

ARCHITECTURE AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

EDITED BY
JOHN SHANNON HENDRIX AND
LORENS EYAN HOLM

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Architecture and the Unconscious

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Introduction

John Shannon Hendrix and Lorens Eyan Holm

THREE ANECDOTES BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION

There are a number of recent texts that draw on psychoanalytic theory as an interpretative approach for understanding architecture or that use the formal and social logics of architecture for understanding the psyche.[1] But there remains work to be done in bringing what largely amounts to a series of independent voices, into a discourse that is greater than the sum of its parts, in the way that, say, the architect Peter Eisenman was able to do with the architecture of deconstruction or that the historian Manfredo Tafuri was able to do with the Marxist critique of architecture. The present volume focusses for the first time on the subject of the unconscious in relation to the design, perception, and understanding of architecture. The hope is that the volume will make a major contribution to architectural theory, expanding it to an unexplored area, and enriching architecture in relation to the humanities.

The aim of this collection on architecture and the unconscious – as was the aim of the paper session of the same title at the SAH conference that forms the heart of this collection – is to bring a group of people into discourse.[2] A collection of chapters focussed on this subject area represents a return to earlier times. If we glance sideways at modernism, texts like Sigfried Giedion's *The Eternal Present* and Lewis Mumford's *Technics and Civilization*, simply assumed that their readers had a working knowledge of psychoanalytic concepts. Giedion has no trouble sliding from inside/outside the house to inside/outside the psyche. Jumping from the 1950s to the 1970s, a postmodern avant-garde congregating around Eisenman's Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies in NYC – the likes of the architects Aldo Rossi, Rem Koolhaas, and Bernard Tschumi – were able to draw on the texts of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan as instruments of radical critique. The 'discovery' of the unconscious by Freud and its instrumentalisation at the centre of the twentieth century discourse of the individual, is one of the hallmarks of modernism; and we would be within our rights to expect that an architecture that stakes its claim in modernism or its legacy, would address it. We would like to bind Le Corbusier's free

plan (*le plan libre*) and free façade with Freud's free association and free floating attention which constitute the discourse of patient and analyst.

Most people today, including most architects, who are not part of this project, in other words, part of the self-selected audience for this book, will wonder about the plausibility of putting such a public and material practice as architecture together with such an inaccessible and symbolic entity as the unconscious. Every time we touch a doorknob, we touch architecture; and we can all touch it together, even in the case of a private house. The only person who has access to an unconscious is the person whose unconscious it is – perhaps also his/her analyst – and it is touched with words, if it is touched at all. Let's begin therefore with three anecdotes that draw architecture and the unconscious together.

The best image to sum up the unconscious is Baltimore in the early morning.[3]

Jacques Lacan once remarked that the unconscious was rather like Baltimore very early in the morning. It's in a paper on the unconscious that Lacan presented at a conference at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. Imagine the situation. You've just pitched up at your hotel in a strange city. It's either too early in the morning or too late at night. You are jet lagged and not a little nervous about delivering your paper the next day. The only thing going on are traffic lights and neon advertising signs and electric clocks. All these messages flashing on and off, only no one is watching. It's like that expression 'Light's on, nobody home'. The language goes on working, whether anyone is paying any attention or not, and that is the unconscious.

Lacan was not without a sense of humour. Baltimore and the unconscious can be dreary and pedestrian places, a far cry from the exotic unconscious celebrated by the surrealists. Lacan has mapped the unconscious onto the city. What we assume to be the most intimate and internalised processes of the psyche, have been externalised and made machinic and impersonal. In his major texts he maps the unconscious onto language. This is a strange thing to do – rather counterintuitive – and he calls it *the field of the Other*. Both the city and language are external to us. If one of the main aims of Lacan's text is to articulate what we might call a linguistic unconscious, Lacan is here offering the tantalising possibility of an urban unconscious, an environmental one. Lacan is alluding to the material aspect of the unconscious and to its Otherness. The unconscious is about the spoken word, the words of others, and what words do when they are left alone and without the constant interference of our attention. When you slip your tongue and you disown it (*I didn't mean that!*) and your analyst responds with silence. It is in this sense outside us, in others, a collective entity like the architecture of the city.

In order to be significant, architecture must be forgotten, or must present only an image for reference which subsequently becomes confounded with memories.[4]

In *A Scientific Autobiography* (1981), Aldo Rossi wrote that architecture must be forgotten, it has to slip under the taught surface of consciousness, in order to be significant. It has, in other words, to be symbolised, so that – like language – it becomes a field of signs. It is not the real Parthenon that haunts me or haunts

modern architectural discourse – that is just a pile of rocks – but the symbolic one. Remembering is the flip side of forgetting. In *The Architecture of the City* (1982), Rossi rethinks the city as the repository or reserve of collective memory. The city is always under construction. The theory of architectural types, which he develops in this context, is such a project of symbolisation. The type is a logical principle, not a form. The typological project is arguably about understanding Architecture as a signifying field, in which one symbol replaces another, according to a history and rules of engagement, which – like Lacan's *field of the Other* – is the exteriorised impersonalised locus of the unconscious.

> *Now let us … suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past – an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one …. In the place occupied by the Palazzo Caffarelli would once more stand – without the Palazzo having to be removed – the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus …*[5]

From a dreary night in Baltimore to Freud's Rome. In the opening chapter of *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), Freud uses the Eternal City as an analogue for the unconscious. Freud is arguing that 'everything is preserved' and nothing that is forgotten is lost to the unconscious. The unconscious is the inexhaustible reserve that makes memory possible. In Freud's Rome, buildings from antiquity to the present coexist as if they interpenetrate. Freud writes that one would only have to shift the angle of one's view to see a building from a different period. Freud describes a city in which each building marks a site of continual exchange and replacement (Caffarelli-Capitolinus). It is not hard to read Rossi's project in this passage by Freud. Although he is using Rome as an analogy to explain the unconscious, Freud could be using the unconscious as an analogy to explain Rome.

This passage is tainted by an inexplicable ambivalence. Firstly, Rome is invoked to explain the so-called 'oceanic feeling', a phenomenon with which Freud has no sympathy whatsoever. Secondly, to his readers' discomfort, Freud concludes that Rome is *not* analogous to the unconscious: the simultaneity that is a condition of the unconscious is spatially impossible, 'only in the mind is such a preservation of all the earlier stages alongside of the final form possible, and … we are not in a position to represent this phenomenon in pictorial terms' (pp. 7–8). Elsewhere Freud will write that although the unconscious has a spatial and temporal logic, it is not the logic of conscious life and representation. And when Eisenman quotes this passage about Rome in his introduction to *The Architecture of the City*, he intends it to say something about the equivocal position of modernism for Rossi and the post-moderns, but – again – it is not clear what. This ambivalence seems to mask a lingering anxiety about putting the unconscious in relation to space, putting the unconscious in space, putting space in the unconscious. If it is an anxiety about the project of modernism, then it is an anxiety that a generation of avant-garde responses to modernism have done nothing to dispel. If there is a problem with placing architecture and the unconscious together, it is probably because the unconscious is not a possible object of representation. It can only ever be alluded

to. It seems to point to the failure of representation itself upon which architecture depends. Something haunts representation, representation lacks something and the unconscious seems to underscore it.

The unconscious seems to have three conditions: it is inaccessible, purposive, and in Lacan's reading of Freud, externalised. We are driven by we know not what, and we know not where. Psychoanalysis focusses on the unconscious as the key driver of the subject's psychic life and interaction with others, but the unconscious remains an internal horizon to the subject that no sail can reach.[6] Exploring the unconscious takes the form of retrospection and remembering; it is known only through its effects. Freud argued that the dream is the 'royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind',[7] and that the meaning of the dream is an unconscious wish. The path from wish to action is labyrinthine. The dream expresses a wish, but it is not the sort of wish that can be enunciated so directly by the *I wish* or *I want* of consciousness. Instead, it is enunciated in the dream whose displaced image fragments the subject remembers upon waking. These remembered fragments become the object of free association in the analytic situation.

Lacan's key contribution to psychoanalytic research is his close attention to the speech of the subject. In a rigorous analysis, all that is admitted as evidence in the analytic setting is what the subject says. It is not the remembered elements of the dream that constitutes the royal road to the unconscious, but what the subject associates with them. The unconscious remains inaccessible to the subject, because all that are known of it are its signifiers, the significance of which the subject is largely unaware. Lacan insists that the aim of analysis is not to explain the dream, to arrive at an interpretation of it that makes sense (it will never make sense), but rather to put into play the subject's signifiers, so that the subject can reposition him/herself within them and they can be instrumentalised in new ways. The unconscious is as externalised and inter-subjective as the language of which it is a function. In this sense it is like architecture, at least an architecture that can be formalised as a system of signs so that it can communicate.

Here we need to pursue our assault on popular notions of subjectivity. The subject is positioned and formed by the signifying system within which s/he finds him/herself and does not exist outside of it. The paradigm is language. Grammar positions subject-verb-object. A subject is a signifier within a signifying system and is subject to its grammar or rules of engagement. '[A] signifier … represents a subject for another signifier'.[8] It is not possible to articulate the concept of the subject without reference to a form of grammar and language. The subject of the king has a particular position with respect to royalty that is articulated through the rules for engagement with kings – tithes, genuflection, obeisance – which define the significance of our kingly actions and from which our subjectivity to the king derives. In his essay 'From Structure to Subject', Mario Gandelsonas argued that only once architecture has been worked through as a sign system, in other words, as a series of elements with a grammar or rules for their combination, can we speak of a subject of architecture.

> *At the point when this object [i.e., architecture] becomes clearly, and almost autonomously, defined in its systematic internal, formal relations then does*

> *the subject take on a clear configuration. In linguistic terms the definition of an organisation as a normative system, which in architecture would be the constitutive rules of the object, implies at the same time its subject.*[9]

He references the project of Peter Eisenman to develop a formal geometric syntax for architecture as the clearest attempt to produce a subject of architecture since the formulation of the classical language of architecture, but he could as well have mentioned Rossi's typological project for the city. Architecture is not a language. We do not speak architecture, nor do we communicate with it so directly because it does not mean the way words mean, but it may be possible that it is structured like a language.[10] There is thus a conscious subject and an unconscious one. We can speak of a subject of consciousness and a subject of the unconscious; they are not the same, and there is no clear link between them. The subject has a position, but it is a position within a signifying system and not space; it is at once a great interference to the psyche and a keystone of sanity, that this subject position is always conflated with another position, the position of the subject's body.

In these anecdotes, there is the recognition that architecture constitutes a form of a cultural unconscious, even as the relation to the unconscious remains problematic. The unconscious is the most speculative of entities. It is contested territory even within psychoanalysis. People tend to disown it; and when confronted by it, tend to get angry. It has a bastard logic that infuriates people and muddles their arguments. Yet the unconscious is one of the few places where alternative narratives are still possible. And where could be a more strategic place to insert the unconscious than in a practice as dominated by rational thought as architecture? Sometimes by understanding something in a new way, you change it for yourself and for others.

Architecture continues to be seen to be a reflection of clients' demands as opposed to an intervention in the field of their unconscious wishes or desire. Architecture is dominated by rational discourse and conscious thought. Psychoanalysis has established that human experience is not limited to consciousness. Important aspects of human experience also include dreams, desires, imagination, memory, emotion – aspects affected by unconscious processes. We are sceptical of the possibility that the present project will lead directly to alleviating unhappiness by an architectural procurement process that taps into the client's unconscious. We do not think that discipline building can be so instrumental, although it would be interesting for an architect and an analyst to co-analyse the client/patient of architecture/psychoanalysis. We can still ask the questions: How do architecture and the unconscious engage each other? How does architecture speak to the unconscious? How can unconscious processes be incorporated into architectural design? How can architecture appeal to the broader scope of human experience?

This book seeks to build a task force for building the unconscious into architectural design and theory. Architectural metaphors and theories of perception, imagination and space, in Freud, Lacan and other psychoanalysts, and theories of the structure of the psyche, are a rich source of understanding for architects to create architecture that responds to the field of unconscious desire. Chapters explore the intersections of architecture and psychoanalysis – historical

or current, theoretic or practical – for the purpose of broadening the approach to architectural design and theory based on the unconscious.

What follows is a brief history of the unconscious in Western philosophy and psychoanalysis. The certainties of history may help us situate the relation between architecture and the unconscious even if we cannot fix it permanently. We will see that the unconscious is a conceptual fact about the world, not a material one; a consequence of this status is that it has undergone review and revision throughout its history.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IN WESTERN THOUGHT

The possibility of the unconscious was suggested in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. Theories of the unconscious were established in the writings of Christian Wolff, Ernst Platner, Carl Gustav Carus, Eduard von Hartmann, Theodor Lipps, and Gustav Fechner. The science of the unconscious was established by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. Freud's early 'topographical metapsychology' gave way to a later 'structural metapsychology', paving the way for Lacan's science of the letter. The study of the unconscious grew beyond the romantic idealist response to the reign of reason in the Enlightenment, into a science itself. A goal of this book is to establish the science of the unconscious as a theoretical basis of the study of the design and perception of architecture.

The chapters reference the theories of a variety of writers, including Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, Hermann von Helmholtz, Eduard von Hartmann, William James, Sigmund Freud, Martin Heidegger, Wolfgang Köhler, Walter Benjamin, Melanie Klein, Adrian Stokes, Jacques Lacan, Gaston Bachelard, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Roland Barthes, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A variety of concepts are explored, including transcendental idealism, a priori intuition, apperception, theories of the unconscious, mysticism, unconscious fantasy, libidinal transformations, subjectivity, diagnosis, symbolic substitution, dream work, hysteria, transference, projection, therapeutic practice, eros and thanatos, historical materialism, psychoanalytical method, subjectivism, reactology, psychodynamics, empiriocriticism, the Other, collective memory, neurosis and psychosis, narcissism, topographies and topologies, projection, part-objects and part-architecture.[11] The concepts are applied to a variety of architects, architectural practices, and architectural conditions.

This summary considers the phenomenon of the unconscious. Various writers have attempted to describe how it works, especially in relation to conscious thought. It is clear that the concept of the unconscious, as it has been established, contributes a great deal to human identity, thus it would stand to reason that it would contribute a great deal to architecture. Conscious thought is influenced by unconscious thought. The unconscious plays a role in sense experience, perception, vision, intellection, the formation of ideas, abstract thought, language, creativity, judgement, imagination, dreams, and artistic production, all involved

in the experience and production of architecture. There is currently much interest in unconscious thought in cognitive science. For example, Unconscious Thought Theory examines the role that unconscious thought plays in everyday thought activities and events. It is necessary to look to philosophy and psychoanalysis to understand the possible roles that unconscious thought plays in more advanced creative activities, thus in architecture. How is unconscious thought known, conceived, and apprehended by conscious thought? Is conscious thought possible without unconscious thought? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to consider, not just pathologies, as introduced by Freud, but the history of philosophy, and the ways in which an unconscious element of thought has been conceived, prior to the coining of the term 'unconscious', and after.[12]

Various modern thinkers, including Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Carus, Platner, Hartmann, and Freud, have been given credit for inventing the unconscious. The truth is that the concept of the unconscious, that part of our mind that functions without our awareness in conscious thought, has been around since the beginning of philosophy, even if the word 'unconscious' was not used. Many terms throughout the history of Western philosophy suggest the concept of the unconscious, terms such as active intellect, *noesis*, *nous poietikos*, intelligible, and productive intellect in classical philosophy; and a priori intuition, apperception, subjectivity, inner experience, the real, the absolute, the noumenal, and being-in-self in eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophies. Classical and medieval conceptions of the unconscious were very different from Enlightenment and psychoanalytic conceptions, which is not surprising given the different epistemological frameworks. The classical and medieval conceptions focus on a higher form of thinking in our minds that comes from an external source, of which we are not aware, an immaterial agent or divine intellect that deals in intelligibles not connected to sense perception or sensory awareness. This concept persists through the writings of Kant and Hartmann, but with Schelling and Hegel the source of unconscious thought is located in the organic real, the noumenal being of the material world. Elements of metaphysical philosophies persist in psychoanalysis, but the focus of psychoanalysis is empirical and materialist, grounding conceptions of the unconscious in experience, in particular dreams and language.

Christian Wolff (1679–1754), in *Rational Thoughts on God, the Soul of Man, and also all things in General*, defined conscious thought as the representation of external objects of thought and sense perception. Conscious thought is the ability to differentiate particulars, and to differentiate external objects from the self. There are many objects that we are capable of perceiving that we do not perceive. Awareness is the basis of conscious thought, and it is possible to infer unconscious thought through conscious thought, to identify ideas in conscious thought that are caused by unconscious thought, through different levels of awareness and differentiated particulars, and the distinction between clear thoughts and obscure thoughts. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–62), in *Metaphysica*, saw obscure perceptions as being the foundation for the soul. In his *Aesthetica*, obscure thoughts and perceptions are connected to the particulars of sensuous cognition, while distinct thoughts are connected to higher forms of intellect, such as *nous poietikos*,

or poetic intuition, in the classical tradition. Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–79), in the *Brief Definition of All Sciences and Other Parts of Learning*, saw unconscious ideas as underlying and causing conscious ideas. Unconscious ideas are dark and unclear, but have considerable effect. Dreams prove the existence of unconscious thought. Conscious thought is connected to apperception, the conceptual gathering together of perceptions, and the differentiation between self and the perceived world. Abstract thoughts, the product of forms of intellect not connected to sense perception, have no connection to the perceived world. Conscious thought is dependent on representation (*Vorstellung*) in the imagination. Conscious thought is itself a representation. The most fundamental activity of the mind is seen as the production of representations.

Ernst Platner (1744–1818), in *Philosophical Aphorisms*, is credited with being the first to use the term 'unconscious' (*Unbewusstsein*).[13] Unconscious ideas play a role in conscious ideas. Conscious ideas are connected to apperception, the cognitive combining of perceptions into totalities, while unconscious ideas are connected to perception. Unconscious ideas are obscure images or representations. Conscious and unconscious, apperception and perception, are in constant oscillation. Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) wrote textbooks on psychology: *Textbook in Psychology*, and *Psychology as a Science Newly Founded on Experience, Metaphysics and Mathematics*. He developed theories on apperception, representation, and conscious and unconscious thought. Apperception is associated with conscious thought. Ideas are products of representations, as for Sulzer, which are seen as dynamic forces, both conscious and unconscious. Obscure ideas are unconscious and distinct ideas are conscious. Unconscious ideas may become conscious ideas as they pass a threshold or limen in the 'law of the threshold' (*Schwellengesetz*), as Herbart explained in his *Textbook in Psychology* (*Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*, 1816). Herbart's law of the threshold was developed by Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–87) in his *Elements of Psychophysics*. For Fechner, unconscious ideas are dynamic forces that are lost in conscious thought. The psychological threshold is an important basis for the concept of the unconscious in psychoanalysis. Fechner's adherence to empirical science had an influence on Freud. He was a pioneer in experimental psychology and the founder of psychophysics, the study of the relation between physical stimuli and sensations and perceptions. Freud followed Fechner in differentiating dream processes from conscious thought.

Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869), with the publication of *Psyche: On the Developmental History of the Soul*, is considered to be the first to develop a systematic theory of the unconscious with the unconscious as the focus of a theory of mind. *Psyche* begins: 'The key to an understanding of the nature of the conscious life of the soul lies in the sphere of the unconscious'.[14] Conscious thought can only be understood through unconscious thought. It is possible to be aware of unconscious thought in conscious thought; while it might seem impossible, it is the task of science to discover how unconscious thought can be accessed by conscious thought. The majority of the psyche is unknown to us in a present moment, lying in 'the night of the unconscious'. If the evolution of an idea is traced, its unconscious components can be discovered. Thoughts travel

between conscious and unconscious realms in a dynamic cycle. The external world cannot be the source of conscious thought, as the external world is the subject of sense perception and sense-based reason, necessitating the existence of unconscious thought. Conscious thoughts are based on images that have been formed in the imagination, but have then sunk into the unconscious. Ideas that have travelled from conscious to unconscious thought continue to develop in unconscious thought. We do not stop thinking while we are sleeping, for example. Unconscious thought is instinctual, the necessary organic real of nature, following Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. The oscillations between conscious and unconscious thought are seen as a dynamic flux in an organic system. The passage from conscious to unconscious thought is the highest form of human fulfilment, and is connected to pleasure and desire.

In *Lectures on Psychology*, Carus outlined the development of the unconscious on a biological model. The development of the psyche, the ontogeny, is a microcosm of the evolutionary development of a species, the phylogeny. This theory would influence both Freud and Carl Jung. The conscious psyche is divided into consciousness of the world and consciousness of the self. The unconscious psyche is divided into the relative unconscious, predicting the preconscious of Freud, and the absolute unconscious. The absolute unconscious is the most basic biological aspect of mind, and can involve both sentient and non-sentient activity. The absolute unconscious is the basis of organic growth, and is in constant activity. The sentient absolute unconscious is created by the nervous system of the biological organism. Mental activity takes place in the relative unconscious, which is connected to conscious thought. The relative unconscious is the permanent repository for conscious ideas, the storehouse for memories. In summary, Carus articulated a psychical field that includes conscious and unconscious memory, and conscious and unconscious imagination. This reflects Kant's distinction between reproductive and productive imagination.

In the thought of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), many of our ideas and representations are too obscure for us to be aware of them, as he explained in the *Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy* (1763), and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798). The higher levels of imagination, productive imagination, are not connected to sense perception or empirical experience, as explained in *Reflections on Anthropology* (1776–8) and *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787). The forms in sense perception are determined by intelligibles, called categories of a priori intuition. Conscious thought depends on the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is inaccessible to conscious thought. The principal categories of a priori intuition are space and time. An exploration of the suggestion of the unconscious in the writings of Kant can be found in the second chapter of this volume.

The relative unconscious of Carus is also where dreams are produced. Dreams are combinations of biological forces from the absolute unconscious and traces or residues of images that are formed in the imagination and that enter the relative unconscious from conscious thought. The relative unconscious is a threshold, as in the *Schwellengesetz* of Herbart, between the absolute unconscious and conscious

thought, what can be revealed to conscious thought of the unconscious. Ideas flow back and forth as dynamic forces, as in the psychophysiological energy of Fechner. The psychophysiological energy of the nervous system causes unconscious sensations and causes them to emerge in conscious thought. In conscious thought, consciousness of world is given by the faculties of sense, connected to the dynamic energy of the nervous system, and continuously affected by the relative unconscious. Consciousness of world depends on 'the condition of one's own organization',[15] and is also dependent on memory and representations (*Vorstellungen*) in imagination. While unconscious mind is an undifferentiated universal shared by all organisms, the individual is differentiated and made particular in conscious thought.

Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906) is known as the 'philosopher of the unconscious' because of his most influential work, *Philosophy of the Unconscious*. Hartmann saw Kant as the inventor of the unconscious. In contrast to Kant, for Hartmann not every conscious idea is a clear idea, and not every obscure idea is an unconscious idea. A conscious idea is only clear when it can be distinguished from other ideas, in a 'consciousness of the discrimination'.[16] The unconscious idea is distinguished from the conscious idea in the form of representation: the *repraesentatio* that is the genus of the unconscious idea, which is differentiated from the *perceptio* in the conscious idea. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* of Sigmund Freud, Hartmann is quoted as asserting that the unconscious underlies combinations of sensuous representations in the imagination, and that all unconscious ideas are purposive. Hartmann sees intellectual intuition as 'divine understanding' that produces intelligible objects and creates the 'world of noumena', while conscious thought is a 'derived and dependent human understanding'.[17] Hartmann sees the unconscious as a metaphysical principle, in a system of 'transcendental realism' involving the induction of what lies beyond experience, by first considering all possible experience. The unconscious is pure potentiality, the noumenal or thing-in-itself, which is created by intellectual intuition, as in *nous poietikos*. It is the ground of existence, combining reason and will. The redemption of the human condition is a return to the unconscious, as it is seen as the absolute in transcendental idealist terms.

Theodor Lipps (1851–1914) was a leading figure in academic psychology and an influence on Sigmund Freud. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud cites Lipps as establishing the unconscious as the key issue of psychology, and establishing the study of the unconscious as a science. It was thus Lipps who began the focus on the unconscious in psychoanalysis, broadening psychological studies from studies of sensations and empirical experience. Despite Freud's claim that his goal was to move beyond the 'metaphysical' conception of the unconscious, the classical metaphysical conceptions of unconscious thought play a core role in Freud's definition of the psyche. In classical philosophy, for example, the thinking subject as potential intellect or conscious thought is defined as 'I' (*to egô*). According to Lipps, in his lecture on 'The Concept of the Unconscious in Psychology', delivered at the Third International Congress for Psychology, all psychical phenomena exist unconsciously; 'the unconscious must be assumed to be the general basis of psychical life', as quoted by Freud in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (p. 651). Freud also

cites Lipps's most influential work, *Fundamental Facts of the Inner Life*, as refuting the theory of somatic stimulation, arguing that dreams are not determined by external stimuli. Lipps is also well known for his aesthetic theory, in particular his theory of empathy (*Einfühlung*), the act of projecting oneself into the object of a perception. Although empathy theory does not directly invoke the unconscious, it was one of the key places where psychology extended into aesthetic – and hence architectural – discourse.[18]

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) is seen as the founder of psychoanalysis, a discipline that he regarded as a science. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, dreams are the 'royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind' (p. 647). According to Freud, the dream is not unconscious thought, although it reveals the structures of the unconscious, and only the memory of the dream can be analysed. Unconscious thoughts are revealed by images in the dream. The memory of the dream is the manifest content, and the object of the analysis of the dream is the latent content, or dream thought, unconscious thought. The analysis itself is a product of conscious thought. Dream work transforms the latent content of the dream into the manifest content, the dream images, in the process by which the dream is generated from the unconscious. The mechanisms of representation in the dream, as they are developed between the dream thought (unconscious) and the dream image (conscious), are different from conscious mechanisms of representation, although conscious and unconscious thought share particular linguistic constructions. Unconscious mechanisms are seen as a variation of conscious mechanisms not under the control of conscious thought. The ego, conscious thought and perception, is always present in the dream. The mechanism of the transposition from dream thoughts to dream images is labeled 'imagination' by Freud in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (p. 116), which is liberated from the control of reason. The linguistic structure of the dream image is missing the organisation of conscious thought, while its forms are mimetic of it. Dreams have no ability to represent logical relations between dream thoughts or conscious thoughts. Dreams have no intention of communicating anything, although they express an unconscious wish.

According to Freud, unconscious thoughts are represented in the dream as fragmented images that are recombined, by processes of displacement (*Verschiebung*) and condensation (*Verdichtung*). Dream interpretation involves the restoration of the connections between dream thoughts that the dream work has destroyed. Thinking does not occur in dreams themselves. A thought process in a dream is a representation of a thought process in the dream thought, which is a representation of a conscious thought process. The thought process in the dream is thus a *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*, a representation of a representation. This theory can be traced to the classical definition of *eidos* and the formation of images in *phantasia* or imagination. The logic of the dream is independent of conscious logic. The network of logical relations between dream images is too complex to be unravelled in dream analysis. 'The most complicated achievements of thought are possible without the assistance of consciousness' (p. 632), according to Freud. Traces of perception (*Wahrnehmungszeichen*) become mnemic residues

of perception and consciousness, the representations of which are the dream images. Unconscious thought can also be made known in conscious thought as the absence in the gaps in conscious thought. The goal of psychoanalysis is to fill in those gaps in order to have access to unconscious processes. It is impossible for conscious thought to fully understand itself or unconscious thought.

In later writings (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, *The Ego and the Id*, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*), Freud expanded his concept of the unconscious to include the elements of *eros* and *thanatos*, life and death instincts (the death drive), and dynamic relationships between the ego, id and superego. In *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, the dream consists of visual residue (*Sachvorstellung*) and auditory residue (*Wortvorstellung*). In Lacan's reading of Freud, these are combined in a 'double inscription' (*Niederschrift*) involving displacement and condensation.[19] The later writings also mark a shift in Freud's thought on the organisation of the psyche from the so-called 'first topography', in which the psyche is divided into conscious, preconscious and unconscious processes or *systems*, to the 'second topography', in which the psyche is divided into three *agencies*, the ego, the id, and the superego. Between psychical processes and psychical agencies there is but an approximate correspondence. When Freud diagrams the ego-id topography, it is clear that he is thinking of bodily organs or containers (it looks like a brain or a liver). Indeed, the shift in topographies seems to be largely a shift in metaphors, from metaphors of space and the physical sciences that describe the first topography of systems, to the biological metaphors of the second.[20]

The id is the locus of libidinal and destructive impulses, what in *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud called the unconscious wish, and in Lacan's text becomes *desire*. The ego is a modification of the id in the development of the subject. The ego is the agency of repression of the id. It is the threshold between the id and reality. It appears in Freud's thought as a glittering reflective outer surface screening a seething cauldron of desire. The ego involves both conscious and unconscious thought. The superego projects the ego into the macrocosm of culture and universal ideas, what Lacan would call *the Other*. In *The Ego and the Id*, 'conscious' and 'unconscious' become descriptive terms that qualify processes rather than topoi or processes themselves. The essence of the psychical cannot be found in conscious thought. States of being conscious are transitory, in relation to the more permanent condition of the unconscious. The ego, conscious thought, is 'that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world',[21] through the medium of the perception-consciousness system. In *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, the inaccessible unconscious, 'cut off from the external world',[22] is dynamically repressed, though there is also a preconscious (*Vorbewusste*), which is that which is accessible to conscious thought in the unconscious, and that which is capable of becoming conscious. What passes from preconscious to conscious thought is not sustained in consciousness. The ego is defined as the organisation of mental processes, and is the ground for conscious thought. The preconscious thought becomes a conscious thought when it is connected with word presentations or language.

Jacques Lacan (1901–81) introduced important new concepts of the unconscious, many of which have a strong application to architecture. The following is a summary

of Lacan's concepts of the unconscious. Lacan regarded himself as Freud's closest reader and most important student. He is largely responsible for rewriting Freudian psychoanalysis in the terms of structural linguistics, thereby lifting Freud's thought out of its nineteenth century preoccupation with biologism and rebooting it for the twentieth century. This linguistic model has several consequences for psychoanalysis, most notably ontological. His theoretical work has made it possible to banish the quasi-non-material entities that have haunted prior treatments of the psyche. There is no ghost in the machine, no breath, no spirit, because the psyche is a language machine. The etymology of topography combines place and writing: a writing place, a place of writing, a place for writing, a place made by writing. Topography has a history that goes back to antiquity, in the recognition that thought is organised into places. We can assume that Lacan, the psychoanalyst influenced by the structural linguistics of Saussure and the structural anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss, was predisposed to Freud's first topography (writing place and place writing) and the aesthetics of surface. In most of his texts, he crosses Freud's two topographies, using ego-unconscious to describe the form of the psyche. This implies psychical agency, largely a function of images, within a field or surface of signifiers.

Lacan's concept of the unconscious combines an analysis of Freudian dream work with an analysis of the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. He calls analysis the science of the letter. In the structural linguistics of Saussure, the word is divided into the signifier, the phonetic sound, and the signified, the idea to which the phonetic sound corresponds. Saussure, in the *Course in General Linguistics*, suggests that any relationship between the two is arbitrary. In 'The instance of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud' (1957),[23] Lacan, following Saussure, places a bar between the two, suggesting the inaccessibility of the signifier to the signified, or the inaccessibility of conscious speech to unconscious thought. The signifier, according to Lacan, represents the speaking subject to another signifier; it represents the insertion of the speaking subject into language. The sliding (*glissement*) of the signifier along the bar of signification constitutes a system of relations between signifiers, and a deferral of meaning. Jacques Derrida identified the same phenomenon of the differing, deferring and temporising of meaning in his essay '*Différance*' (1982).[24] Meaning can only be present as an absence, as unconscious thought can only be present as an absence in conscious thought.[25] The bar between the signifier and signified reifies the presence of the subject in signification, as that absence which is present in every signifier. Language produces the subject, rather than the subject producing language.

Metaphor and metonymy are the principal operational rules that determine language. A metaphor is a condensation of signifiers ('the world is a stage'); a metonym is a displacement of one signifier for another ('fifty sails' for 'fifty ships'), in the terms of Freudian dream work. The bar between signifier and signified is maintained in the displacement of the metonym, but it is crossed in the condensation of the metaphor, in the elision of a second signified, which creates an absence in the signifying chain. The bar is only crossed because one signifier is substituted for another. The absence in the signifying chain is what constitutes the speaking subject, which is other to itself, as conscious thought is other to unconscious thought. Signification

only occurs retroactively, in retroactive anticipation, in the play of signifiers, at the 'anchoring point' (*point de capiton*), which is the point at which the subject inserts itself into language as absence. I can only communicate an idea to someone when they anticipate what I am going to say, when a connection is made in the *glissement* between signifier and signified, as at a 'button-hole' (*point de capiton*), which cancels me as a communicator of an idea. Language is a self-enclosed system with gaps or absences that reveal a connection to what is other to it, the unconscious. In structural linguistics, language is divided into *parole* and *langue*. While *parole* is individual enunciation, *langue* is the collective system of relationships. *Parole* is the conscious use in speech of unconsciously determined structures, or *langue*.

Lacan divides the Freudian psyche into the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. The Real is that which is inaccessible to the Imaginary or Symbolic orders. The Imaginary, the identity of the perceiving subject in the image, precedes the Symbolic, the speaking subject in language. The Imaginary ego is formed in the 'mirror stage', when an infant first identifies itself as image in a mirror. The Imaginary other is then interwoven into the Symbolic, in the matrix of language which is the Other, which Lacan defines as the unconscious. The Imaginary, image-based thinking or immediate experience of perceived objects, is absorbed into the Symbolic when the subject begins to speak; immediate experience becomes symbol in language, as in the *Fort! Da!* Game described by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, where the infant compensates for the temporary loss of its mother by exclaiming 'Gone! Here!'. As Lacan says in *Seminar I*:

> *If we must define that moment in which man becomes human, we would say that it is at that instant when, as minimally as you like, he enters into a symbolic relationship.*[26]

The Imaginary and Symbolic are interwoven in conscious and unconscious thought, as in a Borromean knot. The Imaginary is primarily conscious in primordial image identification, while the Symbolic is primarily unconscious in language, as the matrix of language is the unconscious. The subject becomes divided between the Imaginary and Symbolic, causing a gap in the subject, between image and word. This is the fundamental problem in Lacanian psychoanalysis. The Other is the network of identifications that determine the subject in interpersonal relations. Perception is a dialectic of the Imaginary and Symbolic; as the Imaginary is absorbed into the Symbolic, immediate perception of sense objects is impossible. As in classical philosophy, perceived objects are given by intelligible concepts in unconscious thought. As in Kantian philosophy, experience is determined by the categories of a priori intuition in unconscious thought. The thinking subject is formed when it enters into a symbolic relationship in language. When the subject enters into language, it is represented by a signifier, a pronoun, and the subject is always excluded from the signifying chain, becomes an absence, at the point that it is represented in it. Language defines the subject and assures its non-being. The ego is formed as a replacement for the elided subject in language.

The subject is composed of the ego, the unconscious, the Other and the other (perceived object identification), what Lacan calls the 'quadrature' of the subject.

Conscious thought in the ego is determined by unconscious thought as the Other. The resistance of the conscious ego to the unconscious is the resistance of the signifier to the signified, the inaccessible source of conscious ideas. The unconscious speaks though the subject, but conscious thought cannot know the unconscious, or itself. Conscious thought is constituted by *méconnaissance*, misknowing or misrecognition. The reality beyond language in the unconscious is revealed in the absences in language, the gaps and scotomata. Freud drew attention to those gaps in the form of jokes, puns, slips of the tongue, etc., but he failed to recognise the significance of them, according to Lacan. The unconscious is found in the gaps between signifiers, where the ego is revealed as representation. Absence and presence oscillate in the *glissement* of signifiers.

In *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, the unconscious is 'manifested as that which vacillates in a split in the subject'[27] between the Imaginary and Symbolic, according to Lacan. The unconscious is a primordial cut in thought, manifested in a temporal pulsation in language, as the subject is elided and then re-emerges. The oscillation is also present in the dream, which contains the dialectic of the Imaginary and Symbolic. Unconscious thought perpetually opens and closes with conscious thought. It is only present as an absence in the gap between the Imaginary and Symbolic, in which the subject is 'born divided' (p. 199). The subject becomes the network of signifiers in language, and in the layers of images in dreams. That which passes in the gap between perception and consciousness, Imaginary and Symbolic, other and Other, and in the *glissement* in the signifying chain in language, is what Lacan calls the 'gaze'. The gaze is the absence in conscious thought. The result of the split between Imaginary and Symbolic in the subject is desire, caused by the impossibility of fulfilment, and the absence in conscious thought, the inability to know the unconscious. The object of desire is the Other, which is a substitute for the absence of the subject (the *objet a*). Lacan's concepts of the unconscious, as summarised here, have been the most influential of any as applied to theory in the last 50 years, including architectural theory. Lacan's unconscious is an architectonic one, and easily given to spatial relations that are played out in architecture (concepts such as the mirror stage, for example).

Art, architecture and philosophy define the relation between ourselves and the world around us; they reveal ourselves to ourselves, and they reveal the presence of the unconscious in conscious thought. Architecture has as much capacity as any form of expression to represent human identity; the application of psychoanalysis to architecture can only enhance that capacity. For Schelling, art is the highest form of philosophy, or the only true document of philosophy. The making of art and architecture is a form of philosophising, of defining and expressing the human condition. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote, 'I philosophize with a hammer'.[28]

A SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

This volume contains 14 chapters organised into four thematic sections. The first section of the volume explores historical paradigms for architecture and the