



MUSLIM SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

A Political History of al-Andalus

Hugh Kennedy

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HUGH KENNEDY

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This book is dedicated to my daughter
Katharine, in memory of happy days in
Ubeda and Granada.

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Note on Names and Dates

I have tried to make this book user-friendly to non-Arabists while remaining faithful to the evidence. Personal names are transliterated according to the *Cambridge History of Islam* system, now generally used in English language publications. Place-names are given in the modern Spanish and Portuguese forms for the Iberian peninsula, and standard modern transliterations for North Africa. Al-Andalus refers to those areas of the Iberian peninsula which were under Muslim rule at the time being described, so that, for example, it is much smaller in 1200 than in 1000. Andalucia always refers to the modern region of that name. I have used the English term Morocco to describe that part of the Maghreb which lies within the boundaries of the modern kingdom but which was known to the Muslims of al-Andalus as the 'Udwa, the land on the other side of the Straits. I have also sometimes used the anachronistic Tunisia in place of the contemporary but more obscure Ifrīqīya. I have used Common Era (AD) dates. This sometimes leads to imprecisions when one Muslim year includes parts of two CE ones, and where there is uncertainty I have used both, so an event dated in the Arabic sources to 500 will be described as occurring in 1106/7.

Glossary

- akhbār*: short historical narratives
alcazaba: fortress, usually in a city (from Arabic *al-qaṣaba*)
baladī: local, a term used to describe those Muslims who settled in al-Andalus before the coming of the Syrians in 741
cortes: assemblies in Christian kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula, including lords, churchmen and representatives of towns
dhimmi: a protected person, a term used for Christians or Jews living under Muslim rule
dīnār: Muslim gold coin
dirham: Muslim silver coin
faqīh, pl. *fuqahā'*: a man learned in Muslim law
fata': lit. young man, hence slave soldier (cf. *ghulām*)
ghāzī: warrior for Islam, one who participates in the *jihād*
ghulām, pl. *ghilmān*: page, hence slave soldier (cf. *fata'*)
ḥaḍra: capital city and surrounding area
ḥāfiẓ: lit. one who knows the Qur'an by heart, used as an administrative title in the Almohad caliphate
ḥājib: door keeper or chamberlain, title of chief minister
ḥashm: army
huerta: fertile irrigated area surrounding cities like Valencia, Murcia
'iqtā': land or revenues given in payment for military service
jihād: Muslim Holy War (cf. *ghāzī*)
jizya: poll-tax paid by non-Muslims in an Islamic state
jund: lit. army, hence one of the districts in the south of al-Andalus settled by Syrian troops after 741
jundī: soldier recruited from one of the *junds*
kātib, pl. *kuttāb*: secretary
kharāj: land-tax, sometimes used for tax in general
kūra: administrative division of al-Andalus
maghārim: taxes not sanctioned by Muslim law
mawla, pl. *mawālī*: client or freedman, sometimes used of all non-Arab converts to Islam in the first century AH
muwallad: Muslim from native Iberian stock

qāḍī: Muslim judge

ra'īs, pl. *ru'asā*: chief

Reconquista: Christian reconquest of Muslim Spain and Portugal

riżq: rations given to soldiers as part of their payment

sāhib al-madīna: administrator of an Andalusī city

ṣā'ifa: summer expedition of Muslims against Christians

sayyid: lord, title given to all members of the ruling Almohad dynasty

shaykh: old man, hence tribal chief or venerable teacher

shurṭa: police force

ṣijil: document, usually confirmation of office or property

ṣiqḷabī, pl. *ṣaqāliba*: Slav, originally used of slave soldiers of eastern European origin who served in the armies of Cordoba, later of all white slave soldiers and mercenaries

sūq: market

ṭālib: lit. student, used as an administrative title in the Almohad caliphate

thughūr: areas of al-Andalus bordering on Christian territory, frontier zones

'ulamā: men learned in Muslim sciences and law

'uṣhr, pl. *'uṣhūr*: tithes paid by Muslims

Vega: fertile plain to the west of Granada

wālī: governor of province

wazīr: honorific title given to senior administrators in Umayyad times, vizier

za'im: leader

Introduction

This book is intended to provide an account of the political history of al-Andalus, the parts of the Iberian peninsula under Muslim rule, between 711, the date of the first Muslim invasion, and 1492 when the last independent Muslim power, the Kingdom of Granada, was destroyed.

By political history I do not simply mean the narratives of rulers and battles, though these are of course important, but also the understanding of the structures which lie behind political events and decisions. The most obvious of these structures were the ruling dynasties, where they came from, who their most powerful supporters were and how they attempted to secure a justification and legitimacy for the exercise of power. The most important function of a pre-modern Islamic state was the raising and paying of the military forces. This determined the composition of the elite, the system of taxation and revenue raising and ultimately the success or failure of the regime. The structure of the military is an essential part of political history. Another concern is the reach and range of government and the extent to which the rulers in Cordoba, Seville or Granada were able to make their authority felt throughout al-Andalus. This in turn leads to the examination of local elites and pressure groups and to the consideration of their origins, nature and power.

This is not a history of the Reconquista. Of course the Christian powers to the north always affected the history of al-Andalus, and from the eleventh century onwards they became a threatening and dominant presence, but the struggle against the Christians was only one, and not always the most important, concern of the rulers of al-Andalus: maintaining their own authority in the Muslim-held areas was usually the first priority, and the affairs of North Africa were often as pressing as those of the Christian frontier. This work attempts to see al-Andalus as a Muslim political society among others like it. Its rulers and administrators were always keenly aware that their land was part of a wider Muslim commonwealth and it was to

this commonwealth, rather than to their northern neighbours, that they looked for contacts and political ideas. The ultimate failure and extinction of al-Andalus should not be allowed to overshadow the whole of its 800-year history.

This book is not an intellectual and cultural history of al-Andalus. This is not because these things are unimportant, or that the Muslims of al-Andalus did not make a major contribution in these fields, but simply because they lie beyond the scope of this study except in so far as they affected, or illustrate, political developments. Similarly, there has recently been much fascinating work on such topics as rural settlement, landscape, irrigation technology and cuisine, but none of these are treated here.

There is a certain unavoidable inconsistency of texture in this work. At some periods we are comparatively well informed about political events and the scope and operations of government. At other periods our sources are much more limited and we can only discern a bare outline. Nor is it true that more recent parts of the history of al-Andalus are better known than the earlier ones: we are well informed, for example, about the reign of al-Ḥakam II (961–76) because of the survival of al-Rāzī's court chronicle, but the period 1184–1210 is an almost complete blank.

Any broad-brush history of this sort is bound to be heavily dependent on the works of others. For the history of al-Andalus we have two major political histories which are classics and remain the basis for all future research: E. Lévi-Provençal's celebrated *Histoire de l'Espagne Musulmane*, which covers the centuries when Cordoba was the capital (711–1031), and Ambrosio Huici Miranda's much less well known *Historia Política del Imperio Almohade*. To these two can be added J. Bosch Vila, *Los Almoravides*, and Rachel Arié's *L'Espagne Musulmane au temps des Nasrides (1232–1492)*.

The last two decades have seen a massive increase in the scope and intensity of research, which has meant that in many ways the history of al-Andalus is better known and understood than the history of any other part of the pre-modern Muslim world, and methodologies for treating some important aspects, prosopography and archaeological evidence for example, are more developed. It is perhaps invidious to single out individuals, but mention should be made of some of the main advances. The period up to 1031 has been the subject of intensive study in Spain and the works of E. Manzano Moreno on political structures, and Pedro Chalmeta and M. Barcelo on administrative and fiscal history, are fundamental. Also of major importance are the five volumes of the *Estudios Onomástico-Biográficos*

de Al-Andalus edited by Manuela Marin and others which have added a whole new dimension to our understanding of the Umayyad regime. The period of the Taifa kings in the eleventh century has recently been superbly covered in *Los Reinos de Taifas: Al-Andalus en el Siglo XI*, edited by M.J. Viguera Molins as vol. viii of the Menendez Pidal, *Historia de Espana*.

In contrast, the periods of the Almoravids and Almohads have been studied more by French historians. The work of V. Lagardère has greatly increased our understanding of the Almoravid movement itself, while P. Guichard's *Les Musulmans de Valence* is an outstanding work of regional history. The archaeological evidence in its broadest context has been studied in A. Bazzana, P. Cressier and P. Guichard, *Les Châteaux Ruraux d'al-Andalus*. There has been less recent work on the Almohads and Nasrids, but important contributions have been made in R. Arié, *Nasrides*, L.P. Harvey, *Islamic Spain, 1250–1500*, and R. Manzano Rodriguez, *Los Benimerines*.

Numerous other authors, whose works are cited in footnotes and in the bibliography, have increased our understanding of the history of al-Andalus and I am dependent on and grateful to them all. If this work succeeds in providing an overview of the subject and recent research and introducing it to others, be they Orientalists, western mediaevalists or interested general readers, then it will have succeeded in its purpose.

CHAPTER ONE

The Conquest and the Age of the Amirs, 711–56

The Iberian background

The Iberian peninsula, divided into the great provinces of Tarraconensis, Carthaginensis, Baetica, Lusitania and Gallaecia, had been one of the richest and most developed areas of the western Roman Empire, but for three centuries before the coming of the Muslims it had been dominated by warrior aristocracies of Germanic origin. The most successful of these were the Visigoths who had first entered the peninsula in the early fifth century. With the accession of King Leovigild in 569 the Visigothic monarchy entered on a century and a half of stability during which kings, based in Toledo, exercised effective power.

The kingdom shared many of the characteristics of the post-Roman kingdoms in France and Italy. In general the Visigothic monarchy was a reasonably strong and effective instrument of government: it did not suffer the internal divisions and progressive debility of the contemporary Merovingian monarchy in France and, right up until the Muslim invasions, the kings maintained their control over most of the Iberian peninsula. In theory the monarchy was elective and successive church councils of Toledo in the mid-seventh century had laid down the rules: the king was to be elected by the bishops and nobles. He was to be a catholic Christian, a Goth by descent and of free birth. He was to be elected either in Toledo or on the site of the previous king's death, and before his accession he had to swear to uphold the laws of the realm. In practice, the choice of monarchs was confined to the most important lineages and there was a natural tendency for fathers to wish to pass their crowns to their sons, as Leovigild did to Recared in 586 and Egica did to Witiza in 702. At the same time, there seems

to have been a strong feeling among the nobility against the establishment of a purely hereditary succession and perhaps that a lineage which had held the crown too long should be replaced.

Under the king, the chief men of the state were the nobles, mostly of Gothic origin, and the bishops, mostly recruited from the Hispano-Roman landowning class, although the distinctions between these two groups must have largely disappeared by the beginning of the eighth century. Besides providing spiritual leadership, the bishops were also among the largest landowners and most powerful political figures in the land. The nobles, who sometimes bore the title of *dux* (duke) or *comes* (count), were also owners of large, often underexploited estates cultivated by semi-free peasants. It was the nobles too who provided the army: apart from a royal guard, there was no standing army and the nobles brought their followers in response to the royal summons and the king might reward them with gifts of gold or silver. In general this simple military system seems to have functioned fairly successfully, but it probably meant that the bulk of the troops owed their first loyalties to their lords, rather than to the monarchy.

It is impossible to make any precise assessment of the population or economy of the peninsula. It has been plausibly suggested¹ that the population had been about six million in the early Roman period but had been reduced by plague and war to four million by the later Visigothic period. Archaeological evidence shows that the large open cities of the earlier period had shrunk into small fortified settlements. Country estates and their buildings were certainly more primitive than the great latifundia and villas of the imperial Roman period.

Economic life was almost entirely localised: there is little evidence of long-distance trade and both the small towns and the large estates were effectively economically self-sufficient. The circulation of coinage was extremely limited and most transactions were conducted by barter.

Later Visigothic Spain and Portugal was a fairly stable society and, apart from a limited Byzantine incursion around Cartagena in the south-east, there had been no outside invasion for a couple of centuries. On the other hand, we can picture a very empty landscape, where settlements were few, far between, poor and primitive. Agricultural resources were in many cases neglected or underexploited. There were areas, too, notably in the northern mountains

1. B. Reilly, *The Medieval Spains* (Cambridge, 1993), p. 7.

where the Basques and the Asturians lived, where the people were totally independent of any form of royal control and where a primitive mountain society vigorously resisted outside control. Such was the land the Muslims invaded.

The Muslim conquest, 711–16

The Muslim invasion of Spain and Portugal was in many ways the logical and necessary extension of the conquest of North Africa.² Before the coming of the Muslims the area of the modern states of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco was occupied by two groups, the Byzantines and the Berbers. The Byzantines held a number of strongholds on the coast, notably Tripoli and Carthage, which they kept supplied by sea. When they reconquered the land from the Vandals in the reign of Justinian, they had established an elaborate system of defences on the southern frontiers of the settled areas, but these seem to have been abandoned by the mid-seventh century when the Muslims began to attack. The remaining Byzantine garrisons defended their coastal strongholds stubbornly and they held out much longer than the garrisons in Syria and Palestine had done a generation before, but they could easily be bypassed by overland invaders and were only a real threat when allied to the Berber tribes of the area.

The Berbers were the real power in the land. They were, and still are, the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa, with their own, unwritten, language, quite distinct from either Latin or Arabic. Their social structure was tribal and they seem to have owed their first loyalties to their kin. Apart from this, there were wide variations of lifestyle. Some Berbers were acculturated to the Byzantine world and many were Christians. Others seem to have lived a much more separate existence and some at least were still pagans. There were Berbers who lived in the cities, many more who lived as farmers in

2. The literature on the Muslim conquest of al-Andalus is vast and fairly uneven in quality. The classic account in E. Lévi-Provençal, *HEM*, i, pp. 1–89, is still a useful starting point. A.D. Taha, *The Muslim Conquest and Settlement of North Africa and Spain* (London and New York, 1989), is a meticulous, detailed but somewhat uncritical account. R. Collins, *The Arab Conquest of Spain, 710–797* (Oxford, 1989), contains important insights into Christian life and literature of the eighth century but is flawed by a contemptuous and uncomprehending attitude to the Arabic sources. A more balanced overview of the period by the doyen of historians of al-Andalus is P. Chalmeta, *Invasión e Islamización: la sumisión de Hispania y la formación de al-Andalus* (Madrid, 1994), and I have relied on this at many points.

mountain villages, some who kept sheep and goats in the steppe lands and yet others who wandered as the Touareg do today in the remote and awesome wastes of the Sahara. Berber genealogies are much less fully recorded than Arabic ones and it is difficult to gauge whether the scattered references we have reflect a static relationship or whether some groups were expanding at the expense of others.

According to Arab sources, the Berber tribes were divided into two groups, called Butr and Barānis, just as Arab tribes were divided into Qays/Muḍar and Yemen. Most of the Berbers who joined the Muslim conquest and settled in al-Andalus came from the Butr group. They seem to have retained their tribal identities and probably their pagan religion. In the sixth century these tribes were moving west from Tripolitania and putting pressure on the Byzantine settlements.³ The Barānis, by contrast, were older-established tribes who had entered into closer relations with the Byzantines and had in many cases converted to Christianity. This suggests that the Muslims assumed the leadership and gave extra momentum to an existing movement of populations among the Berbers, and this goes some way to explaining the success and completeness of their conquests. In practice, the difference between Butr and Barānis seems to have had little effect on the politics of al-Andalus, unlike the murderous disputes between Qays/Muḍar and Yemen among the Arabs, and divisions among the Berber tribes were based on smaller units of individual tribes and extended families and their relationship to Arab groups.

The conquest of North Africa⁴ had begun as early as 22/642 when the conqueror of Egypt, 'Amr b. al-'Ās, led an expedition to Barqa in Cyrenaica. From there he dispatched an army to Zawila, an oasis settlement to the south, led by 'Uqba b. Nāfi'al-Fihri. 'Uqba came from a branch of Quraysh, the Prophet Muḥammad's tribe, and his father Nāfi' had been one of the first Muslims to settle in Egypt. He came from the elite of early Islamic society and he used his position to make contacts among the Berber people of the area, alliances that were to make his family the most powerful in North Africa and al-Andalus before the coming of the Umayyads in the mid-eighth century. When 'Amr returned to Egypt, he left 'Uqba in charge at Barqa.

The conquest of North Africa was difficult, partly because of

3. On this see E. Manzano Moreno, *La Frontera de Al-Andalus en época de los Omeyas* (Madrid, 1991), pp. 234–5.

4. For the conquest of North Africa see Taha, *Conquest and Settlement*, pp. 55–83, and Chalmeta, *Invasión e Islamización*, pp. 72–94.

political disputes among the Muslims but more because of the vigorous resistance put up both by the Berber tribes of the interior and the garrisons of Byzantine cities like Tripoli and Carthage on the coast. More than the other Arab commanders, 'Uqba seems to have understood that the key to subduing North Africa was to enrol the support of Berber tribes. In 50/670 he founded the Muslim settlement of Qayrawān, away from the coast, in the central plain of Tunisia. Like earlier Arab garrison cities at Kūfa, Baṣra and Fustāt, this was designed to be a settlement where the Muslims could preserve their identity and from which they could dominate the surrounding country.

In 681 'Uqba led a spectacular raid to the west in which he reached Tangier and the Atlantic coast, although there were no Muslim settlements beyond modern Tunisia at this stage. This was his last and greatest achievement, but his memory lingered on and his sons continued to play a very important role in the Muslim politics of North Africa. There followed a period when the Arabs were almost driven out and Qayrawān itself fell to the Berber leader Kusayla. The Muslims did not recover the initiative until 74/694 when the Caliph 'Abd al-Malik sent an army of Syrians led by Ḥassān b. al-Nu'mān al-Ghassānī. He captured the last Byzantine outpost at Carthage and defeated the Berber leader, the priestess Kāhina, and in 82/701 established himself firmly in Qayrawān. He was able to do this, not only because of his Syrian troops, but because of his policy of working with the Berbers. Some tribes, like the Luwāta, seem to have remained allies of the Arabs throughout; many others came over after the defeat of Kāhina, including her own sons. They converted to Islam and were enrolled in the Muslim *dīwān*, receiving a share of the spoils like the Arabs.

Ḥassān was dismissed by the governor of Egypt, who supervised the western provinces in 704, probably because he was too successful, and was replaced by Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, a man of obscure origins who had risen in the financial administration of the Umayyad empire. He continued Ḥassān's policy of recruiting converted Berbers into the Muslim armies and using this new force to extend his control further to the west until, in about 90/708, he took Tangier and appointed a Berber supporter of his, Ṭāriq b. Ziyād, as governor.

The conquest of North Africa had been achieved by an alliance of Arabs and Berbers in the name of Islam. As the conquest proceeded, so the importance of the Berber contribution increased. By the time the Muslims were conquering the area of modern

Morocco, it is probable that the great majority of the troops in their army were Berbers, newly converted to Islam. These Berber troops received a share of the booty but, apart from Ṭāriq b. Ziyād in Tangier, they do not seem to have occupied positions of political importance. Many Berbers entered into *wālā'* agreements with important Arab groups or individuals. They were then described as *mawlā* (pl. *mawālī*) of so and so (Ṭāriq b. Ziyād, the Berber governor of Tangier and probably a man of considerable importance in his own community, for example, is described as *mawlā* of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, the Arab governor of Qayrawān). This relationship can be described as a sort of clientage, by which members of the conquered peoples were converted (you could not be a non-Muslim *mawlā*) and given a position in the Muslim community in exchange for their loyalty and support.⁵ These networks were very important in the fluid politics of early Muslim North Africa and al-Andalus and were often more useful than tribal followings in building up a power base: both the family of 'Uqba b. Nāfi' and the Umayyads depended heavily on their *mawālī* to support their political ambitions.

The governors (*wālī* or *'āmil* are the two Arabic terms used to describe this office), by contrast, were dependent for their authority on the governor of Egypt, and a change of command in Fuṣṭāṭ (Old Cairo) almost certainly meant a change in Qayrawān. This pattern became even more pronounced in al-Andalus, where the position of the governor was constantly threatened by changes of policies or personnel in Qayrawān or Fuṣṭāṭ. In these circumstances, it was difficult for a commanding personality to establish himself for long and the governors were often transient figures who made little impact on the country.

The conquerors fed off further conquests. It is true that subject Christian and pagan Berbers are said to have been obliged to pay *jizya* or poll-tax, but there is little indication of any formal tax-gathering machinery. Most of the soldiers must have served in the hope of booty and new lands rather than for a salary and Muslim dominion in North Africa had to expand to survive. If the booty dried up and no new opportunities appeared, then the groups and tribes would turn in on each other and disintegration would inevitably follow. The conquest of Tangier effectively meant the end of westward expansion; now only Spain could offer the sort of opportunities the state needed to be able to survive.

Our understanding of the Muslim conquest of al-Andalus and

5. For the role of *mawālī* in the Umayyad caliphate, see P. Crone, *Slaves on Horses. The Evolution of Islamic Polity* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 49–57.

the establishment of Arab rule is hampered by the nature of the sources. No contemporary Arabic accounts of the conquest survive and the earliest major sources which have been passed down to us are collections of historical anecdotes (*akhbār*) preserved in a number of works dating from the tenth century onwards, notably the anonymous *Akhbār al-Majmū'a* (*Collection of Anecdotes*) from possibly c. 940⁶ and the *Ta'rikh Ifṭitāh al-Andalus* (*History of the Conquest of al-Andalus*) of Ibn al-Qūṭīya (d. 977).⁷ Both these collections arrange their materials more or less in chronological order but they are not annals and are more concerned with vivid and interesting stories than the careful ordering of events. The *Akhbār* is particularly important for the pre-Umayyad period, while Ibn al-Qūṭīya gives vivid and gossipy accounts of the courts of the Umayyad amirs.

In the tenth century these accounts were edited and systematised using the criteria of annalistic historiography developed in the eastern Islamic world by such authorities as al-Madā'inī (d. 839) and al-Ṭabarī (d. 923). In al-Andalus this editing seems to have been the work of the Rāzī family, originally from Rayy in central Iran, who had come to al-Andalus as merchants in the late ninth century. According to his son 'Īsā (d. 989), it was Aḥmad b. Mūsā al-Rāzī (d. 955) who took the *akhbār* which people in al-Andalus had not previously been very interested in and ordered them (*dawwana*) according to the rules of historical science.⁸ The writings of the Rāzīs, father and son, have largely been lost but they were used, and often incorporated entirely, with acknowledgements, by the great eleventh-century compiler Ibn Ḥayyān (d. 1076). Much of Ibn Ḥayyān's work has in turn been lost, including the sections which dealt with the conquests and the early amirs. Some of his material has, however, been preserved in shorter works, like the anonymous *Fath al-Andalus* of c. 1100,⁹ and later abbreviated recensions in annalistic compilations like Ibn Idhārī's *Bayān al-Maghrib*¹⁰ of about 1300.

The fact that the sources as they have reached us were written down at least two centuries after the events has meant that fierce

6. Ed. with Spanish trans., E. Lafuente y Alcantara (Madrid, 1867). I have used the dating suggested by Chalmeta (*Invasión e Islamización*, p. 50) because of the archaic nature of the text, but other authorities prefer an eleventh-century date. The text is analysed in detail in C. Sanchez-Albornoz, *El 'Ajbar Maymu'a. Cuestiones historiográficas que suscita* (Buenos Aires, 1944).

7. Ed. with Spanish trans., J. Ribera (Madrid, 1926).

8. Quoted in Chalmeta, *Invasión e Islamización*, p. 45.

9. Ed. L. Molina (Madrid, 1994).

10. The history of the conquest and the Amirs is covered in vol. ii, ed. G.S. Colin and E. Lévi-Provençal (Leiden, 1948).

controversy has raged about the relative merits and reliability of these sources. Opinions have varied between historians like Taha, on the one hand, who accept the Arabic narratives almost completely,¹¹ and Collins, who holds that the Arabic tradition is virtually worthless.¹²

It is important to attempt to assess the reliability of this material. Clearly these Arab histories are biased in the sense that they are in favour of Muslim victories and claimed that these were the result of God's support, but this sort of open partisanship does not present real problems to the modern historian. There are, however, a variety of other ways in which the material needs to be treated with caution.

There is material which is clearly legendary or folkloric, like the story of the locked chamber in Toledo which King Roderick was rash enough to open, only to find that the interior was covered by paintings of Arab warriors, and, probably, the story of Count Julian and the rape of his daughter by King Roderick. These stories, with their obvious predictive and entertaining functions, are unlikely to mislead historians. The use of topoi and conventional phrases, expressions and characterisation borrowed from eastern Islamic sources may also give a false impression of detailed accuracy.¹³

There may also have been more hard-headed reasons for being economical with the truth. The nature of the conquest affected the status of the lands conquered: if they were conquered by force (*'anwatan*) they became the property of the conquerors, the indivisible *fay'* (immovable booty) of the Muslims, and the proceeds from these properties were to be used for the benefit of the Muslims as their ruler saw fit. If the lands were taken peacefully (*sulhan*), on the other hand, they continued to be the absolute property of the inhabitants and would only pass into Muslim hands by inheritance, purchase or conversion of the owner, in which case they would be the absolute property of their Muslim owners. There is some evidence of two historiographical traditions within the accounts of the conquests.¹⁴ The first, reported by the Rāzīs and

11. See *Conquest and Settlement*, pp. 4–14. 12. *Arab Conquest*, pp. 34–5.

13. For these problems in early Islamic historiography in general, see A. Noth, *The Early Arabic Historical Tradition* (new edn with L.I. Conrad, Princeton, 1994); for a detailed discussion of similar problems in the historiography of al-Andalus, see B. Munzel, *Feinde, Nachbarn, Bündnispartner* (Munster, 1994).

14. For these ideas see Manzano Moreno, 'Arabes, berberes e indigenas: al-Andalus en su primer periodo de formacion', paper presented at the Congress on *Incastellamento*, French School in Rome, 1994, pp. 3–12. In press.

other sources close to the Umayyad court, emphasises the forceful nature of the conquest, since conquest by force would give the Umayyads the right to dispose of the lands, whereas other accounts talk of take-over by agreement and so emphasise the rights of the owners. This may account for disagreements in the sources about the nature of the conquest, and such details as the fall of Seville, which is said to have surrendered peacefully and then rebelled and had to be subdued by force, may be explained as attempts to conflate two contradictory traditions. In the end, however, it must be admitted that these divisions of opinion could simply be the result of genuine confusion over events which happened long ago.

The fact that these sources, in the form in which they have been handed down to us, are much later need not undermine their credibility. The Arabic historical tradition laid great emphasis on preserving the wording and forms of old accounts and much of the work of compilers like Ibn Ḥayyān was basically editing and republishing older materials, rather than composing a new account. Later chronicles can contain important nuggets of information which survive from much earlier times: the most important account of the nature of the settlement of the Syrian *junds* in al-Andalus after 741, for example, is found in fragments of al-Rāzī embedded in the late fourteenth-century *Ihāṭa* of Ibn al-Khaṭīb, composed in its present form 650 years after the events it describes.¹⁵

In addition to the Arabic texts there are also Latin sources. Of these by far the most important is the so-called *Chronicle* of 754, also known as the *Mozarabic Chronicle*. This was composed in al-Andalus, probably in the mid-eighth century. Not surprisingly, its viewpoint is very different from the one presented by the Muslim chronicles, and for the Christian author, the invasion is a major disaster rather than a God-given triumph. There are differences over details, but there is a considerable measure of agreement about the broad outlines of events. Given its very early date, the evidence of the *Chronicle* of 754 must carry great weight and it is helpful that it tends to corroborate rather than undermine the outlines of the Muslim tradition.¹⁶

The sources for the Muslim conquest and establishment are as patchy as they are for most other areas of western Europe in the early eighth century. Accidents of survival may play a large part in shaping our understanding. There is always a danger in over-interpreting fragments of information and giving them more

15. See below, p. 50. 16. See Collins, *Arab Conquest*, pp. 26–34.

importance than they deserve. Despite all these qualifications, however, we can attempt a plausible reconstruction of events.

Most of the early Arabic accounts of the beginning of the conquest of al-Andalus tell of a Count Julian of Ceuta, perhaps a Byzantine official with close contacts with the Visigothic rulers of Spain across the Straits.¹⁷ He had sent his daughter, as was the custom among the Visigothic nobility, to the royal court to complete her education. Here she was assaulted by King Roderick and complained to her father, upon which the outraged governor turned to the local Muslim commander as an ally in revenge. Whatever the literal truth of this story, it probably reflects a situation in which the Visigothic King Roderick was resented by an important section of society who were prepared to call in help from outside.

During the seventh century, the Visigothic monarchy was both elective and hereditary. In 693 Egica had associated his son Witiza in his rule, and when he died in 702 Witiza succeeded him as king. In his turn, he attempted to do the same for his own son Akhila and gave him the governorate of Narbonne, but when he died in 710 there was a *coup d'état* in Toledo, probably engineered by nobles who had no wish to see one family retaining the crown for too long. Power was seized by Roderick, not apparently a member of the ruling family, who was able to defeat the army of Akhila and his brothers Alamundo and Ardabast. In terms of Visigothic practice, Roderick was probably a legitimate king by election, but the circumstances did mean that there were a number of influential people at the court who felt themselves wronged; they might well have caused scandalous stories about the new king to circulate and would not have been sad to see him humiliated by outside invaders.

Like some other Muslim conquests, 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ's expedition to Egypt, for example, the invasion of Spain seems to have been undertaken on local initiative without the approval of the hierarchy, represented in this case by the governor of Ifrīqīya at Qayrawān, Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, and ultimately by the Caliph al-Walīd b. 'Abd al-Malik in Damascus. Majority opinion holds that Ṭāriq b. Ziyād, governor of Tangier, with a force of perhaps 7,000 to 12,000 men, mostly Berbers, crossed the Straits of Gibraltar in April 711 and established themselves first on the rock which still bears Ṭāriq's name, Gibraltar, before moving on to occupy Algeciras and the

17. For recent assessments of the Julian story, see Taha, *Conquest and Settlement*, pp. 84–8, and the full discussion in Chalmeta, *Invasion e Islamizacion*, pp. 112–20. Munzel, *Feinde, Nachbarn, Bündnispartner*, pp. 37–54, has a detailed discussion of the early sources.

surrounding countryside. Opinions differ as to whether they encountered any immediate resistance but are agreed that Roderick and the bulk of the Visigothic army were campaigning in the north of the country and it was not until the summer that he was able to lead his army south to counter the invasion.

There followed a battle which was to determine the future of the Iberian peninsula for the next eight centuries. It seems to have lasted for a number of days around 20 July 711. The exact site of the battle has been the subject of prolonged debate, but it probably lay to the south-east of Medina Sidonia. The sources give very large numbers for Roderick's army, between 40,000 and 100,000, and while these are certainly exaggerated, it is likely that Roderick's army was significantly larger than Ṭāriq's and may have amounted to between 24,000 and 30,000 men.¹⁸ Arab sources suggest that there were divisions in the Visigothic ranks and that the brothers of Witiza at least hoped that the Muslims would defeat Roderick and then depart, leaving them to assume the crown they felt was rightly theirs. Whatever the reasons, the Visigothic army suffered a shattering defeat, Roderick was missing, presumed dead, and members of the army scattered throughout Iberia, spreading defeatist sentiment.¹⁹

If the brothers of Witiza had imagined that the Muslims would abandon the fruits of their victory, they were soon undeceived. In the aftermath of his victory, Ṭāriq moved with speed and confidence, aided by Count Julian. He dispatched a force under Mughīth al-Rūmī to Cordoba. Here Mughīth encountered serious resistance from the governor and a small garrison who defended themselves in a church after the Muslims had entered the city through a hole in the walls: it was three months before they surrendered and were executed. Malaga and the district of Elvira (the area around the later city of Granada, which did not really become important until the eleventh century) seem to have been taken by small units without much trouble, but Ṭāriq himself moved on quickly to the Visigothic capital at Toledo. There was no resistance. Most of the people, apart from the Jews, had abandoned the city and Ṭāriq was able to spend the winter of 711–12 there.

Ṭāriq's spectacular success attracted the attention of his superior, Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, in Qayrawān and he was understandably eager to associate himself and his supporters with the triumph and the booty which went with it. The next year he set out with a large

18. Chalmeta, *Invasión e Islamización*, p. 134.

19. For differing opinions on the site and course of the battle, see Taha, *Conquest and Settlement*, pp. 88–90; Chalmeta, *Invasión e Islamización*, pp. 132–44.

force, 18,000 men we are told,²⁰ which included many Arabs.²¹ He landed at Algeciras and adopted a strategy which would enable him and his men to make conquests of their own. He went first to the great fortress of Carmona, which had been bypassed by Ṭāriq, which was captured with the help of some of Count Julian's men who pretended to be fugitives and so gained access to the city. He then went on to take Seville, which is said to have resisted for some months before being taken by force. We are given no more details about this siege and it may be that the resistance was 'invented' so that the city could be said to have been taken by storm and its lands confiscated. Mūsā subdued the neighbouring towns and went on north to Merida, where the Arab chroniclers comment on the splendour of the Roman remains. Here there was serious resistance, the garrison made a sortie and siege engines were required to force it into submission in July 713. While this was going on, Mūsā sent his son 'Abd al-'Azīz to the east; when he came to Orihuela, then the most important city in the Murcia (the city of Murcia itself was another later foundation) district, he was met by the local commander or *dux*, Theodemir, with whom he made a treaty whose lenient terms meant effective local autonomy and freedom of Christian worship in exchange for goodwill and a modest tribute to be paid in cash, wheat, barley, thickened grape juice, vinegar, honey and oil.²² As a result of this, the Murcia area was known to the Arabs as Tudmīr for centuries afterwards.

After the fall of Merida, Mūsā headed for Toledo whence Ṭāriq came to meet him. Inevitably, when the two forces did join at Talavera there were tensions and reproaches, but they patched up their relationship and wintered together in Toledo. In the spring of 714 campaigning began again with expeditions which led to the nominal subjection of Galicia and the Ebro valley.

Their triumphant career was brought to a halt by a summons to present themselves before the Caliph in Damascus. Reluctantly, the two leaders left Spain in September 714, never to return, Mūsā leaving his son 'Abd al-'Azīz as governor.

While most of the peninsula had now been visited by Muslim armies, the conquest was by no means complete. The establishment

20. *Akhbār al-Majmū'a*, p. 15; other sources say 10,000: see Taha, *Conquest and Settlement*, p. 94.

21. For Mūsā's invasion and the conquests that followed, see Taha, *Conquest and Settlement*, pp. 94–102, and Chalmers, *Invasion e Islamización*, pp. 168–205.

22. The full text and translation can be found in C. Melville and A. Ubaydli, *Christians and Moors in Spain. vol iii Arabic Sources* (Warminster, 1992), pp. 10–13.

of Muslim power seems to have occurred in two stages. The first was the take-over of the main cities and the fertile lands of the south and the Levante, in some cases with the assistance or at least agreement of members of the Visigothic nobility like the sons of Witiza and Theodemir. The second phase involved the conquest of the north-east, where there is some evidence that Visigothic rule continued under Akhila until the governorate of al-Samḥ (718–21) and the making of peace agreements with the Visigothic lords of the Ebro valley area and other remote districts like the mountains north of Malaga. In this way the conquest of al-Andalus resembled, on a smaller scale, the Muslim conquest of Iran where the main cities and lines of communication were first secured and only later were agreements reached with the inhabitants of outlying areas.

The reasons for the success of the Muslim conquest have been much debated. From the Muslim side the explanation was simple: God had willed it. For Christian commentators from the author of the ninth-century *Chronicle* of Alfonso III onwards, things were much more problematic and they were faced with the question: how could God have allowed this disaster to afflict a Christian people? For mediaeval authors the most plausible explanation was that the Visigoths were immoral and had disobeyed God's commandments, while more secular modern historians have tended to look for signs of political decay and weakness in the Visigothic kingdom.

For the author of the *Chronicle* of 754 the blame lay with the ambitions of Roderick, the treachery of Oppa, son of King Egica, who conspired with the Arabs, and the cowardice of the Archbishop of Toledo, Sindered, who fled to Rome rather than remaining with his flock.²³ For the *Chronicle* of Alfonso III it was the immorality of King Witiza, who besides having many wives and concubines himself, ordered his bishops and deacons to marry, and the treachery of his sons that led to the Christian débâcle.²⁴

In fact, the evidence for the decadence of the Visigothic kingdom is non-existent.²⁵ In many ways it seems to have been stronger in its final years than ever before: the damaging religious division between Arian Visigoths and their Orthodox subjects had been laid to rest for more than a century and there is by the end of the seventh century no real sign of a split between Roman and Visigothic elements. The Jews certainly suffered severe legal disabilities and intermittent persecution and it is clear that they preferred to remain

23. Caps. 52–4. 24. Caps. 5–7.

25. For a good discussion of the arguments, see Collins, *Arab Conquest*, pp. 6–22.

in their cities and accept Muslim rule than to join their Christian fellow countrymen in flight, but there is no reliable evidence that they actively supported or encouraged the invaders. It is also true that the Basques remained outside effective Visigothic control, and indeed Roderick was campaigning in that area at the time of the first Muslim invasion, but separatism in the northern mountains had been a feature of political life for centuries and it was no more dangerous or more threatening than before. In fact, in some ways the very strength of the kingdom made it easier to conquer: if it had been divided into numerous local lordships and principalities, they would no doubt have put up stiff resistance. As it was, Visigothic Spain, like Anglo-Saxon England in 1066, was centralised to the extent that the defeat of the royal army left the entire land open to the invaders.

The Visigothic monarchy suffered a short-term political crisis at the accession of Roderick, resulting in the defection of important elements of the ruling class which may in turn have contributed to a major military defeat which left the country defenceless. The army he led against the invaders was certainly large enough for the purpose; its military worth is less easy to assess. Clearly the battle was lost, but this might have been the result of bad luck or bad decision-making on the day rather than long-term military weakness.

It is striking that there seems to have been little attempt to defend the cities effectively or to raise a second army. Apart from resistance in the northern mountains, which was at the beginning not conducted by the Visigoths, only Cordoba and Merida put up any effective defence. The smallness of the numbers is noticeable: Ṭāriq is said to have sent Mughīth against Cordoba with only 300 men, which might not have been effective if the governor had been able to raise more than 400 to defend it. The city seems to have been decrepit: the Roman bridge was broken and there was a major hole in the ramparts. When the Muslims arrived at Orihuela the governor Theodemir had so few men that he had to dress up women as soldiers and put them on the ramparts. No-one seems to have defended Toledo, a superb natural fortress. Perhaps this failure was partly a result of lack of population, or at least of arms-bearing population. When Saladin invaded the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187, the Crusaders mustered a large army to oppose him but to do so they had to empty their cities and fortifications of men. When they lost the battle of Hattin, their splendid castles were left virtually undefended and most of them soon fell to the invaders. This

may well have been the same in the case of Visigothic Spain. It was not perhaps that numbers of the population in general were lacking, but rather that numbers of military men were inadequate. There seems to have been a sharp division in Visigothic society between military and non-military classes and there is no mention of popular or civilian resistance. In Cordoba the Muslims were informed by a shepherd they met that most of the people had fled and that only the garrison of 400 and the *du'afā* remained. *Du'afā* is an Arabic word which refers to the non-arms-bearing part of the population; it was clearly considered out of the question that such people would participate in the defence of the city.

Another factor in the lack of resistance may have been that the Visigoths did not take the invasion sufficiently seriously. It has already been noted that Roderick's opponents among the aristocracy were hoping that the invaders would defeat him and depart, leaving them in charge, and it is interesting to see that this attitude was shared by at least some of the invaders. It seems that Ṭāriq had to persuade Mūsā to allow the Muslims to settle in Spain and as late as 717 the Caliph 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz appointed a governor whose mission it was to evacuate the Muslims from the Iberian peninsula. It must have seemed to many in Spain that the logical response to the Muslim raiders was to retreat to their mountain fastnesses with what they could carry and wait for them to take their booty and go.

On the whole the Muslims offered generous terms which certainly made surrender a more attractive option, whereas unsuccessful resistance could, as the unfortunate defenders of Cordoba found, lead to death. In Andalucia the sons of Witiza seem to have been allowed to retain possession of the royal lands;²⁶ in the Murcia area the terms amounted to local autonomy; in Merida the inhabitants were allowed to keep their possessions but the property of those who had been killed in the battle for the city, those who had fled north and of the churches, was confiscated. In the later phases of the conquest many Visigothic lords in the Ebro valley area were allowed to retain their lands and status and soon converted to Islam: amongst the best known of these were the Banū Qasi (Casius) of Tudela and the Banū 'Amrūs of Huesca, who formed dynasties which dominated the area for two centuries after the Muslim conquest.²⁷ Except for the action against church lands, this fits in well with what we know of Muslim terms elsewhere; the local people

26. Manzano 'Arabes, berberes e indigenas', p. 13. 27. *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

were allowed to remain in possession of their lands as long as they paid a land tax and a poll-tax to the conquerors.

The settlement of the Muslims

In the event Spain proved too attractive to its conquerors and they did not leave but chose to settle in the new lands. In the eastern Islamic world it had been the intention that the Muslims should settle only in certain garrison towns, like Kūfa and Baṣra in Iraq, Fuṣṭāṭ (Old Cairo) in Egypt and Qayrawān in Ifrīqiya, and that they should live off the taxes of the land. No effort seems to have been made to develop such a system in Spain, and Muslim settlement seems to have been haphazard and determined by the interests of the settlers rather than any overall scheme. The conquerors settled down as property owners and do not seem to have received the *'aṭā'*, or pensions, which were such an important feature of early Muslim society in the Middle East. This in turn meant that there was no need for the elaborate and precocious bureaucracy which had grown up to service the system, nor any need to compile *dīwāns* or lists of those entitled to pensions. The slow development of bureaucracy in al-Andalus may in turn have been a reason for the slow development of a literary culture: not until the time of 'Abd al-Raḥmān II (822–52) did administration and a native literary culture begin to appear.

Cordoba became the capital shortly after the initial conquest and remained crucial to the politics of the period. Control of the capital was vital for anyone who sought to govern the country and no serious attempt was made to shift the capital elsewhere. The reasons for this are not clear at first. It was not the Roman or Byzantine capital and had little obvious strategic importance. It was, however, at the hinge of a number of important routes. To the north the roads ran through the passes of the Sierra Morena to Calatrava, Toledo and eventually to the Ebro valley. To the east the upper Guadalquivir valley gave access to the Levante, while south and west Elvira (Granada) and Seville were easily accessible. The geography of al-Andalus always made communications a problem, but Cordoba was probably the least inconvenient site for the centre of government.

Perhaps more important was the rich agricultural hinterland of the city and the fact that this was densely settled by the Muslims. These resources of supplies and men were often able to sustain the rulers when, in the reign of the Amir 'Abd Allāh (888–912) for

example, other areas slipped out of their control. Toledo, another possible capital and the centre of Visigothic power, was clearly lacking in such local resources.

The non-Muslim population probably paid some taxes to Cordoba, probably a *jizya* or poll-tax and perhaps a land tax as well; a late source based on much earlier narratives recounts how a Christian count, Ardabast, son of the old king Witiza, rather than a Muslim bureaucrat was in charge of collecting the tax from the Christians.²⁸

Naturally, people from the same tribal and ethnic backgrounds tended to settle in the same areas and in areas they considered appropriate for their lifestyle. On the whole the Arabs settled in the main cities and the fertile irrigated areas of the Guadalquivir valley, the Levante around Murcia and Zaragoza and the middle Ebro valley. In some places there were concentrations of men from the same tribes in the same area, Lakhm around Malaga for example, and the Judhāmīs and Tujībīs who settled in Zaragoza were to dominate the political life of the city and the surrounding area for centuries to come. Other tribes were more dispersed.

It would be wrong to think of these Arabs as Bedouin. Apart from the Qurashis, almost all of them belonged to the Yemeni group of Arab tribes. Some of these, like Lakhm and Judhām, had lived in the steppe lands of Jordan and southern Palestine, while others, like Khawlān and Ma'āfir, came from Yemen proper, a land of cities, well-built villages and carefully tended farms. In either case they would have been familiar with urban and agricultural life. Many of them were second or third generation immigrants to North Africa, reared in such urban settlements as Fustāṭ and Qayrawān and well placed to take advantage of the opportunities offered by their newly conquered lands. Tribal loyalties do not seem to have been strong. The settlers acquired land in absolute ownership, sometimes it would seem by inheritance, marrying the daughters of the previous Visigothic owners, as 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Mūsā married Roderick's daughter and Sara, granddaughter of Witiza, married two Arab husbands in succession and founded a dynasty which produced, among others, the tenth-century historian Ibn al-Qutiya.²⁹ The integration of important elements of the Visigothic aristocracy into the new Muslim ruling class certainly accounts for some of the lack of opposition.

28. See the important passage in Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Al-Iḥāṭa fi akhbār Gharnāta*, ed. M. 'Inan (4 vols, Cairo, 1973–77), i, pp. 100–5.

29. Manzano 'Arabes, berberes e indigenas', p. 15.

The Berbers were widely distributed throughout al-Andalus. Many settled in the central Meseta, Extremadura and the whole of the north and west apart from Zaragoza and its environs. Certain important cities like Toledo and Merida lay in areas with a predominantly Berber population. There was also a significant Berber presence in the Valencia area, where they probably practised transhumance, wintering flocks on the coastal plains and moving west into the mountains for the summer, and the Guadalquivir valley. These lands were in some ways less rich and inviting than the areas settled by the Arabs and it has been suggested that the Berbers were obliged to accept inferior lands despite the major contribution they had made to the conquests. However, there are reasons for thinking that this may not have been the case. As we have seen, there was no overall direction or system in the allocation of lands and, given the small numbers of the conquerors and the vast extent of the conquered lands, they would certainly have been able to take over richer areas had they wished to. Some Berbers were certainly farmers, used to irrigated agriculture, but the majority seem to have been pastoral people and it was natural that they should gravitate to the familiar pastoral environments of the Iberian peninsula. It is quite possible that many Berbers brought flocks with them with the result that they had no alternative but to look for pasture. This did not mean that there were not conflicts between Arabs and Berbers which eventually erupted in civil war, but there is no evidence that grievances over land were among the causes of this.

The early governors, 714–41

The years between the departure of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr in 714 and the installation of Balj b. Bishr al-Qushayrī as governor in 741 were the period when these early settlers enjoyed unopposed power. At first glance it is a period of great confusion: governors succeeded each other with bewildering speed and only one (ʿAnbasa b. Suḥaym al-Kalbī, 721–26) lasted for more than a year or two. Beneath this confusion, however, there are several common themes. The settlers wanted to control the riches of al-Andalus for themselves, and to increase that wealth by raiding areas in France, which were still in the Dār al-Ḥarb (the House of War, that is, non-Muslim territory) and from which booty could be obtained. It did not especially matter to them whether the governors who ruled the country were chosen by them, as sometimes happened, particularly when the previous governor had died a violent death, or appointed from outside,

as long as they were responsive to their needs. In contrast to the period which followed 741, this first quarter of a century was comparatively free of internal strife and rebellion.

When Mūsā b. Nuṣayr departed, he left his son 'Abd al-'Azīz in charge. He established himself as governor in Seville and married Roderick's widow. The story in the Arabic sources explains that she persuaded him to wear a crown and adopt other royal pretensions, as the Visigothic kings had, and that the Arab notables saw this as unIslamic and assassinated him. This certainly reflects their fears that he was attempting to make the governorship his family's property. They may also have been concerned that he was encouraging new settlers from North Africa and the Middle East who would demand a share of the wealth of the country. The struggle of the early arrivals to maintain their privileged status in the face of challenges from later immigrants was to be a major source of unrest in the period of the governors.³⁰ After 'Abd al-'Azīz no governor died a violent death before 741 except at the hands of the infidel, and there were no rebellions of importance.

Muslim Spain was only loosely attached to the main body of the caliphate, but, given the vast distances involved, it is impressive to see how much influence the Umayyad caliphs in Damascus could exert on this, the newest and most distant of their provinces. Governors were in general appointed by the governor of Ifrīqīya in Qayrawān or sometimes, as in the case of al-Samḥ b. Mālik al-Khawlānī, by the Caliph in person, and they were almost always outsiders to the province with no local power base or following. This did not always mean that the wishes of the local people were ignored and the *Akhbār al-Majmū'a* states, perhaps with exaggerated local patriotism, that if they did not like a governor or if he attempted to undermine their autonomy and privileged fiscal status, they would write to the Caliph who would send one who pleased them.³¹ Sometimes, if the governor was killed, the settlers would 'elect' a successor, but such elections were not usually accepted by Qayrawān; when al-Samḥ b. Mālik was killed in the attack on Toulouse, they chose 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Abd Allāh al-Ghāfiqī, but the governor of Qayrawān sent 'Anbasa b. Suḥaym. When 'Anbasa was himself killed while raiding in France in 726 the local people again 'elected' and again their nomination was rejected, but in 730

30. The assassination of Abd al-'Aziz is discussed in Chalmeta, *Invasión e Islamización*, pp. 245–54. Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam's account of the event is translated in Melville and Ubaydli, *Christians and Moors*, pp. 14–17.

31. *Akhbār al-Majmū'a*, p. 25.