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Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province

Zhejiang, 1966-76

Keith Forster

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My major regret in publishing this work is that my parents have not lived to witness its publication. The last book my father read before his death in 1976, on the eve of our first trip to Hangzhou, contained a chapter on that city. Fortunately, my mother was later able to make the journey to China and see Hangzhou for herself.

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Canberra
February 1990.

ABBREVIATIONS

AS	*ASIAN SURVEY*
BR	*BEIJING REVIEW*
CC	CENTRAL COMMITTEE
CNA	*CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS*
CNS	*CHINA NEWS SUMMARY*
CQ	*CHINA QUARTERLY*
CCP	CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
CYL	COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE
CS	*CURRENT SCENE*
F&F	*FACTS & FEATURES*
FEER	*FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW*
FBIS/CHI	*FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE. DAILY REPORT. CHINA*
FBIS/CR/PSMA	*FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE. CHINA REPORT. POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS*
HMC	HANGZHOU MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE
HMMCH	HANGZHOU MUNICIPAL MILITIA COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
HMRC	HANGZHOU MUNICIPAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

HMWC	HANGZHOU MUNICIPAL WORKERS' CONGRESS
HZRB	*HANGZHOU RIBAO*
I & S	*ISSUES & STUDIES*
MAC	MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION
NPC	NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
PR	*PEKING REVIEW*
PLA	PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
RMRB	*RENMIN RIBAO*
SCMM	UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL (HONG KONG). *SELECTIONS FROM CHINA MAINLAND MAGAZINES*
SCMP	UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL (HONG KONG). *SURVEY OF CHINA MAINLAND PRESS*
SWB/FE	BBC. *SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS.* PART THREE. *THE FAR EAST.*
URS	UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE (HONG KONG).*UNION RESEARCH SERVICE*
ZPC	ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE
ZPMD	ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL MILITARY DISTRICT
ZPRC	ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE
ZJRB	*ZHEJIANG, RIBAO*
ZPS	ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL SERVICE
ZPTUC	ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL TRADE UNION COUNCIL

TABLES


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Administrative Map of Zhejiang
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
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INTRODUCTION

Up until now there has been no detailed study of the politics of the decade-long Cultural Revolution at the sub-national level. Such a hiatus has meant that our understanding of these years has largely been conditioned by generalizations based on studies of national politics, or research taking Guangdong province as its subject. Guangdong, with its proximity to Hong Kong, distance from Beijing and history of antipathy toward central rule, may represent the exception rather than the rule. Essays describing the early years of the Cultural Revolution in a number of provinces were published almost two decades ago.[1] These appeared in a period when China's doors were shut tight to the outside world and access to provincial newspapers and other primary source material was extremely limited. As for the period of the early to mid 1970s, there is an even greater lacuna in the literature.

This study, by a detailed analysis of events in the important eastern province of Zhejiang -- a province located in the heartland of Han Chinese political, economic and social power and culture -- attempts to fill the gap. In essence, it presents a revised view of the influence of the influence wielded by local rebels turned radical politicians in provincial affairs. While not making any dogmatic assertions about the applicability of these findings to other areas of China, the study suggests that this interpretation may well have validity beyond the borders of Zhejiang. The book describes and analyzes the nature and composition of the mass organizations which were established at the end of 1966 and traces the evolution of their structure, tactics and activities over the ten-year period. It assesses, through a careful sifting of the available evidence, the nature and extent of their power and influence in the province, particularly in the early to mid 1970s. The study also investigates and draws out the links between prominent personnel of the mass organizations and central and provincial civilian and military party leaders.

It documents in some detail the methods which the rebels used in the political campaigns of 1973-75 to undermine the authority of the provincial leadership. It points to the organizational power of the local radicals as manifest in their control over the appointments' mechanism and their ability to use officially-sanctioned organizations as vehicles to challenge and undermine the provincial

party leadership. The study highlights the innovative and effective strategy of operating both within the formal political system, as holders of party and government posts, and outside it as rebels intent on weakening the very same system. It is suggested that the change in content and style of rebellion and factionalism from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s goes a long way to help explain the success, however limited and temporary, of the rebel politicians. Thus, the twin themes of rebellion and factionalism underpin the chronological narrative which forms the framework of the book.

Before turning to a more detailed discussion of these themes, however, it is necessary to review the source material which has formed the empirical basis of the book. The principal references drawn on in the following pages are the official newspapers of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Zhejiang Provincial Committee (ZPC) and the Hangzhou Municipal Committee (HMC), the *Zhejiang Daily* (浙江日报) and the *Hangzhou Daily* (杭州日报) respectively. The latter newspaper is, except for the odd issue, unavailable outside China. In 1977, when my wife and I arrived to teach in Hangzhou, all local newspapers were categorized as internal (内部) publications and declared off-limits to foreigners. It was the permission I received early in 1979 to read the local press that provided the topic for the doctoral thesis on which this book is based.[2]

Understandably, the reliability and usefulness of such publications, which convey policy statements and party propaganda, is often questioned. The author has repeatedly been reminded of the dangers which stem from reliance on such partial and in many ways unreliable sources of information as party newspapers. In the period 1976-79, when some of the references used in this study were published, the party and its propaganda arm were undertaking an extensive and thorough political campaign against the local followers of the Gang of Four. Distortion, exaggeration, vindictiveness and personal abuse all featured prominently in the campaign. Yet for all their partiality and crude dogma, Chinese newspapers provide an indispensable window into the thinking and behavior of officialdom and the workings of the political system. Articles published during the campaign against the Gang of Four contained detailed, descriptive passages, tendentious in tone but offering valuable insight into the workings of a secretive political system and allowing the critical and discriminating reader to extract, with the necessary qualifications, information of great value.

Additionally, two sets of official documents, published in 1977 and 1978 respectively, setting out in great detail the regime's case against two of the principal rebel leaders, have been extensively drawn upon. The documents consist of photocopies of signed statements by detained rebels and witnesses to their alleged crimes. In effect, the file sets out the case for the prosecution. However, due to careless editing, names and dates blacked out from the typed version have

been left untouched in the original handwriting, testifying to the authenticity of the documents. The invaluable publications have in many instances fleshed out or confirmed incidents or events referred to in the press. However, wherever I have not been able to check or verify various claims and allegations, such qualifiers as "reportedly" and "allegedly" and so on, inelegant as they are, have been used.

Chinese-language sources have been supplemented by a thorough reading of provincial broadcasts from the Zhejiang Provincial Service (ZPS) as monitored by the BBC *Summary of World Broadcasts* (*SWB*), US *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (*FBIS*), Hong Kong *Union Research Service* (*URS*) and *China News Summary* (*CNS*). Guided tours and stays varying from a half-day to a fortnight at state-run factories and rural people's communes provided further material for the study. Nevertheless, given my status as a "foreign expert" and the political climate of the years 1977-79, so different in many respects to the more open atmosphere prevailing until recently, I felt constrained as to how far I could probe into politically-sensitive issues.

Return trips in 1988-89 proved much more fruitful and I was able to hold extensive interviews and discussions on local politics in a much more uninhibited environment. My lengthy acquaintance with Hangzhou, now extending over twelve years, had by now enabled me to build up a group of friends and associates who had participated in, were witness to, or were familiar with many of the events described in the following pages. However, one unavoidable gap in the sources relied on for this study is the absence of Red Guard materials, available in abundance for places like Beijing and Guangzhou. All my efforts to obtain access to such documents have been frustrated. The lack of this material makes a detailed analysis of the social background of members of the major mass organizations in Zhejiang almost impossible. Informed guesswork, speculation, and comparative reference to studies which have drawn on such materials is thus unavoidable, particularly in chapter one.

Factionalism

The word factionalism is used throughout this study and an explanation of what it means is warranted from the outset. The CCP has always defined factionalism (派性) pejoratively and contrasted it with party spirit (党性), the fundamental attribute expected of all party members. Those who practise factionalism are accused of placing loyalty to an illegitimate group (as defined by Leninist organizational norms and party statutes) above that to the party as a whole. Thus, by definition, factions engage in conspiratorial activities which threaten the unity and discipline of the larger group and may even attempt to take over its leadership.

Western political science has grappled with the concept of faction in its many manifestations in various political environments. Even so, according to the editors of a major collection of writings on the subject, "The very idea of faction comes to us with an inheritance whose affective content is a highly negative evaluation seemingly indelibly associated with the term".[3] More important than making derogatory remarks about factions, argue Belloni and Beller, is the need to define their structure, function and causes. But first a definition is required. The most encompassing definition, and the one most relevant here, has been provided by Ann Fenwick from her reading of both empirical studies and theoretical literature. She defines a faction as "a noncorporate political conflict group recruited by a leader on the basis of diverse principles".[4]

This definition is sufficiently broad to allow for different degrees of organizational coherence and does not restrict the *raison d'être* of factions to the pursuit of power, although clearly this will be one of their primary objectives. The attention that factions devote to questions of power in no way detracts from their propensity and ability to formulate policy positions and express them in certain ideological forms. One analyst of the Chinese political scene[5] has attempted, unsuccessfully in my opinion, to isolate policy and ideology from factional disputes and to portray factionalism in the Chinese context as a cultural expression of dependency and security on the part of political superiors and subordinates.

As Beller and Belloni correctly point out, the causes of factionalism are manifold and include societal, political and structural factors.[6] They differentiate three types of factional organizations in terms of their structure, recruitment pattern and members' self-awareness.[7] The first type is classified as the factional clique or tendency. It is basically an unstructured, informal group whose membership has a low level of cognition of its common interests or bonds. In communist societies, where the expression of political interests is normally tightly controlled and directed, such groups are not tolerated.

Beller and Belloni define the second type of faction as the personal, client-group faction whose organization is based on vertical links between leaders and followers and whose membership is recruited personally by these leaders. It is this type of faction, of intermediate duration and whose existence does not outlive the political life of its leader, that Andrew Nathan described in his important article on the subject.[8] Norman Nicholson seems to refer to this type of faction when he points out that a distinction should be drawn between the "core members" of a faction, whose commitment to the leader and the faction is far stronger than that of its ordinary members, who respond in different measure to particular issues and whose level of factional participation is thus of a more intermittent nature.[9] The factions of the mid-1970s in Zhejiang, whose structure and activities are

recounted at length in chapter seven of this study, belong to this type.

The third type of faction, according to Beller and Belloni, is the institutionalized or organized faction, whose membership is more open, whose group cognitive awareness is high and which establishes and maintains horizontal linkages. The mass organizations of the 1966-68 period of the Cultural Revolution conform to this type and were also characterized by hierarchy and functional specialization. Red Guard headquarters and umbrella rebel organizations established their own publications, armed detachments and outside liaison stations to shore up group coherence and facilitate operations. The pattern continued into the mid-1970s with more sophistication and greater effectiveness, in Zhejiang at least. By this time, factional groupings in Zhejiang exhibited features attributed to both the second and third types.

In synthesizing the patterns of factional behavior Beller and Belloni distinguish between closed, elitist factionalism and open factionalism. The former is common to the first two types of factional structures mentioned above. Open factionalism is indicative of institutionalized factions. This study will demonstrate that it was the combination of the open, organizational factionalism characteristic of the period 1966-69, with the closed, elitist, clientelist factionalism widespread in the upper echelons of the CCP, which gave the factionalism of the period 1973-76 in Zhejiang its unique and dangerous features.

Rebels and Conservatives in the Cultural Revolution

One issue which continues to bedevil analysts of the Cultural Revolution relates to the nature of the mass organizations which participated in it. In virtually every province they divided into two opposed groupings but the basis on which these divisions occurred remains a matter of conjecture and debate. William Hinton has observed that the divisions

> occurred with such regularity and persistence that it had to be recognized as some sort of law of the political sphere as universal as Boyle's law in chemistry or Newton's law in physics.[10]

In 1984, when the CCP carried out an ideological and political critique of the Cultural Revolution, an authoritative article in the party journal *Red Flag* declared that judged from their behavior, guiding ideology and their professed loyalty to Mao Zedong, both the so-called "rebel" and "conservative" (or "royalist") mass organizations were indistinguishable.[11] According to this analysis, which has become the prevailing CCP line on the subject, it was the scramble for power which divided the rebels and split them into two organizations standing opposed to or supportive of leading party cadres and officials. There is much in the present party position that is valid, as the

discussion below will indicate. Yet it ignores the important economic and social factors which propelled individuals into the political arena and were instrumental in determining their subsequent actions and behavior.

Studies published in the West on this subject have examined the composition of mass organizations in the southern city of Guangzhou.[12] Hong Yung Lee has found that radical mass organizations recruited their members from social groups that held grievances against the status quo. Among students, radicals included those with a "bad" family background, those sent to rural areas and those who had revolted against the work teams sent onto campuses in May 1966. Workers who were employed in smaller, poorer factories, contract or temporary workers, apprentices and unskilled workers in larger factories and individual laborers tended to join radical organizations. Among the ranks of cadres, low or middle ranking officials, those with bad family background (capitalist, landlord, etc.) and those who had been disciplined or punished before the Cultural Revolution, were more likely to side with radical organizations. Conservative mass organizations, on the other hand, contained members with good class background (worker, peasant, soldier) and were mobilized by political organizations such as the CCP, Communist Youth League (CYL) and trade unions.

While radicals defined class pragmatically, by examining an individual's behavior and performance, their opponents tended to look to the existing "caste" structure,[13] based on pre-revolution categories. Class, however, was a less important consideration for university students than it was for their secondary school juniors.[14] While radicals directed their attacks against party cadres, conservatives concentrated their fire on the old bourgeois class, thus deflecting the movement away from the real power-holders. Radicals broadened, while conservatives restricted, the scope of attack. The conservatives generally maintained good relations with the PLA, while the radicals established links with the Central Cultural Revolution Group under Chen Boda and Jiang Qing. Both groups, however, accepted the unchallenged supremacy of Mao Zedong and his Thought.[15] Rebel leaders tended to be children of intellectuals while conservative or loyalist organizations were generally led by cadres' children. Rebels attacked the number one leader of a unit while the loyalists attacked its deputy.[16]

A recently-published tract from a Chinese participant in the Cultural Revolution has divided the mass organizations along the same lines. It differentiates between "rebels" and "conservatives" on the grounds of the class composition of leaders and rank and file members, their political experience before the Cultural Revolution, and whether they belonged to the CCP or its mass organizations.[17] Another participant in the Cultural Revolution, Gao Yuan, suggests in his recollections that it was personal friendships, grudges and other particularistic relationships that brought together or divided individuals.[18]

This study does not pretend to provide all the answers to these important questions but it addresses them and, from limited data, attempts to come up with some tentative hypotheses. Evidence to prove the validity of the above generalizations for Zhejiang is decidedly thin and ambiguous. There is evidence that both mass organizations put up people of unimpeachable class background as leaders ahead of others of greater ability but susceptible to criticism on class grounds. There is also evidence that revenge for prior injustice, suffered in such campaigns as the Socialist Education Movement (1963-65), motivated certain individuals in particular to rebel against their leaders. But other factors, such as personality differences and rivalries between different mass organization leaders as well as their ability to attract and retain the loyalty of followers, played an equal if not more important role in the attachment of various individuals and social groups to mass organizations.

By definition, a revolution pits a "progressive" against a "reactionary" force. Mao Zedong sometimes saw the Cultural Revolution as a continuation of the civil war between the CCP and the KMT, a view out of touch with reality but conveying in simple, comprehensible imagery the confrontation between good and evil. In Zhejiang it seems that if the Central Cultural Revolution Group had not actually coined the terms "proletarian revolutionary" and "conservative" to differentiate between the two mass organizations, the logic and rhetoric of the times would have required such a distinction. The "royalist" or "conservative" group in Zhejiang was in its own way, both by word and deed, every bit as radical as its protagonist, a point noted by Zhou Enlai in 1968 when trying to mediate a settlement between the two.

What, in essence, divided the two organizations, as the following chapters of this study will show, was their assessment of the revolutionary credentials of leading cadres, an assessment called for by the "proletarian headquarters" in Beijing. This issue divided rebel and Red Guard groups across the country, particularly in relation to the number one provincial official. The determined efforts made in Zhejiang in 1967 to induce one of the leaders of the so-called "conservative" organization to change sides because of the strength of his following, his popularity and his considerable ability, suggests that class background may not have been as important in determining allegiances as more pragmatic considerations. In the view of some readers, the claim that callow youth and hard-boiled workers beat, tortured and killed each other over an issue as seemingly remote from their daily terms of reference as the loyalty of political leaders to an ill-defined "revolutionary line" of Chairman Mao may detach political action from its social basis. Nevertheless it seemed to be true of the behavior of the rebels of both sides in Zhejiang.

The remainder of this introduction will sketch the history of the Cultural

Revolution in Zhejiang as it relates to the question of mass organization factionalism discussed above. This exercise also serves the purpose of providing a synopsis of the more detailed description and analysis contained in later chapters.

The Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang

The origin of factional groupings in Zhejiang dates to the January 1967 power-seizure phase of the Cultural Revolution. With the leaders of the CCP ZPC united against the attacks of the rebels, and the latter divided as to which leaders of the committee merited support and which deserved repudiation as capitalist-roaders, a political stalemate ensued. When the military leaders of the Zhejiang Provincial Military District (ZPMD) were ordered by the central authorities to support one rebel organization in its attempt to overthrow the local administration, they demurred and escorted their civilian colleagues to the safety of the barracks.

In February 1967, the mass organization officially recognized by the Cultural Revolution Group in Beijing, the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Rebel United Headquarters (浙江省 革命 造 反联合总指挥部), decided to hold a mass rally to announce the dismissal of Jiang Hua (江华), First Secretary of the CCP ZPC. Its rival group, the Zhejiang Provincial Red Storm Provisional Headquarters (浙江省红色暴动派临时指挥部), reportedly backed by members of the provincial political elite, broke up the meeting after discovering that Mao Zedong had decided to protect Jiang. On Zhou Enlai's instructions, Jiang was flown to the comparative safety of Beijing. The incident provoked the split between United Headquarters and Red Storm, a rift which escalated during the following two years. Most of Jiang Hua's colleagues were bundled out of office and subjected to varying forms and degrees of punishment. Very few survived the 1967 upheaval and the prolonged absence from office of experienced administrators contributed to the instability which afflicted Zhejiang for the greater part of the following decade.

The "revolutionary rebels", together with the PLA and "revolutionary leading cadres", were to join together as the Maoist-inspired trinity of forces called revolutionary committees, established as governing bodies at all administrative levels. United Headquarters, with the blessing and backing of the Cultural Revolution Group in Beijing, claimed recognition as the "core" of the proposed revolutionary alliance of rebels. Red Storm refused to grant United Headquarters this status. The ambiguous stance adopted toward Jiang Hua by the center gave credibility to Red Storm's pretensions for acceptance as a revolutionary organization. However, from February 1967 onward, United Headquarters became known as the provincial "rebel" group (造反派) while Red Storm labored under the opprobrious epithet of "conservative" faction (保守派), labels

bestowed by the Cultural Revolution Group. To avoid confusion, this study retains the terms while recognizing that the distinction, as it was then drawn, is in many ways misleading.

The failure of the local military forces garrisoned in Hangzhou to support the rebels led to Beijing's decision in late April 1967 to despatch main force Unit 6409 (the 20th Army) from Jiangsu province to take military control of Zhejiang. Together with personnel from the ZPMD and Air Force and Naval units stationed in the province, the PLA performed "support the left" activities as directed by Mao and his deputy Lin Biao. However, the freedom given to the military to decide which mass organization was "revolutionary" and therefore deserving of its support, often worked to the detriment of United Headquarters. Only the Air Force and 20th Army units proved reliable allies to this organization. Naval and local military forces were sympathetic to Red Storm. Outside the provincial capital of Hangzhou, sub-district and People's Armed Forces Department (militia) forces contingents tended to side with local party officials, especially against outside challenges to their rule.

Mass factionalism thus spilled over into the armed forces. Additionally, each mass organization attempted to gain support from the veteran cadres of the defunct CCP ZPC by condemning some and praising and defending others. Only those allowed to "pass the test" by United Headquarters reappeared on the political stage by the time Mao convened the CCP 9th Congress in April 1969. Before that, continuing controversy over the status of Jiang Hua and several of his subordinates kept the mass organizations in Zhejiang at loggerheads, implicating the PLA. In August 1967 leaders of the military district who had prevaricated over support for United Headquarters were dismissed and replaced by the commanders of the 20th Army, who were more enthusiastic in their display of loyalty and obedience to Beijing.

Major incidents in the factories of Hangzhou and such provincial towns as Wenzhou (温州), Jinhua (金华), Xiaoshan (萧山) and Zhuji (诸暨) in the summer of 1967 inflamed factional antagonisms even further. Mao Zedong visited Hangzhou for one day in September 1967 to observe the situation at first hand. During his tour he called for unity among the two major organizations but the call went unheeded. In order to break the deadlock, in December 1967 Mao issued instructions which partially rehabilitated Red Storm as an "old rebel organization which has committed mistakes". The compromise undoubtedly pleased neither party. United Headquarters was forced to negotiate with the old rival it had fought unrelentingly against over the previous year. Red Storm, while seemingly justified in its refusal to kneel to United Headquarters, remained in an unequal, tainted position.

A further two months of hard bargaining was required, under the direction

of an impatient center, before the two groups finally signed an agreement in February 1968. The alliance permitted the formation of the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee (ZPRC) to take place in the following month. However, because the clauses allotting a specified number of places on the standing committee to representatives of Red Storm were not honored, the agreement soon broke down. The newly established political institution struggled to gain legitimacy and respect throughout 1968. Ridiculed by remnant influential officials of the old power structure and unrecognized by Red Storm, it was powerless to discipline the opposition forces which openly defied its edicts. The summer of 1968 witnessed further armed struggles, especially in the isolated southern port-city of Wenzhou.

Throughout the two years of chaos and strife up until the end of 1968, supporters of Jiang Hua both in Zhejiang and Beijing strove for his inclusion in the new political leadership. Their efforts contributed greatly to the destabilization in Zhejiang. They eventually failed but not before they had provoked further rifts between United Headquarters and Red Storm. It was not until November 1968, when Jiang Hua was publicly criticized by name in a series of polemical articles carried in the local press, that his political fate was sealed, temporarily at least.

After the 9th National Congress of "unity and victory" a further attempt was made to unite Zhejiang's two mass organizations and thus effectively demobilize them. An agreement to this effect was announced in May 1969 under the supervision of the provincial authorities. But a substantial number of Red Storm activists refused to accept the terms of the agreement and traveled to Beijing to lodge their complaints. Not surprisingly, they received a cold reception and were ordered back to Hangzhou to undergo virtual internment in "study classes".

Despite being signatories to the agreement which officially disbanded their organizations, both United Headquarters and Red Storm retained their separate identities and an organizational structure which henceforth operated underground. Thus, the mass factionalism of the previous years was supplemented and exacerbated by the formation of secret informal groups which linked the former leaders of United Headquarters with sympathetic military and civilian cadres who dominated the power structure in Zhejiang. The 5th CCP Zhejiang Provincial Congress, which met in January 1971, formalized the military's hegemony over the Zhejiang administration. The running of the province was now largely in the hands of cadres who were both novices to civilian administration and who were outsiders and hence unfamiliar with local conditions.

Details of political developments between the years 1969 and 1972 are scarce. What is clear is that the provincial leadership owed its position primarily to the central military command led by Lin Biao. On this basis it carried out a series of

campaigns to militarize and radicalize the civilian economy and administration and to display loyalty to its patron. Regular contacts between Lin Biao's son, a rising star in the airforce, and the airforce command in Zhejiang strengthened these ties. Ousted civilian cadres returned to their posts but the process was confined mainly to the county level and below. Mass representatives sitting on revolutionary committees and reconstituted party committees struggled to retain any influence and adopted a defensive posture, hoping thereby to avoid persecution in the series of vindictive campaigns which the military leadership directed against Cultural Revolution activists.

Following the demise of Lin Biao and the downfall of his provincial supporters, the central authorities in Beijing were forced once again to take temporary control of Zhejiang through their emissary Xu Shiyou (许世友), Commander of the Nanjing Military Region. Xu conducted the purge of the provincial leadership and recommended that two experienced cadres, Tan Qilong (谭启龙) and Tie Ying (铁瑛), head the administration in Zhejiang.
Tan Qilong had accumulated previous experience in Zhejiang, having served there in the early post-Liberation years. In 1972 and 1973 the new leadership rehabilitated leading pre-Cultural Revolution officials and placed them in key positions in the bureaucracy. They released members of Red Storm languishing in jail. The provincial leaders also initiated an investigation into the deeds of the leaders of United Headquarters during the stormy days of the late 1960s, as well as their relationship with the disgraced military cadres. Other military officials were transferred to Zhejiang from the Nanjing Military Region to root out Lin Biao's political influence and factional network.

In August 1973 the CCP convened its 10th National Congress in an atmosphere heavy with the tension that heralded the resurgence of leftist mobilizational politics. Chairman Mao's "continuous revolution" was gearing up for another campaign. On the eve of the Congress, pre-Cultural Revolution mass organizations held congresses across the country to signal the resumption of their activities. In Zhejiang, leaders of United Headquarters and Red Storm gained solid representation on the Zhejiang Provincial Trade Union Council (ZPTUC) and CYL executives. On the former body they were balanced by the election of veteran trade union leaders and model workers of the 1950s and 1960s. Shortly after the closure of the CCP Congress in Beijing, new urban militia organizations were established under the formal leadership of municipal party committees and modelled after the first such group set up in Shanghai. Hangzhou established such a body in February 1974.

Three former prominent leaders of United Headquarters had gained official posts of some substance at this time. They were Zhang Yongsheng (张永生), a former student of the nationally-famous Zhejiang Academy of Fine Arts, Weng

Senhe (翁森鹤), a worker at the large Hangzhou Silk Dyeing and Printing Complex, and He Xianchun (贺贤春), a former worker at the Hangzhou Heavy Machinery Factory. All three had achieved a great deal of notoriety in the Cultural Revolution. When the anti-Lin Biao anti-Confucius campaign commenced in early 1974 Zhang, Weng and He were ready to swing into action. Encouraged by Wang Hongwen in Beijing and tolerated or condoned in their activities by influential cadres from both provincial and municipal party committees, the radical leaders found themselves back in the type of environment in which they thrived. In a series of mass meetings, rallies and demonstrations they were successful in recreating something of the atmosphere of disorder which had characterized the early days of the Cultural Revolution. Their solid body of supporters in the factories of Hangzhou was mobilized into contingents of the urban militia. He Xianchun and an associate took charge of the Hangzhou Municipal Militia Command Headquarters (杭州市民兵指挥部 -- HMMCH). The substantial number of industrial workers drafted into the militia in Hangzhou acted as a highly effective and mobile task force for use against factional opponents in the city's factories. In addition, the militia substituted for the PLA and public security forces in guard duty and supervision of social order. The intimidation and harassment of selected opponents, both during and after work hours, had disastrous effects on harmony in the work-place and on industrial production.

Zhang, Weng and He, together with their allies in the bureaucracy, also gained control of the leading group which had been established to direct the anti-Lin Biao anti-Confucius campaign. For most of 1974 it seemed to replace the provincial party committee as the ultimate source of authority in Zhejiang. At a four-month conference of the provincial party committee, revolutionary committee and the party committee of the military district, the rebels coordinated a campaign of vilification and humiliation of the provincial leaders. In the face of these tactics, the administration seemed powerless and looked on helplessly as industrial production stalled, social order deteriorated and government became paralyzed. In July 1974 the Central Committee acted to bring the anti-Lin Biao/Confucius campaign to an end before the economy suffered even greater damage. The Zhejiang authorities took considerable time to rein in the destructive activities of the rebels, but by September they had achieved initial success. Yet the situation remained highly volatile and, with the militia continuing to create disturbances, at the end of the year Beijing called both its local representatives and the factional leaders of Zhejiang to a conference in the capital.

Over the following six months, the political struggle focused on Beijing's attempt to reassert central control over Zhejiang and to prop up the provincial authorities against those who sought to undermine and overthrow it. It appears

that early in 1975 the decision was made to disband the urban militia command and so remove a major source of instability from the Zhejiang political scene. A procession of central leaders visited Hangzhou to investigate the situation for themselves. Deng Xiaoping was possibly one such visitor and, in February 1975, Mao Zedong stopped there in transit on his way back to Beijing. The peasant leader and Politburo member, Chen Yonggui, arrived in April to address a provincial meeting concerning agriculture. In his speech Chen uttered some stern words about the dangers of continued factionalism. However, the problem had clearly not been settled when, at the end of June 1975, the central leadership despatched two senior members of the Politburo, Vice-chairman Wang Hongwen and Vice-premier Ji Dengkui, to Hangzhou. They brought with them a high-powered delegation from the CC Organization Department and two central ministries.

After a three-week investigation the two central leaders decided upon recommendations which were submitted to the Politburo for approval. This body made three major decisions which were then relayed back to Zhejiang for implementation. First, a major reshuffle of the provincial and municipal party leaderships, as well as that of the military district, was announced. Cadres who had been compromised by their involvement in factional disturbances were demoted or transferred and replacements brought in from other provinces. The rebel leaders and their supporters were banished, sent to the countryside, or enrolled in study classes to review their mistakes and receive ideological and political re-education.

Second, the central leadership decided to send at least 10,000 soldiers from the three services into the factories of Hangzhou to pacify workers and supervise the resumption of a normal working environment. Outside troops, uninvolved in the lengthy and bitter local squabbles, were moved into the city. Third, the investigation of industrial problems in Hangzhou resulted in the propagation of an intensive emulation campaign, known as the "eight factories' experience". The campaign oversaw the restoration of order in the factories and the criticism and discipline of unruly workers, and issued appeals for the completion of output targets in preparation for the launching of the 6th 5-Year Plan in 1976.

These extraordinary measures -- unprecedented even in the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution -- provide testimony to the havoc that rebellion and factionalism had caused in Zhejiang over the preceding ten years. However, the incident and the circumstances surrounding it to this day remain shrouded in a fog of misunderstanding and incomprehension. In the forty-year history of the People's Republic the communist regime has been loth to involve troops in civil disturbances. Before the massive mobilization of soldiers against the people of Beijing in May and June of 1989, the previous occasion on which the army had

been called out to intervene in civilian unrest involving Han Chinese was in the 1975 military occupation of the factories of Hangzhou.

In spite of the compromises which had been made by the leadership in Beijing to rescue the authority of the CCP ZPC, the decisions of July 1975 contained the seeds of their own destruction. Military occupation of factories was only a short-term solution to the unrest, and the new leadership installed in Zhejiang was at best an interim group, comprised as it was of representatives of different factional groupings. When the Gang of Four launched its counter-attack on Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1975, his supporters in Zhejiang came under renewed pressure. The correctness of the decisions made under Deng's aegis were therefore questioned and openly challenged by the time of Mao's death in September 1976. The Cultural Revolution, with its special brand of rebellion and factionalism, ended with the arrest of the Gang of Four in the following month. Its followers in Zhejiang were dismissed and the rebel leaders arrested and jailed.

Chapter One

THE OUTBREAK OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, MAY 1966 - FEBRUARY 1967

When the Cultural Revolution commenced in 1966, the provincial leadership in Zhejiang, like its counterparts elsewhere in China, faced an unprecedented set of circumstances. Polemics on the literary front, initiated by Yao Wenyuan's broadside against Wu Han's play, *Hai Rui Dismissed from Office,* spread to the political sphere, engulfing Beijing's municipal leadership in the process. Student unrest on campuses in the national capital expanded in scope and militancy. Calls were made for the dismissal of school administrators for unspecified but sweeping crimes including the attempt to suppress the protest. When Mao Zedong added his voice to that of the rebels by demanding the overthrow of the "bourgeois headquarters" within the CCP, it was clear that the Cultural Revolution was to go beyond the bounds of previous mass movements and political campaigns, both in its scope and method of conduct.

With Mao's political victory at the CCP CC 11th Plenum in August 1966, a new social force known as the Red Guards burst upon the political scene to spearhead the campaign. Initially, these young zealots targeted academics in schools and colleges as well as seeking out and destroying examples (whether architectural, written or symbolic) of the feudalistic nature of China's culture. Next they turned their attention to party officials who had cynically manipulated the often genuine resentment that the young felt toward privilege and autocratic leadership and who had diverted it from the real power-holders -- that is, the cadres themselves.

The Zhejiang Political Scene

Since 1949 Zhejiang had been ruled by cadres drawn largely from the 3rd Field Army, which had marched into the province at the beginning of that year.[1] Many of the civilian cadres who arrived in the wake of the PLA were natives of Shandong or northern Jiangsu provinces. Local communist activists who had

participated in guerrilla operations in southern Zhejiang (浙南) in the early 1930s; in eastern Zhejiang (浙东) first in the 1920s and later in the anti-Japanese war; or who had worked in underground party organizations in Shanghai, were, by the end of the 1950s, relegated to a secondary role in the new power structure. Senior cadres of the 3rd Field Army such as Tan Zhenlin (谭震林) and Tan Qilong served in the province during the early post-Liberation years of reconstruction. After Tan Qilong's transfer in 1954, his deputy, Jiang Hua,[2] became the paramount leader of Zhejiang.

Through his lengthy tenure in Zhejiang, Jiang Hua had, by the mid-1960s, built up a powerful network of loyal subordinates within the provincial party leadership. His closest and most trusted colleagues were placed in key bureaucratic posts in the political/legal network, the propaganda department and central office registry. Jiang's wife, Wu Zhonglian (吴仲廉),[3] had held the important positions of head of the ZPC Political and Legal Group and President of the provincial Supreme Court since the mid-1950s. Wang Fang (王芳)[4], who was Deputy-governor and entrusted with overall responsibility for public security work in Zhejiang, was assisted by the Minister for Public Security, Lü Jianguang (吕剑光).[5]

Another close associate of Jiang's was Xue Ju (薛驹), who held the post of Director of the ZPC General Office from where he could oversee the flow of documents and correspondence. Xue had commenced work in Zhejiang in 1947.[6] Chen Bing (陈冰), known as the master of the pen (笔千子), headed the Propaganda Department. Chen Weida (陈伟达), who had been a member of the provincial party secretariat since 1959, was responsible for the implementation of agricultural policy. Zhejiang's regular grain surpluses provided Jiang with bargaining power vis-à-vis the central authorities to obtain funds for the development of the province.[7]

Two of the remaining members of the ZPC secretariat, Li Fengping (李丰平) and Wu Xian (吴宪), had served under Jiang since 1954, Li having spent a three-year interregnum in the neighboring province of Anhui between 1963 and 1966.[8] Lai Keke (赖可可) was the most recent addition to this elite, having been promoted in 1964 from his post of Secretary-general of the CCP ZPC. Lai's career had suffered a serious setback in 1953 as a result of his involvement in conspiratorial plans drawn up by Gao Gang and Rao Shushi to reshuffle the central leadership directly below Mao. After his demotion in 1953-54, Lai's transfer to Zhejiang in 1961 marked a new phase in his career.[9] Significantly, he was the only member of the ZPC secretariat to have suffered the ignominy of demotion before the Cultural Revolution.

Another more recent arrival in Zhejiang was Cao Xiangren (曹祥仁) who had been appointed to the ZPC secretariat in 1959. He had previously served

as China's ambassador to Bulgaria (1950-54) and Deputy-minister of the First Ministry of Machine-building (1955-59). His transfer to Zhejiang perhaps signified a central decision to devote more attention and expertise to the development of industry in the province. It is alleged that Cao found some difficulty working with the rough, blunt, domineering Jiang. For whatever reason, it is significant that Cao and Lai alone broke ranks with Jiang's leadership team when the ZPC came under direct attack from the rebels at the end of 1966. And in January 1967 Cao displayed personal malice toward Jiang by publicly demanding Wu Zhonglian's posthumous expulsion from the CCP.[10]

TABLE ONE

CCP ZPC STANDING COMMITTEE AT 6 JUNE 1966

		Date of appointment
First Secretary:	Jiang Hua	August 1950
Secretaries:	Li Fengping	1952 (1963-66 in Anhui)
	Cao Xiangren	June 1959
	Chen Weida	April 1955
	Wu Xian	April 1955
	Lai Keke	April 1963
Members:	Long Qian	1966
	Lu Zhixian	April 1963
	Li Weixin	April 1963
	Wang Qi	April 1963
	Chen Bing	April 1965
	Shen Ce	April 1965

Sources: *ZJRB*, 28 June 1966, p. 1.
Zhejiang shengqing gaiyao, pp. 24-6.
Kao Ch'ung-yen, *Zhonggong renshi biandong, 1959-69*, pp. 673-5.

Thus, at the beginning of 1966, Jiang Hua led a team of experienced politicians most of whom had worked together for the previous decade. Jiang had several times displayed his commitment to upholding central policy: in his purge of localists in 1957-58,[11] his enthusiastic espousal of both the Great Leap Forward program[12] and the policies of readjustment which followed.[13] Jiang was the perfect example of the provincial politician of the time, the middleman *par excellence*, who, in the words of the leading analyst of the phenomenon

> is a man eminently sensitive to shifting winds from Beijing. Although jealous of provincial interests, he is careful to tailor his articulation of those interests to the prevailing policy line. He emphasizes the primacy of national interest and shapes provincial policy according to central directives. When the provincial politician errs, it is more likely by

> going too far in implementing "infallible" central policies than by opposing them.[14]

The Beginnings of the Cultural Revolution

Two interpretations of the response of provincial officials to the unfolding of events in 1966 have been put forward. One view, enunciated by Parris Chang[15] and applied to Sichuan province by T. J. Mathews,[16] has described the response as, in Chang's phrase, "strategies for survival". Chang writes on the assumption that provincial officials were intent on resisting the Cultural Revolution. In the initial phase, according to Chang, provincial leaders adopted such strategies as evasion and diversion, deception and containment. After the August 1966 plenum these strategies no longer remained viable and sheer survival, physical and political, became of paramount importance. Summoning all the resources at their disposal, provincial party officials sought support and protection from their comrades in provincial military garrisons, lobbied patrons in Beijing, bought off under-privileged groups among workers and peasants by offering them bonuses and subsidies and even resorted to suppression of their rebel challengers. Chang concludes, admiringly,

> The fact that it was the use of military forces that finally brought down the recalcitrant well-entrenched provincial Party leaders attests to the remarkable effectiveness of their survival strategies.[17]

Another, more subtle interpretation of the response of provincial officials has been advanced by Andrew Walder.[18] Based on a study of Shanghai for the period 1966-67, he argues persuasively that local officials, at least in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, responded obediently to Mao's initiatives even when they did not fully comprehend the *raison d'être* behind the campaign. The provincial politicians did their best to move with the constantly expanding parameters of Beijing's dictates.[19] Teiwes' description of provincial leaders, cited above, would strongly suggest such a course of action. But, argues Walder, the momentum of the Cultural Revolution left provincial politicians floundering in its wake and eventually they lost all control over local events. In Walder's view, various social groups needed no incitement from party officials to put forward particularistic demands in an environment where social order and industrial discipline had collapsed. Nor was it surprising that undirected student groups should splinter and engage in increasingly violent actions and internecine confrontation. In short, responsibility for the social and political chaos in the localities lay not with obstructionist acts committed by insubordinate officials, as suggested by Chang, but rather with the increased scope allowed for centrally-inspired and authorized attacks on local political authority.

The passage of time has tended to confirm the accuracy of Walder's

explanation. Certainly, it conforms more closely to the unfolding situation in Zhejiang.[20] Nevertheless, it bestows on provincial officials too large a measure of political good intention. As a group they were grappling with a crisis of enormous dimensions.Their most senior member, Peng Zhen, had already lost his posts in Beijing. Precedent, established party norms,[21] experience and common sense all seemed of little assistance to them and it would have been surprising if desperate circumstances had not produced novel counter-measures. What is certain is that Jiang Hua's spirited and multi-faceted fight for survival, whatever its motivations, had important consequences for the future of the Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang. Moreover, Jiang, like his counterparts in other provincial administrations, linked his fate with that of the CCP. Was he not the party's principal representative in Zhejiang and was not any attack on his leadership in effect an assault on the party itself, and hence counter-revolutionary?

Presumably, Mao's presence in Hangzhou in 1966 for such crucial meetings as the May enlarged Politburo meeting, which drew up the May 16 Circular directing the Cultural Revolution into the political realm, provided Jiang with the opportunity to gauge the Chairman's mood and intentions. This access to Mao and his entourage was not enjoyed by Jiang's colleagues in other provinces. The question arises whether Jiang used the Chairman's proximity,[22] his contacts in Shanghai -- where the East China Bureau of the CCP (of which he was a member) was located and where the Zhejiang provincial government maintained an office[23] -- to discover Mao's intentions in order to promote or sabotage the unfolding Cultural Revolution.

Jiang had powerful patrons in Beijing to assist him assess and adapt to the new situation. The most important of these was Tan Zhenlin. Like Jiang, Tan was an old associate of Mao's dating back to the days on the Jinggang mountains. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution he was a member of the Politburo, Vice-premier of the State Council and Director of its office of agriculture and forestry.[24] Tan had been the first post-1949 provincial leader of Zhejiang until his transfer to Jiangsu province in 1952. At that time Jiang served under Tan as a member of the CCP ZPC standing committee and as Second Deputy-secretary.[25] After his transfer to Beijing, Tan retained strong personal and institutional links with his old province and the whole of East China. However, the maintenance of close relations with powerful central politicians was a two-edged sword. While central patrons remained in good standing with Mao, the benefits were passed on to their followers; but once they fell into disfavor all their close associates were implicated. Zhao Ziyang basked in the glory of Tao Zhu's meteoric rise in Beijing in 1966 and shared in full the consequences of his disgrace at the end of that year.[26] Similarly, the reverberations accompanying Tan Zhenlin's fall in February 1967 were felt in East China.

The acuteness of Jiang Hua's political sensitivities may well have been put to the test in November 1965. In that month Yao Wenyuan's article criticizing Wu Han's play was published in Shanghai. Mao ordered other localities to republish the piece[27] and Jiang responded by ordering *Zhejiang Daily* to print it on 24 November, a fortnight later. Thus, Zhejiang had beaten other localities such as Beijing and Guangzhou in its response to Mao's instructions.[28] A Red Guard publication subsequently charged Jiang with political opportunism by using his contacts in Shanghai to discover the strategic implications behind Yao's article.[29] Equally credible is the possibility that by his promptness in republishing Yao's article, Jiang was ensuring that his loyalty to Mao remained unopen to doubt.

The same Cultural Revolution source also claimed that Jiang obtained an advance draft of the May 16 circular which enabled him, in collaboration with the noted theorist Hu Qiaomu, to instruct Chen Bing to publish three articles under the pen-name of Xin Wenbing (辛文兵). These articles attacked the Beijing "Three Family Village" writing team operating under Peng Zhen's aegis.[30] However, the most sensational accusation levelled at Jiang was that early in 1966 he ordered Lü Jianguang, together with public security officials from Beijing, to spy on Mao. They allegedly emptied Mao's wastepaper baskets for scraps of information, eavesdropped on his conversations, bugged his residence and tapped his telephone calls. This story, apocryphal though it may be, was to have far-reaching consequences for those allegedly involved.[31]

Jiang Hua and the Cultural Revolution, 1966-67

Between June and July 1966 Jiang faithfully implemented central directives concerning the conduct of the Cultural Revolution issued by Liu Shaoqi and the Central Committee. Work teams were sent out in mid-June and recalled, on Mao's instructions, at the end of July.[32] In Zhejiang the work teams were under the overall leadership of Chen Bing who had been appointed Director of the provincial Cultural Revolution Group.[33] Liu Dan, one of the leading party officials and administrators at the prestigious Zhejiang University, and the head of its Cultural Revolution Group, was dismissed at a public rally on 22 June. The meeting was held on campus and attended by Cao Xiangren, representing the CCP ZPC.[34] Liu was charged with investigating the class backgrounds of students who had pasted up wall posters and excluding those lacking the right family background from further participation in the campaign. A Taiwan report alleged that Jiang Hua himself was behind this investigation of the students' class background.[35] If these accusations were true they prove that Liu Dan and Jiang were implementing the party's class line. That this line changed and Liu's diligence brought about his downfall illustrated the volatility and unpredictability

of the political situation at the time. In the light of later events, the ZPC's decision to dismiss Liu on these grounds appears to have been one that appealed to the increasingly militant Red Guard organizations. They were demanding that membership not be restricted to children of the "five red" categories of worker, peasant, cadre, soldier and revolutionary martyr. Selected sacrificial victims in the propaganda and cultural systems were also dismissed and vilified at this time.[36]

To retain the initiative, on 26 June Jiang delivered a major address before a gathering of 10,000 CCP members and a full complement of party and military leaders. In his oration on the topic of Mao Zedong Thought[37] Jiang explained the significance of the Cultural Revolution as an ideological and political class struggle against both representatives of the bourgeoisie in the CCP and bourgeois intellectuals. He cautioned those who practised political deception by waving the red banner only to oppose it -- a warning no doubt delivered in all sincerity but one that before long would rebound on its speaker.

The first major challenge that Jiang Hua and his colleagues faced arose from the formation of local Red Guards and the arrival of Red Guard emissaries from Beijing to check and supervise the progress of the Cultural Revolution in the province.[38] For the CCP ZPC, the principal dilemma at this time was how to keep in step with the center by implementing a set of ill-defined, almost incomprehensible directives, while at the same time carrying on with everyday administration, which was rendered increasingly difficult by the implementation of these very same directives. The presence of Red Guards to check on the party committee's performance made such time-honored tactics as prevarication, distortion or feigned compliance both difficult and politically risky.

A Yugoslav correspondent stationed in Beijing reported that at the 11th Plenum the East China delegates voted as a block for Mao's Cultural Revolution, thereby helping the Chairman carry the day in a tight situation.[39] This gesture may have impressed Mao but soon after the plenum Jiang faced the disruptive activities of Red Guards. Their first public appearance was on 23 August when they were joined in street marches by workers and peasants from suburban communes.[40] In their first attack on the "four olds" the youthful iconoclasts marched around Hangzhou changing the names of streets, restaurants and public buildings and destroying precious cultural relics in the historic city.[41] By September Red Guards from Beijing and elsewhere had arrived in Hangzhou to push along their more "backward" fellow-students in the provinces. At two meetings with the provincial leadership they submitted suggestions concerning its conduct of the campaign and gave initial approval of its performance. Red Guards from outside Zhejiang attended the first meeting, while those from within the province were present at the second.[42] Jiang Hua's presence at these meetings were his last recorded public appearances in Zhejiang during the Cultural Revolution.