it possible to draw more solid and nuanced conclusions.

The Druze critique of political confessionalism and the various alternatives they suggested for reforming the Lebanese political system will be elaborated in **Chapter 6**. Junblat's activity in this context was very important. This chapter will trace the radicalization of his political convictions with respect to the National Pact and the confessional system over more than three decades of his eventful career. But not all Druze were identified with the anti-confessional discourse. As I will show in this chapter, the discourse of secularism met with stubborn opposition from the Yazbaki faction and the religious establishment, both of which consistently adhered to the political status quo. Although the spiritual leadership of the Junblati faction opposed what it claimed to be the discriminatory policy of the Lebanese state, it vigorously rejected any drastic change in the confessional system, fearing a tyranny of the majority.

Chapter 7 focuses on the Druze attempts to form a new historical narrative to serve as an alternative to the "Maronite narrative" or at least challenge its institutionalized paradigms. Not surprisingly, Junblat was the first to promote this issue systematically and by the late 1950s he had published two important essays on Lebanon's history. He tried to redefine the Druze' political and cultural identity by emphasizing the centrality of Islamic culture and Arab nationalism. Thus, my study of Druze historiography will focus on two themes: the polemic against the Maronite narrative, Druze's rewriting of the Emirate's medieval history by pointing out its integration into the wider Arab-Islamic milieu.

Notes

1 It is worth noting that the ideological current called Syrianism differs significantly from Syrian nationalism as espoused by Antoun Sa'adah. Zachs's comprehensive study throws light on the intellectual sources and main notions of this movement. See Furma Zachs, *The Making of Syrian Identity: Intellectuals and Merchants in Nineteenth Century Beirut*

(Leiden: Brill, 2005). Furthermore, the differences or boundaries between these streams were not clearly delineated allowing for a sort of fluidity between them. See: Asher Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Kais Firro, "Lebanese Nationalism versus Arabism: From Bulus Nujaym to Michel Chiha," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 5 (2004), pp. 1–27; Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus al-Bustani," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 2 (1980), pp. 287–304; Robert Haddad, *Syrian Christians in Muslim Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

2 See Meir Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

3 Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 21.

4 Meir Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), p. 44.

5 Ibid, pp. 243–44.

6 Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, p. 222; Yūsuf Sālim, *50 sanah ma'a al-nās* (2nd edition, Beirut: Dār al-Nahār lil-Nashr, 1998), pp. 153–55; Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), pp. 33–34; Elie Salim, "Cabinet Politics in Lebanon," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1967), pp. 489–90; Michael Hudson, *The Precarious Republic, Modernization in Lebanon* (2nd edition, Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 22–23, 44; Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965), pp. 187–88; Abdo Baaklini, *Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon, 1842–1972* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976), pp. 109–12.

7 For in-depth discussion of the Taif agreement, see: William Harris, *Faces of Lebanon, Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1986), pp. 279–322; Joseph Maila, "The Taif Accord: An Evaluation," in Deirdre Collings (ed.), *Peace For Lebanon: From War to Reconstruction* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), pp. 31–44.

8 Halim Barakat, "Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 1973), pp. 302–03; Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 22; Elizabeth Picard, *Lebanon, A Shattered Country* (New York/London: Holmes & Meier, 1996), p. 10; Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*, p. 16.

9 Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 44.

10 Elizabeth Picard, *Lebanon, A Shattered Country*, p. 21.

11 Rabinovich, *The War For Lebanon*, p. 32; Halim Barakat, *Lebanon in Strife: Students Preludes to the Civil War* (Austin/London: University of Texas Press, 1977), pp. 185–99; see also the new insights presented by Karim Marwah regarding the background of the second civil war in Ṭānīyūs Du'aybus (ed.), *al-Waṭan al-ṣa'b al-dawlah al-mustaḥīlah* (Beirut: Dār al-Jadīd, 1995).

12 For studies which emphasize the centrality of external factors, see: Georges Corm, "Myths and Realities of the Lebanese Conflict," in Halim Barakat (ed.), *Towards a Viable Lebanon* (London: Croom Helm & the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1988), pp. 258–74; Farid el-Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1976* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000).

13 Lijphart claims that up to the eruption of the second civil war, Lebanon presented a commendable example of a consociational democratic model. See: Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 147–50.

14 Consociational democracy was presented during the 1970s as an alternative to the conventional majoritarian democracy developed in the West by which political elites' cooperation prevents deep social divisions from destabilizing democracy. See: Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 207–25; Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (2nd edition, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975).

15 Michael Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3–4 (Spring/Summer 1976), pp. 109–22; Richard Dekmejian, *Patterns of Political Leadership: Egypt, Israel and Lebanon* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975).

16 Baaklini, *Legislative and Political*, pp. 49–56; Iliya Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society, Lebanon, 1711–1845* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 35–36; Engin Akarli, *The Long Peace, Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 28–31.
17 Usama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 167.
18 For more on these families, see Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, pp. 127–42; Īliyyā Ḥarīq, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān?* (Beirut: Dār al-nahār, 1972), pp. 15–43.
19 Īliyyā Ḥarīq, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān?*, p. 50.
20 Baaklini, *Legislative and Political*, pp. 166–71. Despite minor differences between Harik and Baaklini on the exact percentage of each category, they draw essentially the same conclusion.
21 Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, pp. 6–8.
22 Farīd al-Khāzin, *Intikhābāt Lubnānīyah ma-ba'd al-ḥarb* (Beirut: Dār al-nahār, 2000), pp. 111–19, 228–29.
23 Baaklini, *Legislative and Political*, pp. 106–09.
24 Ibid, pp. 106–07.
25 Ibid, p. 109.
26 See: The Lebanese Electoral System, IFES, Lebanon Briefing Paper, March 2009.
27 Baaklini, *Legislative and Political*, p. 151.
28 Avraham Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 13, 27–28. As indicated by Nergis Canefe, "The term territorial state, rather than nation-state, better represents the processes of state formation outside Europe." See Nergis Canefe, "Sovereignty without Nationalism: A Critical Assessment of Minority Rights Beyond the Sovereign Nation-State Model," in Mortimer N. S. Sellers (ed.), *The New World Order: Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-determination of Peoples* (Oxford: Washington, D.C.: Berg, 1996), p. 100.
29 Ḥalīm Barakat, *al-mujtama' al-'Arabī fī al-qarn al-'ishrīn* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-'Arabīyah, 2000), pp. 920–23; Ḥalīm Barakat, *al-mujtama' al-'Arabī al-mu'āṣir* (5th edition, Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-'Arabīyah, 1996), pp. 447–48; Halim Barakat, *The Arab World: Society, Culture and State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 26–27.
30 Barakat, *Lebanon in Strife*; Hilal Khashan, *Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1992); Nafhat Nasr and Monte Palmer, "Alienation and Political Participation in Lebanon," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 8 (1977), pp. 493–516.
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32 Mabroka al-Werfalli, *Political Alienation in Libya* (London: Ithaca Press, 2011), p. 73.
33 Kathleen Pacyna, "Carnivalization and Freedom: A Shortcut to the Overcoming of Alienation," in Jerome Braun & Lauren Langman (eds.), *Alienation and the Carnivalization of Society* (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 79–81.
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36 Schwartz, *Political Alienation*, pp. 7, 25.
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38 Ada Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (1970), pp. 390–91.

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40 Ibid, p. 16.
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45 Barakat, "Alienation: A Process," pp. 8–9; Barakat, *Lebanon in Strife*, pp. 21–23; Schwartz, *Political Alienation*, pp. 25–26; Koff, "The Political Use of the Concept of Alienation," pp. 280–89.
46 Schwartz, *Political Alienation*, p. 26.
47 Maurice Zeitlin, *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); William Erbe, "Social Involvement and Political Activity: A Replication and Elaboration," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April, 1964), pp. 198–215; Claude S. Fischer, "On Urban Alienations and Anomie: Powerlessness and Social Isolation," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (June 1973), pp. 311–25.
48 Cerdic Herring, "Acquiescence or Activism? Political Behavior among the Politically Alienated," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1989), p. 150.
49 Ibid, p. 136.

1 The Druze and the Lebanese State
A Complex Dialectic

The Druze community began to stimulate the interest of Orientalists as early as the nineteenth century. Their histories as one of the heterodox minorities in the region, their origin, and their religion have been discussed in numerous publications. Additional works have been written about modern Druze history, and it is no surprise that a considerable number of these focus on the Druze of Lebanon, given the significance of their role (in comparison with the Druze of Syria and Israel), especially during the nineteenth century. The primary deficiency in a significant number of these works lies in the fact that their authors have adopted a rather primordial approach towards the subject, presenting a monolithic view of the history of the Druze without taking the political, cultural, and social aspects unique to each separate community into consideration. Other studies, which may be classified as "synoptic," offer a general theoretical review, sometimes quite cursory, of Druze history.

Existing studies can be classified according to three categories:

1 Works which discuss the ethnic origin of the Druze and their religion and history from the Middle Ages. These include the works of De Sacy, Hitti, Makarim, Bryer, and Abu Izzeddin.[1]
2 Synoptic studies whose primary focus is Druze political history since the founding of the Druze religion in the eleventh century and up to the modern period. Included in this group are the works of Abu Salih, Firro, and Betts.
3 Research which concentrates on the history of the Druze from the nineteenth century with regard to two specific historical events: the social and cultural transformations in Mount Lebanon during the nineteenth century, and the civil wars which erupted between the Druze and Maronites in the middle of that century.

The latter subject has garnered considerable attention from scholars, among whom should be noted Chevallier, Touma, Fawaz, Harik, and Akarli.

That the circumstances within which the Druze communities developed have exerted a significant influence on the community's identity and patterns of behavior. Three elements stand out in this regard: its geographical location; its constitution as a small minority; and its uniqueness as a community isolated religiously from its surroundings. Nevertheless, the tendency to ignore the community's adaptive qualities and its interaction with its changing socio-political environment represents a prominent deficiency in the monotonic approach. Any discussion of the relationship of the Druze to the state will highlight the defects in this primordial method and demonstrate that historical background and changing surroundings have played a vital role in shaping the modes of Druze political behavior in Lebanon.

The Druze Community in Lebanon: Between Past and Present

The number of Druze in the Middle East is estimated today as around a million, primarily scattered throughout Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. A small community also migrated to the north of the kingdom of Jordan at the end of the twentieth century. Syria contains the largest Druze community, numbering around 700,000 (about 3 percent of the total population). The name "Druze" appears for the first time in texts from the eleventh century, in the writings of the Christian Arab historian Yahya Bin Said al-Antaki. Antaki identified the members of the new community with Muhammad Bin Ismail al-Darazi, one of the first propagandists of the Druze religion. In other words, the name "Druze" was given to the community by their non-Druze neighbors and clung to them despite their own reservations, since Darazi fell out of favor and was expelled from the community. The Druze themselves prefer to be called by their original name, which derives from their holy writings—"al-Muwahidun."[2]

The vast majority of Druze are a rural population living in the mountain areas of southern Mount Lebanon, Mount Huran, Mount Hermon, al-Jabal al-Aala (near Aleppo), the western Galilean hills, and Mount Carmel. The claim that such mountains served as a safe haven against persecution at the hands of the Muslim majority is insufficient to explain the Druze patterns of settlement, however. The tendency to isolate themselves from their surroundings in order to distance themselves from the central power and to organize themselves in the face of external influence was undoubtedly of no less significance.[3]

The Druze doctrine, which is in essence secret, has kindled the imagination of many scholars and authors. An article written in 1838 by the French Orientalist Silvestre de Sacy marked a watershed in the research of the Druze religion.[4] This religion was founded in Fatimid Egypt in the eleventh century under the patronage of the sixth Fatimid Caliph, al-Mansur, known as al-Hakim Bi-Amr Allah (AD 996–1021). From the perspective of orthodox Islam, the Druze doctrine—which its adherents call "al-Tawhid"—represents an unquestionably heterodox sect. It is also a prominent example of a syncretistic religion, combining elements and concepts from other religions and philosophical sources such as Shiism, Greek philosophy (particularly the Neo-Platonic and Gnostic streams), and Islamic Sufism.[5]

With the dissemination of the new doctrine in the eleventh century, four centers emerged: Mount Lebanon, Wadi al-Taym, Aleppo, and the north of Palestine. The majority of adherents were located in Lebanon, however, where they existed as a coherent tribal community which accepted the new religion.[6] The appearance of the new religion signals the commencement of Druze history in Lebanon, as well as opening a new chapter in the history of Mount Lebanon. In comparison to the Syrian and the Druze in Israel, the Lebanese Druze community is more developed and dominant, having succeeding in stamping its seal on Lebanese history over the course of several centuries.[7]

The Druze are the sixth-largest community in Lebanon, constituting around 6 percent of the total population.[8] According to the sole official population census, conducted in 1932, Lebanon was home to 53,000 Druze at that time.[9] Today, no accurate estimate of their number is available, due to the fact that confessional population statistics are a taboo subject in Lebanon; however, estimates range between 200,000 and 250,000, indicating that the size of the Lebanese Druze community has tripled since the 1930s.[10] The community is concentrated in four geographic regions: the Shuf Mountains in the southern part of Mount Lebanon; Rashayyah in the south; al-Matin; and Aley,

considered to have the largest Druze population in Lebanon.[11] This geographic distribution demonstrates that the Druze community is, in its overwhelming majority, a rural one. We can point to six elements which shape the distinct politico-social experience of the Lebanese Druze community: the Druze religious doctrine; the Arab tribal heritage—especially the clan structure; the geographic environment and rural lifestyle deriving from it; the governmental tradition existent for centuries in Mount Lebanon; the status of the feudal families; the dualistic structure of the community (i.e., its division into two political parties competing for prestige and power); and finally, the community's symbiosis or historic rivalry with the Maronite community.[12]

The dualistic structure is especially significant given its implications for Druze political behavior in Lebanon. While the community's familial solidarity strengthened internal Druze unity—"le Monolithisme Druse," as Junblat called it[13]—it also created the primordial basis for the traditional Yazbaki-Junblati division which had characterized the community's life since the eighteenth century.[14] Traditionally, the established, veteran political leadership of the community, as well as the religious leadership (Mashyakhat al-Aql), was divided into Yazbaki and Junblati factions. Since 1825, each faction has been served by one religious leader[15] and the Mashyakhat al-Aql was and continues to be subject to the political leadership and acts under its aegis.[16] The division into two factions was not limited to the political arena but extended to all the internal social dynamics of the community. The pioneering research of Nura Alamuddin and Paul Starr has demonstrated that this dualistic structure existed in virtually every Druze village, and clearly impacted day-to-day inter-family relationships.[17] The Nakadi family, which did not belong to either of the two factions and adopted a neutral position in the struggle fought between them, formed an exception in this regard.[18]

Some scholars maintain that the Yazbaki-Junblati division constitutes a natural continuation of the traditional Qaysi-Yamani divide which had characterized the Druze from their beginnings, while the majority of Druze scholars perceive the phenomenon as a later development, the creation of the Chehabi emirs (1711–1841) who sought to weaken the power and status of the Druze feudal system. In contrast, Lebanese scholars contend that the division constituted a natural outcome of the power struggle fought amongst the Manasibs. The polarization of the community gained momentum as the Junblat family became stronger and more affluent. This trend aroused apprehensions amongst other families, who made haste to establish an anti-Junblati coalition, leading to the eventual development into two camps.[19] Whatever the origins of the split, the alliance of the Arslan family with the Yazbaki faction was undoubtedly a later development which only emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. Until the second half of that century, the Arslans had not participated in the factional struggle between the two camps, but had retained a neutral position. This explains the Ottoman policy during the Mutasarrifiya period of regularly electing the governor of al-Shuf from the Arslan family.[20] Although the Yazbaki-Junblati split was a central factor in shaping the political behavior of the Lebanese Druze, their relations with the Lebanese state were shaped much more by the unique historical background of the Druze in this context. The complexity of the Druze leadership's relationship with the state cannot be properly understood without an historical survey of the Druze in Lebanon.

Unlike the Sunnis or Shiites, the Druze are not a new community in Lebanon, having for centuries constituted an integral part of Mount Lebanon. During this time, their name has been associated with an autonomous entity whose origin lay in Mount Lebanon, and they themselves developed a close affinity with the geographic region.[21]

The topographic conditions of Mount Lebanon, the Druze religious-doctrinal particularism, and their feudal structure constituted the three elements upon which the Emirate of Mount Lebanon traditionally depended through the centuries.

As noted above, the Druze presence in Mount Lebanon dates to the eleventh century, the period during which the new doctrine was founded. According to the Druze narrative, twelve Arab tribes migrated into the region prior to the rise of Islam or during the early Islamic period and accepted the Druze doctrine. The most dominant of these tribes was the Tanukh. The members of this tribe settled on Mount Lebanon under the aegis of the Abbassid empire, whose rulers hoped that the Tanukhs would protect the Levant coastline against Byzantine attack.[22] By the eleventh century, the Tanukhs had succeeded in creating a form of autonomous rule in Mount Lebanon. This model, whose precise nature is unknown, was institutionalized, gaining official recognition from the Muslim authorities in 1147. Druze chronicles relate that in this year, against the background of the crusades, the Atabaq rulers of Damascus entrusted the security of the regions around Beirut to the Tanukhi prince Buhtur. In return, in an official letter of appointment, the authorities recognized Buhtur as the ruler of the al-Gharb region. This in effect constituted the formation of the first Druze Emirate in Lebanon, known as the "Buhturid Emirate."[23] Kais Firro questions whether any real connection existed between the Tanukhs and Buhturs, suggesting that such a claim may have been invented by the chroniclers of the fifteenth century.[24] Yet, even if the chronicles of Ibn Sibat (d. 1520) and Ibn Yahya (d. 1435), created a mythological image of the Buhturs and their predecessors, it is undeniable that the Buhturid dynasty laid the initial foundations of a tradition of autonomous government which remained until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

The Buhturid Emirate itself was brought to an end by the Ottoman conquest of the area in 1516. Some claim that the Tanukhs' favor waned in the eyes of the new authorities and their political power dissipated because they remained loyal to the Mamluks. Firro, on the other hand, claims that the factors behind the decline in the Tanukhid dynasty's status as a leading family remain obscure in Lebanese history.[25] Sources indicate that when the Mamluk and Ottoman armies met at the battle of Marj Dabiq (1516), the leaders of the Al-Ma'ni family defected to the Ottomans.[26] The Lebanese chronicler Duwaihi adds that in the same year, the leader of the family, Qurqumaz Ibn Yunus Ibn Al-Ma'ni,[27] went to Damascus to express his loyalty to the new ruler, Sultan Salim I.[28] In exchange for his allegiance, Ibn Al-Ma'ni received recognition as the local ruler of the Shuf region.

As in other areas of Syria, the iltizam system served as the foundation of the relationship between the Ottoman ruler and Al-Ma'ni dynasty—i.e., the dynasty levied taxes in return for Ottoman safeguarding of the emirate's status.[29] The Al-Ma'ni Emirate reached its peak during the rule of Emir Fakhr al-Din Al-Ma'ni II (1590–1635), who expanded the territorial borders of his emirate, established a local army, and built a form of Druze-Christian partnership.[30] At the same time, however, Fakhr al-Din's separatist tendencies and the connections he developed with European powers led the Ottoman authorities to withdraw their support. In 1634, the Ottoman army attacked the emirate and the emir himself was captured. He was executed in 1635, with two of his sons.[31]

Lebanese historiography tends to depict Fakhr al-Din as a national hero and the founder of a political Lebanese entity which developed into an independents state in the twentieth century.[32] Kamal Salibi and his student Abu Husayn claim, on the other hand, that Fakhr al-Din was merely a tax collector who aspired to strengthen his own

rule.[33] Whatever the case, the Al-Ma'ni period, and in particular the rule of Fakhr al-Din Al-Ma'ni II, indubitably constituted the golden age of Druze history in Lebanon.[34] Even after Fakhr al-Din's execution, members of his family continued to rule in the Shuf region until the seventeenth century. The Al-Ma'ni dynasty in Lebanon only came to an end with the death of Emir Ahmad Al-Ma'ni in 1697. Leaders of the Qaysi faction, with whom the Al-Ma'ni were associated,[35] chose the Sunni Chehabi family to stand at the head of the emirate.[36] The selection of Emir Haydar Musa al-Chehabi was made on two grounds: the close family ties between the Chehabis and Al-Ma'nis, and to prevent internal clashes between the Druze leaders.[37]

The appointment of a Chehabi emir was looked upon with disapproval by the families associated with the Yamani faction. The Druze community has traditionally been divided between the Qaysis and Yamanis, who have consistently been in conflict with one another.[38] The struggle between the two factions reached its peak with the Chehabi rise to power, and was finally determined in favor of the Qaysi faction at the battle of Ein Dara. The Yamanis unified around the Alam al-Din family, the last scions of the Tanukhs, in order to restore superiority to the Druze community.[39] Meanwhile, the Chehabis enlisted the Qaysi Druze to their side. The battle at Ein Dara in 1711 ended with the decisive defeat of the Yamani faction and the physical annihilation of the Alam al-Din family. Many Yamani supporters either joined the victorious side or left Lebanon and settled in Syria.[40]

The battle of Ein Dara constitutes a turning point in the political history of the Druze in Lebanon for three reasons. First, the defeat incurred by the Yamani faction effectively led to its dissolution and the end of its political role in the emirate of Mount Lebanon. The Chehabi emir distributed its families' property amongst his Qaysi allies. The principal recipients were the Junblatis, the Imadis, and Abu-Nakadis. Second, the battle signaled the beginning of a concentrated migration, especially of Yamani families, to Mount Huran, a circumstance which led, for the first time, to a shift in the demographic balance between Druze and Christians in favor of the latter. In other words, the status of the Druze as a sectarian collective was diminished relative to the position of the Chehabi emir and the Christian populace. Third, the Chehabi dynasty buttressed its status at the top of the emirate's social and political pyramid and redefined internal relations with the property-owning families.[41]

The elite during the Chehabi period comprised three primary levels and included both Druze and Christian families, though the latter's influence remained limited before the eighteenth century.[42] At the top of the hierarchy were families possessing the title of emir. The Chehabis were the most prominent amongst these, providing Mount Lebanon with its "ruler emirs." Under them were the emirs from the Abu Lama family and, finally, the Arslans. The second level was composed of families bearing the title of shaykh. At the head of these stood the Junblat family, followed by the Imad, Abd al-Malik, and al-Khazin families. Between these two levels lay the intermediate position of muqadam, a title borne by a single Druze family, the Mizhir family.[43]

From the perspective of political status, no concrete significance accrued to these titles, all of which were included in the single category known as manasib, which designated their social status as maqtajiyyah—giving them legal authority over their subjects. The Muqati'jis enjoyed the same privileges and held the same obligations towards the emir.[44] The emir, known as *al-hakim*, held supreme political and legal authority, his principal duty with respect to the Sublime Porte being payment of the *miri* tax (an annual land and agricultural produce tax). Two conditions governed the

appointment of a new ruler: his membership in the Emir Heydar Musa Chehabi branch of the Chehabi family and the support of the manasibs. The maqtajiyyah were directly subject to the emir, each one possessing a muqata'ah or uhdah and enjoying full autonomy in his region. This system, known as the feudal system, differed greatly from the pedantic hierarchical ranking characteristic of medieval European feudalism.[45] It continued to exist in Mount Lebanon even after the fall of the Chehabi emirate, and was only formally annulled in 1864.[46] The Chehabi period signaled the beginning of a process of deterioration of the Druze community's status. This trend gained significant momentum with the rise to power of Emir Bashir II (1789–1840).

Bashir II, a charismatic character, sought to centralize power, working systematically to destroy the status of the maqtajiyyah.[47] Bashir II's encounter with Shaykh Bashir Junblat, the most important of the Druze maqtajiyyah, was an inevitable consequence of this policy, given the former's political aspirations to replace the emir.[48] The conflict between the two figures surfaced in 1822. Three years later, in 1825, the two met on the battlefield close to Samqaniyah in the Shuf region. The emir, aided by Ottoman troops, attacked Shaykh Junblat's camp, and the Shaykh was subsequently executed by the governor of Acre.[49]

Researchers tend to attribute great significance to this battle, maintaining that it constituted a turning point in the political history of Mount Lebanon. Firro, for example, represents the "al-Mukhtarah event" as the first civil war between Druze and Maronites in Lebanon. Leila Fawaz concurs with her predecessors' conclusions and asserts that many Druze consider Shaykh Bashir to have been eliminated simply because he was the Druze adversary of the Christian emir. This event has inculcated significant anti-Christian sentiments within the Druze community.[50] Although Iliya Harik does not frame this event as a war of Christians against Druze, he points to two central implications on the internal politics of the emirate deriving from it. First, the eradication of the Junblat family power base—the most important feudal family in Mount Lebanon—completed the process of disempowering the manasib, the main political institution of Druze feudalism, striking, to borrow Salibi's expression, a deathblow to the Druze leadership. Second, in a certain sense the battle brought about the reorganization of the political forces in the Mount. For the first time, the Maronite community began to take the place of the Druze as the principal pillar of the emirate, forging a new coalition between the emir and the Maronite church. The Maronite priesthood emerged as a player wielding enormous political and economic power, and succeeded in rallying the peasants, leading their battle against the maqtajiyyah in the rebellion of 1820.[51]

The nine years of Egyptian conquest (1831–40) did not constitute a favorable period for the Druze, either. Ibrahim Pasha's policies led to a further decline in the status of the maqtajiyyah, whom he exiled from the country, and profoundly aggravated the communal antagonism between the Druze and the Maronite communities.[52] It must nonetheless be acknowledged that, the rule of Emir Bashir and the Egyptian policy aside, Chehabi rule was itself characterized by various changes which led directly or indirectly to the diminishment of the community's status and the emergence of the Maronite community as a leading force. The shift in the political center of gravity from the Druze to the Maronites reflected various political, social, economic, cultural, and demographic changes. These found expression, for example, in the Druze migration to Huran and the consequent demographic shift in favor of the Maronites, drastic changes in local economic patterns, the strengthening of the status of the Maronite church, the