

Relational Perspectives in Psychoanalysis

Edited by

NEIL J. SKOLNICK
SUSAN C. WARSHAW

WITH A FOREWORD BY EMMANUEL GHENT

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Dedicated to the New York University Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. The sustained commitment of members of this community to the academic values of scholarship and open discourse have furthered immeasurably the study and practice of psychoanalysis.

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Foreword

EMMANUEL GHENT

The title of this book, *Relational Perspectives in Psychoanalysis,* sets a rather complex stage before us; it situates the reader within a theater in the round, inviting him or her to move around freely so as to experience the play from a variety of angles. The drama presents a panorama of issues, clinical and theoretical, that populate the world of psychoanalysis; we are asked to view them from a variety of vantage points, all of which have at least one thing in common, namely that the adjective *relational* is apposite.

The critical term, then, is *relational.* Rather than trying to define it, I believe it would be more fruitful to do in microcosm what the book attempts in the hands of its numerous contributors. Seldom do we learn new words by finding them in the dictionary. Much more naturalistically we come to know them by encountering them in their contexts and usage. An appropriate point of departure would be how the term *object relations* came to be used in psychoanalysis. The term *object* owes its origin to the very beginnings of Freud's drive theory, where it was defined as the largely human target or influencer of an instinctual impulse, or drive. Most usually, it meant *person.*[1] Melanie Klein's (1925, p. 121) first use of the term *object relations* dates to 1925, where its meaning again was relations with people. By 1932 Klein had begun to develop the notions of internal objects and relations among

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[1]Ferenczi (1921), for example, observed that, in "hysteria . . . the repressed pathogenic material belongs to the memory-traces in the unconscious for things that belong to the libido objects (persons)" (p. 172).

them, as well as phantasy as the repository of phylogenetically based images of good and bad internal objects. In 1935, in connection with introducing the conception of the depressive position, and with it the newly developed capacity of the infant of five or six months to internalize whole rather than part objects, Klein (1935) began a subtle shift in theory in which object relations played an increasingly important role (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). Beginning in 1940, Fairbairn (1952) began formulating his object relations theory of personality as a radical departure from drive theory. For many years he wrote nof of object relations but rather of *object relationships.* Endopsychic structure, as he referred to the internal world, was no longer based on built-in phantasy, but instead was seen as deriving entirely from relations of the infant and child with significant people. Clinging to terms that belong to drive theory while totally transforming their meaning, Fairbairn reconceptualized libido as, at root, object seeking rather than pleasure seeking. What came to be called the object relations school of psychoanalysis stemmed largely from the work of Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Balint in particular, notwithstanding the significant differences among them; since the 1950s it has generally been known as the Independent Group in the British Psycho-Analytical Society (Hinshelwood, 1991).

Meanwhile, across the ocean in America, Harry Stack Sullivan had, in the early 1930s, begun developing what he referred to as the interpersonal theory of psychiatry. As early as 1931, in what may be the first reference to "interpersonal relations," he wrote, "psychiatry . . . is not an impossible study of an *individual* suffering mental disorder; it is a study of disordered interpersonal relations nucleating more or less clearly in a particular person" (p. 978), and, a little further on, "the mental or psychobiological . . . has a meaningful existence only in interpersonal complexes, real or *fancied*" (p. 979). "Fancied" was to become Sullivan's quasi-operational code word for what we would today call "internalized." By 1938, Sullivan had started publication of a new journal, *Psychiatry, a Journal of the Biology and the Pathology of Interpersonal Relations.* Not long after, in the early 1940s, the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis and Psychology was founded and became the training ground for several generations of interpersonal psychoanalysts.

It will not easily escape notice that what is common to the two phrases—British object relations theory, and the American theory of interpersonal relations—is the word *relation.* Only slightly less apparent is the overlap in meaning of the terms object and person.

About 20 years later, in 1961, Bernard Kalinkowitz, then Director of the Doctoral Program in Clinical Psychology at New York University

and a graduate of the White Institute, brought to realization a vision he had long cherished of providing a center for psychoanalytic studies in a university setting. The inauguration of the Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis set in motion a long chain of events that, among many other gratifying sequelae, has resulted in the publication of the present book. The Program answered several pressing needs. It opened the door to clinical psychologists to be trained as full-fledged psychoanalysts without having to take the onerous oath that they would not practice as psychoanalysts, as was the case with those few psychologists who were admitted on a research basis to the principal medical institutes of the time. As a university-based center for training in psychoanalysis, it provided for the first time an alternative to the ubiquitous institute model of psychoanalytic training. Fundamental to the formation of a psychoanalytic program for psychologists were the academic values of scholarship, diversity of thinking, efforts at integration and synthesis, and, above all, open discourse, research, and debate. All the existing institutes in the past, including those which accepted a few psychologists on a restrictive basis, were committed to a single theoretical approach. It was Freud *or* Sullivan; never Freud *and* Sullivan, let alone Klein, Winnicott, Mahler, and Kohut. The unique intent of the NYU Postdoctoral Program was to offer in-depth study and training in the major theoretical orientations in a tradition of comparative study. The goal has been to examine basic assumptions and epistemological premises underlying the differing psychoanalytic points of view. In striking contrast to what obtains in psychoanalytic institutes, the very design of the Program was to facilitate and encourage open debate and high-level discourse.

Early in the history of the Program, it was decided to form two tracks or orientations, one classical Freudian, the other Interpersonal; matriculants were encouraged to partake of courses offered by both. Much more recently, a new outlook, one that was not represented in the existing track system, began to make itself felt.

Here is where we return to pick up the thread of the evolution of the term *relational*. A small group of faculty members (Bernard Friedland, Emmanuel Ghent, and Stephen Mitchell) technically affiliated with the interpersonal track had been teaching for some time about exciting developments in the field of psychoanalysis that seemed to extend and enhance the conceptions of interpersonal relations theory, particularly the work of the British object relations theorists, the self psychologists, and some ego psychologists, most notably Loewald, who, in one or other way, were marking out a new paradigm in psychoanalytic theory and practice. What was most

striking, indeed exhilarating, was that despite substantial differences in theoretical baggage and in language, one element seemed to be held in common—the notion that human *relations* played the central role both in human development and in psychopathology. Another major element was that all rejected, in one way or another, the classical metapsychology that was rooted in the notion that two biologically given instincts or drives, sex and aggression, were the root determinants of all human motivation.

The year 1983 marked the publication of two very significant works, one a paper by Merton Gill (1983) and the other a book by Greenberg and Mitchell (1983). In Gill's thinking, the fundamental question facing the field, the question from which all others flow, was the dichotomy between an energy discharge model of mind and a "person" model. Gill recognized that to label his point of view "interpersonal" carried too heavily the political and theoretical weight of Sullivanian thinking. To label his point of view a "self" point of view implied, in the current terminological atmosphere, a global embracing of Kohut's thinking. To label it an "object relations" point of view slanted it incorrectly, in that the term failed to distinguish with sufficient clarity between the work of Klein, where energy discharge remained superordinate to object relations, and that of Fairbairn, where the reverse obtained. He proposed a new term, a "person point of view," to define an inclusive position, one that is opposed to classical metapsychology and its energy discharge point of view and that is currently in the foreground in the evolution of psychoanalytic thinking. Gill noted that although Winnicott approached a person point of view, he did not attempt a systematic and consistent formulation in terms of points of view.[2]

Gill forthrightly opted for abandoning the energy discharge model. He noted, however, that this did not mean abandoning some notion of drive; in fact, along with Bowlby, he proposed that the need for interpersonal attachment is an innately organized drive, with vast and far-reaching consequences for human ontogeny. One might add here that, but for his eschewal of the term, the drive for interpersonal attachment is a cornerstone of Sullivan's theory. Gill's goal clearly was to combine the best strands of these three schools with the best

[2]Gill sees Loewald also as being on the edge: "Loewald describes drive as developing in the matrix of object relations rather than as the matrix within which object relations develop, but his concept of drive remains ambiguous between the person and energy discharge points of view, and he does not propose the major reorientation which his formulation requires" (p. 494).

of Freudian clinical theory and experience while avoiding the political-theoretical implications of singularly endorsing any one of them.

Meanwhile, in the same year, Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) published their landmark book, in which, by careful analysis of the structure and underlying assumptions of current psychoanalytic theoretical systems, they were able to demarcate two mutually exclusive models of mind, a drive/structure model and a relational/structure model. Although a variety of hybrid theories have been propounded in an effort to bridge these models, none has been able to surmount the incompatibility of the almost axiomatic assumption that underpins each. As Greenberg and Mitchell put it,

> [t]here have been two major strategies for dealing with the problem of object relations. The first, employed originally by Freud, has been essentially preservative and consists of stretching and adapting his original model based on drive to accommodate their clinical emphases on object relations. . . . [T]o solve the problem of object relations while preserving drive theory intact requires the derivation of relations with others (and the individuals' inner representation of those relations) as vicissitudes of the drives themselves. Freud and subsequent theorists employing this first strategy understand the role of objects largely in relation to the discharge of drive: they may inhibit discharge, facilitate it, or serve as its target. The second, more radical strategy for dealing with object relations has been to replace the drive theory model with a fundamentally different conceptual framework in which relations with others constitute the fundamental building blocks of mental life. The creation, or re-creation, of specific modes of relatedness with others replaces drive discharge as the force motivating human behavior [p. 3].

At the Postdoctoral Program, the mid-1980s were marked by intense ferment in the area of psychoanalytic theorizing and practice. Finally, in early 1988, owing in no small measure to the efforts of the matriculant body, a new track, or "orientation," came into being. Although we referred to it as the relational perspective, it could with equal advantage be thought of, following Gill, as representing "the person point of view." While the term "person point of view" retained a reasonably euphonious ring, a "person track" would have been rather jarring. We chose, therefore, the name *relational orientation* or *relational track*. The choice, however, was not made without misgivings. Placing the emphasis strongly, if not solely, on human relations tends to minimize both the role of the self and the role of the biologically given in theory building. In addition, its origins in the context of specifically human relations tend to constrict the meaning

of the term "relation," which otherwise could signify relations of all sorts and at many levels of meaning.

The last four years have witnessed remarkable changes both at the Postdoctoral Program and in the field at large. Starting with a faculty of five (Philip Bromberg, Bernard Friedland, James Fosshage, Emmanuel Ghent, and Stephen Mitchell), the Relational Track faculty has burgeoned into a very substantial force of over 30 members, many of whom have participated in the creation of this volume. Peace, mutual respect, a spirit of collaboration, and an atmosphere of healthy discourse have come to prevail at the Program. Several books published by Relational Track faculty (for example, Eagle, 1984; Benjamin, 1988; Mitchell, 1988; Eigen, 1991; Greenberg, 1991) have achieved national and international prominence in recent years, and others are currently in press. A new journal, *Psychoanalytic Dialogues: A Journal of Relational Perspectives* (The Analytic Press), has achieved, within the brief space of a year, remarkable salience in the field.

One might ask, "How does one recognize a relational psychoanalyst?" There is no such thing as a relational analyst; there are only analysts whose backgrounds may vary considerably, but who share a broad outlook in which human relations—specific, unique human relations—play a superordinate role in the genesis of character and of psychopathology, as well as in the practice of psychoanalytic therapeutics.

Relational theorists have in common an interest in the intrapsychic as well as the interpersonal, but the intrapsychic is seen as constituted largely by the internalization of interpersonal experience mediated by the constraints imposed by biologically organized templates and delimiters. Relational theorists tend also to share a view in which both reality and fantasy, both outer world and inner world, both the interpersonal and the intrapsychic, play immensely important and interactive roles in human life. Relational theorists do not substitute a naive environmentalism for drive theory. Due weight is given to what the individual brings to the interaction: temperament, bodily events, physiological responsivity, distinctive patterns of regulation, and sensitivity. Unlike earlier critics of drive theory, relational theorists do not minimize the importance of the body or of sexuality in human development. Relational theorists continue to be interested in the importance of conflict, although conflict most usually is seen as taking place between opposing relational configurations rather than between drive and defense. Relational theory is essentially a psychological, rather than a biological or quasi-biological, theory; its primary concern is with issues of motivation and meaning and their vicissitudes in human development, psychopathology and treatment.

Human experience, from the prenatal period onward, is what writes the software, the programming, and in the earliest stages probably even modulates the very hard wiring that provides the capacities and limitations for the integration of experience. What ensues ultimately is an enormously complex perceptual, cognitive, affective, and motivational system in which prior experience, by now patterned into templates that are unique for each individual, in turn molds and patterns experience. And yet experience, in turn, influences and modifies the template; what hope would there be for psychotherapy or psychoanalysis were this not true?

The word *intrapsychic* is the buzzword that for many interpersonalists is experienced as virtually hyphenated to drive theory, with its associated conception of the primacy of fantasy over reality. For me the intrapsychic is not in opposition to the interpersonal but is complementary to, and in constant flux, with it. Substitute the word *template,* qualify it by adding that templates are in large measure created out of human experience and in turn play a major role in contributing to and controlling human experience; include the notion that the psychological expression of these dynamic templates is what we call *fantasy* and the activities of an inner world; then we have no further need for the term intrapsychic—except that it is a convenient way of referring to internal psychic patterning (or "structure") as against the interpersonal.

The reader will note here that I have used the word *interpersonal* in the sense that it has customarily been used even by interpersonalists. By contrast, when Sullivan first introduced the term, his meaning was grand (see Schecter, 1972). His heuristic conception was that all of psychopathology—indeed, even the structure of personality, or at least all of it that was relevant to the therapeutic situation—was rooted in early human interactions and that these interactions continued to reverberate outside of awareness in such a way as to control a person's entire way of being. Sullivan developed conceptions of good-me, bad-me and not-me, and of the self system; they all represent what might be called the intrapsychic.

The grand vision that Sullivan offered was that the intrapsychic *is* interpersonal. Although his penchant for operationalism kept him from using terms like inner world, it did not stop him from speaking and thinking in those terms as, for example, when he would refer to the eight or more people who were in the room at any one time even though to all external appearances there were only two physical presences.

Years later, when Loewald (1978, p. 494), eschewing the notion of built-in structure with more or less built-in contents, redefined id, ego

and superego in terms of interpersonal experience, it was clear that he was not only drastically revising classical metapsychology, but also formulating the intrapsychic as interpersonal. It should be noted that this inclusive meaning of the term interpersonal is quite different from its current, more constricted and superficial usage; in the current vernacular it is used almost exclusively to refer to the "what's going on in the here and now" between people. It is exactly because the term interpersonal has lost its more profound meaning that we continue to need a term like intrapsychic while at the same time taking pains to divest it of its drive theory penumbra.

Parenthetically, it is worth noting that the term relational is beginning to suffer the same fate that has already befallen the term interpersonal, that of being banalized by constricting its meaning to here-and-now interactions. To my mind, the more profound significance of the term relational is that it stresses relation not only between and among external people and things, but also between and among internal personifications and representations. It stresses process—as against reified entities—and the relations among processes all the way along the continuum from the physical and physiological, through the neurobiological, ultimately the psychological, and, for some, even the spiritual. Everything is context dependent; nothing has meaning without relation to other processes. I believe "relational analysis" represents a step in the direction of moving beyond the idiosyncratic languages and conceptions that parented it—an effort to push past the political polemics that separated the speakers of these dialects from one another and an effort to explore the commonalities and divergencies in the theoretical gropings that came, respectively, to be called interpersonal theory, British object relations theory, self psychology, and what I would refer to as advanced ego psychology.

Earlier I noted that the choice of name *the Relational Track* as representing this new orientation at the Postdoctoral Program was not made without some misgiving; a number of issues remain unaddressed by the overcondensed title. By placing the emphasis firmly on human interrelation or what might be considered a two-person psychology, the result is an implicit defocusing of the one-person aspects of psychological theory (Ghent, 1989).

From the perspective of the evolution of psychoanalytic thinking, Sullivan's radical interpersonalism was heuristically invaluable. It provided the means to probe the extent to which all human motivation could be understood solely in terms of interhuman experience; that purpose has been well served, and the gains from it have by no means been exhausted. At the same time, I believe that we are now at a point in theory building that invites exploration of the balance

between the contributions of the software and hardware, and the ways in which they influence each other. The self as a center of activity and agency has somehow been neglected by placing the emphasis so firmly on a two-person psychology. As elusive as the self is, so, too, is it tangible, even if illusory; certainly the maintenance of security and self-coherence are needs central to human life and their lack spells psychopathology. Somewhat more controversial, but of great interest, are such needs as the quest for growth in the sense of the expansion of one's capacities. Is it exactly here that the lines between hardware and software, between a one-person and a two-person psychology, become blurred. Is it that the growth tendency is simply built into the human organism, or does it require facilitating and structuralizing experience at the hands of others for it to come into being?

In my view, a further proposition underlies a global view of the relational perspective. In its most general form, it can be stated that there are two basic opposing motivational thrusts in all living beings. They could be called expansive versus conservative, centrifugal versus centripetal, growth-oriented versus status-quo oriented, and so on. While we look upon the self-perpetuating motivational thrust as "resistance," we recognize the expansive tendency as the indispensable ally in our therapeutic efforts; in fact, in many ways we, as analysts, are midwives to this thrust. Recently, Greenberg (1991) has advanced persuasive arguments for a model of the mind that eschews the dual-instinct theory of sex and aggression while retaining the duality of two newly defined basic drives, the "safety drive" and the "effectance drive." Although very different in structure, Greenberg's model has a certain family resemblance to the dual-thrust model of Angyal (1965), who proposed two basic trends, one toward autonomy, the other toward homonomy. One can trace the resemblance even as far back as Buber (1947, pp. 85–88), who interestingly referred to somewhat similar dual trends, the "originator instinct"—the human need to make things—and "the instinct for communion"—the need to enter into mutuality and to share in a common undertaking. It is not difficult to see how the vistas offered by Angyal or Buber, although foreign to the language of psychoanalysis, nonetheless can be located in the two broad categories of motivation (see Ghent, 1989). Also related is the distinction made by Schachtel (1959, ch. 2) between activity affects and embeddedness affects. Implicit in Sullivan are the twin givens, the need for satisfaction and the need for security. In all these systems, the "drives" are in some ways and under certain circumstances adversarial and at other times quite complementary.

Clearly, relational thinking has had a long and rich history, although the designation "relational" is a relative newcomer on the psychoanalytic scene. The present volume is a testament to its continuing evolution and clarification; the varied contributions point to the areas of commonality and, as well, draw attention to the unresolved conflicts, both explicit and implicit, in points of view. As I see it, this opportunity to air and discuss such differences is the very essence of what is needed to nurture the development of psychoanalysis both as a theory and as a therapeutic procedure.

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Introduction

NEIL J. SKOLNICK
SUSAN C. WARSHAW

As psychoanalysis prepares to enter its second century, a number of prominent scholars have noted the fundamental conceptual shifts that have occurred within the discipline, shifts that many believe present major challenges to the classical metapsychology (see, e.g., Gedo, 1979; Eagle, 1984; Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell, 1988). There is increasing focus on, and acceptance of, the primacy of relationships with others in the development of the personality, with major ramifications for conceptions of psychic structure, theories of motivation and pathogenesis, and clinical technique.

Since the very beginnings of psychoanalysis there have been attacks on Freud's instinctual drive theory, attacks that have led to the development of alternative models of mind based on different motivational and developmental premises. Writing almost a decade ago, Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) suggested that

> the most significant tension in the history of psychoanalytic ideas has been the dialectic between the original Freudian model . . . and an alternative comprehensive model initiated in the works of Fairbairn and Sullivan, which evolves structure solely from the individual's relations with other people [p. 20].

They designated models belonging to the alternative perspective as "relational/structure" models, with Fairbairn and Sullivan representing its purest forms. Currently many theorists are attempting to integrate relational concepts into their work. There is no single

relational model or theory. Rather, some who identify with this perspective are interpersonalists; others, British object relations theorists; still others, self psychologists. Some may not completely align themselves with a purely relational model and differ in the extent to which they dissociate themselves from drive theory. All have a common concern with the centrality of relationship in the development and structure of personality.

The past decade has seen major attempts to increase communication among psychoanalytic theorists and practitioners from diverse orientations. Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) expressed the hope that a careful and respectful comparison of theories would increase clarity, mitigate confusion generated by diverse schools of thought, and highlight commonalities as well as differences among metapsychological approaches. The contributors to the present volume, each of whom identifies with a relational perspective, have their roots in different psychoanalytic traditions, including British object relations, interpersonal, self psychology, as well as Freudian psychoanalysis. All the contributors have been involved with describing and elucidating aspects of their theoretical and clinical approaches in order to promote an openness of inquiry and a comparison of diverse metapsychologies. Some have undertaken comprehensive explorations of the possibilities for integration and synthesis of ideas from different models. The unifying focus of all the authors has been the primary significance of relational configurations as both the building blocks of mind and the central concern of the psychoanalytic situation. Contemporary developmental research focusing on early mother-infant interaction as well as on attachment theory has provided empirical support for the evolution of relational points of view.

The chapters in this book represent a sampling of issues being addressed by contemporary psychoanalytic clinicians and theoreticians writing from a relational point of view. Some authors concern themselves with reconceptualizing aspects of metapsychology; others believe that relational thinking has in fact permeated psychoanalytic theory from its earliest days. Others take as their focus revision of developmental theory. Still others are concerned with clinical applications. The issues addressed here by no means represent all those with which current relational thinkers are wrestling.

Historically, a central focus of relational theorists has been with the definition and description of the concept of self, particularly in regard to its roles in development, psychopathology, and the analytic process. The first three chapters discuss problematic issues that surface when one attempts to consider the concept of self from a relational point of view. Stephen Mitchell notes that locating the core

of the self presents a particular difficulty for relational theorists. Whereas Freud located the core, or center, of the self in the biologically based id, most relational theorists have difficulty locating such a core, or center, in a model that takes as its basic assumption an inherently interactive definition of self. Mitchell suggests that previous attempts to conceptualize the locus of individuality, or the true self, as rooted in a spatial metaphor, are misleading. Offering as an alternative a temporal definition of self, he defines the self as the subjective organization of meanings a person creates as he or she moves through time, experiencing ideas and feelings, including self-reflective ideas and feelings. Mitchell offers authenticity as a substitute for the concept of true self or core self. Defining authenticity, however, is problematic since its illusiveness is rooted in distinguishing internal from external considerations.

James Fosshage argues that the concept of self can and should be considered from the vantage point of a synthesis of one- *and* two-person psychologies. He discusses the emergent theoretical synthesis in regard to its usefulness for understanding and explaining issues in development, pathogenesis, transference, and therapeutic action.

Jessica Benjamin discusses the significance of our relationships with "the other" in the development of our experience of our self. The concept of the other as object has its historical roots in intrapsychic theory, essentially a one-person psychology. Acknowledging the significance of the object in the development of the self, Benjamin argues that object relations theories and self psychology theory provide us with only a partial understanding of the significance of the relationship to the other in our development. Drawing on the theory of intersubjectivity (originally brought into psychoanalysis from philosophy), Benjamin notes that there is another relationship that we have to the other which is of equal significance to our development of self, and that is our relationship to the other as a separate "subject" with a separate and equivalent center of self. Benjamin proposes that the two dimensions of experience with the object/other (the intrapsychic and the intersubjective) are complementary even though they sometimes stand in an oppositional relationship.

Advancements in developmental research with mothers and young children have provided support for an evolving relational model of mind. The next two chapters present recent and innovative research on the interaction of mothers and children at different developmental stages. Beatrice Beebe, Joseph Jaffe, and Frank Lachmann review the contributions of infant research literature to illustrate a "Dyadic Systems View of Communication." They believe that the elucidation of the nature of interpersonal process and interactive regulation in the

dyad has implications for the conceptualization of psychic structure and its development. It is their contention that early interaction structures, represented in presymbolic form in the first year of life, provide the basis for emerging symbolic forms of self- and object representations. Interaction structures are characteristic patterns of mutual regulation between infant and caregiver, patterns that the infant comes to remember and expect. They believe that the elucidation of the nature of interpersonal process and interactive regulation in the dyad has implications for the conceptualization of psychic structure and its development.

Adrienne Harris explores the manner in which the process of language development is interwoven with the evolution of the self and subjectivity. She reviews many important concepts emerging out of developmental psycholinguistics. She perceives a relationship between certain key psycholinguistic concepts and certain ideas emanating from British object relations theory, particularly Winnicott's "transitional space." By using vignettes derived from her mother-toddler research, Harris illustrates the multiple ways in which parent-child dialogues become sites for the construction of the experience both of self and of social consciousness.

The six clinically oriented chapters represent a sampling of the possibilities for conceptualizing treatment issues and phenomena and formulating intervention approaches once a shift to a relational perspective is taken. Two chapters focus specifically on the implications of a relational perspective for doing clinical work with children.

Susan Warshaw reviews the contributions to child psychoanalysis of several key child clinicians whose work has in one way or another been contributory to an evolving relational perspective. Explicating aspects of the work of Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, D. W. Winnicott, and Margaret Mahler, she notes that these primary contributors to the child psychoanalytic treatment literature were practitioners whose work was rooted in instinct theory. Warshaw discusses the place of relational thinking within each of their treatment perspectives and the conceptions of each with respect to mutative factors in child treatment. She then discusses the implications of attempting to develop a child-treatment approach using a non-drive-relational model of mind.

Neil Altman focuses specifically on the concept of transference in child treatment and attempts to develop a relational perspective that is useful for child work. He begins with a comparison of the concept of transference in the works of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, and he further develops an object-relational perspective that is rooted in the works of Bion. Presenting two clinical vignettes, he attempts to clarify the ways in which his relational perspective assists in understanding and working with the transference.

The following four authors all present arguments, substantiated and illustrated by clinical observations, for the viability and utility of applying a relational emphasis to some aspect of adult clinical work. All make respectful comparisons with other models, with the expressed or implicit purpose of highlighting the change in clinical approach that is shaped and informed by a relational perspective. Doris Silverman provides us with a comprehensive overview of research related to attachment theory. She draws from three sources of intersecting data to demonstrate the establishment and internalization of attachment patterns, which she believes may become relatively unconscious and exert motivational force. She suggests a way that motivations rooted in attachment patterns can exist alongside, as well as become integrated with, motivations originating in bodily experience. The case material she presents illustrates the interdependency of sensual/sexual and aggressive strivings and thwarted early attachment relationships.

Neil Skolnick and Jody Messler Davies consider the issues of secrets and secrecy as they manifest in normal development, psychopathology, and the clinical situation. After a historical overview of psychoanalytic conceptualizations of secrets, they present a developmental and clinical understanding of secrecy that has its foundation in relational concerns. They consider the process of forming and maintaining secrets to be supraordinate to the actual content of a secret. Making this shift to a focus on process, they argue, allows us to regard the meaning and importance of secrets as residing in relational requisites of the self. These requisites include establishing intimacy; defining secure, flexible boundaries between internal and external experience; mitigating primitive omnipotence; and aiding in the discovery and development of an intersubjective sense of self and others.

At another level of discourse, Lewis Aron and Irwin Hirsch approach a long-neglected topic, routinely ignored by theoreticians and clinicians alike. With an admirable degree of candor, they consider the various aspects of the issue of money as it emerges in the transference/countertransference matrix. Invoking an interpersonal understanding of the nature of the analytic situation, they focus on the patient's awareness of the analyst's subjectivity, a focus rooted in Gill's (1982) theory of transference. The authors provide a clinical example to illustrate how the patient's perspective of the external reality and the analyst's attitudes toward money are worked within the clinical setting.

In the final chapter, Philip Bromberg describes the schizoid personality and its development from an interpersonal perspective. While acknowledging the insights derived from a drive perspective, he

expands the conceptualization of the schizoid character structure by postulating its genesis as rooted in a tightly regulated balance between relatedness and detachment. Arguing that an interpersonally rooted approach provides a more comprehensive perspective than one based on libidinal concerns, he explains the appearance of the Isakower phenomenon during the middle phases of treatment as a reemergence of a developmentally earlier unsuccessful struggle to deal creatively and adaptively with potentially catastrophic interpersonal experience.

We conclude with two chapters that take as their exclusive focus the historical underpinnings of relational perspectives in psychoanalytic theory. Steven Reisner returns to Freud's text and argues that throughout Freud's writings a relational component can be discerned that exists in a dialectic tension with his drive-discharge model. Reisner claims, as a point of departure, that Eros, which Freud posited in his final dual-drive theory as one of the two irreducible primal human motivations, was intended to represent an incontrovertably relational concept. To truly appreciate the meaning of Eros, he argues, is to understand it as representing an unyielding motivation for relationship. He places it squarely in the realm of an object-seeking rather than a pleasure-seeking motive. He then focuses on what have been considered major turning points in classical drive theory: the abandonment of the seduction hypothesis of 1897, the articulation of the infantile sexual drive in "The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" (Freud, 1905) and the elaboration of the metapsychology in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" (Freud, 1915). Throughout, he proposes that Freud continually counterposed his emphasis on bodily and genetic tensions with a decided concern for interactional experiences and their subjective meanings.

Benjamin Wolstein approaches the history of relational theorizing from another perspective. He differentiates between psychoanalytic psychology and metapsychology and traces the evolution of each. By psychoanalytic psychology, he is referring to the process of therapeutic inquiry that all psychoanalysts are involved in, such as making observations and inferences about transference, countertransference, resistance and counterresistance, anxiety and counteranxiety, and the self. Interpretively, analysts differ in their appeal to diverse myths and metaphors about the conjectured and reconstructable meanings of those observations and inferences. These diverse myths and metaphors are reflective of differing metapsychologies. Wolstein argues that Freud's metapsychology was only one of many possible explanatory systems that could be utilized to organize and provide meaning to the data gathered from his method of psychoanalytic

inquiry. Despite Freud's use of a biological model of mind, Wolstein continues, from its inception as a method of therapeutic inquiry, psychoanalytic psychology has gathered its data from a primarily relational field of experience created and shared by two coparticipants, the analyst and the patient. This was always the case even when a metapsychology was invoked that did not focus on the relational underpinnings of the psychoanalytic explanatory system.

The range and depth of issues addressed by the contributors to this volume, while by no means comprehensive in scope, are representative of the extent to which clinicians and theoreticians writing from a relational point of view are presenting a serious challenge to more traditional metapsychologies. Although such challenges are far from new, it is our contention that a shift to a broad-based focus on relational concerns is emblematic of a momentous shift in the center of gravity in psychoanalytic theory and practice. Given the diverse traditions and backgrounds of those writing from relational perspectives, it is inevitable that differences among relational theorists will continue to be elucidated and debated. All, however, share a conviction of the centrality of relationships in human development and personality structure.

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True Selves, False Selves, and the Ambiguity of Authenticity

STEPHEN A. MITCHELL

The major influences on Freud's thought include not only the rationality of the 18th-century Enlightenment, which laid the philosophical foundation for the modern scientific world view, but also the powerful romantic vision of 19th-century poets and painters. Central to the vision of the latter was a call for the shedding of the trappings of civilization and a return to the power and immediacy of the "natural" world. For Freud, the embodiment of the "natural" world in man is the "id," where he locates the instincts, at the core of the self; they represent "the true purpose of the individual organism's life. This consists of the satisfaction of its innate needs" (Freud, 1940, p. 148); the ego and the superego are secondary formations, social adaptations, formed on the surface of the id. For Freud, it is an understanding of the body-based instincts that makes psychoanalysis a "depth" psychology, grounded in the most central, most "primitive" wellsprings of the individual.

The commitment of many contemporary analysts to Freud's drive theory is based on the belief that only in an appreciation of drives is the deepest understanding of the individual found, underneath the more superficial, cultural, adaptive overlays. Just as society requires us to wear clothing to cover our physical nakedness, social necessities create layers of regulatory and defensive adaptations to cover our true

I would like to express my gratitude to Emmanuel Ghent and Neil Altman, both of whom carefully read and challenged the ideas in earlier drafts of this essay in a way that helped develop my own thinking about these problems.

animal motives and nature. Waelder's (1960) homage to what he called the "imperative, majestic, power of *Trieb*" (p. 98) is emblematic of the elemental and elevated primacy attributed to the drives.

From this viewpoint, various relational theories including self psychology, interpersonal psychoanalysis, and some versions of object relations theories, by abandoning the theory of drives have lost the basis for an understanding of the individual in any depth. They have given up the tools for exploring true, passionate, authentic individuality, in contrast to the more superficial, shallow, interpersonal and social overlays. In fact, many European analysts see the movement away from an exclusive focus on drives in contemporary American Freudian theory, exemplified by ego psychology, as an abandonment of the individual, personal depths of human psychology. The call for a "return to Freud" and much of the contemporary loyalty to classical theory derive from the concern that the increasing emphasis on relational factors throughout recent psychoanalytic theorizing threatens to eliminate the personal, the uniquely individual, which Freud located in the body-based, sexual and aggressive impulses of the presocial id.

Where is the core of the self within a relational perspective? This is a real problem. In most relational theorizing, consistent with most contemporary infancy research as well as with contemporary linguistics, it is assumed that the self cannot exist in isolation. "There is no such thing as a baby," Winnicott's startling epigram reminds us, "only the mother–infant couple." The very capacity to have experiences necessarily develops in and requires an interpersonal matrix, and the organization, the patterning of all experiences is an extremely complex product of the interactions between the baby (with its temperamental sensitivities and thresholds) and the semiotic and interactive styles of the caregivers. There is no experience that is not interpersonally mediated. The meanings generated by the self are all interactive products.

But where is the center, the heart, the core of the individual in such a perspective? How can we find a place in the self where the individual *qua* individual might be thought to begin or reside? With the relational emphasis on attachment, interpersonal relations, identifications, and so on, how can psychoanalysis fail to become a form of sociology or social learning theory, in which the individual is viewed as a product of the social environment? If there are no body-based drives to represent "nature" at the intrapsychic core of the individual, how does psychoanalysis retain its most important and precious legacy as an instrument for inquiry into the depths of personal experience? The distinction between the true self and false,

between the superficial and the more deeply felt, between conformistic adaptations and the more truly personal, between the authentic and the inauthentic: these distinctions are crucial to the analytic enterprise, and these distinctions seem to require that we locate the core or center of the self for use as a reference point.

There have been various attempts to deal with this problem as alternatives to retaining Freud's outmoded concept of drives as preexperiential, prelinguistic, archaic, phylogenetic residues.

One strategy has been to grant primary importance to the body, its parts and processes, and particularly to infantile bodily experiences, yet without Freud's notion of "drives." Why would the body be important if not for drives? There might be lots of reasons. Schafer (whose identity as a Freudian despite his disavowal of drive theory is based largely on the importance he places on infantile sexuality and aggression) believes that infantile body parts and experiences are the cognitive paradigms for organizing all experience. Our early life is dominated by powerful and absorbing physical events—eating, urinating, defecating, arousal, quiescence—and these events and processes become the basic categories, the underlying metaphors through which all subsequent experience is patterned.

This extremely valuable approach makes possible a reinterpretation of Freudian and Kleinian concepts of instincts from energic into cognitive and linguistic terms, and characterizes some of the most important contemporary contributions to psychoanalytic theorizing (see Ogden, 1986, 1989). Yet it does not help solve our problem of locating the core of the self. Freud thought that body parts and processes are represented directly and invariably in experience; that the ego is first and foremost a body ego, and that "anatomy is destiny." This makes sense within the context of drive theory, because the bodily tensions drive the mental apparatus, because instinctual experiences are the sole motivational energy for the mind, and because the self as a whole is derivative of and superimposed upon the vicissitudes of body-based drives. But if we eliminate drive theory as a motivational substructure, how do we understand the *meaning* that body parts and experiences take on for the individual? They must derive to a significant degree from the mutually regulatory, interpersonal, linguistic, and cultural matrix into which the individual is born. In most relational approaches, in contrast to drive theory metapsychology, it makes no sense to talk about *raw* bodily experience, which is subsequently controlled or regulated through cultural processes. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who have made important recent contributions to our understanding of the metaphorical structure of language, argue:

> What we call "direct physical experience" is never merely a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather, *every* experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we then "interpret" in terms of our conceptual system. Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our "world" in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself [p. 57].

It is also true that the individual experiences culture *through* their own body. In that sense, all experience is also bodily "through and through." The cultural input can sometimes be factored out, because it appears across individuals and its transmission is often visible and apparent (as in a particular cultural value system). Bodily experience only becomes known in necessarily social experience with others, and the very terms and categories through which it becomes known are shaped by linguistic and social experience.

The physical structure of the body probably provides constraints on body-based elaborations of meaning. The penis probably lends itself to a somewhat different, although overlapping, array of possible meanings and metaphors than either the clitoris or the vagina, although this is impossible to ever really determine. Within the framework of drive theory it made sense to think one could separate out the universal from the socially elaborated in bodily experience and to assign the core of the individual to the former, as if the body were directly represented in experience in some sort of pure form. Without the presumption of primary drives as the underlying motivational push, it makes no sense to think about the distillation of a pure, "natural" dimension of experience.

Another way to relocate the importance of the body within a relational framework is to argue that intense bodily happenings—like sexual arousal, orgasm, eating, defecating, perhaps rage—have a preemptive physical claim and explosive power to them that inevitably places them at the core of personal experience. This seems to be what Winnicott for example, meant by "instinctual" experience, which has very little to do with Freud's drive theory. This is a very useful approach, but once again, it does not help us with the problem of locating a core self.

Consider Winnicott's perspective, for example, where the self is derived from interactions between the baby and the mother. Instinctual experiences *can* facilitate and vitalize the development of the self,

but they also can operate totally outside it. Winnicott (1963, p. 181) warns that the baby can be "fobbed off" by a good feed. What does that mean? The self does not develop out of instinctual experiences like feeding, but rather out of the subtle dialectic of maternal responsiveness. If feeding occurs in the context of good-enough mothering, it becomes a vehicle for growth of the self. If the mothering is inadequate, the power of the feeding experience actually detracts from self-development. The meaning of the bodily event depends on its position vis-à-vis the self.

There are people who experience sexual desire, or hunger for food, as a welcome sign of vitality. Others experience desire as a toxic impingement. Still others have no idea at all when they might be desirous of sex or of food, but decide by the clock. Finally, others never seem to experience desire or hunger at all. The location of experiences of anger or rage in relation to the self is similarly crucial; anger can vitalize, intrude upon, or deplete the self. The *meaning* of these bodily events, the psychological significance they contain regarding self, derives not from their inherent properties, but from the way early relational patterns have structured them vis-à-vis the self. Such physical experiences can not represent the core of the self, since they operate rather as vehicles to self-experience, in either authentic or inauthentic ways.

Another aspect of constitutional, bodily factors—temperament—has been similarly appropriated as a route to finding the core of the self. The history of psychoanalytic ideas is a history of overcorrections. In their eagerness to jettison the concept of innate drives, early relational theorists often wrote as if all babies were the same and the course of development derived purely from environmental input. Critics now correctly argue that babies are quite different from each other and that these temperamental differences have major implications for development. Those differences has been amply demonstrated empirically over the past several decades, and recent models of infant–mother interactions stress the "fit" or lack of fit between particular mothers and particular babies. Bollas (1989) has explored and extended this factor in stressing the importance of constitutionally based temperamental differences leading to particular personality style or personal "idiom" and to a sense of "destiny."

Differences in temperament, although extremely important, are nevertheless a problematic place to locate the core of the self. Temperament is not in any obvious sense motivational, and it is not represented directly in experience. The experience and meaning of temperamental differences is interpreted, often through identifications and counteridentifications. What is "high energy" in one family

is hyperactivity in another. What is "sensitivity" in one family is weakness and inadequacy in another. Temperamental factors, like bodily configurations and processes, can be used by the self to fill out and represent various self-expressions and self-definitions. But they do not in themselves lead to particular forms of self-formation outside of complex social interaction.

There have been other attempts to search for a new locus of individuality, apart from the body per se, but located in very early experience. In the place previously occupied by Freud's id Kohut (1977) puts a preprogrammed "destiny"; Guntrip (1969) places a regressed, schizoid baby; Winnicott designates a creative omnipotence, and so on. Each theorist wants to divide the content of the self, to cut up the pie into socially negotiated segments and something else, which exists prior to social interaction and which can be considered the core of the self.

The latter approach is closely connected with a linear perspective on development and developmental arrests. The infant is presumed to begin life with a whole, or integral, self at least in potentiality, and that self is either facilitated by the human environment or blocked and thwarted in some fashion. If the self is blocked, the potential for authentic experience is frozen at that developmental point, and a reanimation of the true self is only possible through a regeneration of those developmental needs. One artifact of this strategy for locating the core of the self outside of and prior to the relational field is that it leads to a regressive cast in theorizing. Earlier is presumed to be somehow more primary, more personal, more "primitive," as if the core of the individual existed preverbally, even preexperientially *before* the infant encountered others.

One way in which this sort of developmental approach is framed is to speak of the self of the child-to-be as existing in potentiality in the infant and intuited and reflected by the mother (Loewald, 1960; Kohut, 1977). I have no problem with this notion if it is understood that the child has many potentialities with respect to self-development and that the one intuited by the mother is regarded as also partially a reflection of the mother's own subjectivity. The father, after all, may very likely intuit a quite different child in potential. In fact, it is precisely because the mother's child is somewhat different from the father's child that conflict between different organizations of self is so universally generated. So, to speak of the core of the self as existing in potentiality is to beg the question. Either it exists in already organized fashion and unfolds in a receptive environment, a notion that I find implausible; or unorganized temperamental differences exist, organized and selected through interaction with care-givers.

This brings us straight back to the problem of locating the core of the self.

An interesting variant of this strategy has been developed recently by Slavin and Kriegman (1990), who have proposed a new paradigm for psychoanalysis derived from evolutionary biology and broad considerations concerning genetics and adaptation. They argue that the basic conflict in human experience is intergenerational—the clash in self-interest between parent and child. Because the offspring represent the survival of the parents' gene pool, the parents sacrifice individual self-interest to care for the child. Because the child exists in a prolonged period of dependence on the parent, the need to continually connect with the parents' goals and values is paramount; his own self-interested motives are rendered secondary and repressed, only to return later in life (that is, in adolescence), when primary attachments are less functionally necessary. Slavin and Kriegman suggest that Freud's concept of endogenous instinctual drives, representing peremptory, aggressively self-interested, asocial, exclusively personal needs, can be thought to refer to that aspect of the personality which shapes and maintains the self as individual versus the self as embedded in a relational matrix. "In the drives we have a mechanism that guarantees access to some types of motivation that *arise from non-relational sources* and are, in a sense, *totally dedicated toward the promotion of our individual interests*" (p. 37).

The evolutionary perspective of Slavin and Kriegman provides interesting angles on many traditional psychoanalytic issues. However, their attempt to use the classical concept of "drives" as the core of the individually-configured self does not really work in the way they claim. A close reading suggests that they alter Freud's notion of "drives" in order to make it work within their larger scheme.

> Drives, and the structural model of drive-defense conflict, assumes a *subsidiary* role within a larger, relationally designed and configured psyche. But, to the extent that the classical agenda is read as a "narrative of conflict," it captures certain major, significant features of the relational world and the inherently "divided" way we are adapted to it [p. 47].

In my view, "drives" relocated and reset into a relationally configured psyche are no longer Freud's "drives," prewired, endogenous pressures whose meaning is represented within the mind unmediated by the semiotic, metaphoric meaning systems of the relational world. Once again, the effort to portray a part of the psyche as separate from, prior to, and sheltered from the interactive, mutually regulatory structures of the relational matrix proves problematic.

There has been considerable interest in contemporary philosophy and linguistics in the way metaphor shapes understanding and experience. Concepts as vague and insubstantial as "psyche," "mind," or "self" are impossible to grasp in precise, denotative terms. We understand and come to experience them in terms of other, generally more concrete kinds of experiences and activities (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Schafer (1976) has demonstrated that in most psychoanalytic theorizing in general and especially in psychoanalytic formulations about self, the self is thought about, either explicitly or implicitly, in concretely spatial terms. This way of thinking comes directly from Freud.[1] In both the topographical and the structural models, Freud grounds his theorizing in a clearly defined spatial metaphor: "the hypothesis we have adopted for a psychical apparatus extended into space" (1940, p. 196).

If we think about mind in terms of spatial metaphors, as if it existed in space, with structures, within a topography, then it makes sense to approach it as one would an onion, to try to locate its "core" or "heart," to delineate its layers, to differentiate its authentic pieces from its false, protective covering, and so on. Some of the more careful psychoanalytic theorists like Rapaport and Loewald have taken pains to point out that the concept of psychic structure refers not to something substantive but to recurring patterns of experience and behavior over time. Thus, Rapaport (1957) defines structure as a "relatively stable (having a slow rate of change), characteristic configuration that we can abstract from the behavior observed" (p. 701).

Yet in common usage, deriving from Freud's talking about the psyche as occupying spaces with structural properties, the spatial metaphor has become reified. All the strategies for theorizing about the "true" or "core" self that we have considered accept, explicitly or implicitly, this spatial metaphor and try to locate the elemental from the unessential features of the self, to distinguish its essential from its insignificant features, to locate its center or foundation. We want to get underneath the adaptations that the self has made in its negotiations with others, to get at its beginnings, its true, presocial essence. This search for a core is what continues to make Freud's id and its romanticization of a pure, animal nature so compelling.

Perhaps to think of the self as existing in space is misleading. Clearly, the brain exists in space, and the phenomenological *experience* of the self as layered and cloistered in space is common, perhaps

[1]Freud did not invent spatial metaphors for thinking about mind; they have a long history in western philosophy. (See Ryle, 1949, for an extended critique of this way of talking about mind.)

universal. But it seems more accurate and, I believe, more useful, to regard the self as a temporal rather than a spatial phenomenon. The self *is* nowhere; the self refers to the subjective organization of meanings a person creates as he or she moves through time, doing things, like having ideas and feelings, including some self-reflective ideas and feelings about oneself.

If the self moves in time rather than exists in space, it has no core; but it has many different ways of operating. Some of the ways in which I operate and express myself I consider more "authentic," more important to or representative of "me" than others. These are often difficult discriminations, but I think we are all involved in making them a good deal of the time. There are times when I feel more "myself" than others, when I feel I have presented my thoughts and feelings accurately and succinctly, when I have been comfortable enough to allow myself to reveal more of my spontaneous repertoire. At other times I feel less "myself," jumbled, unable or unwilling to make myself clear, too awkward or constrained to reveal myself in anything but a stereotyped or constricted fashion. We all operate in this range of possibilities. The extreme form of inauthenticity is deliberate lying. When I am lying, I am misrepresenting my feelings or events and am being less authentic than when I am trying to represent myself and events more accurately.

By using the terms "authentic" and "inauthentic," are we not measuring our experience against some implicit standard, some preconceived idea of what is "me"? Do these terms also imply a "core" or "true" or "real" me that exists somewhere (smuggling back the spatial metaphor)? No. One has a sense of one's experience over time. One can measure a new experience in terms of continuity or discontinuity with the past and present; a new experience can represent and express one's history and current state or deny and betray one's history and current state. Speaking of authenticity versus inauthenticity or true versus false *experience* frees us from the spatial metaphor in a way that speaking of a true or false *self* or a "core" or "real" *self* does not.

In speaking about authenticity and inauthenticity, the crucial difference lies not in the specific *content* of what I feel or do, but in the relationship between what I feel and do and the spontaneous configuration and flow of my experience at that point in *time.* A particular act of self-expression, a piece of self-revelation, for example, or a sexual overture, may feel extremely authentic at one point and extremely inauthentic at another. In the first case, it feels "right," suits both the external, interpersonal context and the internal emotional context. In the second case, it feels "off," forced, contrived, out

of "sync" interpersonally, internally, or both. The degree to which an act or feeling represents or misrepresents the personal self depends not on its content (not on what is *in* it), but on its place in the context and configuration of experience as it is continually organized, disorganized, and reorganized in time.

Consider Winnicott's (1960, 1963) depiction of the earliest feeding experiences, which he establishes as the basis for the split between true and false selves. In pathological feeding, he suggests, the infant takes its cues from impingements from the outside. The baby's own impulses and needs are not met by the mother, and the baby learns to want what the mother gives, to become the mother's idea of who the baby is. Authentic feeding experience, on the other hand, derives from the baby's spontaneously arising gestures, which the good-enough mother meets and actualizes, creating what Winnicott terms the "moment of illusion."

What is the content of these spontaneous gestures? Even in the earliest feedings, Winnicott suggests, the baby's "readiness" to imagine a breast leads immediately to experiences in the real world out of which develops the baby's idea of the breast, which is further matched by the mother's responsiveness. It cannot be the content that differentiates authentic from inauthentic experience; the image of the breast in the two experiences is virtually the same. What is crucial is the point of origin of the idea at any given time, and that makes all the difference. At one moment a movement toward the breast occurs spontaneously in the baby; at another moment, it is a response to the mother's idea of what the baby wants, a compliance with external impingement. Does the idea of the breast at a particular moment come from the baby or the mother? Does it arise spontaneously in the baby, or is it suggested or even coerced from the outside? This is the crucial issue for Winnicott, and it is a very useful starting point for thinking about the problem of authentic individuality in general.

The individual discovers himself within an interpersonal field of interactions in which he has participated long before the dawn of his own self-reflective consciousness of himself. The mind of which he becomes self-aware is constituted by a stream of impulses, fantasies, bodily sensations, which have been patterned through interaction and mutual regulation with caregivers. The experience and meaning of all these have been established and continue to be established, through the physical and mental handling and holding of significant others (Stern, 1985). In Bollas's (1983) earlier work, he argues that there is no purely generic "holding environment"; the particularities of the individual mother's handling of the baby become the existential medium of the baby's world and are structured into the developing

child's personal idiom. With the gradual dawning of self-awareness, that mental content becomes more fully one's own and can be used in various ways—it can be spontaneously expressed; it can be collaboratively coordinated in interactions with others; it can be deceptively packaged, disingenuously presented; it can be compromised; it can be betrayed.

In classical psychoanalysis, the central and most important question to be asked of the individual is: what are the patterns of gratification, frustration, and sublimation that shape this person's life? In contemporary psychoanalysis, in the work of its most visionary contributors (Winnicott, Bion, Schafer, Kohut, Lacan), the most important question to be asked has shifted to: how meaningful and authentic is a person's experience and expression of himself? Richness in living or psychopathology are the product not of instinctual vicissitudes, but of truth or falsity with respect to one's own experience. Why is the self so easily and commonly falsified, so routinely betrayed?

The self operates in the intricate and subtle dialectic between spontaneous vitality and self-expression on the one hand and the requirement, crucial for survival, to preserve secure and familiar connections with others, on the other. (Sullivan's, 1953, basic motivational distinction between the need for interpersonal security and needs for satisfaction reflect this duality.) Spontaneous self-expression serves as the ground for an array of authentic experience; the need for security leads to a concern with the impact of one's self-presentations on others. If I spontaneously express my feeling or thought or state of mind, do I make the other on whom I am greatly dependent anxious, angry, likely to withdraw? Do I have to conceal my spontaneous experience? disguise it? package it in a particular way, perhaps differently for different significant others? It is the necessity for mindfulness and some degree of control of one's impact on others that makes inevitable for all people at one time or another a whole array of inauthentic experiences. It is not differences in content that distinguish the authentic from the inauthentic; it is the way the content is organized, particularly in terms of the balance between internality and externality and the purpose to which the content is being put at any given moment.

Deciding what is true and what is false when it comes to self is a tricky business. Although Winnicott's idea of the "true self" is often used in a concrete and reified fashion, he himself suggests that "there is little point in formulating a True Self idea except for the purpose of trying to understanding the False Self, because it does no more than collect together the details of the experience of aliveness" (Winnicott,