
THE

EXPANDING ROLES

OF

CHINESE AMERICANS

IN

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS



Transnational Networks
and Trans-Pacific Interactions

Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin
editors

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Explanation of Chinese Materials

A few mechanical details about Chinese materials in this volume merit explanation. For readers' convenience and to save space, in most cases we have cited the English translation of a Chinese title only after providing its romanization in the first citation. In addition, to maintain consistency, we have spelled Chinese names according to the Chinese custom, which places one's surname before the given name. Also, Chinese characters are romanized based on the *pinyin* system with the following exceptions: the names and titles that are customarily used in the Chinese American community. In the index at the end of the book, we have placed pinyin, Wade-Giles, and English spellings together to help identify those Chinese names, terms, and titles of publication that are spelled differently throughout the Chinese world.

Foreword

Him Mark Lai

Chinese began large-scale immigration to America during the mid-nineteenth century. Like other immigrant groups in the United States, they customarily continued to maintain social, cultural, economic, and even political ties with the ancestral land on both a personal and an institutional level. In the case of the Chinese American community, immigrants continued to be the dominant majority during most of the period from the 1850s to the present, and these ties, as modified over the years, continue to flourish today. Since ties to the ancestral land are affected by the status of U.S.–China relations, Chinese Americans have long been interested parties in the development course and status of this relationship.

At different times up to the present, Chinese Americans individually, institutionally, or as a community have played roles in the evolving relationship. At times, they became involved involuntarily—for instance, when Chinese immigration became a political issue affecting U.S.–China relations in the late nineteenth century—and at other times, they consciously participated in activities affecting developments. During most of the period before World War II, the scope and effect of Chinese American efforts were limited due to the small size of the population and the community's isolation from mainstream America. Since the end of the 1940s, however, the Chinese American population has increased dramatically—mostly due to immigration. Chinese Americans' social, economic, and political status has also improved significantly. Gradually, they have become integrated in mainstream America and growing numbers filled key leadership positions. Today, although still a minority, Chinese Americans are a group that cannot be easily ignored. Increased Chinese American networking with mainstream institutions as well as growing sophistication in the use of these institutions have accompanied socioeconomic developments. These networks and skills often are used to personal and social advantage in a wide variety of activities that affect U.S.–China relations.

The Chinese American role in such transnational activities has been mentioned in passing by historians. Up to now, however, there has been little in-depth research and analysis of its extent and efficacy. Thus, the present collection of essays on topics in this subject area, written by various experts in their fields and edited by Professors Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin, is timely. The essays explore various aspects of involvement in U.S.–China relations, with emphasis on recent and contemporary developments, and serve the purpose of helping to fill a long-existing gap in our understanding of the Chinese American experience. The work also is particularly relevant today in view of the general consensus that U.S.–China relations rank among the most important international relationships and are of concern not only for the future course of this country and China, but for the rest of the world as well. The explorations presented herein provide valuable additional information that will enhance understanding of the critical issues involved and, hopefully, will advance prospects for the adoption of rational and constructive policies of benefit for the United States, China, and the global community.

— Introduction —

Chinese American Transnationalism and U.S.–China Relations

Presence and Promise for the Trans-Pacific Century

Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin

The late twentieth century witnessed a deepening of U.S.–China relations across cultural, social, economic, and political space on a scale that few imagined would occur. The turn-of-the-century presidential summits awakened many to the growing density of ties between the world’s most populous nation and its most influential state.¹ While important diplomatically, strategically, and symbolically,² formal state-to-state relations constitute only one part of the exploding network of ties that transcend political and perceptual boundaries.³ Given today’s global emphasis on community identity, moreover, “it now makes less sense to speak of ‘U.S.–China relations’ than to talk of how one part of the United States (for instance, Chinese Americans . . .) relates to one part of China. . . .”⁴

At the dawn of the new millennium, the Chinese American population approached 2.8 million persons.⁵ While they constitute the largest Asian American community, Chinese Americans are a highly diverse group. This is also predominantly a community of immigrants (some 70 percent), with nearly half of the turn-of-the-century population having arrived since 1970 from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. Differences in place of origin, socioeconomic status, and political affiliations ensure that members possess divergent outlooks and positions with respect to China–U.S. relations. Given the substantial numbers of recent arrivals, the community’s constant replenishment with newcomers from the Chinese world, and the growing

practice of transmigration, it is not surprising that most Chinese Americans maintain close contact with their heritage place(s).

Shifting and Enduring Routes and Linkages

U.S.–China interactions offer particularly vivid illustrations of the increasing influence that nongovernmental actors exert—individually and collectively—over transnational relations⁶ and domestic policy. *The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.–China Relations* focuses on one component of the rising stream of global civil-society actions and transactions: the unfolding involvement of Chinese Americans—the vast majority of whom are immigrants and speak both Chinese and English—in distinctive roles that shape official bilateral and people-to-people relations in a rich variety of compelling ways.⁷

The scarcity of reliable sources complicates the task of determining exactly when and where Chinese first settled in North America. Although individual arrivals in the New World can be traced back to the eighteenth century, it was not until the Gold Rush years in the mid-nineteenth century that Chinese immigration reached the scale required to exert a major impact on the receiving society. There were 325 Chinese “forty-niners,” [or *Jinshan ke*; *Gam San Hak* in Cantonese dialect, meaning “Gold Mountain Travelers”]. Three years later, their number grew to 20,026. By the time Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the Chinese population in the United States had reached about 150,000. If one includes those who returned to China during this period, some 322,000 Chinese took the trip across the Pacific from 1849 to 1882—before the Chinese Exclusion Act prohibited their entry.⁸

Most early Chinese immigrants arrived as unskilled workers. Peasants from rural regions in Guangdong Province (Canton) were strongly influenced by traditional Chinese values, which can be summarized by the dictum “falling leaves settle on their roots”—a person who resides elsewhere finally should return to the ancestral home. Thus, most dreamed of returning to their villages once they gathered enough money in the “Gold Mountain.” When they gained little support from the ruling Manchu court in China in their struggle for survival in a strange land, they attributed the hardships—especially the racial discrimination they encountered in U.S. society—to the weakness of their homeland, and they believed that a strong China could help them win acceptance from mainstream society and improve their status in the new country. This explains why, when asked by Chinese American leaders for donations to help China, even immigrants who lived in poverty would respond enthusiastically. As a Chinese American community leader

argued emotionally in an interview with New York reporters in 1901: “Why can’t you be fair? Would you talk like that if mine was not a weak nation? Would you say it if the Chinese had votes?”⁹ The concerns of early Chinese immigrants for China and U.S.–China relations reflected their strong desire to improve their status in U.S. society.

The early Chinese immigrants included a few intellectuals. Although they only accounted for a tiny fraction of the Chinese American community, these intellectuals made an impact on U.S.–China relations. Among them, Yung Wing, a graduate from Yale College in 1854, stands out as a prominent figure. Brought to the United States in 1847 by missionaries, Yung later became a naturalized citizen. A friend of President Ulysses S. Grant and the writer Mark Twain, he made an important contribution to the development of early U.S.–China relations after his appointment as co-commissioner of the Chinese Educational Mission to the United States in the 1870s.¹⁰ Although a few individuals such as Yung succeeded in promoting mutual understanding between the two nations, early Chinese Americans as a whole failed to achieve much leverage in U.S.–China relations.

Chinese American involvement in U.S.–China relations entered a distinctively different phase during the World War II era. The war brought the United States and China together against a common enemy—Japan. Since China was an ally in the war, Chinese Americans were considered a “loyal minority.”¹¹ The government encouraged them to play a prominent role in the U.S. wartime China policy. Wartime opportunities enabled Chinese Americans to emerge as players in U.S.–China relations. For instance, a disproportionately large number of Chinese Americans served as liaison officers or interpreters in the U.S. military or at diplomatic missions in China.¹²

Following the defeat of Japan in 1945 and the emergence of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, divisions among Chinese Americans increased. With the enactment of new immigration policies in 1965, more Chinese arrived from the Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. Reflecting the altered population dynamics and the preoccupations of new arrivals, as well as evolving relations between the China Mainland and Taiwan, attempts to influence U.S. policy through the president and Congress expanded and intensified. The existence of two rival governments and Washington’s anxiety about communism influenced the character and politics of Chinese communities throughout the United States. In the decades of the Cold War era, the prevailing anti-Communist disposition allowed Chinese American supporters of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) to exert powerful leverage on U.S.–China relations. They affected U.S.–China relations by helping the KMT establish a favored position in the China policy arena and by persuading Washington to maintain close ties

with Taiwan.¹³ Given the prevailing mood at the time, Chinese Americans who had sympathy for Beijing proved unable to secure a breakthrough in U.S.–PRC relations.

Once mainstream politicians decided that a change in China policy would serve U.S. interests, however, even the influential group of Chinese Americans who strongly opposed the PRC could not reverse the trend. When President Richard Nixon began to explore the normalization of relations with Beijing in the early 1970s, the opinions expressed by Chinese Americans, orchestrated by KMT supporters, were overwhelmingly critical of the new policy. Nevertheless, the Nixon administration continued its new China policy.¹⁴

During the “honeymoon” period of the 1970s, pro-PRC forces in the Chinese American community, for the first time, began to gain visibility in U.S.–China relations. With the normalization of relations, moreover, Chinese Americans, drawing on their ethnic and cultural identification with China, became actively involved in further developing ties. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the PRC government welcomed many Chinese American scholars as distinguished guests and they played an active role in establishing academic-exchange programs.

The shifting, but enduring, transnational routes and linkages that migrants from China built for more than a hundred years became even more important when they coincided with new networks formed in the late twentieth century along functional lines and in response to perceived common identities.¹⁵ Today, the pervasive transboundary presence of Chinese Americans has cast a dense and diverse web of vines possessing varying scope and strength across the folds and crevices in the overall China–U.S. relationship.¹⁶

Volatile Reactions

The vast majority of transnational extensions blossom silently and out of public sight. Occasionally, however, connections become glaringly visible on one or both sides of the Pacific. In the wake of the campaign-contribution controversy surrounding John Huang and overseas interests in 1997, for instance, Chinese Americans, in less than a year, went from “being insignificant to [being] a threat to national security.”¹⁷ In January 2000, following public protestations and pressure from China scholars and others based primarily in the United States, the PRC government released Dickenson College librarian and Cultural Revolution document collector Song Yongyi after five months of irregular detention on charges of “providing confidential materials to foreigners.”¹⁸ Similarly, the New York location of Li Hongzhi, leader of the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement whose protesting members frequently are arrested in Tiananmen Square, is a source of consider-

able frustration for the PRC government,¹⁹ while U.S. Department of Justice, Energy Department, and Federal Bureau of Investigation suspicions that Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwan-born scientist working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, had divulged advanced nuclear weapon designs to the PRC received considerable press attention and aroused the ire of Asian Americans. After being held in near solitary confinement for more than nine months, Lee's case ended (1) with U.S. prosecutors dropping fifty-eight of the fifty-nine counts in their indictment while Lee pleaded guilty to one felony count of mishandling nuclear secrets;²⁰ (2) with a remarkable apology to Dr. Lee issued by Federal District Court Judge James A. Parker "for the unfair manner ["demeaning, unnecessarily punitive conditions"] [in which] you were held in custody by the executive branch"; (3) with Judge Parker's rebuke of top decision makers in the Justice Department and Department of Energy for misleading him about Dr. Lee's supposedly deceptive behavior and for the "embarrassing" way they handled his case²¹ along with President Bill Clinton's admission that he was "quite troubled" by the same actions;²² (4) with an unusual admission by the *New York Times* that, in retrospect, it "found some things we wish we had done differently in the course of the coverage to give Dr. Lee the full benefit of the doubt";²³ and (5) with Attorney General Janet Reno's promise, after meeting with representatives of five Asian American organizations, to seek to make public a classified Justice Department report critical of the investigation and prosecution of Dr. Lee.²⁴

Initial government overreactions on both sides of the Pacific to highly charged and publicly exposed situations provide support for Nina Schiller's posited "dialectic between the promotion of identities and relations that span national borders and *renewed efforts* on the part of states to fortify nationalist ideologies."²⁵ This clash emerges as a recurring theme in the historical and contemporary analyses contributed to this volume.

Chinese Americans: Core Players in the Contemporary Web of Unofficial Transnational Interactions

Both types of transsovereign civil-society ties—the silent and the piercing—possess ramifications for U.S.–China relations and for the welfare of Chinese Americans. Although they are missing from high-level posts in the foreign-policy establishment,²⁶ the extensive presence of Chinese Americans in the vital cultural, social, economic, and political interstices that have cemented the interdependent nature of this challenging relationship holds out the promise that informal partnerships will override state-to-state conflicts in the new century. In the process of addressing the explosion of connections with "unofficial China"²⁷ from a wide variety of perspectives, all of the

contributors to this volume assess prospects that the diverse Chinese American community will influence transnational relations in the twenty-first century. On the whole, the evidence and insights they contribute highlight the prominent, albeit understudied and typically unreported, roles that Chinese Americans fill in increasingly powerful transnational civil-society networks—ranging from philanthropy and development to profit-minded business, scientific exchange, and environmental protection. The network builders featured in this book are neither marginalized subjects nor are they on the periphery of China–U.S. relations; their sensibilities are diverse and complex; and their core transnational skills are by no means limited to capabilities possessing value for personal accumulation or other strictly economic transactions.

Compared with the past, today’s globally connected society²⁸ enables Chinese Americans to play a more prominent part in shaping U.S. policy toward China and China’s policy toward the United States. At no other time in history have Chinese Americans been so active and articulate concerning relations between their adopted and former countries, so concerned about U.S. policy toward China, and so visible in the mainstream media regarding cultural and political affairs. Their new roles result from improved socioeconomic status,²⁹ growing ethnic consciousness, the ability to maintain close ties with the Chinese world and concomitantly to stay in touch with both sending and hosting societies,³⁰ and openings in domestic politics and intercultural appreciation in both countries. Among the factors that have transformed Chinese Americans from passive bystanders to active participants in U.S.–China relations, two stand out: (1) the presence of vast numbers of highly educated immigrants who possess knowledge and expertise in areas that are central to the relationship³¹—many of whom have become U.S. citizens;³² and (2) the emergence and solidification of extensive trans-Pacific Chinese business, migration, and communication networks. In particular, advances in information technology have instantaneously transplanted the Chinese world within the Chinese American community, created multiple reference points, and transmitted new values, practices, and policies with the potential to transform China from the diaspora. Today, Chinese Americans literally and figuratively are on-line in every independent sphere of activity that promotes denser U.S.–China relations.

Multiple and Complex Voices

Given that they constitute such a diverse community—divided by birthplace, language, political experience,³³ and vast disparities in economic status between “downtown” and “uptown” members³⁴—it is not surprising

that Chinese Americans speak out in multiple voices on China-related issues. For instance, some of those who are active in the dissident movement support a confrontational policy toward China in an effort to topple the ruling PRC government.³⁵ Others—especially those who work in China-related professions—advocate a constructive relationship. Some prefer not to be involved in foreign-policy making at all. While some Chinese Americans serve as emissaries on behalf of U.S. multinational corporations in the China Mainland or as beachheads for Chinese firms in America,³⁶ others work to resist the spread of global capitalism.³⁷ Although the lack of a unified viewpoint substantially reduces their ability to influence the U.S. government's China policy,³⁸ the diversity of voices heard today accurately reflects the multidimensional Chinese American perspective on U.S.–China relations.

Cross-national Competency and the Future of China–U.S. Relations

Devoting attention to the ways that migrant and transmigrant³⁹ connections and flows simultaneously are “embedded in larger, global processes”⁴⁰ and bringing about the transformation of what is arguably the world's most important relationship at the start of the trans-Pacific century constitutes an important scholarly undertaking. The contributors to this book explore the immense and diverse involvement of Chinese Americans, acting as skilled individuals and through national and transsovereign nongovernmental collectivities they forge and/or join, in contemporary transboundary relations. Without presuming that all community members possess an inherent competitive advantage in this environment,⁴¹ they consider evidence that Chinese Americans who are cross-nationally competent and “travel” without unwelcome baggage—including certain mainstream American values such as extreme individualism, the arrogance of power, and a missionary complex⁴²—are particularly effective in traversing and shaping trans-Pacific interfaces.

Furthermore, *The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans* moves beyond their current presence along the U.S.–China frontier to consider prospects that members of the Chinese American community will be influential with respect to *future* political, social, cultural, and economic relations between the two countries. The assessments shared by contributors suggest that the nature and scope of their civil-society involvement increasingly will determine the outcome of state-to-state relations between the USA and the PRC. In that event, given the post–Cold War prominence of the United States and China, the actions of Chinese Americans will be of consequence for global politics in the twenty-first century.

Critical Questions

The questions addressed in *The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans* bear directly on the changing mix of players involved and on the future impact issue. They include: How, why, and to what extent are Chinese Americans involved in China-related affairs? How have they both been affected by and affected U.S.–China relations? What are the most important changes that have occurred and are occurring in the domestic and international contexts that have heightened Chinese American concerns regarding China-related issues? What is the actual and potential influence of diverse Chinese American interest groups and networks—business, scientific, academic, human rights, philanthropic, development, cultural, American-born Chinese (ABCs), and immigrant communities from the Chinese world (especially the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong)? Given the diversity of community interests and perspectives, are there grounds for unified action? What are the most promising areas for civil-society cooperation in the coming century? How can and do Chinese Americans promote intercultural appreciation and empathy, mutual learning, and constructive transboundary relations in these areas? What risks and perils are at stake? Does the existence of extensive networks of nonstate ties among Chinese and Chinese Americans effectively limit the scope of policies and actions available to government policymakers and enhance the likelihood that both sides will select constructive approaches over the long term? Shedding scholarly light on these questions takes on growing analytical and practical relevance as U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy become further interwoven and as the China–U.S. relationship becomes even more crucial in global affairs.

Aim and Arrangement

The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans aims to make a multidisciplinary contribution to understanding the role and promise of Chinese Americans at this critical juncture in transnational relations and to revealing the importance of migrants as transterritorial actors in contemporary global politics. The volume is arranged in three interrelated parts.

The Chinese American Presence: Impact and Implications

In the opening part of the book, the impact of the Chinese American presence is placed in historical perspective and the transnational sensibilities of members are explicated by reference to particularly revealing, albeit rarely cited, diasporic literature. In these chapters, we observe that the

presence of Chinese Americans is linked in dynamic fashion to the nature of U.S.–China relations. These complex relationships are revealed most clearly through the changing experiences of Chinese American families and student migrants.

The Chinese Trans-Pacific Family

Haiming Liu's lead-off discussion establishes the fundamental historical importance of the Chinese family in U.S.–China relations. According to Liu, the most interesting aspect of Chinese American family life is not gradual transformation into a "model minority" institution, but its dynamic development as a transnational network. Typically, Chinese migration involves collective decision making and action that invokes "mutual commitment from parents and children in the interest of collective upward social and economic mobility." Liu's discussion of trans-Pacific family separation (including its origins in racial conflicts in U.S. society and in U.S.–China political relations) from the racist exclusion era through the present time confirms that "Chinese Americans historically have been transnationals."⁴³ Today, however, bilocality- and multilocality-network-linked immigrant and voluntary transmigrant family members lead a "life that tends to blunt the acute binarism between Asian and American with which earlier generations had to contend strenuously."⁴⁴ In spite of the barriers to host-society integration placed in their path, transnational family-migration strategies have empowered many Chinese immigrants.⁴⁵

Of the various social forces that could reshape U.S.–China relations, Chinese American families are among the most established global players. Liu's chapter moves on to consider the current and potential future stabilizing roles in China–U.S. relations filled by unbounded and multicultural Chinese American transterritorial family networks that have been strengthened rather than diminished by migration experiences. He sees trans-Pacific family connections as "the Chinese rim's building blocks" that provide a firm foundation for U.S.–China economic relations in the trans-Pacific century. As a minority both in their place of origin and in the receiving country, however, transmigrants risk acquiring a doubly marginal status. Thus, Chinese American families possess a vital stake in the maintenance of a positive U.S.–China relationship.

Student Migrants and Transmigrants: Merging Science with Business in the Information Age

Sufei Li documents the role played by PRC and U.S. policies and practices at the nation-state and (in the United States) university level in the expansion

of the Chinese American population following the 1979 normalization of U.S.–China diplomatic relations. The official U.S. government response to the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 accounts for much of this mobility. Over 60,000 students took advantage of President George Bush’s Executive Order granting Mainland Chinese in the United States between 5 June 1989 and 11 April 1990 permission to remain legally in the United States.⁴⁶ More recently, Mainland applicants have secured roughly one out of every ten H-1B (nonimmigrant professional work) visas issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.⁴⁷ In some fields (such as information technology), Chinese have been adept at converting H-1B visas, via labor certification, into Green Cards. Li suggests that, with their strong educational credentials, these professionals “have been integrated into mainstream American society to an extent unimaginable among earlier Chinese immigrants who lived and worked inside Chinatowns.”

While Chinese authorities consistently intended and expected that students sent abroad, mainly to study science and technology, would return to serve the state after completing their studies, the results often frustrated official intentions since a sizable proportion—particularly among those earning doctoral degrees—opted to stay in the United States. This outcome has helped promote sustained economic expansion in the host country and is increasingly important in terms of U.S. scientific research and technology development. While it generates short-run losses for the PRC, nonreturning U.S.-educated professionals still contribute in important, unanticipated, and ironic (i.e., capitalist) ways to the Mainland’s extraordinary economic growth and to U.S.–China relations. For instance, Li reports on the tendency for nonreturning students of physical science and engineering to shift into careers focused on information technology and conducting business with China in order to support themselves in the United States, confirming that, for many “post-Tiananmen Chinese Americans . . . , the finality of their dislocation co-exists with a perpetual turning of one’s gaze toward the lost homeland.”⁴⁸ The growing opportunities to take advantage of China–U.S. trade and business investment, which are likely to expand further as the PRC becomes integrated into the World Trade Organization, certainly will be skewed in favor of Chinese Americans who are “bilingual and bicultural, which means that they are likely to be foreign born and educated, but with U.S. college or postgraduate degrees.”⁴⁹ Li’s data demonstrate conclusively, however, that this is not “only a small group.”⁵⁰ In addition, her chapter presents evidence of the increasing circular migration of talent;⁵¹ that is, return to the Mainland—particularly Shanghai—by highly qualified Chinese seeking economic opportunities, career advancement, and social recognition that elude them in the United

States.⁵² In terms of long-term U.S.–China scholarly network building, one can draw encouragement from data that show Mainland students heading the list of those from abroad studying at U.S. higher-education institutions since 1998 (at slightly more than 10 percent of the total).

Diasporic Hummingbirds

In contrast to the canonization of English-language Asian American writing in American literature, little attention has been devoted to diasporic writing in Chinese. Out of concern that the neglect of Chinese American literature available in Chinese results in failure to capture the predominant diasporic sensibility, Qian Suoqiao critically examines representative texts drawn from three distinct late-twentieth-century transnational-migration periods in U.S. history. The untranslated works that provide the principal basis for Qian's discussion are particularly revealing because their message is not deflected by a preoccupation with elaborating on Chinese cultural traditions and customs for an uninformed mainstream audience.⁵³ In these works, he discerns authentic diasporic sensibilities with important implications for present and future U.S.–China relations. For instance, his critical understanding of *Seeing Palm Trees Again* and *Yesterday's Anger*, authored, respectively, by Yu Lihua and Zhang Xiguo—two prolific and accomplished writers who came from Taiwan—highlights the important insight that Chinese American discourses concerning “diasporic patriotism” are less about loyalty as such than they are about the inevitability and fear of assimilation. Qian also considers works by Cao Guilin and Zhou Li that are especially popular with a homeland audience. The images of America presented in these novels have influenced current public perceptions of the United States in the China Mainland. These diasporic authors can be seen as energetic transmigrating hummingbirds whose predominantly “peaceful and fruitful” message traverses the Pacific. As Qian elaborates, “a hummingbird flaps its wings with high frequency, flying from here to there, but it apparently does not have permanent residency and its food-hunting hard work seems to be for its own sake.”

Contemporary Activism

Part II casts a fresh, multidimensional light on contemporary Chinese American involvement in U.S. policymaking and trans-Pacific developments. Although highly diverse in ideological views, cultural identities, and socioeconomic interests, Chinese Americans have expanded their involvement in China-related affairs in comparison with past experience and have become a new force that must be reckoned with. One survey conducted by a

Chinese American newspaper in New York during the 1996 U.S. presidential election, for instance, showed that 78 percent of Chinese American voters regarded candidates' positions on U.S. policy toward China as an important consideration in deciding whom to vote for.⁵⁴ In recent years, moreover, Chinese American scholars and activists have participated extensively in debates over human rights in the China Mainland, trade disputes, the U.S. role in China–Taiwan relations, and other transnational issues. Their talks on primetime TV programs and their works written from a Chinese American perspective and published in mainstream newspapers and scholarly presses have helped shape U.S. elite and public opinion.⁵⁵

The chapters included in this section of the volume highlight the activist orientations and behavior concerning issues associated with China that increasingly have been adopted by American-born Chinese and immigrants from the Mainland, Taiwan, and elsewhere. Furthermore, these contributions give voice to important segments of the Chinese American community that do not actively support policies favorable to the PRC regime.⁵⁶

Interior Political Orientations and Participation

Yuhang Shi's exploratory study of the political orientations and participation of (primarily first-generation) North Carolina Chinese Americans offers evidence of increasing political activism. If Chinese Americans are to exert a substantial impact on U.S. foreign policy, Shi argues, they must first possess the knowledge, resources, and psychological propensity needed for political participation. His findings show that, in general, interest in politics and participation in various political activities by North Carolina (N.C.) Chinese approaches that of the U.S. population as a whole.

Shi's data also highlight the considerable uniformity that exists among the surveyed N.C. Chinese regarding key China-related issues. For instance, he uncovered virtually no support for measures to contain China and less than 20 percent of his sample favored the idea of helping Taiwan become independent. In general, the mainly immigrant, professional, and "uptown" respondents in Shi's "interior USA" sample evidenced little interest in the traditional security issues involving Taiwan and the China Mainland that preoccupy U.S. foreign-policy makers. Moreover, roughly two-thirds of the N.C. respondents do *not* want the U.S. government to impose sanctions on China for human-rights abuses, to become involved with Taiwan–Mainland reunification, or even to facilitate trade with the PRC.

These suggestive "interior" findings are consistent with preferences for unofficial and less visible bridging roles. They also highlight the challenges involved in consensus-building and in mobilizing traditional forms of politi-

cal activism on behalf of China-related issues in the face of growing diversity (urban coastal versus interior) within the Chinese American community.⁵⁷ Finally, they suggest the intriguing possibility that increasing numbers of politically aware and active Chinese Americans are receptive to becoming politically involved with respect to issues that transcend community and/or homeland interests.⁵⁸

ABC Involvement

The involvement of American-born Chinese in U.S.–China relations reported by Nancy Yao constitutes one often-overlooked dimension of the broader picture of increasing political activism. Her essay explains the diversity that exists within this community as a function of degree of interest, objectivity, and cross-cultural skills. Yao also shows how the unique cultural position of ABCs serves both as an advantage and as a constraint when it comes to enhancing understanding of China in the United States and promoting positive relations in the future. She concludes that ABC influence on U.S. policy with regard to China-related issues will be exerted by informed individual activists rather than through mass community action. Among other factors, Yao reports that negative media coverage of “Chinese fundraising” for the Clinton campaign and the resulting congressional hearings on possible subversion of U.S. politics by China discouraged ABCs from developing a more vocal and organized voice.

It is important that some American-born Chinese, who in the past have shown little concern for U.S.–China relations, now are expressing interest in the relationship. Their multicultural education and the emergence of trans-Pacific networks have aroused ethnic consciousness and kindled a sense of pride as Americans of Chinese descent. Growing business and professional opportunities in a rapidly expanding China-related field and partisan political manipulation of U.S. policy toward China have served to raise interest levels among ABCs in U.S.–China relations. The changing attitudes, including more favorable sentiments regarding Chinese traditions and practices, are manifest in the large numbers of ABCs majoring in China studies at U.S. colleges and universities in recent decades and by their concentration in China-related professions. As Eric Liu, former foreign-policy speech writer for President Bill Clinton and author of *The Accidental Asian: Notes from a Native Speaker*, noted in an interview with the *Harvard Gazette*, “one way or another, I will stay involved with politics and involved with China and Asia. Those two areas seem really basic to me.”⁵⁹

Yao suggests that three developments could generate increased organiza-

tional participation and encourage the ABC community to become more active with respect to U.S.–China relations. The future developments she sees as critical are: (1) a higher profile for ABCs in the U.S. foreign-policy establishment; (2) sustained economic growth of the China Mainland and further integration of the PRC into international political and economic regimes—which will continue to heighten the public profile of U.S.–China relations and generate complex, multifaceted challenges that necessitate ABC community involvement; and (3) further expansion of technological and economic ties with the Mainland—which will motivate ABCs and their organizations to act on the understanding that foreign-policy decisions affecting U.S.–China relations ultimately determine personal economic outcomes.

Legacy of Vulnerability

A powerful legacy of U.S. political history is widespread consciousness among Chinese Americans of their vulnerability to the vagaries of U.S.–China relations and to backlashes directed against those who seek to shape official foreign policy toward China.⁶⁰ This legacy enhances the attractiveness of participation in “invisible,” or at least less visible, transsovereign civil-society roles. Nevertheless, the widely unappreciated diversity of interests, perspectives, and actions that exists within the Chinese American community includes an important group of players that are intent on influencing U.S. policy toward China through official channels. This type of actor is highlighted in the next two chapters of Part II.

Intercultural Communicators

James Shen focuses on the strategic intercultural-communication role of Chinese American scholars in building and anchoring positive China–U.S. relations since the early 1970s. He examines the important roles played by these “cultural envoys” as messenger, mediator, consultant, moderator, and opinion leader during periods of conflict and cooperation. Participation in the expansion of cross-cultural communication and understanding among political elites and public-opinion shapers provides a particularly critical outlet for activism in light of Jianwei Wang’s finding that “misperceptions, rather than conflict of real interest, could well push U.S.–China relations to the edge.”⁶¹ Shen contends that whereas PRC leaders tend to question the political motives of U.S. political leaders, they are open to listening to Chinese American scholars—who share discursive proximity in the high-context culture of China.⁶²

The Powerful Influence of the Taiwan Lobby

A developing “pan-Asian American consciousness” among some second-generation Chinese Americans⁶³ provides a fertile foundation for efforts by groups like the 80-20 Initiative to mobilize Asian Americans for block voting and other forms of political participation.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the contemporary Chinese American and Asian American communities are overwhelmingly immigrant, possessing close ties to their homelands and tending to replicate “the divisions and conflicts that beset” their societies of origin.⁶⁵ Thus, Paul Watanabe concludes that pan-Asian American unity “is more likely to arise in the domestic arena around distinctly Asian American issues”—such as employment, education, and business opportunities, political representation, and replacing stereotypes with balanced and realistic depictions—rather than around “issues related to U.S. policies toward Asia.”⁶⁶

No other “domestic” issue currently arouses deeper concern among the PRC’s leadership than the status of what it views as the breakaway province of Taiwan. Across the straits, the China Mainland’s rising economic, military, and diplomatic stature, along with the peaceful reintegration of Hong Kong under the “one country, two systems” formula, pose serious challenges for pro-independence sectors of Taiwan’s government and population. Given the sensitivity of the “Taiwan issue” in the Mainland, on the island, and for U.S.–China relations,⁶⁷ it is not surprising that divisions encountered on the other side of the Pacific also are played out within the Chinese American community.

As Xiaoming Huang points out, Taiwan’s leaders have focused efforts to manipulate U.S.–China relations “on influencing U.S. domestic politics by seeking to secure a pro-Taipei lobby in Washington.”⁶⁸ With reference to pivotal issues in the U.S.–China–Taiwan triangular relationship, Tsung Chi’s contribution to this volume demonstrates in vivid detail why, first, the China Lobby and, then, the powerful Taiwan Lobby—led by the highly organized Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) and its lobby-focused offspring, the Formosan Association for Public Relations (FAPR)—have been so successful throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. The Taiwan Lobby has been particularly effective in mobilizing immigrants from Taiwan to exert political pressure on their members of Congress and through media outlets. In comparison with the pre-2000 election environment, Chi expects the new U.S. political alignment at the national level to be even more favorable for attainment of the Taiwan Lobby’s goals—including upgrades in weapons sales and articulation of a new policy that any solution to the Taiwan question must be agreed upon by the people living on the island.

He foresees that the George W. Bush administration will be inclined to pursue “con-gagement” (containment along with engagement) with regard to the Mainland and to play the “Taiwan card” in conflicts with the PRC. At the same time, however, pro-Mainland lobby groups are becoming more influential players in Washington, DC—particularly in terms of aspects of U.S.–China relations that affect trade and investment in the PRC. In any case, the future outcome remains uncertain and anxiety-filled—for major policy victories by the Taiwan Lobby (e.g., advanced-weapons sales) increase the risk that the people of Taiwan will find themselves among the casualties of successful efforts to undermine U.S.–China relations.⁶⁹

Changing Views on U.S.–China Relations

In her provocative contribution to this volume, Xiaojian Zhao shows that the ethnic press, which often is overlooked by scholars, plays an important role in the lives of Chinese Americans. Her chapter builds on the premise that through study of the ethnic press, one is able to discern in broad outline the prevailing attitudes of the Chinese American community toward key China-related issues. Among other insights, Zhao’s analysis points to an historic shift in prevailing community opinion in a direction that generally is favorable to the PRC and opposed to Taiwan’s governing Democratic Progressive Party’s pro-independence platform. Most clearly, Zhao finds that Chinese American opinion at the turn of the century, as reflected in Chinese-language newspapers, is preoccupied with avoiding confrontation and conflict over Taiwan.⁷⁰ She concludes that if the George W. Bush administration pushes beyond rhetoric and implements drastic measures directed against the Mainland in connection with Taiwan or other volatile issues, it will alienate a large and influential proportion of today’s Chinese American community.

Expanding Networks and Prospects

The “increased porosity between Asian and Asian American”⁷¹ is facilitated by network expansion and elaboration. Thus, at the same time that the presence of some 2.5 million Chinese Americans can be traced, in part, to changes in China–U.S. relations, the potential for further transformation of the relationship in the trans-Pacific century is enhanced by dynamic population mobility. Part III presents new and detailed investigations of the current and potential scope and impact of Chinese American actions through various transnational civil-society networks that typically receive scant scholarly and public attention. In this section, contributors document the strength, vitality, and impor-

tance for future U.S.–China relations of business, philanthropic, Mainland-improvement, scientific, and resource-conservation linkages.

Transnational Businesspersons: Powerful Brokers or Compradores?

The complex and expanding web of economic contacts among relatives and friends on both sides of the Pacific is at once responsible for and an outgrowth of massively increased trade and financial services involving the China Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States. Many Chinese transnational businesspersons have successfully foiled nation-state regulations and “enacted their own strategies of accumulation.”⁷² While Chinese investors from throughout East and Southeast Asia pump increasing amounts of capital into U.S. business ventures and real estate, Chinese Americans and others in the diaspora make massive investments in the country of origin and in training China’s managers.⁷³ In his chapter, Wellington Chan documents the trans-Pacific *modus operandi* of Chinese entrepreneurs and describes the impact of changing immigration patterns on U.S.–Taiwan and U.S.–China economic relations since the 1970s. His analysis highlights the value of transnationally intertwined economic relationships and business networks in terms of the “cross-pollenization” of ideas and innovations and the acquisition of up-to-date knowledge of local conditions. Constantly recharged family, economic, and institutional networks are particularly useful in an emerging era of global entrepreneurship that requires sensitivity and adaptability to different cultural practices and shifting market trends.

Are Chinese Americans engaged in transsovereign business acting as powerful cultural and business brokers in their own right or are they reduced to serving as “*compradores* for non-Asian American global capitalists, who merely use Asian Americans, with their cultural capital, as conduits and instruments to penetrate the Asian market or as subcontractors to manage production and labor relations at the floor level”?⁷⁴ According to Chan, who has studied trans-Pacific business networks for the past thirty years, returnees—both to Taiwan and, increasingly, to Shanghai—include many successful Chinese American entrepreneurs (among them, founders, owners, and managers of high-tech Silicon Valley firms) who establish offices and production outlets or are hired to manage existing large-scale enterprises and public corporations.⁷⁵ For a number of compelling reasons, moreover, the Chinese American–linked and Taiwan-based computer suppliers that major U.S. firms are heavily dependent upon are moving an increasing share of their production and assembly operations to Shanghai and other Mainland locations.⁷⁶ Finally, the core Mainland roles played by

Chinese American transmigrants are likely to be further enhanced as China seeks assistance in its preparation for WTO membership and in implementing required post-accession reforms.⁷⁷

Transnational Chinese American Philanthropy

While extensive, the involvement of Chinese Americans in transborder philanthropy is arguably the least visible and least appreciated of the community's manifold transnational civil-society activities. John Deeney's chapter fills an important information gap on the impact of giving by Chinese Americans. He first explores the distinctive style—informal, personal and familial, private rather than public, small-scale, and networked—of Chinese American philanthropy. Then, he assesses the impact, particularly on education in the Mainland and on knowledge exchanges between China and the United States, of Chinese American giving—including the contributions of individual Chinese American philanthropists, foundations, associations, and other (including religious) groups. As Deeney demonstrates, Chinese Americans possess the economic resources to make a difference in societal development both in China and in the United States since their median family income is approximately 20 percent higher than the national level. Deeney concludes with a set of recommendations—including streamlined networking through internet communication—aimed both at expanding participation in the community's philanthropic activity and at enabling Chinese Americans, through effective giving, to improve China–U.S. relations and conditions on both sides of the Pacific.

Chinese American Binational Improvement Associations

The following chapter, by Norton Wheeler, presents a detailed study of four prominent associations recently formed by Chinese American that also are devoted to improving aspects of Mainland society and have not been examined previously under a scholarly lens. Wheeler compares and contrasts these four transnational associations—the 1990 Institute, the Committee of 100, the Association of Chinese Professors of Social Science in the United States, and Human Rights in China—according to membership characteristics, issue orientations, and posture toward the PRC government. His assessment of the diverse contributions each association has made to improving Mainland society and to U.S.–China relations, as well as of their different transnational network strengths and tactics, facilitates understanding of the full panoply of contemporary and potential Chinese American transboundary civil-society involvement.

Epistemic Communities

Chinese American scientists have been in the forefront of efforts to develop contacts between China and the United States following President Richard Nixon's visit in 1972. Although diplomatic overtures opened up the opportunity for binational scientific contacts to commence, neither the scale of the subsequent epistemic exchanges nor the enthusiasm of the Chinese and Chinese American participants can be explained in terms of state interests and objectives.

In his chapter, Zuoyue Wang shows how Chinese American scientists engaged in Mainland projects, particularly those of immigrant background, have been able to pursue their own agenda—which simultaneously has involved promoting the advancement of science in the land of origin, improving relations between the two countries, and creating their own distinctive scientific community. Five Chinese American scientists figure prominently in his account of transnational scientific activity: Qian Xuesen (Hsue-shen Tsien), an aerodynamic scientist who arrived in the United States before World War II; C.N. Yang (Chen Ning Yang, or Yang Zhenning) and T.D. Lee (Tsung Dao Lee, or Li Zhengdao), physicists who came in the 1940s and rose to international academic prominence in the 1950s and the 1980s; Chang-Lin Tien, a mechanical engineer who came via Taiwan and gained influence as chancellor of the University of California–Berkeley; and finally, Wen Ho Lee, a computer scientist who arrived in 1965. Although the advice they offered was not always consistent, the prominent role of Chinese American scientists has helped moderate concern in the PRC about the political and cultural values that accompanied scientific exchanges in particular and modernization and globalization in general. At the same time, the identification of Chinese American scientists with Chinese culture and development objectives facilitated the transmission of new values and ideas that have challenged Chinese orthodoxy.

Wang concludes his historical discussion with the observation that exchanges and diplomatic involvements have “transformed Chinese American scientists from a secluded elite group within a marginalized ‘model U.S. minority’ into agents of transnational technoscience possessing . . . a voice . . . in public-policy making in the United States and China.” While his thorough review indicates that the U.S. government's treatment of Wen Ho Lee has had a chilling effect on Chinese American scientists and on the atmosphere for transnational collaboration that they worked hard to create, Wang finds no evidence that the case has caused a Tiananmen-like disruption of U.S.–China scientific exchanges. He expects that collaborative projects outside of sensitive areas will continue to flourish and that the role

of Chinese American scientists will be of even greater importance in future U.S.–China relations.

*Sustainable-consumption Advocates for a
Natural-resource-scarce Future*

Finally, Peter Koehn demonstrates that Chinese Americans are positioned to transform both U.S. and China Mainland society with respect to critical interdependent environmental-protection and natural-resource-depletion challenges. Koehn's analysis suggests that the turn of the century is graced by the presence of at least one million cross-nationally competent Chinese Americans who are linked to civil-society institutions on both sides of the Pacific that possess the capacity to advance sustainable-development and sustainable-consumption agreements, policies, projects, and values.

Most of the specific nongovernmental roles identified in Koehn's chapter would not be highly visible and would address problems (e.g., limited future fossil-fuel availability) that simultaneously involve the linked destinies of peoples in the China Mainland and the United States. Involvement in these roles is not free of risk. For instance, Chinese Americans actively engaged in advocating curtailed consumption at transnational, national, and/or subnational levels are likely to encounter suspicions of disloyalty both in the PRC⁷⁸ and in the United States.⁷⁹ Koehn finds room for optimism, however, in certain Mainland practices, preliminary evidence that cross-nationally competent Chinese American actors tend to be sustainable-consumption advocates, and in the multiple transterritorial networks open to strategically prepared and motivated community members from all walks of life for influencing U.S.–China environmental-interdependence challenges.

Implications and Prospects

The concluding part of the book considers implications for Asian and Asian American studies and assesses prospects that the expanding involvement of Chinese Americans in U.S., PRC, and transboundary affairs will reinforce a relationship based upon commitment to advancing nongovernmental partnerships in the new century. Our concluding assessment builds on the evidence provided by contributors regarding the individual and collective orientations, networks, and behavior of Chinese Americans acting in diverse civil-society capacities along the U.S.–China frontier. They have shown that devotion to “serving the economic interests of multinational corporations”⁸⁰ or to personal/family accumulation and consumption are far from the only motives for participation in transnational capacities that impact China–U.S.

relations.⁸¹ In the trans-Pacific century, there will be even more bridges with China for Chinese Americans to “choose—or choose not—to build.”⁸²

As a result of increased flexibility in mainstream responses to newcomers and in U.S. foreign-policy orientations and reactions, the expansion of trans-Pacific business and migration networks, growing ethnic consciousness, and improved socioeconomic status, Chinese Americans increasingly are involved in U.S.–China relations. Opportunities for career expansion and to gain social, economic, and political influence have drawn many to China-related affairs. Participation in diverse aspects of U.S.–China relations helps new immigrants and ABCs alike to secure a position in mainstream life.

In analyzing Chinese American involvement, we find it useful to distinguish the informal and nonpolitical from the formal and public. Both types of participation expanded at the end of the twentieth century, but the first grew exponentially while the latter increased incrementally. There are important differences in the nature and implications of the two types of involvement. The informal form is driven mainly by the unbounded movement of information and people and multiplies in response to its own interpersonal, unpredictable, and less-visible dynamic.

Among Chinese Americans, at least, formal political participation in U.S.–China issues responds to quite different, and more predictable, cues. While Chinese Americans have their own reasons to welcome a positive or negative U.S.–China relationship, they tend to become actively involved in a public way only when they find that their interests are not incongruent with those that prevail within mainstream society. They have learned that overt political participation in U.S.–China relations must be deemed consistent with the dominant orientations held among the larger society and/or endorsed by mainstream politicians. That the flows and ebbs in Chinese American political involvement over various historical periods coincide with ups and downs in the volatile formal relationship suggests that activists in the minority community realize that influencing bilateral diplomatic relations requires that their role first fit the domestic and/or international agenda of powerful U.S. political interests.

This distinction further allows us to envision futures where subsurface and publicly observable involvements reinforce one another as well as situations where they move in different directions. Our analysis suggests that, among Chinese Americans, the scope, depth, and momentum established by the unofficial and less-visible interpersonal process is unlikely to be arrested.⁸³ However, visible involvement in sensitive U.S.–China issues will remain susceptible to changes in mainstream political currents. In the Chinese American case, it is exciting to consider the real prospect that the extent of subsurface transsovereign civil-society networking has become sufficiently

deep and interwoven to resist, or even to negate, any substantial cooling of the political winds among state actors.

Notes

1. See Peter Koehn and Joseph Y.S. Cheng (eds.), *The Outlook for U.S.–China Relations Following the 1997–1998 Summits: Chinese and American Perspectives on Security, Trade, and Cultural Exchange* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999).

2. See, for instance, Mark P. Lagon, “The ‘Shanghai Coalition’: The Chattering Classes and China,” *Perspectives on Political Science* 29, No. 1 (2000): 7–16; Xiaoming Huang, “Managing Fluctuations in U.S.–China Relations: World Politics, National Priorities, and Policy Leadership,” *Asian Survey* 42, No. 2 (2000): 292–293; Tu Wei-ming, “Cultural China: The Periphery as Center,” *Daedalus* 120 (Spring 1991): 16.

3. See Jianwei Wang’s interesting study of U.S. and Chinese elite perceptions of the other society and political system. Jianwei Wang, *Limited Adversaries: Post–Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). One of his many findings is that the sampled business, diplomatic, and intellectual elites in both countries generally “are aware of the interdependence of their respective national interests” (p. 261).

4. Richard Madsen, *China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 218.

5. *The Asian Population: Census 2000 Brief* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002), p. 9.

6. In this chapter, we use “transnational” to refer to issues and interactions that transcend the boundaries of nation-states rather than cut across groups that identify as a nation. Daniel Mato provides a succinct definition of transnational relations as involving “relations between two or more social subjects from two or more state-nations when at least one of these subjects is not an agent of a government or inter-governmental organization. . . .” Daniel Mato, “On Global and Local Agents and the Social Making of Transnational Identities and Related Agendas in ‘Latin’ America,” *Identities* 4, No. 2 (1997): 171. The terms *transsovereign* and *transterritorial* also capture our intended meaning. See Maryann K. Cusimano, “Beyond Sovereignty: The Rise of Transsovereign Problems,” in *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), p. 3.

7. Also see David M. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 315.

8. Him Mark Lai, “The Chinese,” in *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, ed. by Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 218. Other scholars believe that the actual numbers are larger. See Rose Hum Lee, *The Chinese in the United States of America* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), pp. 11–13.

9. Wu Ting-feng, *New York Tribune*, 28 November 1901, as cited in Delber L. McKee, *Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open Door Policy, 1900–1906* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977), p. 51. Born to an immigrant family in Singapore and educated in Hong Kong and Britain, Wu acted as a spokesman for the Chinese American community when he served as China’s minister to Washington, D.C., at the turn of the twentieth century.

10. Xiao-huang Yin, *Chinese American Literature Since the 1850s* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), pp. 69–84; Peter Wan, “Yung Wing: A Critical Biography” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1996).

11. Helen P. Bolman, “Notes: *Father and Glorious Descendant*,” *Library Journal* 68, No. 7 (1 April 1943): 287. For a discussion of changes in attitude on the part of mainstream Americans toward Chinese and Chinese Americans, see Harold R. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1980; reprint), pp. 164–189.

12. For information about the Chinese American involvement in China’s anti-Japanese war, see Shih-shan H. Tsai, *The Chinese Experience in America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 120–142; Ren Guixiang, *Huaqiao dierci aiguo gaochao* (The second patriotic movement of overseas Chinese) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi, 1989), pp. 88–128.

13. Xiao-huang Yin and Zhiyong Lan, “Chinese Americans: A Rising Factor in U.S.–China Relations,” *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 6, No. 1 (1997): 35–57.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 51–54. Also see Xiaojian Zhao’s chapter in this volume.

15. Adam McKeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 58, No. 2 (May 1999): 327–330.

16. This includes criminal networks that trade in drugs, sex, and illegal immigrants. See Ronald Skeldon, “East Asian Migration and the Changing World Order,” in *Population, Migration, and the Changing World Order*, ed. by W.T.S. Gould and A.M. Findlay (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), pp. 188–191; Stephen E. Flynn, “Asian Drugs, Crime, and Control: Rethinking the War,” in *Fires Across the Water: Transnational Problems in Asia*, ed. by James Shinn (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 26–27. Evelyn Hu-DeHart notes that undocumented “Fuzhounese workers were forced into American national consciousness when their overloaded and totally unseaworthy vessel, the infelicitously named *Golden Venture*, ran aground on the New Jersey shore in June 1993.” Evelyn Hu-DeHart, “Introduction: Asian American Formations in the Age of Globalization,” in *Across the Pacific: Asian Americans and Globalization*, ed. by Evelyn Hu-DeHart (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), p. 18. Also see Ko-Lin Chin, *Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998).

17. Asia Society, *Bridges with Asia: Asian Americans in the United States*, Summary Report of a 1996 Conference in New York (New York: Asia Society, 1997), pp. 6–7. Also see Taeku Lee, “The Backdoor and the Backlash: Campaign Finance and the Politicization of Chinese Americans,” *Asian American Policy Review* 9 (2000): 31–34; Hu-DeHart, “Introduction,” pp. 14–16.

18. See Elizabeth Rosenthal, “China Frees Scholar Who Worked in U.S.,” *New York Times*, 29 January 2000, p. A3; Erik Eckholm, “China’s Arrest of Pennsylvania Librarian Alarms Scholars,” *New York Times*, 13 January 2000, p. A10; Elizabeth Rosenthal, “For China-born U.S. Citizens, Visiting Homeland Has Risks,” *New York Times*, 1 May 2001, p. A1.

19. See, for instance, Craig S. Smith, “China Attacks the Falun Gong in New Public Relations Effort,” *New York Times*, 11 January 2001, p. A8.

20. James Sterngold, “Accused Scientist to Go Free on Bail in Los Alamos Case,” *New York Times*, 25 August 2000, p. A1; James Sterngold, “Reno Says She’ll Seek Release of U.S. Study on Los Alamos,” *New York Times*, 6 October 2000, p. A22.

21. James Sterngold, “Held for Nine Months: Apology from Bench—Case ‘Embar-

ressed Our Entire Nation,” *New York Times*, 14 September 2000, p. A1; “Statement by Judge in Los Alamos Case, with Apology for Abuse of Power,” *New York Times*, 14 September 2000, p. A21.

22. David Johnston, “Clinton Criticizes Officials’ Actions against Scientist,” *New York Times*, 15 September 2000, p. A1; Marc Lacey, “Clinton Doubts Scientist’s Race Influenced Case,” *New York Times*, 16 September 2000, p. A1.

23. “The Times and Wen Ho Lee,” *New York Times*, 26 September 2000, p. A2.

24. Sterngold, “Reno Says,” p. A22. While Government prosecutors likely believed that their treatment of Lee protected U.S. interests, their actions damaged the foundation of national security by at least temporarily destroying interest in government laboratory work and confidence in science as a career among some of the country’s best and brightest Asian American minds. See Xiao-huang Yin, “The Lee Case Shakes Asian Americans’ Faith in Justice System,” *Los Angeles Times*, 24 September 2000, p. M1; “Playing Dirty with the China Card,” *Nature* 398, No. 6727 (8 April 1999): 445; James Glanz, “Panel Fears Security at Labs Hurts Foreign Hiring,” *New York Times*, 16 May 2000, p. A16; James Glanz, “Asian-American Scholars Call for Boycott of Labs,” *New York Times*, 31 May 2000, p. A23; Gish Jen, “For Wen Ho Lee, a Tarnished Freedom,” *New York Times*, 15 September 2000, p. A25. To offset the “brain drain” that already had occurred by January 2000 in the wake of the firing and arrest of Wen Ho Lee, U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson ordered that clearer policies prohibiting racial profiling be put into effect and reported that he would request an additional \$10–\$15 million specifically for recruiting more Asian American scientists for national laboratories. “Effort Begun for Asian-American Scientists,” *New York Times*, 20 January 2000, p. A11.

25. Nina G. Schiller, “The Situation of Transnational Studies,” *Identities* 4, No. 2 (1997): 159 (emphasis ours).

26. Hu-DeHart, “Introduction,” p. 20.

27. Madsen, *China and the American Dream*, pp. 202–205.

28. See Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Networked Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

29. Also see Myron Weiner, “Asian Immigrants and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. by Robert W. Tucker, Charles B. Keely, and Linda Wrigley (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 193.

30. Shigehiko Shiramizu, “Global Migration, Ethnic Media and Ethnic Identity,” *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 9, No. 3 (August 2000): 273–274.

31. As of 1990, 41 percent of the Chinese American population over twenty-five years of age held a bachelor’s or higher degree versus 20 percent for the U.S. population as a whole. The Chinese American working population also was considerably more likely to fill professional positions—especially in medicine, engineering, technology, and education. See Him Mark Lai, “The United States,” in *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, ed. by Lynn Pan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 271; Franklin Ng, “Chinese Americans: Still the ‘Yellow Peril?’” in *Many Americas: Critical Perspectives on Race, Racism, and Ethnicity*, ed. by Gregory R. Campbell (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1998), pp. 186, 189.

32. Relative to European immigrants, a far higher proportion of eligible immigrants from China have applied for U.S. citizenship. Harry H.L. Kitano and Roger Daniels, *Asian Americans: Emerging Minorities*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 183. Also see Aihwa Ong, “On the Edge of Empires: Flexible Citizenship Among Chinese in Diaspora,” *Positions* 1, No. 3 (1993): 753–755, 770.

33. Among Chinese Americans, as well as mainstream Americans, “Tiananmen forces us to see ourselves as a divided ‘we’ interacting with a multiplex ‘they.’” Madsen, *China and the American Dream*, p. 24.

34. While highly educated “uptown” Chinese Americans professionals who reside in suburban communities are well integrated into mainstream society, predominantly working-class “downtown” immigrants struggle to survive in poor urban ghettos. See Xiao-huang Yin, “The Two Sides of America’s ‘Model Minority,’” *Los Angeles Times*, 7 May 2000; Susumu Awanohara, “Tyros, Triads, Tycoons: Chinatown Ghettos Versus Arriviste Suburbs,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 152, No. 29 (18 July 1991): 50–51; Yin, *Chinese American Literature Since the 1850s*, pp. 194–205; Yen Espiritu and Paul Ong, “Class Constraints on Racial Solidarity Among Asian Americans,” in *The New Asian Immigration in Los Angeles and Global Restructuring*, ed. by Paul Ong, Edna Bonacich, and Lucie Cheng (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), p. 303; Arif Dirlik, “Asians on the Rim: Transnational Capital and Local Community in the Making of Contemporary Asian America,” in *Across the Pacific: Asian Americans and Globalization*, ed. by Evelyn Hu-DeHart (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), p. 45.

35. The spring 2000 debate over permanently granting China normal trade status revealed sharp divisions within the dissident community. See Joseph Kahn, “Conflicting Views Hinder Dissidents on China Trade Vote,” *New York Times*, 19 May 2000, p. A12.

36. See Hu-DeHart, “Introduction,” p. 9; Dirlik, “Asians on the Rim,” p. 45.

37. Lucie Cheng, “Chinese Americans in the Formation of the Pacific Regional Economy,” in *Across the Pacific: Asian Americans and Globalization*, ed. by Evelyn Hu-DeHart (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), p. 75.

38. See Paul Y. Watanabe, “Asian American Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *Across the Pacific: Asian Americans and Globalization*, ed. by Evelyn Hu-DeHart (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), pp. 110, 121; Walker Connor, “Diasporas and the Formation of Foreign Policy: The U.S. in Comparative Perspective,” in *Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective*, ed. by Dimitri C. Conostas and Athanassios G. Platias (Athens: Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, 1993), pp. 174–175.

39. Transmigration refers here to the ceaseless mobility of people between or among nations. See Luis E. Guarnizo, “The Emergence of a Transnational Social Formation and the Mirage of Return Migration Among Dominican Transmigrants,” *Identities* 4, No. 2 (1997): 288. Transmigrants qualify diasporic with *multiple* place consciousness and, thus, “feel at home” in the places where they live. On one hand, such consciousness enables “a different kind of politics that grounds transnationalism in the welfare of local communities.” Dirlik, “Asians on the Rim,” pp. 46, 53; Donald M. Nonini and Aihwa Ong, “Chinese Transnationalism as an Alternative Modernity,” in *Un-grounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, ed. by Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 25. On the other hand, it can diminish the relevance of the local context and reinforce identities that are “at once deterritorialized in relation to a particular country, though highly localized in relation to the family.” Ong, “Flexible Citizenship,” pp. 771–772. Xin Liu shows that the differential mobility associated with ties to global capitalism has become an important source of power accumulation (independent, but not intrinsically subversive, of the state) in post-reform China—for transmigrants who succeed in securing permanent residence in the United States. See Xin Liu, “Space, Mobility,