

The background of the cover is a complex architectural line drawing in a light green color on a dark green background. It features various geometric shapes, including rectangles, circles, and arcs, some of which are filled with patterns like hexagons or dots. The drawing appears to be a technical or conceptual architectural plan, possibly showing a building layout or a site plan with various zones and structures.

Global Governance

BRICS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Edited by
Marina Larionova and John J. Kirton

ROUTLEDGE



BRICS and Global Governance

The past few decades have witnessed the development of an increasingly globalized and multipolar world order, in which the demand for multilateralism becomes ever more pronounced. The BRICS group, established in 2009, has evolved into a plurilateral summit institution recognized both by skeptics and proponents as a major participant in the international system.

Addressing the BRICS's role in global governance, this book critically examines the club's birth and evolution, mechanisms of inter-BRICS cooperation, its agenda priorities, BRICS countries' interests, decisions made by members, their collective and individual compliance with the agreed commitments, and the patterns of BRICS engagement with other international institutions. This volume advances the current state of knowledge on global governance architecture, the BRICS role in this system and the benefits it has provided and can provide for world order.

This book will interest scholars and graduate students who are researching the rise and role of emerging powers, global governance, China and India's approach to global order and relationship with the United States, Great Power politics, democratization as a foreign policy strategy, realist theory-building and hegemonic transitions, and the (crisis of) liberal world order.

Marina Larionova, Center for International Institutions Research (CIIR), Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA).

John J. Kirton, Munk School of Global Affairs, Trinity College, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto.

Global Governance

Series Editor: John J. Kirton

University of Toronto, Canada

Global governance is growing rapidly to meet the compounding challenges of a globalized twenty-first-century world. Many issues once dealt with largely at the local, national or regional level are now going global, in the economic, social and political-security domains. In response, new and renewed intergovernmental institutions are arising and adapting, multilevel governance is expanding, and subnational actors are playing a greater role and creating complex combinations and private-partnerships to this end.

This series focuses on the new dynamics of global governance in the twenty-first century by:

- Addressing the changes in the structure, operation and impact of individual intergovernmental institutions, above all their innovative responses to the growing global challenges they confront.
- Exploring how they affect, are affected by and relate to nonstate actors of global relevance and reach.
- Examining the processes of cooperation, competition and convergence among international institutions and the many global governance gaps where global challenges such as terrorism, transnational crime and energy do not confront powerful international institutions devoted to their control.
- Dealing with how global institutions govern the links among key issues such as climate change and health.

In all cases, it focuses on the central questions of how global governance institutions and processes generate the effective, legitimate, accountable results required to govern today's interconnected, complex, uncertain and crisis-ridden world.

See the web page for a full list of titles: <https://www.routledge.com/Global-Governance/book-series/ASHSER1420>

Recent titles

Accountability for Effectiveness in Global Governance

Edited by John J. Kirton and Marina Larionova

BRICS and Global Governance

Edited by Marina Larionova and John J. Kirton

BRICS and Global Governance

**Edited by Marina Larionova and
John J. Kirton**

First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an
informa business*

© 2018 selection and editorial matter, Marina Larionova and
John J. Kirton; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Marina Larionova and John J. Kirton to be identified
as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their
individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections
77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British
Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Kirton, John J, editor. | Larionova, Marina, editor.

Title: BRICS and global governance / edited by Marina Larionova
and John Kirton.

Description: New York: Routledge, [2018] | Series: Global
governance | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017050165 |

Subjects: LCSH: International organization. | Globalization—
Political aspects. | Globalization—Economic aspects. |
BRIC countries.

Classification: LCC JZ1318 .B745 2018 | DDC 341.2—dc23

LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2017050165>

ISBN: 978-1-4724-8076-7 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-56992-5 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by codeMantra

Contents

<i>List of tables</i>	vii
<i>List of figures</i>	ix
<i>List of contributors</i>	xi
<i>Preface and acknowledgements</i>	xiii
<i>Abbreviations and acronyms</i>	xvii
PART I	
Introduction	1
1 The rise of new institutions	3
MARINA LARIONOVA	
PART II	
The evolving institutional identity of the BRICS	21
2 Explaining the solid, strengthening success of the BRICS summit	23
JOHN J. KIRTON	
3 BRICS engagement with international institutions for better governance	49
ANDREY SHELEPOV	
4 Political dynamics within the BRICS in the context of multilayered global governance	70
MARIA RAQUEL FREIRE	
PART III	
The BRICS contribution to global governance	89
5 The New Development Bank in the global financial and economic architecture	91
ALEXANDRA MOROZKINA	

6 BRICS financial and payment arrangements: A locus of intragroup trade development	106
NATALIA KHMELEVSKAYA	
7 The BRICS security agenda: Russia's approach and the outcomes of the Ufa Summit	129
VICTORIA V. PANOVA	
8 The BRICS and nontraditional security	150
NIALL DUGGAN	
9 Prospects for cooperation in science, technology and innovation among BRICS members	168
MICHAEL KAHN	
PART IV	
BRICS interests and priorities for cooperation	187
10 The BRICS for better global governance: A Russian perspective	189
GEORGY TOLORAYA	
11 The BRICS agenda in the Asia-Pacific region	208
HAIBIN NIU	
12 South Africa in the BRICS: Last but not least	223
VLADIMIR SHUBIN	
13 BRICS regional policy in Africa	242
TATIANA DEYCH	
PART V	
Conclusion	265
14 Looking into the future of the BRICS	267
MARINA LARIONOVA	
<i>Index</i>	275

List of tables

Appendix 2-A	BRICS Performance, 2009–2015	41
Appendix 2-B	BRICS Conclusions, 2009–2015	42
Appendix 2-C	BRICS Commitments by Issue, 2009–2015	43
Appendix 2-D	BRICS Compliance, 2009–2014	44
Appendix 2-E	References to Outside Institutions	47
Appendix 2-F	International Image of BRICS Countries, May 2013	48
3.1	References to International Institutions, 2008–2015	51
5.1	Multilateral Development Bank Loan Portfolios by Sector, %, 2015	92
5.2	World Bank Loan Portfolio by Country, %, 2015	93
5.3	Asian Development Bank Loan Portfolio by Country, %, 2009–2015	94
5.4	African Development Bank Loan Portfolio by Region, %, 2009–2015	94
5.5	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Loan Portfolio by Region and Country, %, 2009–2015	95
5.6	Inter-American Development Bank Loan Portfolio by Country, %, 2009–2015	96
5.7	Financial and Operational Indicators of the Multilateral Development Banks, 2015	97
5.8	Loan Portfolios of the BRICS Development Banks, by Sector, %, 2015	99
5.9	Financial and Operational Indicators of BRICS National Development Banks, 2015	99
5.10	Infrastructure Quality Indicators, 2013–2014	100
5.11	Key Technology Development Indicators, 2007	101
5.12	Gross Domestic Product and Bretton Woods Quotas	101
6.1	Modes of BRICS Monetary-Related Dialogue	108
6.2	BRICS in International Financial Arrangements, as at December 31, 2016	113
8.1	FAO Four Dimensions of Food Security	158
9.1	PESTEL Indicators (2012 or Nearest)	171

viii *List of tables*

9.2	Subject Area Specialization on Scopus: Total Publication Count post 1995	178
9.3	Article Counts and Percentage Co-publication, BRICS 2012	180
13.1	BRICS Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations on June 30, 2017	254
14.1	BRICS Main Achievements	268
14.2	BRICS Members' Voting Power in the International Monetary Fund and Gross Domestic Product	271

List of figures

3.1	References to international institutions, 2008–2015, %	52
3.2	Intensity of References to International Institutions, 2008–2015	53
3.3	Number and Intensity of References to the United Nations, 2008–2015	56
3.4	Number and Intensity of References to the G20, 2008–2015	59
3.5	Number and Intensity of References to the International Monetary Fund, 2008–2015	60
3.6	Number and Intensity of References to the World Bank, 2008–2015	61
3.7	Number and Intensity of References to the World Trade Organization, 2008–2015	63
3.8	Number and Intensity of References to the World Health Organization, 2008–2015	65
6.1	BRICS Export Structures in 2010–15	117
6.2	BRICS Real Effective Exchange Rate and Nominal Exchange Rate in 2010–14	120



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

List of contributors

Tatiana Deych is a leading research fellow of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Niall Duggan is a college lecturer of the Department of Government at University College Cork.

Maria Raquel Freire is the director of the PhD Program in International Politics and Conflict Resolution at the University of Coimbra.

Michael Kahn is a professor extraordinaire in the DST/NRF Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and Science Policy and the Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology at Stellenbosch University.

Natalia Khmelevskaya is an associate professor of the Department of Foreign Economic Ties and International Economic Relations at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

John J. Kirton is the codirector of the BRICS Research Group and the G20 Research Group and director of the G7 Research Group, a fellow of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Trinity College, and a professor of political science at the University of Toronto.

Marina Larionova is the codirector of the BRICS Research Group and head of the Center for International Institutions Research (CIIR) of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA).

Haibin Niu is a senior fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.

Alexandra Morozkina is a PhD student at the National Research University Higher School of Economics and head of the structural reforms division in the Economic Expert Group.

Victoria V. Panova is director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, School of Regional and International Affairs, professor at the Department of

International Relations at the Far Eastern Federal University and a strategy planning advisor for the Russia's National Committee on BRICS Research.

Andrey Shelepov is a lead analyst on international financial institutions at the Center for International Institutions Research (CIIR) of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA).

Vladimir Shubin is a professor and principal research fellow at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Georgy Toloraya is a chair of the Regional Programs Department at the "Russkiy Mir" Foundation and executive director of the National Committee on BRICS Research (Russia).

Preface and acknowledgements

The BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which was hosted by Russia for its first summit of BRIC members at Yekaterinburg on June 16, 2009, has evolved into a plurilateral summit institution recognized both by former skeptics and proponents as a major participant in the international system. However, its members' interests and priorities, the group's actorness features and an assessment of its performance remain subject to research and debate.

As the BRICS return to South Africa for their tenth summit in 2018, the leaders will deliberate and make decisions on a wide number of issues covering most major global governance challenges. BRICS members remain committed to inclusive growth, macroeconomic coordination, strengthened financial stability and the reform of international institutions to reflect the increasing weight of emerging markets and developing countries in the world economy. The BRICS countries are steadily stepping up their cooperation on the social agenda, in development, education, health and agriculture, as well as in innovation and information and communications technology to enhance opportunities for all. Political and security issues remain among the top priorities, given the members' commitment to ensure peace as the cornerstone of development and growth.

BRICS institutionalization has been fast. Its rapid pace is likely to continue. The formal track has grown into a constellation of 14 cooperation forums. The BRICS Business Forum and the BRICS Business Council, established in 2010 and in 2013 respectively, serve as platforms for a regular dialogue between business and the BRICS governments. Since 2010, the BRICS Academic Forum has provided a framework for generating research and producing new ideas and testing concepts that can then be taken up by policy makers in the BRICS. The BRICS Think Tanks Council was set up in Durban in 2013 to enhance cooperation in research, knowledge sharing, capacity building and policy advice among think tanks in the BRICS countries. It presented its long-term vision for the BRICS to the leaders in 2015. Also in 2015, dialogue with social partners expanded to include the Civil BRICS, which held a forum to bring together non-governmental organizations from the member states in June. A Trade Unions Forum also took place during the Russian BRICS presidency.

BRICS outreach cooperation has been acquiring a regional dimension since the 2013 South African presidency initiated and successfully held the BRICS Leaders-Africa Dialogue Forum. In the lead-up to Fortaleza in 2014, the Brazilian presidency hosted a working session in Brasilia between the BRICS leaders and South American leaders. Such an exchange between BRICS leaders and their counterparts in the host's region has become a systemic component of the BRICS outreach strategy. Russia invited the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, all members of the newly created Eurasian Economic Union that came into force on January 1, 2015, as well as members and observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organizations for an outreach meeting in Ufa.

This book was inspired by the transformation of the BRICS into a global summit institution and by the need to elaborate new and innovative theoretical frameworks for analysing the BRICS phenomenon from a multidisciplinary and comparative perspective. The volume first looks at the evolving institutional identity of the BRICS, then focuses on its contribution to several key policy areas of global governance and, finally, explores BRICS members' interests and their priorities for cooperation.

The book was conceived during the preparations for the conference on "The BRICS in the Spotlight," convened by the University of Parma in Italy in November 2014. Early versions of several chapters were published in a special issue of *the International Organisations Research Journal* on the theme of "The BRICS in the System of Global Governance," analysing the contextual background for the group's rise and consolidation as an international actor and offering insights on specific BRICS policies and political perspectives. We are grateful to Veronica Federico of the University of Florence and Lucia Scaffardi of the University of Parma for their invaluable help and advice during the process of preparing that special issue.

This book is a result of the substantial work of an international pool of experts engaged in BRICS research and process. We highly value the work implemented by the BRICS Research Group and its members. This publication would not be feasible without the continuous efforts of our joint University of Toronto and Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration teams (RANEPА) to monitor compliance of the BRICS countries with the commitments made by their leaders at their summits.

We also express our gratitude, as always, to Madeline Koch of the BRICS Research Group, who turned the separate chapters of the book into a high-quality professional text. And we acknowledge with great thanks the tireless and efficient work of Elizaveta Safonkina at RANEPА.

We are deeply grateful to many individuals working within the official BRICS process. It is their work that turned the BRICS from a concept into one of the key actors in the system of global governance.

We highly appreciate the dedication of the BRICS Think Tanks Council, all the researchers and authors, and our colleagues at Russian and international research institutions studying the BRICS.

At Routledge, we owe a great deal to the professionalism and the patience of Rob Sorsby and his colleagues.

We also would like to thank the future readers of this book for using the volume. We hope that this book will add value to BRICS research and contribute to a better understanding of the BRICS by the expert community and by all those people interested in the BRICS and non-BRICS members.

Marina Larionova and John J. Kirton
January 2018



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Abbreviations and acronyms

ABC	Brazilian Cooperation Agency
ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEOI	automatic exchange of tax information
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AISA	Africa Institute of South Africa
ANC	African National Congress
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BAIES	Basic Agricultural Information Exchange System
BEPS	base erosion and profit shifting
BERD	business expenditure on research and development
BNDES	Brazilian Development Bank
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BRL	Brazilian real
BTTC	BRICS Think Tanks Council
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CDB	China Development Bank
CFETS	China Foreign Exchange Trade System
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
CII	Confederation of Indian Industry
CMIM	Chang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
CNY	Chinese renminbi
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CRA	Contingent Reserve Arrangement
CUTS	Consumer Unity and Trust Society
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs (of the United Nations)
DBSA	Development Bank of South Africa

DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EFSD	Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development
EMBRAPA	Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
EMDCs	emerging markets and developing countries
ESI	Export Similarity Index
EU	European Union
Exim Bank	Export-Import Bank of India
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI	foreign direct investment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FSF	Financial Stability Forum
G20	Group of 20 (Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union)
G7	Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union)
G8	Group of Eight (G7 plus Russia)
G77	Group of 77 developing countries
G8+5	Group of Eight + Five (G8 plus Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa)
GCI	Global Competitiveness Index
GDP	gross domestic product
GERD	gross expenditure on research and development
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus / acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
HSRC	Human Science Research Council (South Africa)
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBSA Dialogue Forum	India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum
ICT	information and communication technology
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFI	international financial institution
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INR	Indian rupiah
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
LDCs	least developed countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
Mercosur	(Mercado Común del Sur) Southern Common Market
MOEX	Moscow Exchange
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB	New Development Bank
NER	nominal exchange rate
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
P5	Permanent Five members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, United States and United Kingdom)
PESTEL analysis	political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal analysis
PICI	Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (of the New Partnership for Africa's Development)
PPP	purchasing power parity
PSI	plurilateral summit institution
R&D	research and development
R2P	responsibility to protect
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RCA	revealed comparative advantage
REER	real effective exchange rate
RIC	Russia-India-China
RUB	Russian ruble
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SDR	special drawing right
SICAP	System of Payments and Reciprocal Credits
SKA	Square Kilometre Array (SKA) radio telescope
SMEs	small and medium-sized enterprises
SML	Sistema de Pagos en Moneda Local

xx *Abbreviations and acronyms*

STI	science, technology and innovation
SWOT analysis	analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USPTO	United States Patent and Trademark Office
VEB	Vnesheconombank
WEF	World Economic Forum
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZAR	South African Rand

Part I

Introduction



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

1 The rise of new institutions

Marina Larionova

Introduction: the challenges and responses

The past decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the world. The bipolar world order has vanished, the unipolar period has passed and a new multipolar world order is emerging.

In this “unraveling” globalized world, geopolitical, economic, environmental, societal and technological challenges are tightly interconnected (Haass 2014). They “transcend borders and spheres of influence and require stakeholders to work together, yet these risks also threaten to undermine the trust and collaboration needed to adapt to the challenges of the new global context” (World Economic Forum 2015). The challenges and their perceptions have been driving shifts in international cooperation. One major trend is “the proliferation and diversification of actors, forums, and their arrangements to address global challenges,” leading to a presumed fragmentation of global governance (Egel 2015, 4–5). However, fragmentation is also often perceived positively as “contested multilateralism,” because institutional diversity can produce better outcomes than “stalled cooperation through existing venues” struggling to respond to persisting and emerging challenges (Egel 2015, 5).

With multipolarity rising as countries outside the old core become economically more powerful, and clusters of countries gravitate to form new poles, the demand for multilateralism becomes more pronounced (Wade 2011). Multilateralism can be defined simply as the practice of coordinating policies in groups of states through ad hoc arrangements or institutions (Keohane 1990). Different modes of multilateralism and participation in coordinating mechanisms exist: the entry of new states into apex governing forums, the increased voting power of emerging states in international organizations, and new agreements and institutions established to coordinate and contribute to regional or global governance.

In spite of an increasing number of international actors, including non-state actors, both formal and informal organizations as well as governments remain key players. Responsibility for ensuring that this emerging multipolar world remains stable and contributes to global well-being rests with the

states—both the established powers and the rising centres of power—as well as with the principals of global governance and their agents—international institutions, global and regional, multilateral and plurilateral.

The emergence of informal multilateral institutions claiming a major role in defining the global governance agenda has created alternatives for providing common goods. These new summit institutions—led by the Group of Seven/Eight (G7/8) and, more recently, the Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—are at the centre of the galaxy of global governance institutions.

These groupings are often referred to as clubs, an arrangement that does not imply a common ideological commitment of its members, whose positions can differ on policy and economic ideas (Reay 2012). Club mechanisms are considered flexible, noninstitutionalized intergovernmental platforms for engagement (Drezner 2007). Other experts define a club as a group with clear rules, concrete and exclusive privileges for members, and a high degree of protection from external pressure.

These informal summit institutions are characterized by limited membership, relatively low bureaucracy and reliance on open, flexible and voluntary approaches. Regular meetings of heads of state and government who engage on a wide range of international, regional and domestic politics stand at the pinnacle of such international arrangements, which involve many actors operating according to established procedures on two levels: domestic and international. Commitments contained in their collectively agreed documents are not legally binding, but implementation is stimulated by peer pressure. As with any multilateral institution, they are based on the principles of generalized reciprocity, in which states make common undertakings and agree to act cooperatively, irrespective of their degree of institutionalization (Hampson and Heinbecker 2011, 300).

Most importantly, within informal summit institutions, states do not delegate certain levels of authority to international bureaucrats within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), so there is no delegating relationship between the states and the IGOs in which states are principals and the IGOs are agents. Hence the states retain their sovereign control over their institution's design and agenda.

These new informal groupings set their own agenda. They also engage with established international organizations to steer global governance processes. Those formal organizations have “the UN system as the core of the organized multilateral order” (Thakur et al. 2014, 1). They need reform and cannot respond on their own to the interconnected persisting and arising challenges. Interinstitutional cooperative mechanisms are being transformed, and new models of cooperation are being established.

A trend in the informal groupings leadership is evident in certain areas. On financial regulation, the G20 has taken up the initiative for decision making since its first summit in Washington in 2008, issuing mandates for further elaboration and implementation to relevant international organizations.

The BRICS has adopted a different approach, characteristic of the G7 in its early years of performance, transmitting signals to international organizations, treating the issues within the summit-based apparatus and establishing its own institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) (on the G7 see Putnam and Bayne 1987, 156–57).

If common sense is any guide, global governance would gain effectiveness from a combination of the catalyst, core-group and parallel-treatment approaches exercised by summit institutions: influencing international organizations' changes through endorsement or stimulus, or compelling them to reform; setting a new direction by taking a lead that the other organizations would follow; and creating the informal institutions' own mechanisms. The first two approaches—especially in relation to the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and relevant regional organizations—would undoubtedly enhance the resilience, legitimacy and effectiveness of the global governance architecture. The parallel treatment, however, could initially give rise to tensions and concerns about competition or rivalry, but fills a gap in governance and serves the needs of members and other interested stakeholders, with the new arrangements acquiring their own actorness and a place in the system of global governance.

Analytical paradigm

Rational choice institutionalism can best explain not only the origins of the summit institutions, but also their existence and evolution. In its account of the institutional origins, rational choice institutionalism turns “primarily on the functions that these institutions perform and the benefits they provide” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 952). The rationalist fundamental position aptly holds that institutions are created by states because the states see benefits accrue to them from the functions performed by the institutions (Rosamond 2000, 116).

The calculus approach fits the analysis of summit institutions bringing together states from a wide range of civilizations, continents and economic development. Its distinctive features clearly apply to the analysis of the origin of the BRICS. First, the member states act strategically to maximize the attainment of their priorities. Second, summitry presents an arrangement where strategic interaction among leaders plays a major role in determining political outcomes. Third, according to Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996), rational choice institutionalism offers the greatest analytical leverage to settings where consensus among actors accustomed to strategic action and of roughly equal standing is necessary to secure institutional changes—the features typical of summitry institutions. Fourth, the institutions are created by a voluntary agreement among the leaders of the respective countries to perform concrete functions and missions (Hall and Taylor 1996).

Thus, the leaders designated the G20 to be the premier forum for their international economic cooperation (G20 2009, para. 19). BRICS members came together to establish a platform for dialogue and cooperation to promote peace, security and development in a multipolar, interdependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world, on the basis of universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision making (BRICS 2012, paras. 3–4).

Any theory has its strengths and weaknesses, however, and the rational choice limitations do not constrict the analysis in this book. First, the book relies on a highly functionalist approach to explore BRICS performance on the global governance functions of deliberation, direction setting, decision making, delivery and development of global governance. Deliberation is understood as face-to-face discussions of the members encoded in their collectively issued communiqués. Direction setting is defined as collective affirmation of shared principles, norms and prescriptions. Decision making is regarded as credible, clear, collective commitments with sufficient precision, obligation and delegation. Delivery is understood as stated compliance with collective decisions. The development of global governance is perceived as the capability of the BRICS to use other international institutions and create its own institutions as global governance mechanisms (Kirton 2013, 37–39).

Second, given that the founders' intentions may not be fully understood or attained and that the founders themselves may not fully perceive the future effects of the institutions they establish or control, the analysis in Part II tracks the evolution and contribution of the BRICS to global governance across a wide range of policy areas. This analysis is based on the assumption that its agenda and the commitments its leaders make nevertheless reflect its intentions, interests and priorities, which are changing in response to the external and internal dynamics. Part III reviews the BRICS contribution to the global finance and economic architecture and on traditional and nontraditional security issues, science, technology and innovation. Part IV explores the BRICS members' interests and priorities that shape the cooperation agenda.

Third, the actors voluntarily create an institution to realize certain functions they value in a world already crowded by other organizations. In order to maximize benefits from the new arrangement, the founders may choose to engage with existing institutions in ways they regard most efficient for attaining their goals. Those modes of BRICS engagement with the other international organizations reflected in the leaders' discourse should indicate the group's place and role in the global governance architecture, as imputed at its launch and through its subsequent evolution. This assumption is tested by Andrey Shelepov in Chapter 3 on "BRICS Engagement with International Institutions for Better Governance" and Maria Raquel Freire in Chapter 4 on "Political Dynamics within the BRICS in the Context of Multilayered Global Governance."

Why the BRICS?

This book deals directly with one of the most visible recent cases of summitry institutions, namely the BRICS, which is gaining importance and attention both regionally and globally but which, as an international actor, remains largely unexplored by scholars.

The BRIC group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which was hosted by Russia for its first stand-alone leaders' meeting at Yekaterinburg in Russia on June 16, 2009, has evolved into a plurilateral summit institution recognized both by skeptics and by proponents as a major participant in the international system. Ever since, the forum has grown institutionally, developed into the BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa, expanded its agenda and the intensity of interaction among its members, and demonstrated its capacity to deliver on a wide range of decisions. Among the examples are the NDB, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), the Cooperation Agreement on Innovation and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation among BRICS Export Credit Insurance Agencies.

Skeptics, however, still regard BRICS as a loose group operating in opposition to western states, unable to articulate a shared alternative agenda, and struggling to secure solidarity among its members and its future as a bloc (Egel 2015, 3). Some go as far as to assert that

no idea has done more to muddle thinking about the global economy than that of the BRICs. Other than being the largest economies in their respective regions, the big four emerging markets never had much in common. They generate growth in different and often competing ways—Brazil and Russia, for example, are major energy producers that benefit from high energy prices, whereas India, as a major energy consumer, suffers from them. Except in highly unusual circumstances, such as those of the last decade, they are unlikely to grow in unison. China apart, they have limited trade ties with one another, and they have few political or foreign policy interests in common.

(Sharma 2012, 4)

In spite of the critique, the BRICS is firmly established as an international actor and prominent for at least three reasons: first, the sheer size of its members' combined population and their share of global gross domestic product; second, the fact that all its members are regional powers; and, third, the BRICS operates across at least five regions. So, what are the key features of BRICS actorness?

Nature of the grouping

The BRICS runs counter to the general trend among the progeny of IGOs observed since 1950, accounting for the majority of them (Johnson 2014, 8).

As an informal multilateral institution, it is an example of intergovernmental cooperation in which states retain their monopoly over the establishment and evolution of a new actor. There is no agent, no delegation of authority to international bureaucracy and no principal-agent relationship.

The institutional design and agenda setting remain the prerogative of the BRICS leaders, the national governments and their bureaucrats. International bureaucrats or a secretariat do not affect the content or flow of information, which is similar to the G7. To some extent, it is also similar to the G20, although avoiding the influence of international bureaucracies is more difficult given the highly technical nature of many of the issues addressed by the G20 and the need for expertise from relevant international organizations. Thus, the nature of the BRICS permits it to avoid being influenced by international bureaucrats. However, it is not immune to national bureaucracy entrepreneurship and is certainly not free from national interests.

Given its nature, the BRICS is not as far removed from the attention and control of the general public as traditional IGOs are and cannot as easily avoid the democratic deficit. As with other exclusive clubs, the BRICS is often accused of being illegitimate and ineffective, but the increasing involvement of business, experts and, recently, non-governmental organizations from the five members is a good indication of their awareness of their responsibility to the public.

Mission

At the heart of the BRICS mission is support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision making of all states. The group strives to improve the global governance system and ensure the representation of developing countries in international institutions, which goes hand in hand with its commitment to take more responsibility for delivering global public goods through existing institutions or, if needed, through a parallel governance system. The NDB is the most vivid example of such a parallel system. Moreover, the BRICS also sees its mission as finding a new model of socioeconomic development.

Values

BRICS members have repeatedly defended their values. Those values include multilateralism; the indivisible nature of security; democracy in international relations; inclusive decision making based on universally recognized norms of international law; a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach to establishing sustainable peace based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equity and cooperation; and the inadmissibility of unilateral military interventions and economic sanctions.

An established and expanding agenda

The BRICS agenda reflects the group's mission and values. An increasing share of social issues on the agenda indicates the commitment to deliver public goods for the members' own citizens and those other countries. Based on the documents released by the leaders at their summits, the issues of health (9.78 percent), development (7.22 percent), and education, science and innovation (6.15 percent) have higher shares of the discourse than do political (5.60 percent) and security (3.40 percent) issues, even though the BRICS is often labelled a political gathering. However, the economy (23 percent), finance (11 percent) and trade (17.68 percent) remain the top three priorities. This pattern reflects the members' shared objective to ensure sustainable and inclusive growth.

Environmental protection, renewable energy, and clean and efficient energy technologies have been on the agenda since the first summit; their share in the documents is not high, but remains stable. With the launch of the energy ministers' dialogue in 2015, cooperation on these policy areas will likely expand. Similarly, with the start of the employment and labour ministers' dialogue, the share of the employment issues shot up, and, given the BRICS's intention to continue cooperation on employment and labour, will likely continue to increase.

Thus, although the BRICS is criticized for being unable to build its own positive agenda and for uniting based on opposition to the western-dominated governance system, in fact its members have established a balanced agenda, where economic, social and political dimensions reinforce each other.

Institutionalization

Institutionalization does not automatically translate into actorness or enhanced implementation, but does contribute to shaping the identity of the BRICS. The group's family tree is growing with its expanding agenda. This trend is similar to the G7 and G20 processes. The formal track has now grown into a constellation of 14 cooperation formats, including meetings of sherpas and sous-sherpas, central bank governors, ministers and deputy ministers, senior officials, contact groups, and working and experts groups. From the first stand-alone meeting of the leaders in Yekaterinburg to the end of Russia's 2015 presidency, 122 meetings took place. BRICS members produced 56 documents covering their constantly broadening agenda in that period. There is a clear trend of increasing the number of stand-alone meetings, releasing more documents, and creating more working groups and other mechanisms of coordination.

Balance of global governance functions

With the evolution and institutionalization of the BRICS, the distribution of the global governance functions of deliberation, direction setting, decision

making, delivery and the development of global governance in its discourse is changing. There was a notable decline in direction setting (from almost 49 percent in the total of all discourse for Yekaterinburg to 30 percent for Ufa) and a rise in decision making (from 22 percent for Yekaterinburg to 29 percent for Ufa). The share of deliberation fluctuated from summit to summit, but averaged a healthy 28 percent of the total discourse. At an average three percent, delivery was not high, but its presence indicated an awareness of accountability to the public. The global governance function reflected both the BRICS support of reforming existing institutions—such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO)—and the trend of establishing its own institutions.

Compliance performance

The number of concrete commitments made at summits increased, peaking at 130 for the 2015 Ufa Summit. However, BRICS compliance performance was mixed with an average of 70.7 percent. It was relatively high for the 2011 Sanya and 2013 Durban summits at 74 percent, while for the 2012 New Delhi Summit compliance amounted to 64 percent, and for the 2014 Fortaleza Summit it reached 70 percent. There was a clear trend toward a higher compliance performance with priority commitments. In the absence of any self-accountability mechanisms, a shared sense of urgency for collective and coordinated actions remained the main catalyst for BRICS compliance performance. BRICS self-accountability mechanisms were nascent, and their emergence should encourage implementation. There was one positive example in the case of development and the adoption of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership in Ufa. That decision followed the leaders' request to their sherpas the year before at Fortaleza to advance discussions on intra-BRICS economic, trade and investment cooperation, informed by the work of the BRICS Think Tanks Council.

An emerging pattern for BRICS engagement with IGOs

The BRICS pattern of engagement with IGOs conforms to its mission and evolving identity. To enhance the effectiveness of its collective actions, the BRICS engages with international organizations at various levels. Up to and including the 2015 Ufa Summit, 675 references to 48 IGOs were registered in BRICS documents. This number increased from summit to summit with the exception of the second leaders' meeting in Brasilia. The top ten IGOs in BRICS discourse included the UN with the highest share at 28 percent, the G20 at 10.8 percent, the WTO following closely at 10.4 percent, the IMF and the World Bank at 8.8 percent and 4.2 percent respectively, WHO at 8.5 percent, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) rounding out the ninth at 3.5 percent. The BRICS