ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



EDITED BY
RODNEY P. CARLISLE

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VOLUME ONE-TWO

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EDITED BY
RODNEY P. CARLISLE

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Encyclopedia of

INTELLIGENCE
& COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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Introduction

INTELLIGENCE and counterintelligence are practices as old as recorded human history, with stories from ancient Babylon and the Bible, as well as from the classical era, the high Middle Ages, and through the Renaissance to modern times. An encyclopedia that comprehensively describes intelligence activities through the full sweep of documented history would consist of many volumes more than the reference before you. For this reason, we selected a limited, representative number of article entries that illustrate important intelligence activities before the 20th century. The *Encyclopedia* is geographically inclusive, presenting articles about espionage in Asian, Latin American, and African nations as well as in Europe and America, mostly in the modern era.

The definitions of the terms, *intelligence* and *counterintelligence*, as used in the *Encyclopedia*, are quite straightforward: Intelligence consists of all the information, both secret and open, that can be employed by a nation's decision-makers to reduce the risks to national security. The information is collected and analyzed to establish foreknowledge of external and internal threats. Counterintelligence consists of the efforts of governments and their agencies to prevent the exposure of future plans by countering the intelligence activities directed against them. In addition to the collection and analysis of information, and the thwarting of enemy or potential enemy intelligence activities through counterintelligence, another aspect considered in connection with such work is covert action, designed to secretly effect outcomes in other countries or among groups threatening the state internally. Covert action includes a range of initiatives from simple propaganda efforts to more intrusive techniques of clandestine intervention to affect politics, military, or industrial resources.

Since all three activities—intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action—are conducted in secret, much of the action is never publicized. However, when a major power is defeated, and some of its operatives and archives are captured, details get released. In addition, victors often cannot refrain from describing a few successful intelligence activities that contributed to their victory, either in official accounts or in personal memoirs. Whether such fragmentary accounts and memoirs are factual is sometimes extremely difficult to establish, as when legends and self-serving autobiographies of spies of the American Civil War flourished in the late 19th century.

Following World War I, and again following World War II, accounts of intelligence proliferated. A rich literature accumulated over the 20th century, describing the secret activities that explained the decoding of the Zimmerman Telegram, the techniques

of the Nazi regime, and the intelligence services and cryptology breakthroughs of the Allies of the 1940s. Following the end of the Cold War, there has been a flood of information about the activities of various intelligence services, and it is now possible to research reliable accounts of the activities of the agents of the former Soviet Union. The literature on all of these subjects is vast and continues to grow.

Even with the flood of new and authentic data, the openly published material on intelligence history is fraught with controversies, with strong advocates and equally vociferous opponents waging almost constant battles in print and sometimes, face to face in public forums. In the United States, the conflict between the need for secret organizations to gather information to reduce risks to the nation and the rights of individuals to personal liberty predates even the formation of the American republic.

In the past and today, American writers on topics of intelligence tend to divide into two camps: One side fears national security will be endangered if the gathering and use of intelligence is not vigorously pursued; the other is concerned that individual rights are endangered by the excesses of executive power. The clash of the two basic contradictory principles, present in all democracies, and the need to preserve security and the protection of liberty, is nowhere more apparent than in the interpretations of domestic surveillance and intelligence activities.

Furthermore, many of the methods employed in the gathering of both domestic and foreign intelligence appear to flaunt the rules of ordinary, interpersonal morality. A classic expression of the conflict between personal ethics and the methods required in intelligence is found in the statement by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who in 1929, discovered that his department helped pay for the decryption of diplomatic messages by the American Black Chamber. Stimson cut off State Department funding, according to legend, with the remark "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

Whether Stimson actually made the comment, the story is apt, for intelligence organizations often resort not only to such seemingly rude or ungentlemanly behavior as opening mail, wiretapping, and eavesdropping, but on occasion adopt far more sinister techniques such as lying by spreading disinformation, burglary, bribery, blackmail, and murder, all in the name of protecting national security. Moreover, intelligence and special-operations agencies of many countries have adopted methods that include sabotage of public facilities, killing innocent civilians, and individual assassination. The stories of U.S. and British aid to the anti-Nazi resistance forces in Europe during World War II provide many examples of the Allies' support for what a later generation has dubbed unconventional or asymmetrical warfare.

The argument that national interest justifies such behavior, forbidden by conventional morality, has been horribly stretched in many parts of the world. Some intelligence agencies have practiced truly grotesque techniques, such as interrogation under the most cruel forms of torture that can be imagined; midnight arrest and execution; agent provocateur activities urging dissidents to commit crimes for which they can be arrested and punished; kidnapping and threatening children and spouses of targeted individuals; and other forms of secret-police activities. Many nations regularly use such methods of state terror, but almost all that do also persist in official denial. The fact that torture and terrorist methods have been adopted by totalitarian regimes and dictatorships is terrifying; when evidence emerges that democracies have indulged in similar methods, the result is sometimes a political backlash and even regime change. Cases of such exposures and the political price paid abound in this *Encyclopedia*.

Many veterans of intelligence organizations have contributed to this collection of encyclopedia entries, usually bringing to bear a fairly positive view of the function of intelligence. In some cases, their positive interpretation is tempered by criticism of past mistakes, inept administrators, and national leaders who through mismanagement, lack of vision, or poor advice contributed to intelligence failures.

Other authors who contributed original articles for this encyclopedia include academics and a number of professional, non-academic historians. Most academics in the United States, at the beginning of the 21st century, live in an environment in which it may be fashionable to criticize any excessive use of presidential or other executive power. Some authors are quick to criticize past presidents and intelligence administrators for allowing agencies to infringe the civil liberties of citizens, or displaying an amoral character in the conduct of U.S. policies at home and abroad. Even though the infringement

of civil liberties and conventional ethics by U.S. agencies has only rarely reached the depths found elsewhere in the world, one literary tradition in espionage history has been the shocking exposé that presents ethical lapses with real or exaggerated distaste. A few of our authors put themselves in that camp.

As editors, we have tried to give free rein to the views of contributors, although in a few cases, we believed the entries were so clearly polemical that they needed some re-thinking to achieve a more balanced, less argumentative presentation. Sometimes, such balance was achieved by a wiser choice of vocabulary that was less fraught with emotional overtones. For the most part, however, rather than imposing our own view or trying to find a politically correct path through the underlying controversies, we let the orientation of the authors show through. For this reason, the attentive reader of multiple entries in this *Encyclopedia* may discover a marked degree of variation in viewpoints. Such is the purpose of the *Encyclopedia*: to give the scholar and reader a representative overview of the subject.

We believe that authors can convey specific and accurate facts, regardless of viewpoint. We have checked the submitted material for accuracy against published sources. However, the establishment of what is factual and what is legend, disinformation, rumor, partial truth, or repeated error in any work of history is no simple matter. Revisionism, in which earlier accounts are revised as a result of later research and new perspectives, is a constant of all historical writing. In the field of espionage history, nearly every new book presents a revision of prior established accounts. The literature of intelligence finds ready publication because of broad public interest, so publishers continually enrich the accumulating shelves of works on the topic. The proliferating revision in this field presents special problems for authors and editors alike.

Since by its nature intelligence work was originally conducted behind a cloak of secrecy, only gradually have the facts emerged about many of the events and personalities presented in the *Encyclopedia*. New books and articles supersede old ones, frequently making a trusted source from a decade ago appear naïve, ill-informed, or even corrupted by intentional disinformation. The experts who contributed articles to this collection conscientiously tracked down the most accurate information. In a few cases, we urged contributors to check more recent sources and to compare information between their sources and others that we suggested.

We believe that the people, their operations and adventures, the national variation, and the tools of the trade that they employed are what make the field of intelligence most fascinating. For this reason, the reader of this *Encyclopedia* will note more entries on individuals than on intelligence principles, or the process of intelligence and its organizational structure. Our approach is biographical and historical, not theoretical. Indeed, the theory and discipline of intelligence is probably best presented in a textbook format.

We have adopted a very straightforward format for the entries. A headword (title) defines the subject, person, agency, or nation covered. The reader should expect that when an individual is the subject, the entry will focus on the intelligence aspects of that individual's career. Similarly, an entry such as United States, China, or Albania will describe, not the history of the nation but the intelligence agencies and policies of the country, with the most emphasis on recent decades. Each article entry shows pertinent bibliographic sources, cross-references to other entries, and the contributor's name and institutional affiliation.

A sample of those affiliations reveals the contributors' wide variety of backgrounds. Many who served in intelligence agencies in still-secret capacities, and are now retired, simply show their affiliation as Association of Former Intelligence Officers. Others hold academic appointments. In addition, we have invited contributions from numerous organizations of historical researchers and independent consultants, including the International Spy Museum, the Rand Corporation, History Associates Incorporated, and other think tanks and historical service groups. All contributors agreed that, even if they have access to classified information, their work for this *Encyclopedia* is based on publicly available, unclassified material.

RODNEY CARLISLE, PH.D.
GENERAL EDITOR OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
PROFESSOR EMERITUS, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
VICE-PRESIDENT, HISTORY ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED
AUGUST 2004

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Foreword I: Robert M. Gates

FORMER CIA DIRECTOR

INTELLIGENCE is no longer secret. The last quarter century has seen profound changes in the world of espionage, but no change has been as profound as the loss of secrecy.

To be sure, the public for decades was titillated by the occasional leak about an intelligence coup (in at least two senses of the word) or intelligence blunder. Congressional investigations in the mid-1970s opened the door a little into the world of intelligence operations, though in a highly pejorative way.

Yet not a single presidential memoir in the late 20th century mentioned the role of intelligence information in decision making—either broadly or in specific situations. Nor did the memoirs of any national security adviser or cabinet member, with the sole exception of Ronald Reagan's Secretary of State George Shultz. The occasional intelligence memoir dealt mainly with internal CIA matters and operations, and devoted little attention to how intelligence affected national policies. (Although my own book, *From the Shadows*, discussed the role of intelligence in the last half of the Cold War from the vantage point of both the CIA and the White House.) The motives for nearly all policy makers to avoid discussion of intelligence varied, but I suspect included, above all, a desire not to compromise sources and methods. Nor, for many years, were there scholarly works on the role of intelligence in national security affairs, due mainly to the near total absence of reliable source materials and public testimony. The only exception was the annual publication by the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of CIA's analysis of the Soviet economy. All that has changed in just the last 20 years.

During the mid-1980s, intelligence professionals began to speak out and write about the role that the CIA and other intelligence agencies played in developing national security policy. I felt strongly about the need to do this, and began my own efforts with a public speech on "CIA and the University" at Harvard University in 1986, and followed that with an article "The Role of Intelligence in American Foreign Policy" in *Foreign Affairs* in the fall of 1987. Two years later, I wrote an article for *Washington Quarterly* on "The Use of Intelligence at the White House." Other insiders from the intelligence community made their own contributions.

In 1986, the CIA and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard began a collaboration in which the CIA declassified and provided intelligence documents (and analysts) to scholars who then prepared case studies on the part played by intelligence in specific government decisions, drawing on both the intelligence materials but also many other sources as well. Scores of these case studies have now been prepared and published, and

the collaboration continues. As director of Central Intelligence, in 1992 I directed the declassification of all national intelligence estimates on the Soviet Union prepared throughout the Cold War, as well as information on specific covert actions of historical importance. Much else has been declassified in the ensuing years, especially by the CIA.

With these and other initiatives, the floodgates opened for information, analysis, and scholarly research on U.S. intelligence and its role in the American government. There are now countless books and articles, and even many college courses, on intelligence. Further, the role of intelligence in decision making is no longer just a matter of historical interest. The exposure of U-2 photographs during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was a singular event in those days.

However, over the last 20 years, publicly revealing intelligence information to persuade skeptical audiences at home and abroad has become commonplace practice by policy makers—from the release of communications intercepts in 1986 to prove Libyan government complicity in a terrorist attack on American soldiers in West Berlin, to Secretary of State Colin Powell's intelligence briefing to the United Nations Security Council on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs early in 2003. (We old-timers are still bemused to see U.S. satellite photos marked "No Foreign Dissemination" being shown to the U.N. Security Council.)

Now journalists, as well as historians, can write about intelligence information and its impact on government actions and decisions. The availability of all this information, both historical and contemporary, has contributed significantly to greater understanding of the real world of intelligence and its influence on decisions at all levels.

Public perceptions long shaped by novels, Hollywood and television now are also informed—for those who care—by serious scholarship based on documents and first-hand testimony. While the result is perhaps less entertaining than Ian Fleming's James Bond or Tom Clancy's Jack Ryan, it provides the public (as well as other parts of the American government) with a more realistic understanding and appreciation of the world of intelligence, its strengths and weaknesses, and its part in protecting our national security.

In a post-September 11 world, where threats to Americans are no longer distant or hypothetical, highly effective intelligence organizations are just as critical as during the most dangerous moments of the Cold War, and perhaps even more so. Our very lives depend upon effective, well-funded intelligence agencies.

In a new world of heightened risk, it is important that the public understand the complexities and uncertainties of this vital business. The public, and some decision makers, also need to understand that, as one of my colleagues once observed, the information we seek to inform decisions and to protect Americans falls into two categories, "secrets" and "mysteries."

Secrets ultimately are discoverable and knowable; mysteries encompass situations where even the protagonists do not yet know what they will do. In short, Americans need to understand that the best intelligence services in the world—which we have—will never provide perfect protection against surprise and harm. Still, it will not be for lack of trying. This *Encyclopedia* is an important contribution to the literature of intelligence. It represents a comprehensive effort to bring together in one reference information about the history, organizations, techniques and people who have shaped the world of intelligence—both historically and contemporaneously. It is a beneficiary of the wealth of information that has become available and, at the same time, makes that information easily accessible to and understandable for the student and public. Our security has always depended on good intelligence. It is an unfortunate fact that, after two world wars and nearly half a century of the Cold War, the need for intelligence is as great today as ever before.

Or, as George Smiley says to new intelligence officers in John Le Carré's *The Secret Pilgrim*, "For as long as rogues become leaders, we shall spy. For as long as there are bullies and liars and madmen in the world, we shall spy. For as long as nations compete, and politicians deceive, and tyrants launch conquests, and consumers need resources, and the homeless look for land, and the hungry for food, and the rich for excess, your chosen profession is perfectly secure, I can assure you."

Robert M. Gates, Ph.D.
Director of Central Intelligence,
November 1991–January 1993
President, Texas A&M University
College Station, Texas, August 2003

Foreword II: Oleg D. Kalugin

FORMER KGB OFFICER

"ONE SPY IN THE RIGHT place is worth 20,000 men in the field." Attributed to Napoleon, this aphoristic message assumes special significance in today's world. The end of the Cold War created an illusion that military threats had largely dissipated, espionage and subversion were on the wane and may some day become relics of the past. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, sent a shockwave across the continents, came as a jolt to every decent human. It has become clear that terrorism, combined with weapons of mass destruction, and its potential spread on a global scale, represents a threat incomparable to that posed by America's former communist adversaries. Unlike the Soviets and their allies, the contemporary breed of terrorists is not deterred by fear of death and destruction, in fact they vie for the dubious honor of killing others and themselves.

The new, grim realities demand a close and critical look at the existing intelligence establishment and its prime missions. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the destinies of mankind today, more than ever, depend on the efficacy and exactitude of intelligence services. The current and future transnational threats can be met and coped with through intensified and expanded efforts of national intelligence organizations, as well as the broadest possible cooperation of all security and intelligence bodies of the free world.

But other important adjustments must be implemented without delay. Over the past decades, intelligence has become a highly diversified area of human endeavor in which spy planes, signals, imagery, and new technologies are playing an ever-increasing role. In the dictionary of espionage, a new notion has even been coined: chatter intelligence, the surveillance of increasing communications chatter that may indicate a terrorist strike.

But let's face it: there is no substitute for human penetration, and it has been woefully neglected. No more American hit-and-run espionage forays. The stakes are too high to rest on laurels of triumph in the Cold War. It's high time to dramatically revitalize human intelligence in the United States services. In ancient China, the military strategists emphasized that the enemy's true situation must be sought among men. These words are as valid in the 21st century as they were a thousand years ago. But spies inside the adversaries' backyard do not spring up by a wave of the hand. They need to be carefully selected, meticulously vetted, trained, patiently nurtured, and prepared for highly risky assignments.

Spies are a motley crowd. They may be ideological zealots, true patriots, dedicated public servants, but they may also be recruited from political con-

verts, adventurers, egomaniacs, and mercenaries. Irrespective of their motivations, humans, like gadgets, are not faultless, but once inside the coveted target, they can do miracles no technology can match. The battle of wits, wills, and spirits underlie the magnitude of human intelligence.

And yet, stealing secrets and intelligence collection in general are not the endgame, nor is analysis of obtained data. To make sense of what has been stolen, filed and scrutinized, to penetrate behind official smiles, handshakes, and pledges of cooperation, and to help political leaders navigate the decision-making process—that's what intelligence is about. And more: developing and perfecting capabilities to influence world events, intensifying political and psychological warfare, applying economic and financial pressures, and using other offensive operations known as covert actions to dumbfound the adversary, to weaken his morale, to frustrate his resolve, to eventually achieve desired objectives without resorting to an all-out war.

The intelligence business is not cheap. But millions of dollars more spent on intelligence may save billions spent on war. "Knowledge is never too dear," said Sir Francis Walsingham, the architect of British intelligence in the 16th century.

Intelligence must be both, a shield and a sword. These were the guiding principles of the Soviet intelligence and security organization known as the KGB. And yet, the KGB, its prowess notwithstanding, could not save the Soviet totalitarian state. The communist system was doomed from its inception, and inevitably fell apart under the burden of its economic inefficiency, inhumanity, and inability of the communist leaders to adjust to the realities of modern times.

The KGB experience however, provides a unique saga of not only brutality and human sufferings, but also of dedication, unbridled ambitions and high professionalism. It must not be forgotten or ignored, as the world is facing new, unprecedented challenges and threats.

Oleg D. Kalugin
Former KGB Major General
Professor, Center for Counterintelligence
and Security Studies
August 2003

Timeline of Intelligence

c. 1294 B.C.E.
The Battle of Kadesh sees perhaps first recorded use of military reconnaissance in war, as Egyptian spies bring advance warning of approaching Hittite army to Pharaoh Ramses II, thus making possible his victory.

c. 1267 B.C.E.
The Milesians are in power in Ireland; their chief poets known as the *ollaves* must learn to recite, as Robert Graves writes in his *The White Goddess* (1948), "one hundred fifty Oghams, or verbal ciphers," which the uninitiated cannot understand.

c. 1200 B.C.E.
The Achaeans (Greeks) under King Agamemnon use famous ruse of the Trojan Horse—warriors led by Ulysses concealed inside a horse statue—to gain entry and destroy King Priam's city of Troy in modern Turkey.

c. 1000–950 B.C.E.
David the Israelite, upon finding a servant of the rival Amalekites abandoned, promises him his life in return for leading the Israelites to a surprise victory over the Amalekites in their camp.

521–486 B.C.E.
Darius the Great, ruler of Persia (Iran), establishes the King's Eyes and Ears as an elite intelligence corps to keep watch in his vast empire; constructs vast network of roads for speed of messengers and troop movements, a tactic Genghis Khan will follow in his empire centuries later.

c. 500 B.C.E.
Sun Tzu, Chinese warlord, writes his famous *Art of War*; Chapter 13 gives first known exposition of espionage in war and affairs of state.

480 B.C.E.
Greek traitor Ephialtes reveals secret path behind the Greek army led by Leonidas of Sparta to the Persians under Xerxes at Thermopylae; resulting surprise causes Leonidas and entire army to die as martyrs to freedom.

The 5th century B.C.E. wars between the Greeks and Persians gives rise to what could be called the science of cryptology, from the Greek words *kryptos*, "secret," and *logos*, meaning "writing or knowledge."

323 B.C.E.
Plutarch, the Roman historian, records that Alexander the Great may have been assassinated by order of his old tutor Aristotle by using "water, deadly cold as ice, distilled from a rock in the district of Nonacris [in Greece]."

c. 300 B.C.E.
In Rome's war with the Etruscans in Italy, the Roman consul Fabius Maximus employs his brother, who knows the Etruscan language, to assure that the Umbrians do not enter the war on the side of the Etruscans.

218–201 B.C.E.
In the Second Punic War between Carthage and Rome, Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, will make extensive use of espionage to offset the Roman superiority in manpower and treasure; Hannibal will eventually be defeated at Zama (202 B.C.E.) by Romans under Scipio Africanus.

166 B.C.E.
While on a tour of the East, the Roman Tiberius Gracchus and his entourage will be referred to by the Greek historian Polybius as *kataskopoi* (spies), one of the first clear references to spies in Western, as opposed to Eastern, historical writing (as in Sun Tzu's *Art of War*).

104–102 B.C.E.
Han Wu-ti, the Chinese Martial Emperor, proves his knowledge of Sun Tzu's economic foundations of warfare by launching campaigns to gain prized central Asian Ferghana horses to improve the Chinese imperial stud farms for his cavalry.

58–44 B.C.E.
From the beginning of his rule in Gaul (modern France and Belgium) until his death, Julius Caesar develops his own sophisticated code and corps of spies, the *speculatores*, to keep him aware of activities of military foes abroad and political rivals back in Rome.

The Roman historian Suetonius credits Caesar with also developing his own secret communications cipher. March 15, 44: Ignoring warnings of a soothsayer in his own "intelligence" service, Roman dictator Julius Caesar falls victim to assassins in the Roman Senate.

31 B.C.E.–14 C.E.
Augustus Caesar, adopted son of Julius Caesar, becomes the first Roman emperor, and sets up imperial intelligence services along the general lines that will be followed until the fall of (Western) Roman Empire in 476; eventually the imperial service will divide much like that of later British Empire; *speculatores*, to watch within the empire and the *arcani*, to guard against threat from without (similar to Britain's MI-5 and MI-6 structure).

678 C.E.
Use of Greek Fire (medieval napalm) saves Constantinople (Byzantium) from attack by Arab fleet under Muawija; recipe for Greek Fire given to so few that eventually it will be forgotten.

716–735 C.E.
Traditional Japanese date given for the introduction of the *Thirteen Chapters of Sonshi* (Sun Tzu) into Japan, but U.S. Marine General Samuel B. Griffith in his edition of *The Art of War* (1963) believes Sun's seminal work may have reached the island nation as early as the 1st century C.E.

c. 750
The birth of the Arab Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad marks the beginning of the golden age of Arab cryptology; the 10th-century *Adab al-Kuttab*, *The Secretary's Manual*, has sections on cryptology.

c. 793–1042
With the attack on the monastery at Lindisfarne, the age of Viking invasions begins in the British Isles; in order to warn of the approach of the Norsemen, signal bonfires are lit on high hills so that a large part of the country could be brought to arms in a relatively short period of time; the tradition of building fires on hillsides antedates the Viking invasion, originating in ancient Celtic times.

794–1192
Heian period of great instability in Japan sees the first appearance of the ninjas, the unique Japanese contribution to special services.

October 14, 1066
Duke William the Bastard of Normandy in France defeats England's last Saxon king, Harold Godwineson, at Hastings (Senlac); after his conquest, Duke William inaugurates the *Domesday Book*, a large strategic survey of his new kingdom which guides him where to build his Norman keeps (castles) to dominate the restive Saxon population.

1194
In one of most unique and daring exploits in intelligence, Blondel, the minstrel of King Richard the

Lion-heart of England, finds his master a prisoner of Leopold of Austria; Richard had vanished on his way home from the Third Crusade in 1192, on which he and Leopold had become enemies.

1206–1227
Genghis Khan, in his march of conquest, makes great use of spies in espionage service administered by Chinese schooled in the *Art of War* of Sun Tzu.

1427–1521
The Aztec Empire, centered in the Valley of Mexico, dominates much of Central America from the imperial capital of Tenochtitlan (modern Mexico City); the rulers of the Aztecs are kept informed of developments throughout their realm by a corps of special runners, a tradition maintained by the Tarahumara Indians of today.

Special scribes used pictographs to depict events within the empire, which the runners would relay back to Tenochtitlan. It was such pictographs that showed the last Aztec Emperor Moctezuma II the arrival of Hernando Cortes and his Spanish adventurers in 1519.

1438–1532
The Inca Empire, with its capital in Cuzco in modern Peru, dominates much of western South America; the Inca, the ruler, gathers intelligence throughout his far-flung kingdom with the aid of the messengers known as the *quipucamayus*, or "keepers of the quipus," which were knotted multicolored strings that served as mnemonic devices for the Inca's messengers.

May 29, 1453
Constantinople (Byzantium) falls to the Ottoman Turks under Sultan Mohammed II. The last Emperor (Basileus) Constantine Paleologus falls in confused fighting; treachery by enemies within the city may have played significant role in the Turkish victory, which came after a siege beginning on April 6 in the same year.

1461–1483
Louis XI, "The Spider King of France," moves to rebuild France after devastation of the Hundred Years' War with England; he uses minor nobility and members of the rising middle class to build government bureaucracy, and intelligence service, loyal only to the throne.

1478
In Japan, one of first recorded acts by the ninjas takes place when the ninja Yamoto kills the samurai Herrito.

1530–1578
Uesugi Kenshin, the powerful Japanese *daimyo* (warlord), opposes rise of Oda Nobunaga to control all of Japan; in 1578 he is allegedly killed while in his toilet by a ninja paid by Oda.

1586
Blaise de Vignère writes his classic *Traite des Chiffres* (A Treatise on Secret Writing).

February 8, 1587
Mary, Queen of Scots, is beheaded at Fotheringhay Castle for her part in the plot of Anthony Babington to kill Queen Elizabeth I of England; the code used by the conspirators had been deciphered (and the plot co-opted) by England's spymaster, Sir Francis Walsingham.

c.1600–1800
The Native American tribes are divided by dozens of languages, which have been grouped linguistically by anthropologists into families like Athapascan and Siouan; however, especially in the Great Plains of North America, the tribes have developed a language of hand signing that completely transcends their spoken tongues.

At the same time, they evolve a language of smoke signals, using an indigenous type of Morse Code–like signal bonfires.

c. 1600–1800
A sophisticated drum language is developed in West Africa, among the Yoruba peoples of present day Nigeria for example, as well as in countries such as Senegal and Gambia, where it is called *djembe*; *djembe* can be used to carry messages (with a mnemonic quality) and also to play music; *djembe* is brought from West Africa to the New World in slave ships.

October 21, 1600
At the Battle of Sekigahara, the warlord Tokugawa Ieyasu unites Japan under his rule; Tokugawa and his heirs, who will govern Japan until 1868, regularly employ ninjas as bodyguards, intelligence agents, and assassins.

1610–1643
Louis XIII of France, with his chief minister, Cardinal Richelieu, builds the modern French state; Richelieu sends the Royal Intendants throughout France to gather intelligence and to report to the king (and to him); he will also employ the father and son geniuses Antoine and Bonaventure Rossignol to build codes for state communications.

1700s
By the 18th century in Europe, all the Great Powers have special bureaus in cryptology, both to encrypt their own messages and decrypt those of their opponents: that of the Austrian Empire, the Geheime Kabinets-Kanzlei is reputed to be the best.

1643–1715
Building upon the work of his father, Louis XIII's reign, Louis XIV, the Sun King, continues to ensure the growth of the French intelligence apparatus, introducing the (first) Grand Chiffre, "great cipher" for most secret state communications.

1715–1774
Louis XV of France embarks on his program of personal diplomacy called the King's Secret, and will use agents such as Chevalier d'Eon and Jacques Casanova on special assignments.

1776–1784
Benjamin Franklin represents the new United States in France with other diplomats such as Silas Deane; Franklin is very much involved in secret diplomacy, helping Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, the French foreign minister, and the playwright Pierre de Beaumarchais establish the "front company" of Hortalez et Cie which will channel vital supplies to the American cause.

September 22, 1776
Nathan Hale, a member of the elite New England covert operators is hanged by the British in New York City under Sir William Howe; 21-year-old Hale was on an espionage mission for American General George Washington.

December 26, 1776–January 3, 1777
Two victories of the American army under General George Washington at Trenton and Princeton in New Jersey, which save the American cause, are made possible in large measure by the espionage of Washington's spy John Honeyman, whose cover is that of an itinerant butcher with the British forces.

1778–1783
The Culper spy ring, headed by Major Benjamin Tallmadge, Washington's spymaster, and first American master of HUMINT (human intelligence) gives Americans invaluable information on the British garrison of New York City under Sir Henry Clinton, who had succeeded Howe as British Commander in Chief in 1778.

February 6, 1778
The work of Benjamin Franklin and other American diplomats such as Arthur Lee and Silas Deane leads to Treaty of Alliance between the United States and France against Great Britain; Hortalez et Cie closes up as one of the most successful clandestine operations in the history of espionage.

A second and secret treaty is signed by France and the United States to enable Spain, also a long time enemy of Great Britain, to join in the alliance; Spain would enter the war on American and French side in June 1779.

October 2, 1780
British Major John Andre is hanged by Americans for his complicity in the plot by American traitor General Benedict Arnold to hand the fort at West Point, New York, over to the British.

1792
French Revolutionary Committee of Public Safety makes Joseph Fouche the Paris minister of police, with responsibility for intelligence as well; Fouche will retain his position under Napoleon (with brief hiatus from 1802 to 1804) until, in 1814, Napoleon finds Fouche has been communicating with the emperor's enemies; Jean Savary, Duc de Rovigo, is appointed in Fouche's place, and combines posts of head of military and civilian intelligence.

June 26, 1794
First recorded use of balloons for reconnaissance purposes takes place on orders of French revolutionary General Jean-Baptiste Jourdan at Battle of Fleurus.

July 12, 1811
Marshal Louis Berthier sends message to Napoleon's brother Joseph, the King of Spain, in

the new Grande Chiffre designed by the Secretary of State Hugues Maret: Joseph, however, does not have the cipher key and cannot read the message.

May 21, 1813
The decipherment of Napoleon's special code, the Grande Chiffre, by George Scovell of the headquarters staff of the British commander Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, helps make possible Wellington's complete defeat of the French Marshal Jean-Baptiste Jourdan at the Battle of Vitoria in Spain.

April 21, 1836
The victory of Sam Houston and his Texas army at the Battle of San Jacinto brings independence to Texas from the Mexican dictator Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna; the nature and extent of the covert assistance given to Houston by his old comrade American President Andrew Jackson may never be known even today.

c. 1839–1907
The British Empire and Tsarist Russia devote some of their best intelligence agents to the Great Game, the struggle between Russia and Great Britain for mastery in Central Asia and Afghanistan; the Great Game will only cease when both empires realize that the German Empire has become a threat to both.

April 12, 1861
Confederate firing on Union Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor in South Carolina begins American Civil War; the war will see first use of electromagnetic spectrum in communications as the telegraph of Samuel Morse and his code will be used by both North and the South; the birth of ELINT (electronic intelligence).

1861–1863
Union observation balloons used by Thaddeus Lowe, who will also introduce first aerial photography for intelligence purposes by taking photos from the gondolas of his balloons; Lowe and his crew make over 3,000 flights over Confederate territory.

c. 1861–1865
Harriet Tubman, famed for her work in the abolitionist Underground Railroad before the Civil War, serves the Union during the war as both intelligence agent and activist with anti-Confederate guerrillas.

July 21, 1861
Intelligence information gathered by Confederate spy Rose Greenhow helps make possible defeat of Union General Irwin McDowell at hands of Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard at First Bull Run in American Civil War.

September 17, 1862
Although unique stroke of luck gives Union General George McClellan the battle plans of Confederate General Robert E. Lee in his first invasion of the North, McClellan defeats Lee at Antietam but fails to destroy his Army of Northern Virginia the following day.

July 1–3, 1863
Loss of vital intelligence gathered by Confederate cavalry under General "Jeb" Stuart contributes to defeat of General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

c. 1860–1900
American and British armies in the American West and the northwest frontier of British India make extensive use of the heliograph to send messages using the sun's rays with Morse code.

1871
During the aftermath of the disastrous Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), the first modern French military intelligence operation is established, the Deuxième Bureau, run by Commandants Vinson and Samuel: its name comes from 1874 when it became the Second Bureau of the Ministry of War.

May 5, 1905
Sidney Reilly, the "Ace of Spies," plays clandestine role in the agreement which gives Great Britain control of vital oil leases in Persia (Iran) owned by William Knox D'Arcy.

October 1909
A recommendation from the Committee of Imperial Defense establishes British intelligence structure that is known today: MI-5, the Security Service, or Secret Service Bureau, oversees intelligence (along with the Special Branch of Scotland Yard) within the United Kingdom, while MI-6, the Secret Intelligence Service, is tasked with conducting intelligence activities outside the nation. The structure is borrowed in forming the CIA and FBI in America.

May 25, 1913
Austrian Colonel Alfred Redl commits suicide after having been discovered passing defense secrets of the Austrian Empire to the Russians.

August 4–5, 1914
On the first night of World War I, the British ship *Telconia* rips up all the German communications cables on the sea bottom, forcing Imperial Germany to use communications systems of other nations (e.g., Western Union of the then neutral United States) to send sensitive coded communications.

August 26–30, 1914
In Russian invasion of East Prussia in World War I, Russian general Alexander Samsonov neglects to encode his battle plans, causing Germans under General Paul von Hindenberg to inflict worst Russian defeat since Borodino in June 1812; Samsonov will shoot himself in his grief.

c. January 1915
Great Britain and France establish the Folkestone network (the Anglo-French Bureau), run by the Briton Major Cecil Cameron and for France by Commandant Zopff; Folkestone agents were successful in gaining information on the German gas warfare program. Marie Birckel and Emile Fauquenot, Folkestone agents, will be decorated by both France and Great Britain at the end of the war.

August 6, 1917
United States declares war on Germany due in large part to decipherment of the Zimmermann Telegram by British under Admiral "Blinker" Hall in Room 40; telegram from German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann had promised Mexico redemption of lands lost to U.S. in Mexican War (1846–1848) if Mexico entered World War I on side of Germany.

1914–1919
German agent Wilhelm Wassmuss creates disturbances for British in Persia and ultimately launches Third Afghan War of 1919, which leads to third Afghan defeat at hands of British.

October 31, 1917
Using intelligence gathered by Lawrence of Arabia before the war, with archaeologist Leonard Woolley among others, and Jewish spy ring of Aaron and Sarah Aaronsohn during the war, British General Edmund Allenby takes Ottoman Turks completely by surprise at Beersheba in today's southern Israel.

December 20, 1917
Soviet Vecheka is established by the Council of Peoples' Commissars to bring all of Russia under the rule of the Bolshevik Party of Vladimir Lenin, who took power in the Revolution of November 1917.

April 1918
Arthur Scherbius secures patent for new type of cipher machine, the ENIGMA. In the years to come, the ENIGMA will become most important German machine for sending encoded messages, and the decrypting of its ULTRA signals will play major role in Allied victory during World War II.

October 26, 1918
First recorded use of Native American language in war when Choctaw language is used to bring about withdrawal of Second Battalion of the 142nd Infantry on Western Front in World War I.

November 1921
The American negotiating position at the Washington Conference on naval disarmament is vastly improved by the fact that American cryptologist and his MI-8 group have been able to decipher critical Japanese diplomatic messages; by the end of the conference, Herbert O. Yardley's group has deciphered some 5,000 Japanese messages.

1928
American ELINT (electronic intelligence) has advanced to the point where U.S. Navy Lieutenant Ellis M. Zacharias can listen to the maneuvers of the entire Japanese Combined Fleet from the USS *Marblehead* in the Pacific Ocean.

June 1931
When American Secretary of State Henry Stimson removes State Department funding for MI-8, a joint project with the War Department, Yardley, financially hard-pressed, publishes his historic book *The American Black Chamber*.

1933–1941
President Franklin D. Roosevelt uses his own private intelligence service, The Room, which had

been founded by Vincent Astor in 1927; an alumnus of The Room is Kermit Roosevelt, who will preside over the 1953 overthrow of Iran's pro-Marxist leader Mohammed Mossadeq.

August 16, 1939
On the eve of World War II, the first German ENIGMA machine makes its way finally to London, via Paris from Warsaw, where cryptologists of the elite Polish Cipher Bureau had made much progress already in decrypting the ENIGMA messages, the ULTRA code traffic

1940
William Friedman and the cryptologists of the U.S. Army SIS (Signals Intelligence Service) break the vital Japanese diplomatic PURPLE code. Decryptions of PURPLE signals are called MAGIC.

December 7, 1941
A combination of manpower shortage, budgetary limitations, and extensive Japanese code traffic causes vital code messages to remain undeciphered, paving way for disaster at Pearl Harbor.

1939–1941
Communist Rote Kapelle, "Red Orchestra," spy network brings Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin vital information, including information about German invasion of Russia in June 1941, but Stalin refuses to believe it.

c. 1940
Jacques Bergier of the Red Orchestra network helps establish French MARCO POLO group which gains information about German atomic program under Werner Heisenberg and the development of the V-1 and V-2 rockets.

August 20, 1940
The long arm of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin reaches out to Mexico where his old rival Leon Trotsky is killed by Soviet NKVD agent Ramon Mercader.

January 2, 1941
The XX Committee is established, under direction of J. C. Masterman of MI-5, to "turn" those German agents who are found within the United Kingdom. The German agents are given a chance to double-cross their former employers and relay false messages given them by MI-5, or be hanged for espionage. However, at least two German agents escape the XX dragnet—and almost succeed in giving away date of Normandy invasion by way of a rebus puzzle.

February 28, 1942
Successful demonstration of Navajo Native American language for use by U.S. Marines for coded communications; the "Navajo Code Talkers."

June 4, 1942
Less than six months after debacle at Pearl Harbor, herculean effort by U.S. Navy cryptologists and their British Empire allies permit breaking of Japanese Navy Code JN25b: the result is the decisive Japanese defeat at Midway.

June 13, 1942
American wartime intelligence put on formal basis with the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under William J. Donovan, who had won the Congressional Medal of Honor in World War I and served as Colonel of the famous Fighting 69th Regiment of New York City.

January 1943
Jean Moulin, "Rex," who has united all the Free French intelligence groups within France, is betrayed to Germans by his friend Rene Hardy; he will be handed over to Klaus Barbie, the Gestapo "Butcher of Lyons," who will be sentenced to life imprisonment in a French court for crimes against humanity in July 1987.

May 17, 1943
BRUSA (Britain-USA) Agreement cements British and American cooperation on cryptology during World War II; in 1948, the UKUSA Agreement will make BRUSA permanent.

June 6, 1944
Allied invasion of Normandy, Operation Overlord, will become most successful act of deception in the history of intelligence, as disinformation project Neptune causes Germans to believe invasion will come at the Pas de Calais instead.

November 1944
British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's fear of a Soviet Iron Curtain already falling over East

Europe will lead him to begin eavesdropping on Soviet communications in the Bride operation, known as VENONA in the United States; VENONA will become important in the following Cold War against the expansionist Soviet Union.

Among those high-level Soviet moles in the United States and United Kingdom who will be exposed partly as a result of the VENONA code traffic will be Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, and Kim Philby. Burgess and Maclean would flee to Moscow in 1951 and Philby would leave his last station in Beirut, Lebanon, for Moscow in 1963.

c. 1944–1945

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agents in Vietnam with Archimides Patti urge that the United States recognize Ho Chi Minh, leader of anti-Japanese resistance and staunch American ally, as leader of a unified Vietnam: their advice is turned down in Washington, D.C.

c. 1944–1945

The Mossad, the intelligence agency of the Jewish Agency, the de facto Jewish government in Palestine, begins its first overseas mission by helping the Jewish Brigade of the British Army in Italy to assist refugees from the German concentration camps to find asylum in Palestine (to be divided into Israel and Jordan by United Nations in May 1948).

July 1945

Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle tasks Andre Dewavrin with reorganization of French intelligence, giving it the general outline it will retain until the present: the SDECE will be the senior intelligence service, the DST will monitor activities within France, while the Action Service (with aide of the Union Corse) will be used for direct and lethal action as needed, such as in the war in Algeria (1954–1962).

September 5, 1945

Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko defects in Ottawa, Canada; his defection will lead to unmasking of Soviet agents such as Canadian Allan Nunn May and American Harry Dexter White.

1948–c. 1963

CIA carries out massive clandestine operation aimed at frustrating communist takeover of war-weakened Western Europe; the effort, involving politics, industry, and media, leads to creation of stable West European democracies.

1948–1991

The American and Soviet navies carry out a tense struggle for intelligence under the oceans of the water using submarines; some 2,000 known secret missions were carried out against the Soviet Union by American Navy submariners; in 1969 the USS *Lapon* tracked a Soviet submarine for 40 days under the North Atlantic.

June 25, 1950

Making great use of Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, North Korea scores complete surprise in its invasion of South Korea over the 38th parallel frontier border.

August 19, 1953

Riots in Tehran, Iran, orchestrated by CIA under Kermit Roosevelt lead to overthrow of pro-Marxist Premier Mohammed Mossadeq and restoration of the Imperial Peacock Throne of Shah Reza Pahlavi.

July 20, 1955

General Reinhard Gehlen becomes intelligence chief for the German Federal Republic (West Germany); previously running what was known as the Gehlen "Org," he had begun his intelligence career by being head of section of Foreign Armies East (mainly Russian front) for the German High Command in World War II.

October 3, 1957

An agreement, still largely classified, signed between the French Fourth Republic and the State of Israel will lead to the construction of the Dimona nuclear reactor; rumors persist CIA's James J. Angleton, then chief of Israeli desk, made possible clandestine material American support.

1959

Still smarting from defeat at hands of Israel in the Suez War of 1956, President Gamal Abdel Nasser begins plans for German ballistic missile program; Israel's Mossad under Isser Harel responds with Operation DAMOCLES, a ruthless attempt to terrorize German scientists into not helping Egyptians; although successful, Operation DAMOCLES will lead to Harel's resignation in 1963.

c. 1960–c. 1972
CIA and its proprietary air fleet, Air America, carries out massive covert operation in support of anti-communist forces in Laos against the Communist Pathet Lao, supported by Peoples' Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

May 1, 1960
Francis Gary Powers is shot down in his U-2 spy plane in flight over Soviet Union, forcing American President Dwight D. Eisenhower to make public notice of the U-2 program.

August 25, 1960
Possibly stimulated by public revelation of the U-2 spy plane, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is established; a project which will involve the U.S. Air Force, the CIA, and the National Security Agency (NSA), the NRO will gain intelligence by using spy satellites in the ultimate high ground: space itself. Microwave radiation will become main means of communication between satellites and their home stations on earth.

1960–1965
What begins as an attempt by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to make reparations to Israel for the crimes of the Holocaust becomes massive clandestine shipment, with approval of American Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, of American tanks from arsenal of West German Army to Israel. Most of the tanks used by the Israelis in their lightning victory against neigboring Arab states in the Six-Day War of 1967 were American tanks shipped by Germany's Adenauer.

August 12, 1961
One day before Berlin Wall is established, Bogdan Stashinsky, KGB assassin of Ukrainian dissidents Lev Rebet and Stefan Bandera, defects to West to reveal full details of KGB's Department 13, "Wet affairs, *mokriye delo*," which is charged with carrying out political murders.

December 15, 1961
KGB agent Anatoli Golytsin defects in Helsinki, Finland, and makes charges of Soviet penetration of American and British intelligence services; the "great mole hunt" has begun, and will continue for over a decade.

Golytsin corroborates the Venona unmasking of Burgess, Maclean, Philby, and eventually Blunt, but insists that the Cambridge University spies were referred to as the Ring of Five, setting off a hunt for the Fifth Man in British intelligence. One casualty of the mole hunt will be the CIA's chief of counterintelligence, James J. Angleton, who will be dismissed in 1974.

May 31, 1962
One of most determined manhunts in history ends with the execution at Ramleh, Israel, of Adolf Eichmann, who had been captured by Israeli Mossad in Argentina for his part in the Final Solution, the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jewish People.

October 14, 1962
U-2 flight by Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr., who will later be killed on another mission, confirms presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, beginning the Cuban Missile Crisis; at the time, all credit for aerial reconnaissance is given to U-2 flights to protect existence of Corona spy satellite program.

May 16, 1963
Soviet GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky executed for passing secrets to the United States and United Kingdom; Penkovsky's courageous effort helped give the United States the decisive edge in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.

September 5, 1972
With alleged help of East German intelligence, the Stasi, Black September terrorists storm Olympic Village at Munich, Germany, and kill 11 Israeli athletes; Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir unleashes Mossad to kill all the Palestinian terrorists.

1973–1975
Investigative committees chaired by Senator Frank Church in the U.S. Senate, Congressman Otis Pike in the House, and by Nelson Rockefeller bring covert operations of CIA under intensive scrutiny; CIA Director William Colby is forced to reveal the "Family Jewels," CIA operations that included plots to kill Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

1974
F. W. Winterbotham publishes *The Ultra Secret*, publicly disclosing for the first time the achievements of ENIGMA.

April 12, 1975
Famed African-American chanteuse Josephine Baker dies, and is celebrated in Paris with 21-gun salute; after World War II, Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle awarded her the Croix de Guerre for her espionage service in the Free French cause during the war, constantly risking imprisonment and death at the hands of the German Gestapo.

March 9, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner, a classmate of President Jimmy Carter, is sworn in as director of the Central Intelligence Agency; based on the revealed excesses of the HUMINT (Human Intelligence) capacity of the agency, Turner, in what could be called the Turner Doctrine, flows almost monolithic power to ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) sources of gathering information.

November 4, 1979
The U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, falls to Iranian student radicals; the embassy staff is taken completely by surprise, one reason being the shortage of those learned in the language of Iran (Farsi); now speculated as the first sign of danger of over-reliance on ELINT.

1979–1989
Massive invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces after inability to establish Marxist regime to Moscow's liking; covert aid to the mujahideen Afghan resistance begins under President Jimmy Carter and continues under President Ronald Reagan until Russian official withdrawal under Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.

1980–1990
Clandestine effort begun by administration of President Ronald Reagan to prevent Russian invasion of Poland to crush Solidarity labor movement of Lech Walesa.

1980–1992
Fear of the Marxist Sandinistas making Nicaragua into a new Cuba causes Reagan administration to back the Contra guerrilla movement in Nicaragua against Sandinista regime; although Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega will lose to Violetta Charmorro in 1990 presidential elections, real peace will not come to country until 1992.

August 31, 1983
South Korean Airlines Flight KAL 007 Boeing 747 is shot down by Soviet interceptor fighters when it is mistaken for a U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance plane; incident causes command crisis in Soviet Air Force.

1985
A monument is erected in Moscow to the memory of Soviet spy Richard Sorge, who was executed during World War II by the Japanese on November 7, 1944; among the information which Sorge delivered to Stalin (but was ignored) involved the German invasion of Russia in June 1941.

May 19, 1985
While approaching a "dead drop" to make contact with his Russian handlers, American John Walker is arrested by the FBI, bringing to an end a career of espionage which had begun in 1967 while serving in U.S. Navy communications; the Walker Spy Ring also included his son Michael and his brother Arthur, also his friend Jerry Whitworth.

August 1985
CIA admits existence of "spy dust," NPDD (nitrophenyl pentadien), perhaps with luminol, which KGB uses to keep track of individuals. Milt Bearden and James Risen in *The Main Enemy* (2003) wrote that CIA feared it could be "mutagenic—that is if absorbed by humans in an unaltered form, it could cause alterations in the cell structure."

October 7, 1985
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorists under Abu Abbas capture Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean and kill American handicapped tourist Leon Klinghoffer; although later released by Italy, Abu Abbas will be apprehended during British and American conquest of Iraq in the spring of 2003.

November 2, 1985
KGB defector Vitali Yurchenko returns to the Soviet Union. Some historians suspect Yurchenko knew of the Soviet mole in the CIA's Soviet/Eastern European Division, Aldrich Ames.

August 1990–March 1991
Operation DESERT STORM sees the first major use of the GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) system

to help American planes and vehicles in navigation, and the use of reconnaissance drone aircraft.

January 1992
The chief of the FBI's National Security Threat List Unit, Robert Hanssen, writes paper that argues that with the collapse of the Soviet Union "loose networks" of "transnational rogue actors" pose more of a threat to U.S. security than Russian espionage.

April 19, 1994
Aldrich Ames, a Soviet spy since 1985 who was counterintelligence chief in the CIA's Soviet/Eastern European Division, pleads guilty to charges of espionage and receives life sentence; among those 11 agents he betrayed to the KGB was Dmitri Polyakov, the famous TOPHAT, of the Soviet Military Intelligence, the GRU.

December 24, 1997
Carlos Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, "The Jackal," is sentenced to life imprisonment in a French court for his 1975 murder of two agents of French domestic intelligence, the DST, and their Lebanese informant on the Rue Tullier in Paris in 1975.

February 18, 2001
FBI agent Robert Hanssen is arrested at "dead drop" where he is planning to leave classified material for pick up by Russian agents; Hanssen's arrest brings to an end a career of 21 years of Soviet intelligence work.

May 2001
National Security Agency begins to pick up electronic "chatter" from Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda Islamic terror network, which had been responsible for the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 and the USS *Cole* in Aden harbor in October 2000. The chatter warns of "Hiroshima" type strike at United States or American interests abroad.

August 1, 2001
U.S. Navy P-3 Orion air reconnaissance plane forced down over Hainan Island by two jet fighters from air force of the Peoples' Republic of China.

September 11, 2001
United States falls victim to four jumbo jets hijacked by Islamic extremist terrorists of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network; one plane crashes in western Pennsylvania, while two crash into World Trade Center in New York City and one into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.; some 3,400 people are killed.

October 8, 2001
Intelligence shortcomings revealed by the 9/11 attacks lead to a renewed emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) in Afghanistan as CIA recruits warriors of the Northern Alliance to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban; invasion of Afghanistan on October 8 leads to conquest of country by December 2001 with aid of U.S. and British Special Forces and regular troops.

January 7–April 16, 2003
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the "Second Iraq War," sees increased use of second generation drone aircraft armed with missiles and first use of internet email in wartime, as it appears that U.S. forces gained access to email addresses of senior Iraqi commanders to warn them against using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against American and British coalition troops.

December 13, 2003
Iraq's Saddam Hussein is captured by U.S. forces; discovered alone, bewildered, and hidden in a hole in the ground near his family's hometown of Tikrit, across the Tigris River from one of his palaces.

March 11, 2004
Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists explode 10 bombs on four trains in three Madrid, Spain, railroad stations at the height of rush hour. The attack affects the Spanish national elections a few days later, leading to Spain's withdrawal from the American-led coalition forces in Iraq.

July 2004
The 9/11 Commission, a bipartisan panel tasked with examining the events leading to September 11, 2001, releases its report. The commission criticizes the intelligence communication under both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, and makes recommendations for restructuring the CIA and the intelligence community heirarchy.

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SOURCES. David A. Graaf, "Han Wu-ti," *The Reader's Companion To Military History* (1996); Nigel West, *Mole Hunt* (William R. Morrow, 1989); John Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes* (Da Capo, 1959); John Barron, KGB (Living Sacrifice, 1974); General Hao Hanzhang, *Sun Tzu's Art of War* (1987); Jeffrey T. Richelson, *A Century of Spies* (Oxford University Press, 1995); Mark Riebling, *Wedge* (Simon & Schuster, 1994); Bob Woodward, *Veil* (Simon & Schuster, 1987); Sally McClain, *Navajo Weapon: The Navajo Code Talkers* (Treasure Chest Books, 1994); Ronald Lewis, *ULTRA Goes To War* (Welcome Rain Publishers, 1978); Simon Singh, *The Code Book* (Random House, 1999); Rose Mary Sheldon, "Toga And Dagger: Espionage In Ancient Rome," *MHQ: A Quarterly Journal for Military History,* www.about.com; Paul Elliott, Warrior Cults (Blandford Press, 1995); A. Weiss and Tom Philbin, *Ninja: Clan of Death* (Pocket Books, 1981); "MI-5 Home Page," www.mi5.gov.uk; David Kahn, *The Codebreakers* (Simon & Schuster, 1996); Ernest Volkman, *Espionage* (John Wiley, 1995); Milt Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy* (Random House, 2003); Joseph E. Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War* (Random House, 2002); "Spy Dust: Glossary of Spy Terms," www.themasterofdisguise.com; Peter Maas, *Killer Spy* (Diane Publishing, 1995); Peter Wright, *Spycatcher* (Viking Penguin, 1987); Richard Deacon, *The French Secret Service* (Grafton Books, 1990); Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *Target Tokyo* (Value Publishing, 1984); "The Quipucumayu," www.spanish.sbc.edu; "African Drum Rhythms," www.djembe.net; "The African Drums And Ratios Curriculum," www.algebra.org; Rudolf Kippenhahn, *Codebreaking* (Overlook Press, 1999); Mark Urban, *The Man Who Broke Napoleon's Codes* (HarperCollins, 2001); David Colley, "The Wet Cold War," *VFW Magazine* (April 1997).

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Holst, Arthur H.
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Young, Ronald
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Abel, Rudolf

ALONG WITH Andrew Kayotis, Emil R. Goldfus, Martin Collins, Mark, and many other names, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel was an alias used by Soviet intelligence agent William August "Willi" Fischer (1903–1971).

Abel was born in northern England to Russian exiles of German descent. The family returned to Russia after the Russian Revolution, where 17-year-old Abel adjusted amazingly well. He married and used his multilingualism (he was fluent in English, German, Russian, Polish, and Yiddish) to gain employment in 1927 with the Obedinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (OGPU), a predecessor to the KGB intelligence service. For the next two decades, he lived a very turbulent life, establishing radio-communication networks and spy cells throughout Western Europe, becoming an expert in microphotography, and surviving Stalinist purges and World War II before being chosen for service in America in 1948.

Abel entered the United States from Canada on November 16, 1948 using papers stolen from a Lithuanian-American émigré, and settled in Brooklyn, New York City, using the guise of an eccentric photographer and the papers of an infant who died in 1902. Abel's ambitious mission was to establish a web that would bring together Moscow's disparate and autonomous "illegal agents" from Argentina to Alaska without sacrificing their secrecy. Over the next several years, he worked with numerous spies (including Lona and Morris Cohen), recruited nuclear physicist Theodore Hall as an agent, and established a radio-communications infrastructure so effective that parts are still in use today.

Abel was recalled to Moscow for debriefing and investigation in 1955 following Hall's re-defection and false allegations of embezzlement from agent Reino Hayhanen (who knew his superior only by the alias Mark). Abel assuaged Moscow's doubts of his loyalty while casting suspicion on Hayhanen and was returned to New York City.

When Hayhanen defected, Abel immediately went into hiding for two months in Florida. He returned cautiously to retrieve papers and equipment from his apartment, believing he could dodge surveillance agents, but was discovered and arrested on June 21, 1957. His treasure trove of espionage tools (including micro-storage technology and hollow cufflinks) was confiscated and after heavy interrogation, he finally identified himself as Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel. (The real Rudolf Abel was a friend of Fischer's who had recently died in Moscow.)

Abel was sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment and $3,000 in fines for spying. (Though he had seen many fellow KGB agents executed by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, Abel formally complained that the United States had violated his constitutional rights.)

In 1962, Abel was released by presidential order and exchanged with great ceremony on an East German bridge for Frederic L. Pryor (an American student held in East Berlin) and captured spy-plane pilot Francis Gary Powers. He returned to a hero's welcome in Moscow.

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SEE ALSO: Cohen, Lona and Morris; Hall, Theodore; Hayhanen, Reino; KGB.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (Basic Books, 1999); Louise Bernikow, *Abel* (Trident Press, 1970); James B. Donovan, *Strangers on a Bridge* (Atheneum, 1964).

Adams, John

SECOND PRESIDENT of the United States from 1797 to 1801, John Adams (1735–1826) brought to the office some previous experience in elementary intelligence tradecraft (basic use of codes and ciphers, direction of personal agents, and techniques for evading capture or observation) as a former overseas agent of the Continental Congress, as U.S. minister plenipotentiary to both France and England, and U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands.

Adams as president, however, encountered obstacles gathering useful intelligence to help the U.S. navigate between two much more powerful, potential enemy nations, Great Britain and France. Like other early presidents in an era long before formal establishment of military and civilian intelligence-gathering offices, Adams had at his disposal the Contingent Fund for Foreign Intercourse, also known as the Secret Service Fund. Authorized in 1790 by Congress, the fund could be used to "pay persons to serve the United States in foreign parts" and did not require disclosure of all expenditures to Congress.

Personal agents with little or no intelligence training, but often possessing great ideological zeal or a desire for money or revenge, could also be employed within the United States to engage in counterintelligence duties. Adams's fellow New Englander and Secretary of State Timothy Pickering hired William Eaton, a dissatisfied former army officer, to investigate and successfully expose Dr. Nicholas Romayne, a prominent New York physician recruited by the British to spy on American preparations for military defense along the border with the huge Louisiana territory (then under Spanish control but coveted by both France and England as colonial prospects).

Pickering turned over the evidence against Romayne to Congress; Romayne left the country, and the Senate expelled Senator William Blount of Tennessee, who had conspired with the British to mount an armed attack on Spanish Louisiana and Florida. The Spanish minister to the United States, Don Carlos Martinez de Yrujo, had supplied Pickering with information against Blount and the British ambassador, but the latter remained in place, while Romayne and Blount suffered the consequences of their actions.

Adams had no suspicion that General James Wilkinson, commanding general of the U.S. Army, was also a well-paid agent of the Spanish government based in Kentucky. Meanwhile, U.S. relations deteriorated and finally fell apart with France, whose seizure and pursuit of American merchant vessels led to the undeclared naval "Quasi-War," as well as the first U.S. federal laws against foreign espionage, the Alien Acts of 1798, that permitted deportation of foreigners deemed "dangerous" by the president.

Adams never invoked this right, and the accompanying Sedition Act was so broadly written that it could not be used effectively to prosecute spies. Adams's legacy in the intelligence field is thus a mixed one; although he may have intended that passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts would prevent espionage by foreign powers against America, the laws and their dramatic enforcement against Jeffersonian editors primarily succeeded in stirring up political opposition to Adams. That ended up costing him a second term in the national election of 1800, when he was defeated by Thomas Jefferson.

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SEE ALSO: Jefferson, Thomas; American Revolution.

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Cullough, *John Adams* (Simon & Schuster, 2001); G.J.A. O'Toole, *Honorable Treachery* (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991); Edward F. Sayle, "The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence Community," *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (v.1/1, Spring 1986).

Adams, John Quincy

SIXTH PRESIDENT of the United States (1825–1829) and the son of second president John Adams, John Quincy Adams (1767–1848), like his father, brought extensive diplomatic experience to the White House and was sensitive to the need for secret intelligence-gathering as a tool of diplomacy. In an intrigue-filled atmosphere in Paris in 1800, Adams had negotiated the secret convention that ended the unofficial, naval "Quasi-War" between the U.S. and French navies.

Later, as President James Monroe's secretary of state, he had supported U.S. General Andrew Jackson's occupation of Florida (and Jackson's execution of British agents), as well as Jackson's contention that he acted as a presidential agent, and had negotiated a treaty for purchase of what is now the state of Florida. As secretary of state and later as president, however, Adams resorted most often to secret intelligence-gathering when he confronted the first Monroe Doctrine challenge of keeping the British and other European powers from snapping up, or economically dominating the former Spanish colonies in South and Central America and the Caribbean, then emerging as newly independent nations.

Many of Adams's agents were sponsored or paid out of the Contingent Fund for Foreign Intercourse, or Secret Service Fund, established by Congress in 1790 to permit the president to employ confidential agents "off the books" when necessary. These agents included Alexander Macrae, sent to Europe to secretly learn what he could about French schemes to recover their New World colonies; Joel Poinsett, sent to Mexico to report on intentions of the new republic there in advance of American recognition; and Condy Raguet, the U.S. consul at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, who was also instructed to secretly collect trade intelligence. Neither the State Department with its tiny staff and underpaid, often incompetent consuls, nor the post-War of 1812 U.S. Navy, could do much more than forward basic intelligence (on a country's political leanings or economic relations, for instance) through official channels.



John Quincy Adams used secret executive agents to conduct covert missions on behalf of the United States.

The so-called President's Men or secret executive agents, were the only means available to conduct secret or covert missions. The fact-finding commission sent by Monroe and Adams to Latin America in 1818 included several distinguished members but also the Baltimore propagandist Theodoric Bland, who supported Chilean independence, but not without an element of personal greed (Bland's son-in law made a loan to the Chileans that Bland intended to collect). Although many nations did emerge from the former Spanish possessions, Cuba did not and its proximity to the United States and continuing Spanish colonial status concerned Adams enough to prompt him to authorize secret intelligence-gathering missions. In 1825, Adams and his Secretary of State Henry Clay attempted to hire a Louisiana judge, Thomas Robertson, as a confidential agent to go to Cuba to assess the need for intervention, but Robertson declined. Two years later, however, British designs on Cuba were so well known that Adams and Clay sent Illinois politician Daniel P. Cook to Cuba as a secret agent; Cook completed his mission, returned to Illi-

nois, but died before he could file a report (although Abraham Lincoln's future political rival Ninian Edwards did send Adams as much of Cook's papers as he could find). Enciphered letters to the president and secretary of state from U.S. Minister to Madrid Alexander Everett also warned of British intentions, although Everett himself was sympathetic to a British takeover of Cuba.

Research has also established that as secretary of state, Adams sent at least two agents to the Ottoman Empire (present-day Turkey) out of a desire to see if a commercial treaty could be negotiated between the Ottoman ruler and the United States. A U.S. lawyer went under cover to Constantinople, the Ottoman capital, but the lawyer was compromised when the British ambassador blew his cover. Adams tried again in 1823 with the larger-than-life George B. English, who had previously converted to Islam and served as an officer in the artillery branch of the Ottoman Army. English covertly secured an advance copy of the proposed treaty and traveled throughout the Ottoman provinces disguised in Turkish robes.

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SEE ALSO: Adams, John; France; Monroe, James; United States.

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Adenauer, Konrad

IN APRIL, 1953, at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia, only eight years after the end of World War II, a U.S. Army band played the German national anthem for a special visitor: Konrad Adenauer (1867–1967), the Chancellor of the West German Federal Republic. This was testimony to how far Adenauer had brought West Germany from the wreckage of the German defeat in May 1945.

Konrad Adenauer reviews documents for the Federal Republic of Germany to become a member of NATO in 1955.

Adenauer served as the first chancellor of West Germany from its foundation in 1949 out of the ruins of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich. His Christian Democratic Union Party was one of the successes of the CIA in providing West Europeans with a democratic answer to the heavily Soviet-financed effort to communize Europe. Adenauer oversaw the entry of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955, making his country a full participant in the Cold War against the Soviet Union and its East German allied (or conquered) nation. From the beginning of the Federal Republic, Adenauer found his country on the front line of the Cold War conflict, sharing a common border with the communist German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

In order to meet the threat of both East German and Soviet intelligence against the Federal Republic, Adenauer turned for assistance to Reinhard Gehlen. During the war, Gehlen had served as head of the Foreign Armies East section of German military intelligence, that answered to the German Armed Forces High Command, the OKW. As such, Gehlen became the most widely informed officer in the German Army on the Russian enemy.

Adenauer also authorized a less-known intelligence service: the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The Federal Office was, on the surface, tasked with counterespionage, but mainly focused on the protection of West Germany against

neo-Nazis who would seek to take the Germans back to the dark days of the Third Reich. Yet, Adenauer was not content with merely establishing West Germany as an important NATO player against the Soviet Union. He envisioned a role for German intelligence more daring than any conceived by Germany in the days of the Third Reich. In 1960, Adenauer staged a historic meeting with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion of Israel to help heal the breach with the Jewish people caused by the Nazis' "Final Solution" genocide campaign. As part of the meeting, "Adenauer secretly agreed to supply arms worth $80 million to the embattled Middle Eastern state," as George Thayer noted in *The War Business: The International Trade in Armaments* (1969). Adenauer's capable Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss was put in charge of the clandestine arms-transfer program.

All of the war equipment was transferred with the approval of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, who saw the West German arrangement as a way of supporting Israel clandestinely, without alienating the Arab nations. After Kennedy's assassination in November, 1963, his successor President Lyndon B. Johnson continued the secret agreement with Adenauer. In 1964, a second deal was struck in which U.S. Army tanks, that had served with the West German Army, could be sent to Israel. Some 200 American tanks thus ended up wearing the Star of David of the Israeli Army.

When news of the secret agreement became public in 1965, Adenauer's successor as chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, canceled it. However, it had already been a resounding success. When the Israeli armored forces of General Israel Tal reached the Suez Canal in Egypt in June 1967, in the stunning Israeli victory in the Six-Day War, the Israelis were riding in American Patton, Sherman, and Super Sherman tanks that had been provided by the deal with West Germany.

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SEE ALSO: Germany; Cold War; Six-Day War; Israel.

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Afghanistan

THE HISTORY OF MODERN Afghanistan is, in fundamental ways, the history of covert action gone awry. Although Afghanistan was unified in 1747, its monarchy was established in 1919 with British backing. The last king of Afghanistan, Mohammed Zahir Shah, ascended the throne in 1933 and was overthrown in 1973 by his cousin Mohammed Daoud, who declared a republic. Daoud was killed in a 1978 coup and the Afghan Communist Party assumed control of the government.

The Soviet Union invaded in December 1979, to support the government against the mujahideen, who had united disparate factions under the banners of Islam and anti-Soviet nationalism. U.S. President Jimmy Carter authorized the first covert CIA operation to aid the mujahideen in June 1979. The CIA developed a close relationship with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI), which ran the daily operations in Afghanistan. Between 1980 and 1985, the CIA funded the recruitment and training of thousands of Muslim volunteers (also known as Afghan Arabs) to fight in Afghanistan, including Osama bin Laden.

Later, many volunteers turned against their American and Saudi Arabian sponsors, forming the al-Qaeda terrorist group. As part of the largest U.S. covert action program since World War II, the United States channeled $2-3 billion in weapons and supplies through the CIA and ISI to the mujahideen.

The CIA helped the ISI establish a network of schools in Pakistan and bases in Afghanistan to train the mujahideen in secure communications, covert financial transactions, guerrilla warfare, urban sabotage, and heavy weapons. To counter Soviet domination of the air, the United States also trained the mujahideen to use Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, which turned the tide of war against the Soviets. In 1989, the Soviets withdrew, leaving behind an unpopular proxy government. Although the CIA largely withdrew from Pakistan, the ISI continued to train the mujahideen and Afghan Arabs, and to channel Saudi Arabian funds to them.

After three years of civil war, the mujahideen captured the Afghan capital, Kabul, and killed the president. The new mujahideen government immediately devolved into brutal factional fighting. Pakistan, with U.S. and Saudi support, began to promote the Taliban movement as a stable alternative in Afghanistan. The ISI began to train the Taliban in the same Pakistani military camps as the mujahideen. Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto acknowledged that the training was "paid for by the United States and Britain."

Under the leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar in the city of Kandahar, Taliban forces defeated mujahideen units and took control of 27 of 30 national provinces between 1994 and 1996. Various mujahideen factions, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud (Tajik), Abdur Rashid Dostum (Uzbek) and Karim Khalili (Shiite Hazara) continued fighting the Taliban from the north. Iran, Russia, and India supplied arms and funds to the northern factions under Massoud's leadership, enabling them to control up to 10 percent of the Afghan territory. Mullah Mohammed Omar formed an alliance with bin Laden, who began using the camps to train new cohorts of terrorist recruits.

In 1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton declared that bin Laden was responsible for attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and attacked Afghanistan with more than 200 cruise missiles. A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan was also destroyed based on reportedly false information that it was owned by bin Laden. In October 1999, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 imposed economic sanctions on Afghanistan for offering sanctuary to bin Laden.

In May 2001, U.S. officials visited Afghanistan, praising Taliban efforts to limit opium production. Two months later Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a $43 million emergency aid grant to Afghanistan to cope with the effects of a prolonged drought. On September 10, 2001, al-Qaeda agents assassinated Massoud and on September 11 the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked by al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. U.S. and allied military action forced the Taliban's downfall within a few months. Although reconstruction in 2003 continued, many parts of Afghanistan were only marginally controlled by the central government. Pakistani military and paramilitary forces conducted sweeps in the tribal corridor that runs between Pakistan and Afghanistan, searching for Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives. American special forces units operated directly across the border in Afghanistan.

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SEE ALSO: al-Qaeda; counterterrorism; Pakistan; War on Terrorism; Bush, George W.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Steve Coll, "Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War," *Washington Post* (July 19, 1992); Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (Yale University Press, 2000); Mary Anne Weaver, "The Real Bin Laden," *New Yorker* (January 24, 2000).

Agee, Philip

IN JUNE 1956, Philip Agee graduated from the University of Notre Dame. Before graduation, a CIA recruiter approached him, but he had already been accepted to law school.

However, with the military draft looming, Agee reconsidered the CIA's offer. After 12 years in the CIA, 10 of them as a covert operations officer in Ecuador, Uruguay, Mexico, and Washington, D.C., Agee resigned in 1969. In 1974, Agee called a press conference in London, England, to announce his "campaign to fight the United States' CIA wherever it is operating." Agee took on a mission to ruin the CIA.

To identify CIA personnel in a particular country, Agee went to the target country and consulted sources in local diplomatic circles whom he knew from his prior service. He recruited collaborators and trained them in clandestine techniques designed to expose the cover of CIA employees and sources.

Agee's 1975 book *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* exposed alleged CIA misdeeds against leftists in Latin America, and included a 22-page list of 250 purported agency operatives and officers. Published in 20 languages, the book was an embarrassment to the CIA. "It was not enough simply to describe what the CIA does," Agee said in a television interview. "It was important to neutralize the effectiveness of everybody doing it. And that's why I was

involved after my first book came out in the exposure of hundreds and hundreds of CIA people around the world."

In her autobiography, Barbara Bush, wife of former President George H.W. Bush, accused Agee of exposing a CIA station chief, Richard S. Welch, who was later killed by leftist terrorists in Athens, Greece, in 1975. After Agee sued her for defamation, she revised her autobiography as part of the settlement. In 1978, Agee began publishing the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* in order to promote "a worldwide campaign to destabilize the CIA through exposure of its operations and personnel."

In July 1980, two days after a Jamaica press conference at which Agee's principal collaborator identified Richard Kinsman as CIA chief-of-station in Jamaica, Kinsman's house was strafed with automatic gunfire. In January 1981, two American officials of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, previously identified as a CIA front by Agee, were assassinated in El Salvador.

During the Iran hostage crisis in 1979, Agee offered to exchange CIA documents about Iran for the Americans held at the U.S. embassy in the capital, Tehran. Soon after in 1979, the State Department revoked Agee's passport on national-security grounds. Agee then sued the U.S. government on the grounds that the revocation violated a Fifth Amendment liberty interest in the right to travel.

The case went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that the Passport Act of 1926 authorized the secretary of state to revoke a citizen's passport, and that the revocation of Agee's passport did not impermissibly burden his freedom to travel. U.S. intelligence officials believe that Agee had been working for Cuban intelligence since the early 1970s. A high-ranking Cuban defector in 1992 alleged that Agee had repeatedly taken money that the Cuban intelligence service had received from the Soviet KGB.

In late 1989, Agee allegedly tried to pry secrets out of a female staff member in the CIA Mexico City station. Posing as a member of the CIA inspector general's staff, Agee claimed he wanted information about the Mexico City station as part of a secret investigation. The female CIA employee reported the contact and brought two CIA case officers with her to her second meeting with Agee. One of the two case officers told Agee that he recognized him, and Agee ended his efforts before enough evidence could be collected to bring formal charges. The two CIA officers later were disciplined for their failure to notify superiors of Agee's alleged action

In 2000, Agee launched an internet website in Havana, Cuba, called Cubalinda.com Inter-Active Travel to promote Cuban tourism in partnership with the Cuban state company Cubatur. The venture is the first independent, American-owned business established on the Caribbean island under communist rule. Agee said the site was an attempt to force a small break in the embargo placed on the island by the United States government following the seizure of American property and industries by Fidel Castro during the Cuban Revolution.

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SEE ALSO: Cuba; Central Intelligence Agency; Iran; Central America; Castro, Fidel.

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Air America

A PARAMILITARY OPERATION coordinated by the CIA, Air America functioned from 1955 to 1974 with a mission to provide transport support to anti-communist guerrilla factions in Laos and Vietnam under the guise of a public airline. After the United States' role in the Vietnam conflict ended and Air America was discontinued, the operation absorbed heavy criticism from the public regarding Air America's role in the southeast Asian drug trade. Public attention was brought to the covert operation from author Christopher Robbin when he published the book, *Air America* in 1979. A movie of the same name and loosely based on the book, produced in 1990, also fueled the fire of public criticism. While the criticism that Air America had a role in the southeast Asian drug trade is not

unfounded, Air America's larger roles in Laos and Vietnam, such as troop and food transport, counter some of the negative aspects that appear on the operation's record.

Air America began in 1950 when the CIA gained the necessary funds and resources to purchase the Civil Air Transport (CAT). CAT was developed after World War II by General Claire L. Chennault and Whiting Willauer. After the CIA acquired CAT entirely, the airline continued to fly commercial flights to keep up the ruse of private ownership. CAT played a key role prior to the U.S. involvement in withdrawing 19,808 men, women, and children out of North Vietnam in 1954, supporting France's fight in Indochina, and supporting military and police organizations in Laos.

In 1959, CAT changed its name to Air America, primarily to avoid confusion between commercial transport and paramilitary transports in Laos and Vietnam. By 1960, Air America was being used by the CIA to transport supplies into Laos, to support the anti-communists. While the CIA trained the troops and police in Laos in guerrilla warfare, Air America planes provided the supplies that the troops needed to win the fight against the communists.

On July 23, 1962, Air America's presence and action in Laos dropped to nearly zero when the "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos" was signed by President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. The North Vietnamese Army did not abide by the treaty and began massing troops in Laos. The CIA pushed for Air America to resume supply drops to the resistance and finally got approval to do so "for defense purposes only" by Assistant Secretary of State Averill Harriman. Then, in 1964, Laos became a war zone again and the communists defeated the coalition government.

Kennedy stepped up CIA actions in the following years that had to rely on Air America to transport supplies and officers where they were needed. Air America even picked up the role of recovering downed pilots when the U.S. Air Force could not. With the end of the Vietnam War near, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms ordered the disbandment of Air America and all of its operations on April 21, 1972.

On June 3, 1974, Air America's final aircraft flew from Laos to Thailand and on June 30, 1976, Air America officially closed its operations and returned its more than $20 million in net worth to the U.S. Treasury.

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SEE ALSO: Vietnam; Cambodia; Vietnam War; Central Intelligence Agency.

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air force intelligence

THE U.S. AIR FORCE possesses a formidable all-source intelligence capability, designed both to provide air force general staff with the knowledge they need to make strategic decisions, and to provide pilots and aircrew with the current intelligence they require to fly safely into battle. Counterintelligence is handled by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI).

The executive arm of air force intelligence is the director of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (XOI, based out of the Pentagon). XOI oversees the primary air force intelligence organization, the Air Intelligence Agency (a Field Operating Agency, meaning it is responsible to XOI but is not located with them).

Direct daily intelligence support to geographic combatant commands (such as the Central Air Forces—CENTAF—which is responsible for the Middle East and North Africa region) is provided by Air Intelligence Groups (AIGs) assigned to each. The AIGs deliver daily intelligence briefings to the theater commanders, build target lists for contingencies and wartime operations, and provide the requisite intelligence support to the general staff. During wartime, the AIGs provide intelligence support to the Combined Air Operations Centers that serve as the command posts for theater-wide air operations (such as those that might occur during a regional war).

The AIGs also support, in turn, the Wings (usually a group of three squadrons) and Squadrons (a

small number of aircraft) that fall under their jurisdiction.

Wing and Squadron intelligence staff provide current intelligence briefings to the pilots, deliver contingency briefings during heightened activity and deployments, and build and maintain target folders. Squadron intelligence officers also debrief pilots following their mission and report these results back up the intelligence and operations chains of command.

Air force personnel staff all joint military intelligence organizations, such as the National Joint Military Intelligence Center at the Pentagon and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. DIA provides graduate-level training in intelligence work to all service members, the U.S. Air Force being a primary customer. To accomplish these varied missions, air force personnel draw upon a full suite of intelligence, including signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), measurements and signals intelligence (MASINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). The air force has the native capacity to collect intelligence in all these areas, in many cases in near real-time and with short notice.

Multiple air force intelligence collection platforms and capacities are brought to bear on these missions. Through its critical involvement in the U.S. Space Command, the air force operates technical overhead collection systems, such as surveillance photo and radar satellites, the Defense Support Program (DSP) (which uses infrared detection systems on satellites to provide early warning of missile launches and explosions), and the Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation. Other programs, such as the Space Based Infrared Satellite constellation, have also been developed and deployed in recent years.

Other collection assets. In addition to its ample space-collection capacities, the air force operates ground-based and air-breathing collection assets. Ground-based assets include radar stations (such as the Phased Array Warning System) and signals-collection stations, like those along the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line of the Cold War era. Air-breathing collection assets include traditional platforms such as U-2 reconnaissance aircraft capable of taking photographs in the visual and radar spectra, the RC-135 Rivet Joint which collects signals intelligence, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Predator and Global Hawk, which can collect multi-source intelligence. The air force's E-3 Sentry, although primarily an airborne command post, also has a collection capability.

The air force owns the Joint STARS system (Joint Surveillance Attack Radar System), which has the capability to gather radar-based intelligence about ground force movements. Multiple Air Force platforms (such as the F-16 Fighting Falcon) can be equipped with pods that give the airplane enhanced intelligence-collection capacities. For example, the Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) pod provides enhanced electro-optical collection capabilities.

The air force also operates its own human intelligence organization. In addition to analyzing open-source and human intelligence, these officers and enlisted personnel serve as de-briefers (for example, they might collect intelligence from a defecting foreign national) and wartime interrogators. They normally receive language training and attend special skill-related programs at Fort Huachuca in Arizona.

The air force operates sea-based collections as well; the Cobra series of ships collect MASINT-style telemetry on events such as missile launches.

After processing, information from these sensors is pushed out into the field by a variety of computer systems. The air force must deliver timely, actionable intelligence to decision makers at all levels, and a large part of its intelligence budget is devoted to such delivery systems. (For example, the Combat Intelligence System is a suite of communications, computers, and software, and is an important planning tool used at the squadron level.)

Intelligence training. Air force intelligence training is accomplished primarily at Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. The school program is several months long and covers subjects such as the intelligence cycle, current events, intelligence collection capacities, weapons systems and their capabilities, technical collection issues, briefing skills, and analytic capabilities. Advanced study in intelligence might include graduate study at the Joint Military Intelligence College at DIA, or attendance at the intelligence officer's version of the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force base in Nevada for advanced training in tactics and enemy capabilities. A typical career progression for an air force intelligence officer after Goodfellow might in-

volve serving a tour at the squadron or wing level, then serving in a joint intelligence center or an air intelligence group, followed by career-broadening assignments prior to serving at a national level intelligence organization, ending with a squadron commander assignment at an AIG.

Air force counterintelligence (CI) is operated by the Office of Special Investigations (OSI). In coordination with officials from the FBI and the CIA, the OSI conducts operational counterintelligence-related activities, including briefing and debriefing air force personnel on any suspected collection attempts and providing them with counterintelligence training (such as pointers regarding what unclassified information it might nonetheless be damaging to discuss, called "essential elements of friendly information").

The OSI is authorized, when such authority is granted by the appropriate agency, to use "special techniques" in counterintelligence investigations and operations for periods of up to 90 days. The Air Intelligence Agency and XO provide support to CI and defensive CI operations by maintaining operational security programs and establishing "red teams" that check up on the defensive counterintelligence procedures in the Air Force.

In the first decade of the 21st century, the U.S. Air Force has, most analysts would agree, an extensive and effective intelligence collection and analysis capability, which is critical in a world of quickly changing non-traditional security threats abroad and at home.

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SEE ALSO: army intelligence; naval intelligence; human intelligence; signals intelligence; scientific and technical intelligence.

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Akhmerov, Iskhak A.

ISKHAK AKHMEROV JOINED the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1919, which sponsored his admission in 1921 to the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, a school established to educate Asian nationalities in the Soviet republics. In 1930, Akhmerov graduated from the School of International Relations at the First State University. Akhmerov joined the OGPU (foreign intelligence service) after graduation, and participated in the suppression of anti-Soviet movements in the Bukhara Republic from 1930 to 1931. He transferred to the Foreign Department (INO) of the intelligence service in 1932, and served as a legal intelligence officer under diplomatic cover in Turkey.

Akhmerov became an illegal field officer, an agent with a false identity, and no diplomatic status or official connection to the Soviet government, in China in 1934, where he enrolled in an American-run college. Akhmerov entered the college to improve his English-language skills, in preparation for intelligence work in the United States. He and his wife entered the United States with false identity papers in 1935, where he operated a business front as a clothier.

Akhmerov, who spoke good but accented English, began to actively recruit members of the American Communist Party as agents for the Soviet intelligence community. In 1936, Akhmerov recruited Helen Lowry, the niece of the American Communist Party leader Earl Browder, to operate a safe house for Soviet intelligence officers to meet agents in Washington, D.C. Akhmerov's wife returned to Moscow, and later became secretary to Lavrenty Beria, Soviet leader Josef Stalin's chief of intelligence and secret police.

Akhmerov was recalled to the Soviet Union in mid-1939, where Lowry was granted Soviet citizenship. At a January 1940, meeting Beria denounced and ordered the execution of two dozen Soviet intelligence officers from Great Britain, Germany, and Poland. Akhmerov was not executed, only demoted and assigned to the American section of the intelligence service in Moscow.

In 1941, Akhmerov re-entered the United States as an illegal agent, and operated a small front business selling furs. During the war, Akhmerov, who employed a number of pseudonyms, including

Michael Adamec, Michael Green, and William Grieneke, recruited several highly placed agents in the U.S. State and Treasury Departments who supplied the Soviet Union with significant intelligence on political, technological, and military matters. Akhmerov has also been allegedly linked to several noted, high-profile intelligence figures, including Harry Dexter White, Harry Hopkins, Alger Hiss, and Whittaker Chambers.

He orchestrated the transmission of more than 2,500 photostats of sensitive documents to Moscow. Akhmerov returned to the Soviet Union in early December 1945, and assumed the position of deputy chief of the illegal branch of the foreign intelligence division. For his service, Akhmerov was awarded the Badge of Honor, the Order of the Red Banner (twice), and the title of Honored Chekist, the highest award issued to members of the Soviet intelligence community. His son and daughter later served as officers for the KGB. Akhmerov died in 1975, and was buried with full honors by the Soviet government.

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SEE ALSO: Beria, Lavrenty; Chambers, Whittaker.

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al-Qaeda

AL-QAEDA AL SUBAH (the "Solid Base" in Arabic) is a globe-spanning terrorist network that was responsible for executing the attacks on September 11, 2001, against the United States, as well as numerous other deadly actions around the world. Following the September 11 attacks, the al-Qaeda terrorist network, allied terrorist organizations and cells, the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and possibly allied regimes in other nations (including Iraq and Iran), have been the chief targets of the U.S.-led War on Terrorism, a complex array of military, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic actions designed to disrupt and destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

Despite losing their Afghan base, remnants of the al-Qaeda network have proven themselves still capable of conducting major terrorist operations. Al-Qaeda is not a conventional terrorist organization but rather a global "network of cells, associate terrorist groups, and other affiliated organizations, and shares expertise, transfers resources, discusses strategy, and even conducts joint operations with some or all of them," explains Rohan Gunaratna in his book, *Inside al-Qaeda*.

Origins of the network. The al-Qaeda network traces its immediate origins to the formation of the logistics and recruitment networks that were designed to support the resistance fighters against the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, which lasted from late 1979 until the final withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989. It was during the anti-Soviet jihad (holy war) that the founders of the MAK (Maktab al Khidmat lil Majahidin al Arab or Afghan Service Bureau) and al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden (born in Saudi Arabia, July 1957), and Abdullah Azzam established reputations as steadfast supporters of pan-Islamic armed resistance to perceived moves by non-Islamic entities. Initially, this meant the Soviet Union but later, of course, Israel, the United States and Western influence more generally, began to dominate the Islamic extremists agenda. MAK/al-Qaeda's participation in the resistance to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan also brought it into contact with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI and possibly the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

At the conclusion of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda continued to develop its ties with Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and terrorist organizations looking for additional opportunities to promote its ideology and provide assistance to armed actions. Bin Laden became the uncontested leader of al-Qaeda following a struggle over the post-Afghanistan role of al-Qaeda. The terrorist group was initially based in Saudi Arabia but the radicalization of al-Qaeda, following the introduction of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, led to al-Qaeda's expulsion from Saudi Arabia in 1994.

Al-Qaeda easily adapted and developed its main bases of operations in Sudan and Afghanistan, ini-

tially in areas under the control of the coalition of warlords. Extreme religious leaders evolved into the Taliban movement, which took control from the warlords to rule Afghanistan.

By the time of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent military operations in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's primary base of operations, in terms of training of recruits and weapons research and development, was largely restricted to Afghanistan, and the subsequent loss of Afghanistan after the U.S.-led invasion significantly disrupted al-Qaeda, at least in the short term.

Ideology and grand strategy. Throughout the 1990s, al-Qaeda began to develop the organizational capacity, network of associations, and logistics needed to carry-out a series of increasingly larger and more spectacular terrorist actions in support of its pan-Islamic ideology. Al-Qaeda's grand strategy has been developed to support the realization of a resurgent Islamic caliphate, through resistance, leading to the removal of apostate regimes in countries with significant Islamic populations that have not adopted a sufficiently strict *sharia* (Islamic law), as determined by al-Qaeda.

The terrorist organization seeks to ensure the predominance, if not the domination, of these countries by al-Qaeda's extreme interpretation of Islamic doctrines and theology, which is influenced in part by the writings of Wahhabism. Wahhabism is an interpretation of Koranic scripture that first developed as a movement in Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaeda's ideology targets Westernization and globalization generally, and the United States in particular, for not only providing assistance to regimes that are in the cross-hairs of al-Qaeda, but also for having troops stationed in Islamic areas, thereby supposedly threatening Islamic ideology, and political, economic and cultural power.

Tactics and operational capacity. Al-Qaeda has shown it can execute a wide variety of terrorist attacks ranging from conventional terrorist operations (assassinations, bombings with high explosives), to unique configurations of conventional terrorist tactics to produce catastrophic results, and has conducted research and development and intelligence operations aimed at either developing its own capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction, or to acquire weapons of mass destruction for use against symbolic targets. Al-Qaeda is known for careful planning and execution of terrorist operations and for perfecting tactics designed for covert, unconventional warfare.

In addition to the intensive training of recruits, very tight compartmentalization and cellularization, al-Qaeda has proven itself to have highly sophisticated and resilient communication (including the use of military-grade encryption and other tactics) and financial networks. An example of the sophistication of training can be seen in al-Qaeda training manuals which not only include detailed weapon-building instructions, but advice on assuming a Western cover.

While al-Qaeda's ongoing organizational and network configuration is likely undergoing rapid and repeated mutations under the pressure of the War on Terrorism, its organizational structure is probably loosely based upon the structure that resulted from its reorganization in 1998. At that time, al-Qaeda was divided into "four distinct but interlinked entities. The first was a pyramidal structure to facilitate strategic and tactical direction; the second was a global terrorist network; the third, a base force for guerrilla warfare inside Afghanistan; and the fourth, a loose coalition of transnational terrorist and guerrilla groups," Gunaratna notes in *Inside al-Qaeda*.

The command-and-control structure of al-Qaeda is headed by the emir-general, who was bin Laden. A consultative council, the *shura majlis*, is composed of senior leaders and four operational committees (military, financial, religious, and propaganda) each headed by an emir. Given the arrests or deaths of the senior leaders of al-Qaeda from U.S.-led military and covert actions, it is unclear who is staffing these positions, or indeed if the central architecture of the al-Qaeda has been disbanded to make it more resilient to counter-terrorist operations.

Al-Qaeda has either been involved in or planned a wide range of terrorist attacks, and also provided assistance to other terrorist organizations and networks, and has both overtly and covertly worked with the intelligence and military services of, at the very least, the Taliban regime, and possibly certain factions of the Iraqi, Iranian, and Pakistani intelligence and military services. Major terrorist attacks have included: World Trade Center in 1993; Khobar Tower bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996; U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; the USS *Cole* in 2000; World Trade Center

and Pentagon in September 2001; Bali, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco in 2002–03; Spain in March 2004.

The multiple attacks on September 11, 2001, were truly catastrophic, killing some 3,000 individuals and causing property damage of as much as $50 billion, and insurance losses and compensation of $5 billion.

Al-Qaeda's sources and methods. Al-Qaeda has a highly developed intelligence collection and direct action network comprised of cells that are capable of autonomous direction and resourcing. According to analysts, al-Qaeda has been able to either place agents or recruit assets in the national and internal security apparatus of certain key nations (for example, Pakistan and Egypt). It has also placed a number of effective sleeper cells in Western states, including the United States, that have been, and likely will continue to be capable of operating despite intense national and international counter-mobilizations of military, intelligence, and law enforcement assets.

The al-Qaeda network has proven to be a very difficult target for counterterrorist operations conducted by a number of states, including the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and others. These states also trace and disrupt the terrorist network's support operations, involving logistics, planning, and intelligence-gathering. The difficulty in determining the exact contours of al-Qaeda has created a situation in which accusations and investigations of possible intelligence failures gained traction in the United States in 2002–03, contributing to dramatic reorganizations of the intelligence and internal security communities in the United States, specifically, the creation and addition of a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the American executive branch of government and security infrastructure. As of the summer of 2004, al-Qaeda continued to pose a significant terrorist threat throughout the globe and was likely to be a major target for Western intelligence, military, and law enforcement operations in many countries for the foreseeable future. The U.S. government announced there was a strong probability that al-Qaeda was capable of staging attacks involving the use of either weapons of mass destruction or the coordination of simultaneous conventional attacks.

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SEE ALSO: War on Terrorism; Homeland Security Department; Central Intelligence Agency.

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Albania

ONE OF MOST ISOLATED and backward regions in Europe, Albania experienced little in the way of formal intelligence operations until World War II. After Italy occupied the country in 1939, Great Britain launched several small-scale missions to aid local resistance movements, though these operations never approached the levels undertaken in neighboring Yugoslavia and Greece. The Soviet Union also sent intelligence agents to work with the Albanian Communist Party headed by Enver Hoxha.

Following Albania's liberation in late 1944, Hoxha established a communist government, and one of his first steps was to create a secret police force, the Sigurimi, to intimidate opposition to the new regime.

In 1945–46, the Sigurimi engineered a massive purge of anti-communist groups, and relations between Albania and the West quickly deteriorated. The Sigurimi also worked to silence foreign critics of the communist take-over, including Albanians living abroad. Between 1949 and 1953, a joint American CIA and British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) operation attempted to infiltrate Albanian exiles into the country with the aim of overthrowing Hoxha, but the operation failed badly.

The Sigurimi compromised radio communications between agents and their Western handlers, and hundreds of operatives were captured and executed. Official accounts laid the blame on Kim Philby, a member of the Cambridge Five spy ring, who was accused of betraying mission details to the Soviet Union. However, Hoxha claimed that the Sigurimi had undermined the mission from the start by penetrating Albanian exile groups in Western Europe.

In the 1960s, Albania broke with the Soviet Union and formed an alliance with the People's Republic of China. During this period, the Sigurimi cooperated closely with Chinese espionage agencies to coordinate intelligence-gathering operations in Europe.

In addition, the agency increased its internal monitoring operations to cut off all communications between Albania and the outside world. After relations with other members of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe soured, the Sigurimi also developed contacts with Albanian minority groups in neighboring Balkan countries. In particular, the agency was reported to have played a role in fomenting the 1981 Albanian student riots that broke out in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo.

The Albanian communist regime only lasted a few years after Hoxha's death in 1985. In 1992, a new democratic government disbanded the Sigurimi, replacing it with the National Intelligence Service (SHIK). However, the SHIK used many of the same staff and assumed responsibility for the functions of its predecessor, including liaison efforts with Albanian paramilitary groups operating in neighboring Yugoslavia and Macedonia.

The SHIK has also been accused of interfering in the Albanian political process. In 1997, after the Socialist Party won parliamentary elections, it received aid from the CIA to reform and restructure the SHIK in order to limit its influence.

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SEE ALSO: Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

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Algeria

AFTER A CENTURY OF RULE by France, Algeria became independent in 1962. Since that time, the security climate of Algeria has been tense. The new nation was governed for more than 25 years by two military figures: Houari Boumediene from 1965 until 1978 and Chadli Benjedid from 1979 until 1992.

Although these regimes were not military dictatorships, the military dominated the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN), the single party that controlled Algeria until 1989. During the December 1991 election, the first-round success of the fundamentalist FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) party caused the army to intervene, crack down on the FIS, and postpone subsequent elections.

For the next 10 years, the FIS waged a continuous low-intensity civil conflict against the government. Although FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000 under an amnesty program designed to promote national reconciliation, residual fighting continued. In addition to the on-going tensions with FIS, Algeria is also threatened by Berber unrest, large-scale unemployment, and a stagnant economy. In Algeria, Sécurité Militaire (SM; Military Security) is the principal and most effective intelligence service in the country. SM is responsible for foreign intelligence, military offenses, and civilian espionage and subversion, especially at times of a breakdown of public order. SM operates under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, but is commanded by an army general and reports directly to the minister of national defense.

In the early 1990s, SM had about 6,000 to 10,000 military personnel, equipped with shotguns and other small arms, organized into counterterrorist brigades. Their mission was and remains to investigate and respond to intelligence provided by the police.

Although theoretically bound by the same legal restrictions as the police, SM is less circumscribed

in its operations. Frequent cases of incommunicado detention of suspects have been ascribed mainly to SM. The security services are believed to infiltrate Islamic groups, to employ paid informers for monitoring opposition movements, and to practice extensive illegal telephone surveillance. Following the riots of October 1988, allegations of torture and other human rights abuses of detainees appeared in the press.

Both SM and the Delégation Générale de Documentation et Sûreté (General Delegation for Documentation and Security; DGDS) the principal civilian apparatus for conducting foreign intelligence and countering internal subversion, have been implicated in torture to obtain confessions or extract information about clandestine political activity.

In 1990, the DGDS was dissolved after criticism of its repressive role in the 1988 riots. It is generally believed that the dissolution of DGDS did not represent an end to domestic intelligence operations, but that DGDS functions were transferred to other security bodies, specifically SM.

SM, with its abundant documentation on the leadership and organization of the violent Islamist groups, remains the senior intelligence body concerned with internal security. Other intelligence groups include a Coordinating Directorate of Territorial Security, an Antiterrorist Detachment, and a working group of the High Council of State charged with political and security matters.

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SEE ALSO: France; de Gaulle, Charles.

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American Black Chamber

FOR CENTURIES, a secure place where confidential messages were decoded and deciphered was called a "black chamber." Indeed, such arcane work was often associated with mysticism and ecclesiastics. However, the American Black Chamber owes its fame to a book of the same name, written by Herbert O. Yardley, published in 1931 and still in print.

The American Black Chamber referred to a set of offices in New York City, in which a team solved and translated international diplomatic traffic for almost a decade during the 1920s. Yardley directed this effort that was sponsored by the U.S. State Department and Army. The effort was discontinued when Secretary of State Henry Stimson took umbrage with such efforts, uttering his famous dictum, "Gentlemen do not read each others' mail." Yardley's response to rather sudden unemployment was to write his book, which caused a furor both in the United States and overseas.

A midwesterner of no great promise or connections, Yardley had obtained a position as a code clerk in the State Department at age 23. However, he promptly put a flair for both codebreaking and salesmanship to use. Indeed, his capacity for immersing himself in cryptological problems, even while asleep, has ever after been known as the Yardley Syndrome among cryptanalysts. Yardley sold the idea of a cryptologic unit to the U.S. Army upon American entry into World War I. The 27-year-old man from Indiana was commissioned and made head of the cryptologic section of the Military Intelligence Division, MI-8. Washington, D.C.–based, MI-8 grew quickly; many of the members, including some academics, were considerably older than Yardley. From becoming expert in invisible inks, to solving cryptograms, to intercepting and translating a wide variety of diplomatic traffic from many nations, MI-8 proved its worth.

His work during the war had been heady indeed, and Yardley had little desire to return to clerking duties in the State Department code room. Accordingly, he used all his considerable charm and salesmanship to obtain Department of State permission to establish "a permanent organization for code and cipher investigation and attack" that would become America's Black Chamber.

Recruiting largely from the MI-8 organization, Yardley set up shop in New York City. Federal funding for such operations within the District of Columbia was legally proscribed at that time. Considerable effort was put into breaking Japanese codes, as Japanese naval strength, imperial aspirations, and American nativist fears of the "yellow peril" were all rife at the time. For a translator, Yard-

ley recruited a missionary who spoke the language. However, he remained only six months, and left after he discerned the actual nature of the work and thought it immoral. However, by that time one of Yardley's colleagues transferred from MI-8, and something of the same *bon vivant* that Yardley could be, Lieutenant Frederick Livesey had actually learned the Japanese language.

During the Naval Disarmament Conference in Washington, D.C., the American Black Chamber translated over 5,000 communications. The United States fared well in the Five Power Treaty negotiations with Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes knew the strategies and final positions of the Japanese before their delegations arrived for meetings.

The Chamber had the full cooperation of the presidents of Western Union Telegraph Company and Postal Telegraph Company. Yardley would later claim that, during its existence, his team had solved some 45,000 telegrams of 19 countries. Yet the days of triumph were not to last. Yardley and others were affected by the constant strain of the work. Moreover, funding was often a challenge. The election of Herbert Hoover to the White House was a harbinger of a time of official moralism. Secretary of State Stimson was not long in withdrawing State Department funding for America's Black Chamber. On December 31, 1929, the American Black Chamber ceased to exist. Yardley could not be expected to leave his life's work quietly, and he did not. He also needed money and was having a hard time finding work in Depression-era America.

In June 1931, his book, *The American Black Chamber*, was published. It was a resounding success. Indeed, the book has become a piece of intelligence history and still sells well.

Yardley was a born story-teller, and he did have a story to tell, though a certain degree of self-aggrandizement was included. The press loved the tale: the State Department responded to embarrassing queries with circumlocution, and the War Department lied forthrightly, stating that no such organization had existed in recent years. Sales of *The American Black Chamber* also did well overseas, particularly in Japan. The fictionalized truth struck a nerve, and resulted in increasing suspicion of the United States and a determination to secure better diplomatic and military traffic. In America, there were Congressional hearings on what should or should not be allowed into the public domain. Yardley had, by his early 40s, reached his professional zenith.

Thereafter, he would write some second-rate novels (one of which became a motion picture), serve as a paid cryptologist of China's anti-communist Chiang Kai-shek, speculate in real estate, and hold some nondescript government posts. However, his work in cryptanalysis and writings about it introduced the arcane art into the American consciousness. He died in 1958 and was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery.

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SEE ALSO: Yardley, Herbert O.; cryptography; World War I; United States.

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American Civil War

NO PREVIOUS WAR between the United States and a foreign nation could have prepared the armies amassed by the Union and Confederacy for the intensity, duration, and strategic complexities of fighting during the Civil War. The conflict was waged on native ground. Soldiers on both sides shared a language, cultural heritage, and abiding commitment to principle or way of life. Many of their officers has been trained together in the military arts. Perhaps inevitably, then, intelligence would play a vital role in the outcome of the war. The basic approaches to spying carried out by the North and South reflected the overall interests and resources of each side. Unlike their European counterparts, the agents were nonprofessional. The tradecraft learned from actual spying experience was a key to success in the 1861–65 conflict.

Records and record-keeping were treated much more casually than in later conflicts. Records were often lost, misplaced, or destroyed during and after the Civil War. In fact, many times nothing was committed to writing. For example, a portion of spy

chief Allan Pinkerton's material was destroyed in a fire shortly after the war. It was said that Confederate Secretary of State Judah Benjamin spent two or three days in 1865, just before the Richmond evacuation, destroying materials related to Confederate espionage and conspiracies.

Perhaps the first intelligence incident of the Civil War period occurred on February 21, 1861, when Abraham Lincoln received Pinkerton, head of the prominent American detective agency, in his Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, hotel room. Lincoln was on his way to Washington, D.C., for his inauguration as 16th president of the United States. Pinkerton informed Lincoln that he had uncovered a plot to assassinate the president-elect as he passed through Baltimore, Maryland.

At first quite skeptical, Lincoln altered his opinion when General Winfield Scott and Secretary of State William Seward reported that there was some foundation to the assertion. Lincoln, with protection provided by Pinkerton, proceeded through Baltimore and was safely inaugurated. Lincoln was introduced early on to the world of espionage and intrigue.

Allan Pinkerton, whose detective agency got its start providing intelligence for Union forces.

Professionalism. Organized tradecraft was anything but organized when the war began. For the Confederates, the General Intelligence Service was established in January 1862 but, headed by a clergyman, it mainly concerned itself with collecting information about the sick and wounded. A newly created secret service became operational on November 30, 1864, but by that date the Confederacy needed more than just a new secret service agency. The service contributed little of value to its struggling government.

On the other hand, Union spy craft developed in a consistent format. Pinkerton brought his detective agency into the Union fold. He was asked by Major General George B. McClellan, then commander of the Department of Ohio, to provide intelligence support. Pinkerton's organization was known as the Secret Service of the Army of the Potomac after McClellan was given command of that army.

However, Pinkerton's vast overestimation of Confederate troop strength was, in great part, responsible for the failure of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. He stayed with McClellan until McClellan's removal from command after the Battle of Antietam.

Seward engaged the services of an old California "gold field vigilante," Lafayette C. Baker, to provide a counter-espionage service. With a staff of detectives, Baker did very well during the first year of war and uncovered many Confederate agents in the Washington, D.C., area. He was shuffled off to the War Department in February 1862, and spent most of the war years gathering up spies, deserters, prostitutes, and bounty jumpers.

After the conclusion of the war, Pinkerton and Baker wrote memoirs in which each contended that he had held the title of chief of the United States Secret Service. Such flamboyant, but untrue, assertions were to cause trouble for latter-day historians. Actually, the Treasury Department's Secret Service was founded on July 5, 1865.

There was one Union intelligence organization that did offer reliable information. Founded by Major General "Fighting Joe" Hooker, it survived Hooker and served Union armies, in particular the Army of the Potomac, until the end of the war. It was called the Bureau of Military Information. Hooker appointed Colonel George H. Sharpe to get the organization off and running. Under Sharpe's leadership it was the best day-to-day intelligence operation of the war.

In addition, a number of generals on both sides possessed their own intelligence services. Major General U. S. Grant, for example, after Shiloh (April 6, 1862), used the services of Brigadier General Grenville M. Dodge, a former civil engineer. Dodge

had over 130 men and women operatives who delivered information from areas as widespread as Atlanta, Georgia, Mobile, Alabama, and along the Tennessee River. About half of his agents were captured before the end of the war.

Technology. Although used in the Crimean War, photography came into its own during the Civil War. Photographs made for improved topographical maps. General William T. Sherman, during his famous march through Georgia, sent photographers with portable darkrooms out ahead of his troops to photograph, develop, and distribute pictorials of the terrain in front of his advancing army. Group photographs of military units made it possible to identify enemy infiltrators within their ranks. Confederate spies were warned to avoid group photographers "like the plague."

Aerial observation balloons played a part in the Civil War, at least during the first two years of conflict. Lincoln became a proponent after witnessing an assent over Washington, D.C., by Professor Thaddeus S. C. Lowe. While airborne, Lowe was connected to Lincoln on the ground by a telegraph cable. McClellan utilized balloons during his Peninsula Campaign in 1862. At the same time, the Confederates developed a hydrogen balloon inflated with illuminating gas to observe Union troops maneuvering east of Richmond, Virginia.

The balloon was tied to a locomotive of the York River Railroad that moved about the battlefield areas. In all, Lowe produced seven balloon units during the course of the war, but their awkward size and their inability to use cameras aloft led to their decline. In June 1863, the Union Balloon Corps was disbanded. Little is known of Confederate balloons after 1862. One of the world's leading historians of cryptography, David Kahn, has remarked that the telegraph did for Americans in the 1850s what Sputnik did for Americans in the 1950s. It awakened them to the possibilities of a new approach to communications. Its military potential was recognized, but not really understood during the Crimean War. The Union had an excellent telegraphic system, and it was reported that messages from all military areas could be sent directly to Washington, D.C.

The Confederate system was much more limited and suffered from a lack of wire. Telegraphic wire could be tapped; messages on line could be read at the tap, and sometimes even altered in content. New messages could be forwarded from the tap-point to a prescribed destination. Despite the security limitations, some 6,500,000 military messages were sent during the course of the war. Codes, the substitution of words or phrases for their equivalent in plain text; and ciphers, mainly substitution or transposition of letters for plain text letters or symbols, were the cryptological methods employed during the war. Of course, sender and receiver had to possess some kind of key to a ciphered or coded message so that it could be decoded or deciphered into understandable plain text.

The Confederates placed some emphasis on the tableau developed in the 16th century by Blaise de Vigenère. It utilized a substitution cipher based on a tableau of 26 staggered alphabets with row shifts and a key. The Union cryptologists were far ahead of the Confederates when it came to effective ciphers and codes, as the Confederates were very slipshod when it came to security, less accurate with message preparation, and often seemed not to know what to do with encrypted information when received. At one time Richmond was so bewildered that it published some messages in local newspapers and offered payment to anyone who could put them into plain text. The Confederates also used small mechanical cipher wheels, with the alphabet on two disk faces that would align to produce substitution ciphers. Obviously these wheeled devices were quite simple to decipher.

A good example of what can happen when cryptological constraints are overlooked was the Great Beef Steak raid of 1864. During the summer of that year, with the Confederate Army suffering from food shortages, Union General Grant began to build up a herd of more than 3,000 cattle at Cogging Point on the James River near Richmond. The Federal quartermaster, fearful of Confederate interference, telegraphed a request for additional guards for the expanding herd.

Unfortunately, he ignored his instructions in cryptology and sent the message in plain text. The message was picked up by Charles Gaston, a Rebel telegraphic eavesdropper, who sent the message on to Confederate General Robert E. Lee. In addition to Gaston's pick, a local Confederate scout, Sergeant George Shadburne, had recently become aware of the developing collection of critters at Cogging Point. The result: at 3:00 A.M. on September 14, 1864, Confederate cavalry under command of Major General Wade Hampton moved on Cog-

ging Point and rode off with the assembled herd. Hampton had rustled 2,486 beef cattle, which provided over two million pounds of beef steak for the Confederacy.

Spies and more spies. Of all the books written on Civil War espionage more space was given over to the activities of individual agents than to the development of technologies or organizational systems.

Security in both North and South can be likened to a kitchen colander. There were holes in it everywhere. People could travel from Confederate territory to Union territory and return with little probability of interference, at least in the early years of the war. Newspapers were not reluctant to print up-to-date information on troop movements and other military matters. Legend has it Lee regularly read *The New York Times* for strategic information.

Few, if any, of the spies had any formal training and so operated with few boundaries on their activities. Results were all that counted. Women, neither before nor since, have played such courageous or determined parts in espionage activities as they played from 1861 to 1865.

David Markle, author of *Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War*, lists by name and short description about 390 spies from both sides. Women made up around 10 percent of the total but had a much greater percentage in results and publicity. About 15 Union spies were executed by the Confederacy during the war, and the Union executed 23 Confederates, including those involved in the 1865 Lincoln assassination plot.

The story of Spencer Kellogg Brown (1842–1863) is just one example of the many who worked as special agents during the Civil War. When war began, Brown enlisted in the U.S. Army for a short term, and then enlisted in the U.S. Navy. He was assigned to the ramshackle ironclad ship, *Essex*, then operating on the Tennessee River.

The Union Navy needed information on Confederate river batteries so Brown agreed to obtain the information through false enlistments in the Confederate Army. This he accomplished while serving on Island Ten and Fort Pillow, both in or near the Mississippi River. Brown eventually made an escape and, after a hazardous journey, reached Grant near Corinth, Mississippi. Brown then returned to the ironclad. The navy found that Fort Hudson in Georgia was being supplied by a ferryboat and wanted it destroyed prior to an attack on the fort. A party of 40, including Brown, destroyed the ferry as ordered on August 15, 1862.



A Civil War-era photo shows telegraph wire being cut in such a way that the broken connection is not seen from the ground.

Unfortunately, when the deed was done Brown got detached from the others and was captured by some Confederate guerrillas. Brown was next sent to Richmond where he was tried for espionage. Despite efforts by Commodore W. D. Porter of the Union Navy to obtain his release, Brown was found guilty and sentenced to hang. On September 25, 1863, more than a year after his capture, Brown was hanged.

In addition, during the Civil War, scouts were used for intelligence gathering. These were groups of men, Union or Confederate, who combined spying with out-and-out sabotage. They either reported to a specific army commander or to any officer in command of the area in which they operated. Most

were soldiers in uniform who donned civilian clothes for special projects. Extant records are sparse, if they exist at all, on their successes and failures.

The Northwest Conspiracy. When the war began the Democratic Party split into the War Democrats and Peace Democrats. The War Democrats, of course, supported the war and Republican policies. The Peace Democrats (PDs) opposed Lincoln's policies of suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the easier application of martial law. They were willing to negotiate a peace and leave the Confederacy intact. The majority of the PDs were located in the states of the old northwest: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin. More and more, the PDs began to incorporate many of the aggressive antiwar groups such as the Knights of the Golden Circle and the Sons of Liberty, and gained the moniker Copperheads, after the venomous snake. If the Copperheads possessed a leader it was ex-Ohio Congressman Clement Vallandigham.

He was known to support the creation of an association of the old northwest states to be called the Northwest Confederation. If this Confederation ever came to fruition, an actual new nation would be created and the old United States would have developed into three separate countries. It would have virtually assured the Confederate States a permanency, so the Jefferson Davis government gave the creation of Northwest Confederation its full support. Vallandigham made a speech at Mount Vernon, Ohio, on May 1, 1863, that caused his arrest by Major General Ambrose Burnside, military head of the Department of Ohio. He disparaged the war in general and Burnside in particular.

Lincoln decided that exile to the Confederacy was the best punishment for Vallandigham. He was released at Shelbyville, Tennessee. Actually, he spent most of the remainder of the war in Canada where he came into contact with Confederate representatives: Jacob Thompson, Clement Clay, and Confederate chief spy Captain Thomas H. Hines.

A number of conspiracies were planned in Richmond to utilize Copperhead support. They usually contemplated the rise of Copperhead societies throughout the North accompanied by the ousting (or worse) of political officials. Draft riots were to be supported and arson carried out in several large cities, notably Chicago and New York. The Confederacy would assist where possible. Prisoners were to be released in Illinois and Ohio, removed to Canada, and then re-equipped for war. Arson and support for the draft riots were partly implemented, but the Copperheads never revolted, then or at any other time. Attempts to release prisoners failed largely because of the activities of Union spies.

In Sandusky Bay, off Lake Erie, lay a Confederate prison camp on Johnson's Island with about 2,000 inmates, mostly officers. In Illinois were at least 25,000 prisoners in various locations. Confederate plans for prisoner release were largely developed in Toronto, a Canadian city which contained both Union representatives and their Confederate counterparts. Toronto resembled Geneva and Lisbon in World War II, in that it was a neutral spy-town.

To effect the Johnson's Island release, John Yeats Beall, an acting master in the Confederate Navy, Captain Charles Cole, and Godfrey Hyams met in Toronto in early September 1864, to plan the escape. They decided to seize the Union warship, *Michigan*, on or about September 20, and use it in the prisoner release. Cole, posing as a wealthy businessman, would throw a party for the crew of the *Michigan* and incapacitate them on drugged champagne. Beale and some comrades would seize the *Michigan* and its crew.

As Beale approached the *Michigan*, the crew realized something was wrong and made Beale turn and sail toward Canada. It was a smart move because the *Michigan* was ready for them: what Beale and his comrades did not know was that Hyams was a Union double-agent. The prisoners on Johnson's Island remained in place for another year.

Like Johnson's Island, Camp Douglas prison in Chicago was near Canada and offered the 8,000 Confederate prisoners confined in the city a fairly close escape route, if and when released. Captain Thomas H. Hines and a group of Confederates from Toronto moved to Chicago in the summer of 1864 to develop and implement an escape plan in cooperation with local Copperheads and a 4,000-man legion of the Sons of Liberty. They intended to get the ex-prisoners to Canada after a period of mayhem in Chicago.

Following several postponements, November 8 was set as the day for action. Unfortunately, Colonel B. J. Sweet, the camp commandant had

been apprised of the plan and the expected uprising in Chicago by Union double-agents with the help of a turncoat Confederate major.

On September 7, the leaders of the uprising were arrested. Hines, as was his custom, escaped. The Copperheads, including the Sons of Liberty, did nothing, as was their custom. By November 1864, the outcome of the Civil War was not in doubt so the Copperheads lost much of their appeal in the northwest states. The Northwest Confederation became the Northwest Conspiracy.

The Union won the war of espionage. They were superior in technology and in the ability to understand the concepts of cryptology and the secret delivery of intelligence.

ERNIE TEAGARDEN
ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

SEE ALSO: Greenhow, Rose O'Neal; technology; cryptography; Lincoln, Abraham; women; signals intelligence.

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American Revolution

EVEN BEFORE "the shot heard around the world" at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, on April 19, 1775, the American colonists had founded what could legitimately be called the first American intelligence network.

When the Boston Tea Party of December 1773 led to the closure of the port of Boston by England's King George III, it also gave birth to the Committees of Correspondence. The Committees of Correspondence became a clandestine network of messengers and merchant travelers who kept the colonists aware of what the British Crown forces were doing in the immediate area and the other 12 colonies.

It was the dispatch riders of the Committees, as well as colonial newspapers, who informed the Americans of the summoning of the First Continental Congress, which opened in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on September 5, 1774. When the crisis between the British and the colonists reached the flash point in April 1775, it was two of the Boston riders, Paul Revere and William Dawes, who alerted the Massachusetts militia companies that Boston commander General Thomas Gage was about to send a military detachment to seize the military supplies in Concord.

Gage, realizing that hostilities with the colonists were almost inevitable, had taken the precaution of seeding Boston and Massachusetts with his own agents. It was a report from a British agent (never identified) that prompted Gage to send troops. The spy had warned Gage that the colonists were swiftly evacuating the military goods from Concord since "a sudden march of the troops might dispossess them of their stores."

A nascent intelligence network. Although somewhat trivialized, the story of the lanterns in Boston's Old North Church showing "one if by land, two if by sea" had real intelligence significance. The signal, made possible by Robert Newman, the church's sexton, showed that the British force under Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith would proceed by land toward Concord and not cross the Charles River from Boston, a gambit made possible by the British naval squadron under Admiral Thomas Graves.

Thus, by the time that George Washington assumed command of the Continental Army outside Boston in June 1775, the new commander-in-chief already had a nascent American intelligence network in the making. Yet, lacking any experience in the field, Washington built a spy network whose operations would have earned the respect of any modern-day agency. Indeed, Washington's network, later headed by Major Benjamin Tallmadge, was so artfully crafted that even today the names of most of its members are unknown.

While Washington and his new army forced the evacuation of Boston by the British in March 1776, ironically the birth of what can really be called Washington's spy service lay in one of the worst periods of disaster for the American cause. After

abandoning Boston, the new British commander, Sir William Howe, attacked New York City on August 22, 1776. After a series of grueling encounters, Howe forced Washington and his battered troops out of the vicinity of New York City.

Soon, Washington's Continental Army began a retreat through New Jersey which did not end until his tired troops came to rest in Pennsylvania in December 1776. But, prior to the disastrous battles fought for New York City, Washington had done something then unique in the annals of spycraft: he organized a net of "stay-behinds."

Washington, while still battling Howe for New York, carefully organized an American network of stay-behinds to keep him informed of what Howe (and later Sir Henry Clinton) did in New York City. Although no battle was fought for New York after the fall of 1776, the city was never captured by the Americans. With the size of the British force there, Washington's need for intelligence about British intentions in New York remained a high priority throughout the war.

During the critical early weeks of September 1776, as Washington sought to recover from the August battles, information about the plans of Howe, now safely settled in New York, became vital. Washington wrote at the time: "I was never more uneasy than on account of my want of knowledge." When no satisfactory information was forthcoming, he decided to send a volunteer, Nathan Hale, into the city. About September 12, Hale was landed, as John Bakeless writes in his *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes* (1959) "at Huntington, Long Island, where American secret missions continued to slip in during the rest of the war." Although a novice at espionage, Hale carefully discharged his mission and made excellent notes of Howe's troop dispositions.

Tragically, with these incriminating documents on his person, he was apprehended by British forces just as he was making his way back to the American lines (some accounts say Hale was betrayed by somebody he knew).

Unceremoniously, and without benefit of clergy, Hale was hanged the next day. In spite of Hale's grim end, the spirit of American intelligence was born with his death. Shortly thereafter, another American agent, Joshua Davis, entered New York City and safely returned by September 29, exactly a week after Hale's execution, to General Washington's lines.

Battles of Trenton and Princeton. Indeed, New York City remained the center for both British and American intelligence services for the duration of the war. Both Howe and Washington strove to build spy networks in the city, as the deadly cat-and-mouse campaign between them continued. It was at this period that, apparently, women were first employed as secret agents. An American agent heard a British intelligence officer (in an early case of "loose lips") declare that "women were the most proper persons for that purpose [spying]."

Two American spies, Alexander Cruikshank and a man named Cummings (apparently neither ever identified to the British as American agents), represented perhaps Washington's first known effort at disinformation. They attempted to spread rumors that Washington's army was much greater in size that it was in reality, but the British Provost Marshal William Cunningham, who had presided over the hanging of Hale, was not deceived by such efforts.

Thus, from his first major engagements, the American commander-in-chief, unlike many other American field commanders, realized the vitality of accurate intelligence information for his military operations. Although he was defeated in battles, such as Brandywine in September 1777 and Germantown in October 1777, as he attempted to keep the British under Howe from occupying Philadelphia, Washington would never be caught by surprise by advancing enemy forces. As Washington retreated south through New Jersey, he continued to plant his stay-behinds to observe the British he knew would pursue him. One of the stay-behinds, John Honeyman, gave Washington the intelligence key to the two victories which kept alive the Patriot cause: Trenton and Princeton.

A British soldier in the French and Indian War, Honeyman offered his services to the American forces once the Revolution began. During the British pursuit of Washington through New Jersey, Honeyman (armed with his impeccable British Loyalist credentials) traveled with the British and Hessians (German soldiers enlisted to the British) as an itinerant butcher and horse trader.

With the American army on the verge of dissolution, Washington was anxious for a victory to revive his soldiers' hopes. Therefore, he pressed his spies for information. Honeyman rose to the occasion. Having carefully observed the Hessian garrison of Colonel Johann Rall at Trenton, he learned

that they were planning a traditional German Christmas celebration, in spite of the American enemy camped just across the Delaware River. Honeyman contrived to let himself become "captured" by American scouts who took him to Washington, who had been eagerly expecting him.

That night, the Loyalist "spy" was permitted to escape, but not until Honeyman gave Washington the information that made possible the surprise victory over the Hessians at Trenton on December 26, 1776. Just a week later, similar intelligence most likely provided by Honeyman again, made possible Washington's lightning stroke against the British under Lord Charles Cornwallis at Princeton on January 2–3, 1777.

At the same time that Honeyman was providing intelligence information to Washington, Cortlandt Skinner, a New Jersey Loyalist, was performing the same service for Howe. Skinner had been forced to flee to the British when the spying he had been doing for them was discovered in January 1776. However, he was able to resume his duties after receiving sanctuary in New York City, so that, as Howe wrote, "he might keep up the correspondence he had formerly established in Jersey, and furnish the Commander-in-Chief [Howe] from time to time with intelligence." Washington himself was forced to admit that "General Howe has every species of intelligence he can wish for."

Franklin and the mission to France. While the battles for Trenton and Princeton were in progress, something even more momentous was afoot: in December 1776, Congress dispatched Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Silas Deane on the most important secret mission of the war. The three American diplomats were to attempt to bring the French, whose help to the struggling American colonies had been thus far confined to clandestine supplies, to openly support the United States in the war. From their arrival in France, the activities of the trio became the most important objective for British intelligence. London knew why they were in Paris and dreaded it, for a military renaissance after the bungled French and Indian War (the Seven Years' War in England) had made the French the equal, if not the masters, of the British on both land and sea.

Indeed, the British had a highly placed spy: Edward Bancroft, the secretary to the American delegation, was a sophisticated British agent. At a dead drop near the embassy building, he would regularly leave reports to be picked up by another spy. As the Public Broadcasting System noted in a documentary on Benjamin Franklin and espionage, "Bancroft's role as a spy was not made public by the British until almost a century after he died." The reports deposited by Bancroft were immediately given to Lord Stormont, the British ambassador in Paris, who functioned as the British intelligence chief in the French capital.

Franklin and his associates were eventually successful in their mission: France joined the war on the American side, increasing its shipment of supplies and in 1778 sending a French fleet and troops to support the war against the British. The mission's success was predicated on the French Crown's desire to strike at the British as well as Franklin's famous charm and wit as he seduced the French royal court to the American cause.

Intelligence war continues. Although no major battles were fought in the Middle Atlantic states until Howe's invasion in 1777, the grim intelligence war kept on. Only two days after the victory at Princeton, American General Israel Putnam was commanded on January 5 to send out agents as "horsemen, in the dress of the country." Indeed, the ferocity with which the espionage struggle was carried on in New Jersey was seldom equaled anywhere else. Even Franklin became estranged from his son William, who was the Loyalist governor of the state. Fierce bands of Loyalists, more motivated by greed than loyalty to the British Crown, terrorized the Patriot families in New Jersey, and also served to seriously impair the operations of Putnam's "horsemen." The struggle between the two camps grew so extreme that not even the clergy was exempt. An Anglican priest, the Reverend Johnathan O' Dell, the rector of St. Mary's Church in Burlington, New Jersey, was considered an ardent Loyalist, a Tory. Historians speculate that O'Dell was the unknown man who had been seen by the British watching the Delaware River with a spyglass. Was O'Dell an American agent, watching the river in anticipation of Washington's assault on Trenton? Or, equally possible, was the man of the cloth in reality that most daring of spies, a double-agent?

After being pursued by Patriots in Burlington, O'Dell went to New York City. There, the priest became the chaplain of a regiment of a Pennsylvania

Loyalists on Staten Island. He also became the spymaster of the Board of Associated Loyalists. A poet of not extraordinary grace, O'Dell had his anti-Patriot verses published in the *Royal Gazette*.

By November 16, 1777, Howe was able to beat back Washington's forces and enter Philadelphia. While Howe was consolidating his position in Philadelphia, Washington had not yet given up hopes of defeating him. And Howe, knowing winter was coming on, wanted to finish off the Americans before cold and snow would put an end to military operations until the spring. Consequently, Howe decided to advance against the position the Americans had taken up at Whitemarsh. On December 1, 1777, Washington heard from his agent that "orders were given to the [British] troops to hold themselves in readiness to move." On December 4, the American agent Lydia Darragh was able to confirm that Howe was planning an attack on Whitemarsh. However, when Howe did so on December 7, he pursued his attack in such a lackluster manner that the engagement ended in a draw. Later, on December 18, Washington entered his winter quarters at Valley Forge.

New York, Valley Forge, and Philadelphia. While the fighting had been in progress for Philadelphia, the second major campaign of 1777 had been launched by the British in Canada: the invasion led by General John Burgoyne. Burgoyne's leisurely progress south through New York state brought forth a positive chatter from the human intelligence sources employed by the Patriots and British alike. The British march was long, and through country where much of the population was inflamed by the attacks of the pro-British Indians. British agents began to use Livingston's Manor, between Rhinebeck and Kinderhook, New York, as a safe house to leave their reports.

Some of these couriers appear to have been double-agents, since in July 1777 a British agent named Henry Williams turned over his missive to the Americans. While couriers were attempting to reach the tardy Burgoyne, in an intelligence sense it appears that Burgoyne may have been defeated before he began his campaign. Thirteen days before his campaign plan was submitted to George III and his Prime Minister Lord North, the New York State Committee on Conspiracies had on February 15, 1777 complete details of his planned march through New York state, by way of Lake George and Lake Champlain. On October 17, hopelessly outmaneuvered, "Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne was forced to capitulate to General Horatio Gates at Saratoga, New York. While no American spy has been given credit for this stunning coup, a likely candidate is Sir James Jay, the brother of American diplomat and spymaster John Jay.

Meanwhile, with Washington at Valley Forge outside the city, and Howe in winter quarters within Philadelphia, a tense game of espionage took place between the two camps. Within the city, Continental Army officers Major John Clark, Captain Stephen Chambers, and Captain Charles Craig had previously organized a network of American spies, among whom most likely were Darragh and "Old Mom" Rinker, who owned a tavern in Germantown.

During this period, Colonel Elias Boudinot played an important role in handling American agents. Communication between the spies in the city and the American army was facilitated by guerrilla groups such as the Green Boys, who served a double purpose by helping Washington's agents and discouraging the attempts of British spies sent out from the city to learn about the condition of the Americans. During the occupation of Philadelphia, Howe did not seem to display the enthusiasm for counterespionage that he had displayed when he had had Hale hanged. His main work seems to have been simply to employ local Loyalists to watch suspected American agents and attempt to apprehend them. Another gambit, incredibly inept as spycraft goes, was for Loyalists or British soldiers to infiltrate the camp at Valley Forge and attempt to incite the Americans to desertion or mutiny. While sometimes in dire straits, the loyalty of Washington's troops was never in doubt: these spies were turned over to the army provost marshal who gave them to "Jack Ketch"—the hangman.

Howe's efforts in this Valley Forge period point to his growing disillusion with the war and his part in it. Indeed, he would request permission to give up his command while in Philadelphia. In May 1778, General Sir Henry Clinton replaced Howe in command; Howe returned to England where he would die in 1814. On June 18, 1778, Clinton ordered the evacuation of Philadelphia to return to New York City.

Monmouth and Lee. On June 28, 1778, Washington caught up with Clinton at Monmouth, New Jer-

sey, where one of the fiercest battles of the war took place. Yet, the battle was almost lost by the early orders of American General Charles Lee to retreat, a tactic only personally stopped by Washington who relieved Lee of command on the spot. For disobeying orders, disrespect to Washington, and ordering the retreat, a court martial on July 4, 1778 suspended Lee from command.

What makes Lee's story relevant to an account of intelligence in the war was that Lee had earlier been a serving officer in the British Army. On December 12, 1776, he had been captured by the British while occupying a tavern which he had chosen for his headquarters, inexplicably two or three miles from the protection of his main force of American troops. It was not until May 9, 1778, that Lee was returned by the British to the American Continental Army.

While he was a captive, he submitted his own plan to the British to end the war. Considering his performance at Monmouth, surprising in an officer of his ability, it is entirely possible that Lee had been "turned" by the British during his captivity and was serving their interests, and not those of the Americans, that day on the battlefield.

With the Battle of Monmouth, the last major engagement had taken place in the New England and Middle Atlantic states. At the same time, with Clinton's return to New York, the city became again the main focus of both American and British intelligence services. It was during this period that Tallmadge truly came into his own. While some accounts claim that Tallmadge recruited new agents, it seems more plausible that he would have relied upon those who survived from the stay-behinds of 1776.

The group Tallmadge now managed became known as the Culper Spy Ring, from the aliases of two of its best-known members. Culper Senior, a friend of Tallmadge, was a farmer from Setauket, Long Island, named Abraham Woodhull. Culper Junior was a Quaker shopkeeper from Manhattan, Robert Townsend, who was a friend of Woodhull. In a sense, Tallmadge had hit upon what is still the best way to recruit spies: "talent spot" those you know.

Woodhull was a merchant who had daily business on New York's thriving docks. As Harry Macy, Jr., of the New York Genealogical and Biographical Society noted for *U.S. News & World Report*'s special spy issue in July 2003, "with every new ship that arrived, there would be information to be gleaned from passengers about British ships and troops." If Townsend had information for Washington while Woodhull was in the city, he would communicate it to him personally. Otherwise, Townsend would contact the third most important member of the Culper Ring, the tavern keeper Austin Roe, who would then make the trip to Setauket with the news for Woodhull. However, showing the sophistication of Washington's operation, Roe and Woodhull apparently never met face to face. Roe would leave his reports at a dead drop, a secret hiding place known only to him and to Woodhull.

While there were other members of the ring such as Caleb Brewster, who used his experience as a seaman aboard whaling ships to recruit a sub-ring of mariners, Roe, Woodhull, and Townsend seem to have been the principal Culper agents. While Tallmadge is usually referred to as the head of Washington's secret service, with the assistance of Israel Putnam and Alexander Hamilton, it is apparent that the commander-in-chief ran his own network of spies, of which Honeyman is the best known. Another of Washington's own agents was the New Yorker Hercules Mulligan, of whom Hamilton shared some knowledge. Hamilton had "talent-spotted" Mulligan, with whose family he had lived in New York before the war. The nature of Mulligan's reports have never arisen, but it is significant of how important Mulligan's work for liberty must have been when, as late as 1780, Tallmadge himself had to ask Washington personally to give him at least "a hint of it!"

Applying what is known today about the functioning of intelligence networks, it begins to look like the Culper Ring was actually a series of interlocking smaller networks, including the traditional Roe-Woodhull-Townsend triumvirate, Brewster's sailors, and Washington's private agents such as Honeyman and Mulligan.

If this was the case, it would be a logical growth of Washington's thoughts on espionage. It is not certain even now if the members of the different mini-rings even knew each other. If this were so, if the British counterintelligence spycatchers broke up one intelligence network, its operations could be assumed by the others. Perhaps the greatest coup of the entire New York operation was the theft, organized by James Rivington of the notoriously *Tory New York Gazette*, of the British Royal Navy's entire signals book.

Benedict Arnold. It was in New York that the most serious espionage case of the war came to its climax: the treason of American General Benedict Arnold. Arnold had led a distinguished career in the Continental service, fighting in Canada with General Richard Montgomery in December 1775, and serving valiantly in the Saratoga Campaign against British General Burgoyne among other commands.

Yet somewhere his patriotism soured, partly because he felt he was not receiving the preferred treatment from Congress that Arnold believed was his due. Though most accounts of his treason begin with his approach to the British about May 1779, after being court-martialed for financial misconduct while the American military governor of Philadelphia, his dalliance with the British may have started earlier.

One of the earliest to suspect Arnold was one of Washington's best intelligence officers, Major Allan McLane. Arnold made attempts to conceal his identity at first, but eventually British General Clinton's intelligence service was able to reveal him through extensive study of the profiles of American commanders. Arnold's plan was to turn over the strategic post of West Point on the Hudson River to the British. In fact, Arnold had schemed with Washington for the command with just that purpose in mind. On the British side, Major John André, who had been in charge of the farewell performance for Howe in Philadelphia, was assigned to be Arnold's British handler. Why Beverly Robinson, the British equal to Tallmadge, was not given direct control of Arnold is only more proof of Clinton's limited faculties as a commander.

Arnold's plot might indeed have succeeded had it not been for the ineptness displayed by André. On the night of September 21, 1780, André arrived on the aptly named HMS *Vulture* to meet Arnold along the Hudson River. Arnold then turned over the plans to West Point to André. André stuffed the incriminating papers into a hollow boot heel. Amazingly, instead of boarding the *Vulture* again to go down the river to New York, André decided to stay ashore to spend the night with a friend. When American shelling forced the *Vulture* downstream, André was forced to try to reach New York overland. The next day, André was captured by American partisans, who found the West Point plans in his boot heel. When the plot was thus exposed, Arnold barely escaped with his life (aboard the *Vulture*), while the hapless André was hanged on October 2, 1780. While much has been written lamenting the unfortunate major, he had simply violated the most elementary law of intelligence: one does not remain behind enemy lines with incriminating evidence one second more than is necessary.

French and American intelligence. There was one more major task before the American spies in New York City and the surrounding area. On July 11, 1780, Lieutenant-General Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, the Comte de Rochambeau reached Newport, Rhode Island, with an army of some 5,000 men to support Washington in accordance with the Treaty of 1778. The obvious target for the now allied army would have been New York City.

But even augmented by the French reinforcements, Washington and Rochambeau were daunted by the prospect of attempting to take New York. No action was taken throughout the rest of 1780, and Washington's plans were dealt a severe reversal by mutinies, which Clinton's spies tried to exploit, in his hard-pressed army in January 1781.

For most of the year, the prospect of action against New York seems to have been debated. Jean Jules Jusserand in his 1916 *Rochambeau and the French in America*, wrote that within a week of arriving in Newport, Rochambeau had expressed the wish to "pay them [the British] in New York" a visit. However, the decision was made with help from an unexpected source. On August 14, 1781, Admiral de Grasse sent word from the West Indies that he was sailing north, but the lateness of the year meant that New York was too far to aim for before the onset of the Caribbean hurricane season.

Accordingly, Washington and Rochambeau made the historic decision to use de Grasse's battle fleet to help destroy Lord Cornwallis in the Virginia tobacco port of Yorktown, where he had been trapped by General Anthony Wayne and Marie Joseph Paul, the Marquis de Lafayette. In order to carry out this strategy, the French and American espionage networks began one of the most sparkling examples of disinformation in intelligence history.

The objective of the French and American agents was to so flummox Clinton about the massive movements of the allied army that the eventual march south would be too far advanced for him to do anything to interfere with it. To accomplish this objective, the French and American military com-

manders utilized every possible artifice at their disposal.

Their goal was to deceive the British into believing that New York was to be their ultimate target anyhow. In doing so, they were aided on the part of the enemy with their wish fulfillment: the British and their spies were fixated with an American-French move on New York. In July 1781, a leading British agent in New Jersey, Thomas Ward, communicated to Clinton that a "report strongly prevails in the country of raising militia and laying siege to New York."

To keep this delusion alive, everyone from Washington down the chain of command worked hard. Washington even dined with a New Yorker of known Tory sympathies and inquired of the geography of the area. As the disinformation plan unfolded, elaborate preparations were made to make it appear that there would be a siege of New York. The French and Americans under the Continental "Baker-General," Christopher Ludwick, set up massive bake ovens near Chatham, since an army in for a long siege would need dependable supplies of fresh bread. Continental General William Heath helped set up military camps, at the same time as he masked the crossing of the Hudson by the allied army on August 21, 1781.

When the Army marched south into New Jersey, it took a route far to the west, away from most of the Tories who might have given the alarm. Yet, amazingly, as reports came in of the American forces' location, still Clinton did not appreciate the facts. When Clinton noted on September 2 that "Mr. Washington is moving an army to the southward," on the same day Washington was giving Congress in Philadelphia a grand review of his army.

The French, under Rochambeau, marched through Philadelphia on September 4. One day later, using the stolen Royal Navy signals book, the French Admiral de Grasse defeated the British squadron under Admiral Thomas Graves at the Battle of the Virginia Capes. British General Cornwallis was now hopelessly trapped. On September 28, the American and French allied army engaged Cornwallis in a formal siege. On October 19, 1781, six years and seven months after Lexington and Concord, Cornwallis surrendered.

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SEE ALSO: Tallmadge, Major Benjamin; Arnold, Benedict; Hale, Nathan; Culper Ring; Washington, George.

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Ames, Aldrich

ALDRICH HAZEN AMES, the highest-ranking, perhaps most damaging traitor in the history of the CIA, was born on May 26, 1941, in River Falls, Wisconsin. Ames was raised in a CIA family; his father, Carleton Cecil Ames, joined the CIA in 1952 and served as an operations officer in Burma and CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Ames worked clerical positions part-time at the CIA throughout high school and college, and entered the agency's Career Trainee Program upon graduating from George Washington University in 1967. He became an officer within the Directorate of Operations (DO) specializing in Soviet intelligence services in 1968. Ames's first overseas assignment was in Ankara, Turkey, with subsequent tours in New York and Mexico City.

Ames was consistently unsuccessful in recruiting Soviet officials to spy for the CIA, his primary responsibility as an operations officer. While he occasionally received positive performance reports, Ames displayed many other traits that cast doubt on his suitability for the job; he paid poor attention to security details (he once left a briefcase full of top-secret materials on a New York City subway), procrastinated in filing reports relating to his fi-

nances and contacts with foreign nationals, and drank heavily. His superiors never officially reprimanded him for any of these activities, primarily due to a DO culture that often protected its own at the expense of job performance. While in Mexico, Ames became involved with the Colombian embassy's cultural attaché, Maria del Rosario Casas Dupuy, who would later become his second wife.

In September 1983, Ames returned from Mexico with Rosario and was made counterintelligence branch chief for Soviet operations, a position that gave him access to all operations involving Soviet officials spying for the CIA. At the same time, Ames assisted the field office in Washington, D.C., responsible for contacting, assessing, and recruiting Soviet Union embassy officials.

Ames was facing mounting debts due to a recent divorce settlement from his first wife and Rosario's extravagant spending habits. He decided to sell information to the KGB. On April 16, 1985, Ames walked into the Soviet embassy and offered information on two or three Soviet agents working for the CIA.

A few days later, the KGB paid Ames $50,000. On June 13, Ames met again with his KGB handler and supplied the names of more than 10 Soviet officials spying for the CIA, FBI, and British intelligence, and turned over several pounds of classified documents that he had carried out of CIA headquarters in plastic bags. From May 1985 until July 1986, Ames met with his KGB handler approximately 14 times and received $20,000 to $50,000 cash payments at each meeting. Soviet authorities immediately began arresting the agents identified by Ames. The loss of so many spies in such a short period prompted CIA officials to launch an investigation. Some of the losses were attributed to Edward Lee Howard, a former CIA employee and known traitor who had defected to the Soviet Union. Howard was not in a position to know about all of the compromised agents, but CIA investigators attributed the other losses to either KGB penetration of CIA communications or poor security measures by the CIA officers or agents.

At this point, they did not even consider the possibility of a mole within the agency. The CIA eventually created a mole-hunt team to examine the so-called 1985 losses, but the investigation faltered for several years due to meager resources, neglect by CIA upper management, and disinformation put out by the KGB to divert attention from Ames.

Ames was sent to Rome, Italy, in July 1986, to serve as chief of a branch dealing with Soviet operations, and he continued to betray the CIA's Soviet agents and deliver bags of classified documents to the KGB. By the end of his tour in July 1989, the KGB had paid Ames $1.8 million and promised him an annual salary of $300,000 if he continued to spy for the KGB after his return to CIA headquarters near Washington, D.C.

Sudden wealth. Ames and Rosario made no attempt to hide their new-found wealth, paying $540,000 in cash for a new house and charging $20,000 to $30,000 per month on their credit cards, actions not commensurate with a government employee's salary. Ames initially deflected suspicion of his finances by claiming that Rosario's family was wealthy, but in 1992 the mole-hunt team checked his bank records and found that the dates of his deposits matched the dates of meetings with Soviet officials that he had reported to his superiors as recruitment efforts.

In 1993, the mole-hunt team turned the investigation over to the FBI's Counterintelligence Division. The FBI investigated Ames for 10 months and gathered evidence that confirmed Ames's treason and Rosario's knowledge of his work for the KGB. The FBI arrested Ames and Rosario on February 24, 1994. Both worked out plea agreements in which they debriefed the FBI on their illegal activities. Rosario received 63 months in prison and was deported to Colombia upon completion of her sentence. Ames received life in prison without the possibility of parole.

In all, Ames sold the names of 25 Soviet agents to the KGB—10 of whom were executed—and almost single-handedly destroyed the CIA's human intelligence capabilities within the Soviet Union. The fact that Ames evaded capture for nine years underscored serious counterintelligence deficiencies within the CIA, stemming primarily from the agency's lax enforcement of security and job performance standards among its officers, and an unwillingness to believe that it could be betrayed by one of its own.

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SEE ALSO: Central Intelligence Agency; Howard, Edward Lee; human intelligence.

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ancient intelligence

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING is nearly as old as written history. Excavations at the palace of the ancient city of Mari in modern Syria, for example, have produced an archive filled with evidence of the shadow trade, dating to around 1800 B.C.E. The use of spies for both political and military espionage was quite common, and evidence of ancient recruiting techniques is plentiful. Spies worked for money, for ideological motivations, for retribution against their own government, or for the sheer excitement and intrigue of the business and the love of gossip. Both city-dwellers and nomadic tribesmen engaged in espionage activities. One text speaks of Hammurabi never running out of "mouths willing to talk." In 1985, when archaeologists uncovered tablets in the palace of Tell Leilan (the ancient Shubat Enlil) in Syria, the first 12 tablets mentioned spy exchanges.

Among the most intriguing items in the Mari archive was a tablet that had inscribed across the top "THIS IS A SECRET TABLET," making it possibly the earliest extant classified document. The marking probably restricted access to the document by unauthorized readers and guaranteed that it would be carried by a trusted messenger. The heading let the reader know it was "For Your Eyes Only." Why all the secrecy surrounding this document? Because it was an execution order. Loosely translated it says: "Locate this man. If there is a ditch in the countryside or in the city, make this man disappear, whether he climbs to heaven or sinks into hell, let no one see him anymore."

Such documents were handled in a special room set off from the main archive where scribes could translate and analyze captured documents and generally keep the king up-to-date on intelligence matters. The bureau is thought to have been headed by trusted officials, and intelligence poured in from every possible source.

We know the name of at least one director of this intelligence bureau, "little knat." Reports from every source including the queen were collected, evaluated and filed. Information was extracted from gossipy merchants, wandering artisans, messengers, soldiers and sailors, and refugees. On a more official level, there were reports sent by ambassadors of the courts of allied and neutral powers. Thus far, well over 2,000 documents have been recovered from the palace. All the local kings in Mesopotamia appear to have engaged in subversive activities intended to weaken their enemies' resistance or to overthrow the leaders of other city-states. Kings dispatched propagandists known as "men of rumors" to discourage resistance. Such men were successful in causing desertions that severely weakened the defense at Mari.

In one example, mere rumors of an advancing Assyrian army were enough to encourage the defenders to abandon their positions. The king of Mari, Yasmakh-Adad, wrote to his father Shamshi-Adad King of Shubat Enlil: "Who has caused the troops to revolt? Two soldiers. And these two men, in creating fear, caused the troops to revolt."

Accurate and timely intelligence allowed the army of Mari to surprise its enemies, usually in the form of ambush or deception operations. Armies are likened to wrestlers trying to trick one another. Each side tried to out-maneuver its opponent with an ambush. Correspondence from Hammurabi in Babylon made a clear statement about the importance of intelligence to his military operations; he simply would not make a move until he had "information concerning the enemy." Deception operations were common in situations where an army had been lulled into security and then attacked, or lured into unfavorable territory for an ambush. Texts also mention guerrilla attacks by men in disguise.

Internal security was of the utmost importance. Political assassinations and palace intrigues were commonplace in the second millennium B.C.E. Kings often lost their thrones to internal revolts if they were not vigilant. The texts make numerous references to assassination attempts. However, a king was not a hopeless victim, waiting to be picked off. He had spies to test people's loyalty and punishments in place for those whose loyalty was suspect. Texts speak of "ringleaders who have caused a disturbance" being rounded up, and their fate was not enviable. One conspirator was beheaded, and an-

other had his skull crushed. Punishment was extended to include the plotter's household and his companions in crime. One judgment decreed: "the one who has thought up or knows of a plot, let him and his household be burnt."

The Mari and Tell Leilan tablets disclose how rulers of the second millennium B.C.E. deployed spies, scouts, and "eyes" to check up on each other's activities. These texts show what happened when spies were captured, and how treaties were negotiated for their return through the payment of ransom.

The rulers of Mesopotamian city-states were clever strategists and master spy-runners, and because the destruction of their palaces by fire baked the clay tablets and preserved them indefinitely, we are able to excavate the intelligence history of the ancient Near East with relative ease. When archaeologists can find tablets to document their political and military activities, so too they find evidence of intelligence operations.

Ancient Near Eastern empires. Any ruler aspiring to empire in the ancient Near East needed a large army with an intelligence gathering capacity to effectively conquer foreign territories and their populations. Once established, the smooth running of an empire relied upon intelligence gathering, analysis, and the proper dissemination of that intelligence to ensure stability and security. In this way, we witness the birth of large and intricate intelligence services run by centralized bureaucracies.

Rulers also developed intelligence services for the defense of their kingdoms, and for political expansion. They protected themselves against domestic and foreign threats, and used internal spying as the basic method of controlling their subjects.

Egypt. From ancient Egypt we have records on both papyrus and clay that detail the military campaigns of the Egyptians as they spread their hegemony into Nubia to the south and Palestine and Syria to the north. Egyptian intelligence gatherers could be messengers, diplomats, soldiers, governors, or any official who might have stumbled across information of interest to the pharaoh.

As an example of their efficiency, we know of a series of intelligence reports from the Middle Kingdom fortress at Semnah, the southern border of Egyptian-held territory in Nubia. These dispatches, which date to the reign of Amenemhet III circa 1844 to 1841 B.C.E., deal with the comings and goings of a group of nomads known as the Medjay people. Attempts were being made to keep track of the movements of tribes in the desert; some of the Medjay were later recruited into the Egyptian army. These are some of the earliest extant intelligence documents.

Two of our very first detailed descriptions of Bronze Age battles also come from Egypt, and not surprisingly both of them rely on intelligence operations. The Battle of Megiddo was the first military campaign in recorded history from which any kind of detailed account has survived.

The 18th Dynasty pharaoh, Thutmose III, had abstracts from the records of his campaign inscribed on the temple walls. Megiddo was his first victory and it was recorded in more detail than his later campaigns. Thutmose sent out his reconnaissance people to find out which was the best way to attack the fortress of Megiddo. Thutmose also engaged in a common but dangerous practice of ignoring the advice of his intelligence staff, once the information had been collected and analyzed.

In a daring attack on the fortress, he took the direct route that his intelligence people had warned him against. By choosing a daring frontal assault, he was able to take the Syrian forces by surprise, and the result was a resounding victory for the Egyptians.

Similarly, intelligence-gathering played a significant part in the story of the Battle of Kadesh that nearly ended in disaster for the Egyptians. The pharaoh, Ramses II, was fed disinformation by a spy working for the Hittites and was led into a trap. By torturing more accurate intelligence out of some local bedouin, he was able to recover somewhat and fight his way out through the surrounding Hittite forces. This example shows that even a militarily talented leader like Ramses could falter when given inaccurate intelligence.

Assyria. As empire builders, the Assyrians had the advantage of being able to build upon the work of their predecessors, the Egyptians and the Mesopotamians. They realized that the defense and security of their empire depended upon both good communications and reliable intelligence.

The first great Assyrian conqueror, Tiglath-Pileser I (1115–1077 B.C.E.) considered the provision of good roads for his troops and messengers as the first condition of success. Assyrian roads were said

to be protected by a special divinity, and royal guards were posted at certain distances to assure rapid transmission of urgent messages. Along the main roads, a special royal postal service was established to secure rapid intelligence from all points of the Assyrian empire. The royal messengers held a particular place at court among the minor officials.

The Babylonian name for these messengers was *angaroi*, and its adoption by the Persians shows the continuity of the concept. The Assyrian communications system seems to have been completed during the reign of Assurbanipal (668–627 B.C.E.) and the measurements between the different stations were definitely fixed. Whenever royal armies went out against rebels, scribes would record the distances so that they could calculate the time it would take to put down a revolt should they have to return.

The Assyrian system seems to have been quite successful since we have many accounts of revolts being detected and stamped out in their early stages. A text from the reign of Esarhaddon (668–627 B.C.E.) tells of the treachery of the king of Sidon and how the Assyrian king caught him up "like a fish in the sea." Assyrian agents even worked on the borders of the empire and in foreign lands not yet subject to Assyria.

A text of Esarhaddon's provides instructions on how to debrief defectors coming over the borders. Important intelligence, such as news of plots, was sent back to the capital by means of fire signals. These signals had to be pre-arranged, but they would be followed by a fast courier who could give more details of the events announced by the fire post. Although we do not have a great amount of information about how the Assyrian intelligence service functioned, or by what means the kings obtained necessary information of political and military value, the longevity of their empire suggests that the system was successful for a very long time.

Persia. The Persians, too, built upon the system of their predecessors. As heirs to the work of the Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians and Hittites, they set up an immense empire that could function effectively only if the central government was in touch with the remotest provinces and had a system that could warn of all dangers from both outside and inside their borders. The founders of the Persian empire created an important office that oversaw the entire administration. The head of this office was named "The Eye of the King" and he controlled all the provincial governors and royal functionaries.

The Greek historian Xenophon describes in his *Cyropaedia* what seems like the benevolent functioning of this system, but in reality what he is describing, if his text is reliable, is a Persian secret service. The running of this office depended upon an efficient intelligence service. A postal/military intelligence network was built that operated on the royal road from Persepolis to Susa and out to Sardis and Ephesus on the coast of Asia Minor.

The Persians maintained fixed remount stations where royal messengers who carried royal orders, could rest and change horses. Reports from *satraps* (provincial governors), and confidential intelligence on the behavior of hostile or subjected tribes could be sped along with great efficiency. The Greek historian Herodotus tells us of the system's speed when he writes that "nothing mortal accomplishes a course more swiftly" than do these messengers who are stayed "neither by snow, nor rain, nor heat, nor darkness" from accomplishing their appointed rounds.

The fact that the messengers were still called *angaroi* shows the system was adapted from the Babylonians through the Assyrians. Like the Assyrians, the Persians used fire signals for rapid intelligence. And like the Assyrians, the size and longevity of their empire suggests that the head of this secret service was successful in keeping the Persian kings informed of possible threats to the empire through counterintelligence efforts.

Roman Empire. It was once fashionable to believe that because the Greeks had a democracy and the Romans a republic, that neither of them needed an intelligence service. But representative government and intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence activities are by no means mutually exclusive. States rely upon information gathered from friends and enemies for the formation of their foreign policy, and the Romans were no exception. Granted that in the early days of the republic, when one could cross the entire city in a day on foot, intelligence-gathering was not as complicated a task as it would be when Rome ruled the entire Mediterranean world. But even in the beginning, Rome certainly did not lack enemies to target. Their early conflicts with the neighboring tribes, the Aequi and the Volsci, were followed by major wars with the Samnites, Etruscans, and Gauls. Collecting intelligence on these

peoples was a full-time job. The Romans learned to infiltrate neighboring tribes, develop bilingual agents, and launch surprise attacks with great success. Institutions such as the *exploratores* (cavalry scouts) were created to ride out ahead of the army and search out camp sites, battle grounds, and to locate the enemy. Similarly, the *speculatores* were created as mounted couriers who sometimes acted as spies and undercover agents.

After Rome had conquered most of the Italian peninsula, the Romans became entangled in Sicily with a major foreign enemy, the Carthaginians. An intelligence war ensued during which Hannibal surprised the Romans by invading through the Alps, and the Romans, in turn, attempted to cut off supplies and communications between Hannibal's army and his capital in Carthage. Both sides had their spies, and both could be brutal when dealing with captured enemy agents, or even with their own operatives who did not perform well. When the Romans caught two Carthaginian spies in Rome they had their right hands cut off. When Hannibal was given inaccurate information about the route to Casinum, he had his scout crucified.

Rome never developed one single organization to collect intelligence during the republican era. For political intelligence from overseas, the main source of intelligence was the embassy. Small missions of inquiry were sent to visit kings who had requested assistance. Most of this was done in the open, although retainers brought along with the embassy staff often snooped around and reported back to the ambassadors. On his grand tour of the East in 166 B.C.E., Tiberius Gracchus and his entourage were referred to as *kataskopoi* (spies) by the Greek historian Polybius. Because rulers in the East had a long history of playing this diplomatic game, they often assumed the Romans were doing the same thing. Information might be gathered informally by traders, messengers, or military personnel overseas. Even Romans traveling in non-official capacities were mistrusted by provincials. For example, Roman grain buyers making purchases in Cumae and Sicily were accused of spying and treated with great hostility.

Much of the behind-the-scenes, cloak-and-dagger work of senatorial politics is lost to us, but the various political factions all had their personal retinue of spies, if for no other reason than to collect gossip that might launch or sink a political career. The Romans had no qualms about using espionage on a personal level. Every Roman aristocrat had his private network of business associates, informers, clansmen, slaves or agents (male or female) who could keep him informed on the latest happenings in the Senate or elsewhere in the city. The famous conspiracy of Catiline was detected and put down by Cicero by using a female spy who was the lover of one of the conspirators. In non-political situations, even Roman builders worked with counterintelligence in mind. Livius Drusus's architect, as an example, asked him whether he would like his house built in such a way that he would be "free from public gaze, safe from all espionage and that no one could look down on it."

Espionage on this small scale became espionage on a national scale when the nobility took their family interests into the foreign-policy arena. Because each senatorial family had its own private intelligence network, no one group would have sanctioned the creation of a single intelligence office that might have fallen into the hands of a rival faction. This large collection of individual interests was simply not fertile ground for spawning a centralized intelligence service that would both monitor Rome's overseas interests and watch over Roman society at home.

Julius Caesar was a Roman commander who understood well the importance of good intelligence assets and who used the republican system to its best advantage. He established a rapid message and information transport system using couriers. His *Commentaries* are filled with stories of spies and scouts who used codes and ciphers to prevent his military plans from falling into the hands of the enemy. Plutarch states that he traveled very swiftly in carriages, and kept two scribes busy at the same time taking down his dictation. The truly ironic fact is, however, that this man who valued intelligence so highly and whose spies worked so efficiently, died with a list of the conspirators who would kill him still in his hand. His spy network had done its job of uncovering his enemies, and it did so in good time, but Caesar never read the message and walked into the trap.

Although the empire under Augustus pretended to preserve the republic, the government had, in reality, evolved into one-man rule. New institutions were introduced such as the *cursus publicus*, the postal system, that was set up on Roman roads to deliver intelligence between the provinces and the capital. For the first time, there was a reli-

able means of transmitting important intelligence. Like the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Persians before them, the Romans combined their road network with a communications system to help ensure the security of the emperor and the stability of the empire.

Not long after the *cursus publicus* had been established, an emperor, possibly Domitian or Hadrian, came up with another innovation that added more manpower to the Roman intelligence apparatus. The supply section of the army provided personnel who also served as intelligence agents. Because they had worked with the grain supply they retained the name *frumentarii* (frumentum means grain). These intelligence officers were constantly traveling on logistical assignments and were in a position to watch over the army, the imperial bureaucracy, and the local populace. They reported back to the emperor on any situation that was of interest to national security, so the emperors came to heavily rely upon the system. We can see this in the fact that the *frumentarii* came to replace the *speculatores* as the primary intelligence couriers and eventually took on the work of secret police. Although their three main duties were as couriers, tax collectors, and policemen, like the *speculatores* before them, these officers were used in many capacities involving state security.

In their capacity as spies, they were quite efficient; certainly no one high or low seems to have escaped their scrutiny. As secret police agents, the *frumentarii* participated in the persecution of the Christians and were often the agents who ordered their arrest. The soldier who supervised Saint Paul in Rome while he was awaiting trial was a *frumentarius*. The activities of the *frumentarii* did not endear them to the general public. Roman administrators, under the best of circumstances, could be arbitrary, authoritarian, and corrupt. When they became involved in collecting taxes and hunting down subversives, the temptations to corruption were even greater.

A 3rd-century writer describes the provinces as "enslaved by fear" because spies were everywhere. Their snooping became so pervasive by the third century that their behavior was compared to a plundering army, and they were frequently compared to a swarm of locusts. They descended upon villages ostensibly in pursuit of political criminals, but then they demanded bribes from the locals. The complaints became so numerous and frequent that the emperor Diocletian disbanded the *frumentarii*; however, he had no intention of giving up such a valuable intelligence asset. In place of the *frumentarii*, he simply set up a new organization that would perform the same tasks but under a different name. These new men were called *agentes in rebus*, general agents.

The blandness of the title belies their insidious function. Like their predecessors, they performed a wide range of intelligence and security functions. The two major differences were that these new agentes were civilians, not soldiers, and they were not under the jurisdiction of the Praetorian Prefect like the *frumentarii*, but rather were directed by an official called the master of offices. Since the master of offices controlled other groups that had intelligence functions, such as the *notarii* (the imperial secretaries), he became, in effect, a minister of information. The new corps of agents also became more numerous than it had been under military control, numbering as many as 1,200 men.

The growth of bureaucracy in the late empire created another use for spies: the surveillance of other ministries of state. The central government used intelligence officers from the imperial court to serve in other departments of government and there they could spy on both their superiors and subordinates alike. Sometimes they remained loyal to the emperor, but at other times they cooperated with their superiors with the aim of advancing their own careers. Charges of treason were often hurled at political rivals, rather than real traitors, with the consequence that the security of the empire was not really served.

During the late empire, the Roman government institutionalized its intelligence activities to an extent unknown during Augustus's reign. In order to remain safe, the emperors relied on many different groups to provide them with intelligence. The distinguishing characteristic of espionage in the late empire is that no one department carried it out alone. Many groups, both civilian and military, were assigned tasks that involved surveillance, transmission, or security functions.

Yet, ironically, all this espionage and counterintelligence did not seem to keep the emperor any safer. Seventy-five percent of Roman emperors fell to assassins or pretenders to the throne. Nor was there very much innovation in the types of intelligence work done. Foreign intelligence continued to be collected by diplomats visiting foreign courts, or

by military scouts such as the exploratores. In the late empire, large mobile units of *exploratores* were deployed along the border where they were used to monitor enemy activity beyond the empire's limits. This was straightforward military reconnaissance.

In spite of their corruption and frequent inefficiency, the Roman government considered the *agentes in rebus* indispensable. Even after the fall of the western empire in 476 C.E., these agents continued to be used by the Ostrogothic government well into the 6th century. In the eastern part of the empire, which did not suffer the catastrophic invasions of the West, they continued to function until the central administration was reorganized shortly after 700 C.E. No government in the ancient world was without its intelligence collectors, analyzers and disseminators.

Although the forms of government varied immensely over time, the one thing they all had in common was that no leader, civilian or military, made strategic decisions without first collecting as much accurate intelligence as possible.

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SEE ALSO: diplomacy; Middle Ages; Sun Tzu; China.

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Andropov, Yuri

YURI ANDROPOV was president of the Soviet Union during 1983 and 1984; general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party from 1982 to 1984; and head of the Committee for State Security (KGB) from 1967 to 1982.

One of the most formidable Soviet leaders during the Cold War, he was also one of the most enigmatic. He played a central role in the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, thus delaying political reforms in the Soviet satellite nations for over 20 years. He also favored martial law or armed intervention during the 1980–81 Polish crises. He believed these political-military interventions were the only way to preserve the Soviet strategic sphere of influence in central and eastern Europe after World War II.

As head of the KGB, he exercised oversight of all repressive measures against dissident movements throughout the Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe. He also directed the KGB's global espionage networks, aimed at increased agent penetrations, subversion, and disinformation. Foreign intelligence collection became more intensive under his direction, as the KGB employed more signals intelligence (SIGINT) interceptions targeted mainly against the United States and Western Europe. He also intensified human intelligence (HUMINT) agent operations against Western nations for the acquisition of plans, policies, and scientific-technological innovations.

In Soviet domestic affairs, he pressed for reforms within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and supported Mikhail Gorbachev's entry into the Soviet Politburo. He initiated proceedings against senior party officials for corruption and bribery. Andropov advocated improved efficiency throughout the lethargic socialist system and economic reform before his effectiveness as general secretary was cut short by terminal illness.

Andropov was born on June 15, 1914, the son of a railway official in the Stavropol region of southern Russia. He left school in 1930, working as a telegraph boy, cinema projectionist, and crew member on boats plying the Volga River. He entered the Technical Institute of Water Transportation at Rybinsk and graduated in 1936. He simultaneously began his political career as a member of the Yaraslav Komsomol (communist youth group).

During World War II, he served as a political commissar on the Finnish front. After the war, Andropov served in a series of communist party positions, gaining a reputation as an expert on Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, he supplemented his earlier limited education with part-time study at Petrazavodsk University and at the Higher Party School.

Prominent communist intellectuals at home and abroad who later worked with him were impressed by his intelligence and comprehensive reading. During 1953, Andropov entered the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and in 1954 he was assigned to the Soviet embassy in Budapest, Hungary. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution revealed Andropov's character under crisis conditions. He demonstrated a ruthless composure as Hungarian leaders sought his reassurances that reform would not threaten Soviet interests.

Andropov reassured them that Soviet forces would not intervene, even as Soviet tanks entered the Hungarian capital. Andropov was subsequently placed in charge of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Relations with Communist Parties of Socialist Countries. From 1957 to 1967, as head of this department, Andopov acquired the reputation of being the most reform-minded member of the Soviet leadership. Andropov had good relations with CPSU General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev during these years.

However, his relations with CPSU ideologist Mikhail Suslov were strained. It was Suslov who proposed Andropov for KGB chief, thus transferring Andropov from the CPSU Secretariat and eliminating him as a contender for general secretary. The Politburo approved Andropov's KGB appointment. Nonetheless, with the death of Suslov in 1982, Andropov was returned to the Secretariat and became a prime contender to succeed CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.

Meanwhile, Andropov's KGB was recognized as the most efficient organization in the Soviet system both in domestic surveillance and foreign intelligence. Overt dissent was significantly reduced through imprisonment and assignment to the prison camps (gulags) or the Soviet psychiatric hospitals. After Andropov's return to the Secretariat, he immediately launched an anti-corruption campaign that implicated several comrades close to Brezhnev. The risky campaign was successful in that it led to Andropov's appointment as CPSU General Secretary on November 12, 1982, two days after Brezhnev's death.

Andropov came to power committed to major reform of political and economic structures, conscious that the infrastructure was suffering from lethargy. However, Andropov never intended to adopt changes that would endanger CPSU hegemony. These developments would occur under a subsequent Soviet leader. Andropov's health noticeably began to fail in February 1983. It was revealed after his death on February 9, 1984, that he had a chronic kidney condition, diabetes, and cardiovascular problems.

Andropov did undertake several foreign policy initiatives as Soviet leader including efforts to improve relations with China and entice Western Europe away from the United States. These diplomatic overtures were to fail following the September 1983 shoot-down of a Korean Airliner with 269 passengers on board. Nonetheless, Andropov did pave the way for more radical reforms that would be realized under Gorbachev and others he succeeded in promoting to the Politburo. Perhaps that should be viewed as his legacy.

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SEE ALSO: Soviet Union; Hungary; KGB; human intelligence; signals intelligence.

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Angleton, James J.

AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (CIA) counterintelligence chief from 1954 to 1974, James Jesus Angleton (1917–1987) was charged with ferreting-out Soviet disinformation received by the CIA. Instead, many scholars agree, Angleton risked America's counterintelligence capability in a fruitless and destructive hunt for a KGB mole working inside the CIA.

Angleton was born in Boise, Idaho, on December 9, 1917. He was raised in Idaho, Ohio, Italy, and England. From 1937 to 1941, he attended Yale University, where he earned poor grades but founded a respected poetry journal, *Furioso*. In 1943, Angleton was drafted into the army and assigned to join its Office of Strategic Services (OSS) headed by William Donovan.

In 1944, OSS sent Angleton to London to assist the anti-German counterintelligence operations of the British Secret Service (MI-6). From 1945 to 1947, Angleton was stationed in Italy. In 1948, he returned to Washington to join OSS's successor organization, the CIA. From 1949 to 1951, one of Angleton's CIA duties was to exchange Soviet counterintelligence information with his British MI-6 counterpart, Kim Philby, with whom he had worked in London in 1944. In 1954, the CIA promoted Angleton to the office of chief of counterintelligence.

As counterintelligence chief, Angleton was given unparalleled free reign to operate without oversight supervision or bureaucratic interference. Angleton's operations had two primary goals: to disorient the Soviet KGB by supplying its agents with disinformation, and to detect corresponding KGB attempts to disorient the CIA.

To achieve these goals, Angleton needed to ascertain the true loyalties of the shadowy agents and defectors through whom communication between the rival agencies were channeled, and also to keep the CIA's staff free of KGB moles. In 1951, Angleton was asked to assess whether his British MI-6 counterpart, Philby, was a Soviet agent. Contrary to the prevailing view inside the CIA, Angleton concluded that Philby was uncompromised. Philby's defection to the Soviet Union in 1963 may have contributed to Angleton's subsequent descent into obsession.

That descent began in 1961, when Soviet defector Anatoly Golitsyn convinced Angelton that a KGB mole had penetrated the highest reaches of the American intelligence establishment. From 1961 to 1974, Angleton obsessively sought to identify the "big mole." Among others, he falsely accused British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, CIA Director William Colby, and 18 career CIA officers who were fired or demoted based on Angleton's false accusations. Angleton's mole hunt also paralyzed the CIA's ability to recruit sources in the Soviet Union. Golitsyn also convinced Angleton that the Soviets would send waves of false defectors in a future attempt to discredit Golitsyn. As a result, from 1964 to 1967, Angleton ordered the torture and detention for 1,277 days of Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko, whom Angleton considered a false defector. In 1973, Angleton's deputy, Clare Petty, accused Angelton himself of being the suspected "big mole."

The following year, CIA Director William Colby fired Angleton following media reports that Angleton had been illegally spying on thousands of U.S. citizens. In 1975, Angleton publicly defended his illegal activities, testifying before Congress that: "It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government." He died in 1987.

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SEE ALSO: Philby, Kim; Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William; Golitsyn, Anatoly; Wilson, Harold.

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Arbenz Guzman, Jacobo

JACOBO ARBENZ Guzman (1913–1971), as president of Guatemala, was the subject of a CIA covert operation which deposed him in 1954. Arbenz was born in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, to a middle-class Swiss immigrant and his Guatemalan wife. Raised by his mother after his father's suicide, Arbenz chose the most promising career path for the middle class at the time and entered the Guatemalan Army as an officer.

During the period that Arbenz was an instructor at the Guatemalan Military Academy, the country was ruled as a military dictatorship by Jorge

Ubico, with the patronage of traditional landowners.

Although initially apolitical, Arbenz began taking a greater interest in politics after his marriage in 1939 to a woman with strong leftist beliefs. In 1944, serious unrest broke out in Guatemala against Ubico and he turned over power to General Francisco Ponce who called for presidential elections. Ponce then arrested the candidate who was running against him. In response, Captain Arbenz and Major Francisco Arana conducted a violent coup and began leading a junta (a revolutionary government), promising free and fair elections. Juan Jose Arevalo won the first presidential elections, followed by Arbenz campaigning for and winning the 1950 elections with 65 percent of the vote.

Arbenz undertook a number of projects to modernize Guatemala. The most controversial, ultimately leading to his downfall, was his agrarian-reform plan. This plan called for the expropriation (with compensation to the owners) of uncultivated parts of large plantations. About 1.5 million acres actually were turned over to small farmers, although some clashes between the new land claimants (encouraged by the Guatemalan Communist Party) and police broke out. The biggest issue, however, was the expropriation of some land belonging to United Fruit Company. United Fruit was very dissatisfied with the financial terms of the expropriation and pressured the U.S. government for support. In addition to the specific expropriation issue, the U.S. government was very concerned about Arbenz's political leanings. There was no evidence at the time, or since, that Arbenz was a communist, but he clearly was on the left of the political spectrum, and certainly accepted political support from the communist party. Nevertheless, the United States branded him as a front-agent for communism and began a concerted diplomatic and political campaign against his government. More importantly, U.S. President Harry Truman authorized a covert CIA operation called PBFORTUNE to overthrow Arbenz. This was followed by PBSUCCESS under President Dwight Eisenhower.

The CIA provided direct support to a Guatemalan military officer in exile in Nicaragua, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. The agency provided training, equipment, and money for Castillo's rebel army, together with some air support. It also conducted an extensive psychological-operations campaign in Guatemala. After Castillo's forces entered Guatemala in June 1954, Arbenz's government collapsed in only two weeks. In general, neither the army nor peasantry proved interested in opposing Castillo's invasion. Arbenz fled into exile, living successively in Switzerland, France, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, Uruguay, Cuba, and finally Mexico where he died in 1971.

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SEE ALSO: Truman, Harry S; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Central Intelligence Agency; Central America.

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Argentina

IN 1937, ROBERTO Ortiz came to power in Argentina. While he officially maintained Argentine neutrality when World War II began in 1939, he showed a preference for the Allied cause. For example, when the war started, he submitted intelligence information to Great Britain on suspected German agents operating in Argentina. In July 1940, however, Ortiz stepped down due to failing health. He was followed in office by Ramón Castillo, who was more conservative and less democratic than Ortiz. Castillo was also less friendly to the United States. Despite pressure from the United States government, Castillo choose to continue Argentina's neutrality even after Pearl Harbor and the entrance of the United States into the war. In retaliation, the United States withheld almost all military and economic aid from Argentina. In 1940, the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires also developed its own intelligence network in Argentina, although it was largely unsuccessful.

Castillo attempted to obtain military aid from Germany after the United States began to limit ties with Argentina. While Germany was sympathetic, it was unable to provide such aid. Nevertheless, the

Argentine military did maintain ties to German intelligence. By 1942, German agents had set up a clandestine radio transmission network in Argentina. U.S. operatives knew of the German activity, but early FBI attempts to break the German codes were unsuccessful. U.S. intelligence also requested Argentine cooperation in locating the German transmitters. In light of the two countries' strained relations, Castillo refused the request and took no action to interfere with the German activities in Argentina.

In June 1943, the military overthrew the Castillo government. The new military government approached the United States in hope of acquiring arms to counterbalance the Brazilian military. In response, the United States demanded that Argentina would first have to break diplomatic ties to the Axis powers and end German espionage activities in country.

The United States threatened to recall its ambassador, freeze Argentine assets, and publish evidence of Argentine collaboration with German intelligence. Argentina did finally cut ties to the Axis, the last Latin American country to do so. However, relations between the two countries did not improve, as the United States claimed that Argentina was still pro-fascist and had done little to crack down on German espionage.

Relations soured even more with the publication of the Blue Book by Spruille Braden, briefly the U.S. ambassador in Argentina and later the assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs. In this publication, based on U.S. intelligence sources and captured German records, Braden outlined Argentine government and military cooperation with German intelligence activities. As it was released right before the 1946 presidential elections, it was viewed by many in Argentina as an attack on candidate Juan Perón.

Intelligence activities during 1976–83. Intelligence operations played an important role during the military dictatorship that ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983. This military government was notorious for its abuses of human rights and thousands of people "disappeared" in Argentina during this period. The intelligence apparatus played a central role in the state terrorism carried out by the military. In particular, the army's Battalion 601, renamed the Center for Military Intelligence during the 1980s, and the Secretariat of State Intelligence (SIDE) were responsible for extortion, kidnappings, torture, and assassinations. Members of both of these intelligence units participated in paramilitary groups and death squads.

Another legacy of the military government was its participation in Operation Condor, a system of international intelligence cooperation in South America that included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia. Multinational teams, structured like U.S. Special Forces, tracked down and killed opponents outside of their home countries. For example, CIA documents show that Argentina, along with Chile and Uruguay planned assassinations in Western Europe with training sessions scheduled in Buenos Aires.

An investigation in 2000 looked into the disappearance of three Argentine citizens who were seized in Brazil and then secretly taken back to Argentina. There are also claims that former Brazilian president João Goulart, who was living in Argentina when he died in 1976, was a victim of poisoning.

The return to democracy. Upon Argentina's return to democracy in 1983, there was much debate over the role of military and intelligence organizations. Civilian control over intelligence became a major issue. There were some attempts at reducing the role of the military-security-intelligence apparatus. However, under the government of Carlos Menem, the budget for military and intelligence increased significantly. The military continued to operate within numerous intelligence units, some of which operated with very large budgets that came from "reserved funds" that Menem could authorize without congressional approval.

There have been numerous scandals involving intelligence forces spying on sectors of civil society, including students, shanty-town dwellers, journalists, women's groups, and political parties. In one notorious case, an army intelligence unit carried out surveillance and even sent death threats to witnesses and lawyers involved in a case investigating human rights abuses. There has also been an increase in private security agencies that are largely beyond government control. These agencies are often run by former military officers.

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SEE ALSO: Brazil; World War II; Central America.

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army intelligence

ARMY INTELLIGENCE is generally defined as information collected and analyzed to support army operations. On the modern battlefield, this information is collected from a variety of sources, analyzed by an intelligence staff, and then presented to the commander so that he or she can make timely operational decisions. The ultimate purpose of this intelligence is to enable commanders to optimize their resources. For example, if intelligence can predict where an enemy will attack, the commander can then concentrate defensive forces in that area.

The modern army intelligence staff, such as the U.S. Army's G-2 group, has a variety of sources to assist the commander in predicting the enemy's actions. Some of these sources include communications intelligence (COMINT), derived from the intercept and analysis of enemy radio transmissions through various modes including voice, Morse Code, analog or digital data, teletypewriter, and facsimile.

Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is derived from the intercept and analysis of threat from non-communication emissions including radars, transponders, repeaters, and beacons. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is information obtained from the analysis of radar, photographic, infrared, and electro-optical imagery.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) results from the intercept, analysis, and exploitation of enemy radio electronic emissions. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is information collected from human sources such as the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war or reports from battlefield scouts. Of these types of intelligence, HUMINT is usually the most costly and least accurate. The characteristics of effective army intelligence are: relevancy, usability, timeliness, accuracy, comprehensiveness, objectivity, and prediction.

Early army intelligence. Intelligence has always played an essential part in organized war. Early references include the Bible, wherein Joshua scouted the hostile land of Canaan. In ancient South America, the J'varo tribe of Ecuador crept into enemy villages to count houses and estimate the size of the enemy force. In China and India, Sun Tzu and Kautilya both counseled the necessity of accurate intelligence. Sun Tzu says, "What enables the wise commander to strike and conquer and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge."

The early 19th century marked a new era for intelligence. The large armies of the Napoleonic period, combined with the technical advances of the Industrial Revolution, made overcoming former logistical impossibilities a reality. Mass armies supported by industrialized economies, outfitted with mass-produced equipment, and mobilized via rail provided intelligence a bonanza of new collection targets.

For example, rail schedules, factory orders, and the vast record-keeping bureaucracy needed to process it all gave intelligence analysts precise war plans, population statistics, and details of industry. The Industrial Revolution later furnished intelligence with the tools needed to expose these targets: the camera to photograph them, the airplane to view them, and the intercept radio to overhear them. Also, the upsurge of open sources, such as press and government publications, produced voluminous amounts of information.

As the amount of intelligence collected grew, so did the number of personnel needed to analyze the information, and it was during this period that intelligence evolved out of the general staff into its own discrete branch. In the U.S. military, for example, the intelligence staff grew from one officer and four clerks in 1885 to 52 officers, 12 clerks, and 16 attachés in 1889. This new intelligence operational staff even had its own name: the Military Information Division.

It was also during this period that intelligence began to specialize in distinctive fields to further expedite the analysis of information. For instance, the Military Information Division served the army and was distinct from the newly formed Office of Naval Intelligence in expertise, organization, and priorities. Whereas naval intelligence focused on the technological advancements of other navies, army intelligence focused on geography and foreign

armies. The Spanish-American War of 1898 was the first test of the Military Information Division.

In an effort to combat Philippine guerrillas, the army divided its units into small garrisons around the country. Each garrison had its own intelligence staff officer to coordinate information on the terrain and the enemy, mostly from reconnaissance, spies, deserters, prisoners, or captured documents. By 1900, a Military Information Division was created for the entire Philippine Islands, thus centralizing the effort.

World War I marked the culmination of intelligence advancements not only in collection, but also in analysis and dissemination. New aerial photography was used extensively and intelligence officers would often use examine photos instead of maps. With the advent of the military radio, radio-intercepts played an increasingly significant role. However, patrols, observation posts, and raids were still the most important sources of intelligence.

World War II. Army intelligence attained even greater significance during World War II, as more venues and technologies for collection became available. In fact, so successful were the collection assets that intelligence organizations were quickly overwhelmed with too much information. In May 1942, for example, the G-2 in Washington, D.C., was besieged with nearly 126,000 communiqués, and the 2,500-person staff was swamped in its search for vital information. As the war progressed, however, intelligence evolved into a more efficient discipline in a number of ways.

First, unlike World War I, which had no standard organization for the intelligence staff, World War II saw a uniform organization of intelligence sections. Second, with this standardization came new systems for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. Third, as intelligence proved increasingly more valuable to operations, an intelligence consciousness emerged among the military commanders and troops of World War II. American generals, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, Robert L. Eichelberger, and A. M. Patch listened to their intelligence officers.

Like World War I, the main sources of army intelligence were aerial photography, radio intercepts, and human sources. As aviation advanced during the inter-war years, so did the potential for aerial photography. Although aerial photography provided only a minority of the intelligence gathered, it was important because it was one of the army's few organic assets that could look deep into enemy territory, and provide reliable information regarding defenses and terrain. Intelligence derived from radio transmissions also evolved, and continued to play a major role in collection as radio use proliferated. On the tactical side, radio intelligence units were formed at the corps and army levels. These units helped to locate headquarters, detect movement, and decode enemy messages in fluid situations. At the strategic level, militaries engaged in sophisticated cryptology, such as the German Enigma cipher machine, and the British Ultra system used to decrypt Enigma.

The most abundant army intelligence was information collected from human sources. Lower-level units continued to use patrols, scouts, and other troops in contact. The most profitable source of intelligence came from prisoners of war (POWs) and captured enemy documents. In Europe, more than one-third of all intelligence came from POWs, and an army POW team could handle up to 5,000 prisoners a day.

Counterintelligence. Owing to the growing capabilities of intelligence, armies also adopted counterintelligence strategies to thwart enemy subversion, sabotage, and intelligence gathering. Thanks to mass media campaigns such as "Loose Lips Sink Ships," most soldiers, regardless of nationality, were aware that foreign intelligence was always a threat. During basic training, soldiers were instructed what information they were allowed to give the enemy if captured (name, rank, service number) and what information was prohibited.

To minimize the threat of exposing sensitive documents, a clearance system was developed and material was marked Secret, Top Secret, and so forth; only those with the same or higher clearance level were allowed access to it. Background investigations were also conducted on individuals who routinely handled the most sensitive materials. Electronic warfare and other countermeasures were developed to foil enemy radio listening devices, the use of cryptography was widespread, and even the Navajo language was used by U.S. forces in the Pacific Theater, a code that the Japanese never broke.

Following World War II, military and political leaders alike recognized that intelligence was crucial to military success. Following the end of the war, militaries consolidated, reorganized and emerged

with an intelligence structure prefiguring today's. Influences including the Cold War, advances in technology, and imperatives of bureaucracy caused further refinement of intelligence organizations. To meet these new challenges, army intelligence expanded in size, became more professionalized, integrated its diverse disciplines, and extended its operational scope. So considerable were these changes that in the United States, for instance, the U.S. Army finally established a military intelligence branch in 1962, on a par with branches like infantry, medical, and transportation.

Technology over humans. Following World War II, army intelligence also relied increasingly on technology over traditional human beings to collect information. In other words, instead of relying on spies, armies sought high-tech solutions. For example, the U.S. war in Vietnam witnessed the introduction of Side-Looking Airborne Radar and Ground Surveillance Radar, which are still used today.

Though this new technology offered revolutionary capabilities, some of these assets were offset by relatively simple countermeasures and harsh terrain. Other developments during the Vietnam War included pattern analysis, in which enemy activity was plotted and tracked on maps over an extended period of time via a variety of sources. What emerged from this tracking were patterns of enemy activity, intensity, and even intentions. Pattern analysis played a key role in the success of Operation Cedar Falls on January 8–26, 1967, one of the largest offensives of the war.

However, U.S. Army intelligence also experienced problems. Analytical capability was inadequate partly because experts were attached to G-2 rather than being organic. Collections efforts on the tactical level were often myopic in scope, and secure radio procedures sometimes proved fatally slow during combat situations. Lastly, since intelligence sections were attached, and not intrinsic to maneuver units such as an infantry battalion, intelligence was viewed as a "bastard" unit.

New strategy and tactics. To remedy these problems, U.S. Army intelligence re-organized again, dividing along strategic and tactical lines. For the strategic level, the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) was created in 1979. Its mission is to provide senior army commanders relevant intelligence collected from the entire intelligence community. INSCOM also conducts intelligence preparation of the battlefield on the strategic level, situation development, signals analysis, imagery exploitation, and science and technology intelligence production. INSCOM also has major responsibilities in the areas of counterintelligence, force protection, and electronic and information warfare.

On the tactical level, the army has made a greater effort to integrate intelligence organically into maneuver units, like a tank battalion, which allows them to better analyze information and produce intelligence. In the U.S. Army, every tactical unit down to battalion has its own organic intelligence officer, or S-2. In addition to the S-2, battalions and brigades also have a Battlefield Information Coordination Center (BICC). BICCs provide detailed control and coordination of intelligence collection, production, and dissemination, thus freeing the S-2 from routine tasks, and can better manage the overall intelligence effort.

Divisions also have an organic military intelligence battalion, which is primarily a SIGINT organization and is weak in HUMINT and IMINT (imagery intelligence). One of its primary missions is to deploy Electronic Warfare (EW) units, which engage in counterintelligence. Not only can EW protect friendly communications, but it can also disrupt enemy command, control, and fire-support communications during a critical phase of a battle.

There are three types of EW. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) are measures to protect friendly command, control, and communications from enemy EW. Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) provides immediate threat recognition, combat information, and target acquisition as well as the specific frequencies and radio nets a commander can jam. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) consist of jamming enemy communications and electronic deception.

Used properly, these last two elements can complement other attacks on the battlefield. Intelligence and counterintelligence, in all their capacities, play a fundamental role in any successful army operation.

SEAN MCFATE
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

SEE ALSO: naval intelligence; air force intelligence; human intelligence; signals intelligence; scientific and technical intelligence.

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Arnold, Benedict



Benedict Arnold earned immortal infamy in the United States for his betrayal of the American Revolutionary cause.

SCION OF A PROMINENT New England family, Benedict Arnold held a variety of jobs before the American Revolution, including druggist, bookseller, and master of a cargo ship in the Caribbean trade. His appetite for military adventure was whetted by service in the Connecticut militia in the Seven Years' War and as the captain of the Governor's Guard in 1775. He assembled 400 men to defend Boston, and, as a colonel of the Massachusetts militia, led them in an attack on Fort Ticonderoga and a daring winter assault on Quebec. Despite the failure of the Canadian invasion, and a serious leg wound, Arnold engineered a brilliant delaying battle on Lake Champlain that prevented a British incursion into New England.

Despite promotion to brigadier general for these actions, Arnold resented the petty personal politics of the Revolution that promoted lesser men from influential colonies. Sent north to join Generals Philip Schuyler and Horatio Gates, Arnold became a hero of the Battle of Saratoga after disobeying Gate's orders and breaking the British advance with his left flank. Now badly crippled, Arnold became commander of Philadelphia, where he collected a circle of Loyalists and disillusioned revolutionaries. He married Margaret Shippen, daughter of a prominent Loyalist, who brought him into contact with Major John André, one of British Sir Henry Clinton's staff officers. Angry and living far beyond his means, Arnold offered to betray the fortifications at West Point to the British through André, convinced that he could reconcile Britain and the colonies, as well as benefit personally.

Arnold asked for and received command of the fort, and made plans to hand it over to a party of Clinton's men from New York City during a scheduled visit from General George Washington and his senior staff. However, André, leaving a September 20, 1780, meeting with Arnold, ran into pickets, and the plans of West Point were discovered in his boots. Since André had disobeyed Clinton's instructions and appeared at the meeting in civilian clothes, he was later hanged as a spy, rather than treated as an officer.

Arnold received warning of the disaster and fled to Clinton in New York. Mistrusted by the British, and disliked by Clinton because of André's death, he was kept as a British brigadier, and even allowed to lead a raid on the Chesapeake in 1781, but accomplished little. After the Revolution, Arnold moved to London and reunited with his wife, but he was ostracized by British society as a turncoat. Arnold's last years in exile were spent in bitterness

at his treatment by both the Americans and British, and the narrow margins by which his plan misfired.

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SEE ALSO: American Revolution; Washington, George; Hale, Nathan.

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ARTICHOKE, Project

PROJECT ARTICHOKE was a CIA program of psychological and drug research conducted between 1951 and 1967. Beginning as a comparatively modest effort to improve interrogation techniques, Project ARTICHOKE soon expanded to focus on long-distance, long-term mind control for intelligence purposes. Despite early promise, the project failed to make significant progress either in assisting in the interrogation of hostile agents or in achieving the elusive goal of mind control. More damaging, revelations of the program, and its use of unwitting Americans as guinea pigs in drug experiments, contributed to growing public and Congressional disillusionment with the CIA in the 1970s.

Project ARTICHOKE had its genesis in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Shocked and impressed by the public confession of Hungarian Cardinal Josef Mindszenty during his 1949 show trial, and by the pro-communist statements of some American soldiers captured during the Korean War, the CIA concluded that the Soviet Union had perfected a technique of controlling unwilling subjects.

Eager to catch up to the Soviets and to build upon crude Office of Strategic Services (OSS) research in World War II, Special Assistant for Clandestine Operations Richard Helms and biochemist Sidney Gottlieb established Project BLUEBIRD on April 2, 1951, with the initially limited goal of improving interrogation techniques through psychological and pharmacological means.

Experiments using a combination of sodium pentathol and hypnosis produced some early promise, but they failed to achieve the ultimate goal of rendering the interrogated individual unaware that he had been subject to questioning, and, thus, oblivious to the fact that he had divulged valuable information.

Later tests using a combination of stimulants and depressants proved equally unsuccessful. Even as these experiments were ongoing, however, the project increasingly focused on the broader goal of achieving long-term, long-distance mind control over a subject, with the ultimate aim of placing unwitting spies throughout the Eastern Bloc; it consequently received the new designation Operation ARTICHOKE in August 1951.

Under Gottlieb's direction, Project ARTICHOKE sought to achieve the elusive aim of mind control through hypnosis, psychological techniques, and, above all, drugs. Gottlieb and his colleagues conducted a series of tests on individuals using cocaine, marijuana, heroine, peyote, and mescaline; increasingly, however, they concluded that lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) offered the best chance of achieving control over an individual. By the middle of 1952, virtually all Project ARTICHOKE tests involved administering LSD either to CIA volunteers or, increasingly, to unwitting CIA agents in an effort to determine the drug's effects on unsuspecting individuals. Eager to expand the scope of the testing, Gottlieb later contracted with Dr. Harris Isbell, director of the Addiction Research Center at the U.S. Public Health Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, to experiment with LSD on drug addicts in his care in the addiction center.

Isbell conducted his experiments with the consent of his mostly African-American patients, but failed to disclose the potential dangers of LSD to them and subjected the men to particularly intensive doses. In one extreme case, for example, Isbell kept an individual on LSD for a staggering 77 days. Despite Gottlieb and Isbell's exhaustive experimentation on numerous subjects, Project ARTICHOKE never succeeded. The program was eventually phased out under the Lyndon Johnson administration in 1967. To Gottlieb and the CIA's great embarrassment, however, Project ARTICHOKE resurfaced in the 1970s. Whistleblowers and investigative journalists, such as Tad Szulc, re-

vealed to the public lurid accounts of intensive drug experiments on unsuspecting CIA agents and civilian guinea pigs.

Most damaging of all was the revelation that Frank Olson, a CIA biochemist, had committed suicide in 1953 just nine days after being administered LSD without his knowledge. Such shocking revelations not only eroded public support for the CIA, but also played a key role in initiating the Congressional hearings on agency operations that took place in the mid-1970s under Senator Frank Church.

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SEE ALSO: Central Intelligence Agency; Church, Frank; Helms, Richard; Congressional oversight.

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assassination

IT IS ONE of the most grim, and most immutable, laws of statecraft that the quickest and surest way to change the foreign policy of a country, or to effect a change in an external regime, is to kill the head of state, an important government official, or military leader. Usually a head of state, today most often a president, premier, or prime minister, will decide on the killing of a foreign leader when all other means have failed to rectify a serious foreign policy problem between the two nations. In the 18th century, artillery was called the *ultima ratio regis*, the final argument of kings. Today, the final argument of presidents, premiers, or prime ministers may be political assassination.

Throughout recorded history, assassination using stealth and surprise has been a direct means to eliminate an opponent. When Marcus Brutus and Gaius Cassius, along with others, plotted the death of Julius Caesar in March, 44 B.C.E., they carried out their killing as a political assassination in the Roman Senate. Any attempt to kill Caesar at other sites would have almost certainly caused their death at the hands of his loyal soldiers. Caesar never brought an armed escort with him to the Senate.

Historical examples of assassination: England. The history of assassination shows that all nations, no matter how politically enlightened, or socially or economically advanced, have had their history marred by this bloody act. During the Middle Ages, England suffered from a spate of assassinations as rival factions of great nobles competed for the throne. Edward II of England, who was defeated by Robert the Bruce of Scotland in 1314, met his death at the hands of assassins in 1327 in a peculiarly brutal manner while imprisoned in Berkeley Castle.

Richard II was most likely killed in Pontefract Castle on the orders of Henry Bolingbroke, when the latter forced him from the throne in 1399. Bolingbroke took the throne as King Henry IV; his grandson, Henry VI, would rule as monarch of both France and England but, being feeble-minded, was unable to hold onto power. He died in 1471, executed by his rival in the dynastic War of the Roses, by Edward, Duke of York, who became king as Edward IV.

Yet his son, Edward V, was most likely killed by orders of his own uncle, Richard, Duke of Gloucester, while imprisoned in the Tower of London in 1483. Richard would fall to the invading army of Henry Tudor at the Battle of Bosworth Field in 1485, and Henry Tudor would begin the Tudor dynasty as Henry VII.

While Henry VII established political stability of a sort not seen for over a century in England, assassination or political murder remained the ultimate weapon in the armory of reigning monarchs. Henry VII's granddaughter, Elizabeth I, reigned from 1558 to 1603, giving England one of the most prolonged eras of peace in its history. Yet Elizabeth herself resorted to political murder to remove a rival, and perhaps save her own life.

In May 1568, Mary, Queen of Scots, a Catholic, was defeated by her Scottish enemies at the Battle of Langside. Her advisors were unanimous in begging her to retreat to Catholic France where, as the wife of the dead King Francis II, she would receive protection. Mary elected instead to seek refuge with the worst of all possible choices: Queen Elizabeth I of England.

Elizabeth was a poor choice for two reasons, either of which would have given a wiser monarch reason to pause. First, Elizabeth was a champion of the Protestant Reformation, which her father Henry VIII had brought to England, and had no tolerance for Catholics. Furthermore, she had been covertly backing the nobles who had defeated Mary. Second, the Pope, by excommunicating Henry and his children, had removed the duty of all English Catholics to obey Henry or, now, Elizabeth. Mary was a devout Catholic, and the avowed champion of her religion in the British Isles. Even worse, she too could claim descent from Henry VII.

The decision to seek refuge with Elizabeth prompted Mary's biographer, Antonia Fraser, to write in *Mary, Queen of Scots* (1969), "as decisions go, it was a brave one, a romantic one even, but under the circumstances it was certainly not a wise one." From the time she set foot off her boat in England, Mary was treated more as a prisoner than royal guest. To Elizabeth and her advisors such as William Cecil, Lord Burghley, Mary's arrival seemed like an ill omen, indeed. Her chief of intelligence, Sir Francis Walsingham, almost from the beginning, urged that Elizabeth have Mary executed posthaste.

Some Catholic magnates, especially those in the English Midlands, had never become reconciled to the Protestant Reformation. Furthermore, Elizabeth had been sterile, and unable to produce an heir. On the other hand, Mary had left behind in Scotland a young son, James. Thus, Walsingham argued, Mary could easily become the center of any plot to kill Elizabeth since, if a Roman Catholic did it, she would be absolved of murder because Elizabeth was considered by the Pope to be a heretic like her father.

And, furthermore, Mary knew she had a son to follow her on the throne. Already, Walsingham had built up a network of spies operating throughout western Europe and the British Isles. He employed regular codebreakers who opened the mail of the most noble families of England, breaking and closing their lofty seals without any sign of interference. To her credit, Elizabeth did not act immediately on Walsingham's bloody suggestions. In 1586, the British Parliament made it a capital offense punishable by death to seek the death of the queen. It was then, ironically, that Mary became involved in just such a plot. She was approached by a young man, Gilbert Gifford, with a plan to kill Elizabeth and put Mary on the throne. Little did Mary realize that Gifford was a double agent for Walsingham. At the heart of the plot was a brave and very reckless young Catholic gentleman, Anthony Babington.

Mary, Queen of Scots, agreed to a plot to have England's Queen Elizabeth I assassinated.

Incredibly, Mary agreed to the plot. On July 17, 1586, she agreed that the only way to gain her freedom was to have Elizabeth assassinated. Walsingham, of course, learned of the plan immediately. In February 1587, after 19 years of confinement, Mary, Queen of Scots, was beheaded for conspiracy to have Elizabeth killed.

France. Assassination proved to be an efficient, if gruesome, way to open the path for a rival candidate for the throne. This was as true for France as it was for England. For example, during the period of the Wars of Religion in France, King Henry III was assassinated in 1589 by Jacques Clement.

Seven months earlier, in December 1588, Henry III had used assassination to rid himself of his most powerful vassal, Duke Henry of Guise. In order to rise to the French throne after Henry III's death, and also to bring the wars to an end, Henry Duke of Vendôme and King of Navarre, became king of France as Henry IV. Yet Henry IV, who is remembered as Henry the Great for his role in bringing peace to France, was himself murdered in 1610 while riding in his coach.

Prior to the French Revolution of 1789, assassination was considered the prerogative of kings, queens, and their advisors, or secret French tribunals such as the Chambre Ardente of King Louis XIV.

However, the French Revolution, by raising the middle class to positions of power in government, also made killing by government fiat, assassination, an option open to a much larger circle of rulers, all lacking in the centuries of experience which had guided the monarchs in such grim matters of state policy.

The Republic of Virtue, which French revolutionaries such as Louis Antoine de Saint-Just and Maximilien Robespierre attempted to create after the Revolution of 1789, justified all crimes including wholesale murder. As Albert Camus wrote in *The Rebel*, "absolute virtue is impossible . . . the republic of forgiveness leads, with implacable logic, to the republic of the guillotine."

Under such laws, King Louis XVI was beheaded in January 1793, and his Queen Marie Antoinette in October 1793. Yet the Reign of Terror, the wholesale executions which the extremists carried out in the name of their Republic of Virtue, provoked its own reaction. On July 28, 1794, Robespierre, Saint-Just, and 20 of their followers went themselves to Madame Guillotine. As the resulting dictum goes, "the revolution devoured its children."

The evolution of assassination. The governments of Europe were permanently changed by the ideas proclaimed by the American and French Revolutions, and could only ignore them at their peril. The waves of successive revolutions in 1830 and 1848 that swept throughout Europe showed the governments that the people would not forget their newly acquired sense of freedom, liberty, and justice. Gradually, the governments were affected by the new political climate: they no longer considered assassination as the ready tool of policy as had the monarchs of old.

This held true even for those countries still ruled by kings or emperors. While King Philip II of Spain had Prince William of Orange, the leader of the revolt in the Spanish Netherlands, "liquidated" in 1585, when the Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph put down the Hungarian revolution in 1849 with Russian help from Tsar Nicholas I, its leader Louis Kossuth was allowed to safely go into exile in Paris.

The end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century saw the emergence of an international movement aimed at limiting the destructiveness of war. Conferences with this goal were held in St. Petersburg in Russia in 1868, and at the Hague in the Netherlands in 1899 and 1907. During the same era, the use of assassination as the ultimate sanction approved by a government, at least in the developed world, became increasingly a matter for history books.

However, in the tumultuous world after the end of World War I in 1918, totalitarian dictatorships such as Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany once again used assassination as a tool of national policy. Political assassinations, both at home and abroad, became an accepted way of executing state policy. Indeed, in such regimes, special intelligence departments were established to carry out assassinations on a regular basis. It is this development that may be referred to as the institutionalization of assassination.

The institutionalization of assassination. Perhaps no tyranny in modern history has used assassination as an accepted part of foreign policy more than the former communist regime in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of Russia, then known as the Bolsheviks, achieved power in Russia in the Revolution of November 7, 1917. On December 20, 1917, within weeks of the Bolshevik triumph, the Cheka, under the direction of "Iron" Feliks Dzerzhinsky, was formed.

The purpose of the Cheka was quite simply to bring the Russian people under the control of Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin through a policy of sheer terror. Dzerzhinsky set the tone for the Cheka on the night of the day it was established. Dzerzhinsky wrote, "it is war now—face to face, a fight to the finish. Life or death!" According to Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky in their book, *KGB: The Inside Story* (1991), "the total of

Cheka executions during the period 1917–21 was probably well over 250,000."

As a sign of the institutionalization of assassination in the communist regime, in 1936 the Cheka, by then the NKVD, established the Administration of Special Tasks, known among Russian agents as *mokriy dela*, the department of "wet affairs." This administration was charged specifically with carrying out assassinations, usually abroad. The administration survived as Department Thirteen of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, as the Soviet secret police was called after 1954. Assassination as official government policy lasted, to the best of public knowledge, within the communist Soviet Union until almost the fall of communism itself.

The list of those killed overseas with the official sanction of the Soviet regime is staggering; just a sampling includes: Simeon Petlura, a Ukrainian nationalist leader, was killed in Paris in 1926. On January 29, 1930, General Alexander Kutepov, an anti-communist leader, was kidnapped and presumably killed by the OGPU, as the Cheka was then known. In New York City, in 1934, the OGPU senior officer, Valentin Markov, was killed.

As Soviet dictator Josef Stalin was beginning his campaign of terror in 1937, the number of those assassinated outside Russia climbed remarkably. The roster of assassinated people in 1937 includes: Dimitri Navachine in Paris; Juliet Stuart Poyntz in New York City; Ignace Reiss in Lausanne, Switzerland; and Yevgeni Miller, who was kidnapped in Paris and most likely killed later. In 1940, in Mexico, Stalin finally tracked down his old nemesis Leon Trotsky, who had once been his rival for power in Russia after the death of Lenin in 1924. After Trotsky's bodyguards had fought off an attack on his villa, Stalin had an NKVD hit man, named Ramon Mercader, insinuate himself into Trotsky's inner circle. After gaining Trotsky's confidence, Mercader killed him with a blow of an alpine pick ax to the head. After escaping from Mexico, Mercader was awarded a medal at the headquarters of the NKVD in the infamous Lyubyanka Prison in Moscow.

This list does not include the hundreds that NKVD officers had killed in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. Behind the façade of trying to prop up the Spanish republic in the face of Francisco Franco's fascist rebellion, Stalin was attempting to set up a communist state in Spain. The NKVD liquidated uncounted numbers of Spaniards and some foreign volunteers, who were considered politically unreliable.

As late as December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, KGB and army special forces killed Hafizullah Amin, the Marxist president, at the Darulamin Palace in the capital city of Kabul.

The depersonalization of assassination. After World War II, assassination became more associated with the turbulent Middle East than with Europe (excluding the Soviet Union). In 1951, King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated, followed by his relative, King Faisal II, in Iraq in 1958. The murder of Faisal set the stage for the rise to power of the socialist Ba'ath Party and, later, for the ascension of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 1979. However, the unrest in the Middle East, after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, unleashed among the Palestinian people dispossessed by Israel's founding, a wave of terrorism that had not been seen before. It was the ultimate expression of assassination, carried out against innocent civilians as a way to undermine Israel.

This represented the depersonalization of assassination, a phenomenon in which the actual victims of the terrorists were unknown to the terrorists who killed them: their lives were taken simply as an act meant to terrorize and disorient the innocent Israeli civilian population. In the 1970s, the main Palestinian groups such as the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) carried their policy of terrorist assassination into western Europe.

On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered the most severe attack of this new type of terrorist, depersonalized assassination.

Assassination as American policy. Political assassination had been publicly renounced by President Gerald R. Ford as an instrument of United States policy during his presidency in 1976, as a result of the revelation of earlier CIA plots before the Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church in 1975. Some 14 volumes of reports were issued by the committee in 1975 and 1976; much of the material was considered classified information at the time.

Ford's Executive Order Number 11905 stated: "No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political

assassination." Ford's policy statement was reinforced by Executive Order Number 12036 signed by President Jimmy Carter in January 1978, and Number 12333 by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, which declared: "No person employed by or acting in behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination."

These executive orders, while not having the force of actual law (presidents can regularly supersede their own executive orders or those of their predecessors) framed American intelligence policy regarding assassinations for 25 years. However, the rise of al-Qaeda, and its bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Saalam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in the summer of 1998 led to a reconsideration of the role of assassination as a tool of American governmental policy. President Bill Clinton issued a classified intelligence "finding" that authorized the use of lethal force by the CIA against Osama bin Laden and other members of the al-Qaeda network. The policy was quickly put into effect when a U.S. cruise-missile attack was launched on a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan that bin Laden had left only hours before.

When President George W. Bush signed the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, he stated that "we're fighting a war against terror with all our resources, and we're determined to win. We recognize that our greatest security is found in the relentless pursuit of these cold-blooded killers." Whether "all our resources" included government-sanctioned killing of terrorists apparently had already been proven. Earlier in November, al-Qaeda plotter Qaed al-Harethi had been killed, along with five companions, by a missile fired by an unmanned Predator drone aircraft in Yemen. Immediately after the terrorist attack on America, in his address on the evening of September 11, 2001, Bush declared, "America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time."

Using the time-honored doctrine of hot pursuit (which President Woodrow Wilson initiated by having Mexican bandit revolutionary Pancho Villa followed across the border into Mexico in 1916), Bush promised to track down bin Laden and his conspirators anywhere. The Bush administration considered al-Qaeda members as combatants in warfare and thus appropriate targets for killing.

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SEE ALSO: terrorism; Church, Frank; Congressional oversight; Elizabethan Age; Walsingham, Francis; United Kingdom; France; Soviet Union.

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attaché

MANY NATIONS IN the world today collect valuable intelligence through defense attachés. A trained and experienced military attaché is a critical source of human intelligence information and insight; attaché observations and narratives are often critical for piecing together a story and unifying otherwise disparate sources of information into a coherent and actionable whole.

In the case of the United States, the Defense Attaché System (DAS) is a multiple-mission intelligence and diplomatic organization with a worldwide presence, operating in 134 locations. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is responsible for managing the DAS and the Attaché Officer (USDAO) and his staff. The attaché has multiple duties, including fostering positive relations between the U.S. military and the host nation defense and security establishment. This includes coordinating aircraft overflight and ship-berthing permissions, approving "country clearances" that give Department of Defense personnel the ability to travel in the host country, and providing the ambassador with military and political-military advice. Department of Defense Directive C-5105.32 assigns the DAS three