

# INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL RELATIONS

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J. M. Mitchell

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Volume 7

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J. M. MITCHELL

 **Routledge**  
Taylor & Francis Group  
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1986 by Allen & Unwin in association with The British Council

This edition first published in 2016

by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge

711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

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*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-138-94006-2 (Set)

ISBN: 978-1-315-66794-2 (Set) (ebk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-94101-4 (Volume 7) (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-67390-5 (Volume 7) (ebk)

**Publisher's Note**

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# International Cultural Relations

**J. M. Mitchell**

London  
**ALLEN & UNWIN**  
Boston                      Sydney

Published in association with  
**THE BRITISH COUNCIL**

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**Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd,  
40 Museum Street, London WC1A 1LU, UK**

Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd,  
Park Lane, Hemel Hempstead, Herts HP2 4TE, UK

Allen & Unwin, Inc.,  
8 Winchester Place, Winchester, Mass. 01890, USA

Allen & Unwin (Australia) Ltd,  
8 Napier Street, North Sydney, NSW 2060, Australia

First published in 1986

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**British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data**

Mitchell, J. M.

International cultural relations—(Key concepts in international relations; 3)

1. Cultural relations

I. Title II. Series

303.4'82 HM101

ISBN 0-04-327082-4

ISBN 0-04-327083-2 Pbk

---

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Mitchell, J. M., 1925–

International cultural relations.

(Key concepts in international relations; 3)

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Cultural policy. 2. International relations and culture.

I. Title. II. Series.

K3712.M58 1986 344'.09 86-3425

342.49

ISBN 0-04-327082-4 (alk. paper)

ISBN 0-04-327083-2 (pbk.: alk. paper)

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Set in 10 on 11 point Times by Fotographics (Bedford) Ltd,  
and printed in Great Britain by Billing and Son Ltd,  
London and Worcester

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## Acknowledgement

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## General Editor's Introduction

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The word 'concept' is derived from a Latin root meaning literally gathering or bundling together. In any organized body of knowledge the major concepts developed and deployed by scholars are the vital instruments for organizing information and ideas; they are as indispensable for the tasks of gathering classification and typology as they are in the more ambitious work of model and theory-building. And in any study of human history and society these key concepts inevitably constitute weapons and battlefields in the conflict of normative theories, ideologies and moral judgements. Every major concept of international relations has a very different connotation depending on the philosophical beliefs, ideology, or attitude of the beholder. Take the terms 'imperialism' and 'revolution': although liberal and Marxist writers frequently use these words the precise meanings and significance they attach to them will vary enormously, and even if a single author is perfectly consistent in usage in a single book, he may alter his usage, either consciously or unwittingly, over time. None of us is immune against this process of continual redefinition and reevaluation. This is one of the reasons why it is so important for us all, whether laymen or specialists to become more aware, vigilant and critical of the problems and pitfalls of conceptualization both for ourselves and others. The review and clarification should not be left to a small coterie of professional philosophers and linguistic analysts. It should be a regular part of our own mental preparation for study, reflection, writing, and the practical burdens of communicating and participating in a democratic society. Careful and informed use of the full range of major concepts developed in any field of knowledge, with due attention to clarity and consistency and the interrelatedness of concepts is also obviously a vital heuristic tool, a prerequisite for good scientific research. More than this, the refinement, modification and reevaluation involved in operationalizing well-tried concepts often lead to the introduction of new concepts, fresh building-blocks in the development of knowledge, discovery and fuller understanding, whether of the physical universe, human history and society, or the nature and development of the individual human spirit, personality, and imagination.

If one examines the standard range of introductory texts on international relations used by universities in America and Western Europe, one is struck by three features of their conceptual apparatus,

aspects which are now so widespread that they can be said to typify the stock-in-trade of the discipline. First, there is the astonishingly wide consensus on the basic checklist of key organizing concepts in the subject, almost invariably reflected in the contents outline: international system, nation–state, sovereignty, power, balance of power, diplomacy, military strategy, nuclear deterrence, alliances, foreign policy-making, international law, international organization, trade, aid, and development. These are the almost ubiquitous repertoires. Other themes such as human rights, conflict resolution, ideology, and propaganda find inclusion in a minority of contents pages; almost invariably in the modern texts they will be mentioned only briefly at some point in the introductory survey course.

A second recurrent feature is the lack of attention to the origin and development of the concepts themselves. This characterizes nearly all the well-known texts. It is almost as if the text-book writers wish to leave the student in innocence of the major historical developments of their subject. How many of the introductory texts, for example, even bother to mention such seminal contributions as those of Grotius in international law, Clausewitz in military strategy, or Mittrany in the field of international organization? Only rarely is attention given to problems of definition, to conflicting theories and approaches, and to the problems of conceptual obsolescence and innovation.

The third major weakness, in the editor's view, is the failure to adequately relate the key concepts of international relations to the real world thinking and activities of statesmen, officials, political parties, media, public, and other key participants in the international system. Yet the language of international relations we use as academic teachers, researchers, and students, is not the esoteric product of a research laboratory or seminar room: our major concepts are the very stuff of international diplomacy, foreign policy, and intercourse. True, on occasion, as in the case of the key concepts of nuclear deterrence and functionalist and neo-functionalist theories of integration, academicians and scientists serving or advising governments have also played a key role in developing new concepts. Yet the plain fact is that many of our newer concepts – in, for example, military strategy, economic development and international organization – have been originated, modified, developed and debated mainly among politicians, diplomatists, civil servants, service chiefs, guerrilla leaders, and even journalists. And because we need to be closely in touch with the nuances and subtleties of the constant evolution of ideas and assumptions of the main participants in the international system, narrowly-based surveys of conceptual usage and development in the scholarly literature would also be inadequate and distorting.

It is to remedy these grave deficiencies that this new series of individual monographs, each devoted to a thorough review of a major international relations concept, has been devised. The editor and publishers hope that the series will educate and illuminate at both the undergraduate and post-graduate teaching levels in all universities and colleges that offer courses in international relations. It is also hoped that the volumes will provide valuable background, sources, and stimulus to teachers and researchers, many of whom have long complained about the absence of such guides. Finally, the series should also be of value to officials, politicians, industrial executives and others whose professional work involves some degree of participation in, and understanding of, international developments, trends, policy-making and problems. The series should also be of interest and value to students and specialists in cognate disciplines, such as history, economics, political science, and sociology.

It may help to recapitulate the brief given to each contributor in the series. It is intended that each volume will deal thoroughly with the following aspects: The origins and evolution of the concept, including significant variations and changes in usage, and in relation to changes in the international system and in the political systems of major powers; an attempt at an authoritative definition of the concept in order that it may be employed as a more effective tool in the analysis and theory of international relations; the identification of any important sub-concepts and typologies; a critical review of the ways in which the concept is utilized in major theories, models and approaches in the contemporary study of international relations; the relationship between the concept and the contemporary practice of international relations; the relationship between the concept and policy-making in international relations; the future of the concept in international relations.

It should hardly be necessary to add that the publishers and the series academic editor should have chosen the individual authors commissioned to review each concept, with considerable care, taking into account not only their previous record of scholarly work in the field, but also their experience as teachers and expositors. We hope and believe that the completed series will provide a boon to international relations teaching and research world-wide. We welcome suggestions, responses and even practical proposals for additional contributions to the series. Please correspond in the first instance with Gordon Smith of Allen & Unwin at the address printed on the reverse of the title page.

In addition to dealing with the key concepts traditionally included in any university syllabus on international relations, it is one of the tasks of this series to re-examine neglected or undervalued concepts and even to pioneer the analysis of those totally omitted from the conventional general textbooks on the subject. *International Cultural Relations* clearly falls into the latter category. Yet when one considers the historical role and importance of cultural developments, changes in cultural influences and patterns of dominance, and the often seminal role of cultural attitudes and differences in triggering and sustaining international conflicts and determining their outcomes, this omission is clearly indefensible. The reasons why the concepts of cultural relations, culture-clash, cultural imperialism, and cultural diplomacy are missing from the contents of our standard textbooks on international relations have nothing to do with their relative importance in the international system: rather they are a reflection of the uneven and incomplete development of the subject and, in particular, our contemporary preoccupations with the short-term shifts in the balance of power, alliances, and foreign policy. In the 1950s and 1960s the huge burgeoning of strategic studies, stimulated by the development of nuclear weapons, led to a diversion of considerable energy and resources in these aspects of the subject. This preoccupation is of course largely explained by the insatiable demands of the policymakers for conceptual, analytical and theoretical tools to help them deal with the complex problems raised by the revolution in weapons technology. Substantial grants by government agencies to promote such studies in research institutes and university departments in the United States and Western Europe have fuelled this rush to strategic studies to such an extent that there are clear signs of over-commitment and exhaustion, with much duplication and inferior work being sustained often simply because there is no money for research on other aspects of international relations. Since the oil crisis of 1973 there has been a new fashionable preoccupation with the study of international economic relations. Considering the severity of the problems of lack of economic development, poverty and famine in the Third World, the debt crisis, and the strong reemergence of protectionist pressures in the international economy, this impetus in international economic research is to be greatly welcomed. Thus far it has hardly received a fraction of the government support lavished on strategic studies. At least it is increasingly recognized as a key focus for further concerted research efforts.

Alas there has been no serious effort to sponsor research in the field of cultural relations. Because governments and other major bodies concerned with funding cannot see any obvious application or 'pay-

offs' for such investigations, they simply have not been carried out. In policy terms this is mirrored in the miserly grants made to cultural and educational agencies such as the British Council. But it is not our job as academics to pander and adjust to the fashions and prejudices of our political masters. There *is* an overwhelming intellectual case for the study of international cultural relations as an area of basic research. For if we take the long-term view of international relations we find that cultural changes are the most pervasive and irreversible elements in human history. To take a famous and striking example, the influence of Latin and of Roman ideas of law, governance, civic and architectural design, military strategy and organization, agriculture and trade was seminal in moulding the history of Europe from Byzantium in the East to Britain in the West. Long after the fall of the Roman Empire in the West, this cultural experience provided a framework, a series of models and a source of knowledge which could be constantly rediscovered, modified and applied by later societies in different conditions. Like the Hellenic civilization that preceded Roman culture it was to become a kind of master 'data bank' for the development of future civilizations.

Yet perhaps the most vivid demonstration of the tenacity of cultural imprints on history is the way in which the cultures of small and politically and militarily powerless societies can survive for centuries, even under conditions of rapacious colonial domination and subjection by more powerful civilizations. This is strikingly illustrated in the dogged survival of the languages and arts and crafts of the indigenous Indian peoples of North and South America.

Ranging between the imperialism of temporarily dominant cultures and the almost 'underground' survival of the weak and vulnerable ones there is a whole fascinating field for investigation in the processes and effects of cultural intermixing and interaction and the political, social, economic and religious relations of multi-ethnic societies. This has been the subject of some superb pioneering work by social historians such as Oscar Handlin in the case of the USA. But the international interactions, for example between Francophone and indigenous Black culture in West Africa, or between British and Indian culture in the sub-continent are still little understood.

A careful reading of John Mitchell's exciting and pioneering study of international cultural relations in the contemporary international system shows how little we really know about the underlying processes of cultural influence, growth and decay. Why is it that some cultures appear to leave profound and lasting influences on the societies which have experienced contact with them while others disappear almost without trace? Are some languages more suited than others to cultural 'transplantation'? Why is it that some cultures

appear more resistant than others to the assimilation of externally derived technology and scientific knowledge? John Mitchell does not pretend to have simple answers to any of these questions. But, drawing on his long personal experience as a senior official of the British Council and a formidable erudition in the modern history of cultural relations, he provides a thought-provoking analysis of the problems of international cultural relations and poses some crucial questions about their future development. With a fascinating blend of historical comparison and professional insight he explores the crucial distinction between cultural relations and the much narrower field of formal cultural diplomacy. He critically examines the role of the national cultural agencies of the leading powers and assesses their limitations, resource problems, and relative effectiveness.

John Mitchell has a striking and iconoclastic view of the role of the professional expert in cultural relations. In his view he should not be seen as a servant of national power politics or economic enrichment. He sees culture as a vehicle for more fundamental purposes than manipulation or the purchase of influence. To him the ideal exponent of international cultural relations is dedicated to the task of helping different cultures to understand each other and to learn from each other. It is a noble aspiration of 'nation speaking unto nation', totally free from machination, pressure or coercion. In this task, the author argues, higher education, the arts and sciences, and the broadcasting media all have a key part to play. In all these activities successful conduct of international relations calls for endless reserves of patience, a dedicated pursuit of greater knowledge of other languages and cultures, enormous sensitivity, and total integrity. In addition it requires all the skills of the educator and expositor.

The author does not for one minute pretend that the successful conduct of cultural relations is easily achieved. He constantly emphasises the formidable constraints. Unlike some of the more superficial commentators on international relations, he never underestimates the degree to which language differences can pose barriers to understanding and communication. By this he does not, of course, simply refer to the contacts of government leaders and officials with their universal paraphernalia of interpreters. He means that the people of one language group will only be able to acquire a thorough and profound understanding of another if it is able to converse in a language both can understand. Hence his considerable, and in my view totally justified, emphasis on the activities of language training as the cornerstone of a cultural relations policy. Secondly, John Mitchell never attempts to avoid the problem of instinctive suspicion towards foreign or alien ideas. In so many of the so-called cosmopolitan societies of the industrialized West there are ample

signs of an ugly latent xenophobia in many sectors of society. Such feelings are often partly the result of bitter conflicts and wars in living memory. They are also often whipped up by unscrupulous politicians pandering to populist instincts.

Last but not least, Dr Mitchell is profoundly aware of the deep and lasting effect of socialization, the formal education process and the dominant political and religious culture. But as a dedicated exponent of international cultural relations he views all these inherent difficulties as an exciting challenge. He has the abiding faith of the true liberal internationalist that they can be overcome. Not for him the music of doom and despair. His argument is always as beautifully calm and lucid as it is crisp and incisive. Teachers and students of international relations everywhere will do well to depend on this magisterial guide to this important but little understood branch of international relations.

Paul Wilkinson  
*Professor of International Relations*  
*University of Aberdeen*

## Foreword

---

One balmy evening in Cairo, when I was a junior member of the British Council, I got into conversation at a cocktail party with a sophisticated Egyptian freshly returned from taking a higher degree in English Literature at Oxford. On discovering my profession, he languidly asked, 'Don't you find it slightly absurd to be representing your country's culture abroad?' This was in the early 1950s when the campaign against the British Council in the Beaverbrook press was at its height; it was also the time when the British presence in the Suez Canal Zone was the object of constant attack from the Nasser régime, and one did not feel by any means *persona grata* in all company. 'No', I replied, 'not at all.' And feeling that this response required some elaboration, I added, 'At least, no more absurd than anything else.' Shadows of Albert Camus hung between us. The Egyptian nodded in acknowledgement that I had made a point, and changed the subject.

The incident is significant not because this book is meant to be a more adequate reply thirty years too late – that would be a frivolous beginning – but because the question, so typical then, would hardly be asked today. We have progressed. If my interlocutor and I could take up our conversation now, conscious of the afflictions of the intervening years, I imagine we would both agree that if relations between our two countries had been conducted with more understanding decades ago a great deal of waste could have been avoided, and I have no doubt he would agree that a greater investment in cultural relations would have been a means towards that understanding.

Having declared I now disavow my national interest. This book is an attempt to set cultural relations in a wide context, to take a worldwide conspectus of this aspect of international affairs. The task would be inconceivable in a volume of this size if it meant compiling a gazetteer. My treatment will be thematic rather than synoptic. This will in any case be appropriate to the thesis that the book serves to demonstrate: that cultural relations have become an intrinsic part of the way governments and nations relate to one another, and of the way institutions and peoples form an understanding of one another across frontiers. I hope the book will prompt further research into some of the themes I expose.

To provide a focus on the main issues, special attention has been paid to five countries which are valuable references: France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany as long-established practitioners,

the United States as an inescapable giant, and Japan as a country whose external cultural role is evolving to match her prosperity and riches. In addition, information supplied by British Council colleagues in some eighty countries has been drawn upon. My own thirty-five years' experience of working at home and abroad with the British Council inevitably, and I hope helpfully, informs my own perceptions. Within the time at my disposal to collect material and visit the five analogue countries, it has not been possible to consult archives anywhere but in Britain. My primary sources are therefore for the most part British or found in Britain.

Translations from French, German and Italian are, except where otherwise indicated in the bibliography, my own. Terminology presents something of a problem, especially in regard to more basic concepts (culture, civilization, etc.), which do not have the same connotation in every language. Some of the terms used in this book are rehearsed in Chapter 9. They are not always satisfactory from the semantic or aesthetic point of view, but the aim has been to achieve intelligibility rather than to revolutionize the vocabulary. The work by Albert Salon, *Vocabulaire critique des relations internationales dans les domaines culturel, scientifique et de la coopération technique* contains a comparative index of terms in French, German and English.

In order to standardize at least the name of one basic institution, the phrase 'foreign ministry' is used throughout for various countries' ministries of external or foreign affairs. The English terms of Foreign (and Commonwealth) Office and State Department are used, however, in respect of Britain and the United States. The word 'foreign' itself deserves a come-back in the English language. Out of apology for latent xenophobia, 'foreign' has in recent years been slowly supplanted by 'overseas' ('overseas students', etc.). In a book on cultural relations, foreigners do not require euphemistic handling. The neutral use of 'foreign' in this book may help to make them seem less foreign.

The book is in three parts. First, the nature and development of international cultural relations; second, their organization and management; third, the various activities whereby they are practised. Since not all readers will be familiar with documentation on this subject the following Appendices are included:

- A Cultural Convention between Great Britain and France.
- B Cultural Agreement between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
- C External Broadcasting: programme hours.
- D Budgets of Britain and Analogue Countries.

*Author's Acknowledgements*

The groundwork for this book was accomplished in the last year of my service with the British Council, after I had spent the three and a half decades since 1949 in a variety of overseas and home posts. The last of these was as Assistant Director-General 1981–4.

I am grateful to Sir John Burgh, Director-General of the British Council, for accepting my proposal that I should be released from duties in the Council's headquarters for the year 1984–5 to work on this book. I am particularly indebted to Rayner Unwin of George Allen and Unwin for his counsel when I first broached the project of producing a book on this subject, and for his enthusiasm and encouragement thereafter. I also record my gratitude to Council colleagues and members of the Diplomatic Service in the five analogue countries for their helpfulness and welcome, and to colleagues elsewhere who gave useful answers to the questionnaire I distributed to Council representatives. Among those in the Council's London office to whom I am indebted I would particularly mention Trevor Rutter, Sandy Edington, Harriet Harvey Wood, Sandra Cromey, Teresa Spurgeon and Cilla Rohacz; also Marion Robinson of Central Typing Services, Bournemouth.

My thanks go to Roland Hindmarsh, ex-Council officer and now language adviser, for his advice on language questions; to Henry Croom-Johnson, Kenneth Walsh and David Dilks for the loan of materials from their personal collections; to Francis King and Albert Sloman for their interest; also to members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of Education and Science, the BBC, the Royal Society, Chatham House, the Public Record Office, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, PEN, and the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges who supplied information. I am grateful also to those cultural representatives of their countries based in London who gave me their assistance, and to all those people I visited abroad, who were invariably informative and welcoming. In particular, I wish to thank Delia Lennie for her advice on Italian translations of English literature and David Rundle, Director of the British Institute of Florence.

Finally, I acknowledge with gratitude the permission kindly given by Lady Leeper to quote from the correspondence of her late husband, Sir Reginald Leeper. Any account of the development of cultural relations in Britain must be a tribute to his grasp of affairs and far-sightedness.

*In tribute to those who have devoted their best  
efforts to the promotion of understanding  
between nations and to the reduction of mental  
frontiers.*

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# 1

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## Beyond Diplomacy

The heading *Beyond Diplomacy* suggests further horizons. In the often quoted definition by Sir Ernest Satow, 'Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states' (Gore-Booth, 1979, p. 3). One is struck by the constraints implied in this form of words. Official relations do not directly touch the lives of most people, not even of elites, though everyone may be disastrously affected when they go wrong. Governments, whether elected or not, are executors of a political will determined by present necessities and burdened by the past. And governments are preoccupied with short-term policies to meet immediate crises.

Politics as a mechanism for bridging the gap between national interest and the compulsive forces at work in the world at large does not score obvious successes. Diplomacy is, however skilfully conducted, the instrument of the political will. Ours is hardly a visionary age. Its technological wonders often exacerbate rather than resolve its fundamental problems. But one unsensational progression has been achieved that brings a degree of international convergence of thought. This is the spread of education, the propagation of the written word, information across frontiers, and the availability of cultural goods in people's lives. It is in this area that cultural relations work is done. The time is opportune to capitalize on the potential it yields for world stability. If, as is often said, the golden age of diplomacy is past, then beyond diplomacy lie alternative forms of international relations.

That cultural relations are of great importance is not today generally in dispute. It is accepted in many countries that they are an essential third dimension in relations between states: third, because they accompany politics and trade (for some American writers, they come fourth after politics, trade and defence). It was Willy Brandt, when he was German Foreign Minister in 1966, who first gave currency to the term 'third pillar of foreign policy'. Senator Fulbright, after whom one of the most imaginative exchange schemes

is named (see pp. 54, 57 and 157), wrote in his Foreword to *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy*: 'Foreign policy cannot be based on military posture and diplomatic activities alone in today's world. The shape of the world a generation from now will be influenced far more by how well we communicate the values of our society to others than by our military or diplomatic superiority' (Coombs, 1964, p. ix). The French, who pioneered the whole business, consider the representation of their culture abroad almost a sacred mission and spend half their budget for foreign relations on fulfilling it. But whereas the French government has traditionally identified this work closely with French interests and foreign policy, the general tendency in other democracies since 1945 has, as Doka (1956, p. 33) points out, been to distance it from government direction. The idea of people communicating with each other across national boundaries has been frequently invoked. Indeed, some expressions of the idea have gone further than can altogether be sustained. Writing in a period of postwar idealism, the American author Archibald MacLeish, who was then Assistant Secretary in charge of public and cultural affairs in the State Department, went so far as to say, 'Foreign Offices are no longer offices to speak for one people to another; the people can speak now for themselves. Foreign Offices are offices of international understanding, the principal duty of which is the duty to make the understanding of peoples whole and intelligible and complete' (McMurry and Lee, 1947, p. x). This seems today to carry to extremes the Open Door and New Deal approach, but the desirability that communication between nations should not be inhibited by political barriers remains fundamental and has steadily gained in recognition.

### **Cultural Relations and Cultural Diplomacy**

These two terms are often used as though they were synonymous. In fact, the differences between them are fundamental, but also complex and fairly subtle. Both apply to the practice followed by modern states of interrelating through their cultures. Both have acquired greater currency with the recognition that culture is an expression of national identity and therefore a factor in international affairs. Culture lends impetus to the quest for convergence between conflicting national interests; it has a particular part in overcoming conventional barriers that separate peoples, by promoting understanding between them. Culture represents a dimension in international attitudes where alienation between nations yields to familiarity and feelings of common humanity.

This evolution has had important consequences, which have not

been fully appraised and described. The underlying concepts, therefore, remain ambiguous. The term cultural relations itself is neutrally descriptive and throws up little semantic difficulty. It has a wide reference going beyond the actions of governments and their agencies. Cultural relations can be conducted on the initiative of private as well as public institutions. Cultural diplomacy is narrower in scope because it is essentially the business of governments. But cultural diplomacy has two levels of meaning. The first-order meaning applies to the agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, which are made between governments to permit, facilitate or prescribe cultural exchanges. The inter-governmental negotiation of cultural treaties, conventions, agreements and exchange programmes is cultural diplomacy. Two examples of these are shown in Appendices A and B (see pp. 233 and 235). Likewise the inclusion of cultural clauses in major international agreements, such as the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation, signed in Helsinki in 1975, is cultural diplomacy. The creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1946 was an act of cultural diplomacy. The same applies to the cultural aspects of international organizations that are primarily political or economic; for instance, the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Community (although the Treaty of Rome, 1957, makes no mention of culture), the Council of Europe (whose members signed a European Cultural Convention in 1954), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Nordic Council.

The Tindemans Report (1976, p. 28) proposed the creation of a European Foundation 'to promote, either directly or by assisting existing bodies, anything which could help towards greater understanding among our peoples by placing the emphasis on human contact'. The aim in fact was to further wide-scale cultural relations by an act which in itself rates as cultural diplomacy. The examples Tindemans gives of this human contact – 'youth activities, university exchanges, scientific debates and symposia, meetings between the socio-professional categories, cultural and information activities' – clearly go beyond governmental or governmentally inspired activity; they illustrate the way agreements under the heading of cultural diplomacy can facilitate, by collective resolution and budgetary obligation, a wider range of operations involving the institutions of member states. Yet the motive force of diplomacy is clear, as in the sentence: 'This Foundation will also have a role to play in presenting abroad the image of a United Europe' (p. 28). This is a political purpose, but it requires the backing of cultural relations for its implementation. Political agreement or decree involving individuals

and institutions would be tenuous without some expectation of their support; there must therefore be a basis in the popular will, and this basis rests upon cultural attitudes.

An outstanding example of multilateral cultural diplomacy is seen in the Helsinki Agreement of 1975. A major section of this, known as Basket III, is concerned with 'Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields'. There are important elements in this which represent concessions made by the Warsaw Pact countries, in return for the recognition of the status quo of Central and Eastern European frontiers, to the demand by the Western democracies for greater freedom of contact and for human rights. Although these concessions have by no means been fully honoured, they provide a text, the product of long diplomatic negotiation and the object of protracted subsequent debate, which can be invoked in the cause of those relations between people that contribute to international security through access and exchanges. Basket III comprises Human Contacts, Information, Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture and Co-operation in the Field of Education. Under Culture, the participating states:

Declare that they jointly set themselves the following objectives:

- (a) to develop the mutual exchange of information with a view to a better knowledge of respective cultural achievements,
- (b) to improve the facilities for the exchange and for the dissemination of cultural property,
- (c) to promote access by all to respective cultural achievements,
- (d) to develop contacts and co-operation among persons active in the field of culture,
- (e) to seek new fields and forms of cultural co-operation.

(Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975, p. 40)

The first-order meaning of cultural diplomacy is apparent enough, then, as one of the areas of international affairs governed by negotiations and agreements between governments. The second-order meaning is less determinate. Essentially, the execution of these agreements and the conduct of cultural relations flowing from them may be seen either as the extended responsibility of governments or as something delegated by governments to agencies and cultural institutions. The former is cultural diplomacy of the second order. As an aspect of diplomacy it is normally carried out abroad by diplomatic staff. It is closely aligned to official policy and national interest. Its ulterior purpose is political or economic. This may or may not be perceptible to its foreign clients, depending on the tact

and restraint with which it is executed. Cultural diplomacy seeks to impress, to present a favourable image, so that diplomatic operations as a whole are facilitated. Typically, though with a touch of exaggeration, it would be cultural diplomacy for a government to dispatch its national opera company, with a galaxy of international stars, to perform at a prestigious foreign festival before a cosmopolitan audience, or to mount a series of image-building lectures in a foreign capital, followed by lavish diplomatic receptions, for an invited audience of the great and the good. Both activities would be designed to redound to the credit of the sending country; they might even be timed to further some particular diplomatic end. Now, there is nothing wrong with this. Much activity that rates as cultural diplomacy is defensible and desirable. This might well be true of the examples above. It could undoubtedly be true of national participation in gala occasions, such as arts festivals, to which national representation cannot be denied without offence to the host country or without a significant and damaging forfeit of presence. The manner and cost of representation will of course need careful thought, as we shall see in later chapters, but the compulsion to be included, not to default on an occasion of international offerings, is a worthy reaction not only of diplomacy in general but also of cultural diplomacy. No government and no people wishes to fade into oblivion. Flying the flag is a common manifestation of national identity. Of the colours to be hoisted at the masthead, those that unfurl a nation's cultural achievement are in many modern situations the most appealing. And it is, of course, part of cultural diplomacy to appeal.

Cultural relations on the other hand, are more neutral and comprehensive. In a sense, they embrace the methods of cultural diplomacy, for they employ the resources granted by governments and the benefits resulting from international agreements. The difference is, in practice, one of mode. The purpose of cultural relations is not necessarily, and in advanced thinking hardly at all, to seek one-sided advantage. At their most effective, their purpose is to achieve understanding and co-operation between national societies for their mutual benefit. Cultural relations proceed ideally by the accretion of open professional exchanges rather than by selective self-projection. They purvey an honest picture of each country rather than a beautified one. They do not conceal but neither need they make a show of national problems. They neither pretend that warts are not there nor do they parade them to the repugnance of others.

Obviously, it would make for easier intelligibility if the term cultural diplomacy were reserved for its first-order meaning, and if cultural relations were applied generally to the execution and to the

craft. The second-order meaning of cultural diplomacy could then be abandoned to the archives, where it figures prominently in documented history. In effect, this is the tendency that is at work. But to postulate its fulfilment at present would be to presume too far on the intention of all modern states to handle their cultural representation objectively and not to link it inexorably with national interest. After all, cultural diplomacy is probably still the only realizable mode for countries that have not been able to evolve beyond a high degree of government control.

The boycott belongs to cultural diplomacy. It is an expression of political animus. For instance, the cultural boycott placed by Western democracies on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and on Poland after its imposition of military rule in 1980 is a short-term political response. It is based on the calculation that a greater effect will be achieved in the boycotted country, and before world opinion, by restriction than by the maintenance of normal cultural relations as a projection of alternative and presumably superior values. Normally, boycotts of this kind involve the suspension of major cultural events rather than the cessation of routine exchange programmes; they are therefore more declamatory than fundamental, the equivalent of the withdrawal of ambassadors rather than the rupture of diplomatic relations. The desirability and efficacy of boycotts can be debated from various points of view. But it is clear that the political motivation, however justified in its own terms, is alien to the spirit of cultural relations, since these operate on a longer time-scale and different wavelength. Admittedly, it might be the case, though it usually is not, that society at large in the sending country would not tolerate more than a minimal level of cultural activity towards a state that has offended against international law or the accepted code of conduct. Then it would be appropriate to cultural relations for more than obligatory activities to be frozen. Indeed, the executors, whether artists or whatever, might refuse their services for reasons of conscience. But in general the cultural boycott is politically motivated and unwelcome to the executors, who as members of elite groups value professional contacts abroad and do not wish them to go by default. For just as cultural relations can continue through non-governmental agencies in countries with which diplomatic relations have been broken off, so they can remain a vehicle for longer-term understanding between peoples, even when hostility between their governments finds its natural political expression in the way in which diplomacy and trade are restricted. Indeed, the citizens of the offending state may use their response to visiting cultural events as a means of indirectly expressing their own condemnation of their

government's actions. The acclamation that artists from the free world receive in totalitarian countries is often fuelled by protest.

This book is concerned with cultural relations. Cultural diplomacy of both the first and the second order takes due place, but the progressive and exciting aspects of the actual work lie beyond government direction. Already, democratic countries with open societies subscribe to the idea of two-way benefit, of mutuality. Admittedly, some governments even in open democratic countries look for a return on the investment of funds in cultural relations in terms of immediate national advantage, whereas the real return is in long-term relationships, which produce and propagate understanding and encourage co-operation. It is because these relationships can flourish only if they are not subject to politics that cultural relations work is best done by organizations that enjoy an appropriate degree of independence of the state machinery. Sometimes, for instance in some major countries with traditions in this direction, such organizations are constitutionally independent; elsewhere, they are formally responsible to a ministry, usually the foreign ministry, but are encouraged by the home authority and by the ambassador to exercise a considerable measure of autonomy. Indeed, today the concept of the cultural attaché slavishly scoring points for his political masters, the very antithesis of right-minded cultural relations, is probably out of date even in the embassies of totalitarian states. If such a person still exists, he inhabits a world of his own, unblest by ideals, untouched by modern communications and the cynicism of his clients – and of himself.

### **Meaning of Culture**

This book, then, is about cultural relations. The component parts comprise the arts, libraries and information services, literature, language teaching, science and technology, social structure, the exchange of persons, links between communities and institutions, and educational aid and training in the developing world. But what of culture itself, that undefined concept at the very heart of the matter? Fortunately, this is not the place to attempt a comprehensive definition: if T. S. Eliot (1948, p. 22) in his *Notes towards the Definition of Culture* was prepared to settle for 'Culture may even be described simply as that which makes life worth living', we need not plague ourselves over abstractions. All that matters here is to establish what we mean by culture in cultural relations (or cultural diplomacy). This is rendered more difficult, however, because culture means different things in different languages. In German, for