Relational Psychoanalysis

VOLUME 4

Expansion *of* Theory

EDITED BY
Lewis Aron • Adrienne Harris

RBP

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The Relational Perspectives Book Series (RPBS) publishes books that grow out of or contribute to the relational tradition in contemporary psychoanalysis. The term *relational psychoanalysis* was first used by Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) to bridge the traditions of interpersonal relations, as developed within interpersonal psychoanalysis and object relations, as developed within contemporary British theory. But, under the seminal work of the late Stephen A. Mitchell, the term *relational psychoanalysis* grew and began to accrue to itself many other influences and developments. Various tributaries—interpersonal psychoanalysis, object relations theory, self psychology, empirical infancy research, and elements of contemporary Freudian and Kleinian thought—flow into this tradition, which understands relational configurations between self and others, both real and fantasied, as the primary subject of psychoanalytic investigation.

We refer to the relational tradition, rather than to a relational school, to highlight that we are identifying a trend, a tendency within contemporary psychoanalysis, not a more formally organized or coherent school or system of beliefs. Our use of the term *relational* signifies a dimension of theory and practice that has become salient across the wide spectrum of contemporary psychoanalysis. Now under the editorial supervision of Lewis Aron and Adrienne Harris, the Relational Perspectives Book Series originated in 1990 under the editorial eye of the late Stephen A. Mitchell. Mitchell was the most prolific and influential of the originators of the relational tradition. He was committed to dialogue among psychoanalysts and he abhorred the authoritarianism that dictated adherence to a rigid set of beliefs or technical restrictions. He championed open discussion, comparative and integrative approaches, and he promoted new voices across the generations.

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In Loving Memory of Ruth Stein (1947–2010)

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Contributors

Neil Altman, PhD, is an associate professor at the New York University (NYU) Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. He is also the past president of the Section on Social Responsibility for Division 39 (Psychoanalysis) of the American Psychological Association and is a founding board member, consultation group leader, and therapist in Fostering Connection, a program that offers pro bono psychotherapy to foster children. A coeditor of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, he is the author of *The Analyst in the Inner City, Second Edition: Race, Class, and Culture through a Psychoanalytic Lens* (Routledge, 2010).

Jessica Benjamin, PhD, is a faculty member at the Postdoctoral Psychology Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis at New York University. She is best known as the author of *The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination* (1988); her more recent books are *Like Subjects, Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Sexual Difference* (1995) and *Shadow of the Other: Intersubjectivity and Gender in Psychoanalysis* (1997). Recently she has been writing on the idea of thirdness and on the problem of acknowledgment and mutual recognition. She is the director of The Acknowledgment Project, a dialogue project started in the Middle East between Israeli and Palestinian mental health professionals. Dr. Benjamin has lectured and supervised all over the world, presenting her perspective on the development of gender and intersubjectivity as well as on the clinical and social implications of acknowledgment. She helped to found *Studies in Gender and Sexuality* and the International Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy. She is an associate of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* and is also a cofounder and board member of the Stephen Mitchell Center for Relational Studies in New York. She is a psychoanalyst in private practice in New York City.

Emanuel Berman, PhD, is a training and supervising analyst at the Israel Psychoanalytic Institute, a professor of psychology at the University of Haifa, and chief international editor of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*. He is the author of *Impossible Training: A Relational View of Psychoanalytic Education* (Analytic Press, 2004) and the editor of *Essential Papers on Literature and Psychoanalysis* (New York University Press, 1993). He has translated to Hebrew the works of Sigmund Freud, Sándor Ferenczi, Michael Balint, Donald Winnicott, and Thomas Ogden.

Jeanne Wolff Bernstein, PhD, is a past president of the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California and is a supervising and personal analyst on its faculty. She serves on the editorial boards of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, and *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* and has published articles on psychoanalysis and the arts and on the different schools of thought in psychoanalysis, particularly on the work of Jacques Lacan. She was the 2008 Fulbright Scholar at the Freud Museum in Vienna and is in private practice in Berkeley, California.

Susan Coates, PhD, is a clinical professor of psychology in the Psychiatry Department at the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University as well as a member of the teaching faculty of the Columbia Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research, where she was also a founding director of the Parent–Infant Psychotherapy Training Program. She has a long-standing interest in intergenerational transfer of trauma and in the interface of gender, trauma, and attachment. She is the coeditor of *September 11: Trauma and Human Bonds* (Analytic Press, 2003), along with her colleagues Dan Schechter and Jane Rosenthal.

Ken Corbett, PhD, is a clinical assistant professor at the New York University (NYU) Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. He is the author of *Boyhoods: Rethinking Masculinities* (Yale University Press, 2009).

Muriel Dimen, PhD, is an adjunct clinical professor of psychology at the New York University (NYU) Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis and professor emerita of anthropology at Lehman College (City University New York). On the faculties of many institutes, she is editor of *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, associate editor of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, and a founding board member and former treasurer of the International Association for Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy. Her most recent book, *Sexuality, Intimacy, Power*, received the Goethe Award from the Canadian Psychological Association for the Best Book of Psychoanalytic Scholarship published in 2003. She has also written *Surviving Sexual*

Contradictions (1986) and *The Anthropological Imagination* (1977). Her coedited books are *Gender in Psychoanalytic Space: Between Clinic and Culture* with Virginia Goldner (2002), *Storms in Her Head: New Clinical and Theoretical Perspectives on Breuer and Freud's Studies on Hysteria* with Adrienne Harris (2001), and *Regional Variation in Modern Greece and Cyprus: Toward an Ethnography of Greece* with Ernestine Friedl (1976). A fellow at the New York Institute for the Humanities at NYU, Dr. Dimen practices in Manhattan and supervises nationally.

Martin Stephen Frommer, PhD, is a faculty member and supervisor at the Institute for Contemporary Psychotherapy in New York City and faculty member at the Stephen Mitchell Center for Relational Studies. An associate editor of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* and a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Gay and Lesbian Mental Health*, he is in private practice in Manhattan.

Jill Gentile, PhD, is a faculty member at the New York University (NYU) Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis, the Institute for the Psychoanalytic Study of Subjectivity, and the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California. Her writing focuses on developmental semiotics and psychoanalytic phenomenology.

Samuel Gerson, PhD, is a founder and past president of the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California (PINC), where he is currently a faculty member and personal and supervising analyst. He is professor at the California School of Professional Psychology, an associate editor of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, and an editor for *Studies in Gender and Sexuality* and *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*. His recent work focuses on intersubjectivity, the concept of the third, hysteria, and drama and psychoanalysis. Dr. Gerson was awarded the Elise M. Hayman Award for the Study of Genocide and the Holocaust from the International Psychoanalytic Association in Berlin in 2007 for the work published in this volume.

Virginia Goldner, PhD, is the founding editor of *Studies in Gender and Sexuality* and an associate editor of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* and served two terms on the board of directors of the International Association of Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy (IARPP). She is coeditor of two books, *Gender in Psychoanalytic Space* (Other Press, 2001, with Muriel Dimen) and *Predatory Priests, Silenced Victims* (Routledge, 2007, with Mary Gail Frawley-O'Dea). She has received awards for her distinguished contributions to psychoanalysis by Division 39 of the APA (2007) and to family therapy by the American Family Therapy Academy (1996).

Sue Grand, PhD, is a faculty member and supervisor at the New York University (NYU) Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis, where she holds a specialization in trauma as well as couples and families. In addition, she is a faculty member at the Stephen Mitchell Center for Relational Psychoanalysis, the Manhattan Institute for Psychoanalysis, the National Institute for the Psychotherapies, and the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California. An associate editor of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, Dr. Grand is the author of *The Reproduction of Evil* (Analytic Press, 2000) and *The Hero in the Mirror* (Routledge, 2010). She maintains a private practice in New York City and Teaneck, New Jersey.

Hazel Ipp, PhD, is a past president of the International Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy and vice president of the Toronto Institute for Contemporary Psychoanalysis. Additionally, she is the joint editor-in-chief of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*.

Kimberlyn Leary, PhD, is the director of psychology and psychology training at the Cambridge Health Alliance and an associate professor at Harvard Medical School. She is also a member of the Network Faculty at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, where she has been a visiting scholar working on interdisciplinary inquiry pertaining to relational processes in negotiation and in clinical practice. She is the 2007 recipient of the Ernst and Gertrude Ticho Award of the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American Psychological Association's Division of Psychoanalysis award for clinical scholarship in 2010. Dr. Leary is on the editorial boards of *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, *Psychoanalytic Inquiry*, *Psychoanalytic Psychology*, the *Harvard Mental Health Letter,* and the *Harvard Negotiation Journal*.

Jonathan Slavin, PhD, ABPP, is a clinical instructor of psychology in the Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and is a member of the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California. He served twice as president of the Division of Psychoanalysis (39) of the American Psychological Association (1991, 2002). He is founding director of the Tufts University Counseling Center (1970–2006) and founding president of the Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis. Dr. Slavin has served as a consulting psychologist for the Ministry of Health of the State of Israel and the Israel Defense Forces and as a consulting psychologist of the Palestinian Counseling Service. He has also been a visiting lecturer at the Moscow Psychoanalytic Society; St. Petersburg Association for Child Psychoanalysis; Charles University, Prague; Hunan Medical University, Changsha, PRC; Armenian Psychoanalytic Association; Tel-Aviv University School for Psychotherapy; Israel Psychoanalytic Institute;

the Romanian–Dutch Foundation for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. He was also an honorary chair of the Psychoanalytic Division for the China Medical Association. Dr. Slavin has published in the areas of psychotherapy and psychoanalytic technique with emphasis on the mutual impact of analyst and patient in the evolving treatment relationship and the repair of disrupted experiences of personal agency. He has also published and lectured internationally in the areas of treatment of adult survivors of trauma and sexual abuse, treatment of late adolescents, and problems and controversies in psychoanalytic training and supervision. He is in private practice in Newton Highlands, Massachusetts.

Malcolm Owen Slavin, PhD, is the founder, former president, and supervising analyst at the Massachusetts Institute of Psychoanalysis and founder of its Postgraduate Fellowship Program. The former director of training at the Tufts University Counseling Center, he is an associate editor for *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* and on the board of *Gender and Psychoanalysis*.

Charles Spezzano, PhD, is a training and supervising analyst at the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California. He has served on the editorial boards of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, and *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, and his papers and reviews have been published in those and other journals. The author of *Affect in Psychoanalysis* (Analytic Press, 1993), he is a recipient of the Heinz Hartmann Award from the New York Psychoanalytic Institute for "outstanding contributions to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis."

Ruth Stein, PhD, was an associate clinical professor in the New York University (NYU) Postdoctoral Program for Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis and training analyst at the International Psychoanalytic Association. The author of *For Love of the Father: A Psychoanalytic Study of Religious Terrorism* (Stanford University Press, 2009), she maintained a private practice of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in New York City.

Melanie Suchet, PhD, is a faculty member at the Stephen Mitchell Center for Relational Studies. An associate editor of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* and contributing editor of *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, she is the originator and coeditor of *Relational Psychoanalysis: Volume 3* (Analytic Press, 2007). She is dedicated to bringing to the forefront newer ideas, especially political and social issues, and introducing newer literary forms of writing. She is particularly interested in issues of otherness: race, class, gender, and sexuality. She maintains a private practice in Manhattan.

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Foreword

Hazel Ipp

History

In ending his 1993 book *Hope and Dread in Psychoanalysis*, Stephen Mitchell offered a prescient observation. He noted that "the particular wrinkle for the author of clinical theory is that while the book has stopped, the work goes on.… Books of psychoanalytic theory are less fixed structures, less like buildings, and more like action photos, snapshots of a process that, if it remains alive, is continually changing" (p. 230).

So it was that Mitchell set the stage for a relational theory as a *home* for many divergent ideas as well as a particular *blueprint* that encouraged novel ways of conceiving old and new experiences that would be generative, constantly evolving and expanding, impacting and shaping our theory and process, as these mirror and intertwine with each other in dialectic tension.

It is now just over a decade since the publication of Mitchell and Aron's (1999) *Relational Psychoanalysis: The Emergence of a Tradition*—a compilation of seminal articles from many of our finest thinkers who, while influenced by diverse theoretical currents, shared a sensibility that infused their respective ideas and expanded the psychoanalytic terrain enormously.

In considering the importance of traditions, Mitchell and Aron argue that they cannot be consciously created. Rather, they need to be discovered self-reflectively. In Mitchell and Aron's (1999) view, "Meaningful traditions become touchstones, adding a depth and sense of connectedness that helps generate fresh thoughts and feelings" (p. ix). Indeed, these words are the very touchstone we can reflect on as we consider how much has emerged within and on account of the relational tradition being forged back then.

Looking back over the past decade, we are struck with the enormous experience of loss we have struggled with in the wake of the deaths of Stephen Mitchell and Emmanuel Ghent—two of the giants behind the relational tradition. Simultaneously, as we reflect on where we were, we cannot but be impressed with how much we have gained in our endeavors to deal with our losses creatively and generatively and as a testament to those who inspired so much. How far we have come in developing, articulating, enriching, extending, expanding, and intertwining the original key ideas into an ever more focused, delineated, yet variegated sensibility. This new thinking has deepened our understanding of the human mind, of the complexity of our clinical endeavors, and of the world in which we live. The political, social, cultural, once simply pitted as background, are now intrinsically interwoven into our thought, recalibrating our comprehension of subjectivity and human psychology.

Current Thinking

As the present volume shows, much of relational psychoanalysis is framed within a dialectical sensibility that organizes our thinking in several distinct ways. Within this model, we strive to hold the tension and the complexity to avoid polarizing issues of the learned, the universal, and the particular as we inevitably bump up against them. We struggle to stay with the necessary disruption of social categories and the alterations to our sense of the familiar even as it perturbs our semiotic systems. We strive to inhabit ambiguity, holding in mind the multiplicity of possibilities inherent in any given moment. In so doing, we wrestle constantly with not knowing, with the illusion of finding, with the reality of losing, with refinding and losing again.

In this spirit, we are forced to interrogate our beliefs as we consider ourselves in relation to another whose very being, or so we believe, may pit us against ourselves in ways too painful to imagine or hold. This is our challenge and our opportunity clinically, socially, and politically.

This anthology, the fourth in this series, focusing on "expansion" in terms of the current state of relational psychoanalysis, illuminates not only a deepening of thought but also an intensified intertwining of ideas and domains, with a particular focus throughout on keeping creative and reflective space open.

The papers selected for this volume are diverse, evocative, and compelling. The topics cover a wide range, their emphases vary, and novel ideas are brought to the fore and given life. While most of them hail to earlier writings in the relational tradition, each paper builds on and extends some of the thinking that was revolutionary just a few decades earlier.

As is evident in the diversity of topics and approaches, we are confronted with a multiplicity of ideas that, while bound by a shared sensibility and

dialectical thinking, do not necessarily fit together. Perhaps this is the very essence of what constitutes a relational collection (Aron & Harris, 2005). We arrive at our positions through the use of *multiple* analytic and political lenses where different versions become blended with relational concepts along with many other influences. Relational theory strives to mirror its content. In holding complexity and remaining fluid and dynamic, it is developed more with an intention to invite questions than to provide the stock answers of earlier psychoanalytic conceptualizations. Yet there is certainly a sensibility and a way of framing an understanding of mind and relationship that binds our thinking and keeps our dialogic space from simply collapsing into a "confusion of tongues."

A dominant organizing theme of this volume is the idea of the dialectics of self and other. Subthemes include the following:

- Finding the self *in* the other as titrated through one's particular attachment patterns and their correlated affect states
- Negotiating the otherness of the other, and engaging the disavowed, not-me self, the otherness within the self
- The shared making of meaning, its creation, loss, and recreation in relation to the other and to the otherness within self
- Self- and mutual recognition, and the serious sequelae of nonrecognition feature in most of the essays regardless of their particular emphasis

Another organizing theme coursing through this volume is predicated on the understanding that psychological trauma is ubiquitous from the very start. Whether one considers trauma from a developmental or existential perspective, it is ever present as a psychological potential, intertwining individual with social trauma and critically shaping personality. The magnitude and intersubjective context of the trauma determine its sequelae. In optimal circumstances, trauma is absorbed and worked into the everyday struggles of achieving a sustainable sense of personal integrity and relatedness. However, more massive trauma, particularly when it occurs within less optimal intersubjective contexts, often leads to greater devastation where powerfully dissociated repetitive patterns of being prevail. This is a state of being that eludes reflection and perpetually courts a sense of personal failure, along with a numbed relatedness that precludes spontaneity, creativity, and intimacy.

Ubuntu

To the theme of self and other, it seems appropriate to apply the idea of *ubuntu*. This ancient Bantu word familiar to South Africans and used by

Suchet (this volume) refers to an ethic of relatedness: A person is a person through other people. It is a concept that underscores interdependence and the shared fate of humanity. Tutu (cited in Nicolson, 2008) states:

> A person with *ubuntu* is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished, when others are tortured and oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are. (p. 2)

As is evident in these essays, the idea of *ubuntu* overlaps with many relational concepts that emphasize the achievement of genuine subjectivity and empathy with another as predicated on a solid sense of one's own mind. This requires a flexible but resilient subjectivity of one's own that can tolerate differences, discontinuities, and uncertainty while remaining bonded within the larger framework of being vulnerably human in relation to the shifting sands of tide and time. This is what we are all grappling with whether it is in the clinical, developmental, social, political, or existential realm.

Organization of This Book

The specific topics articulated in this volume fall into rough divides even while evincing clear overlaps and continuities among them. In broad terms, the topics can be organized along the following lines: attachment and developmental theory, models of mind, mental space, identity, sexuality, politics, and culture.

Observations deriving from attachment theory and other developmental models emphasize the life-sustaining force of the early dyad—the dyad that optimally contains and enables the developing infant while simultaneously setting the stage for the increasing differentiation of self and as well as self with other (Coates). We are reminded that the developing infant thrives best in interaction with a parent's authentic self (Berman)—the self that is felt as affectively engaged and present while holding a distinctly separate center of feeling and perception.

The idea of connectedness, which permits distinct subjectivities to coexist runs through many of the papers in this volume. Spezzano argues cogently that without a home for the mind, the self cannot locate itself. This home or psychic space is possible only when the other (the analyst) has the freedom to be a subjective agent in her or his own right so that dialogue, meaning making, and shifting affect states can be owned, acknowledged, and emotionally tolerated by the self.

Gentile's essay, in accordance with some of Spezzano's ideas, argues for greater fluidity between private and public selves mediated through a "transitional subject" (Gentile's term) that permits meaning making in the presence of a robust other.

Many of these essays emphasize a core theme: that subjectivities necessarily collide. Conflicting interests, self-interest, the illusions of self-preservation with their ubiquitous deceptions and self-deceptions, anxieties, shame, and other challenging affects, formulated or not, inevitably prevail in the continuous dialectic between self and other and in relation to the multiple, often dissociated self-states intrinsic to any interaction.

Benjamin's expanded theory of intersubjectivity, explicated in this volume, adds much to this conversation of mental space in terms of her ideas about the jointly created sense of safety or *rhythmic third* that sets the stage for achieving the dialogic *shared third*—the lens through which knowing and feeling known emerges, leading to mutual recognition and living with difference. Benjamin also expands on her notion of the *moral third* that speaks to the analyst's responsibility and willingness to affectively confront and acknowledge his or her own contribution to the enactments and inevitable breakdowns of mutual recognition.

What are the implications for the developing self when there is no compassionate witness, no home for the mind, no robust or caring other to feel with and be recognized by? We turn to the realms of identity formation, the social and the political.

Many of the papers address the sequelae of misrecognition or recognition cast in binary constructions where self-definition is determined in opposition to another—a determination rife with self-deception and dissociated self-states in the service of apparent self-preservation and power. Emphasizing the sociopolitical construction of identity to include the inherent tensions, paradoxes, and complexities entailed in these constructions, these essays address the perpetuation of binaries in the face of the misrecognizing other that maintains the great divide between being and experiencing. Each of these papers extends its consideration to what happens when the binaries are deconstructed, and we are able to consider paradox and complexity within dialogic space.

The essays focusing on racial identity (Altman, Leary, Suchet) offer a nuanced conceptualization. So Whiteness involves a denial of Blackness, an illusion of wholeness steeped in privilege and constructed in relation to the illusory perception of the lesser, disempowered other—the not-me other who, in Hegelian terms, remains ironically intrinsic to the recognition of the privileged one's superiority, if the latter is indeed to achieve purchase. Leary addresses a similar paradox in the act of *passing*—a form of camouflage that sequesters the self from expected trauma, usually associated with racism and homophobia—the trauma of variance so to speak (Corbett).

Passing also requires the context of a relationship with the implicit agreement between subject and object of not asking and not telling.

Grand extends the paradox in her relational consideration of terrorism, counterterrorism, and torture, demonstrating that there can be no hero without a sacrificial villain.

The intertwining of the political and mental space is demonstrated in Gerson's paper on the *dead third* in which he describes the devastating consequences of nonrecognition too often afforded the survivors of massive trauma such as the Holocaust and genocide. The complexity of surviving unimaginable atrocities, designed and perpetrated by fellow humans, culminates in living with an enduring sense of deadness where phantoms and voids abound and the psyche strains under the constant presence of absence. This is the state that Gerson refers to as the *dead third*. He argues that psychological survival after such atrocity requires the impossibility of life to be spoken with an actively concerned witness who can bear living with and feeling with unspeakable horror.

In this paper, Gerson offers a nuanced view of mourning and melancholia. While Sigmund Freud posited melancholia as the consequence of incomplete mourning, Gerson maintains that there is no completion of the mourning of genocide—we live *with* catastrophic loss, we do not work it *through*. It is truncated mourning that manifests as melancholia or mania characterized by indifference, delusion, and denial.

Bernstein, in her richly evocative reexamination of melancholia and its complex underpinnings, also addresses the history of early or severe trauma in the melancholic who, she argues, cannot risk erasure of the object by relinquishing mourning and moving on. Instead, the melancholic becomes a faithful and perpetual chronicler of his or her own personal history—often alienating the other who cannot find his or her way into this seemingly closed system of despair. Paradoxically, as noted above, Gerson argues that melancholia is the illusory or compromised solution to the irresolvable grief that engulfs survivors of genocide, whose future life is best ensured by *living with* rather than *working through* loss, absence, and betrayal.

The essays on gender and sexuality further demonstrate how profoundly deconstructing binaries has shaken the foundations of early categorizations. Goldner's felicitous argument for "theories that refuse to sit still" is well borne out as we consider our evolving understanding achieved through the deconstruction of anatomically fettered thinking that pervaded our culture and our clinics for far too long. We now understand that gender and sexuality are not biological givens but emanate and take shape through mind and culture (Corbett, Goldner). As Corbett states, "Minds are made in relation, genders are made in relation, and gender is routinely read as a marker of mind." Both Corbett and Goldner, through their respective lenses,

emphasize the "how" rather than the "why" that contributes to the specific features of another's lived gendered and sexual experience. Recasting our thinking on previously gendered binaries and sexual categorizations has important implications for clinical technique. How we listen and what we listen to become more meaningfully focused on the narratives and fantasies that accompany the complexity of lived experience.

Further expansion in our thinking is evinced in the papers dealing with love and lust and love and power where reflexive categorizations are interrogated and reconceptualized. Frommer, in expanding upon Mitchell's thinking of the otherness of the other to the otherness of self, argues for the coexistence of lust, traditionally perceived as otherness, and secure love. Frommer argues that the subjective dimensions of sexuality are heightened when our loving is accompanied by the capacity to bring the otherness of self more comfortably within our attachments.

Stein holds a similar view. She argues that excess, usually equated with otherness, makes for lusty relations but, as Ghent has argued before, believes that its transformative quality resides within a context of surrender with a trusted, secure other. At the same time, Stein demonstrates the complexity and paradoxical meanings inherent in the concept of excess, ranging from its impingement on the self to its potential to liberate sexual experience. She cautions us to exercise similar restraint in our theories and clinical practice to avoid foreclosing on understanding the richness and generative possibilities encoded in the term.

Dimen shakes up the habitually assumed binary between love and money; she considers the inherent contradictions between them and argues for us finding a way to inhabit and tolerate the tensions between them, much as we have to wrestle with other affect states invariably linked in dialectic tension.

J. Slavin addresses the historically psychoanalytic binary between love and analytic love. He emphasizes the analyst's "innocent," as opposed to coercive, power motivated, sexual, and emotional responsiveness within the transitional space as key to facilitating the patient's experience of shared intimacy, pleasure, and sense of personal agency in sexuality.

Consistently, the papers reveal that the relational turn, along with the essential influences of feminist thinking, gender and social theory and the deconstructions of many of the polarizations that have served as dogma in our sociopolitical realm, continues to open up dialogic space, posing challenging questions that encourage a constant rethinking and deeper understanding of what renders us human, vital, and engaged. Similarly, the authors force us to confront much more of what has compromised us, deadened us, blinded us in terms of our views of self and others, of otherness within self and disowned parts of self in the other.

Malcolm Slavin's paper reflects an intertwining of the developmental, the clinical, and the cultural through a perspective rooted in both evolutionary

biology and existential philosophy. From this perspective, relational theory is extended, as we are encouraged to inhabit *the breach*, a position that enables a more dialectical view of issues of self and otherness, of the innately adaptive and relationally constructed.

Slavin (M.) captures the essence of what we need to work toward in his plea for "a radical level of empathy, based in a universally shared ancient trauma … a form of empathy linked, deep down, to that far greater embeddedness in nature that we all lost when we became human. Linked ironically, to our common suffering … there may emerge a poignant yet reassuring and potentially creative human bond."

We are living in a time of intense uncertainty and angst and international instability. It is a time that will continue to draw on us and from us in challenging and novel ways. The essays lay out much of the terrain we are grappling with in terms of the inherent intertwining of the domains of the clinical, the existential, and the sociopolitical. Through this volume we, as an ongoing relational community, are invited to think more deeply about and question more piercingly many of the contradictions we have accepted far too readily and reflexively.

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Editors' Introduction

Lewis Aron and Adrienne Harris

Relational Psychoanalysis: The Emergence of a Tradition, edited by Steven A. Mitchell and Lewis Aron in 1999, was the first of what was to become a series of books within the Relational Perspectives Book Series (RPBS) published by The Analytic Press and later by Routledge. At that time, Aron and Mitchell were interested in establishing a beachhead in American psychoanalysis, pulling together the early and first theorizing, under a relational rubric, of a number of analysts associated with diverse affiliations. The analysts who contributed to these early volumes can be described in a variety of ways. The immigrant generation, growing up somewhere and journeying to the new relational world. Diverse thinkers, grounded in other schools of psychoanalysis, other domains outside psychoanalysis, the world of the activist, the world of the clinic. Now close to two decades later, Lewis Aron and Adrienne Harris (who joined as coeditor with Aron after Mitchell's death in 2000) put together a state-of-the-art assemblage of writers, now seasoned and engaged practitioners of relational psychoanalysis.

A tradition grows in fertile soil, but also strong plants are those that can survive in difficult conditions. One might say that relational psychoanalysis has met both those circumstances. Mitchell set the stage for a rich and very diversified world of theory and practice. He was a man interested in creating landscapes. One might say his vision of relational psychoanalysis was architectural. He wanted individual voices, deeply personal and experience-near encounters with the clinical and theoretical problems that animated the lives and works of the practitioners he drew around him.

Relational psychoanalysis also arose in a climate of deep antagonisms, controversies, and ferment. Turbulent critique from within the field and

outside required of relational analysts that they think deeply and carefully and responsibly about the ideas that so fully and vibrantly entered the field. Disclosure and enactment; subjectivity and intersubjectivity; multiplicity of self-states; trauma and fantasy; investigating Thirdness as an aspect of clinical dyads, family patterns: All these problems preoccupied relational analysts over the past several decades. From the initial assumption, following Hoffman and Gill that clinical process was best understood as a social construction, many relational analysts studying gender, sexuality, identities of many sorts found that these terms, while necessary, required exegesis, evolution, enlightenment, and expansion.

We invited two senior analysts in the relational community, Hazel Ipp and Spyros Orfanos, to write more detailed forewords to the specific volumes: Ipp on *Theory* and Orfanos on *Process*.

In introducing the *Theory* volume, Ipp tracks the simultaneous movement toward depth and breadth. She underscores how many relational authors are committed to writing theory in the spirit of uncertainty, of the radically unsettled experiences of self and other, self and culture, self and self. She gives us the felicitous and grace-filled word *ubuntu*, drawn from an African heritage well known to the South Africans in our group (Ipp and Suchet). An ethics of relatedness: *ubuntu*, an inspired organizing term for relational work. In introducing the *Process* volume, Orfanos tracks the relational turn in terms of evolution and revolution, the nature of creative innovation, redirection and reinitiation. He views the wide range of clinical contributions to process as sharing a sensibility in which relational psychoanalysis is understood as therapeutic action under conditions of inevitable uncertainty, and he reviews the 19 chapters contributing to our understanding of the ongoing complexities of clinical encounters. These are collections of some of the strongest and most articulate and innovative voices in our unfolding tradition.

We have described Mitchell's vision in terms of landscapes and architectural designs, and these capture one aspect of the international growth of the relational psychoanalytic edifice, the institutional structure of a school of thought. In these volumes we might be seen as adding new towers to the relational landscape, but we prefer one of Mitchell's other ubiquitous tropes, that of adding voices to the conversation.

In an incisive doctoral dissertation examining the life and work of Mitchell, Steve Dorse (2010) highlighted the use of "voices" throughout Mitchell's work. Here are a few of the examples highlighted by Dorse: Mitchell (1988) often spoke about the analyst's voice in speaking to a patient, where "the analyst becomes the various figures in the analysand's relational matrix, taking on their attributes and assuming their voices" (p. 296). From his perspective, "the struggle is to find an authentic voice in which to speak to the analysand, a voice more fully one's own" (p. 295). The patient is encouraged

"to suspend continuity" (p. 142) and "hear the echoes of other voices, to feel other presences of earlier selves and earlier experiences of others" (p. 142).

In his Editorial Philosophy to the inaugural issue of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, Mitchell (1991) wrote that "contemporary psychoanalytic theories can be understood as single voices within a larger discussion, voices that can be more fully grasped and appreciated only when one has access to the other participants in the conversation" (p. 5). Dorse (2010) argues that Mitchell used the metaphor of "voices" interchangeably with "ideas." In using analytic theories, Mitchell focused his attention on how these voices/ideas engaged each other, allowing him a full appreciation of what any individual theory had to offer.

In describing the various analytic writers who had relational sensibilities before the advent of a relational tradition, Mitchell (1999) wrote, "Each one was a voice in the wilderness" (p. 11), and he considered "one of the major projects of [his] own work to be getting people to notice that there were many voices in the wilderness, a veritable chorus, in fact" (p. 11). To develop this point, he offers the following parable to capture "the experience of many people who identify with the term 'relational psychoanalysis'…" (p. 11). We quote it at length because it is one of his less well-known passages:

> Once upon a time, out in the wilderness, lonely relational voices were each singing loudly, oblivious of those around them. Some of those voices were those of the excluded, some of the misunderstood, and some were voices of those who just felt they had a unique song to sing. But, gradually, various relational theorists and clinicians began to look around and discover they were not alone. They found that while their individual voices were faint, their efforts, drawn together in harmony, made a very compelling sound, different from the droning strains of traditional psychoanalysis that they had each, in their own way, left behind. So the excluded formed their own chorus, their own tradition, their own system of notation, their own psychoanalytic subculture. And a lively subculture it has been. Over the years, things started to dry up in the mainstream, and the sounds of vitality that wafted over from the wilderness suddenly became interesting. "I wonder what those guys are singing? Gee, I bet we can sing that way too. In fact, now that I am trying it out, it feels as if we've always been singing that way. Come on back; come on back. We are all really the same." Suddenly, the excluders became gracious hosts. Some of the wilderness choir felt very flattered and returned. Of course, there were all sorts of political problems, because wilderness institutes did not have the right credentials, so that only special wilderness writers could become "honorary" members, and so on. But many of those in the wilderness subculture, originally based partly on exclusion, but now a thriving community, simply did not find returning a terribly interesting or compelling prospect. (p. 11)

Mitchell's use of the voice as a synecdoche emphasizes what is most unique, personal, subjective, and expressive about the individual person as

well as what is most characteristic of the theory. But here Mitchell explicitly describes relational psychoanalysis as a chorus, a choir made up of distinct and individual voices. The voices may blend together in harmony but may also be dissonant at times and can sing solos and stand out as distinct, even clashing. This is our vision for these volumes of *Relational Psychoanalysis*. Listen to the voices arrayed in these two volumes. Together they make up a glorious, harmonious anthem; individually each voice is rich and distinct with its own timbre. Listen for and enjoy the overtones, the tensions, the consonance and dissonance. Our intention is not to resolve the music to a stable tone but rather to keep it going with more and more voices contributing.

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1

Money, Love, and Hate

*Contradiction and Paradox in Psychoanalysis**

Muriel Dimen

The way analysts talk, behave, and feel in relation to money is replete with an uneasiness that is the surface manifestation of a deep, psychocultural contradiction between money and love that cannot be thought, willed, or wished away. For the clinical project to succeed, this contradiction can and must find a temporary, reparative resolution in the paradox between love and hate. This essay takes up the question of money in the spirit of the Marx–Freud tradition, in postmodern perspective, and through several languages, not only psychoanalysis but also social theory, anthropology, and, less centrally, feminist theory as well. It addresses money's unconscious and emotional resonance and its cultural meanings; money's clinical and theoretical vicissitudes in the context of cultural symbolism and economic change as well as the class position of psychoanalysis and the psychology of class itself; and money's relational meaning in transference and countertransference.

Since most psychoanalytic discourse about money takes place informally, it seems appropriate to begin in anecdotal style. When I first mentioned to colleagues my intention to write about this topic, I was greeted with what you might call a less than enthusiastic response. "Why are you talking about money?" asked one, quite startled. Another found the proposed title a bit

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inappropriate and wondered if it oughtn't be changed to something like "Between Commerce and Trust." It's almost as though money were in fact not quite a suitable topic for our distinguished community. Something we don't talk about, at least in public? A little unsavory, perhaps? Or vulgar?

This was not the first time I'd met with psychoanalytic unease about money. Consider Dr. French, as I am calling him, a colleague to whom, many years ago, I referred a patient's husband. The man had a cash business (no, he wasn't dealing drugs) and, like his wife, paid his analyst in cash, just as anyone in his subculture did whenever buying anything. Shocked, Dr. French shook his hands as if to rid them of dirt and said to me with an embarrassed smile, "It's, well, money just doesn't belong in the consulting room."

It begins to look as though Freud was right, doesn't it? Recall his (1913) ubiquitously quoted observation: "Money matters are treated by civilized people in the same way as sexual matters—with the same inconsistency, prudishness and hypocrisy" (p. 131).

Freud and his contemporaries might not have shared Dr. French's feelings about cold, hard cash. If they had, they probably would have written about it; to my knowledge, the only classical reference to the matter is Abraham's (1921) certainly accurate diagnosis of severe anality in people who insist on paying not only analysts' bills but even the smallest sums by check (p. 378). Nevertheless, our forebears, themselves uneasy about money, recognized the deep desire that its dilemmas simply vanish. They thought hard about money's relation to development, character, and pathology. Abraham's (1921) and Jones's (1918) attention to its place in anal characterology develops Freud's (1908) original insights about its psychosexuality, "the sexual and especially the anal erotic significance of money" (Aron & Hirsch, 1992, pp. 39–40), ideas that are certainly familiar enough and to which I return later. Ferenczi (1914) augments this line of reasoning by assigning money a role in development; he argues that the adult attachment to money represents a socially useful reaction formation to repressed anal eroticism. Fenichel (1938) suggests that anal-erogeneity is made use of, and strengthened, by a social system based on the accumulation of wealth and competitiveness.

The approach to money taken by Ferenczi and Fenichel was political as well as psychoanalytic. Ferenczi (1914), for example, concludes that the "capitalistic instinct … contains … [both] an egoistic and an analerotic component"; standing at the disposal of the reality principle, "the delight in gold and the possession of money … also satisfies the pleasure-principle" (p. 88). Fenichel (1938) points out that what he identifies as the drive to amass wealth is born with capitalism, adding that in precapitalist, tribal society it did not exist, while in a future classless society it would have disappeared (p. 108). They were not the only classically trained psychoanalysts who wanted to unite two of the three great and diverging arteries of 19th-century European thought, Marxism, and psychoanalysis (to put them in their chronological

order; the third and temporally intermediate one is Darwinian evolutionary theory). While it is unlikely and probably not desirable that these two grand theories will meld into a single perspective encompassing nothing short of human life itself, nevertheless the dialogue between them has been fruitful and remains compelling. Not only Ferenczi and Fenichel but such luminaries as Edith Jacobson, George Gero, and Annie Reich received their intellectual formation during a time heady with progressive politics and psychoanalytic discovery. While some, like Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm, kept striving for synthesis, others abandoned their politics, a yielding impelled more by their Holocaust-driven escape to an anticommunist United States (with its medicalized and antiintellectual psychoanalysis) than by the inherent incompatibility of two cherished and imaginative comprehensions of human possibility (Jacoby, 1983).

Taking up the question of money in the spirit of the Marx–Freud tradition (a project already called for by Rendon, 1991) but adding a postmodern perspective, I consider money's vicissitudes in the psychoanalytic relationship a topic that is theoretically immediate as well. Freud's discussions about money as a practical matter (1913) and money as a psychological matter (e.g., 1908) may appear in separate essays (see Whitson, nd, p. 3). But their distance in print represents only the map of his thought, not their lived geography. In the light of recent psychoanalytic and social thought, money's clinical and theoretical locations turn out to be more proximate than might at first appear. Developments in psychoanalytic theory—such as the Kleinian understanding of love and hate, the Winnicottian notion of paradox, the interpersonal assessment of countertransference, and contemporary relational arguments about the simultaneity of one-person and two-person psychologies—and developments in social theory (e.g., social constructionism, critical theory, postmodernism) permit a synthetic and evolving interpretation of money in the psychoanalytic relationship that is both clinically relevant and theoretically responsible.

On reflection it becomes clear that a theory of money cannot derive from psychoanalysis alone. Consider Freud's only partially theorized perspective. His ideas on the psychosexuality of money, which predate his instructions about its handling in the clinical setting, in essence constitute the sole intellectual frame for his practical considerations. Money is, Freud (1913) says, to be approached in the consulting room with the same matter-of-factness as sex, for while money has a narcissistic dimension being "in the first instance … a medium for self-preservation and for obtaining power … powerful sexual factors are [also] involved in the value set on it" (p. 131). The way analysts address it ought then to serve psychotherapy. By speaking with frankness, Freud says, he furthers the educative project of psychoanalysis; he shows patients that "he himself has cast off false shame on these topics, by voluntarily telling them the price at which he values his time" (p. 131).

As for the rest, for the principles on which Freud (1913) bases his policy of leasing his time and setting his fee, he speaks from "ordinary good sense" (p. 131). He speaks as a practical man of the world who must consider his material existence by charging for all time leased and regularly collecting his debts (pp. 131–132). The arrangement of leasing one's time, he observes, is "taken as a matter of course for teachers of music or languages in good society" (p. 126). He is faithful to his beliefs, not only his own theory of treatment but also what is closely related, his ethics. In elaborating his ethical position, he reviews the behavior of other professionals, concurring in, or distinguishing his own practice from, theirs. He has, he tells us, desisted from taking patients without charge or extending courtesy to colleagues' kin for three reasons. For one thing, free treatment stirs up resistances to, say, the erotic transference in young women and to the paternal transference in young men, who rebel against any "obligation to feel grateful" (p. 132). For another, charging a fee preempts countertransferential resentment of patients' selfishness and exploitativeness (pp. 131–132). Finally, he finds it "more respectable and ethically less objectionable" to avoid the pretense to philanthropy customary in the medical profession and to acknowledge straightforwardly his interests and needs (p. 131).

The common sense from which Freud reasons is, however, like any informal system of "folk" or cultural knowledge, embedded in unexamined presuppositions. It combines, in effect, the expectations and prejudices customary for his class with his personal needs and predilections and thus contains unarticulated ideas about issues that are only now being theorized in psychoanalysis—such as the patient's experience of the analyst's subjectivity (Aron, 1991) or the relation between one-person and two-person psychologies (Ghent, 1989; Aron & Hirsch, 1992)—or have, only since Freud's time, been anatomized by social thought, like the economic and political place of the helping professions, the social class of analysts and patients, and the psychology of class (Sennett & Cobb, 1972; Ehrenreich, 1989). Such vantage points being absent either from classical theory or from psychoanalytic thought altogether, it is not surprising that, until recently, so few analysts have considered the matter of money systematically. Whatever the other resistances to this topic (and I get back to them shortly), the intellectual tools to study it have been missing.

I want here to refurbish the intellectual tool kit by conversing in several languages not only psychoanalysis but also social theory, anthropology, and, less centrally, feminist theory as well. I decode money's unconscious and emotional resonance as well as its cultural meanings. I track its clinical and theoretical vicissitudes in terms of cultural symbolism and economic change as well as the class position of psychoanalysts and the psychology of class itself. Through both an examination of Freud's dicta

and feelings about money and a clinical example, I render its relational meaning in transference and countertransference.

Money in Psychoanalytic Question

If Freud and his contemporaries were laconic on this matter, his followers have become exponentially voluble as the psychoanalytic century has worn on. The bibliographical entries in the anthology *The Last Taboo: Psychoanalysis and Money* (Krueger, 1986) are few and far between until the 1960s, when they begin to cluster; then in the 1970s and 1980s they positively blizzard. Here we are in the 2010s, trying to climb out of what has been termed a "recession" but has really been a depression, which has nipped at, if not bitten into, the practices and pocketbooks and psyches of most psychoanalysts in private practice. Just in the last three years, there have appeared two more books on the question, one a general anthology (Klebanow & Lowenkopf, 1991) and the other about the fee (Herron & Welt, 1992). All cover quite a range of topics, from fee setting, personal philosophies about fee policies, and the relation between gender and money to managed health care and the effects of free treatment.

The snowballing discussion of money has a history, part of which is cultural. Psychoanalysis's "last taboo" fell during a period when a lot of other icons were being broken too, as, simultaneously, the class position of professionals was subtly but permanently shifting. If the 1960s (the "we decade") saw the blossoming of sexual expression and the 1970s (the "me decade") of narcissism, then the 1980s (the "greed decade") made the admission of the desire for money and the accumulation of wealth at least more common if not more socially acceptable. But, we might ask, acceptable to whom? Surely not stockbrokers and corporate raiders. Wall Street's expression of greed may well have had to do with the wildest financial party since the roaring '20s, a party perhaps even more avaricious than the age of the robber barons. But people who trade in money are supposed to be on good terms with selfishness; helping professionals are not. Instead, they are supposed to value money only for its ability to serve a modest standard of living. What was surprising in the 1980s, then, was the seemingly sudden acquaintance with covetousness on the part of professionals.*

* Although this essay was published in the early 1990s, although there have appeared more essays on money and psychoanalysis since then, and although Euro-American culture has seen yet another boom and bust cycle—still, even as history has moved on through the cyber revolution of the 1990s and 2000s, the contradictory relation between money and culture framing psychoanalysis not only remains substantially the same but has intensified as the depression sometimes known as the Great Recession refuses to release its worldwide grip.

Psychoanalysts' heightened interest in money, not to mention their greed, had, however, more than a decade behind it. It was, in fact, a response to, and expression of, a long, slow slide in their socioeconomic fortunes. The 1960s were a watershed in a century-long trend; until then, the gap between rich and poor in the United States had been steadily decreasing. After that, the gap began to yawn. The middle class, from which traditionally have come most analysts and analysands, began to shrink, indeed, to decline; presently, middle-class people can no longer count on owning their homes or sending their children to college without impoverishing themselves (Newman, 1988; Ehrenreich, 1989). By the same token, the insurance reimbursements that subsidized their psychoanalytic treatment have dwindled, bruising both those in need of therapeutic help and those who make their living by providing it.

This decline in middle-class fortunes coincided with a boom in the helping professions, which in turn further reduced professionals' share of the pie. The extension of parity to psychologists and social workers by insurance companies, the increasing participation of social workers in the psychoanalytic profession, the proliferation of "media shrinks," and the flood of self-help books—these belong to the expansion of psychotherapy to all levels of the middle class, even to the working class. Part of the democratizing trend in psychoanalysis (Havens, 1989, p. 142; Zaphiropoulos, 1991, p. 242), this growth also belonged to a cultural change that might be called the "therapization of America." The evolution of a therapy-sensitive culture in which people are knowledgeable about, and receptive to, psychotherapy, in which consumers assume the right to question and choose among all medical authorities and in which psychotherapy is packaged by managed health care has, ironically, also reduced analysts' incomes. The more competition there is among providers of mental health care, the fewer the patients and the lower the fees for each privately practicing analyst (Chodoff, 1991, pp. 254–256; Drellich, 1991, pp. 159–161; Aron & Hirsch, 1992); the more knowledge consumers have, the more they question analysts' authority and resist the imposition of what have sometimes seemed to be arbitrarily high fees (see also Herron & Welt, 1992, p. 171).

As psychoanalytic pockets slowly emptied, psychoanalytic journals began to fill up with articles on money. Comparisons would be interesting. In other countries, say, Sweden, where the middle class remains or has become economically secure, as it was in Freud's time, are these issues handled differently? Are they addressed systematically? Or are they ignored, as, in fact, they were in Europe and the United States until, for all intents and purposes, 30 years ago? Or take the obverse: Will psychoanalysts in Eastern Europe begin formally to consider the clinical and theoretical problems money presents as their practices leave the public domain of (medical) hospital care and enter the private market?

The Disturbance of Money

In responding, if only unconsciously, to this recent (and perhaps permanent) downturn in the American economy, however, analysts are noticing merely what has been there all along. In saying this, I am revising Durkheim's (1930) classic sociological position, codified in his paradigmatic study of suicide. Durkheim (1938) drew a parallel between medical and social science: If studying illness reveals the nature of health (as, indeed, Freud himself, 1905, argued), then, he said, studies of social pathology should reveal the basis for social order and hence the true nature of social life. That social life is normally orderly, however, can no longer go unquestioned. A deconstructive, postmodern approach, which, perhaps not strangely, finds a harbinger in Freud, suggests otherwise. Taking a Foucaultian tack (Flax, 1990, p. 36), I argue that studying social disorder reveals instead the normal lines of discontinuity and conflict that are the fault lines along which cultural evolution and changes in inner life occur.

So with money and psychoanalysis: Just as we learn from "hysterical misery" about "common unhappiness" (Freud, 1895), so if we look into disrupted economics, we come upon money's ever-present, complicated meaning in psychoanalysis and, thence, the normal difficulties of the work. Several recent papers teach us a lot about the underrecognized countertransferential effects of analysts' economic dependence on their patients that these parlous times make visible. While their work allows us to see that you and your patients want you to be as invulnerable as a tenured full professor, you actually feel about as secure as a part-time adjunct. Yet analysts have been so uncomfortable with their own feelings of need and greed (Aron & Hirsch, 1992, p. 255) that they have tended to treat money as a psychological problem for patients and merely a practical one for analysts (Whitson, nd, p. 3). Indeed, analysts' dystonic relation to their own dependence may constitute the biggest single counterresistance in regard to money (Aron & Hirsch, 1992, p. 243; Whitson, nd, p. 3). Herron and Welt (1992) concur and develop the theme: "The issue … isn't that greed exists [among psychoanalysts]; rather, it is how that greed is responded to; how it is aroused, frustrated, or met" (p. 48; see also Shainess, 1991).

Analysts' pecuniary need of their patients, however, is not only a discrete countertransference problem. As we can see from Freud's by now well-known financial preoccupations, it is an inevitable thorn in their sides that demands as much inspection as their other basic needs vis-à-vis patients, their needs for, for example, love and respect, power and gratitude. Throughout his 17-year correspondence with Fliess (Masson, 1985), Freud writes periodically about his money-related worries as well as about the times when his income feels to him adequate. It's quite clear not only that his cash flow is

uneven but also that this unpredictability breeds cynicism. For example, he prefers American patients for their hard currency (Gay, 1988) and writes, on January 24, 1895, "Mrs. M. will be welcome; if she brings money and patience with her, we shall do a nice analysis. If in the process there are some therapeutic gains for her, she too can be pleased" (Masson, 1985, p. 107). Notice also his reference to his wellborn, well-to-do patients as "goldfish," once on September 21, 1899 (p. 374) and another time on September 27, 1899: "The goldfish (L. von E., and S. by birth and as such a distant relative of my wife) has been caught, but will still enjoy half her freedom until the end of October because she is remaining in the country" (p. 375). Such mordant humor ought not gainsay Freud's famous largess toward some of his patients, for example, the Wolf Man (1918). Still, since he complains, on September 15, 1898, of sleeping during his "afternoon analyses" (Masson, 1985, p. 303), can we not imagine that, sometimes, the most desirable capacity of a patient's purse may have detoxified her less alluring capacity to make him nod off? In any event, Freud's pervasive, if intermittent, focus on money and its ups and downs of anxiety, cynicism, optimism, and the like suggests that the roller coaster of comfort and fear about income so familiar to contemporary analysts is doubly determined: The product of hard times, this anxiety may also be an aggravated variant of a pattern actually inherent to the work not only of psychoanalysts but, as we see in a moment, of most helping professionals.

In the last generation or two, analysts have had a far smoother economic ride than Freud, and those made anxious by money were more likely to be in the beginning stages of practice. For example, at the beginning of the affluent 1980s, when my practice was relatively new and supplemented by an academic position, I made my anxiety known to my supervisor, a very senior and well-known analyst of interpersonal persuasion. His reply was, "You can do your best work only when it's become a matter of indifference to you whether you gain or lose an hour." While he seemed to be saying that one can work well only when money is out of the picture, I would now put it another way. It's not that money is relevant to analytic work only when times are bad. When times are good, it's relevant by its absence; then, we're like TAPs, which is what the disabled call the rest of us, "temporarily abled persons." From our present perspective of financial doubt, then, we might wonder whether the mid-century lack of competition among analysts was simply a constant or, instead, an active agent of countertransference. For example, if financial uncertainty now unsettles analysts, can financial security make them smug? Was it such smug sincerity, as well as, perhaps, character, that led another prominent analyst, during the ironically but wistfully termed "golden years" of psychoanalysis (the late 1950s/early 1960s to the stock market crash of 1987), to decline patients older than 40 because he thought them less able to change? Can complacency distort analysts'

respect for patients' neediness, transforming empathy into pity? Could such a countertransference amplify the vexing popular mistrust of psychoanalysis itself?

These questions intersect another vital clinical issue, the countertransference symbolism of money. Do psychoanalysts not face a dilemma of safety that money actually symbolizes? If feeling unsafe threatens to impede the analyst's confidence and hence competence, is it also possible to feel too safe (Greenberg, 1986)? There's a necessary insecurity: Psychoanalysts cannot guarantee their method will work, for success depends on a relationship being established and maintained, and the sustenance of relatedness is a day-to-day affair (Bromberg, personal communication). More, current emphases on clinical process, on the importance of not knowing too precisely where you are in a session suggest a need for analysts to tolerate a certain amount of danger (Bion, 1980; Eigen, 1986). Indeed, they develop Freud's insistence on not pressing the patient for linear sense: In explicating the value of the fundamental rule, Freud (1913) cautions, "A systematic narrative should never be expected and nothing should be done to encourage it" (p. 136). Only in this atmosphere of unsafety can we expect to come upon the new and/or the forgotten. Hence, money's roller-coaster effect becomes a convenient, rationalized, and inevitable container for the nonrationality and uncertainty of psychoanalytic process.

While not arguing that the uncertainty of earning a living in capitalist society guarantees the feeling of risk necessary to analytic process, I insist that the anxiety money generates cannot be banished from the consulting room. On the contrary, it is endemic to the particular sort of work analysts do (e.g., Chodoff, 1986). Analysts, it turns out, are not alone in their unease about money matters. They share it with everyone else in their class, a class called the "professional-managerial class" (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1979; Ehrenreich, 1989) that came into being between 1870 and 1920 (the birth period, note, of psychoanalysis, as well as the robber barons). Professional-managerial work ranges from law and medicine to middle management, from social work and psychotherapy to education, from academe to journalism. It entails what is crudely called mental labor but is better characterized as labor that combines intellect and drive with considerable, although not total, autonomy and self-direction (Ehrenreich, 1989, pp. 38, 78).

Professional-managerial work is not only a livelihood. It is also a means of power and prestige and a shaper of personal identity. Because it involves conceptualizing other people's work and lives (Ehrenreich, 1989, p. 13), it confers authority and influence. Indeed, it was arguably the chisel that the then-emerging middle class used "to carve out" its own socioeconomic place, its own "occupational niche that would be closed both to the poor and to those who were merely rich" (p. 78). Finally, by providing the opportunity for creativity and discovery in regard not only to one's work but

also to one of its chief instruments, one's self, it enters—indeed, expresses, reflects, and generates—one's identity.

This kind of work renders the professional-managerial class an elite. But, and this is Barbara Ehrenreich's main point in *Fear of Falling,* it is a highly anxious elite. For one thing, members of this class know that their power, privilege, and authority can make their clients envy, resent, and hate them (and, analysts would add, idealize them). For another, they, like their clients, also sometimes suspect, even if secretly, that because they do not produce anything visible or tangible they do not actually do anything real; as such, not only does their work seem worthless, it also cannot match their own or their clients' idealization. Because their only "capital," so to speak, is, as Ehrenreich writes, "knowledge and skill, or at least the credentials imputing skill and knowledge" (p. 15), their high status is insecurely founded. She continues, unlike real, material capital, skill and knowledge cannot be used to hedge inflation, nor can they be bequeathed. They must be renewed by and in each person through hard work, diligence, and self-discipline. Consequently, members of the professional-managerial class, like anyone in any class but the highest, fear the misfortunes that have overnight sent even middle-income people sliding into homelessness and indignity, a fear that Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere (1964), to whom I shall return, liken to that of children who imagine being orphaned or beggared as punishment for their unconscious aggression (p. 109, note 1). They fear falling through the economic and moral safety net—hence Ehrenreich's aptly titled *Fear of Falling.* They fear "falling from grace," the title of another book by Kathy Newman (1988) on a similar topic; they fear losing their financial status, their elite position of authority, the work they love and their identity as moral, beneficent persons. Rooted in the very work of professionals, then, this anxiety about felt fraudulence and looming loss is actually built into the role of analyst in a class-structured society.

Class, Countertransference, and Alienation

Like all social institutions, class has powerful unconscious resonance. In the most general sense, class refers to the material aspect of society and the way it divides and joins people along a ladder of economic and political power. By definition, class is hierarchical; the relation between classes is determined by their economic and political superiority or inferiority to one another. To put it more crudely, class distinctions are about money and its unequal distribution in society. Conversely, money represents the veritable or potential differences in power among individuals and among groups. It indicates not only differences of class but also those constituting other hierarchies, like race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual preference. Money, in other words, is

symbolic of the fault lines webbing and cracking a psychological and social reality in which difference is the nucleus of hierarchy (Dimen-Schein, 1977, pp. 88–92). The hierarchy of privilege organized by class, status distinctions, the unequal amounts of money people have—these trigger not only greed but envy, excite questions of self-esteem, invite oedipal competitions.

The fault lines of class and other hierarchies show up systematically in transference and countertransference. To return to our exemplar: if, in his most despondent moments, Freud felt greed and cynicism toward his "goldfish," he was unreflectively contemptuous of the middle class and benevolently condescending toward those poorer than he. Addressing the petit bourgeois reluctance to pay for psychoanalysis, Freud (1913) argued that the restored health and increased "efficiency and earning capacity" afforded by treatment made therapy less expensive than it appeared. Therefore, he concluded, "We are entitled to say that the patients have made a good bargain. Nothing in life is so expensive as illness—and stupidity" (p. 133).

As for the poor, he opined that the best psychoanalysis could supply was "a practical therapy of … the kind which … used to be dispensed by the Emperor Joseph II" (p. 133). Known as the "emperor of the beggars" (1780–1790), Joseph, in good Enlightenment fashion, used on occasion to live among the poor so he could come to know at firsthand what they needed (Fink, personal communication). It would not, of course, have occurred to either the emperor or the physician what we take for granted today, that poor people might actually have been able to articulate at least some of their own needs. Still, while Freud (1913) regrets the inaccessibility of psychoanalysis to the impecunious, he acknowledges that "one does occasionally come across deserving people who are helpless from no fault of their own, in whom unpaid treatment does not meet with any of the obstacles [including secondary gain] that I have mentioned and in whom it leads to excellent results" (p. 133). Nevertheless, in his relation to such poor patients as he might have taken on, his paternalism would have had to be analyzed. That it would not have been is a foregone conclusion. As we have known from his unconscious sexism, the emotional structure of socioeconomic hierarchy does not appear on his map or on that of classical psychoanalysis.

From a psychoanalytic perspective, one might see in Freud's intermittent dyspepsia about his patients a symptom of what has been called the "money neurosis" suffered by the bourgeoisie in Vienna and other European cities in the late 19th century (Warner, 1991). From a political perspective, one could label it "classism," or class prejudice. If we put psychoanalysis and politics together, however, what we discern in Freud's heart is the social malaise called "alienation." What I mean by alienation is not so much estrangement or disaffection but the cause of these feelings. Hear, for example, the dysphoria of a supervisee who reported thinking, during a difficult session, "I wouldn't be sitting here if I weren't doing it for the money." His guilt,

bewilderment, loss, hate, and self-hate proceed from the way money, which permitted him to do his work, nevertheless stole from him its pleasures and meaning. When money is exchanged in a capitalist economy, both buyer and seller—patient and analyst—come to be like commodities, or things, to one another because they enter into relation with each other through the mediation of a third thing (money) that, simultaneously, separates them. As money wedges them apart, so it estranges them from themselves, a distancing that creates anxiety in both (Amar, 1956, p. 286; Marx, 1964, p. 113; Mészáros, 1975, pp. 178, 186). This theft of the personal satisfaction you take in work and in your relationship to those with whom you work is alienation, the process by which your labor and its fruit become alien to you because of the very socioeconomic structure that lets them be (a defining point that deserves particular emphasis here because it tends to be omitted from psychoanalytic discussions; e.g., Fromm, 1966; see Struik, 1964, pp. 50–52; Mészáros, 1975, p. 36).

Alienation, in short, is the estrangement of people from their activity, their products, other people, and themselves (Ollman, 1976, p. 135). An occupational hazard of modern life, it is core to psychoanalysis. As Masud Khan (1979) writes in the preface to *Alienation in Perversions*: "In the nineteenth century two persons dictated the destiny of the twentieth century, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. Each … diagnosed the sickness of the Western Judeo-Christian cultures: Marx in terms of the alienated person in society; Freud, the person alienated from himself" (p. 9). And, of course, we would add today, "herself." Elsewhere, Khan (1972) calls psychoanalysis the "inevitable result of a long sociological process of the evolution and alienation of the individual" in the West. Freud's genius, he declares, was "to evaluate the situation and give it a new frame in which [the alienated] could find [their] symbolic, therapeutic speech and expression" (p. 131). Extending Khan's point, I think of psychoanalysis as the perfect therapy for a culture of alienation, for in it you pay a stranger to recover yourself. Paradoxically, psychotherapy that is bought and sold under conditions of alienation generates a "dis-ease" in both the person who pays the stranger and the stranger who is paid, and that needs treatment too. In a way, then, my goal is to explicate how alienation filters into transference and countertransference and how clinical process, by exploiting it, transcends it in a momentary, utopian, and reparative fashion.

Commerce and Psychoanalysis

This explication requires a further and ethnographic inquiry into money's cultural and psychological significance. As the agent of alienation, money has acquired many kinds of meaning. One psychoanalyst observes that it "is esteemed, yet … condemned" and traces this familiar ambivalence to twin

polarities—one, the dichotomy between the "altruistic, selfless, humanistic sacrificing ethic" of the Judeo-Christian tradition and the acquisitional, individualist values of capitalism; and two, Puritanism's conflict, in which hard work and thrift are valued, but their material rewards may not be enjoyed (Krueger, 1986, p. 4). Another notes the contradiction between the philanthropic inclinations of psychoanalysis and the custom of fee for service (Gutheil, 1986, p. 182); he thus echoes Freud's admonition that the analyst be immune to demands for charity routinely placed on the medical profession lest they obstruct one's ability to make a living.

But what is money? Money is so deeply embedded in our culture, daily life, and history that it tends to stay just out of definition's reach. Indeed as many years of teaching anthropology showed me, one's own culture is often intangible until it is compared with another. Like any institution, psychoanalysis has its own subculture. Let me, then, switch the conversational perspective once again and look at money anthropologically. A most important conclusion from the lengthy anthropological debate about money is that money objects are not present in all cultures (Dimen-Schein, 1977, pp. 197–199). Money, in other words, is not cultural bedrock. Instead, it comes into being under particular political, economic, or ecological conditions. For example, under some circumstances, the circulation of goods and services does not require money but instead is carried out by barter or by conventionalized equivalences. In other situations, different kinds of money have evolved, varying not only in substance (rock, shell, bead, metal, paper) but also in their use and function.

After much cross-cultural comparison, then, anthropologists have come up with a universal definition of money, that, spelled out, helps us see, as if anew, money's meaning in psychoanalytic context: Money is any material object that performs one or more of the following five functions—a medium of exchange, a standard of value, a unit of account, a store of value, and a standard of deferred payments. While there may be different objects serving each different function in any one society, the first function tends to be controlling; whatever is the medium of exchange likely serves the other functions too. Finally, money itself may be a commodity, as it is in capitalism, where you buy it with what we call interest, that is, with more of the same (LeClair & Schneider, 1968, p. 468).

According to this less than exciting definition then, there's nothing mystical about money; it is, among other things, a matter of commerce. As Freud saw, however, this plain fact notoriously renders clinicians uneasy. After all these years, psychotherapists still "want to nurture their image as beneficent purveyors of good rather than as individuals who are at least partially involved in commerce" (Tulipan, 1986, p. 79), suffering its alienating effects as much as their customers. Even the notion of fee for service goes gently by

the rough implications of trade, civilly suggesting the fair-and-squareness of being paid for the work you do so that you, like your patients, may use what you earn by your labor to buy what you need to live. But commerce? No. That we find tawdry and petty, the very opposite of the trust and professionalism on which psychoanalysis depends (Herron & Welt, 1992, p. 4).

Still, commerce is a cornerstone of the psychoanalytic edifice. It is not the only cornerstone, but it is a primary one. We sell our services to make our living. Oh, yes, sometimes analysts see patients for free. Some even argue that it may be necessary not to charge certain kinds of patients in order to treat them at all (Jacobs, 1986). But even to say "for free" suggests the norm, that analysts engage in trade (see also Horner, 1991, p. 177).

Without money, then, there's no psychoanalysis at all. But with it comes an unavoidable anxiety, an anxiety to which I attribute my colleagues' initial disgruntlement, as well as Dr. French's shock. Indeed, I would be quite surprised were anyone able to think through this topic without a moment or two of anxiety. Just in case that anxiety has in the present instance proved elusive, perhaps I may offer some assistance. Think, for instance, of that moment when you learn that your analytic patient who comes four times a week has been fired and will have to discontinue treatment. That first dip on the Cyclone at Coney Island has nothing on it. Or turn it around: You have taken on a new patient at your very highest fee for a long-term analysis. To take a milder example, you find out that a colleague's practice has doubled while yours has only maintained, or even dropped an hour or two. Suppose it's even the reverse, and you feel merely the queasiness of dismayed triumph: You have got more hours, income, or both than a friend who badly needs the money.

Are these suggestions extreme? Perhaps there are clinicians to whom the loss (or gain) of, let us say $600 a week or about $25,000 a year has no emotional resonance. If so, then the extremity of these examples may have something to do with the history recounted earlier: analysts who came of age before and just after the middle class began its recent, but silent, descent in the 1960s are likely to be very differently positioned and to have been initially less worried than those whose practices began in the last 15 or 20 years. The original work experience of the last generation may well have created a basic sense of ease, financial optimism, and professional security no matter what the current economy.

Nevertheless, psychoanalytic anxiety in relation to money has always sufficed to create the tacit prohibition on asking people how many hours they carry or what fees they charge unless you know them very well. Of course, it's never in the best of taste for professionals to inquire about each other's income. The traditional ideology of the professional-managerial class is that they work for love, not money or power—although, as we have seen, the 1980s saw some segments of this class reverse their priorities. Still, I do not

suppose it would surprise anyone to find that, to protect themselves from their anxiety about money and the alienation contextualizing it, psychoanalysts depict their pecuniary practices in ways that are, at best, confusing. Let me illustrate with an anecdote. I remember an informal and anonymous survey about fees taken at a retreat sponsored by the New York University Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. One of the obstacles to evaluating the results of this most unscientific investigation is the difference between what people say they do and what they actually do, and sometimes this difference is further complicated by gender. While I can't here anatomize the question of gender difference in presentation of professional self, it's absolutely true that in answering the questionnaire all the women said they had a sliding scale, while each man declared one bold fee. Yet we all know male analysts, both senior and junior, who "reduce" their fees, to use that rather cool and complacent euphemism for bargaining. The alleged tendency of women to charge lower fees (Herron & Welt, 1992, p. 174; see Liss-Levenson, 1990) may be at times a fact, and at others, an artifact of the same asymmetrical self-presentation: although men may charge the same fees as women, offer sliding scales, and the like, saying so publicly is probably inconsistent with their gender identity, in contrast to women, whose self-sacrifice accords more with cultural and intrapsychic expectations of women. To let the men off the hook, I also have a female colleague who, to conquer her own anxiety about her recently increased expenses (as well as, perhaps, to make me anxious), rather loftily announced that she was now "taking" patients at higher fees (and I always think, "How nice of her!").

The Contradiction Between Money and Love

The point is critical: The way analysts talk, behave, and feel in relation to money is replete with uneasiness, an uneasiness that is the surface manifestation of a deep, psychocultural contradiction that cannot be thought, willed, or wished away. In the marrow of our culture, this contradiction is embedded in the matrix of our work. It inhabits our souls. And it will not disappear until the very bones of our society change, for like all social contradictions it is a relation between contraries that are historical and therefore mutable but only by a political change that resolves their opposition. All we can do in our work is to find a temporary and utopian resolution to it, and I return to that later.

For now, let us proceed with the contradiction between money and love, for that is what I am talking about. Money and love, the twin engines that make the world go round, at least the world as we know it, do not go together at all. Worse, they negate, undo one another, and their contradiction funds

alienation. While money may be a matter of commerce, it is, like any material object, social practice, or cultural symbol, simultaneously a matter of primitive passion. Freud knew this. He called money the "devil's gold," an image he found in European folklore. The devil, say the tales, gives his lovers a parting gift of gold, which, upon his going, turns to excrement (Freud, 1908, p. 174). (By the way, witches were said to have made a similar present to their lovers; neither gender has a monopoly on love's cruelties.) Freud's psychosexual interpretation of this extravagant and primal metaphor addressed what it means to consort with what he called "the repressed instinctual life." For example, he noted how the image contrasts the most precious and the most worthless of substances, money and feces, and considered how this contrast sublimates anal eroticism (whence Ferenczi's discussion). This interpretation is, of course, right, brightly illuminating, for example, Dr. French's distress about the mess that base and dirty money made in his office, the scene of noble motives and high-minded encounters.

The aspect of Freud's interpretation that awaits elaboration, however, is the relation between the gift and the act; what needs unraveling is the relation between the devil and his lovers so that we may, in turn, decipher the relation between money and love as well as the relation between those who exchange both and therefore the place of money in psychoanalysis. Freud and the European folktales had something very subtle in mind, and if you have ever been loved by the devil you will know what I mean. Shakespeare did. Recall *Sonnet 129*, which begins:

> The expense of spirit in a waste of shame
> Is lust in action,

and ends with this couplet:

> All this the world well knows; yet none knows well
> To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell.

Follow me, if you would, through a brief exegesis of this poetry, which takes us where we must go, along the nonlinear road from love to hate. When the devil has left you, you know not that you have been fooled but that you have fooled yourself. Your feelings, yearnings, longings have betrayed you. You now see you knew all along that what you thought was pure gold was false, that what you thought would uplift you only degrades you. You have searched to be better than you are, in fact, to be the best you can be. The devil's betrayal crumbles your dreams, destroys the ideal self into which you have breathed life by imagining it in the other's form. In the end, you become less, not more, than you hoped to be. This degradation, then, is the devil's gold: The devil's gold is a gift, not a payment. It is a gift given after passion is spent. But, instead of honoring an encounter that, we must assume, was glorious, as glorious as love, this gift degrades it. Gold

given to mark love becomes worse than nothing, degraded desire and lost illusions. Hopelessness.

That capacity to make everything less than it is and so to make us doubt what it was we had in mind when we worked so hard to get it—that capacity, says Freud, is what money has. That's why it's the devil's gold. Money is a pact with the devil. That's what Marx (1964) said expounding on Goethe (and having also just quoted Shakespeare):

> That which is for me through the medium of money—that for which I can pay (i.e., which money can buy)—that am I, the possessor of the money. The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. … Thus, what I am and am capable of is by no means determined by my individuality. I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the most beautiful of women. Therefore I am not ugly, for the effect of ugliness—its deterrent power—is nullified by money. I, as an individual, am lame, but money furnishes me with twenty-four feet. Therefore I am not lame.… Money is the supreme good, therefore its possessor is good. (p. 167)

If, as Marx goes on to tell us, money can "transform all [your] incapacities into their contrary," why would you not sell your soul to get it? If money can get you whatever you need, then it "is the bond binding [you] to human life … the bond of all bonds" (p. 167). But then what can you get yourself? Money can create all that we are and desire and, by the same token, destroy it. Marx therefore asks, "Can it not dissolve and bind all ties? Is it not therefore the universal agent of separation? It is the true agent of separation as well as the true binding agent … of society" (p. 167). The agent of alienation, it absorbs all creative power into itself, robs people of their own potential; just as money transforms imperfections into powers, so it "transforms the real essential powers of [human beings] and nature into what are merely abstract conceits" (pp. 168–169). In a way, money occupies the place in modern society that kinship has in premodern culture; it is the cultural nerve center, the institution that organizes economic life, structures social relations, underlies political power, and informs symbol, ritual, and systems of meaning. Kinship, however, unlike money, can't be taken away from you; as the aphorism has it, "Home is, when you go there, they gotta take you in." In contrast, "money … is the alienated ability of [hu]mankind" (p. 167). That's why it's the devil's gold.

In our culture, money has the same unconscious effect no matter in what trade it is used. By reducing everything to a common denominator, it robs everything and every person of individuality and thereby debases what it touches. That is one reason we like to separate it from love and distinguish the profane, public sphere of work, trade, and politics from the sacred, private space of intimacy, love, and relationship. Perhaps that is also one reason that, in the families with which we are familiar and in which men