



STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE IN THE COLD WAR AND BEYOND

JEFFERSON ADAMS

MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond

Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond looks at the many events, personalities, and controversies in the field of intelligence and espionage since the end of World War II. A crucial but often neglected topic, strategic intelligence took on added significance during the protracted struggle of the Cold War.

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- the technological dimension;
- spies in fiction, film, and television;
- developments in the intelligence organizations of both sides in the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Supplemented by suggestions for further reading, a glossary of key terms, and a timeline of important events, this is an essential read for all those interested in the modern history of espionage.

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Abbreviations

AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (US)
AfNS	Amt für Nationale Sicherheit (East German Office for National Security)
AVO/AVH	Államvédelmi Osztály/Államvédelmi Hatóság (Hungarian Security and Intelligence Service)
BfV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (West German/German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)
BIS	Bezpečnostní informační služba (Czech Republic Security Information Service)
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst (West German/German Federal Intelligence Service)
BStU	Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic/Gauck Authority)
Cheka	Vserossiiskaya Chrezvychainaya Komissiya po Borbe s Kontrevolyutsiei i Sabotazhem (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPUSA	Communist Party USA
DCI	director of central intelligence (US)
DGI	Dirección General de Inteligencia (Cuban Intelligence Service)
DGSE	Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (French Foreign Intelligence Service)

DIE	Departamentul de Informatii Externe (Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service)
DS	Durzhavna Sigurnost (Bulgarian Security and Intelligence Service)
DST	Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (French Domestic Security Service)
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FHO	Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East – Germany)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FSB	Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Russian Federal Security Service)
FSK	Federal'naia Sluzhba Kontrrazvedki (Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service)
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinistas)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GRU	Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravieniye (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff)
HUMINT	intelligence derived from human sources
HVA	Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (East German Foreign Intelligence Service)
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Soviet Committee of State Security)
KI	Komitet Informatsii (Soviet Committee of Information)
MACVSOG:	Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Unit
MB	Ministestvo Bezopastnosti (Russian Ministry of Security)
MfS	Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (East German Ministry of State Security)
MGB	Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (First Directorate of the Soviet State Security/Soviet Ministry of State Security)
MI5	Security Service (UK)
MI6	alternate designation for SIS (UK)
MICE	money, ideology, career, and ego
MSS	Guoanbu (Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBH	Nemzetbiztonsagi Hivatal (Hungarian National Security Office)
NBSzSz	Nemzetbiztonsagi Szakszolgalat (Hungarian National Security Service)
NKVD	Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (Soviet People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs)
NSA	National Security Agency (US)
NSC	National Security Council (US)
NKGB/MGB	Narodniy Kommissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti/Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Soviet People's Commissariat of State Security/Ministry of State Security)
OG	Organisation Gehlen (Gehlen Organization/West German Foreign Intelligence Agency)
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination (US)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services (US)
PCF	Parti communiste français (French Communist Party)
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSIA	<i>koanchosa-cho</i> (Japanese Public Security Investigative Agency)
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (US)
SB	Sluzba Bezpieczenstw (Polish Security and Intelligence Service)
SDECE	Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-espionage (French Foreign Intelligence Service)
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (German Socialist Unity Party)
SHAI	Sherut ha' Yediot ha'Artzit (Israeli National Information Service)
SIE	Serviciul de Informatiile Externe (Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service)
SIGINT	intelligence derived from interception and analysis of signals
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service (UK)/ Slovenská informačná služba (Slovak Information Service)
SOE	Special Operations Executive (UK)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SRI	Servicul Roman de Infortli (Romanian Security Service)

SS	Schutzstaffel (Nazi Party Protection Squadrons)
Stasi	Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (East German Ministry of State Security)
StB	Státní Bezpecnost (Czechoslovakian Security and Intelligence Service)
SVR	Sluzhba Vnesheni Razvedki (Russian Foreign Intelligence Service)
UN	United Nations
UOP	Urząd Ochrony Państwa (Polish State Protection Office)
ÚZSI	Úřad pro zahraniční styky a informace (Czech Republic Foreign Intelligence Service)

Perception is strong and sight weak. In strategy it is important to see distant things as they were close and to take a distanced view of close things.

Miyamoto Musashi, a seventeenth-century
Japanese swordsman

1 Introduction

Strategic intelligence on a broad front lay at the heart of countless struggles waged during the Cold War. Some have called it the secret war in the Cold War. One historian has fittingly characterized the intelligence networks of this era as its “light infantry” – the only force that could be mobilized given the nuclear stalemate that had developed between the superpowers.¹ Yet, unfortunately, too many accounts dealing with this period persist in ignoring the vital dimension of intelligence, preferring to concentrate almost solely on the political and diplomatic maneuverings of the major adversaries. When the subject of espionage is broached, one often encounters a glaring asymmetry: on the one hand, frequent references to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – notably in the Third World – but, on the other, few if any regarding Soviet and Eastern bloc intelligence operations. Besides providing a general introduction to the topic, this volume is intended to help correct this imbalance. It also extends the time frame to examine post-Cold War developments in the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall.

For most laypersons, matters involving intelligence tend to be reduced to images of covert action – the toppling of an unfriendly foreign government or supplying under-the-table subsidies to ostensibly independent groups or individuals. The field of intelligence, however, is multifaceted and comprised of various distinct components such as research and analysis, counterintelligence, and cryptography. Each has a separate methodology, and each tends to develop its own *esprit de corps*, if not rivalry with other intelligence branches. A former CIA analyst referred to a “bureaucratic Berlin Wall” that separated his branch from the clandestine service, except at the uppermost levels.² Seen in monetary terms, it is striking that the budget of the National Security Agency (NSA), charged with safeguarding the US government’s communications network, easily eclipses the allotment received by the CIA. Of those

2 *Introduction*

funds, covert action receives only a small percentage. Altogether the US intelligence community encompasses 17 agencies and organizations within the executive branch of the government.

Despite countless attempts to formulate an all-embracing theory by scholars and practitioners alike, intelligence work defies a positivist or scientific approach. The analyst is often grappling with ambiguous and fragmentary evidence and must weigh its validity in the context of the prevailing threat level. The same piece of information might be accorded a high degree of relevance if a potential attack were deemed imminent or basically discounted should that not be the case. And as classified reports move through the large secret service bureaucracies, they are subject to constant review and evaluation. Hard inconvertible facts, as a result, rarely exist on their own. In addition, the successful recruitment of an informant usually depends upon a keen intuitive understanding of the individual involved. In fact, real life espionage, full of unexpected twists and turns, can easily trigger some of the most bizarre examples of human behavior. Were some of these incidents submitted in fictional form to a publishing house, they would likely be rejected as simply too implausible. What the American spymaster Allen Dulles once dubbed as “the craft of intelligence” seems as apt a characterization as any that has ever been advanced. He further added that it is “probably the least understood and the most misrepresented of the professions.”³

There is inevitably the crucial question of sources. How, many ask, can one know what really transpired in the shadowy realm of espionage? Reasons for skepticism clearly abound. So often confidential exchanges are purposely conducted orally in order not to leave a domestic paper trail or run the risk of being monitored by an enemy service. An old intelligence axiom holds that “if you want to keep it secret, don’t write it down.” Documents themselves can be difficult to obtain from government archives, particularly given the ever-present tension between historians desiring to reconstruct as complete a picture of the past as possible and state officials wary of releasing materials that could compromise individuals or methods. In the case of the Cold War, the Russian archives present a most formidable obstacle. Neither the KGB nor the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) archives have been made available for general inquiry. According to Moscow’s highly manipulative procedures, only certain batches of documents, often extracted from their historical context, tend to be shown to selected researchers. A special fee might even be imposed, and an appropriate KGB co-author assigned to the project.

Still, the historian need not despair. In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress expanded the Freedom of Information Act in 1974,

which has permitted access to many files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the first time, while an executive order issued in 1982 has given individual researchers and former presidential appointees the possibility of examining classified documents of the CIA. Open sources, too, can provide a unique and often underappreciated window into the world of intelligence. Such was the experience of those academics assigned to the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. Much to the surprise of the military commanders, these specialists managed to ascertain key changes in the enemy's disposition of resources by closely perusing scholarly works, specialized journals, and foreign newspapers and magazines. In another instance, the historian Richard Pipes, while assigned to the National Security Council in the early 1980s, found that the *Intelligence Daily* that landed on his desk every morning added little to what he had already read in the world press. From his vantage point, it was difficult not to conclude that classified data rarely outweighs what can be found in the public domain. More recently, a CIA analyst noted that nearly 60 percent of the sources utilized by his technical branch originated in scientific journals, computer databases, newspaper reports, and translated items by the agency's Foreign Broadcast Information Service.⁴ Other analysts place the figure closer to 80 percent in their work.

In the meantime, a number of former Soviet intelligence officers fled safely to the West, bringing with them their detailed memories relating to what had transpired at the upper levels of decision-making in Moscow. When Oleg Gordievsky made his escape from Moscow in 1985, he departed with a wealth of information on the KGB's operations, personnel, and organizational structure. In another extraordinary instance, Vasili Mitrokhin even managed to bring an entire archive with him to Britain in 1992 – ten manuscript volumes of daily notes that he secretly made while covering a 12-year period working in the KGB's foreign intelligence branch. An invaluable source regarding Soviet espionage in the United States have been the notebooks of Alexander Vassiliev, a Moscow journalist and ex-KGB officer who was given privileged access to archival holdings a year after the demise of the Soviet Union as part of a large-scale book project. Then, too, there is the case of the former German Democratic Republic, whose total collapse at the end of the Cold War created the unprecedented opportunity to examine the surviving voluminous records of its powerful and seemingly ubiquitous state security apparatus.

Sometimes a lengthy time lag may be involved. Not until the early 1970s – more than 25 years following the end of World War II – did the story reach the general public of how Ultra and Bletchley Park

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overcame enormous odds and defeated the sophisticated German Enigma cipher machine. Or in another classic code-breaking feat, the Venona decryptations of Soviet intelligence traffic during the period 1942–1949 remained highly classified information by the US government until after the end of the Cold War. What therefore follows in these pages reflects the painstaking research of many scholars in the field of intelligence – particularly since 1989 – with the important proviso that more revelations about the Cold War period will doubtlessly see the future light of day.

Notes

- 1 Vladislav M. Zubov, “Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960–62,” in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars), no. 4, 22.
- 2 Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 33–34.
- 3 Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1963), 5.
- 4 Loch K. Johnson, *Secret Agencies: US Intelligence in a Hostile World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 4.

2 The Players

One of the defining moments following the end of World War II was the decision of President Harry S. Truman to sign the National Defense Act on July 26, 1947. This piece of legislation brought the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) into official existence, thus ending several years of acrimonious debate. Such an organization had faced opposition from various quarters of the federal government: the State Department, which had sought a lead role in peacetime intelligence; the armed services, which had wanted no civilian interference in their own operations; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), whose director J. Edgar Hoover saw a major rival and competitor and never moderated his stiff resistance during his own long tenure in office.

To a large extent, the design of the new agency followed the recommendations of William “Wild Bill” Donovan, the former head of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which had grown to over 10,000 worldwide operatives. Above all, he had called for “the establishment for the first time in our nation’s history of a foreign secret intelligence service which reported information as seen through American eyes.” Stressing the importance of its independence from other government departments, Donovan further urged research and analysis to become “an integral and inseparable part of this service.” Because building a modern system – never an easy matter – was more difficult in peacetime than war, Donovan urged immediate action before the OSS completely disappeared to take advantage of “its experience and know how.”¹

Fears had to be allayed that the new organization might be generally construed as an “American Gestapo.” Yet this apprehension gained little traction, in part because the legislation specifically denied the agency any police, subpoena, and law-enforcement powers as well as a domestic security function. In addition, the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 remained a vivid memory. Had a centralized agency been in place at that time, some argued, advance