

The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party

Documents and Analysis

Edited by

Tony Saich and Benjamin Yang

With a Contribution by Benjamin Yang



THE RISE TO POWER OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

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**EDITED BY TONY SAICH
WITH A CONTRIBUTION BY BENJAMIN YANG**



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Preface

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The project originated with discussions in the mid-1980s initiated by Professor Roderick MacFarquhar among Fairbank colleagues, in particular Dr. Timothy Cheek and Dr. Hans van de Ven. The major conclusion of these discussions was that the massive amount of new sources that had become available as a result of the "opening up" of the People's Republic of China in the 1980s, when combined with those available in the Republic of China on Taiwan, the now former Soviet Union, and elsewhere, allowed for a comprehensive reappraisal of the rise to power of the Chinese communist movement.

The idea of a documentary history was inspired by the classic work produced at Harvard by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John King Fairbank in the early 1950s, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*. The new work was to contain many sources that were unavailable at that time, but, as it was designed to provide a comprehensive introduction for students in a single collection to the CCP's rise to power, it had to include a number of already translated documents.

Early in 1986, I was brought into the discussions. That summer, Professor MacFarquhar and I were quartered in the same hotel in Beijing while we were both conducting research at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Further discussions led to my agreeing to direct the project, and steps were taken to contact Chinese scholars and research institutes engaged in work on CCP history and to collect materials to supplement those already available at Harvard and Leiden. Apart from the help from various scholars and institutes in the People's Republic of China, the staff of the Bureau of Investigation Archives (Taibei) provided copies of valuable materials. In addition, Dr. Eugene Wu and the staff of the Harvard-Yenching Library as well as the library staff of the Sinologisch Instituut, Leiden, and the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, all helped in locating materials. Nancy Hearst of the Fairbank Center Library deserves special mention for her enthusiasm in tracking down relevant materials and making me aware of new, interesting publications.

Now that the materials had been compiled, the process of selection, translating, editing, and interpretation began. Dr. Benjamin Yang worked as a consultant to the project in its early stages and was a constant source of wisdom and advice. He provided basic information for the initial drafts of the commentaries covering 1927 to 1938. This work drew largely on the research he had carried out for his

book *From Revolution to Politics. Chinese Communists on the Long March* (1990). I put these drafts into final form, adding materials like debate on party history, work in the white areas, and some additional documentation on the origins of the Second United Front. For better or worse, I am solely responsible for the general introduction, the remaining chronological introductions, the quality of the translations, and their annotation.

The eight chronological introductions place each document in its specific historical context, while the general introduction is intended to introduce the reader to the broader issues of the Chinese communist revolution to which the documents relate.

Unless specifically stated, the translations were done by Sarah Burgess, Gu Weiqun, Guo Xiaolin, Hong Xiaolin, Huang Yasheng, Tony Saich, Peter Wan, and Yin Xiaohuang. Pei Minxin deserves special mention for the large amount of translation work he undertook. If it had not been for him, the project would probably still be running.

The following people read all or part of the manuscript, and their advice kept me from falling into some of the pitfalls that lay along the way: David Apter, Richard Baum, Gregor Benton, Timothy Cheek, Christina Gilmartin, Kathleen Hartford, Roderick MacFarquhar, Benjamin Schwartz, Lawrence Sullivan, Frederick Teiwes, Fritjof Tichelman, and C. Martin Wilbur.

The administration of the project would have been impossible without the professional guidance of Anne Denna, Nancy Deptula, and Patrick Maddox. Antonina Colbert did sterling work to help type up the manuscript. At a crucial stage, Doug Merwin of M.E. Sharpe stepped in to resolve the issue of publication.

Two people deserve special mention. Without Roderick MacFarquhar's help and enthusiasm, the project would never have even started let alone been finished. His advice was invaluable at every step. Professor John King Fairbank showed great enthusiasm for the project, and I learned much from our numerous discussions. Further, he cast a critical and editorial eye over virtually the entire manuscript and provided much sound advice.

Finally, I would like to thank all the members of the Fairbank Center for making my visits there such pleasant ones. Without the benefit of the seminars and lunch-time discussions this manuscript would be in far worse shape.

Tony Saich
Amsterdam, June 1991

Abbreviations and Notes

A.B.	Anti-Bolshevik [League]
ACFTU	All-China Federation of Trade Unions
CC	Central Committee
CP	Communist Party
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEC	Central Executive Committee
Comintern	Communist International
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CYL	Communist Youth League
ECCI	Executive Committee of the Communist International
GMD	Guomindang
PLA	People's Liberation Army
Politburo	Political Bureau
PRC	People's Republic of China
SYL	Socialist Youth League
YL	Youth League
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association

Single Square Brackets [] are used for editorial insertions in the text.

Double Square Brackets [[]] are used for summarized sections or passages.

Transcription

The system of transcription for Chinese names and places used in the text is the *Hanyu pinyin* system. This system is used now by the People's Republic of China and is increasingly used by scholars in the West. However, for a number of familiar names the *Hanyu pinyin* system has not been used. These are the following:

<i>Familiar spelling</i>	<i>Hanyu pinyin</i>
Canton	Guangzhou
Chiang Kai-shek	Jiang Jieshi
Jehol	Rehe
Kalgan	Zhangjiakou
Manchuria	Manzhouguo
Sun Yat-sen	Sun Zhongshan
Whampoa	Huangpu
Yangtze River	Changjiang

Beijing has been used throughout the text rather than other forms such as Beiping or Peking.

Chronology of the Chinese Communist Movement 1919–1949

1919

- 2–6 March: Founding Congress of the Third Communist International (Comintern) held in Moscow.
- 4 May: Nationalist May Fourth Movement breaks out in Beijing.
- 25 July: Soviet Russia announces the abolition of all unequal treaties with China (Karakhan Declaration).

1920

- January: Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu discuss the possibility of setting up a CP.
- April: Gregory Voitinsky arrives in China as a representative of the Vladivostok Branch of the Bolshevik's Far Eastern Bureau. In April and May, he confers with Li Dazhao in Beijing and Chen Duxiu in Shanghai about the establishment of communist organizations in China.
- August: First communist small group founded in Shanghai. By spring 1921 similar organizations have been set up in Beijing, Wuhan, Changsha, Jinan, and Canton.
- November: "Manifesto of the CP" drafted and the party journal *The Communist* launched.

1921

- 3 June: Maring (Hendricus Sneevliet) arrives in China as the first official representative of the ECCI.
- 23 July–
Early August: First National Congress held in Shanghai and the CCP is formally founded. Chen Duxiu is elected secretary of the Provisional Central Executive Bureau.
- August: Chinese Labor Secretariat founded under CCP leadership in Shanghai.
- November: CCP preliminary work plan published.
- 23 December: Maring meets with Sun Yat-sen in Guilin.

1922

- 12 January: Hong Kong sailors' strike breaks out and successfully concludes on 5 May.
- 1–6 May: Chinese Labor Secretariat sponsors First National Labor Congress in Canton.

- 6 July: Chen Duxiu writes to Voitinsky opposing the idea of cooperation with the GMD.
- 11 July: Maring delivers his report to the ECCI suggesting the idea of the CCP operating as a “bloc within” the GMD.
- 16–23 July: Second National Congress of the CCP held in Shanghai.
- 28–30 August: Hangzhou Plenum convened by Maring to approve the idea of CCP members entering the GMD.
- 4 September: First group of CCP leaders join the GMD.
- 6 September: Chen Duxiu appointed to the nine-person committee set up to plan the reorganization of the GMD.
- October: Headquarters of the CCP moves to Beijing.

1923

- 26 January: Sun Yat-sen and A.A. Joffe, a special envoy of Soviet Russia, issue their Joint Manifesto pledging Soviet support for China.
- 7 February: Beijing-Hankou Railway Workers’ Strike crushed by troops of the northern warlord Wu Peifu.
- 15 February: Headquarters of the CCP moves back to Shanghai.
- April: Party headquarters moves to Canton.
- 12–20 June: Third National Congress of the CCP held in Canton. The Congress approves Maring’s view that CCP members can join the GMD as individuals. Chen Duxiu elected chair of the Central Bureau with Mao Zedong as secretary.
- June: Central Bureau decides to return party headquarters to Shanghai as quickly as possible. The move is carried out in late July.
- August: Maring leaves China.
- 6 October: Michael Borodin arrives in Canton as the permanent delegate of Soviet Russia.
- 24–25 November: First Plenum of the CCP CEC held in Shanghai and calls for the reorganization of the GMD.

1924

- 20–30 January: First National Congress of the GMD convenes in Canton. The GMD is reorganized and CCP-GMD cooperation formally established.
- 14–16 May: First Enlarged Meeting of the CCP CEC held in Shanghai. It decides the GMD is composed of a friendly left wing and a hostile right wing.
- 16 June: Whampoa Military Academy founded in Canton.
- 7 October: First Russian ship arrives in Canton with weapons for the GMD.
- 13 October: Borodin appointed as adviser to the GMD Revolutionary Committee.
- 13 November: Sun Yat-sen leaves Canton for Beijing, marking the end of his effective leadership of the GMD.

1925

- 11-22 January: Fourth National Congress of the CCP held in Shanghai. The Congress resolution reflects Chen Duxiu's caution about CCP involvement with the GMD. Chen Duxiu elected general secretary of the CEC.
- 12 March: Sun Yat-sen dies in Beijing.
- 1-9 May: Second National Labor Congress and the First Peasant Congress held in Canton.
- 30 May: May 30 Movement breaks out in Shanghai when International Settlement police open fire on demonstrators.
- 1 June: CCP sets up the Shanghai General Labor Union to try to gain control over the movement.
- 1 July: Formation of the GMD national government announced with Wang Jingwei as chair and Borodin as senior advisor.
- 20 August: Liao Zhongkai, an ardent supporter of communist participation in the GMD and the alliance with Soviet Russia, murdered in Canton.
- October: Second Enlarged Meeting of the CEC held in Beijing. It decides that the time is ripe to convert the party from a "small group" into a "central mass political party."

1926

- 4-19 January: Second National Congress of the GMD convenes in Canton and pledges continued support for the policy of cooperation with the CCP.
- 21-24 February: Special meeting of the CCP CEC convened in Beijing. It decides that work among the peasantry must be strengthened during the Northern Expedition.
- 20 March: "Zhongshan Incident" takes place, with Chiang Kai-shek declaring martial law and claiming that a gunboat under communist command was planning to kidnap him.
- 15-22 May: GMD CEC meeting adopts measures to restrict CCP activity in the GMD.
- 9 July: Northern Expedition launched with Chiang Kai-shek as commander-in-chief.
- 12-18 July: Fourth Plenum of the CCP CEC meets in Shanghai to discuss Northern Expedition. Policy focuses on cooperation with the bourgeoisie rather than seizure of power.
- 4-5 November: Meeting of CCP leadership convened at which Chen Duxiu criticizes the views of the Canton party organization.
- 13 December: Special meeting of the Party Center is held in Hankou. Chen criticizes "leftism" in the party, and the decision is taken to support Wang Jingwei.

1927

- 10–17 March: Third Plenum of the GMD CEC meets, attended mainly by members of the GMD-left and the CCP. It moves to undermine Chiang's military power. It is the last time CCP leaders attend a GMD CEC meeting.
- 5 April: Chen Duxiu and Wang Jingwei issue joint statement emphasizing continued collaboration between the CCP and the GMD.
- 6 April: Soviet Embassy compound in Beijing raided. Li Dazhao and other CCP leaders are arrested; several, including Li, are later executed.
- 12 April: Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers massacre Communists in Shanghai and a purge of Communists begins in many eastern and southern cities.
- 27 April–9 May: Fifth National Congress of the CCP convenes in Hankou. The Congress does not order a break with the GMD, but delegates argue about how to push ahead with the peasant movement without upsetting cooperation. Chen Duxiu remains general secretary.
- 21 May: "Horse Day" massacre takes place in Changsha, a military suppression of communist-led mass organizations.
- 30 June: Enlarged meeting of the CCP CC adopts an eleven-point resolution acknowledging that the GMD is the leader of the national revolution.
- 12 July: CCP leadership is reformed. Chen Duxiu resigns as general secretary and new five-person temporary Standing Committee of the Politburo is chosen.
- 15 July: Wuhan GMD Political Affairs Committee announces the end of cooperation with the CCP.
- 1 August: Communist-led Nanchang Uprising launched. The uprising is quickly defeated, and some of the remnants under Zhu De flee to the mountains. The day is subsequently celebrated as the founding of the Red Army.
- 5 August: Wang Jingwei begins a wide-scale purge of Communists.
- 7 August: CCP Party Center convenes an Emergency Conference in Hankou under the supervision of Comintern representative Lominadze. Qu Qiubai takes Chen Duxiu's place as general secretary. The meeting calls for armed struggle against the GMD.
- 9 August: Temporary Politburo meets and elects a three-person Standing Committee comprising Qu Qiubai, Li Weihan, and Su Zhaosheng. The meeting decides to send Mao Zedong and Peng Gongda to take charge of the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan and to reorganize the Hunan Party Committee.
- 19 September: With the failure of the uprising apparent, Mao Zedong decides to abandon the party's orders to attack Changsha and retreats to the Jinggang Mountains.

- 9–10 November: Enlarged meeting of the Temporary Politburo convenes in Shanghai and decides to sever all relations with the GMD and calls for uprisings throughout the country.
- 11–14 December: Uprising by the Communists in the south (Canton Commune) ends in a massive defeat.

1928

- April: Mao Zedong and Zhu De join forces in the Jinggang Mountains to form the first and most influential communist base area in the countryside.
- 18 June–10 July: Sixth National Congress of the CCP is held in Moscow because of security concerns. It takes place under the direct supervision of Bukharin. The revolution in China is depicted as being in a trough between two waves. The soviet is designated as the instrument of political power for the future.
- 19 July: First Plenum of the CC elects the new Politburo.
- 20 July: New Politburo meets and elects Xiang Zhongfa as general secretary.
- November: Li Lisan replaces Cai Hesen in the Politburo.

1929

- 8 February: ECCI sends a letter to the CCP claiming that signs of a new revolutionary high tide in China are visible.
- 22 April: Stalin openly criticizes Bukharin for “right opportunism,” and Bukharin loses his position in the Comintern.
- 25–30 June: Second Plenum of the CC is held in Shanghai, and the “leftist” trend in the party increases. “Rightism” is defined as the greatest danger at the present time.
- 5 October: Politburo decision attacks Chen Duxiu for his “Trotskyite” and “liquidationist” tendencies.
- 26 October: ECCI writes to the CCP telling it that the new revolutionary tide has arrived and that the party must take over its leadership.
- Late December: Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army is held in Gutian and adopts a resolution drafted by Mao Zedong.

1930

- April: Zhou Enlai leaves China for Moscow, thus leaving effective power within the party in the hands of Li Lisan.
- 5 April: War breaks out between Chiang Kai-shek’s troops and those of Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. In November Chiang is victorious.
- May: Li Lisan convenes two conferences in Shanghai: the National Conference of Delegates from the Red Armies (mid-May) and the National Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas (20–23 May). The former calls for the establishment of a

- national Soviet regime, while the latter abandons the former guerrilla warfare tactics in favor of mobile warfare. This paves the way for the decision to attack major cities.
- 11 June: Li Lisan presides over Politburo meeting in Shanghai that decides the revolutionary upsurge has arrived. Wuhan is to be seized as part of the takeover of one or more provinces.
- 18 July: National Conference of CCP Organizations opens in Shanghai. It announces that the party should organize uprisings and that the party is the one preparing to take power. It calls for action committees to be established at the central and local levels.
- 23 July: The party in Shanghai receives the ECCI's response to Li Lisan's policy that seems to approve of it but expresses concern.
- 27 July: Peng Dehuai's Third Army captures Changsha but is able to hold it for only seven days.
- August: Qu Qiubai and Zhou Enlai are sent back to China from Moscow to moderate Li Lisan's policies.
- 6 August: Li Lisan chairs the first meeting of the Central Action Committee, which calls on the whole party to mobilize for immediate revolution.
- 23 August: First Front Army formed with Mao Zedong as general political commissar.
- 24 August–
12 September: Second attack on Changsha takes place without success.
- 24–28 September: Third Plenum of the CC meets in Shanghai chaired by Qu Qiubai. Li Lisan is criticized for tactical errors, particularly concerning the speed and development of the revolution.
- 16 November: ECCI letter of October arrives in China. It criticizes Li Lisan's mistakes as ones of line.
- December: GMD's First Suppression Campaign defeated within one month. Futian Incident occurs. The Twentieth Army led by Liu Tiechao revolts but is swiftly defeated.

1931

- 7 January: Fourth Plenum of the CC is held in Shanghai under the supervision of Pavel Mif, who had arrived in China in late December 1930. The Plenum harshly condemns Li Lisan. Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Li Weihai are dismissed from the Politburo, and Wang Ming is added. Xiang Zhongfa remains general secretary but real power lies with Wang Ming. Central Soviet Bureau established with Zhou Enlai as secretary.
- 17 January: He Mengxiong and Luo Zhanglong make public their opposition to the Fourth Plenum and demand the convocation of an emergency congress.

- 18 January: He Mengxiong and key supporters, not including Luo Zhanglong, are arrested by the British police and handed over to the GMD. They are executed on 7 February.
- 27 January: Luo Zhanglong expelled from the CCP.
- May–June: GMD’s Second Suppression Campaign rebuffed.
- 21 June: General Secretary Xiang Zhongfa is arrested in Shanghai and is executed by the GMD on 24 June. Wang Ming takes over as acting general secretary.
- July–October: GMD’s Third Suppression Campaign launched under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership.
- 18 September: Japanese troops invade northeast China.
- 1–5 November: Gannan Conference (First Party Congress of the Central Soviet) convenes and criticizes Mao Zedong’s harshness in dealing with the Futian Incident. Mao is transferred to work in the soviet government.
- 7–20 November: First All-China Soviet Congress convenes in Ruijin and founds the Chinese Soviet Republic as a national regime. Mao Zedong is appointed chair of the soviet government. Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao are appointed vice-chairs with Zhu De as chair of newly created Central Revolutionary Military Commission.
- December: Zhou Enlai arrives in Jiangxi and formally assumes the position of secretary of the Central Soviet Bureau.

1932

- 9 January: CCP Party Center passes a resolution urging an “initial victory in one or more provinces.”
- May: Chiang Kai-shek sets up General Headquarters for the Fourth Suppression Campaign.
- 8 October: Ningdu Conference of the Central Soviet Bureau convenes. Mao is strongly criticized, and on 23 October Zhou Enlai replaces Mao Zedong as political commissar of First Front Army.
- 11 October: Fourth Front Army is forced by the suppression campaign to leave the E-Yu-Wan Soviet Base Area and withdraw westward.
- 15 October: Chen Duxiu, Peng Shuzhi, and other Trotskyites are arrested by the GMD in Shanghai.
- October: Third Front Army forced to leave Hubei and flee north.
- 29 December: Fourth Front Army founds the Revolutionary Committee of the Sichuan-Shaanxi Base Area.

1933

- January: Party Center headed by Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian is forced to leave Shanghai and move to the Jiangxi Soviet, where it merges with the Central Soviet Bureau.
- 15 February: Anti–Luo Ming campaign begins in the Jiangxi Central Soviet.

- 26–28 February: First Front Army in the Central Soviet gains a victory in the Fourth Suppression Campaign.
- 1 June: Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic launches the Land Investigation Movement.
- October: GMD launches its Fifth Suppression Campaign against the Central Soviet. In the same month Otto Braun, the Comintern's military advisor to the CCP, arrives in Jiangxi.
- 26 October: Secret peace agreement signed between the Red Army and the Nineteenth Route Army in Fujian.
- 20 November: The Nineteenth Route Army leaders declare a revolt against the GMD. By late December, the loosely knit government set up by the rebellion collapses under pressure from advancing GMD troops.

1934

- 15–18 January: Fifth Plenum of the CC convenes in Ruijin. Bo Gu's political report stresses that the revolutionary situation is excellent.
- 22 January–
3 February: Second All-China Soviet Congress convenes in Ruijin. Mao Zedong elected chair of the Central Government, and Zhang Wentian elected chair of the Council of People's Commissars.
- 28 April: Central Red Army loses the battle at Guangchang.
- 21 October: CCP CC moves out of Ruijin and embarks on the Long March.
- 10 November: GMD forces occupy Ruijin.
- 11 December: CCP Politburo meets at Tongdao and again on 18 December at Liping, and the original decision to move north to meet the Second and Sixth Army Corps is scrapped.

1935

- 15–18 January: An enlarged meeting of the Politburo convenes at Zunyi. Bo Gu is criticized for implementing a mistaken military line, and Mao Zedong is elected a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.
- 15 May: Zhang Guotao and the Fourth Front Army set up the Northwest Special Committee of the CCP in the Sichuan-Xikang Border Area.
- 30 May: Zhang Guotao announces formation of the "Northwest Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic."
- 14 June: Rally held to mark the reunion of the First and Fourth Front Armies.
- 18 June: Qu Qiubai is executed having been arrested by the GMD in February.
- 26 June: Politburo meets at Lianghekou to deal with urgent military

- matters. Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong differ over which direction the Red Armies should move. Zhang wants to move east, while Mao, in the name of the Party Center, decides to move north.
- 18 July: Zhang Guotao named political commissar of the Red Army with Zhu De as commander-in-chief.
- 25 July–
20 August: Comintern’s Seventh Congress adopts a new policy calling for a united front of all classes to resist fascism.
- 1 August: CCP Mission to the Comintern headed by Wang Ming publishes the August First Declaration advocating a national united front against the Japanese.
- 5–6 August: Politburo meets at Shawo to try to solve the political differences between the First and Fourth Front Armies. The decision to march north is confirmed.
- 10 September: Mao Zedong convenes emergency Politburo meeting at Baxi and again gets confirmation that the troops should march north. Zhang Guotao is not present.
- 12 September: CC meets at Ejie, and Mao Zedong delivers a report criticizing Zhang Guotao.
- 13–14 September: Zhang Guotao in a meeting held in Aba decides to move south. Mao Zedong is criticized as a “right opportunist.”
- 15 October: Fourth Front Army’s conference held in Zhuomubao decides to establish another Party Center headed by Zhang Guotao.
- 19 October: Central Red Army reaches Wuqizhen in north Shaanxi.
- 21 November: Zhang Hao, an envoy from the Comintern in Moscow, arrives in north Shaanxi.
- 5 December: Zhang Guotao telegrams the First Front Army informing it of his new “Party Center.”
- 17 December: Politburo meets at Wayaobao to discuss the implications of the new united front strategy for China.

1936

- 22 January: Party Center passes a resolution denouncing Zhang Guotao.
- 28 January: Zhang Guotao at conference of party and army activists accepts the new united front policy.
- February: Zhang Guotao’s troops defeated by the GMD and forced to retreat westward.
- 9 April: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang meet in Yan’an for secret talks about opposition to Japan.
- 5 May: CCP sends appeal to the Nanjing government calling for a cease-fire.
- June: Ren Bishi and He Long lead the remnants of the Second and Sixth Army Corps to meet up with the Fourth Front Army at Ganzi.

- July: Second and Sixth Army Corps and the Fourth Front Army decide to move north to join up with the First Front Army.
- 25 August: Zhang Wentian drafts an open letter on behalf of the CCP commending Chiang Kai-shek and referring to him as generalissimo.
- 17 September: Politburo passes resolution suggesting that an agreement be reached with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 8 October: The three major Red Army groups link up.
- 7 December: Mao Zedong assumes position of chair of the Central Military Council.
- 12 December: Xi'an Incident occurs. Chiang Kai-shek is taken captive by Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. On 16 December Zhou Enlai goes to Xi'an for negotiations, having received instructions from the Comintern to resolve the issue peacefully. On 25 December, Zhang Xueliang accompanies Chiang Kai-shek back to Nanjing.

1937

- January: CCP moves its headquarters from Bao'an to Yan'an.
- 10 February: CCP CC sends a telegram to the Third Plenum of the GMD CC calling for a new period of CCP-GMD cooperation. The CCP calls for a cessation of civil war and convocation of a National Assembly and offers to abolish its independent political regime and to cease using the terms soviet and Red Army.
- 4 March: Liu Shaoqi sends a letter to the Party Center claiming that the party has suffered from "leftism" ever since the 7 August 1927 Emergency Meeting.
- 23-31 March: Politburo convenes an enlarged meeting in Yan'an to discuss the domestic situation and to criticize Zhang Guotao. A decision is adopted on Zhang Guotao's "mistakes."
- April: Liu Zhidan killed in combat with GMD troops in Shaanxi.
- 2-14 May: CCP conference of national party delegates is convened in Yan'an. Zhang Wentian rejects Liu Shaoqi's view that the party as a whole had suffered from "leftism" and reaffirms the party's and the Comintern's basic line as correct.
- May-June: Party Center convenes a conference in Yan'an on work in the white areas. Liu Shaoqi presides. While dropping his criticism of the Party Center during the Jiangxi period, he still criticizes "leftism" in the party and warns of "subjectivism" and "dogmatism."
- 7 July: Sino-Japanese War begins with the "incident" at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing.
- 9 August: Clash at Hongqiao Airport (Shanghai) between Chinese and Japanese troops takes place.
- 21 August: Nonaggression treaty is signed between the USSR and the Nationalist government in Nanjing.

- 22–25 August: Politburo convenes an enlarged meeting at Luochuan. The resolution calls for an “all-around war of resistance” and emphasizes the leading role of the CCP in the war. It formally adopts the “Ten Great Policies for Resistance Against Japan and National Salvation.”
- 25 August: Eighth Route Army formed with Zhu De as general commander and Ren Bishi as director of the Political Department.
- 22 September: CCP’s manifesto on GMD-CCP cooperation, drafted on 4 July, is made public by the Central News Agency of the central government.
- 10 October: New Fourth Army founded with Ye Ting as general commander and Xiang Ying as political commissar.
- 12 November: Mao Zedong addresses a meeting of party activists in Yan’an. He stresses the need for the CCP to retain its independence.
- 29 November: Wang Ming and seven members of the CCP Mission to the Comintern, including Kang Sheng and Chen Yun, arrive in Yan’an.
- 9–14 December: Politburo convenes in Yan’an to discuss Comintern policy and party work. Wang Ming prevails over Mao Zedong, but no formal resolution is drawn up. On Comintern instructions, the post of general secretary (held by Zhang Wentian) is abolished and a Secretariat formed comprising Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng, and Chen Yun. Mao retains his position as chair of the Military Council. Following the meeting, Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu leave for Wuhan to set up the Yangtze Bureau with Wang Ming as secretary.

1938

- 27 February–
1 March: Conflict between Mao Zedong and Wang Ming reaches a high point at a Politburo meeting. No formal resolution is adopted.
- 4 April: Zhang Guotao flees Yan’an to join the GMD.
- 18 April: Zhang Guotao is expelled from the CCP.
- 15 June: Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and Zhou Enlai issue a public statement citing the heroic defense of Madrid as a good example for the defense of Wuhan. They propose mass mobilization to defend Wuhan.
- 5 August: GMD places restrictions on the activities of mass organizations in Wuhan.
- 14 September: Politburo meets to discuss news from the Comintern brought to Yan’an by Wang Jiaxiang. The Comintern approves the conduct of the war to date and suggests that Mao Zedong, not Wang Ming, should be the party leader.
- 29 September–
6 November: Sixth Plenum of the CCP CC convenes in Yan’an. By the end of

the Plenum, Mao strongly expresses his differences with Wang Ming. However, in his opening remarks Mao asserts that the CCP takes second place to the GMD in the war against Japan. Mao states that the CCP's aim is to establish a "new democratic republic" based on Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People." In his closing remarks, Mao is more critical of the GMD, blaming it for not allowing the united front to assume a proper organizational form. Mao criticizes Wang Ming's approach of using legal channels to develop the communist movement and of shifting the focus of work from the countryside to the cities. Mao Zedong is placed in control of the daily work of the Secretariat.

- 25 October: Wuhan falls to the Japanese.
9 November: Yangtze Bureau is abolished and its former area of jurisdiction placed under two new bureaus, the Southern Bureau headed by Zhou Enlai (13 January 1939) and the Central Plain's Bureau headed by Liu Shaoqi.

1939

- 15 January–
4 February: Meeting of the First People's Council of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region convenes. It adopts a milder political line to be pursued during the war. Lin Boqu elected as chair of the Border Region government.
- 21–30 January: Fifth Plenum of the GMD CC meets and decides to step up its curbs on CCP activities.
- 10 February: CCP CC issues instructions concerning clashes between CCP and GMD troops.
- 10 June: Mao Zedong addresses a high-level cadres conference on the deteriorating relations with the GMD. He depicts all anti-communist activity as capitulation to the Japanese.
- 3–25 August: Enlarged meeting of the Politburo convened in Yan'an. It decides to stop the "storm membership drive" that had been in progress since the beginning of the war in 1937. Policy is to consolidate and to purge "undesirable elements."
- 9–18 September: National Political Consultative Assembly convenes its fourth session. The CCP tries to use the meeting to reject GMD attacks and to strengthen the anti-Japanese front. The GMD is unresponsive and criticizes the CCP's principal representative, Wang Ming.
- October: GMD severs financial and logistical support to the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region government.
- 4 October: Mao Zedong publishes "Introduction to the Communist." It marks the beginning of Mao's attempt to define a new party history that is critical of Wang Ming and his supporters.

1940

- January: Secret agreement between Wang Jingwei and the Japanese to set up a new “National Government” made public.
- 15 January: Mao Zedong publishes “New Democratic Politics and New Democratic Culture.” For the first time since the outbreak of the war, the CCP publicly advances its claim to lead the revolution.
- 1 February: CCP CC issues resolution warning that capitulation is the greatest danger at the present time.
- 6 March: CCP CC issues directive on the question of administration of the anti-Japanese base areas. It proposes adoption of the “three thirds” system of government.
- 13 August: CCP’s Northern Bureau adopts the “Double Ten Policy” for the administration of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region.
- 20 August: “100 Regiments” Campaign is launched by the Eighth Route Army to attack the Japanese troops in North China. It concludes on 5 December.

1941

- January: “Southern Anhui Incident” (New Fourth Army Incident) occurs. The New Fourth Army troops are destroyed by the GMD.
- 20 January: New leadership of the New Fourth Army is announced that places it firmly under the control of Mao Zedong and his supporters. Chen Yi is made temporary commander and Liu Shaoqi appointed political commissar.
- 13 April: USSR and Japan conclude a five-year neutrality pact.
- 19 May: Mao Zedong delivers a speech to high-level cadres attending a study conference. He points out that the practical application of Marxism-Leninism in revolutionary work merits the most attention. (The speech is not published until 27 March 1942.)
- 22 June: Nazi Germany invades the Soviet Union.
- 2 July: Liu Shaoqi addresses the Central China Branch of the Party School on the question of how inner-party struggle should be conducted.
- 10 September–
22 October: An enlarged meeting of the Politburo convenes. The meeting marks the effective launch of the Rectification Campaign. The meeting decides that mistakes made by the party between 1931 and 1934 were ones of political line.
- 26 September: Central Secretariat publishes a decision on organizing study for senior cadres. A central study organization is formed with Mao Zedong as its head and Wang Jiaxiang as his deputy.
- 6–21 November: Second People’s Council of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region convenes. It decides on the policy of “Better Troops and Simpler Administration.”

- 4 December: Border Region government sends out a directive to all counties on implementing “Better Troops and Simpler Administration.”
- 9 December: CCP calls for the formation of an anti-Japanese and antifascist front in the Pacific to include all the governments and peoples who are opposed to Japan.

1942

- 28 January: Politburo ratifies a CC decision on land policy in the base areas. It is designed to appeal to all classes in the rural areas.
- 1 and 8 February: Mao Zedong addresses opening ceremony of the Central Party School in Yan’an. He highlights incorrect work methods in the party. The speech marks the formal beginning of the Rectification Campaign.
- 6 February: CC issues a directive explaining the need for moderation in current economic policy.
- 2–23 May: Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art convenes at which Mao Zedong outlines his policy.
- 27 May–11 June: Struggle sessions are held at the Central Research Institute to criticize Wang Shiwei.
- 28 May: Chen Duxiu dies.
- 8 June: Propaganda Department announces that a general study committee is to be set up in Yan’an with Mao Zedong as its head and Kang Sheng as his deputy.
- 19 October–
14 January 1943: CCP Northwest Bureau convenes a senior cadres conference that makes decisions supportive of Mao Zedong’s view on party history and economic and administrative affairs. Mao delivers a speech on economic affairs setting forth the principles for future work.
- December: Party organs are instructed to begin investigation of cadres’ backgrounds. However, the work formally begins only in April 1943.

1943

- 10 March: Chiang Kai-shek’s *China’s Destiny* is published.
- 16–20 March: Politburo meets to discuss the question of strengthening party centralized leadership. The Secretariat is subordinated to the Politburo but is to carry out its day-to-day work. Mao Zedong appointed chair of the Politburo and the Secretariat. It is decided that the chair of the Secretariat will have the final power of decision on matters to be discussed at Secretariat meetings.
- 15 May: Comintern is dissolved.
- 26 May: CCP CC announces its agreement with the dissolution of the Comintern.

- 1 July: CCP begins to build up the public stature of Mao Zedong and his role in the history of the party.
- 6 July: Liu Shaoqi in an article attacks “false Marxists” and calls for party members to arm themselves with Mao Zedong’s system of thought.
- 15 August: CCP CC decision formally links the investigation of cadres with rectification.
- Early September–October: Politburo meets and criticizes Wang Ming’s “right opportunism” during the first year of the anti-Japanese war.
- 28 December: CC directives are sent out criticizing Wang Ming and Bo Gu for mistakes both during the anti-Japanese war and during the period 1931–34.

1944

- April: Japan’s Operation Ichigo attempts to clear a land route from Korea down to Hanoi.
- 12 April: Mao Zedong addresses a meeting of senior cadres in Yan’an. He calls for work in urban areas to be stepped up.
- 4–8 May: Substantive contacts take place between the GMD and the CCP in Xi’an.
- 21 May: Seventh Plenum of the CCP CC convenes in Yan’an. It concludes on 20 April 1945. It meets on 21 May, 5 June, 9 November, 7 and 9 December 1944, 18 February, 31 March, and 20 April 1945. Mao Zedong chairs the Presidium and the meeting as a whole. While in session, the Presidium and the Plenum take over the work of the Secretariat and the Politburo.
- 5 June: Seventh Plenum at its second session issues an instruction on urban work and sets up an urban work committee with Peng Zhen as its head.
- 1 July: CCP directives clearly show that the party feels the war will end soon.
- 4 September: CC instructs urban work departments to be set up at all levels above the local party committee. Base area and urban work is placed on an equal footing.
- 10 November: General Patrick Hurley and Mao Zedong sign an agreement that is optimistically billed as one between the CCP and the national government of China.
- 22 November: GMD issues its own three-point agreement.

1945

- 3 February: An agreement is reached between the CCP and the GMD calling for a political consultative conference to discuss the establish-

- ment of constitutional government and the unification of military forces.
- February: Yalta Conference convenes.
- 1 March: Chiang Kai-shek makes it clear that while Communists and members of other parties can participate in the national government, the GMD will not give up its ultimate decision-making power until the people's congress has been convened to inaugurate constitutional government.
- 20 April: Seventh Plenum of the CCP CC concludes and adopts the resolution on party history. For the first time in such an official document, Wang Ming and Bo Gu are named as the "two dogmatists" who led the incorrect third "left line."
- 23 April-11 June: Seventh National Congress of the CCP convenes in Yan'an. Mao Zedong presents his report "On Coalition Government." The Congress adopts a new constitution drafted under Liu Shaoqi's guidance. The constitution stresses Mao Zedong Thought, stating that together with Marxism-Leninism it provides the guiding principles for all party work. A new CC of forty-four full and thirty-three alternate members is elected. Wang Ming and Bo Gu appear as numbers forty-three and forty-four respectively on the list of full members.
- 19 June: First Plenum of the CCP CC convenes in Yan'an. Mao Zedong is elected chair of the CC, the Politburo, and the Secretariat. A Politburo of thirteen members is elected.
- 6 August: Atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima.
- 8 August: Soviet Russia declares war on Japan.
- 10 August: Japan indicates its intention to surrender.
- 14 August: Soviet Russia signs a treaty of alliance with the Chinese Nationalist government. Soviet Russia agrees to pull out of Manchuria by mid-November.
- 23 August: Enlarged meeting of the Politburo sets up the CC's Military Affairs Commission with Mao Zedong as chair. It decides that Mao Zedong should go to Chongqing for negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 25 August: CC publishes a declaration putting forward the slogans of peace, democracy, and unity.
- 26 August: Mao Zedong flies to Chongqing for negotiations, returning to Yan'an on 11 October 1945.
- 10 September: Communist troops successfully conduct the Shangdang battle.
- 14-15 September: Politburo meets to discuss work in the Northeast. It sets up a Northeast Bureau with Peng Zhen as secretary.
- 19 September: CC informs its bureaus that its policy is to expand in the north and defend in the south.

- 11 October: Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek issue a joint statement pledging the desire for peace and unity.
- End October: GMD-CCP armed clashes break out in eleven provinces.
- 21 December: CC sends a directive to the Northeast Bureau calling for long-term bases to be set up in the region.
- 23 December: General George C. Marshall arrives in China as President Harry Truman's envoy. This follows the resignation of Patrick Hurley in late November.

1946

- 10 January: Under General Marshall's mediation, the GMD and the CCP agree to a ceasefire to begin at midnight, 13 January.
- 10-31 January: Political Consultative Conference meets and succeeds in resolving most of the political and military differences between the CCP and the GMD.
- 1 February: CC issues a directive claiming that the most important form of struggle is now a peaceful, parliamentary one.
- 25 February: Three-person military committee (Marshall, Zhang Zhizhong, and Zhou Enlai) announces plans for large-scale troop reductions on both sides.
- 12 March: GMD forces occupy Shenyang, one day after Soviet withdrawal. General Marshall returns to the United States to report to President Truman.
- 15 April: Zhou Enlai declares that a state of hostilities exists in the northeast because of persistent GMD attacks.
- 18 April: General Marshall returns to China.
- 4 May: CCP CC issues a directive drafted by Liu Shaoqi calling for land reform instead of the policy of rent-reduction in order to attract peasant support during the Civil War.
- 7 June: A two-week ceasefire in the northeast is scheduled to begin. It is extended to the end of the month but to no avail.
- 14 June: United States passes legislation to provide military assistance to the GMD.
- 23 June: Mao Zedong demands that the United States cease all aid to the GMD and calls for U.S. withdrawal.
- 7 July: CCP CC launches a public attack on U.S. policy in China and demands withdrawal of U.S. forces.
- 4 August: Bo Gu, Ye Ting, Wang Ruofei, and Deng Fa are killed in a plane crash while flying from Chongqing to Yan'an.
- 10 October: Kalgan falls to the GMD. The CCP announces that this means certain civil war.
- 15 November-
25 December: The National Assembly convenes in Nanjing. The CCP boycotts it.

1947

- 7 January: General Marshall returns to the United States admitting the failure of his mission in China.
- 1 February: Enlarged Politburo meeting is held in Yan'an primarily to discuss Mao Zedong's "Welcome the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution."
- 11 February: CCP delegation in Nanjing headed by Zhou Enlai is ordered to leave by the Nationalist government.
- 19 March: CCP withdraws from Yan'an.
- 26 March: CCP CC meets in Zaolingou Village (north Shaanxi) and decides to divide the CC in two. A Front Line Committee is established headed by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Ren Bishi. It remains in north Shaanxi to lead the national liberation struggle. A Work Committee is set up headed by Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De. It moves to the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area.
- 9 April: It is decided that the CC and the general headquarters of the PLA will remain in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region.
- 17 July–
13 September: CC Work Committee convenes the National Land Conference at Xibaipo Village (Hebei) and passes the "Outline Land Law of China."
- 1 September: Mao Zedong drafts a CC directive calling for a switch from strategic withdrawal to launching a nationwide counteroffensive.
- 10 October: CC approves and publishes the "Outline Land Law of China." Not only the land of landlords is to be appropriated but also houses and all movable property.
- 27 October: Nationalist government outlaws the Democratic League composed of third-party groups largely sympathetic to the CCP.
- 25–28 December: CCP CC convenes at Yangjiagou (north Shaanxi) to consider land policy as well as the general situation. This is preceded by preparatory meetings from 7 December. Mao Zedong warns that the "ultraleft" policy of 1931–34 of granting no land to landlords should not be repeated. Mao also raises the "10 basic military principles."

1948

- 12 January: Ren Bishi talks to an enlarged meeting of the Northwest Field Operations Military Front Committee about rural problems. He highlights the problem of too many middle peasants being classified as rich peasants and then being deprived of property.
- 23 January: Liu Shaoqi writes to Bo Yibo restating the integral link between land reform and party rectification and warns against encroachment on the rights of middle peasants.

- 3 and 6 February: Mao Zedong outlines a threefold categorization of “liberated areas,” each requiring a different land policy.
- 1 April: Mao Zedong, addressing the Congress of Cadres of the Shaan-Sui Liberated Area, warns against “ultraleft” tendencies.
- 22 April: Communist forces reoccupy Yan’an.
- 30 April–7 May: Secretariat of the CCP CC meets in Chengnan Village (Hebei) to discuss strategy for the war. It decides to concentrate forces on the Central Plains for attack as preparation for destruction of enemy troops north of the Yangtze.
- 25 May: CCP CC issues a directive drafted by Mao Zedong moderating land reform. Mao suggests that in some areas the conditions are not ripe for land reform.
- Late July–
31 August: Northeast Bureau of the CCP convenes a conference on urban work stressing its primacy over that in the rural areas.
- 1–22 August: Sixth Congress of the ACFTU is held in Harbin. Chen Yun is elected chair.
- 8–13 September: Enlarged meeting of the Politburo takes place at Xibaipo to undertake a major review of the previous couple of years and to plan for the future. It predicts a basic victory within five years and calls for a recentralization of control in the party. The center of gravity of party work is to be shifted from the rural areas to the cities.
- 12 September–
2 November: Communist forces engage in the Liao-Shen Campaign. This is Lin Biao’s eighth offensive, and it results in the total defeat of GMD forces in the northeast.
- 6 November–
10 January 1949: Communist forces launch the Huai-Hai Campaign, which opens the route to the Yangtze and beyond.
- 21 November–
31 January 1949: Communist forces launch the Beijing-Tianjin Campaign. Tianjin is taken on 15 January, and on 31 January communist troops enter Beijing.

1949

- 6–8 January: Politburo meets at Xibaipo and predicts that victory will be achieved during 1949 and 1950. The resolution adopted calls for moderation in policy when entering the south, proposing rent and interest reduction rather than land redistribution.
- 14 January: Mao Zedong presents eight conditions for the surrender of the GMD.
- 5–13 March: Second Plenum of the CCP CC convenes in Xibaipo. The Plenum reaffirms the conditions for peace, confirms that the Political

- Consultative Conference should be convened and that a democratic coalition government be formed. The switch of focus of work from the countryside to the cities is confirmed.
- 1 April: Unsuccessful peace talks between the GMD and the CCP begin in Beijing.
- 11–18 April: First Congress of the New Democracy Youth Federation convenes in Beijing.
- 20 April: With the CCP deadline for GMD acceptance of terms past, communist troops advance across the Yangtze.
- 23 April: Communist troops take over Nanjing.
- 27 May: Shanghai falls to communist troops.
- 1 July: Mao Zedong publishes “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship.”
- 16 July: Association of Sino-Soviet Friendship is established with Guo Moruo as its chair.
- Late July–
31 August: Northeast Bureau of the CCP holds a city work conference and outlines CCP policy for urban work.
- 27 August: Northeast People’s Government is formed with Gao Gang as chair.
- 21–30 September: Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference convenes in Beijing to prepare for the establishment of the PRC and the election of the People’s Government. On 27 September, it adopts the “Organic Law of the Central People’s Government” and the “Organic Law of the People’s Political Consultative Conference.”
- 1 October: PRC is formally founded with Mao Zedong as chair and Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Gao Gang (CCP), Song Qingling, Li Jishen, and Zhang Lan (democrats) as vice-chairs. Zhou Enlai is appointed premier of the State Council and minister of foreign affairs.

Introduction

The rise of Chinese communism has shaped the history of China for most of the twentieth century. Almost from the founding of the CCP in 1920 to its seizure of state power in 1949, its struggle with the GMD dominated the domestic stage of Chinese politics. From the founding of the PRC (1949) until the present, the CCP has presided over the world's most populous state. Its ambitious programs to transform these people's lives have affected everyone in staggering and sometimes catastrophic ways. On the international stage, the PRC's international behavior has had a major impact within the communist bloc, on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and on the balance of power in East Asia.

The CCP's struggle to gain power is a dramatic story of policy disputes and power struggles, intrigue and infighting, tragedy and ultimately triumph. The main outlines of this story have been known for a long time: a first congress in July 1921 inspired by the Bolshevik revolution and guided by a Comintern emissary that sought to find an identity for the fledgling party; a united front with the GMD from 1923 to 1927 that ended in disaster in 1927 when the GMD leader, Chiang Kai-shek, broke decisively with the CCP and slaughtered thousands; the early years in the wilderness when the guerrilla warfare gradually led to the buildup of base areas in south China; the increasingly ferocious campaigns by Chiang Kai-shek to exterminate the "bandits" that led to the evacuation of the central soviet area in October 1934; the epic journey of the Long March, which resulted in a sadly depleted Red Army arriving in northwest China a year later; the emergence of the military strategist Mao Zedong as the CCP's preeminent leader after bitter struggles with his political foes Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming; the formation of a second united front with the GMD to resist Japanese aggression in China in the mid-1930s; the expansion of the CCP during the anti-Japanese war and the creation of a new orthodoxy by Mao Zedong in Yan'an in the late 1930s and early 1940s; the slide from cooperation between the CCP and the GMD to civil war after the Japanese had been defeated; the better organization and discipline of the CCP's troops that led to a surprisingly swift triumph in the Civil War and the flight of the GMD to Taiwan.

Much was clear when *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* was published at Harvard four decades ago. Unclear then, however, were the answers to why, how, and even when and where many key events took place, and who had shaped them. With almost the complete documentation now available, the story can

I would like to thank Richard Baum, Michel Hunt, Benjamin Schwartz, Lawrence Sullivan, and C. Martin Wilbur for their comments on an earlier draft of this introduction. In particular, I would like to thank Roderick MacFarquhar and Frederick Teiwes, who both subjected this introduction to a very rigorous reading. These readers' suggestions have enabled me to correct certain faulty ideas, but I am afraid stubbornness has caused me to persist in what may be others.

be told here through contemporary CCP materials. The documents show how the CCP interpreted the revolution in which it was participating, how it devised policies to meet the changing circumstances, and how these were communicated both to party members and to the public at large. The message was not always the same, not even for party members. How much one was entitled to know or which particular interpretation of an event one was entitled to see depended on party rank.¹

The details of the Chinese revolution are, of course, unique but there are a number of general features that will be familiar to students of revolutions elsewhere. First, the traditional system in China had ceased to “deliver the goods” for its citizens and crucially for key groups such as the urban elites and intellectuals. Disillusionment set in and the imperial system lost its monopoly over feasible alternatives, allowing disaffected intellectuals to challenge the premises of state power. Second, the communist movement was able to thrive where the bases of power of local elites had been destroyed or lost the capacity to repress alternatives to its rule. There the Communists could establish local military superiority. Third, for the revolutionaries, the organization and organizational ethos were crucial in terms of providing the movement with its direction and purpose. This gave the activists their frame of reference. It enabled them to channel the energies of other social forces when necessary and to overcome the resistance and apathy of the local population.

The chronological introductions in this volume seek to place the documents in their specific historical context. They also reveal the high degree of policy diversity that existed within the CCP. The CCP has never been a monolithic entity despite the desires of some of its leaders and the misconceptions of some Western observers, particularly those writing in the 1950s when the influence of the Cold War was at its height.

In fact, the history of the CCP has been marked by great internal diversity and change. The documents selected reveal this policy diversity in two ways. First, they show the wide range of debate within the party on issues of strategy and tactics. Resolutions adopted were frequently compromises between different factions in the party. While this tendency was clearer in the first two decades, it persisted despite Mao’s consolidation of power in the 1940s. Second, there was a very strong regional dimension to the revolution. Put simply, the issue of strategy and tactics could look quite different depending on whether it was viewed from the top of a barren mountain or from a safe-house in Tianjin.

The First United Front, for example, brought contrasting responses from the underground party apparatus functioning in Shanghai, where the foreign presence dominated, and from the party apparatus working openly in Canton under the patronage of the GMD and free from foreign pressure. The local party organization often provided the focus of loyalty for its members, and the locality was frequently the source of policy initiative. In various base areas, the party had to be extremely flexible, on occasion, just to survive. Party documents frequently complain about this tendency toward localism, and the party devised various

institutional arrangements to try to improve accountability to the Center.

The choice of documents is, of course, subjective, and intends to highlight the aspects and issues which the author feels are most important for understanding the rise to power of the CCP. Indeed, revolution itself is a contested concept, and its interpretation depends on one's viewpoint or position of involvement.² Revolution is a mental construct. This is true for participants and observers alike. The symbols used by participants to describe the events taking place depend on whether one wants to create a feeling of solidarity and incitement to action or to form a bond of solidarity to repress what is taking place. Thus, terms such as *comrade*, *counterrevolutionary*, and *dictatorship of the proletariat* summon up different images, depending on from where one views them. Observers and interpreters of revolution are no less affected. Interpretation is influenced by one's own political position as well as by the particular questions in the social sciences which seem most relevant at any specific time.³

The concentration on the CCP inevitably leaves out other important aspects of the revolution in twentieth-century China. Communist success in seizing state power was aided by factors beyond its control, and a major part of the explanation for communist success lies in the failure of the alternatives. For example, the GMD's neotraditional response failed to come to terms with China's situation. While the Japanese invasion may have sounded the death-knell for the GMD, the work of Lloyd Eastman and others has shown that even without this it would have been difficult for the GMD to have constructed a credible institutional framework to govern China.⁴

Two issues on which the documents shed light on must be briefly discussed: the role of the Comintern and the role of the CCP's military. Then, three broader issues that the documents touch on implicitly will be reviewed: the emergence of the CCP, the relationship between the CCP and social forces in China, and the development of the CCP as an organization and its ideology.

The Role of the Comintern

During the 1950s, the assumption that the CCP was under the tutelage of Moscow led to attempts to see Comintern influence on the CCP in earlier phases of the revolution. It was not difficult to find.⁵ Indeed, some scholars saw the destruction of the First United Front in China as tantamount to a failure of Soviet policy or even more particularly of Stalin himself.⁶ The work of Benjamin Schwartz stands out as an exception. While he acknowledged the debt owed by the Chinese Communists to Bolshevik theory and organization, he was aware of traditional Chinese influences and the "originality" of Mao Zedong and his supporters, which was of increasing importance after 1927.⁷ The indigenous elements that had gone into Chinese communism became major objects for retrieval, particularly after the Sino-Soviet rupture became apparent in the early 1960s. Some researchers began to explore the "sinification of Marxism" and to stress that much had

happened in spite of Comintern interference rather than because of it.⁸

We can see now that there was continual tension between the CCP and the Comintern resulting from China's perceived position in the world revolution and Moscow's perception of Soviet geopolitical interest. Comintern influence was of major importance in the party's founding and development, but its authority was not always accepted or decisive in all periods.⁹ Yet it was a voice that could not be ignored, and until 1938, when the Comintern could articulate its message clearly and get it through the communication network to the CCP leadership, it had a reasonably decisive say.

Comintern agents in China enjoyed high prestige but had to find Chinese through whom they could transmit their orders and the Comintern's strategic and tactical visions. At best, they were always one step removed from the realities they were trying to influence and interpret.¹⁰ Even Chen Duxiu, who supported Maring's view of the need for cooperation with the GMD at the CCP's Third Congress (**Doc. A.19**), had originally rejected Maring's ideas (**Doc. A.9**). In fact, it was only after Maring appealed to Comintern discipline that he was able to bring Chen and other key CCP leaders briefly to his side. Conversely, Comintern agents relied on the Chinese leaders for their information about the local situation. Thus, Maring depended on Liao Zhongkai for information about the GMD and about cooperation with the CCP. Liao was on the left of the GMD and a strong supporter of such cooperation, perhaps leading Maring to adopt a positive assessment while underestimating opposition within the GMD.

Some previous analyses viewed Mao Zedong's rise to power within the CCP as occurring in spite of the Comintern, but it now appears that the Comintern was at least willing to acquiesce in Mao's rise and his victories over Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming (Moscow's own trainee). In both confrontations, the actions and words of the Comintern tended to favor Mao over his opponents.¹¹ Whether the Comintern clearly perceived what was at stake is another matter. Further, on a number of occasions the Comintern called for the CCP not to ape Soviet experience, but to develop its own policy, and the Comintern's Seventh Congress (1935) accepted that individual parties should have more freedom. Whether the Comintern approved of what was finally developed in China is a different question. Thus, the Comintern was not anti-Mao; nor was Mao inevitably opposed to the Comintern.¹²

The Role of the Military

Throughout the twentieth century, military strength has been a key factor in Chinese politics. The primary agent of CCP control of its base areas before 1949 and its seizure of state power was the military. Yet the CCP's Red Army was clearly different from previous warlord armies that had tried to rule China. By the early 1940s, it was a well-disciplined, multifunctional organization that submitted to party rule. This is not to say, however, that there were no tensions in the relationship.

Mao's initial breakthrough to the top leadership came at the Zunyi Conference (January 1935) with his criticism of the military tactics that had been used to defend the Central Soviet from GMD encirclement. Mao was identified with a correct military strategy that gained him the trust of most military leaders and, as his strategy proved successful, increasingly with other party leaders. The military commanders were Mao's staunchest supporters and were the first to praise Mao and his thought within the party. As Raymond Wylie has pointed out, it was military figures who rallied first to Mao's support after the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CC (September–November 1938) and again in 1942 when they began publicly to praise Mao and his thought. This was one full year before such praise became common among party leaders.¹³ Also, the first collected works of Mao Zedong was published on the order of the military leader of the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area, Nie Rongzhen.¹⁴

Similarly, Mao held the army in high esteem, seeing in it the virtues of plain living and selfless devotion to the cause, which he felt were often lacking in the party. In times of stress, Mao would turn to the army for support such as during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, when he sought to purify the ranks of the party and the state. He felt that under the leadership of Minister of Defense Lin Biao, it embodied the "true spirit" of the revolution. Earlier, at the Lushan meeting in 1959 when Mao came under attack for his mishandling of the Great Leap Forward, he threatened to retreat again into the countryside and lead the peasants to overthrow the government, even founding a new Red Army if necessary.¹⁵

This positive view of the army in the PRC has been widely held. Individual soldiers or units have frequently been promoted as models for emulation because of their embodiment of the communist spirit. The best example of this is Lei Feng, the soldier who was put forward in the early 1960s during the PLA campaigns to study the thought of Mao, again after the fall of the "Gang of Four" in 1976–77, and finally for young people to learn from after the party had called in the PLA to crush the student-led demonstrations in 1989. In the latter two cases the party wanted to restore its battered prestige and impress on the young that they should unthinkingly obey the party.

However, the close relationship between Mao and the military did not mean that the party was a military party.¹⁶ Mao was faithful to his dictum that "the party controls the gun." At the Seventh Party Congress (1945), despite Mao's close ties to the military and its previous importance for him, military representation in central party organs was not increased significantly. In the thirteen-person Politburo, for example, only Zhu De and Peng Dehuai could be classified as professional soldiers, and both had been figures of standing for a long time. However, the input of professional soldiers into military decision making did increase after the Congress and during the Civil War, when the military became crucial to the party's success. As Frederick Teiwes has remarked, there began a subtle long-term process which saw "increased military representation on authoritative policy-making bodies, greater professional military independence concerning military affairs, and the narrowing of civilian control to personal control by the Chairman."¹⁷

The PLA has never acted as a homogeneous group in the Chinese political system pursuing military interests against those of other apparats. On the whole, it has remained under party control or, more correctly, under that of the supreme leader, first Mao Zedong and later Deng Xiaoping. Thus, the cases of Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao, who were dismissed in 1959 and 1971, respectively, had more to do with political differences in the broad sense rather than the promotion of a narrow military interest.¹⁸ As with Mao, the military has provided Deng Xiaoping with a solid bedrock of support since his assumption of power in the late 1970s. For example, in 1989, despite obvious tensions, the military accepted Deng Xiaoping's tough line against the student-led protests.¹⁹

Party control of the military was backed up by a system of political commissars based on the pattern developed by the Red Army in Soviet Russia. The distinction of the military from other organizations before 1949 was blurred because leaders were often interchangeable. This overlap of personnel has continued since 1949, with many leaders concurrently holding party and military positions. This has contributed to the institutional overlap and lack of clear demarcation between different organizations that has been a major feature of PRC administrative life.

Finally, the military nature of the Chinese revolution has deeply affected the language of the CCP. While Marxism, especially in its Leninist form, is punctuated by the language of struggle, particularly that of class, the terminology of the CCP is one of war: war on class enemies or the struggle to achieve production targets or the battle to overcome nature. This language combined with the mobilization campaigns that accompanied policy initiatives or denunciations of enemies explains, in part, the severe nature of post-1949 Chinese politics.

The Emergence of the CCP

The story of the CCP's rise to power forms part of the much larger process of Chinese modernization. Crucial to the latter was the search for a suitable state structure to facilitate the pursuit of wealth and power and to enable China to assume "its rightful position" in the international arena. In the nineteenth century, the combination of internal degeneration and external pressure caused the imperial system to collapse. The institutions and belief system that had sustained successive dynasties were unable to meet China's contemporary needs. As the system rotted from within and was squeezed from without, some Chinese began to look for alternatives to guide future development. Their quest for new state and societal forms took on a number of guises. While the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) was not a "modern" revolutionary movement, it came about partially as a consequence of Western economic and intellectual intervention. Joseph Levenson has shown that the rebellion presented a fundamental challenge to the intellectual orthodoxy of Confucian China, and he has described how it adopted elements foreign to the traditional order of peasant rebellions, many of which foreshadowed the intellectual revolution of the twentieth century.²⁰ The "rebellion" convinced some of the necessity for reform

within the system. Others began to see the imperial system itself as the root cause of China's difficulties.

Initial reforms in the mid-nineteenth century consisted of a mechanical borrowing of certain features of Western "progress," particularly military ones, and were not intended to introduce new cultural values or systems of thought. This approach was best summed up in the phrase of the reformer Zhang Zhidong, "Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning for the practical application" (*Zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong*). The policy of selective adaptation proved short-sighted. Its supporters did not comprehend the interrelated nature of Western societies and failed to see that their technology could not easily be disentangled from the social and cultural matrix in which it was embedded.²¹

A second reaction was to fall back on China's xenophobic traditions and try to shut out the foreigners altogether, including their technology. At its most extreme, this view led to violent attacks on the foreign presence in China as witnessed in the Boxer Movement (1899–1900) with its slogan of "wipe out the foreigners."²²

The third reaction was to see China's tradition, with the emperor supported by Confucian principles reinforcing a system of hierarchical subordination, as the core of China's crisis. This caused certain groups to question the validity of China's tradition and even to propose all-out Westernization as a solution. The defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) caused, according to Benjamin Schwartz, "an almost traumatic change in the climate of literati opinion."²³ A moderate response to this situation was to modernize within the existing imperial structure as witnessed by the Hundred Days' Reform (11 June–21 September 1898). However, some intellectuals became profoundly disillusioned with their heritage and sought solutions outside China. In their search, these Chinese went to Japan, Europe, the United States, and, later, Soviet Russia for the ideas that might save the Chinese nation.

The collapse of the dynastic system in 1911 sharply focused on the issues of what kind of government system would replace the old imperial bureaucracy and what kind of authority relationships there would be. The crumbling of Confucianism left a gap in the intellectual sphere which Chinese intellectuals used other thought systems to fill. The period of intellectual ferment and discussion that followed was called the May Fourth Movement (1915–19).²⁴ The movement embraced a wide-ranging cultural and nationalistic renaissance and opened up a Pandora's box of solutions to China's problems. However, the movement did not offer an answer to the crucial question of political power. Pragmatic liberalism, anarchism, and the various forms of socialist thought that were popular in these years did not seem to offer the quick, total solution to China's problems that many saw as necessary. Intellectuals like Hu Shi, the liberal reformer who proposed reform by "inches and drops," seemed increasingly irrelevant.

A new factor emerged with the 1917 Bolshevik revolution which demonstrated the possibilities for radical change within the context of underdevelopment. To men like Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, a Bolshevik-style party appeared to offer a strong

organization committed to a radical break with the past, which could guide and coordinate change. However “sinified” Marxism-Leninism may have later become under Mao Zedong, it must be remembered that it was introduced into China by a generation of intellectuals who were profoundly disenchanted with their intellectual heritage and who sought China’s salvation in a foreign ideology. Marxism in its Leninist form seemed to provide an explanation for China’s humiliation that transcended the immediate situation and linked China’s domestic troubles to the international order. Domestically, the label of feudalism was used to describe the former imperial system and the subsequent degeneration of China into warlordism under which landlords exploited the peasantry. The concept of imperialism was used to explain the foreign enclaves and the collapse of native industry under pressure from the foreign powers. China’s national humiliation was linked to international forces, and thus, logically, its salvation was linked to the greater cause of working-class liberation from the shackles of capitalism. The choice of a Bolshevik form of organization represented an implicit acceptance that a basic political transformation was a prerequisite for any effective solution to the social problems confronting China. Yet, it also opened the door to future problems which the founding generation could not foresee. The choice of a party organized on the principle of democratic centralism may have offered the hope of rapid, coordinated action, but it also created a tension between authoritarian organization and the antidespotic, iconoclastic thrust of the May Fourth Movement.

Leninism seemed to offer an organizational ideology that was antithetical to a leader-centered traditional political culture. Yet, the concentration of power also inherent in the Bolshevik-style party created a tension between collective responsibility and individual power. This tension came to the fore briefly in the late 1920s under Li Lisan and more dramatically in Yan’an as Mao Zedong achieved an exalted status.²⁵ The humiliation of the writer Wang Shiwei and the Rectification Campaign launched in Yan’an (1941–44) marked the triumph of the party apparatus and its apparatchiks over the few cosmopolitan intellectuals who had managed to survive in the party since the days of the May Fourth Movement (**Docs. G.10, G.16, G.17, G.18, and G.19**). Finally, as Arif Dirlik has perceptively argued, the adoption of a Bolshevik organization put an end to the discussion of Marxism within the CCP. The “clichés of Bolshevism substituted for independent analysis,” and the organization itself and its principles substituted for theoretical analysis.²⁶

The CCP and Its Constituencies of Support

In the 1960s and 1970s, academics debated whether the Communists won because they responded as nationalists to the Japanese invasion, or because they proved capable of mobilizing the population through sound socioeconomic policies or, inevitably, some vaguely defined combination of the two. Chalmers Johnson provided the most cogent argument that essentially the Communists used the Japanese invasion to portray the CCP as a patriotic party.²⁷ Lucien Bianco offered a more

complex explanation that combined the national thesis with a stress on the socio-economic program of the Communists. He wrote, "it was the national problem, not the social problem, that acted as a catalyst" but added the important rider that "at the very heart of the decisive 'national' stage of the revolution lay the social problem."²⁸ By contrast, Mark Selden maintained that it was the Communists' program for socioeconomic transformation, as implemented in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, that had paved the way for their ultimate success.²⁹ Tetsuya Kataoka was almost alone in arguing that it was the CCP's organizational control that led to its victory.³⁰ Later, Shum Kui-kwong stressed the importance of the Second United Front for neutralizing the hostility of local elites and wooing the "intermediate classes" over to the CCP's side. Shum viewed this component of the equation as equally important to CCP success as peasant support.³¹

More recent research and newly available sources present an infinitely more complex picture of the party's policies and its relationship to different social forces in the Chinese countryside.³²

Perhaps the most striking thing about the documents and recent studies is that they reveal the extent to which the CCP had difficulty in mobilizing support within society. Establishing effective contact with both the workers and the peasantry proved to be a problem. In fact, mobilization was so acutely difficult on occasions that the question seems not to be why were the Communists so successful, but rather how did they ever manage to gain state power against such considerable odds.³³ The CCP was successful in putting down local roots where it showed flexibility in adapting policy to local circumstances, where initially it was good at micropolitics. By contrast, attempts to transform local environments to conform with predetermined ideological predispositions were unsuccessful. Thus, to succeed, local party leaders were forced to compromise on party principles and were left open to attacks by the Party Center or its commissioners for "crimes" such as "corruption," "tailism," "right opportunism," and pursuing "superstitious practices."³⁴

The Party and the Working Class

The founders of the CCP adopted the sectarian stance of basing their revolutionary strategy on the working class. The prime objective was to organize the working class and promote a social revolution through the use of the strike weapon (**Docs. A.1 and A.3**). The focus on labor organization was aided by the presence of the Comintern representative, Maring, who had begun his revolutionary career in the Dutch labor movement. Maring, however, was opposed to the initial decision to shun other classes and to adopt an attitude toward them of "independence, aggression, and hostility" (**Docs. A.8 and A.20**). This exclusionism was shown to be ineffective with the defeat of the Beijing-Hankou Railway Workers' Strike in February 1923. Defeat revealed to party members the inability of the working class to conduct the revolution by itself. The blow was all the harder because it was the railway workers

who had been most receptive to CCP ideas, as compared with the two other elements of the traditional revolutionary “holy trinity,” the miners and the sailors (**Docs. A.7** and **A.16**).

Despite the CCP’s grudging acceptance of cooperation with other classes, pride of place in the revolutionary struggle still remained with the working class. Yet, the party in Shanghai, Beijing, and other major industrial centers had great difficulty in penetrating the proletariat (see, for example, **Doc. A.5**).³⁵ Partly, this was owing to the fact that early party members were few in number and were almost exclusively intellectuals with little or no practical experience in organization and little genuine understanding of the social conditions of the nascent working class. In Beijing, some headway was made through the use of workers’ schools, and although education was used as “agitprop,” for instance to promote the idea of the eight-hour workday, party activists were wary of declaring themselves to be Communists.³⁶

The shortage of party members was especially a problem in China’s main industrial center, Shanghai (see **Doc. B.4**). Work in Shanghai was further hampered by the foreign presence. In addition, the Communists had to compete with other organizations that had already established a presence among the working class. In Shanghai, communist access was frequently blocked by the Green and Red Gangs and even by the YMCA, while in Canton the GMD and the anarchists enjoyed greater popularity and influence.³⁷ This caused party leader Chen Duxiu frequently to bemoan the situation with respect to labor work in Shanghai (see, for example, **Docs. A.19** and **A.28**). In May 1924, the Shanghai party committee summed up the results to date in labor organization as “nil” (**Doc. B.4**).

The outbreak of the May 30 Movement (1925) and the start of the Northern Expedition (1926) appeared to change this situation and enable the CCP to break out of its relative isolation (**Doc. B.10**).³⁸ Party membership expanded rapidly from just under 1,000 in January 1924 to 3,000 by October 1925 and then by leaps and bounds to around 58,000 at the time of the Fifth Party Congress (April 1927). However, these figures conceal problems. The party was still short of skilled personnel to organize on the ground and to develop extensive grass-roots support. Many of the new recruits, because of the reduced membership requirements, were not conversant with party norms.

As a result of its lack of labor power at the grass roots, the party attempted to gain control of the movement generated by nationalist sentiment from the top down. Thus, the CCP set up the Shanghai General Labor Union at the start of the May 30 Movement, but this had to be closed down in mid-September 1925 partly because of a lack of revolutionary momentum and partly because of attacks on it by various groups in Shanghai. Indeed, Chen Duxiu was later to admit that, despite the rhetoric, the movement in Shanghai had really been coordinated by the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce and genuine communist influence seems to have been slight. This opportunism was combined with attempts to take over leading positions in existing organizations rather than building up solid grass-roots support.³⁹

The apparent initial success of this strategy lulled party leaders, particularly

those in Shanghai, into a false sense of security. A CCP-led revolution on the back of a swelling nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution seemed to be a possibility. Thus, in May 1926, Chen Duxiu was moved to claim that 1.25 million workers were under CCP leadership. This claim was based on a head-count of members in organizations whose representatives had attended the Third Labor Congress. However, the CCP had constructed no colossus but rather a Buddha that turned out to have feet of clay. As the strength of the movement ebbed, familiar problems resurfaced with labor work in Shanghai: the persistence of the guild tradition and the influence of the Green and Red Gangs (see, for example, **Doc. B.19**).

In the 1920s, the CCP did not develop the necessary support base in urban China; nor, as is argued below, was it able to build up solid support in the southern countryside. Once the military power of the GMD was turned on the CCP, it had very little with which to defend itself. Given the short history of the CCP and its small size, it was most unlikely that a sufficient base of support could have been developed. Building up an independent armed force was also out of the question, not only because of the lack of numbers and financial resources, but also because it would have inevitably speeded up the clash with the GMD, especially the powerful GMD right.

In this sense, the failure of the First Revolution was not caused directly by either rigid implementation of a misguided Comintern policy or the “capitulationism” and “opportunism” of Chen Duxiu vis-à-vis the GMD.⁴⁰ It was more closely related to the CCP’s inability to develop genuine support in urban and rural China⁴¹ and to develop a military force with which to defend itself.⁴² The CCP tended to follow behind events in China, interpreting positive signs as the next revolutionary wave that would cause history to flow in the right direction. When the waves came, the party was unable to channel the flow to its own benefit.

Yet, the period was not entirely without benefit to the CCP. Cooperation with the GMD had allowed the CCP to develop its organization on a much wider scale, especially in the south, than would otherwise have been the case. Further, it had been a valuable learning experience for the CCP. With expanded membership, it had begun to pay serious attention to its organizational structure. Despite all the problems, it had gained some influence in the southern labor movements, and more particularly the southern peasant movements, and had trained a body of cadres. It had no army of its own, but the CCP did have a number of military officers who had been trained in the Whampoa Military Academy. These officers would play an important role in the subsequent phase of the revolution. The vulnerability of the CCP to the GMD’s armed force was made more apparent when the Red Army was driven out of the Jiangxi Soviet. These two experiences deeply affected Mao Zedong and caused him to try to hold the Second United Front together for as long as possible during the 1940s.

The CCP only gave up its focus on the working class as the primary agent of revolutionary change when forced to do so by the prevailing circumstances. The failure of legal communism in 1927, and the further disasters wrought by first Li

Lisan's and then Qu Qiubai's insurrectionist policies (**Docs. C.18** and **C.19**, respectively), caused the CCP to lose effective contact with the major urban centers of Shanghai, Wuhan, and Canton.⁴³ This marked a break in substantial contact between the CCP and the working class for the next twenty-two years. However, the ideology of the CCP never ceased to stress working-class leadership over the peasantry. In the absence of the working class this meant the rule of its "vanguard," the party. As soon as conditions permitted, the party again reasserted the primacy of urban work over that in the countryside. In April 1944, Mao Zedong called for work in urban areas to be stepped up, and on 5 June the CC passed a resolution that highlighted this renewed emphasis (**Doc. G.24**).

It was circumstance which forced leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhang Guotao to retreat to the barren mountainous areas where they could put together a successful new strategy. They clearly recognized that the road to power in China had to pass through the countryside.

The CCP in the Countryside

The centrality of the discontented peasant affected practical revolutionaries and also social science observers. Revolutionary leaders such as Che Guevara saw rural bases and the mobilization of the peasantry as the way to seize state power. This revolutionary practice derived its origins from the experience of the Chinese revolution, but these perceptions related to a mythic form of the Chinese revolution rather than to its reality.

Since the 1960s, social science literature has placed strong emphasis on the central role played by the peasantry in the revolutionary process. The centrality of the peasant question dominated the work of social scientists such as Eric Wolf, Joel Migdal, and Theda Skocpol.⁴⁴ With respect to China, the most enthusiastic supporter of the peasants' central role in the revolution is to be found in the work of Ralph Thaxton. Thaxton takes James Scott's notion of the "moral economy of the peasant" as his point of departure. Scott's research on southeast Asia shows that the peasantry could actually influence the historical process to create a state form incorporating their communalist and egalitarian traditions.⁴⁵ Using these premises, Thaxton argues that the peasantry could conduct revolution without the insertion of outside organizers and that when the CCP came, it accommodated the "counter-values" of the peasantry and, in combination, they were able to overthrow the traditional local elite.⁴⁶

The CCP encountered great difficulties in finding a ready support base in the countryside. It proved to be no easier than in the urban areas. Most recent research on the CCP in the rural base areas indicates that it was not only difficult to mobilize the peasantry, but that, once mobilized, it was difficult both to maintain the momentum and to keep it under control. Indeed, Lucien Bianco has written that the CCP was in the difficult position of trying to initiate a peasant movement without peasants.⁴⁷

While as early as November 1922 Chen Duxiu had recognized the importance of the peasant question in China (**Doc. A.18**) the issue was not extensively addressed until the CCP's Fourth Congress in January 1925. Even so, the resolution adopted did not amount to a plan of action (**Doc. B.8**). In the more radical post-May 30 atmosphere, the CCP adopted a radical program of land confiscation, although it was swiftly reined in when perceived "peasant excesses" during the Northern Expedition were deemed to be threatening cooperation with the GMD. Mao Zedong took exception to this viewpoint and was greatly impressed with the power of the peasantry, as he depicted in his report of March 1927 (**Doc. B.20**). At the time of his report, however, Mao had not yet combined the notion of peasant power with military organization.

The main developments in the peasant movement were all in the south in Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. As the Northern Expedition moved out from the GMD strongholds in the south, large rural areas came under joint GMD-CCP control. Here peasant associations were established, often under the leadership of professionally trained peasant organizers. CCP supporters ran many of the associations, and the party leadership saw this as a way to gain control over the peasant movement. However, as in urban China, the CCP lacked sufficient local cadres. A July 1926 report on the peasant movement in Guangdong outlined the problem. While some 800,000 peasants were members of peasant associations in 60 counties, there were only 600 party members working in 20 counties (**Doc. B.18**). Thus, the party had weak links to many local communities. The CCP adopted the same head-counting, top-down approach to controlling the peasantry as they had used with respect to the working class in urban China. Thus, at the CCP's Fifth Congress, Chen Duxiu spoke of almost 10 million peasants being organized in the countryside via the peasant associations and seemed to count this as being synonymous with CCP control (**Doc. B.25**).

Yet, the communist presence was kept in place only by GMD military power. Once attacked by the GMD, CCP members had very little alternative but to retreat into more inhospitable rural areas. While CCP policy vis-à-vis the peasantry was radicalized in the wake of its defeat (**Doc. C.1**), the policy of rural-led uprisings to help recapture the urban centers weakened the CCP even further.⁴⁸ However, these failed uprisings did leave the CCP with the basis for the Red Army.

The *sine qua non* for CCP success was sustained control over a particular locality on the basis of military force. This provided the party with the time and space to devise policies relevant to the particular region. Moreover, a continuous CCP presence backed by armed force caused the local elite either to cooperate or acquiesce in CCP rule. For the peasantry, it offered a continuity of rule to which they could respond. Simple military control and rule through repression, however, would have rendered the CCP indistinguishable from the warlords of whom they had been so critical. As a result, the CCP found itself faced with devising policies to suit localities without compromising its general principles, while simultaneously avoiding driving potentially hostile groups into outright opposition.

The lack of alternatives for the local elites was vital. Thus, the CCP survived in those areas where it could gain a local military superiority over the GMD as in the base areas around Wuhan from 1928 to 1934⁴⁹ or where the invading Japanese forces had driven out the GMD as happened in north and northeast China from 1937 onward. Steven Levine has shown how the Japanese invasion destroyed the local elite in the northeast, thus making communist penetration much easier.⁵⁰ The Communists thus established themselves as a new “state authority” primarily by means of military conquest.⁵¹

Contrary to conventional wisdom, in the period after 1937 the rural elite was more readily attracted to the CCP program of resistance than was the local peasantry.⁵² Indeed, the threat posed by the Japanese forces bonded the CCP and the local elite together in an uneasy marriage of convenience. Further positive support in this period came from rural students and teachers.⁵³ In July 1927, when the CCP fully recognized the important role of the peasantry, it also pointed out the respect that school teachers enjoyed in local communities. As a result, the party called for the election of primary school teachers to the area executive committees of peasant associations (**Doc. C.1**). This was in marked contrast to the disdain with which such groups were viewed by the party when it tried to organize urban China during the early 1920s.

Kathleen Hartford has shown how in the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) Base Area the CCP devised policy programs that sought to neutralize the threat from the local elite by co-opting them into the power structure and appearing to give them a place in the new political structure. The term she uses to describe this process is “power management.”⁵⁴ “Power management” was one of Peng Zhen’s main themes in his September 1941 report to the Politburo (**Doc. G.5**). Peng outlined local CCP policy for ensuring that the old power structure could be broken up without alienating the powerful traditional elite. Policy moderation formed one aspect, while the administrative solution was the “three-thirds” system of government that guaranteed the local elite one-third of governmental positions. Peng was at pains to point out that this approach needed a strengthening of the party apparatus at the village level to ensure that the local elite was not able to dominate the political process.

This co-optation of the local elite was accompanied by attempts to gain the support of the local peasantry for the CCP’s program of social reform. In this process, the CCP attempted to define political and economic relationships in the villages in terms of classification by class rather than by the traditional forms of patronage and familial relationships. The introduction of class as the defining characteristic in village life was new. However, many of the documents in the collection clearly reveal the continual problem that the CCP had in defining classes in the countryside precisely and working out a policy for land redistribution or interest and rent-reduction based on these suppositions.

Both in the early 1930s and in the period from 1937 onward, the party faced the problem of, first, winning acceptance by the local peasantry, second, getting them

mobilized for practical support, and then, finally, once mobilized trying to keep them under control. The politics of mobilization was complicated in the post-1937 period not only by the problems arising from the use of class labels but, more particularly, by the need not to alienate the local elite, a need partly created and defined by the Japanese invasion.

The attempts at accommodation with the local elites were reinforced by the earlier experiences with radical policy in the Jiangxi Soviet. There, radicalization had alienated groups such as the middle and rich peasants who were crucial to CCP survival. The CCP had decided that land redistribution was imperative for ensuring peasant support in their resistance to the GMD, but changes in landownership based on strict class definitions caused unforeseen economic and social problems that in turn led to further readjustment. Thus, the Soviet Land Law adopted in November 1931 (**Doc. D.8**) contained prescriptions more liberal than previous policy and did not mention land nationalization and collectivization. It represented a deliberate attempt to woo back the alienated “middle classes.” Later, between June and September 1933, many “middle peasants” were reclassified as “landlords,” with serious consequences for them. This rereadicalization of policy began with the investigation movement that was again intended to ensure peasant support in the conflict with the GMD (**Doc. D.15**). Between October and December, the new “landlords” were demoted to the ranks of “middle peasants.” Finally, in early 1934, policy was radicalized once again with attacks on the “rich peasants.” This merry-go-round was halted only with the expulsion of the communist forces from their base area. The CCP did learn from this experience; as Shum Kui-kwong has noted, “No matter how successful the land revolution was in generating support within their base areas, their strength derived from the lower masses was no match for the reactionary order.”⁵⁵ Yet, the learning process was not complete, as the party never lost its inclination to radicalize policy once it felt securely embedded in an area.

Despite CCP emphasis on the support of the poor peasantry, this support was never firm, and when the rural dispossessed did act, they tended to take matters into their own hands, often producing a radicalization that went beyond party wishes. This occurred not only in Jiangxi but also in the Civil War period, 1945–49. The need to keep up with peasant voluntarism, combined with the desire to mobilize the poor peasantry against the GMD, lay behind the radical turn in land policy that began in May 1946 (**Doc. H.14**). “Land to the tillers” replaced the more moderate approach of rent and interest reduction.⁵⁶ Equal distribution of land became party policy (**Docs. H.16** and **H.17**), leading to a radical upsurge that threatened to undermine the party’s position in relationship to the middle peasantry as well as the local elites. Having mobilized the poor peasantry to support the CCP against the GMD in the Civil War, the CCP became afraid that social dislocation would undermine the war effort. In particular, the middle peasantry in recently liberated areas were being classified as rich peasants and being deprived of property (**Doc. H.18**). As a result, in late 1947 and early 1948, land reform was slowed down.⁵⁷

Invariably, the initial support for the CCP came from displaced rural elements such as students, rural school teachers, and roving groups of bandits. According to Pauline Keating's research on two counties in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, it was those who had lost farms after defaulting on tax or loan payments who joined the CCP fighting groups. She notes that it was the widespread anger against the local authorities for taxation that had enabled the communist partisans to set up two soviet governments in northwest China in the early 1930s.⁵⁸

This reliance on middle peasant and elite support forced the CCP to make many policy compromises. Thus, when He Long's Third Army arrived in north Guizhou in January 1934, it dropped its revolutionary propaganda in order to appeal to the local peasantry. To try to seek an identity of interests with the "celestial soldiers," it claimed that the latter's attacks on exorbitant taxes and levies could be interpreted as a form of primitive revolutionary struggle (**Docs. D.11** and **D.12**).

As Bianco contends, the economic policy pursued by the CCP did not ensure the party automatic peasant support.⁵⁹ It was always conditional. Hartford's study of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region shows that widespread and deep-seated peasant support was not necessary to produce CCP success. One can take this argument one step further to suggest that what was necessary for the CCP was not so much large-scale positive support, but that key and potentially hostile groups should acquiesce in party control. The CCP was assisted by the lack of any viable alternatives. Traditional power structures had broken down with the Japanese invasion, and the GMD appeared morally bankrupt and economically incompetent.

Organization and Ideology

Given rapidly changing circumstances and policy lines, it is not surprising that party organization was much more fluid than theory would have indicated. The notion of a modern mass political party run by activists was alien to the Chinese political culture, and a major process of adjustment and adaptation was necessary before the CCP became embedded in a local polity. Yet, CCP leaders intended that commitment to an overall organizational unity should link together the different locales within which the CCP had to work and provide a loyalty transcending that to particular individuals or regions. Commitment to the organization was strengthened by adherence to the ideology that gave a common purpose to action and linked it to "supranational" and "supernatural" forces that operated beyond the party itself.

For the activists who worked in the CCP, more than simple acquiescence was required, and commitment was provided by organization and ideology. The organization could transform all these disparate local experiences into a national goal; its ideology could give the experiment a greater importance and dignity for participants than mere survival. The presence of a resilient, disciplined revolutionary organization performed the crucial function of retaining the loyalty of the activists who might have otherwise deserted the cause.

Early Debates on the Nature of the Party

Before notions of organizational discipline could readily be accepted by the majority of members, however, there had to be a consensus about what kind of a party it should be and what its function was. Acceptance of a modern political party as a suitable form of organization could fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the Confucian bureaucracy. It was expected to provide an institutional form that transcended the personal authority of an individual leader⁶⁰ and a rational hierarchical structure that would facilitate decision making and policy implementation. The introduction of such a party form was not easy, and from the beginning a number of problems emerged that have persisted in varying degrees throughout the party's existence. Here two problems will be considered.

First, there has been the continual tension between loyalty to the organization itself and to the supreme leader. Many of the CCP's early leaders were attracted to the Bolshevik form of organization because they felt that it would challenge what they saw as a traditional Chinese political culture that stressed obedience to the powerful individual leader.⁶¹ This view simplified the past, as the traditional system culminated in an institution centered on an individual, the "emperorship," and previous Chinese rulers had been aware of the role played by "abstract" institutions. In their search for organization, these early CCP leaders missed the fact that while, in theory, Bolshevik organization would transcend the individual, from the outset it was inseparable from the role of Lenin. Later, this tendency toward the domination of the organization by the supreme leader became more apparent under Stalin.

In addition, Bolshevik organization seemed to offer an alternative to the rule of individual warlords or the GMD, which, from its reorganization in the early 1920s, combined Leninist organization with leader worship. Sun Yat-sen was a supreme leader, a function subsequently taken over by Chiang Kai-shek. In the CCP, the reemergence of this tradition took longer and came with the assumption of supreme power by Mao Zedong in Yan'an in the 1940s. There were antecedents in the CCP, especially under Li Lisan's brief leadership. Chinese communist historians have blamed Chen Duxiu for authoritarianism and, after Chen's removal from power, Lominadze, the Comintern representative, denounced the "patriarchal" style of leadership in the party. He called for its replacement by the "collective model" of leadership (**Doc. C.3**). While his personality may have displayed this tendency, Chen does not appear to have sought total power, not even in the last years of his leadership. Debate remained very wide-ranging, and the question of collective control over the individual received consistent attention in party documents.

Second, there was the tension in lines of authority between the Party Center and the regional apparatus and noncentral party organs. While much of the Leninist party apparatus was theoretically in place by 1922, it did not always dominate life for party members. The problem was particularly acute in the early phase of party formation, but it persisted in varying degrees throughout the period under consideration. The regional autonomy that was inherent in the origins of the party exerted its

influence for a long time.⁶² Cells or local parties often owed their origins more to the local environment than to being a product of Comintern machinations or the influence of Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. One example is the tension evident throughout the 1920s in the policy disputes between the nominal Party Center in Shanghai and the party organization in Canton.⁶³

The documents reveal the variety of views in the early debates about just what kind of a party it should be. The first party document of November 1920 had outlined the structure of a highly orthodox Bolshevik party, and the organizational outlines drawn up at the First and Second Party Congresses provided a detailed Bolshevik organizational structure (**Docs. A.1, A.3, and A.12**, respectively). However, this structure was not readily acceptable to all members and began to assume a reality only as the party expanded rapidly as a result of the May 30 Movement (1925). Among the first party members, anarchist influences were strong as were ideas of guild socialism (**Docs. A.5 and A.6**). Indeed, seven of the nine original members in the CP group in Canton were anarchists. Such members had to be purged from the organization, and the notion of the party as the focus of loyalty had to be substituted for the personal loyalty ties that dominated a number of the early party groups. The party's founding congress became the forum for debating these different views (see **Doc. A.2** for an official summary of these debates).

Founders such as Li Hanjun and Zhou Fuhai argued for the review of alternatives and placed stress on the need for a lengthy period of education. Li was opposed at this stage to direct involvement in the workers' movement.⁶⁴ Li felt that the working class was unprepared and had an inadequate understanding of Marxism. For him, the first task was to undertake a lengthy period of educational and propaganda work, organizing Marxist universities, publishing journals and pamphlets. Intellectuals were to be armed with Marxism and then workers were to be organized and educated to raise their class consciousness. While this was in progress, study could be done of the comparative values of Russian Bolshevism and German Social Democracy before deciding on which form was most suitable to China's needs. As a result of this trend of thinking, Li Hanjun was opposed to the creation of a tightly organized party based on the proletariat with the objective of establishing its dictatorship. While recognizing the need for some form of organization to conduct party work, he did not see it as vitally important. He preferred a more loosely based party that would also recruit students, intellectuals, and anyone who believed in Marxism and was willing to propagate it.

A tougher, highly orthodox line was argued by other founders such as Liu Renjing and Zhang Guotao. They favored the promotion of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the immediate objective. They objected to joining the bourgeois democratic revolution and placed their faith in the power of the nascent working class and its organization under the leadership of the CCP. Finally, somewhat ironically, they were against recruitment of intellectuals into the party. It was this latter view that was reflected in the documents of the First Party Congress (**Docs. A.2, A.3, and A.4**).

A number of factors combined to instill the notion of the Bolshevik party among CCP members. First, there was the translation of key works and the promotion of the Bolshevik form of organization in the party press. Second, there was the influence of Comintern emissaries like Voitinsky and Maring who already had experience of such party organization and devoted considerable time to propagating their views. Indeed, Maring was appalled by the lack of discipline which he witnessed in the early CCP. Maring provided information on the idea and importance of party organization and of propaganda as a political weapon.⁶⁵ Further, he stressed the view that the struggle was linked to a much wider one: it was a part of the worldwide struggle against imperialism. Within this context, according to Maring and subsequent Comintern agents, the national party was subordinate to the Comintern.⁶⁶

Third, in the early 1920s there was the gradual return of key figures, such as Cai Hesun, who had studied in Europe and had become acquainted with communist ideology and organization as well as the modern labor movement. As the 1920s progressed, the idea of a Bolshevik party was strengthened through the visits or training of key CCP figures in Soviet Russia. The first group of Chinese students went to Soviet Russia for study as early as spring 1921, and some 1,000 were trained in the 1920s and 1930s at the Communist University of the Working People of China.⁶⁷ While the students who returned from Soviet Russia were a very varied group, they had all received a thorough training in notions of party organization and discipline.

Despite the adoption of the Bolshevik form of organization from the beginning, the CCP has shown a remarkable degree of organizational fluidity, even since its seizure of power in 1949.⁶⁸ While the party was often bitterly divided over tactics and strategy, party organization provided the framework within which debates had to take place. This limited the options for groups opposed to a particular policy line dictated by the Center. Yet, in the early years, the nominal Party Center had little capacity, and perhaps little authority, to exert its will over the localities. The Center could quite simply be ignored, and in the first half of the 1920s, the local organizations enjoyed considerable independence in practice.

Only with the May 30 Movement did the party begin to move toward being a genuine mass party and were attempts made to establish a more differentiated central party apparatus with greater control over the regional organizations (**Doc. B.11**). While this was still often ignored, it did give the Party Center the capacity for concentrating power. In fact, as early as the Fourth Party Congress (January 1925) attempts were made to tighten up organization (**Docs. B.7** and **B.9**) in order to ensure survival, and improvements were seen as the way to enable the party to break out from being merely a collection of "small propaganda groups."⁶⁹ However, at the Fifth Party Congress (1927), Chen Duxiu was still complaining that something had to be done to enforce the discipline of the Center and adherence to its directives or the party would be little more than an accumulation of provincially based organizations (**Doc. B.25**).

The rush to create a mass party during the May 30 Movement did have an adverse effect on party development by permitting many new members to join who had little or no idea of communism or Bolshevik organization. To confront these problems and to equip the party as a fighting force to seize power, the Fifth Party Congress adopted a number of measures to tighten up centralization and discipline. For the first time, the basic Leninist notion of democratic centralism was included in the party's Constitution as the guiding principle of the party (**Doc. B.28**). Further, a Central Supervisory Committee was established as were counterparts at the lower levels. To these organs was entrusted the task of tightening up on discipline in the party.

This move toward tighter control and centralization was increased at the 7 August Emergency Conference (1927) as the effects of the collapse of CCP-GMD cooperation became apparent.⁷⁰ First, as the "Decision on Political Discipline" makes clear, the process of political surveillance and persecution in the party was stepped up. Surveillance over intellectuals in particular was to be increased, and they were blamed for the previous policy failures.⁷¹ Second, the Party Center was forced into an underground existence, and this was reflected in the development of a party profile conducive to such work. An extensive campaign was launched to "Bolshevize" the party further. This tendency became stronger after Li Lisan's removal from power after the failure of his insurrectionist policy. This stress was helped by the return from Soviet Russia of a group of students with a mandate to Bolshevize the party, and they effectively took over the running of the central party apparatus during the next few years (**Docs. C.21** and **D.18**). These men included Bo Gu, Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang. Yet, while democratic centralism was first mentioned in the party Constitution adopted in June 1927 (**Doc. B.28**), organization as a cohesive factor was accepted only after the Rectification Campaign in Yan'an in the early 1940s.

Ideology and Struggle

The influence of the Comintern and the use of ideology as a weapon in inner-party struggle was increased by the events at the 7 August Emergency Conference (**Docs. C.2** and **C.4**). The removal of Chen Duxiu as party leader was a potentially traumatic event in CCP history. For many, Chen had been a symbol of progress not just from the May Fourth Movement but from his earlier struggle against the imperial system. A number of the early leaders had been drawn into the party because of personal connections and loyalty to Chen. In terms of the Chinese tradition, to turn on a respected senior and elder was of major significance.

Chen's removal was legitimized not merely through criticism of his "mistakes" but also through the invocation of ideological symbols to justify the attack. Adherence to the correct ideological line came to legitimize policy, and understanding of the "line" was a necessary condition for leadership. This had the effect of strengthening Comintern control over party leadership as the Comintern possessed a higher wisdom and vision of the revolutionary process than a mere national party. Concur-

rently, debate in the party became governed by the manipulation of ideological symbols with the result that genuine debate about policy disputes became even less feasible than before. As the resolution of the Second Plenum of the Sixth CC pointed out (June 1929, **Doc. C.14**), there was no such thing as peace in the party. Erroneous tendencies always had to be fought against. All too often policy dispute was raised to the level of line struggle.

Thus, the 7 August Emergency Conference ushered in ideological correctness as a key element in control, leadership, and cohesion within the CCP. This tendency and the problems it created were noted by Liu Shaoqi. In a letter of 4 March 1937, Liu suggested to the Party Center that methods in ideological struggle had always been excessive and had created a situation that blocked “calm discussion” of problems within the party. Further, he noted that the hallmark of the party since the 7 August meeting had been “leftism,” which in turn had exacerbated the factionalism within the party (**Doc. E.22**).

Chen Duxiu had already noted, in December 1929, the lack of rational discussion within the party. He complained of the party leaders using the notion of “iron discipline” as a mechanism of control (**Doc. C.17**). Chen felt that this had created a situation where no one dared to speak out, with the result that strategy and tactics that many knew to be wrong were still implemented. Those who opposed party policy were labeled “Trotskyites,” “anarchists,” “right deviationists,” “left deviationists,” etc. Once labeled, their objection to policy was more easily dealt with by the Party Center. The idea of “correct line” also had consequences for the Party Center itself. It could not recognize faults in its own leadership, and thus policy failure was followed by the hunt for “scapegoats” who had sabotaged the party’s correct line. As Chen Duxiu wrote, the party leadership became committed to covering up its mistakes in order to maintain its rule.

The tendency toward the dominance of an organizationally derived ideological truth was inherent in the choice of a Bolshevik organization from the beginning. Yet in the early stages it was not so readily apparent. The CCP had been organized before there had been any serious discussion of Marxism, and indeed the choice of a Bolshevik organization removed the need for theoretical analysis. As a result, “an organizationally defined analysis became for them [the original founders] a substitute for theoretical analysis.”⁷² Naturally, it was presumed that those from Soviet Russia or their emissaries had a greater understanding of this problem and the relevant needs.

Certainly, the early 1930s were marked by intense inner-party struggles that took on a sharp ideological tone and resulted in fratricide within the party. The stress on secrecy, discipline, and reorienting work for life underground backed up by this drive for ideological orthodoxy brought the Party Center into conflict with operations in the rural soviets. In the soviets, the party operated openly as the local government, and compromise was the order of the day. The compromises made by local leaders in the base areas in order to survive looked like ideological laxness to those in the Party Center.

The criticism of local leaders contained another dimension of power struggle within it. When officials from the Party Center in Shanghai arrived in the base areas, they were given high positions as their standing deserved, but they were shut out from real power-holding. They were simply not a part of the local power structure.⁷³ Accusations of the flaunting of ideological correctness became the main weapon with which to attack the local leaders. This led to the arrest of many local leaders, the increase of factionalism, and in extreme cases fighting and murder. Such clashes were experienced in Jiangxi, E-Yu-Wan, Xiang-Exi, and the northwest (**Docs. D.2, D.6, D.13, D.14, and G.20**). One of the most extreme cases occurred with the Futian Incident of 1930 (**Doc. D.3**).⁷⁴

Opposition to the Party Center was confined to a limited number of strategies. The most effective tactic was to take over power at the Center. The struggles between Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao and subsequently Wang Ming were both about seizing power at the Party Center in order to be able to implement conflicting policy programs.⁷⁵

A second strategy was to ignore central party directives as happened not only in the early 1920s but also on a number of occasions in the base areas in the early 1930s. Mao Zedong himself was very adept at turning a blind eye to those directives with which he did not agree. However, this could not provide a long-term solution to the problem and was at best viable only when the Party Center and its coercive apparatus were remote from the area.

Third, opponents could try to set up a rival organization to try to take over the legitimacy of the Party Center. This had been attempted by He Mengxiong and Luo Zhanglong when they set up a second Jiangsu party committee in 1931 (**Doc. C.22**), and by Zhang Guotao in the mid-1930s when he began to use the name of the CC. This breakaway strategy never proved successful. Neither He and Luo nor Zhang was able to assume legitimacy, and indeed all were seen to have broken the most fundamental norms governing party discipline. Further, recognition by the Comintern was a crucial element in legitimation. The Comintern was unwilling to support such breakaways.

Finally, opponents could leave the party entirely. This was, in fact, the case with many of the original party members who were opposed to, or were not entirely happy with, the adoption of a Bolshevik form of organization. Sniping from the outside was quite easily dismissed as attacks by counterrevolutionaries.⁷⁶

Mao Zedong's Political Skill and the Rectification Campaign

The party clearly needed a guiding framework of reference that could rally the allegiance of most party members and give a purpose to their actions that was greater than simple survival. While a modern political party may have been alien to Chinese political culture, adherence to an idealistic belief system was not.⁷⁷ The ethical system that underpinned the Confucian state formed an important part of the

institutions of government, and the correct explanation of the world was an important part of the legitimacy to rule. The CCP was able to supply an ideology that provided an “entire cosmology that summed up all of human history on a cosmopolitan, supra-national basis.”⁷⁸ Yet, it had to be a belief system to which the party faithful could relate. This framework would also have to allow flexibility for local action while still linking it to some greater overall objective and would have to put an end to bloodshed. Having engaged in his own fratricidal struggles, Mao Zedong was to provide this framework in Yan’an in what is commonly referred to as the sinification of Marxism.⁷⁹

The documents covering the mid-1930s to early 1940s reveal what an able politician Mao Zedong was. He was able to outmaneuver Zhang Guotao, who commanded a far larger number of troops, and also Wang Ming, who supposedly possessed greater theoretical knowledge.⁸⁰ Mao responded quickly and practically to the rapidly unfolding events. The documents he produced concerning the Second United Front (**Docs. E.28, F.3, F.7, and F.8**), the rapidly changing military situation (**Docs. E.25, F.19, H.1, and H.8**), the dissolution of the Comintern (**Doc. G.21**), and the Soviet attitude toward the war (**Docs. F.20 and F.21**) stood in marked contrast to the sterile references to class analysis that marked those of the First United Front.⁸¹ Mao was able to reassure party leaders that he understood a rapidly changing world. More important, he appeared to be successful. As Teiwes has noted, “[I]n a movement weaned on the notion of ideological correctness, the apparent correlation between party success and Mao’s ideas was powerful persuasion indeed.”⁸²

Crucial to the clarification of organizational goals and the process of creating a binding loyalty was the Rectification Campaign of 1941–44 (**Docs. G.2, G.4, G.10, G.11, G.13, G.14, and G.19**). The need to tighten up organization and to produce ideological conformity was increased by the influx of new members who had been recruited during the “storm membership drives” and by the numbers of intellectuals who had come to Yan’an as patriots to resist the Japanese rather than as good Communists dedicated to social revolution (**Doc. G.3**).⁸³ For Mao, if this new organizational and ideological orthodoxy could be defined in such a way as to position him in the central role of the CCP’s revolutionary history, it would provide him with the legitimacy necessary to secure an unchallengeable leadership position. A crucial step in this process was the construction of an official party history adopted as a CC resolution in April 1945 (**Doc. G.25**).⁸⁴ Mao as the correct interpreter of the past would become the ideological authority defining the present and future course of revolution. Through this discourse, Mao created the necessary “symbolic capital” to enhance his own status as the revolution’s supreme leader and interpreter.⁸⁵

There was more to creating this Maoist discourse than simply providing a guiding framework for party members to relate to. It was also intended to end alternative discourses within the movement. Disagreement with Mao’s viewpoint would be tantamount to committing a mistake in “line.” Rectification was not just a peaceful proselytizing event but entailed the eradication of alternative intellectual responses

to his policy, no matter whether the challenge came from Wang Ming and his supporters or from those intellectuals who represented the cosmopolitan trend of the May Fourth Movement within the CCP. The creation of this single discourse eliminated the pluralism of ideas that had temporarily replaced the monism customary in the Chinese polity. Thus, the Rectification Campaign had to ensure that most party members would behave in a predictable way most of the time despite the enormously varied environments in which they operated. This left the party's security apparatus merely with the task of cleaning up the mess where this system broke down.

The new orthodoxy being constructed by Mao Zedong provided the basis for the "reattachment" of many disaffected intellectuals who had moved to the base areas. With the collapse of the imperial system, intellectuals as a group had been detached from the function of public service which they had fulfilled in the Confucian order. This detachment led them to take a more critical look at their own society. In John Fairbank's view this split the literati into two groups: "those in public service and those in public criticism."⁸⁶

One did not have to be a "true believer" to propagate the new orthodoxy. At worst, it simply provided the new "rules of the game" that should not be overstepped. Yet the work of Timothy Cheek on the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area shows that the version of Maoism propagated there sat quite comfortably with elite culture. Further, Cheek claims that the CCP successfully "attracted, motivated, organized and controlled deviance" among a number of metropolitan intellectuals. The party achieved this goal by allowing these intellectuals to view propaganda work as "an honorable vocation."⁸⁷

For those who may have wavered in terms of positive compliance, the linking of the Rectification Campaign and the "screening" of cadres served as warnings to those unwilling to accept the new orthodoxy. According to David Apter, the establishment of Mao Zedong Thought as the "way to a superior and more virtuous social existence" disguised Mao's "ruthless pursuit of power and the hardboiled morality of his leadership generally."⁸⁸ In Yan'an, Mao Zedong made it quite clear that the independent critical role of the intellectual as it had developed from the May Fourth Movement would no longer be tolerated within his republic. The rules were made plain in his Yan'an talks on literature and art (**Doc. G.10**), and in case anyone had missed the message there was the humiliation of Wang Shiwei to serve as a warning (**Docs. G.17** and **G.18**).⁸⁹

Rectification took on a more ominous note, not merely with the persecution of Wang Shiwei but also with the campaign to "screen" cadres, indicating that the threat of the use of terror was the obverse of education.⁹⁰ Ostensibly, the investigations that took place were to protect the party against presumed GMD and Japanese supporters who had infiltrated the party and the base areas. In August 1943, cadre screening and rectification were formally linked, and some 4,000 people were "screened" in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, 2,000 in Yan'an alone.⁹¹ While spies there may have been, the intensity of the movement indicated the kind of

paranoia that was to mark Mao Zedong in his later years. Kang Sheng, the organizer of the campaign, indicated its exaggerated nature by claiming that of those who “confessed” less than 10 percent were actually spies or enemies.⁹² This campaign would certainly have caused those contemplating openly challenging Mao and the Party Center to think twice for fear of being accused of being a traitor or a spy.

While the campaign in Yan’an forged a unified leadership that helped the CCP win the Civil War, the new system created there at its outset planted the roots of a number of problems that would come back to haunt the party. First, there was a distrust of independent intellectual criticism, which was thereafter associated with a lack of loyalty. Intellectuals have been almost continually regarded with suspicion since 1949. This reached a high point in the Cultural Revolution when intellectuals were denounced as the “stinking ninth category.”

Second, the emphasis on orthodoxy led to recurrent campaigns to cleanse people’s souls to enable them to be rescued from their errors. The hounding of people by Kang Sheng and the security apparatus during the “screening” campaign and the style of the criticism of Wang Shiwei were both to reappear as forms of struggle during the Anti-Rightist campaign of the mid-1950s and the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s.

Third, there was the stress on unity of thought within the party. This carried on the trend of negating genuine debate within the party, and since 1949, policy difference has regularly been interpreted as antiparty activity.

Fourth, there was the stress on the use of mass mobilization as a means to achieve a policy objective. Although this has been a permanent feature of post-1949 Chinese politics, the continual reliance on this method as a means of bringing about change has reduced it to a ritual. Particularly in the years since the Cultural Revolution was launched, this has resulted in the devaluation of the effectiveness of the method through overuse or through the direction of the movement toward spurious targets.

The CCP was successful in those areas where its cadres understood the local environment and where they were good at micropolitics. In part, this sensitivity to the locality was reinforced by the simple need to survive, and it provided the party with the strong rural bases from which it could launch its assault on the GMD-held areas or those evacuated by the Japanese after their defeat. On assuming power, the CCP’s policy-making center moved away from the countryside, and leaders soon forgot that survival and expansion had depended on detailed negotiation and brokerage. With state power in their hands, senior party leaders no longer felt the need to negotiate with other groups and social forces. When party members thought about the lessons of the revolution, it was increasingly in terms of the myth that had been created with the CCP being swept to power by a massive wave of popular peasant support. The party leadership became increasingly divorced from the everyday realities of politics, and policy making began to suffer.

Finally, the stress on organizational stability and ideological orthodoxy went, somewhat paradoxically, hand in hand with the accretion of power in Mao’s hands. Indeed, it went even further than this, as loyalty to the organization was reinforced

through a campaign to promote Mao Zedong the individual as the font of supreme wisdom in China's revolution, a campaign that built up momentum from July 1943 onward (**Docs. G.22** and **H.6**). At the time, it does not seem to have occurred to other senior leaders that the buildup of a Mao cult negated the stress on collective leadership and loyalty to the CCP as an organization. Indeed, it seems that senior party supporters of Mao saw the buildup of Mao not only as a necessary counter to the concurrent buildup of Chiang Kai-shek as a national leader but also as the way to bind the peasant party and army members together with the organization. Some leaders believed that the thought of Mao Zedong embodied the collective wisdom of the top leadership. While the persona of Mao did not dominate the CCP as totally as did that of Chiang Kai-shek, in it lay the seeds of future problems that would all but destroy the party during the Cultural Revolution.

Notes to Introduction

1. For example, the September 1935 Party Center resolution on Zhang Guotao's "mistakes" was for the eyes of CC members only (**Doc. E.3**). Clearly, it was felt that circulation within the party at large could prove destabilizing. Similarly, events could be interpreted in different ways depending on the audience. A good example is provided by the three documents included covering the Southern Anhui Incident of 1941. Mao Zedong's public statement stressed the premeditated action of the anticommunists in the GMD (**Doc. F.16**), while party members were told to use the Incident to reform the GMD and expel pro-Japanese elements within it (**Doc. F.17**). For the party elite, the interpretation offered related to the inner-party struggle between Mao Zedong and Wang Ming (**Doc. F.18**). Xiang Ying, who Mao saw as a Wang Ming supporter, was blamed for the Incident because of his "right opportunist" mistakes in the united front.

2. For a recent discussion of this see P. Calvert, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, pp. 16–29. For a stimulating discussion of conceptual thinking about revolutions in recent social science literature see R. Aya, *Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence: Studies on Concept, Theory, and Method*.

3. For an excellent overview of the historical development of the analysis and interpretation of the Chinese communist revolution, see K. Hartford and S. M. Goldstein, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution," in K. Hartford and S. M. Goldstein (eds.), *Single Sparks: China's Rural Revolutions*, pp. 3–27.

4. L. Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937*.

5. See, for example, R. C. North, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists*.

6. C. Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China*. An earlier analysis originally published in 1938 that laid the blame at Stalin's feet was H. R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*.

7. B. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*.

8. Schram has analyzed in detail the process of the "sinification of Marxism" and the interplay of the traditional and Marxist in the persona of Mao Zedong. See, for example, S. R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. For Schram's most recent views see *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung* and his introductions to various volumes of *Mao's Road to Power*. For a recent view that sees the relationship between the CCP and the Comintern in terms of conflict see J. W. Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism* and "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party," *The China Quarterly*, no. 113 (March 1988): 29–59.

9. Arif Dirlik is the scholar most recently to argue that the role of the Comintern was

crucial for forging together the party in its nascent period. By contrast, Hans van de Ven highlights the indigenous roots of the communist movement. Not only did this localism have a strong impact on the first decade of the CCP but also there were regional groupings, such as that in Sichuan, that came into existence without reference to the Comintern and even without contact with the “founding fathers,” Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. A. Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, and H. J. van de Ven, *The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the Search for a New Political Order, 1920–1927*.

10. For an account of the role of Maring and the problems he encountered, see T. Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring)*. The best account of Borodin’s work in China is Lydia Holubnychy’s uncompleted work *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923–25*. Otto Braun has written his own account of his work in China and the frustrations he encountered; see *A Comintern Agent in China, 1932–1939*.

11. This is convincingly argued by F. C. Teiwes in “The Formation of the Maoist Leadership: From the Return of Wang Ming to the Seventh Party Congress,” in his paper presented to the conference “New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution,” Amsterdam and Leiden, January 1990.

12. Mao himself felt that the Comintern had played a progressive role up until 1927 and again between mid-1935 and its dissolution in 1943.

13. R. F. Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Ch’en Po-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory 1935–1945*, pp. 192–93. In particular, see Zhu De, “Jinian dang de ershiyi zhounian” (In Commemoration of the Twenty-First Anniversary of the Party), in *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily), 1 July 1942, p. 1.

14. *Mao Zedong xuanji* (n.p.: Jin-Cha-Ji xinhua shudian, 1944).

15. Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Lushan Conference,” 23 July 1959, in Stuart Schram (ed.), *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, p. 139.

16. Even when the military effectively replaced the party in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966–69), Mao soon made it very clear that he fully intended that a revamped party would reassume its leadership role.

17. Teiwes, “The Formation of the Maoist Leadership.”

18. For argumentation along these lines see T. Saich, *China: Politics and Government*, 149–56.

19. On this see T. Saich, “When Worlds Collide: The Beijing People’s Movement of 1989,” in T. Saich (ed.), *The Chinese People’s Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989*.

20. J. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*.

21. This kind of thinking has remained in China up to the present day. Deng Xiaoping’s reform program of the 1980s essentially pursued a similar strategy designed to import the high technology needed for China’s modernization without bringing in Western “bourgeois ideas.”

22. Parallels can be drawn with China during the Cultural Revolution and the kind of paranoia that underlay the thinking of the “Gang of Four” (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan).

23. B. Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West*, p. 42.

24. The best substantial account of the movement remains Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*. A valuable account of the role of radical thought in the May Fourth Movement is contained in Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, pp. 57–190.

25. This tension is perceptively analyzed in L. R. Sullivan, “The Evolution of Chinese Communist Party Organization and Leadership Doctrine, 1921–1949,” in a paper presented to the conference “New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution.”

26. Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, pp. 268–70.

27. C. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolu-*

tionary China, 1937–1945. Despite some wavering, Johnson restated his essential thesis in “Peasant Nationalism Revisited: The Biography of a Book,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 72 (December 1977): 766–85.

28. See L. Bianco, *The Origins of the Chinese Revolution 1915–1949*. The need to pay attention to both the nationalist and social aspects had been strongly argued by Donald G. Gillin in “‘Peasant Nationalism’ in the History of Chinese Communism,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2 (February 1964).

29. M. Selden, *The Yen-an Way in Revolutionary China*.

30. Tetsuya Kataoka, *Resistance and Revolution in China*. In the 1950s, it had been commonplace to argue that the “organizational weapon” was paramount. See Hartford and Goldstein, “Introduction,” pp. 9–13.

31. Shum Kui-kwong, *The Chinese Communists’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935–1945*.

32. Of particular importance are Yung-fa Chen, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945*; K. Hartford, *Step by Step: Reform, Resistance, and Revolution in Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region, 1937–1945*; P. Keating, *Two Revolutions: Village Reconstruction and Cooperativisation in North Shaanxi, 1934–1945*; and D. M. Paulson, *War and Revolution in North China: The Shandong Base Area 1937–1945*.

33. Hartford and Goldstein reach a similar conclusion and state that revolution at the basic level was a “political process, not the predetermined working out of structural factors or the inevitable Big Boom emanating from the mixture of revolutionary preconditions and revolutionary consciousness.” Hartford and Goldstein, “Introduction,” p. 33. This follows the kind of argumentation used in R. Aya, *Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence*.

34. This problem is dealt with in more detail in the following section.

35. On the general problems the CCP had in organizing labor in the period 1928 to 1935 see S. B. Thomas, *Labor and the Chinese Revolution: Class Strategies and Contradictions of Chinese Communism, 1928–48*.

36. Interview with Luo Zhanglong, summer 1988. Luo was one of the founders of the Beijing party organization and an important figure in the communist-led labor movement throughout the 1920s.

37. Much of the CCP’s early struggle was against the anarchists and other radical and socialist groupings.

38. The May 30 Movement broke out after police in the International Settlement, Shanghai, had opened fire on those protesting against imperialism. As a result, a large-scale movement against the imperialist presence in China developed. The Northern Expedition was the name given to the advance of the GMD-led armies in their drive to unify China.

39. Indeed the whole strategy of the CCP-GMD cooperation in the eyes of some CCP leaders was to take over the leading positions and thus to exert an influence out of all proportion to the actual numerical strength of the CCP.

40. Brandt in *Stalin’s Failure* had argued the first view, while orthodox CCP histories place the blame on Chen’s shoulders.

41. This point is argued in H. van de Ven, *The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party*.

42. However, the Comintern did stress the view that the CCP should work within the framework of the united front and not develop its own, separate armed force. Given the circumstances, the development of an independent armed force would not have been practical and would have precipitated a break with the CCP even more quickly.

43. The Party Center did remain in Shanghai until 1933, but it is questionable how effective its contacts were.

44. E. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*; J. S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics and*

Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World; and T. Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" *Comparative Politics*, vol. 14 (April 1982): 351–75.

45. The classic statement is to be found in J. C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*.

46. See R. Thaxton, *China Turned Rightside Up: Revolutionary Legitimacy in the Peasant World*. For a devastating critique of both Thaxton's method and his use of sources see Chen Yung-fa and G. Benton, *Moral Economy and the Chinese Revolution*.

47. See Lucien Bianco's masterful synthesizing essay, "Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies, 1937–1945," in Saich and van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

48. For the strategy of rebellions, inciting military mutinies and initiating peasant uprisings, as outlined by Qu Qiubai in August 1927, see **Doc. C.4**. For details of the Hunan Autumn Harvest Uprising, see **Docs. C.6, C.7, and C.8**.

49. For information on the two main bases apart from Jiangxi, the E-Yu-Wan (Hubei-Henan-Anhui) and Xiang-Exi (West Hunan-Hubei) Soviets, see **Docs. D.4, D.5, D.6, and D.10**.

50. See S. I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948*. For documents on CCP penetration into the northeast, see **Docs. H.9, H.10, H.11, and H.12**. It should be pointed out, however, that the postwar base areas tended to be away from the developed centers, where the influence of the elites was probably weaker in any case.

51. Keating, *Two Revolutions*, p. 35.

52. See Bianco, "Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies."

53. In fact, local school teachers and college lecturers played prominent roles in the founding of a number of local party organizations.

54. Hartford, *Step by Step*.

55. Shum, *The Chinese Communists' Road to Power*, p. 14.

56. A relatively moderate policy had been laid down in the CC decision of January 1942; see **Doc. G.6**.

57. The moderation of land reform culminated with the publication of the CC directive drafted by Mao Zedong on 24 May 1948 (**Doc. H.20**).

58. Keating, *Two Revolutions*, p. 80. The fact that initial communist support came from such groups is supported by other recent research. See Bianco, "Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies."

59. Bianco, "Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies."

60. On this issue see L. R. Sullivan, "The Evolution of Chinese Communist Organization.

61. *Ibid.* The tension created between the party norms and Mao Zedong's rise to supreme power is interestingly handled in F. C. Teiwes, "From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party: The CCP's Changing Leadership, 1937–1945," in T. Saich and H. J. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

62. On this point see H. van de Ven, *The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party*. For the origins of the "small groups" in China see T. Saich, "Through the Past Darkly: Some New Sources on the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party," *International Review of Social History*, vol. 30, part 2 (1986): 167–82.

63. Many of the documents covering the period 1924 to 1927 (section B) touch on this issue and reveal the different policies and strategies of the two organizations.

64. For details of the First Party Congress see Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 1, pp. 60–69.

65. Apart from his regular contact with early party leaders and his briefings at meetings, Maring also published many articles in the Chinese communist press under one of his pen-names, Sun Duo (Sentot). For an English translation of these articles and others written while

he was in China, see Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 2, pp. 737–836.

66. Maring invoked Comintern discipline to get his views on cooperation with the GMD accepted. See **Doc. A.20** for his criticism of the lack of discipline in the movement.

67. This latter figure also includes those from the GMD. From 1925 to 1928 the university was called the Sun Yat-sen University of Working People of China. The first batch of fourteen students to go to Soviet Russia were from the Foreign Language School in Shanghai. For details of the training programs see M. F. Yuriev and A. V. Pantsov, “Comintern, CPSU (B) and Ideological and Organizational Evolution of the Communist Party of China,” in R. Ulyanovsky (ed.), *Revolutionary Democracy and Communists in the East*, pp. 283–333. The authors estimate that of the 118 top leaders in the CCP during the period before 1949, some 70 percent were trained in Soviet Russia.

68. A number of documents are included that cover the development of the party’s organizational structure. All seven party constitutions that were adopted before 1949 are included: First, 1921, **Doc. A.3**; Second, 1922, **Doc. A.15**; Third, 1923, **Doc. A.24**; Fourth, 1925, **Doc. B.9**; Fifth, 1927, **Doc. B.28**; Sixth, 1928, **Doc. C.13**; and Seventh, 1945, **Doc. H.7**.

69. In July 1922 the tendency toward being an academic study society was criticized and a call was made for the organization to become an “activist” party (**Doc. A.14**).

70. On this crucial meeting see **Docs. C.2, C.3, C.4, and C.5**.

71. On this point see Sullivan, “The Evolution of Chinese Communist Party Organization.”

72. Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, p. 269.

73. This issue of localism and outside control has remained a problem for the CCP Party Center. Vogel has dealt with the problem in a later period with his history of Canton. E. F. Vogel, *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949–1968*.

74. For the fullest explanation of the incident see S. Averill, “The Futian Incident,” in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

75. For key documents in the development of Zhang Guotao’s policy and his clash with Mao Zedong, see **Docs. E.1, E.2, E.3, E.9, E.10, E.11, E.14, and E.15**. For Wang Ming’s policy on the united front, etc., see **Docs. E.5, E.26, and E.27**.

76. See, for example, the Politburo’s denunciation of Chen Duxiu in October 1929 as a “Trotskyite” and Chen’s reply (**Docs. C.16 and C.17**). For Zhang Guotao’s attack on the CCP after leaving Yan’an, see **Doc. E.16**.

77. C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, p. 16.

78. J. K. Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution 1800–1985*, p. 226.

79. For the development of Mao’s thought in the period under consideration, see Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. For the best account of the development of Maoism in Yan’an, see Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*.

80. For a recent account of these struggles see D. E. Apter, “Discourse as Power: Yan’an and the Chinese Revolution,” in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*; and D. E. Apter and T. Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic*.

81. The problematic nature of trying to implement a policy of cooperation with the GMD based on a strict analysis of class forces is clearly seen by comparing **Docs. B.12, B.16, B.21, and B.24** with Mao’s writings in the later period.

82. Teiwes, “From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party.” For Mao’s economic and administrative policies, see **Docs. G.6 and G.7 and G.8 and G.9**, respectively.

83. At the party’s premier institute for ideological work, the Central Research Institute, 82 percent of the students were classified as urban intellectuals of whom 74 percent had

joined the party since 1937. Zhang Ruxin, “Zhongyang yanjiuyuan zhengfeng yilai sixiang gaizao zongjie” (Summary Concerning Thought Reform at the Central Research Institute Since Rectification), in *Jiefang ribao*, 31 October 1942. For an interesting account of the institute see the memoirs edited by Wen Jize et al., *Yan’an zhongyang yanjiuyuan huiyilu*.

84. For an analysis of the construction of this party history see T. Saich, “Writing or Re-writing Party History? The Construction of a Maoist Party History,” in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

85. For the concept of symbolic capital see P. Bourdieu, *Outline of the Theory of Practice*, and Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflective Sociology*, pp. 123–39 and *passim*. For its adaptation and application to Mao Zedong and Yan’an, see Apter, “Discourse as Power: Yan’an and the Chinese Revolution,” and Apter and Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse*.

86. Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution 1800–1985*, p. 253.

87. T. C. Cheek, “The Honorable Vocation: Intellectual Service in CCP Propaganda Institutions in North China, 1937–49,” in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

88. Apter, “Discourse as Power: Yan’an and the Chinese Revolution.”

89. On the humiliation of Wang Shiwei and its significance, see T. C. Cheek, “The Fading of Wild Lilies: Wang Shiwei and Mao Zedong’s *Yan’an Talks* in the First CPC Rectification Movement,” *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 11 (1984): 25–57; see also Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and “Wild Lilies.”*

90. Peter Seybolt has argued that “terror” was a necessary component of the rectification drive in Yan’an. P. J. Seybolt, “Terror and Conformity. Counterespionage Campaigns, Rectification, and Mass Movements, 1942–1943,” *Modern China*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1986): 39–73. For a view that does not see Mao as leading a conscious effort to use terror to consolidate his personal power, see Teiwes, “From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party.”

91. When the movement spread out to the general population, some 160,000 took part in confession rallies.

92. This was in a report Kang Sheng delivered on 29 March 1944 at a senior cadres’ conference in the CCP’s Northwest Bureau. It is extracted in W. Kuo, *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party*, Book 4, p. 421. Not everyone arrested and later released saw this as a reason to become critical of CCP practice. Li Rui, who was arrested during this period, commented during an interview in 1989 that he saw his subsequent release as vindication of the party’s correct approach.

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**THE RISE
TO POWER
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Commentary A

The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the Origins of Cooperation with the Guomindang, 1920–1923

The CCP emerged from the cultural and political movement named for the incident of 4 May 1919. The period from roughly 1915 to 1921 saw the introduction to China of many new ideas for regenerating the Chinese state and society. Some of China's patriotic youth came to believe that the international credo of Marxism and its Leninist variant could provide China's national salvation. The spread of Marxism was aided by its adoption by a number of key intellectuals. The best known of these were the two founding fathers of the CCP, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, but there were others, such as Li Da, who played a key role in promoting the study of Marxism.¹

Apart from the intellectual attraction of Marxism, a number of factors led to an increase of its appeal in its Bolshevik form.² First, there was the Bolshevik revolution itself. It demonstrated to some Chinese the possibilities for radical change in the context of underdevelopment. Second, the growing prestige of Soviet Russia was boosted by the Karakhan Declaration (1919), which appeared to renounce the former czarist privileges in China. This portrayed new Soviet Russia in a favorable light in comparison with the old imperialist powers that seemed intent on dismembering China. Third, during the May Fourth Movement a politically conscious urban proletariat began its entry onto the political stage. Although the workforce remained small, its members were dramatically increasing, primarily as a result of World War I. China's tardy industrialization had been propelled forward as many foreign imports disappeared because of the war.

Finally, the Comintern took a strong interest in events in China and was able to promote the idea of the development of a revolutionary party to guide and control future actions. In April 1920, Voitinsky visited China as the head of a group sent by the Vladivostok Branch of the Bolshevik's Far Eastern Bureau. He and his fellow visitors found fertile soil in which to plant the seeds of a Bolshevik organization.³ According to the historian Arif Dirlik, the timing was fortuitous as the radical movement in China had reached a point of crisis because the previous ideological and organizational premises appeared to have run into a dead end.⁴ Voitinsky's group established contacts with radical intellectuals such as Li Dazhao in Beijing and Chen Duxiu in Shanghai. Out of their discussions emerged the idea of founding a CP in China.⁵

Yet the early communist organizations in China did not simply emerge out of the blue; they evolved from the study societies set up during the May Fourth period. Out of study groups such as the New People's Study Society, the Awakening Society, and the Social Welfare Society came many of China's later communist leaders.⁶

The group in Shanghai was the first communist organization to be set up, most probably in August 1920.⁷ It functioned as the provisional Party Center until the First Congress was convened in the following year. Although the precise structure and names varied from place to place, by the time of the First Party Congress the communist organizations functioned in a threefold structure. Operating illegally at the core were the communist small groups; then there were units of the SYC operating semi-openly and providing a recruitment pool for the party; and finally the Marxist study societies presented a public face, trying to reach the widest possible audience.⁸

a) The First Party Congress (July–August 1921)— Pro-proletariat, Antibourgeoisie

The First Congress of the CCP that began its meeting on 23 July 1921 adopted a sectarian attitude of hostility toward cooperation with other forces in Chinese society and an exclusive focus on the working class. This attitude is already clear in "The Manifesto of the CCP" (Doc. A.1) drawn up in November 1920. The publication of this manifesto coincided with the launching of the party's first journal, the monthly *Gongchandang* (The Communist). Clearly, the organization was now thinking of itself as distinct from the other radical groupings and was trying to establish its own profile and program.

In a very simple fashion, the manifesto outlines basic concepts of communism, its goals, and the tasks of the CP. It is remarkable for its orthodoxy. It shows little feeling for China's situation or for the policy of tactical alliance with the bourgeoisie that was being developed at that time within the Comintern. The bourgeoisie is clearly identified as the key target to be destroyed in the process of class struggle. After the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the soviet was to provide the governmental form. Reflecting the anarchist ideas that were highly influential in the communist movement at the time, it states that the political ideal of communism is the abolition of state power.

These ideas dominated debates at the First Party Congress (see Doc. A.2).⁹ Essentially two main viewpoints were put forward, with Li Hanjun the main proponent of the minority view and Liu Renjing the fiercest defender of the majority viewpoint. In Li's opinion, it was too soon to become directly involved in the workers' movement as the working class was still unprepared and had an inadequate understanding of Marxism. As a result, the first task was to undertake a lengthy period of educational and propaganda work. First, intellectuals were to be armed with Marxism, and then workers were to be organized and educated to raise

their class consciousness. While this was in process, study could be made of the comparative values of Bolshevism and German Social Democracy, before it was decided which was most suitable to China's needs.

The "Program" and the "Resolution" passed by the Congress (**Docs. A.3, A.4**) both show the rejection of the minority view on crucial issues. The "Program" calls for the "revolutionary army of the proletariat to overthrow the capitalistic classes" and for the adoption of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Both documents are uncompromising in their hostility to collaboration with other parties, groups, or the "yellow intellectual class." A related debate concerned whether party members should hold government posts. The "Program," in general, barred members from holding posts as government officials or members of parliament, but exempted soldiers, police officers, and civil service employees. The workers' movement was confirmed as the core of party work, with the chief aim being the creation of industrial unions.

The party itself was to adopt a secretive, hierarchical structure based on local soviets. Supreme power was vested in a CEC that still had to be set up. It would have the right to supervise and direct the finances, publications, and policies of any local soviet. The appeals of Li Hanjun for a decentralized system of power were thus rejected. The final session of the Congress elected the central leadership. As party membership was still small, it was decided to set up a Provisional Central Executive Bureau to maintain liaison, etc., with the various branches. Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, and Li Da were elected members with Chen as secretary. Zhang and Li were in charge of organization and propaganda respectively.¹⁰ In Chen Duxiu's continued absence, Zhou Fuhai was to deputize for him.

The reports of the Beijing and Canton party groups to the Congress (**Docs. A.5, A.6**) give an idea of party work in these localities. The first battle the communist groups faced was to eradicate the influence of the anarchists. In Canton, seven of the original members and in Beijing six of the original eight members were anarchists.¹¹ Most of the anarchists left these nascent organizations because they refused to accept the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. While work varied from place to place and, in reality, local organizational independence was a strong feature of the early years of party life, all the groups sought to establish propaganda organs to propagate Marxism and to involve themselves in the labor movement.

Despite the high-sounding phrases adopted by the Congress, party work was slow in getting off the ground because of continued differences of opinion, financial difficulties, and the fact that the newly elected party secretary, Chen Duxiu, did not return to Shanghai until late August-mid-September.¹² By November 1921, however, a preliminary work plan was agreed upon (**Doc. A.7**) and circulated to the localities. It tried to formalize party structure by calling on the five major districts to set up district executive committees, each recruiting some thirty members. This would allow a "formal CEC" to be set up in accordance with the party program. Labor work was stressed, and each district was instructed to have at least one labor

union under its control. The focus was on organizing railway workers, with the objective of creating a national railway union.

The exclusive focus on the working class and hostility toward the bourgeoisie ran counter to the policy line that was evolving in the Comintern. The Comintern's Second Congress (July–August 1920) had put forward the idea of a temporary alliance between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie during the phase of the national revolution. It was in light of this that the Comintern had decided to send Maring as its representative to China. He arrived in June 1921.¹³ The subsequent period saw an attempt to force on the CCP a policy of cooperation with the bourgeoisie in the nationalist revolutionary movement.

b) The Second Congress (16–23 July 1922)—Pro-CCP Cooperation with the Bourgeois GMD—the “Bloc Without”

As Maring made clear in his July 1922 “Report” to the ECCI concerning his first year in China (**Doc. A.8**), he was very pessimistic about the work of the CCP. In contrast, his visit to Sun Yat-sen’s headquarters in south China in the winter of 1921–22 produced a very favorable view of the GMD. In particular, the GMD’s involvement in the Hong Kong sailors’ strike (January–May 1922) left a deep impression on Maring. This led Maring to propose that CCP members join the GMD to form a bloc within. The ideological complication of the proletariat joining a bourgeois party was swept aside with the assertion that the GMD was not a bourgeois party at all but a combination of four groups: the intelligentsia, the Chinese patriots overseas, the soldiers, and the workers.

Initially the idea of CCP members joining the GMD was totally unacceptable to the CCP leaders, as Chen Duxiu’s letter of 6 April 1922 to Voitinsky clearly shows (**Doc. A.9**). Yet by June 1922 signs of a shift in attitude were apparent. Presumably the influence of both Maring and the Youth International representative, Dalin, was beginning to take effect.¹⁴ The CCP’s June “Statement” (**Doc. A.10**) referred to the GMD as the only existing political party that could be called a revolutionary party. Support was qualified for the GMD—it was only “relatively democratic and revolutionary”; while the southern (Canton) government’s involvement in the labor movement was commented on favorably, the GMD’s occasional dalliances with the imperialists externally and with northern militarists internally were criticized. However, this was the first public sign of a shift in views.

The Second Congress of the CCP (16–23 July 1922) confirmed the party’s decision to join the democratic revolutionary movement in a temporary alliance (**Doc. A.11**).¹⁵ It is important to note that this decision referred to “all the nation’s revolutionary parties,” not just the GMD. However, since the “democratic elements” did not represent the interests of the proletariat, the CCP was to promote an independent class movement. Lest cooperation be misconstrued, the “Manifesto” issued by the Congress (**Doc. A.12**) began with the statement that such cooperation should not be seen as a proletarian surrender to the capitalists. This willingness to

work with other groups was accompanied by a change in attitude toward work within the system. The idea of entering parliament to promote the interests of the proletariat and the poor peasant classes was positively embraced (**Doc. A.13**).

The Congress also sought to tighten up on organization in an attempt to transform the party from its intellectual study group origins into a more orthodox Leninist party (**Docs. A.14, A.15**). The CEC was enshrined as the most powerful organ in the party with the tasks of enforcing Congress decisions and examining and deciding on the policies and actions of the party.¹⁶ To overcome the tendency toward anarchy, the party was to operate under “centralized and iron-like laws.” However, constitutions of themselves do not establish discipline, and the party remained internally divided on key questions such as whether cooperation with the GMD should be pursued and, if so, what form it should take.

Work in the labor movement continued to be defined as the party’s main *raison d’être*, and the Congress outlined the role of the CCP in the labor movement (**Doc. A.16**). Labor unions were to represent all workers regardless of their political opinions while educating them toward acceptance of socialist and communist principles. The party itself, however, was the army of the class-conscious elements of the proletariat, and it embodied the objective of overthrowing capitalism.

The Congress acknowledged the need for some form of cooperation in the national revolution but favored a horizontal alignment alongside the GMD rather than a “bloc within” as had been proposed by Maring. On his return to China in the summer of 1922, Maring found the party in disarray; Chen Duxiu had tendered his resignation, and the other four members of the CEC all appear to have belonged to Zhang Guotao’s “small group.” This “small group” was based on the Labor Secretariat, and it attempted to recruit activists and delegate them work as a way to overcome what it saw as the inactivity of members such as Li Hanjun. It was also hostile to the idea of cooperation with the GMD.

c) The Third Congress (12–20 June 1923)—Pro-CCP Members Joining GMD as Individuals—“The Bloc Within”

To get his ideas accepted, Maring convened the Hangzhou Plenum (28–30 August 1922), the first plenum ever held by the CCP. To overcome the opposition of the majority, Maring was able to cite the “Instructions for the ECCI Representative in South China” (**Doc. A.17**). This document, drafted by Radek on the basis of Maring’s statements, was an endorsement of the latter’s views. This imposition of Comintern discipline was intended to move the CCP away from its idealism and exclusionist position to embrace the bourgeoisie in a tactical alliance. Moreover, Maring used it to argue that CCP members should accept his view that they join the GMD to form a “bloc within.” While some form of tactical cooperation with the bourgeoisie was generally accepted within the CCP, the idea of forming a “bloc within” the GMD was strongly resisted and became a major point of controversy at the Third Party Congress.

The orthodox approach of the CCP was criticized by Radek at the Comintern's Fourth Congress (November–December 1922). He lambasted the Chinese Communists for their unworldliness, remarking on how they behaved like traditional Confucian scholars. Locking themselves away to study Marx and Lenin meant that they had failed to “associate themselves with the laboring masses.” Neither socialism nor the Soviet system should be on the political agenda; the current task of the party was to work together with the “revolutionary bourgeois elements” to “organize the struggle against European and Asiatic imperialism.”¹⁷ However, Radek did not identify this cooperation with forming a communist “bloc within” the GMD.

Chen Duxiu took the words of the Congress to heart and while in Moscow (November 1922) drafted “The Immediate Tactics of the Communist Party of China” (**Doc. A.18**). He noted the weak position of the proletariat in China and the failure of the bourgeoisie to oppose sufficiently the foreign imperialists and the native feudal class. Thus, the proletariat was to use its economic power to convince the bourgeoisie of the necessity of forming a united front. However, Chen was concerned with the preservation of CCP independence within the united front, and he remained skeptical whether this class collaboration could be achieved through the CCP operating as a “bloc within” the GMD.

This document is also remarkable for the first detailed handling of peasant policy by a senior CCP leader. Taking his cue from “The Theses on the Eastern Problem” adopted by the Comintern Congress, Chen outlined a detailed program. He acknowledged that the proletariat could not achieve its goals without the support of the “poor peasant masses.” Were the party to remain isolated from the peasantry, it would never be able to become a “great mass party.”

The party was in bad shape by the time it convened its Third Congress (12–20 June 1923).¹⁸ The brutal crushing of the February 1923 Beijing–Hankou railway workers’ strike had shattered the party’s high hopes for the workers’ movement.¹⁹ The destruction of the railway union, the best communist organization, and the ensuing crackdown on labor in general made many party members realize that the strength of the proletariat alone was insufficient. Maring’s reports to the Comintern at this time paint a very gloomy picture²⁰ that is echoed by Chen Duxiu’s report to the Party Congress (**Doc. A.19**).

The main point of contention at the Congress was the form of cooperation between the CCP and the GMD, and the main protagonists were Maring and Zhang Guotao (**Docs. A.20, A.21**, respectively). While Zhang accepted that for the sake of the revolution the GMD and the CCP should be more closely linked, he did not feel that the GMD yet represented the nationalist movement. Neither was the GMD geographically a national movement. Zhang felt that it should be supported only where it had strong links with the masses but not in the north where it had no organization. Given his background in the labor movement, Zhang would not accept subordination of it to the GMD. With the exception of Canton and Hankou, where Zhang saw no other choice, the CCP-controlled labor movement was to remain outside the GMD. Zhang received his strongest support from Cai Hesen, who

stressed that the bourgeoisie had no revolutionary significance and that it was important to build up an independent workers' party.²¹

Maring defended himself and Chen Duxiu against charges that they wished to dissolve the CCP through cooperation with the GMD. Again he invoked Comintern discipline to force his points home. In his view, the strong emphasis on the working class derived from an overestimation of the potential of the proletariat in China; he reasserted that the only way forward for the CCP was to develop the GMD from within. He accused both Zhang and Cai of ignoring the Comintern's January 1923 formulation that because the central task in China was the nationalist revolution, the activities of the GMD and the "young CCP" should be coordinated.

The Congress "Manifesto" and the "Resolution" on cooperation with the GMD (**Docs. A.22, A.23**, respectively) show that Maring's and Chen Duxiu's ideas carried the day.²² The "Manifesto" clearly acknowledged the GMD as the central force of the national revolution. The "Resolution" spelled out in more detail the need to rally around the GMD, noting that the weakness of the working class prevented the development of a mass communist party. *Within* the GMD, the communist organization would be maintained and attract to itself radical elements who would provide a solid basis for the development of the CCP.²³

Organizationally, the Congress made a number of minor adjustments in the Constitution (**Doc. A.24**); more importantly, the central party apparatus was clearly outlined (**Doc. A.25**). Membership of the CEC was increased to nine but, at its first session, it was to elect a five-person Central Bureau to exercise power on its behalf. The Bureau was to meet every week while the CEC was to meet only every four months. Thus, effective power was to remain centralized in a few hands. The CEC also elected a chair to preside over both organs, a secretary to handle party correspondence and documentation, and a party accountant.²⁴

Despite the passing of resolutions for cooperation with the GMD, the policy was not smoothly implemented immediately afterward; indeed it was hardly implemented at all. The Central Bureau of the party decided to move back to Shanghai as it felt that not much could be achieved with Sun Yat-sen and because it wanted to create new organizations in the north either to bring about a radical change in the dominant opinions within the GMD, or to create a new nationalist party. This was quite contrary to Maring's intentions, although even he was moved to muse about a GMD without Sun at its head.

The disillusionment with Sun stemmed from his obsession with a military solution to China's problems and his resistance to the reorganization of the GMD. This was fueled by what the Communists saw as his inactivity concerning the situation in Beijing. In June 1923, through the intrigues of Cao Kun, Li Yuanhong was dismissed as president of the Republic. The CCP saw the resultant power vacuum as providing Sun with the perfect chance to place himself at the head of the national movement by going to Shanghai and convening there a national assembly. A letter by senior CCP members who were also in the GMD was sent to Sun to this effect (**Docs. A.26**).²⁵ However, Sun rejected these overtures, claiming that the assembly

was an impossibility and that when the merchants understood this they would rally to him.²⁶

The problem of realizing cooperation between the CCP and the GMD was a major topic discussed at the first meeting of the CEC on 24–25 November 1923.²⁷ The report of the Central Bureau (**Doc. A.27**) noted that some members still opposed the “Resolution” adopted at the Third Party Congress and that differences of opinion and lack of trust existed between members of the two parties. Lack of progress was mentioned in the regional reports to the meeting (**Doc. A.28**), the main exception being Guangdong. Borodin’s arrival in Canton had put life back into the process of expanding cooperation between the CCP and the GMD. The meeting reaffirmed the CCP’s principles of cooperation, calling for all members to join the GMD where its organization existed and to strive to create organizations where it did not (**Doc. A.29**). The meeting also confirmed the tactic of taking over the GMD from within. CCP members were to form secret organizations within the GMD, and all their political pronouncements were to come under party guidance.

The meeting addressed the problem of labor work. Most workers’ organizations in north and central China had been shattered in the aftermath of the February 1923 railway workers’ strike. In the future, work was to concentrate on the triumvirate of railway workers, sailors, and miners with the intention of creating a National Labor Union (**Doc. A.30**). The bleak situation with respect to labor organization was borne out by the regional reports, with only the situation in Anyuan seeming to be a bright spot.

Further cooperation between the CCP and the GMD was spurred by Borodin’s arrival with promises of even greater Soviet financial support and the reorganization of the GMD, which was to take place in January 1924.

DOCUMENTS 1920–1923

A.1 The Manifesto of the CCP (November 1920)²⁸

Dear Comrades!

This manifesto was agreed on by the CCP in November of last year. Since it does not contain all the communist principles, the manifesto has not been made public and is used only as guidance for accepting new party members. Since the original Chinese text of the manifesto could not be found here, I translated it from English. Because it was a year ago that this manifesto was agreed on, of course by now parts of it need to be revised and new things need to be added. I very much hope that every comrade will read it carefully because every Communist must pay attention to important documents such as this—the Manifesto of the CP. Furthermore, it is proposed that the communist group of the Chinese delegation to the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East discuss this document.²⁹ The result of the discussion will be given to the CCP for consideration and adoption.

Zhang³⁰

10 December 1921

1) Communist Ideals

A) Views on the Economy: Communists advocate social and common ownership and use of the means of production—machinery, factories, raw materials, land, transportation facilities, and so on. Once common ownership and common use of the means of production have been achieved, private property and the system of moneylending will naturally be eliminated. The current phenomenon of exploitation of man by man in society will cease to exist because the origin of the exploitation—surplus value—will cease to exist.

B) Views on Politics: Communists advocate the abolition of the state. Anything akin to current state institutions and government absolutely cannot be allowed to exist. Because the state, the army, and the courts protect the interests of the minority and oppress the majority working masses, they are very necessary when the means of production are privately owned. Of course, if private property and the system of moneylending are abolished, the state, the army, and the courts are no longer useful.

C) Views on Society: Communists will ensure that society has only one class (i.e., it will be classless)—this is the class of the laboring masses. The origin of all special powers in today's society is private property; special classes would not exist if no one could concentrate property.

2) The Communists' Goal

The goal of Communists is to create a new society in accordance with commu-

nist ideals. In order to make the realization of our ideal society feasible, the first step is the elimination of the present capitalist system. The elimination of the capitalist system requires strong power to defeat the capitalist countries. The power of the laboring masses—the proletariat—is growing stronger and is becoming more concentrated. This is precisely the result of class conflicts within capitalist countries. The form that this power takes is class struggle.

Thus the instrument to defeat capitalism is class struggle. Class struggle has always existed in human society, but because its form is determined by the development of the means of production, its form has changed a number of times. Class struggle also existed under the feudal system, but it differed from that in capitalist countries. Class struggle in capitalist countries is exceptionally intense, with a momentum great enough to shake the whole world. This power is becoming increasingly consolidated and eventually will eliminate capitalism. This kind of intensification of struggle is determined by the logic of history.

The CP's task is to organize and concentrate the power of this class struggle and to make the force opposing capitalism stronger.

To be successful, this [idea] must be propagated among workers, peasants, soldiers, sailors, and students. The objective is to organize some large industrial associations and combine them into a general federation of industrial associations, and also to organize a revolutionary, proletarian political party—the CP. The CP is to guide the revolutionary proletariat to fight against capitalists and to seize political power from them. This power is used to maintain the capitalist system. Instead, power will be placed in the hands of workers and peasants, just as the Russian CP did in 1917.

The revolutionary proletariat's industrial associations must use general strikes to cause constant agitation in capitalist countries to make the enemy of the working masses weaker and weaker. When the time of the final struggle to seize political power from capitalists is at hand, the CP will call a general, all-out strike. This will deal a fatal blow to the capitalist system.

After the proletariat defeats the capitalists, the industrial associations will become the organs responsible for the economy in the communist society.

The overthrow of capitalist government and transfer of political power to the revolutionary proletariat is only one of the goals of the CP, and it is already showing success. However, this will not be the end of the CP's task, as class struggle will continue to exist. Only its form will change and will become the dictatorship of the proletariat.

3) Recent Conditions of Class Struggle

As it appears now, the whole world can be viewed as a single capitalist institution. Therefore class struggle in one country can have repercussions in others. The result of the victory of the Russian proletarian revolution was the transformation of class struggle in Russia into the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. This causes class struggle in other countries to become more intense, and it tends toward the same form as class struggle in Russia—the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is no accident that the form of class struggle in Russia was transformed into the dictatorship of the proletariat; it is a natural state of affairs in the development of

human society. It is a natural state of affairs at the time when the capitalists are being defeated and a communist society is being created. At a certain moment, the political form that exists in Russia is destined to emerge. Therefore it is true that this political form is destined to emerge in every other country. This is the case because these countries are the same. If one looks at their methods of production and distribution, they are all capitalist. The dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia only demonstrates that in one part of the world victory has been achieved in the struggle between the proletarian and capitalist. It would be a major mistake to believe that a single communist state can be established within the boundary of Russia at a time when the proletariat in other countries is still struggling against capitalism and has yet to achieve victory. Since the Russian proletariat cannot immediately establish a communist state, and since capitalism has already been overthrown, the proletariat has to defend itself against enemies within the country and without. This is obvious. Therefore only through the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat can the enemies within the country and without be successfully resisted. That is to say, the power of one class is used to create communist society. Furthermore this class will make the society of the future. The fulfillment of this task is ordained by history.

Moreover, this is characteristic not only of the development of Russian history but also of world history. Every country in the world will go through this phase of class struggle.

The meaning of the dictatorship of the proletariat lies solely in that political power has been seized by the revolutionary proletariat. Yet this does not mean that residual forces of capitalism, such as counterrevolutionary forces, have been totally eradicated. This is not at all the case. The task facing the dictatorship of the proletariat is, on the one hand, to continue using force to fight the residual forces of capitalism and, on the other, to use revolutionary methods to produce many communist methods of construction. Methods like these will be devised by the elected representatives of the proletariat—those of the proletariat with the highest class consciousness and revolutionary spirit.

By the time capitalists' forces have been eliminated all over the world and productive activities begin to operate in accordance with communist principles, the dictatorship of the proletariat will move on to carve out a path leading to communism.

A.2 The First Congress of the CCP (August 1921)³¹

The Chinese communist organization was established in the middle of last year [1920]. Initially, the Shanghai organization had only five members. The leader is the editor of the well-received journal *New Youth* [Xin qingnian], Comrade Chen [Duxiu]. This organization has gradually expanded the scope of its activities and

now comprises six small groups³² with a total of fifty-three party members. The Congress was originally scheduled to open on 20 June, but because the delegates from Beijing, Hankou, Canton, Changsha, Jinan, and Japan did not all arrive in Shanghai until 23 July, the Congress only began then. Twelve representatives participated in the Congress. They came from seven localities, including Shanghai. Two localities sent one delegate each, and five localities sent two.³³

At the first session, the chairman, Comrade Zhang [Guotao], explained the significance of the Congress. The Congress was to formulate a program and a plan for practical work. An agenda was drawn up, and the Congress listened to reports concerning the activities of the local small groups and the general situation. In total, this took two days. These reports all pointed out three things: party members are very few; it is necessary to increase party membership; and the methods of organizing workers and making propaganda have to be improved. We are extremely pleased to mention here that Comrades Maring³⁴ and Nikolsky attended the First Congress and that they provided us with valuable guidance. Comrade Maring, in his speech, discussed his activities in Java and recommended that we should pay special attention to establishing workers' organizations.

Comrade Nikolsky told us about the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Far Eastern Secretariat³⁵ and gave his impressions of Russia. After this report, and on the basis of Nikolsky's suggestion, we decided to send a telegram to Irkutsk informing them of the progress of the Congress. Following Maring's recommendation it was decided to elect a commission to draft the program and the work plan. The commission was given two days to draft the plan and the program. During this period, there were no Congress sessions.

The third, fourth, and fifth sessions of the Congress were devoted to the study of the program. After a long debate, final decisions were reached, with the exception of one point that caused heated debate. This point was whether party members could, with the permission of the Executive Committee, become government officials and members of parliament. On this point, there were two different viewpoints. One was that there was no danger in our party members' becoming officials. Moreover, the selection of party members to enter parliament was even recommended so that they could carry out their work under party leadership. The other viewpoint did not accept this.

At the third meeting, the representatives did not reach an agreement, and at the fourth meeting the discussion became even more heated. One side firmly believed that acceptance into parliament could turn our party into a yellow party. They quoted the example of the Social Democratic Party in Germany to show that when people entered parliament they gradually abandoned their principles and became a part of the bourgeoisie, becoming traitors and recognizing the parliamentary system as the only means of struggle and work. So as not to undertake any activities in common with the bourgeoisie and in order to concentrate our forces for attack, we certainly should not participate in parliament but should engage in struggle outside it. Moreover, taking advantage of parliament could not improve our situation, yet

entering parliament might make people think that taking advantage of parliament, and only that, could improve our situation and enable us to be of service to the revolutionary cause. The others persisted in advocating that we must link open work with secret work. If we believed that the state could not be abolished within twenty-four hours and that a general strike could be suppressed by the capitalists, then political activities would be a necessity. Although opportunities for uprisings were few and far between, we had to make preparations in the meantime. We had to improve the workers' conditions, expand their outlook, and lead them to take part in the revolutionary struggle and the struggle for freedom of publication and assembly. The open propagation of our theories was an absolute condition for success, and the adoption of activities in common with other parties and factions oppressed in parliament could have brought partial success. However, we must point out to the people that it is futile to hope to build a new society within the old system even if we are the ones trying to do so. The working class must liberate itself because it is not possible to force it to carry out revolution. Otherwise, it will entertain illusions about parliament and adopt peaceful, instead of radical, means.

By the end, the issue still had not been resolved, and its resolution was left to the next Congress. The question of whether we should become government officials was intentionally avoided, but it was unanimously believed that we should not become ministers or provincial governors and that, in general, we should not take up important administrative posts. In China, the word "official" can be applied to all the posts mentioned above. However, we would permit our comrades to take up such official posts such as plant directors.

The sixth session of the Congress was held at night in a comrade's home. The meeting had only just started when a detective barged into the house.³⁶ Although he apologized for coming in by mistake, it was impossible for us to carry on with the meeting. The arrival of the detective did not damage the party, although after he came the police quickly arrived and carried out a search. After this incident, we were on our guard, and in order to continue the Congress we had to move to a small town nearby.³⁷

There we discussed the commission's draft of the practical work plan. Concerning our attitude to other parties and factions, there was a short but intense debate. Some people maintained that no matter whether in theory or in practice, the proletariat should always struggle against other parties and factions. At the same time, however, undertaking common activities with other parties and factions did not violate our party's principles. Also, we were to do our utmost to cooperate with all other elements to oppose our common enemy—the warlords who are the enemy of all other classes in society. Others advocated that although we should cooperate in activities with other parties and factions to oppose the common enemy, at the same time, we should not forsake principles and must criticize them in our newspaper. Even if we were not able to seize power immediately, at least we would be able to strengthen ourselves so that we would be able to take further action. Because our strength would inevitably be improved

by achievements in this respect, the ruling class that is in the process of replacing the current ruling class might not dare to oppress the people in the same way as the feudal lords. In this way, we could concentrate our revolutionary strength and expand our revolutionary activities. Therefore, even if the proletariat could not take over political power immediately, we should still unite with other classes to oppose the common enemy and strengthen ourselves so that we could struggle further to overthrow the class that has gained political power. In this way, one would be able to see that our unity with other classes is for the purpose of engaging in struggle of a destructive nature. However, the meeting made a decision in favor of the first option, namely, the recommendation submitted by the commission that drafted the practical work plan.

Because party members are few, the questions of organizing the peasantry and an army were suspended, and it was decided to concentrate our energies on organizing the factory workers. In order to win good and reliable comrades to our side, it was decided that party members must be admitted with special caution and via a strict selection process. In view of the fact that up to now our party has been composed almost entirely of intellectuals, the Congress decided to pay special attention to the organization of workers and their education in the communist spirit. The Central Bureau of the party was entrusted with the drafting of the party Constitution. After having elected three comrades to organize the Secretariat and having elected the Organization Department and the Propaganda Committee,³⁸ the Congress shouted the following slogans and declared the meeting closed: “Long Live the CP, Long Live the Third International, Long Live Communism—the Emancipator of Humankind.”

A.3 The First Program of the CCP (July–August 1921)³⁹

1. Our party shall be named the Chinese Communist Party.
2. The program of our party is as follows:
 - a) With the revolutionary army of the proletariat, to overthrow the capitalistic classes and to reconstruct the nation from the labor class, until class distinctions are eliminated.
 - b) To adopt the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to complete the end of class struggle—abolishing classes.
 - c) To overthrow the private ownership of capital, to confiscate all the productive means, such as machines, land, buildings, semimanufactured products, and so on, and to entrust them to social ownership.
 - d) To unite with the Third International.
- 3) Our party, with the adoption of the soviet form, organizes the industrial and

agricultural laborers and soldiers, propagates communism, and recognizes the social revolution as our chief policy; it absolutely cuts off all relations with the yellow intellectual class and other such groups.

4) No discrimination as to sex or nationality is allowed in the membership; anyone who accepts the programs and policies of our party and who promises loyalty to our party after introduction by one of our members can be our comrade, but before he [she] enters our party, he [she] shall sever relations with any other party or group which opposes our program.

5) The procedure for introducing a member is this: the candidate should be suggested to the local soviet for investigation; the time for investigation is limited to at most two months. After investigation, through the consent of the majority of the members, the membership of the new applicant is recognized. If in that locality an executive committee has been established, its membership should be approved by that committee.

6) Until the time for disclosure is ripe, the doctrines of the party and even membership in it must be kept secret.

7) In any locality which has as many as five members, a local soviet can be organized.

8) The member of a soviet, through a formal introduction from his [her] local secretary can transfer to another local soviet.

9) In any local soviet numbering less than ten members, only one secretary is appointed to manage affairs; if the soviet has over ten members, a treasurer, an organizer, and a propagandist should be appointed; if the soviet has over thirty members, an executive committee should be organized. The rules of such a committee will be stipulated hereafter.

10) In various localities when the membership increases, the organizations of laborers, peasants, soldiers, and students should be utilized for external activity according to occupations, but such organizations should be under the direction of the local executive committee.

12) The finances, publications, and policies of any local soviet shall be supervised and directed by the CEC.

13) When the members exceed 500 or when more than five local executive committees have been established in the whole country, a convenient place should be chosen in which to organize an executive committee, including ten members elected by the national representative conference. When the above-mentioned conditions are not carried out, a provisional CEC should be organized to fill the need. The detailed regulations of the CEC will be stipulated thereafter.

14) The members, unless they are under pressure of existing law or have obtained consent from the party, cannot be government officials or members of parliament, but soldiers, policemen, and civil service employees are not held to this restriction.

15) This program can be amended when a bill concerning such amendments is passed by two-thirds of the representatives of the national representative conference.

A.4 The First Decision as to the Objects of the CCP (July–August 1921)⁴⁰

1) Labor Organization

To form industrial unions is the chief aim of our party. In any locality where there is more than one kind of industry, an industrial union shall be organized; if there is no great industry in a certain locality but only one or two factories, a factory union can be organized suitable to conditions in that locality.

The party should imbue the unions with the spirit of the class struggle. If the political struggle, fostered by various unions, does not agree with our program, this party should avoid becoming the puppet of other parties.

As to the existing guilds and technical unions, this party is allowed to send members to join these organizations in order to take the first step toward reorganization.

A labor union cannot be formed unless more than 200 members can be secured. At least two of our members should be sent to a new union to aid in organization.

2) Propaganda

Magazines, daily publications, encyclopedias, and pamphlets must all be under the management of the CEC or the provisional CEC.

Each locality can publish a union magazine, a daily and a weekly paper and pamphlets, and temporary circulars according to its needs.

Whether a publication is central or local, it should be directly managed and edited by the members of the party.

Any publication of a central or local [organization] must not contain articles inconsistent with the principles, policies, and decisions of the party.

3) Labor Supplementary Schools

As a labor supplementary school is the preparatory step in the organization of an industrial union, such schools should be formed within units of various industries, such as the transportation supplementary labor school, the textile supplementary school, etc. No supplementary school teaching several different kinds of work is permitted, except in those cases where the need for such an arrangement cannot be met.

In the supplementary school, only workers can be members of the managing board of the school that takes charge of school affairs. Teachers are employed by the party, but they can attend such board meetings.

Labor supplementary schools should gradually become the centers of labor organs; otherwise they are not permitted and can be suspended or reorganized by the party according to conditions.

The most important doctrine taught should be that which can awake the consciousness of laborers and show them the need for organizing labor unions.

4) Institution for Studying Labor Organization

This institution should be organized by the leaders of various industries, class-

conscious workers, and comrades of the party and should teach the proper methods of industrial organization.

The object of such an institution is to discipline the workers who carry on the practical work of the party so that special attention can be paid to such phases as the organization of labor unions, assistance in the various other movements of the proletariat, and investigation of the conditions of the labor unions and of the proletariat.

For the purpose of increasing the ability of the members, the institution may be divided into research groups in the following subjects: the history of the labor movement, the method of organizing factory laborers, Karl Marx's economic theories, and the present aspects of the labor movement of various nations. The results of this research may be published in a series. (In the discussion of these problems, special attention is paid to local conditions in China.)

5) The Attitude Toward Existing Political Parties

Toward existing political parties, an attitude of independence, aggression, and exclusion should be adopted. In the political struggle, in opposing militarism and bureaucracy, and in demanding freedom of speech, press, and assemblage, when we must declare our attitude, our party should stand up on behalf of the proletariat and should allow no relationship with the other parties or groups.

6) The Relationship Between the Party and the Third International

The central organ should make a report to the Third International every month. If necessary, a formal representative should be sent to be stationed in the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Third International in Irkutsk, and deputies should be sent to the various Far Eastern nations to further plans for union in the class struggle.

A.5 Report of the Beijing Communist Group. *Zhang Guotao* (July 1921)⁴¹

Comrades:

The Beijing communist organization was founded only ten months ago [October 1920]. Just a few intellectuals have joined this youthful organization, and most of them lack revolutionary experience. Because of changes in the political situation itself, our entire operation has encountered quite a few difficulties. For this reason, our work has not been very fruitful. We very much regret to say that we cannot report to you much more about our experiences at this Congress. However, we sincerely hope that this Congress will greatly enrich our experience and will issue principles and instructions concerning all our future activities.

Before beginning the report, I [Zhang Guotao] will give you as brief a description as possible of Beijing society.

1) As you know, Beijing is the political center of north China and, for the past

500 years, has been China's capital. In the Qing dynasty [1644–1911], many Manchus lived there, maintaining an unruly and lawless life-style because of their relationship to the emperor. Even now there are 200,000 such residents. Because of their continuing loyalty, they cannot find regular work. Apart from these good-for-nothings, there are high- and low-level civil and military officials on whom all manner of parasites hang. Then there are their family members. Finally, there are about 30,000 characters engaged in all kinds of suspicious professions. Beijing's population is only about 930,000 and, I dare say, half of them are loafing around. Indeed, one might say that Beijing is the strangest city in the world.

As I said, Beijing is the acknowledged political center. Hence people here should be concerned about politics. Yet this is far from the case. When China had an imperial system, people regarded politics as the emperor's personal concern. After the revolution, it was considered the business of the military. That is to say that politics is seen as the personal concern of senior and junior officers and of politicians who pursue their own selfish ends in struggles for all kinds of privileges. For this reason, people do not pay much attention to politics.

How can this passive attitude of people in Beijing be explained? First, people in Beijing remember very well what the ancient philosophers said—"Politics is not for the common people." This fatalistic idea is ingrained in their minds. Second, for thousands of years they lived under the oppression of a despotic system. Obedience and feelings of dependency are very strong. Third, industrial development is in its infancy and extreme egoism is rampant among workers. Steeped in a conservative, traditional ethos, they have no sense of collectivity; at teahouses or restaurants, one often sees signs saying "No Discussing Affairs of State." This kind of sanction on any discussions of state and political affairs seems designed to influence people from the lower classes.

After the revolution in "literature" (the popularization of *baihua*,⁴² etc.), for the first time the intellectuals felt the need for new ideals, aspirations, and ambitions. At the same time, disputes developed between China and Japan over the Shandong issue at the conference for dividing war booty. This provoked an unprecedented nationalist movement among students—the May Fourth Movement.⁴³ At that time, students made a great effort to get the masses interested in political matters, but to no avail. Without support from the masses, the student movement languished. This example demonstrates that in this political center the patriotic spirit of the intellectuals has not taken root among the proletariat.

The political movement among the intellectuals can be divided into three schools: (1) the democratic movement; (2) guild socialism; and (3) the anarchist movement. Supporters of the democratic movement do not have stable organizations. Guild socialism has only a small number of supporters. Therefore, their influence is limited. In order to spread their very confused ideas, they simply use whatever papers and other periodicals exist. Even the anarchists are no different from these people. Pick up any newspaper, even including those run by the war-lords, and you can find articles about this mish-mash of different, confused ideas;

democracy, guild socialism, anarchism, and more. Naturally, this kind of movement, given the means employed, cannot achieve its purpose. As for anarchists, although they probably have realized how important it is to arouse the masses, besides giving out their little pamphlets and sitting in prison, they do not know what to do. For example, during the recent May Fourth Movement, the anarchists gathered together thirty people but were unable to organize demonstrations among workers. They just put out a few weeklies but because they could not organize their distribution in a sensible way, they were distributed randomly.

Those in intellectual circles think that the transformation of society needs their knowledge. The fulfillment of scientific tasks will enable them to gain influential positions, and so they want more education. They regard the proletariat as an ignorant, poor, and impotent class that can be used to further their goals. While intellectuals think themselves very important, the proletariat is not worth mentioning. This tendency on their part is very obvious and as a result is a big obstacle in the workers' revolutionary movement.

Comrades, based on what I have said, we face two important questions that need immediate resolution. First, how can we get the workers and the destitute interested in politics and use the spirit of rebellion to educate and organize them and get them involved in revolutionary work? Second, how can they be dissuaded from their desire to become scholars thus joining the intellectual circles? How can they be persuaded to participate in the revolutionary movement of the proletariat? Finally, how can they be made into a part of the proletariat?

In general, this government of warlords and bureaucrats is not stable at all. It does not have any consistent political direction. It would be easy to get rid of this government if the proletariat made an effort.

2) Beijing's economic situation is not very complex. Beijing is a political center, not an industrial or commercial one. In fact, only millionaires have money in banks. There are very few industrialists, and there are not many big merchants either. Some relatively large factories and enterprises such as editorial offices, publishing houses, the local treasury, precision machinery factories, measurement-equipment factories, and railways are all government institutions. Therefore, the factory owners and the employers are the government itself. To strengthen the patriotic spirit among the workers of the above-mentioned factories and enterprises and to make them work long hours, the government says, "You should do this for the prosperity of the country." Naturally, under such conditions it is very difficult to carry out propaganda work. It is more difficult than dealing with capitalists. Comrades, I would like to call your attention to this problem.

There are many rickshaw pullers among the workers, between fifty and sixty thousand. Although they do not work for the capitalists, they come from lower social strata and their work enables them to be in contact with people of all social backgrounds. We must find ways to conduct propaganda work among them.

3) In Beijing, it is common to see people being bullied. Foreigners insult Chinese; military officers harshly treat civilians; passengers drive on rickshaw pullers

with whips, canes, etc. In my opinion, no matter where, once things like that happen, we should seize the opportunity to arouse the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat.

Government officials, officers, bureaucrats, and the police compete to oppress the common people. The cars of the “VIP’s” can run down pedestrians with impunity. They can direct traffic as they please and deploy police to oppress people arbitrarily. All this indicates that there are many opportunities for propaganda among the masses.

Now let me return to talk about the past activities and the program of the Beijing communist organization. We should point out that in October last year when the organization was founded, a few sham Communists also joined. These people were really anarchists, and they made some trouble for us. Because of their extreme view of politics, they left the organization. After they left, things began to go smoothly. We do not have many people, so we cannot now propose any comprehensive tasks. We must concentrate on propaganda and organization work among intellectuals and workers.

Propaganda Work Among Workers

Beijing’s industry is not very developed. There are no big factories concentrating the workers in one place. For this reason, we decided to shift our attention to railway workers. However, all of us come from intellectual families and are distanced from the working class. Therefore the first thing to do was increase communication among the workers themselves. We decided to set up a workers’ supplementary school at Changxindian to train 2,000 railway workers. This school is not far from Beijing and it has three teachers—they are socialists.

This school is one way we approach workers. On more than one occasion our suggestions caused excitement. As a result, all kinds of classes have made demands, and ideas of wage increases, shortening working hours, and establishing trade unions have spread among the workers. Later, they set up a railway union with 340 to 350 members.

Comrades, we should not confine ourselves to setting up trade unions. After they are set up, we should guide the trade unions to fight with factory bosses. Only then can workers show concern for their own unions and believe in their strength. The workers are uneducated and illiterate. Only one out of ten can read a newspaper. Of course, propaganda work using printed materials is not effective. As you can see, we must fight these difficulties and overcome them at any cost.

In brief, the lessons we learned during this short time are: First, good relations should be established between those loyal to the workers’ cause and the workers themselves. Second, leaders should be selected from the workers. Third, we should remind them of the purpose of our organization and to use their own unions to fight with employers so that class hatred will be intensified. Fourth, we must seize every opportunity to encourage the masses to demonstrate and launch strikes.

Of course, because of inadequacies with our staff and a lack of funds we cannot expect to raise the general education level of the workers immediately. Through this school, we seek to achieve only the two aims outlined above. The purpose of the school is mainly to educate workers and get them accustomed to a situation in which they themselves elect those among them with high consciousness and enthusiasm to govern the school and the union. Student meetings provide good opportunities for propaganda work, and it is extremely important to develop the custom of calling public, mass meetings. This kind of meeting is the best way to develop people's sense of common interest and discipline.

What do we teach workers? We constantly tell them that they are being exploited by capitalist factory owners and that this is the reason why they have a wretched life. Also, we introduce them to the history of workers' movements in foreign countries. We constantly point out to them the significance and methods of becoming organized. We often give lectures and teach them how to read. At the same time, we teach them to use words to express their thoughts and make them write about their family's daily life and all the injustices happening in the factory. At first, they were rather reluctant, but we did produce some very good agitators. However, the task of finding true proletarian leaders is very difficult.

I think it is unnecessary to open such schools for workers from every profession. Only in those places where there are no workers' organizations and leaders is it necessary to have a school like this. Experience shows that we cannot have general schools but schools that are specialized, such as schools for textile and railway workers, etc. This kind of school is the necessary preparatory stage for setting up unions along professional lines.

With respect to the Beijing-Hankou Railway trade union, our effort is to get its workers to develop close relationships with us. At the same time, we pay special attention to strikes that occur here and there. Once, as soon as we heard about a strike launched by coal mine and other workers, Comrade Luo [Zhanglong] and I rushed there by train. We wanted to help the strikers but they did not believe that they could get help from outsiders and furthermore they suspected us of being spies and were afraid of us. Hence our effort failed.

Most of the propaganda publications we publish for the proletariat have only a few pages. We often encourage workers to write brief news pieces and print them in our or other publications. Our first publication was *Workers' Weekly* [Laodong zhoukan], but after the sixth issue, the government banned it. After this restraining order by the government, we changed the name to *Voice of Benevolence* [Rensheng], but after the third issue we had to cease publication because of lack of funds. We also put out some pamphlets such as *Workers' Victory* [Gongren de shengli] and *May Day* [Wuyijie]. These publications had a wide circulation. However, our main propaganda work so far has concentrated on increasing wages and shortening working hours. These demands have become the most effective slogans for our struggle.

I want to give an example to illustrate how important it is for workers to openly

organize strikes and demonstrations. As I said before, we planted the first seeds of propaganda work at Changxindian, and on 1 May last year the first strike occurred. I want to praise this strike organized by our comrades. On that day, a mass rally was called with thousands of people attending. Workers made agitational speeches, and some did not even have the opportunity to speak even though the rally lasted three hours. After the rally, they took to the streets. Some 1,500 people marched through the streets, holding banners bearing important slogans, singing revolutionary songs, and shouting "Higher wages; shorter working hours!" Less than one week after this demonstration, about ten small-scale incidents occurred in the factory that caused the management great concern. I would like to remind you, comrades, that we must work with workers who have a sense of discipline. In my opinion, the best way is to help them organize strikes and demonstrations. We must take every measure that can speed up this movement.

Propaganda Work Among Intellectuals

We tried to conduct propaganda work on a wider basis among intellectuals, but our printing house was under surveillance and we could not print anything. We translated some small pamphlets, *The Russian Revolution and Class Struggle* and *The Program of the Communist Party*, for example, but we have not printed the translated texts. We only circulated *The Communist Manifesto* and *Conversations on Economics*, which were printed in Shanghai.

Although one of our comrades is responsible for the publication of the journal *Dawn Light* [Shuguang], the journal is run jointly with others. We published some translations and creative pieces. When Professor [Bertrand] Russell was lecturing in Shanghai and endorsed guild socialism, we organized public debates to voice our criticism of him. Very often we have to argue with anarchists and social democrats, but most of the arguments are conducted in the form of public debates and private conversations rather than through articles.

In recent years, the number of public schools has increased appreciably. These schools first teach their students to be patriotic, but we are making an effort to get these schools to teach communism, and we have made some headway in that regard.

This is the end of my report, but let me add a few more things. Although we now concentrate all our energy on organizing and educating the masses, at the same time we should also pay attention to propaganda work directed toward intellectuals. Comrades, a bleak political situation pervades our corrupt society; unbearable social injustices and pathetic living conditions are all factors leading to the outbreak of revolution. Whether we can capitalize on the easily evoked revolutionary spirit of the proletariat and whether we can channel a democratic political revolution into a proletarian social revolution all depends on the degree of effort we put into the struggle where we hold high the red banner. This founding Congress should deal with all the tasks facing us in a concrete way and draw up specific work plans. It seems that the task of this Congress is not an easy one.

A.6 Report of the Canton CP. *Chen Gongbo* (July 1921)⁴⁴

1) Last Year

There was no organization here last year, nor was it possible to find people to do organizational work in Canton. When we returned to Canton, we established a daily newspaper, *The Socialist* [Shehuizhuyizhe];⁴⁵ but we cannot claim that *The Socialist* was a kind of organization. It was a propaganda organ. At that time Canton was ruled by the people from Guangxi, who cruelly repressed all kinds of movements; we also had financial problems then, so there was no progress.

At the end of last year, B and Perlin came to Canton and opened an office of the Russian News Agency [Rosta]. They took some measures to organize labor unions and wrote articles for the weekly magazine *The Workers' World* [Laodongjie].⁴⁶ Comrade Huang Lingshuang introduced them to the revolutionaries in Canton, and thus they were surrounded by the anarchists.⁴⁷ Although a CP was organized, it would have been more appropriate to have called it the anarchists' CP. Of the nine members of the party's executive committee, seven were anarchists; only Comrades Perlin and Stoyanovich were Communists.⁴⁸ Because of our different views, Tan Pingshan, Tan Zhitang, and I refused to join this group. The paper they published was called *The Worker* [Laodongzhe], with a circulation of 3,000 copies. At that time, two workers' organizations emerged in Canton: one was the Mechanical Workers' Club and the other was the Kuanshan [Foshan?] Workers' Club; Kuanshan is a small place about 25 kilometers from Canton. Each of the organizations had about forty to fifty members. Because we were not members of these clubs, we cannot provide detailed reports about them.

Comrade Chen Duxiu came to Canton in January together with Comrade B.⁴⁹ They had very intensive discussions and concluded that we must get rid of the anarchists. Just at that time, the anarchists left the party, so we began the building of the real CP, and we declared that the daily newspaper *The Socialist* was the official newspaper for party propaganda. Altogether there were nine party members, including Chen Duxiu, Stoyanovich, and Perlin.

Regrettably, we were in great need of funds. *The Worker* [as of 2 January 1921] had already folded; two labor unions had to close because of, first, financial difficulties and, second, the wide dissemination of anarchist thinking inside labor unions.

2) The Present Situation

Now our propaganda agency's newspaper is the daily paper *The Socialist*. This newspaper needs 700 *yuan* a month; it is very difficult to continue publishing. In addition, we have a Marxist Research Society with about eighty members. Twenty percent of the members are law students, 20 percent are students from universities and trade schools, and the rest are members of all kinds of political and editorial groups. There are no workers in these groups because it is very difficult for us to

establish contacts with them. It is even more difficult to establish ties with soldiers. In order to keep afloat the monthly magazine *The Communist* [Gongchandang]⁵⁰ and pay for the costs of the workers' evening schools, every month we appropriate 10 percent of each party member's income.

In Shanghai [error for Canton] we have established a school for mechanical workers. Thanks to help from the seven school committee members, we have propagated our principles and hope to increase the number of schools. In addition, we have also established the training institute for propagandists, which is directly managed by the propaganda committee. I was appointed director of the institute. This institute is the principal agency for carrying out socialist education in Guangdong Province. Many teachers are good comrades of ours. We hope that the training institute will set up affiliated evening schools for workers and schools for organizational work among workers. But the existence of this training institute depends on political connections; we can only use such connections.

3) Suggestions for the Future

A. Recruit new party members.

The number of party members in Canton is small; this reminds us that we should pay much more attention to this work. However, when just beginning such work, we should not be casual about admitting new party members. The situation in Canton is very different from that in other places. Even if we exclude the workers and soldiers, we can say that university students sympathize with the secretive anarchists, or are manipulated by the GMD. Because of such difficulties, we should be especially determined. In the future, we plan to recruit new party members from some Marxist groups, from the school for mechanical workers, and from the training institute for propagandists. If other people want to join our party, we cannot deal with them at the present time as it is not a part of our plan.

B. Establish labor unions.

This is a tough problem because, in the past year, the number of labor unions has increased to over one hundred. But all these labor unions have been contaminated by anarchism or are controlled by the GMD. We don't have to talk about the anarchists because there are only five or six in Canton. Of these, three are going to France very soon. We should also point out that, in general, the anarchists themselves have no organization. Our struggle with the GMD is a much tougher one because relations between the workers and the GMD have a long history. As early as ten years ago the GMD was trying to disseminate their ideas and influence among workers and soldiers. Last year, they also instigated the workers to go on strike to support General Chen [Jiongming].⁵¹ Many of the members of this party consider themselves socialist. The GMD CC has a propaganda department that is exclusively in charge of liaison work with the workers, especially with the machine tool workers and the mechanical workers.

Our number one task in organizing workers is to establish the mechanical workers' labor union and the railway workers' club. Now we are taking measures to organize the teachers' union.

On the surface we have ties with the GMD, but we are still trying to organize labor unions independently. Now we have connections with some labor unions like the barbers' union; we are taking effective measures to create influence among the mechanical workers' union. It seems that our initial efforts will succeed.

C. Establish schools for workers.

(i) Schools for labor unions

The plan to establish such schools is: ask each labor union to send two representatives to come to the school two or three times a week. The courses taught at the school include: organizational laws of labor unions, history of the labor movement, the current situation of the labor movement in Europe and America, etc. We think that this school will certainly achieve great results in two or three months and that many unions will be satisfied with our work.

(ii) Evening schools for workers

At the moment only one school is directly governed by our comrades. Although many schools have been established by workers who have ties with us, the work at these schools has not been smooth. The union of mechanical workers has the greatest influence in Canton. This union contains many members who support us. After this school has gained conspicuous results, we will start working on other schools.

D. Propaganda for the peasants.

Comrade Zhu Nuochen, a member of the Marxist group, founded *The New Village* [Xin nongcun] to disseminate our communist thought; we should do our best to help it and enable it to have great influence and expand its propaganda.

E. Ties with soldiers.

We purposefully put this point at the end because there are no soldiers in Canton. The soldiers in the army are either rotten eggs or bandits. They are dangerous; we must be very cautious with them. Many officers have our respect. We should win them over to our side before too long.

A.7 Circular of the CCP Central Bureau—Concerning Building and Developing the Party, the Youth League, Labor Unions, and Propaganda Work (November 1921)⁵²

Colleagues, please take note:

The following is the circular of the Central Bureau to each district:

1) According to the financial situation of each group, it has been decided that at a minimum the following four things must be done.

A) The five districts of Shanghai, Beijing, Canton, Wuhan, and Changsha must each recruit twenty comrades to form district executive committees, preferably this year and before the Congress next July at the latest. Thus, at the next Congress, the

CEC can be formally established in accordance with the party Program.⁵³

B) The membership of the country's SYL must exceed 2,000 before July of next year.

C) Each district must have more than one labor union under its direct control and establish solid relations with other labor unions. At next year's Congress, representatives from each district must give summarized reports about the labor situation in their respective districts.

D) The Central Bureau's Propaganda Department must publish more than twenty books (concerning true Communists) before July of next year.

2) On the labor movement, it was decided to use our entire strength to organize a national union of railway workers. Our comrades in Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, Changsha, Jinan, Nanjing, Tianjin, Zhengzhou, Hangzhou, and Changxindian should work hard on this project.

3) All districts must pay attention to the youth and women's movements. In the next few days, we shall be forwarding to you the reformulated manifestos and constitutions of the Youth League and the "Women's Federation." You should immediately start working on these movements in accordance with these new constitutions.

Secretary of the Central Bureau
T.S. Chen [Chen Duxiu]

A.8 Report of Comrade H. Maring to the Executive (11 July 1922)⁵⁴

From 10 December to the End of April 1922. Contacts with the GMD

On 10 December, with Comrade Zhang Taili as interpreter I undertook a trip inland through Hunan to visit Sun Yat-sen. At the time, Sun had concentrated his troops in Guilin (Guangxi Province). As a guest of Sun Yat-sen I spent nine days there and then continued on to Canton, where I was in daily communication with GMD leaders during the sailors' strike.⁵⁵ I spent ten days in Canton and then left overland for Shantou [Swatow]. In my opinion, this trip to the south was the most important part of my stay in China. In Shanghai, I had become very pessimistic about the movement in China and its possibilities. In the south, I became convinced that fruitful work was possible. In a few provincial cities I saw how interested the young people are in socialist questions. I attended young people's meetings in Changsha, Guilin, Canton, and Haifeng, where there are student clubs concerned with anarchist and socialist theories. Of these youth organizations, one can say, in general, that they have contributed little in practical terms to the development of the

labor movement. Only in Changsha did our youth organization hold a demonstration against the Washington [Conference] and found an association of local textile workers, who went on strike at the end of December 1921. The two leaders of the youth organization were arrested and murdered by the governor.⁵⁶ Especially in the interior it is difficult for the young people to engage in practical work because conditions are still totally medieval. There is no transportation; I was in villages where neither European nor Japanese goods could be found, everything was still produced by the village itself. In such areas, one can do very little with local artisans for our purposes.

Now I would like to talk about the character of the GMD. In discussions with various leaders it became clear that there are four kinds of members in the GMD.

1) The leading *Intelligentsia*, mostly men who participated in the 1911 Revolution. A number of them became acquainted with socialism in Japan or France and call themselves Socialists. Sun Yat-sen is one of these, and he told me personally that he considers himself a Bolshevik. A group of three of Sun Yat-sen's aides published a monthly Marxist journal in Canton for some time. This was interrupted only when the expedition against the north was being organized. Also among the officers with whom I had contact, there was a great interest in the Russian revolution and the Red Army.

2) The *Immigrants*. These are the capitalist elements of the GMD. These Chinese have always financed the workers' party⁵⁷ and expect it to reunify China, to establish law and order, to eradicate the divisive influence of the constantly fighting *dujuns*,⁵⁸ and to defend China's independence from foreign domination. This Chinese bourgeoisie is situated in the colonies and has only very recently begun to set up capitalist firms in China. It has no clear political goal. The leadership of the GMD can never really express the needs of this group.

3) The *Soldiers* of the Southern Army. These déclassé elements, who live under very unfavorable conditions, have joined the party in some numbers, although some of the generals are against the political organization of soldiers. The younger officers who belong to the GMD conduct propaganda among the soldiers. Sun Yat-sen himself, after his arrival in Guilin, discussed the goals of the GMD organization in several meetings, and he specifically referred to the example of the Red Army.

4) The *Workers*. Especially in Guangdong Province and among the immigrants, Sun Yat-sen has long had contacts with workers. Leaders of his party supported the trade union organization in Canton and during the strikes always took the side of the workers. During the great sailors' strike in January of this year, it became clear to me how close the ties between the workers and the GMD are. The entire strike was led by leaders of this political organization.⁵⁹ The striking workers participated in the nationalist demonstrations of the party, and all the financial support came from the GMD. The communist group in Canton had no links whatsoever with the striking sailors and did not support the strike because the local party thought it could only work illegally. The ties between the GMD and strikers were so close that about 12,000 sailors in Canton, Hong Kong, and Shantou joined that political party.

The program of the party makes it possible for these very different groups to join the party. Its character is nationalist. It has three principles: it opposes foreign domination; it is for democracy; and it is for a worthy life for all citizens. This last demand is interpreted in a socialist sense by Sun Yat-sen. In 1920, Sun Yat-sen published a book on China's economic development.⁶⁰ This book contains his plans for a state capitalist economy; he states in the preface that this state capitalist economy must lead to a socialist form of production. Sun Yat-sen wants to develop China through the use of foreign loans, but he wants to exclude all foreign intervention in Chinese affairs. After the GMD had been defeated in the first revolution by Yuan Shikai, many members went over to the enemy camp.⁶¹ As a consequence, discipline was taken up in the program of the GMD as a fourth point. That is to say, unconditional obedience to the chair was demanded. On joining the party, members must swear an oath to this effect. This fourth principle is a hindrance to the growth of the party among young intellectuals. Sun Yat-sen complained to me about the younger intellectuals, who are interested in socialism, form small groups and sects, and are worthless as far as China's political life is concerned. Other party leaders told me that since the [1911] defeat of the Manchus the appeal of the party has decreased greatly because the nationalist principles of the party are not emphasized as strongly as before. The formulation of the program makes it possible for socialists to become members, and representatives of various socialist tendencies can be found among the members. Since Sun Yat-sen began to organize the expedition against the northern government, the party's situation has become abnormal. Congresses are not held. Sun Yat-sen has personal dictatorial powers, just as in the Southern [Canton] Government, whose president he was.⁶² The former Parliament of the Chinese Republic, which had been convened in Canton, gave Sun Yat-sen these powers. The expedition is his idea but he has been opposed from the beginning by General Chen Jiongming, the party secretary. This leader thought that the GMD should limit its activities to Guangdong Province at the present time. He opposed Sun Yat-sen's election as president of the Southern Government because he favors decentralization, not centralization. Because he wanted a federation of autonomous provinces, he was sympathetic to the policy of Wu Peifu. Guangdong Province had to bear nearly all the costs of the expedition. Chen Jiongming did not want to have any responsibility for the expedition. Although he was asked three times to assume the post of commander-in-chief of the expedition, he remained in Canton and refused to have anything to do with it. His troops, the best in the Southern Army, also remained in Guangdong. In January and February, a complete break between the two leaders of the GMD was avoided. I had three long discussions with Sun Yat-sen about the possibility of recognition of and an alliance with Russia. He felt that the Washington Conference had created an even more unfavorable situation for China, but he thought that an alliance with Russia would be a practical impossibility until the expedition against the north had been successful. He declared that after the expedition he would immediately propose an open alliance

with Russia. It was his opinion that Russia and China together could bring about the liberation of Asia. An untimely alliance with Russia would cause an immediate intervention by the Great Powers. He expressed the opinion that he thought it possible to settle Chinese affairs without intervention of the great powers if there were no links with Russia. I pointed out that his nationalist party propaganda must also lead to intervention, and that he dare not neglect this propaganda, because his entire position would be dependent on the support of a few generals who, at best, could lead him no further than another Nanjing compromise. Several times generals who linked up with him, left him again, and the example of Chen Jiongming shows that Sun Yat-sen's interpretation does not lead anywhere. In January, he would go no further than establishing unofficial links with Russia, and he declared himself prepared to send some of his best comrades to Russia.

In Canton, I met a few members of the Southern Government who all had a positive attitude toward the Russian Revolution. In particular, the president of the first Chinese Parliament, Zhang Ji, spoke in favor of a party dictatorship in China and hoped to be able to support the movement in the south by organizing revolutionary Chinese in the north, either in Mongolia or in Siberia. Only Chen Jiongming, with whom I spoke three times, wanted to know nothing of a party dictatorship. He also called himself a Socialist; while general of a revolutionary army in Fujian Province, he was completely on the side of the Russian Revolution. Developments in Russia had pushed him to the right. He defended the view that in Guangdong Province, which has a population of 30 million, it would be possible to institute state capitalism. Private capitalism could be pushed back, and politically a democratic form of government, with a high level of local autonomy, could be set up. In his view, centralization of all of China would be impossible and the GMD's program was insufficient. It was necessary to build a new socialist party. He financially supported a daily newspaper with a communist editorship, just as he had always helped striking workers. He wanted to send a representative to Russia and declared that he would have nothing against the *founding of a Comintern office in Canton*. Also, he hoped to reorganize the army with Russian military advisers. Although his attitude toward Sun Yat-sen was very negative, it was not clear at this time that an open break was imminent. Now, after his aide was murdered and he was dismissed as governor of Guangdong, this break has come about. He withdrew into the province with his army to await what measures Sun Yat-sen, who had returned to Canton, would undertake. He then turned against Sun Yat-sen, with the result that the latter was driven out,⁶³ the Southern Government was dissolved, and Chen Jiongming declared himself to be in agreement with the reorganization plans of Wu Peifu. At the time when I was with Chen Jiongming, he knew that Sun Yat-sen was concluding a military alliance with the Manchurian warlord, Zhang Zuolin. This tactic was defended with the claim that only in this way could Wu Peifu be defeated.

To date, the governor of Guangdong has possessed dictatorial powers in the

province. No reforms of a socialist nature have been carried out. In Canton, no measures have been taken that indicate a socialist policy is being followed. A few workers' representatives have been given jobs in the city administration, but their number is so small that they cannot exert any influence. The organization of trade unions, under Chinese conditions, has made great progress. The construction workers have a large modern trade union with branches in the province, and it has conducted a few successful local strikes for higher wages. This organization is under the influence of a few comrades. It seeks links with local federations in other Chinese cities and wants to set up a national union. More important than this organization is the Seamen's Union, which has around 12,000 members and which won the big strike in January against the steamship companies and the British government in Hong Kong, with the help of the GMD. Among the metal workers only old forms of labor organization exist, but people are now busy trying to form a modern union. I believe that I am not exaggerating when I estimate the number of unionized workers in Canton to be around 50,000. To date, one can find no Profintern literature. To me it seems possible to bring the organized workers in Canton *into contact with the Profintern*. There is a mutual-aid association of workers under the leadership of a Chinese comrade who came back from America and who is conducting communist propaganda. On 15 January, this organization held a demonstration with the youth group in commemoration of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Some 2,000 workers participated in this demonstration. Noticeably, the communist group stood *outside* of this propaganda.

The province has founded a school to train propagandists for the GMD. It gives evening classes to the workers in Canton. The curriculum provides for instruction in socialist theories.

After my trip through southern China, I visited the Russian legation in Beijing to report and to propose Russian representation in the south. The consul [A. Paikes] sent my preliminary report for Narkomindel and the Comintern to Russia. Because I could not take the overland route via Siberia, I left Shanghai on 24 April after some discussions with leaders of the communist organization and with members of the GMD CC there. I suggested to our comrades that they give up their exclusive attitude toward the GMD and that they begin to develop activities *within* the GMD, through which one can gain access much more easily to the workers and soldiers in the south. The small group does not have to give up its independence; on the contrary, the comrades must together decide which tactics they should follow within the GMD. The leaders of the GMD have told me that they will permit communist propaganda within their party. Our comrades were against the idea. The prospects for propaganda by the small groups, as long as they are not linked to the GMD, are dim. Only among the young is it more favorable. In Shanghai, a Russian comrade, a representative of the Youth International [S.A. Dalin] has arrived. Together with our Comrade Zhang Tailei, he arranged a youth congress in Canton; it took place in May. Especially in the south, youth organizations are well developed. If these local federations can be brought together it is possible to create an important youth

organization. I advised our party leadership to move its seat to Canton and to work openly there. On the return trip, I spoke with the Dutch comrades about the possibility of sending some Communists to Java to overcome the bad consequences of the government's policy.

With communist greetings
H. Maring
Moscow, 11 July 1922

To the ECCI.

Having returned from China as representative of the Comintern in the Far East, I hereby propose the following:

1) The establishment of a representation for the Comintern and Profintern⁶⁴ in Canton in the form of an office to undertake the distribution of communist literature in China, Japan, and Korea; to translate communist literature into the languages of these three countries; to print one of our English-language weeklies; to regulate and support relations between the nationalist and communist movements in China and Korea; and to report regularly to the Comintern and Profintern about such activities as well as on the situation in the various countries. At the same time, this office can serve as a center for the work among *youths* and *women*.

2) *Organization* of the office. The staff of the office should be limited to the smallest number possible. I firmly believe that a joint representative of the Comintern and the Profintern and a representative of the parties of each of the three countries will be enough. At the same time, the latter can take care of the translations into the national languages. For the time being, I do not see the necessity for our own printing shop since a printing shop to take over this work can be found very easily in Canton.

3) *Budget*. My estimation for the expenses of the office are 500 pounds sterling per month. Included in this are the costs of the English newspapers as well as all the current expenses. The budget must be guaranteed for one year.

[[Points 4 and 5 concern proposals for the improvement of work in the Dutch East Indies.]]

H. Maring.
Moscow, 11 July 1922

Explanatory Memorandum

1) *Concerning the Office in Canton*. Canton is the only city in the Far East where such a permanent representation is possible without being bothered by the authorities. Links via Hong Kong with the three countries are very favorable, and, with the help of Chinese sailors, the distribution of literature published there would not be difficult. The permanent presence of a representative of the Comintern and Profintern is made necessary by the situation of the young Chinese movement, especially in the south, the expansion of the labor movement, the problems in the Korean movement, and the important situation of the Japanese labor movement.

Optimally, there should be a *representative of the Comintern present* at the forthcoming conference of the Koreans to cooperate in the preparatory work there.

[[Point 2 concerns sending European Communists to Java to strengthen work in the colony.]]

H. Maring

A.9 Letter from Chen Duxiu to G. Voitinsky (6 April 1922)⁶⁵

Mr. Voitinsky,

This special missive concerns: the proposal of Mr. Maring that all the members of the CCP and the SYL should join the GMD. The following reasons are given for opposing this:

1) The revolutionary aims of the CP and the GMD and their basic policies are not the same.

2) The GMD policy of cooperation with America, Zhang Zuolin, Duan Qirui, and others is totally incompatible with communism.

3) The GMD has not published a party program. Other than in Guangdong, the people of each province regard it as a political party scrambling for power and profit. If the CP enters this party, the faith of members of society will be completely lost (particularly among the young), there will never be an opportunity for development.

4) Chen Jiongming of the Guangdong Shili [Zhili] clique, known as the GMD, in reality intensely opposes the Sun Yat-sen clique. If we join the GMD, we shall immediately meet with the hostility of the Chen clique and we will be unable to carry out activities in Guangdong.

5) The Sun Yat-sen clique of the GMD never tolerates the ideas of new members and uses lies as power.

6) The comrades from Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, Changsha, and Wuhan have already met to consider the issue of joining the GMD and, unanimously, passed a resolution expressing total disapproval. In reality, this makes entry an impossibility.

Should the Third International discuss this matter, please, sir, take the responsibility of conveying Chen's six points.

A.10 Statement of the CCP on the Current Situation (15 June 1922)⁶⁶

[[**Section One:** Before the 1911 Revolution, China suffered from “feudal economic conditions” and increasing foreign encroachment. **Section Two:** The 1911 Revolu-

tion failed to change the feudal system into a democratic political regime. The GMD took a conciliatory approach to Yuan Shikai in 1912 and to Duan Qirui in 1916. The CCP calls on the GMD to avoid a third defeat through conciliation by taking "the path of revolutionary struggle." Continued civil war in China only helps the imperialists and hinders the development of indigenous industry.]]

Three

[[The struggles between the GMD and its opponents such as Yuan Shikai and Duan Qirui demonstrate the following.]]

The struggle to achieve democracy is a struggle of one class to overthrow another; it is the replacement of one system by another. It cannot be seen as a struggle of one individual or one group for the overthrow of another individual or group.

Four

A genuine democratic party must show the people two things: (1) its party program and policies must be correlated with the concepts of democracy; and (2) from beginning to end, its actions must support democracy in the struggle against the warlords. Taking this into account, of all the political parties in China, only the GMD can be characterized as a relatively revolutionary democratic party, a relatively genuine democratic party. The party's program has not yet been fully elaborated. However, its public expression of the Three Principles of the People and its plans to develop the economy have a democratic character. In addition to its participation in the revolutionary movement, other actions of the GMD attest to its democratic spirit, such as the actions of its parliamentary representatives in 1911, 1913, and 1917 during the struggles in the parliament and against the opposition parties; the Canton government's [headed by Sun Yat-sen, 1921-22] not restricting the labor movement; its abolishing police regulations concerning "public order and national security"; and its abolishing the law by which workers were deprived of the right to strike. Often, however, this party's actions have been contradictory in nature. On occasion the GMD manifests a friendly attitude toward groups with imperialist tendencies, and on two occasions has worked hand-in-hand with the Beiyang militarists.⁶⁷ If the GMD wants to maintain its place in the democratic revolution, it must change this kind of vacillating policy.

[[**Section Five:** Revitalizing the presidency and restoring the legal power of parliament will not solve the current problems. The warlords continued to dominate and Li Yuanhong proved inadequate when he was last president in 1916-17. **Section Six:** A federation of autonomous provinces provides no solution. **Section Seven:** Those who hold the view that Wu Peifu is a supporter of democracy and is different from the nation's other warlords and thus has the strength to resolve the current problems are mistaken. He must be supported against the northeast warlord, Zhang Zuolin, but Wu is no democrat. Although he opposes the pro-Japanese

groupings in Beijing, he is also supported by foreigners. His use of troops against the south was antidemocratic, while his attempts to consolidate the north use feudal means. **Section Eight:** As long as the warlords remain they will fight against the democratic forces and among themselves. Thus, the warlords are the cause of civil war in China. The warlords prevent the creation of a so-called good government, as a military government can only be a “bad government.”]]

Nine

Advocates of good government! Just after uttering your cries of “Endeavor,” “Struggle,” and “Wage War on the Evil Forces,” Xu Shichang was exiled,⁶⁸ and you immediately opposed the Northern Expedition. In line with all revolutionary lessons, your compromising, petty bourgeois pacificism is an obstacle to realizing your slogans of “Endeavor,” “Struggle,” and “Wage War on the Evil Forces.” Can you realize your aim of a so-called good government while under the power of the warlords? Given the current atmosphere in Beijing, Tianjin, Baoding [Wu Peifu’s headquarters], do you think you can carry out your three principles and the six concrete aims of your program? After the fall of the Qing dynasty [1911], the Unification Party of Zhang Binglin et al. stridently advocated compromise with Yuan Shikai and opposition to continued war. After Yuan Shikai died, the Progressive Party of Liang Qichao et al. stridently advocated compromise with Duan Qirui and opposition to continued war. The results created reactionary turmoil. You with your petty bourgeois pacificism are heading down the same path!

GMD members! Originally, you were revolutionary fighters for the triumph of democracy. It would be better to fight and lose than make a compromise with the warlords and still perish. During the first year of the Chinese Republic [1912], Yuan Shikai made a pledge to support the Republic, and you compromised with Yuan Shikai. In 1916, when Duan Qirui proposed a restoration of parliament, you again compromised. Now you cannot once more compromise with the northern warlords when they propose to restore parliament and the constitution, to abolish the *dujun* system, and to demobilize the troops. Does the present constitutional parliament differ in any way from the parliament of the fifth and the sixth years of the Republic [1916–17]? Are not the hopes for abolishing the *dujun* system and for demobilization merely hopes that the tiger will shed its own skin? Would the change of title from *dujun* to commander-in-chief, as in Yunnan, Sichuan, and Hunan Provinces, make any difference?

Is there any hope whatever for a troop demobilization at a time when war between the militarists is at its height, when they are pitted against one another, and they are thus increasing their troop numbers? Previously [General] Xu Shuzheng said, “I am an advocate of disarmament, but wait until my soldiers are adequately trained and equipped, so that I may disarm the soldiers of my adversaries.” [General] Zhang Shaozeng said: “There are many problems in such provinces as Zhili, Jiangxi, and Henan, and each province needs to be brought under control. If Gener-

als Cao [Kun] and Wu [Peifu] should actually put the demobilization scheme into effect, can you imagine what would become of the provinces?" In reality, they cannot take the trouble to demobilize the troops and abolish the *dujun* system. This can be seen from the candid words spoken by these two Beiyang representatives. You must complete the historical task of the democratic revolution; do not act like these people; understand their empty words for the lies they are!

Workers, peasants, students, soldiers, police, and merchants! So long as the warlords are not overthrown, there will be no hope of disarming the provincial armies and abolishing the *dujun* system. So long as the warlords are not overthrown, there will be no hope of reducing the demands for funds to cover military expenses, and this will disrupt further the entire national and local financial system. So long as the warlords are not overthrown, they will be able to secure new loans from the foreigners, bringing about an increase in foreign influence in China. So long as the warlords are not overthrown, the exorbitant levies and taxes will continue, the disorder and chaos will continue, and there will be no hope of restoring order in the regions. So long as the warlords are not overthrown, industry cannot develop, and how can education be maintained and promoted? So long as the warlords are not overthrown, there is no hope that their struggles to expand their spheres of influence will cease. Peasants, workers, and merchants are always the victims of these conflicts. Innocent soldiers and police fall before their bullets. Their war is without end. We must stop this endless sacrifice.

Only by joining the democratic struggle can warlordism be smashed and a genuine peace and prosperity be attained. There is no other way; certainly one cannot adopt the methods of compromise to attain a false peace. Some petty bourgeois figures and politicians use their tendency toward compromise to attain a false peace to oppose the democratic struggle, but we must not listen to them. Naturally, we all want peace, but real rather than false peace. We welcome a war to achieve democracy, to destroy the warlords and to liberate the people. We would sing the praises of this kind of war.

Ten

The CCP is the vanguard army of the proletariat, struggling for the proletariat and acting as its revolutionary party. Until the Chinese proletariat is able to seize power in its own hands, and considering the present political and economic conditions of China's development and all the historical processes now occurring in China, the proletariat's urgent task is to unite with the democratic parties to oppose the feudal warlords and in so doing create a democratic government.

The concrete aims of the present political struggle cannot be limited to a fight for the publication of data on public finances or for surveillance over elections, etc. Our immediate aims are as follows:

1) Reform of the tariff system; abolition of extraterritoriality and the special privileges of the great powers in China, estimation of railway subsidies made to

China by foreign capital, and immediate transfer of all railways to state management.

2) Elimination of the warlords, confiscation of the property of warlords and bureaucrats, and distribution of their landholdings to the poorest peasants.

3) Adoption of the system of universal suffrage.

4) Guarantee of the people's freedom of association, assembly, speech, and publication; annulment of the police regulations concerning safeguarding public order and the criminal law on the suppression of strikes.

5) Legislation to protect child and female labor and laws governing safety in factories and workers' insurance.

6) Law to restrict taxation on land.

7) Implementation of compulsory education.

8) Abolition of the *lijin* system⁶⁹ and of other surtaxes.

9) Revision of the legal code with the abolition of the death penalty and of physical torture.

10) Introduction of a progressive tax system.

11) Establishment of a system of equal rights of men and women before the law.

Under the rule of the feudal warlords, none of this minimum program can be carried out by the methods of compromise or by petition. The CCP's method is to invite the GMD, other democratic parties, and all revolutionary socialist groupings to participate in a joint conference and, on the basis of the above principles, establish a democratic united front to continue the fight against the warlords. Since this united fight is one to liberate the Chinese people from the double oppression of the great powers and the warlords, it is an inevitable war that is necessary for China at the present time.

A.11 Resolution on the "Democratic United Front" (July 1922)⁷⁰

The economic and political evolution of humankind constitutes, of course, class struggle. Because of major economic and political changes, it is inevitable that the bourgeoisie will fight against feudalism during the transition from feudalism to democracy. During the period of transition from democracy to communism, because of major economic and political changes, the proletariat must fight against the bourgeoisie.

The current history of humankind is a record of struggle. The great war waged by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie has not yet been victorious, while that between democracy and feudalism is still raging. Especially in the Eastern nations with their young industry, the power of feudalism persists in social traditions as well as in national sovereignty. In those nations where feudalism is powerful, the lives

and property of the people are firmly grasped in military hands; law and public opinion do not have any effect. Democratic elements must overthrow feudalism to secure the people's welfare. If the proletariat alone cannot bring about the revolution against feudalism, it must be helped by the democratic elements. Because the feudal militarists are the common enemy of the proletarians and democratic elements, the two groups must unite in common attack. Only in this way can they achieve freedom of the press, meeting, and assembly. No class can find the opportunity for development if it cannot secure these liberties. After the democrats achieve success, naturally, desiring privileges, they too will oppress the proletariat by using the political power seized from the feudal rulers. At that time, the power of the proletariat will depend on its ability to organize and fight as manifested in the period of the democratic struggle.

China is a republic in name, but in fact it is controlled by feudal warlords. Externally, it is a semi-independent nation controlled by international imperialistic powers. Under such economic and political conditions, with the twin internal and external pressures, it is imperative that the proletariat gain freedom and join the democratic revolutionary movement. There is no other way. We must realize that joining the democratic revolutionary movement does not mean that the proletariat surrenders to the democratic elements who represent only the bourgeoisie. Neither will victory by the democratic elements signal the complete liberation of the proletariat. Yet it is a fact that there must be a temporary alliance with the democratic elements to overthrow the exploitation by our common enemies—the feudal warlords internally and the international imperialists externally. Since the democratic elements do not constitute a political party that represents the proletariat or struggles on its behalf, under no circumstances should it [the proletariat] become dependent on them or merge with them even though it should unite with and assist these elements. It must assemble in the political party of the proletariat—under the CP's banner—and independently construct its own class movement.

The CP is not a party of utopians or revolutionary candidates but is a party that at all times stands for indefatigable work, striving hard for the benefit of the proletariat. In China's economic and political conditions, we recognize that a democratic revolution will benefit not only the bourgeoisie but also the proletariat. Thus, our CP should unite with all the nation's revolutionary parties⁷¹ and organize a democratic united front to bring about the overthrow of the feudal militarists and imperialist oppression and establish a real democratic, independent nation. We must call on all workers and peasants to join the struggle under our party's banner. We should tell them that this struggle, although it will not completely release the workers and peasants from their miseries, is the first step in helping them on the way to establishing their rights. At the same time, we should tell them again that the proletariat does not join this kind of struggle for the benefit of the democratic elements. The sacrifice is not for them but to gain a freedom that remains temporary. The proletariat must not forget its own independent organization during the struggle.

The Second Congress of the CCP approves the democratic united front as pro-

posed by the CEC because it meets the needs of the present conditions. From now on it should be expanded; regulations should implement the following plan:

A) The GMD and the SYL are asked to call a representative conference in a suitable place to discuss the best method of summoning other revolutionary parties and what should be done.

B) Members of parliament who support communism are to contact members who are truly democratic to form a democratic left-wing alliance.

C) Labor unions; peasant, merchant, teacher, and student associations; women's political alliances; lawyers' clubs; and editors' clubs in various cities are to organize a "democratic great alliance."

A.12 Manifesto of the Second Party Congress (July 1922)⁷²

[[**Section One:** International imperialism has wreaked havoc in China.]]

Two: China's Political and Economic Situation and the Oppression of the Toiling Masses

[[A new feature in China's political situation is that since the convocation of the Washington Conference, the imperialist powers have been conniving together in their division of China. British and American support for Wu Peifu in his conflict with Zhang Zuolin is evident. Further, it is clear that the imperialists want to destroy China's old economic system and replace it with capitalism.]]

China's infant bourgeoisie already can unite the nation's strength to oppose the foreign imperialists and the traitorous Beijing government. This was seen in the 1919 anti-Japanese movement [May Fourth Movement]. The Guangdong government organized by the GMD represents the enlightened bourgeois democratic movement. Although the Guangdong government has been turned over, the petty bourgeois democratic movement in China cannot be destroyed. In addition, there is China's intellectual class and the merchant and industrial bourgeoisie who want to avoid the deceit of the Americans. If they do this, their democratic movement can advance along the right track.

The 300 million peasants in China are the most important factor in the revolutionary movement. Because of the scarcity of land, density of population, rampant natural disasters, wars, and harassment by bandits, the extra levies imposed and exploitation by warlords, oppression by foreign commodities and rising living costs, the peasants have become increasingly poor and miserable. At present, three kinds of peasants can be distinguished: (1) wealthy rural landlords, (2) independent small peasant self-cultivators, and (3) tenant peasants and hired hands. The first kind is the minority; poor peasants of the second and the third kinds account for at least 95 percent [of the total rural population]. The poor peasants must rise in revolt if they

want to rid themselves of poverty and their miserable plight. Then, most of the poor peasants will be able to join forces with the workers in the revolution, thus guaranteeing the success of the Chinese revolution.

Since foreign goods flooded the Chinese market, the artisans, small shopkeepers, and employers have also become increasingly poor, even bankrupt. In addition, the development of capitalism in China has also speeded up the rate of proletarianization of the artisans. This enormous mass will, of course, bitterly hate the system of world capitalism that has brought them such miseries. They will then join the ranks of the revolutionaries.

The Chinese labor movement has already evolved out of this infancy period. The strikes that were staged for meeting economic demands by the sailors in Hong Kong and other workers are sufficient proof of the enormous strength of the workers and the rapid expansion of workers' organizations recently. Moreover, the workers suffer extreme oppression from Chinese and foreign capitalists; their revolutionary movement will advance continuously. The development of this revolutionary movement will produce the leading army of revolutionaries who will overthrow world capitalism in China.

Three

Many things show that those who have imposed the greatest miseries on the Chinese people (including the bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants) are the capitalist imperialists and the feudal forces of the warlords and bureaucrats. Thus, the democratic revolutionary movement to oppose these two forces is of great significance, because when the democratic revolution succeeds, we can gain independence and greater freedom. Therefore, we the proletariat must examine the political and economic situation of China today. We the proletariat and the poor peasants must support the democratic revolutionary movement. Moreover, we the proletariat believe that in the course of the current struggles, only the joint efforts of the revolutionary forces of the proletariat and the democratic revolutionary forces will enable the real democratic revolution to achieve extraordinary success.

3. The Tasks of the CCP and Its Current Struggle

1. The proletariat's offer to help the democratic revolution does not mean that the proletariat will conquer the bourgeoisie. Rather, this is a necessary step to shorten the life of the feudal system and to nurture the proletariat's real strength.

We the proletariat have our own class interests. When the democratic revolution succeeds, the proletariat will simply gain some liberties and rights, but will not achieve complete liberation. Moreover, the success of the democratic movement will only help the rapid development of the nascent bourgeoisie, who will come into opposition to the proletariat. Therefore, the proletariat must deal with the bourgeoisie immediately, establishing "a proletarian dictatorship in alliance with the poor

peasants.” If the organizational and fighting strength of the proletariat increases, this second struggle will succeed immediately after the victory of the democratic revolution.

2. The CCP is China’s proletarian political party. Its goal is to organize the proletariat, use the means of class struggle, establish the politics of the workers and peasants’ dictatorship, eradicate the system of private property, and advance gradually to a communist society.

In order to advance the current interests of the workers and peasants, the CCP is guiding the workers to help the democratic revolutionary movement, so that the workers and peasants can establish a democratic united front with the petty bourgeoisie. In the interests of the workers and poor peasants, the goals of struggle for the CCP in this united front are:

- 1) Eradicate internal chaos, overthrow the warlords, and build domestic peace.
- 2) Overthrow oppression by the international imperialists and win the complete independence of the Chinese nation.
- 3) Unify China proper (including the three provinces in the northeast)⁷³ and establish a real democratic republic.
- 4) Establish autonomous rule in Mongolia, Tibet, and Muslim Xinjiang to turn them into democratic autonomous republics.
- 5) Use the free federal system to unify China proper, Mongolia, Tibet, and Muslim Xinjiang in order to establish a Chinese Federal Republic.
- 6) Workers and peasants, irrespective of sex, should have unlimited voting rights in parliaments at all levels and city councils. They should have absolute freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, and strike.
- 7) Establishment of laws concerning workers, peasants, and women.
 - i) Improve workers’ benefits: (a) abolish the contract system, (b) adopt the eight-hour working day, (c) provide factory insurance, (d) protect women and child labor, (e) protect unemployed workers.
 - ii) Abolish the individual capitation tax, the river transportation tax, and other major taxes; regulate property tax provisions throughout the country—in both cities and villages.
 - iii) Abolish cash commissions and all other extra taxes; establish progressive income taxes.
 - iv) Make laws to limit the land lease rates.
 - v) Abolish all laws that restrict women. Women should enjoy equally all political, economic, social, and education rights.
 - vi) Improve the educational system and popularize education.

The seven proposals above will benefit the interests of workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie and are the necessary conditions for liberating them from the current oppression. We must join in the common struggle to liberate ourselves! Workers and peasants must rally to the CCP’s flag and unite with the petty bourgeoisie in joining this struggle!

However, the workers should not become the appendage of the petty bourgeoisie

in this democratic united front; they must simultaneously fight for the interests of their own class. Therefore, it is very important to have organizations of workers both in the party and in the labor unions, so that the workers are frequently reminded that they constitute an independent class and that they may train their organizational and fighting capacities, prepare to unite the poor peasants to form soviets, and attain the goal of complete emancipation.

The CCP is a branch of the Comintern. Now it cries aloud to the Chinese workers and poor peasants: Rally to the flag of the CP and join our struggle quickly! It also cries aloud to all the oppressed people in China: Come and join the workers and peasants who have rallied to the flag of the CCP and take part in their struggle! It also cries aloud: Come and join our revolutionary friends in the world and advance shoulder to shoulder! "The union of the proletariat and the oppressed people all over the world" is the only means to liberate the whole world! March! March together!

Down with warlords!

Down with international imperialists!

Fight for peace!

Fight for freedom!

Fight for independence!

Long live peace, freedom, and independence!

Long live the liberation of all the oppressed masses!

Long live the CCP!

Long live the Comintern!

A.13 Resolution on Parliamentary Actions (July 1922)⁷⁴

1) In economically advanced nations, the smooth development of large-scale capitalist production over several decades has led to the consolidation of parliamentary politics, which provides a screen for the former. Against this background, parliamentary activities by political parties gradually became opportunist and reformist. That is to say, they became the parliamentary action of the Second International. The social democratic parties and the socialist parties of Germany, Austria, France, and Belgium simply focused all their energy on these legal, tongue-wagging, reformist activities and totally ignored proletarian revolutionary propaganda movements and all other necessary illegal work.

2) The Third International came into being in the midst of the bloody bankruptcy of opportunist reformism. That is to say, it came into being during the imperialist world war [1914-18]. The reevaluation of proletarian participation in "institutions of popular will" under bourgeois dictatorship is important in a number

of respects. It wipes the reformist makeup off the face of Marxism and elucidates the revolutionary nature of proletarian parliamentary action. It specifies the steps to be taken by the proletariat in its participation, abandonment, and withdrawal from the bourgeois parliament and in its total destruction of the bourgeois institution of the state. Finally it subjugates totally such legal action to illegal revolutionary action, thereby making revolutionary parliamentary activities an important method of instigating, or supporting, major revolutionary uprisings.

3) An economically backward China has become, on the one hand, a looting ground and a colony for imperialism and, on the other hand, an object of butchery and a land of corruption for armed forces fostered by international imperialism. Therefore, the democratic revolution has not yet succeeded and parliamentary politics has not yet been established. Although parliamentary forms have been established at various levels, they are constantly terrorized because of sabotage and threats of interference and havoc wreaked by the armed forces.

4) The CCP is the vanguard army representing the interests of the proletariat and the poor peasants of China. Therefore, it should enter the parliament that is often threatened and sabotaged by feudal armed forces. It should raise its voice against the recurrent evils of the military politics fostered by international imperialism and bring the democratic revolution to a high tide so as to achieve the goal of social revolution.

5) To conduct revolutionary parliamentary action, and in accordance with the principles passed by the Second Congress of the Third International, the CCP lays down the following rules:

a) Candidates for the national parliament will be named by the CEC; candidates for parliaments of provinces, municipalities, and counties will be named by regional and local executive committees and approved by the CEC. If the CEC considers all, or some, of those nominated to be unfit for their duties, it will order the regional or local executive committee to nominate others.

b) Qualifications of candidates will definitely not be limited to so-called learning or experience. One should feel free to nominate laborers in our party who are the bravest and the most imbued with revolutionary spirit.

c) Members of our party in the national parliament are under the absolute supervision and command of the CEC. Members in provincial, municipal, and county-level parliaments are under the absolute supervision and command of the CEC commissioner and of the regional and local executive committees. All major political issues will follow the guidelines issued by the CEC; members of our party in parliament, either as individuals or as a group (the parliamentary group of the CP), enjoy absolutely no autonomy. Drafts of speeches to be made by members to the national parliament shall be submitted in advance to the CEC for approval. Drafts of speeches to be made by members to provincial, municipal, and county-level parliaments shall be submitted in advance to the CEC commissioner and to the regional and local executive committees for approval.

d) Members of our party in parliament should take advantage of their inviolabil-

ity to participate in all mass movements and illegal organizations outside of parliament. Whenever demonstrations break out, members of our party in parliament should take the lead and should be at the forefront of the masses.

e) Members of our party in parliament must maintain constant, direct contact with the masses; make several visits a year to the district that elected them; call various voters' meetings; speak on political, economic, and international issues; and investigate new demands of the masses. Their speeches in parliament should be written in a language that can be understood by the masses and that arouses them. Regularly, they should be collected, printed in pamphlet form, and distributed in cities and the countryside.

f) When a member of our party refuses the supervision of the CEC or violates the CEC's guidelines, he or she shall be deprived immediately of his or her position as a member of parliament and expelled from the party.

A.14 Resolution on the Constitution of the Organization of the CP (July 1922)⁷⁵

We, the CP, are not a "Marxist society formed by intellectuals"; nor are we a "utopian, revolutionary society formed by a few Communists who place themselves above the masses," [but we] should be the "party organized by the most revolutionary masses among the proletariat, fighting on behalf of the interests of the proletariat and the vanguard of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat." Because we are not intellectuals going around on the lecture circuit or utopian revolutionaries, we need not frequent research societies and libraries. Because we are the party fighting for the proletariat, we must go deep among the masses, forming a large-scale " 'mass' party." Because we are to organize a large-scale masses' party for the revolutionary movement, we must not forget two important rules:

- 1) Every action of the party must take deep root among the broad masses.
- 2) Within the party, there must be organization and training that serve the needs of the revolution.

Without strict, centralized, disciplined organization and training, a revolutionary party only possesses revolutionary ambitions without sufficient strength to launch a revolutionary movement.

Strict, centralized, and disciplined organization and training must observe the following principles:

- 1) From the central organs down to the small groups at the basic levels, there must be a well-organized system to avoid chaos; there must be a spirit of centralization and ironlike discipline to avoid anarchy.
- 2) All members must be trained by the party to conduct themselves in a military-like fashion.

3) All party members should not only be Communists in their words; more importantly, they must show themselves to be Communists by their deeds.

4) All party members must sacrifice their personal emotions, opinions, and interests to preserve party unity.

5) All party members must remember that the day that they do not work for the CP is the day that they undermine communism.

6) At all times and under all circumstances, the words and deeds of all party members must be those of the party. [No one] may use individualistic or local reasons to desert the party. To engage in the communist movement outside the supervision of the party is an individualistic act, not that of the party, and it belongs to anarcho-communism.

7) Every party member must understand that when the CP enforces centralization and training, they are not enforced in terms of the bourgeois concept of law and order; they must be practiced in accordance with the actual needs of the communist revolution.

Therefore the resolution of the Second Party Congress must point out that our CP must be turned into a party, not an academic society; and that it must be made a mass party capable of launching proletarian revolution, not a revolutionary association of a few utopians; and that our organization and training must be strict, centralized, and disciplined; and that our activities must not be separated from the masses.

A.15 Constitution of the CCP (July 1922)⁷⁶

Chapter One: Membership

1) Members of our party are not differentiated on the basis of nationality or sex. Those who acknowledge our party's manifesto and constitution and are willing to serve our party loyally can become members of our party.

2) On joining the party, the prospective member must have one party member recommend him or her to the district [local] executive committee [*difang zhixing weiyuanhui*]. After the application is approved by the district executive committee, the district executive committee reports its decision to the area executive committee [*qu zhixing weiyuanhui*]; the area executive committee then reports to the CEC. After examination and approval by the area executive committee and the CEC, the applicant will become a formal party member. However, a worker can become a formal party member only after the district executive committee approves the application and reports to the area executive committee and the CEC.

3) New members recognized directly by the CEC or those who have already joined foreign communist parties recognized by the Comintern can become members of our party.

Chapter Two: Organization

4) In the countryside, in factories, on railways, in mines, barracks, schools, and other institutions and their surroundings, a cell [*zu*] group may be formed as long as there are between three and five members. Each cell elects one head; the cells are under the command of the local branch [*difang zhibu*]; if there are not yet local branches in the places where there are groups, the area executive committee may order the cells in question to come under the command of nearby branches or directly under the area executive committee; in places where there is no area executive committee, the groups are to come under and be supervised directly by the CEC. When in one institution or in two institutions combined, there are more than two cells, the district executive committee appoints various people to act as cadres for the organ[s] in question. Cells are the basic units of the party's organizational system that train party members and within which party members operate. All party members must join these cells.

5) If a locality has more than two party branches, the area executive committee should, with permission from the CEC, send personnel there to convene either a full members' or a delegates' congress. This congress should elect three people to form the district executive committee; it should also elect three alternate committee members—when committee members have to leave their posts for any reason, they are to be replaced temporarily by alternate members. In localities without area executive committees, the CEC is to send personnel down to organize the district executive committees, and they will be directly responsible to the Party Center. Once an area executive committee is set up, it is to take over the responsibilities and powers of that particular district executive committee.

6) If an area has more than two district executive committees and when the CEC thinks it is necessary to organize the area executive committee, it will send personnel to the area in question to call a delegates' meeting to elect five people to form the area executive committee as well as three alternate members; if committee members have to leave their posts for any reason, they are to be temporarily replaced by alternate members. When the CEC deems it necessary, it will entrust a district executive committee to take over temporarily the responsibilities and powers of the area executive committee. The jurisdiction of the area is determined by the CEC and is subject to constant change.

7) The CEC is to be composed of five members elected by the National Congress; three alternate members are also elected by the Congress; when members leave their posts, they must be replaced temporarily by alternate members.

8) The CEC's term of office is one year; for area and district executive committees it is six months. There is no set limit on the tenure of heads of cells, but they must be subject to reelection. District executive committees may appoint and dismiss cadres in party cells as they see fit.

9) The CEC implements all the resolutions passed by the Congress, deliberates and decides on our party's policies and all the methods of implementation; area and

district executive committees implement the resolutions passed by superior organs and, within their jurisdiction and authority, deliberate and decide on all the methods of execution. Every executive committee is to elect a committee chair to take overall charge of party affairs and decide on all methods of implementation; other committee members assist the committee chair in managing political, labor, youth, and women's movements.

10) The resolutions passed by the National Congress or the CEC and special problems that arise unexpectedly are to be handled by special commissions made up of several party members who are appointed by area and district executive committees; when such special commissions convene meetings, the chair of such meetings must be a member of an area or district executive committee.

Chapter Three: Meetings

11) All cells must meet once a week as convened by the cell head. All branches convene a full meeting of party members or of cell heads once a month. Each district executive committee should convene a meeting of party branches once a month; every six months the district executive committee calls a full meeting of the party members in the district or a meeting of cell heads. In each area, the executive committee is to convene every six months, on a fixed date, a delegates' congress. The National Congress is to be convened by the CEC on a fixed date once a year.

12) When the CEC deems it necessary, it may convene an unscheduled [*linshi*] National Congress; when over half the areas request it, the CEC must also convene an unscheduled congress.

13) The number of delegates to the National Congress or an unscheduled congress is to be determined by the CEC on an *ad hoc* basis.

14) Should a problem arise, a superior executive committee may order a subordinate executive committee to convene various kinds of unscheduled meetings.

15) The CEC must always send personnel to all places to convene various forms of unscheduled meetings. They are to be chaired by the special commissioners sent by the CEC.

16) The meetings of the central and local executive committees may be called by the committee chair at any time.

Chapter Four: Discipline

17) The National Congress is the highest organ of our party; when the National Congress is not in session, the CEC is the highest organ.

18) The resolutions of the National Congress and the CEC must be obeyed unconditionally by every member of our party.

19) Lower-level organs must implement fully the orders of higher organs. Should they refuse to do so, the higher-level organ must dismantle or reorganize them.

20) When over half the party members in a district protest the orders of the executive committee [of the district], they must report to the superior executive committee for judgment; when the district executive committee protests the orders of the area executive committee, it must report to the CEC for arbitration; when there are protests against the CEC, they must be reported to the National Congress or an unscheduled congress for judgment. However, prior to the outcome of the judgment, orders of superior organs must be executed.

21) Area or district executive committees and every cell must implement and propagandize all the policies made by the CEC; they are not allowed to make policies on their own. Whenever a major political problem occurs that concerns the whole country, area or district executive committees are not allowed to issue individual opinions before the CEC makes a statement. When any of the statements made by the area or district executive committees conflict with our party's manifesto, constitution, or the resolutions and policies made by the CEC, the CEC must order the reorganization of these committees.

22) Party members are not allowed to join any political party without special permission from the CEC. Those who have already joined other political parties must formally withdraw from them on being inducted into our party, unless special authorization is given.

23) No party member is allowed to serve as a government official in the bourgeois state without special permission from the CEC.

24) All party meetings are to be decided by the majority; the minority must unconditionally obey the majority.

25) If any party member commits any one of the following [mistakes], the district executive committee must expel him or her from the party:

- a) uses words or commits deeds that violate our party's political programs, constitution, or resolutions passed by the National Congress or all executive committees;
- b) fails to attend two consecutive meetings without any reason;
- c) fails to pay party dues for three months without any reason;
- d) fails to serve the party for four consecutive weeks;
- e) fails to reform at the end of a period of probation;
- f) discloses party secrets.

After the district executive committee expels any party member, it must report the reasons to the CEC and the area executive committee.

Chapter Five: Finances

26) The revenues of our party come from the following sources:

- a) Party dues: party members whose monthly income is below 50 *yuan* pay one *yuan*; those whose monthly income is over 50 *yuan* pay one percent of their income in dues each month; those who have no monthly income or those workers whose monthly income is below 20 *yuan* pay 20 cents a month. Party dues are waived for unemployed workers and imprisoned party members.

b) Inner-party levies.

c) Support sources from outside of the party.

27) All revenues and expenditures of our party are to be disposed of by the CEC.

Chapter Six: Appendix

28) The power to revise this Constitution belongs to the National Congress, and the right to interpret it belongs to the CEC.

31) This Constitution has been adopted by our party's Second National Congress (16–23 July 1922) and is effective from the day it is released by the CEC.

A.16 Resolution Concerning the “Labor Union Movement and the CP” (July 1922)⁷⁷

The Chinese labor movement is still in its infancy and cannot shake off the restraints imposed by the old guilds and artisans' organizations. At the same time, the struggles of the working class are no more than individual movements [to improve] the specific conditions of a certain craft or a particular factory; they are not universal movements. The workers' organizations are neither strong nor secure; there are few organized workers. It is the fundamental task of the CCP to study this situation carefully; to concentrate, expand, and command this movement legitimately.

In line with the current labor situation in China, the experiences of our past activities and the lessons from the labor movement in Europe in the recent past, we should use the following principles as our fundamental policies for the labor movement.

1) The struggle by the working class and poor working people to liberate themselves from robbery and exploitation by the bourgeoisie must be carried out together with the struggle for the interests of the most progressive element and the most capable fighters among the poor working people—the proletariat. Therefore, in its labor movement, the CCP must concentrate its energies on the movement to organize industrial workers, such as railway workers, sailors, and manufacturing and textile workers.

2) Why was the labor union founded? The labor union is an institution that protects and fights for the immediate interests of the workers. As the laborer is the creator of all goods, the laborer should enjoy the goods produced. This truth is the starting point of the real labor union.

3) The labor union should realize that the capitalists and the workers have nothing in common. Their conflict of interest is irreconcilable, so the labor union should not only avoid mediating between the interests of the capitalists and those of the

workers, but intensify such struggles. One struggle should follow another, and between struggles the labor union organization will become stronger and more secure, so as to prepare for yet another struggle. It is necessary to save most of the membership dues of the union as strike funds, but at the same time workers must avoid a fight in a disadvantageous situation.

4) The labor union should do its best to engage in the movement to improve workers' conditions; it should do everything that can lead to reforms under capitalism. At the same time, we must make the labor union advance quickly toward the ultimate goal of the labor movement, which is a movement to overthrow the capitalist system based on waged slaves and thoroughly change society according to communist principles.

5) When the labor union engages in the movement to improve economic conditions for laborers, it must move on to a movement for labor legislation. We should also make the labor union understand: adoption of labor legislation and improving working conditions both depend on a strong organization of the labor union. If we want to make labor legislation and improvement in working conditions truly materialize under capitalism, we need laborers in sufficiently great strength to pressure the government and factory owners.

6) Sometimes our comrades suggest that the labor union not get involved in political movements—this is a tendency of the anarchist labor unions and constitutes a very big mistake. This will weaken the labor union movement and keep it forever in an illegal position. Labor unions must fight for the independence of our nation and the political rights and freedom of our citizens (including the movement for universal suffrage and abolition of the criminal law against strikes). They must also occupy important positions in the democratic united front; only these actions will support the workers through to the final victory. But, at the same time, the meaning of these struggles provides the proletariat with its real revolutionary propaganda. They should not be used for the political objectives of the opportunists. Thus, we should prevent nonproletarian workers from leading labor unions. They must be led by the proletariat.

7) Of course, labor unions may struggle against individual foremen or employers, but the unions must treat and resist the employers as a class; they can also resist the contract system, as well as the system under which foremen oppress workers at will. Labor unions will expand only when all kinds of movements assume universal significance and become real class-based actions.

8) There are two most important tasks the labor union must do everything possible to fulfill: the first concerns collective contracts; the second is equal pay for equal work. Individual contracts are the employers' tool for exploitation. Using this tool, the employers can hire and fire workers at will, thus manipulating the price of labor. The labor union must do its best to fight for the following condition: the employer is not allowed to negotiate and conclude with individual workers any of the provisions concerning hiring and firing and other benefits and obligations. Only the labor union may represent workers in signing contracts with employers. It is also

one of the most clever and cruel means of the capitalists to divide workers into separate categories—based on race, age, and physical strength—and determine their pay according to these categories. The capitalists can use this method not only to rob more greedily those weak and young laborers, but also to split the working class into several groups with different interests, so that they may hate and compete with each other. Under these circumstances, the labor union must try to fight for equal pay for equal work. No matter whether the worker is a foreigner or Chinese, male or female, a strong young man, a boy, or an old man, they must receive the same pay as long as they do the same kind of work. No one is to deny them similar pay on grounds of biological and social differences. At the same time, however, we should not confuse ourselves. So-called equal pay for equal work does not mean to cut higher wages to meet lower wages, but to raise lower wages to the same level as the higher wages. These are the two basic tasks for the labor union. The success of the first will increase the workers' trust in the labor union and attract large numbers of them to join the movement; the success of the latter will prevent and eliminate mutual conflicts among workers so as to realize class unity and harmony.

9) The character of the labor union should not be identical with that of the guild. No employers are allowed into the labor union, but all workers who earn a wage must join the union, regardless of their sex, age, religious belief, region, ethnic origin, nationality, political view, or skill. Thus, labor unions should not have such procedures as membership dues that are too high and exhaustive preinduction investigations to limit the enrollment of workers. Only this will enable the labor union to become a union of the masses of the same class.

10) The main activities of the labor union are the struggles against the capitalists and the government; mutual help and emotional ties are only secondary objectives, because the labor union is a fighting unit, not an institution of group help.

11) The structure of the labor union is such that it will enable the union to become a very tightly united organization very soon, with centralized power and disciplined individual industrial sector unions. The sector unions of industrial workers should not be subdivided internally into "autonomous" groups along the lines of different professions, because they will become fragmented groups that prevent the union from waging struggles.

13) The best basic organization of the labor union is the factory committee. Workers in every factory in each industry organize a factory committee as their basic unit, and then organize a sector union. However, the factory committee is exclusively a workers' organization; it must never be composed of a mixture of factory employers and workers' representatives. At the same time, the factory committee should not be independent of the labor union.

14) But labor unions are only part of the structure of the sector union and do not count as ideal labor unions. The real labor unions should possess class harmony and disciplined training apart from being part of the structure of the sector union and having revolutionary goals. They must unite the whole working class and never allow any incidents of conflict between the special interests of one factory or among

the workers and the interests of the sector union to occur. They should also mediate between the interests of one sector union and those of the working class of the whole country.

15) There should be a unified organization of all the revolutionary labor unions in the world to fight against world capitalism. This unified organization of the world revolutionary labor unions is the Profintern. The CCP must organize labor unions to rally under the flag of the Profintern in accordance with the above principles. At the same time, the Chinese working class must avoid conflict of interest with the working class of the world. For example, increasing Chinese workers' wages will prevent foreign capitalists from hiring cheap Chinese labor to substitute for expensive foreign labor.

16) The difference between the CP and the labor union is that the CP is an organization of the proletarian elements with class consciousness from all classes; it is the vanguard of the proletariat and has a fixed party program; it is a proletarian political party whose aim is the overthrow of capitalism. The labor union is an organization of all workers (regardless of their political views); in the labor union, workers receive education on "how to struggle in the spirit of socialism and communism" and march toward the same objectives as the CP; but it is a moderate organization of all classes. Just as in a war the army has a vanguard, which is followed by the main strength of the army. The CP may be said to constitute the brain and the workers the body. Therefore, in any kind of labor movement, the CP must be the "vanguard" and the "brain." It must pay attention to all the activities of the labor union and should honestly and bravely lead the labor union movement.

17) In order to lead the labor unions and become the vanguard of the proletariat, the CP should have strong and effective groups in the labor unions, all factory committees, and all labor organizations; there should be few exceptions.

18) When they operate in the labor unions organized by the GMD, nongovernment political parties, or Christian organizations, the Communists must not instigate the workers to leave the established labor unions. Our tactic is to build up our own strength gradually in the labor unions in which they have greater strength, and ultimately to overthrow the leadership position of the GMD, nongovernment parties, or Christian organizations, so that we ourselves will seize the leading position.

19) To fight for the present interests of the workers, we Communists should always cooperate with the GMD, nongovernment parties, or even Christian organizations. But we must also always prove and explain to the workers that only the CP is the vanguard of the workers and their political party.

Additional resolutions:

The preceding resolution concerns the labor union movement of important industrial workers. It is the most important part. Below, several secondary resolutions are listed:

- 1) Workers' consumer cooperatives are organizations that defend the workers' interests; the CP must pay attention to and operate in these kind of organizations.
- 2) The CP should also penetrate and work inside the relatively progressive

guilds in order to drive employers out of the guilds; we may thus unite with other guilds that are either similar in character or use the raw materials to form a labor union.

3) The CP should also penetrate and work inside those very conservative guilds and the groups, clubs, and schools with which the bourgeoisie have established links to fool the people; we should organize small groups inside them.

A.17 Instructions for the ECCI Representative in South China. *H. Maring* (August 1922)⁷⁸

Instructions for the Representative of IKKI [ECCI] in South China

I) Whole the activity⁷⁹ of the representative a-s.o must be based on the resolution of the II Kongress of Komintern in the Colonial Question -⁸⁰

II) The Exec. Committee sees the Guomindang party [GMD] as a revolutionary organization, which maintains the character of the revolution of 1912 and which tries to create an independent chinese republic.⁸¹ Therefore the task of the communist elements in China must be the following: (a) the Education of ideologically independent elements, which should form the nucleus of the Chinese kom.Party [CCP] in the Future; (b) this party will grow in agreement with the growing split between bourgeois—petty bourgeois and proletarian elements. Till that time the Communists are obliged to support the party Guomindang and specially this wing of the party which represents the proletarian elements and the manual workers.

III) For the fullfilling of these tasks the communists must organize communist groups of followers in the Guomindang and also Tradeunions—These groups must form an army which carries on the propaganda for the Ideas of the struggle against foreign imperialism and for the creation of a Chinese People's Republic, for the organization of the class struggle against foreign and chinese exploiters.

IV) For the fight against foreign imperialism a special propagandaorganization should be created. This organization must try to develop its work in whole the country on the base of a program of action not only against the open japanese oppression but also against the hypocritical politics of the british and american imperialism and for the alliance with Soviet-Russia, for the association with the revolutionary elements of Japan.⁸² This organization must be established if possible in agreement with Guomindang, but she should be totally independent of this party because Guomindang responsible for the Southern government, has from time to time to avoid a conflict with imperialist elements.

V) The fullfilling of the most principal task of the communists in China, the organization of the Labor masses, in this moment only possible in the form of the creation of tradeunions meets with obstacles by the existing form of organization of

the anachronistic G[u]ilds, which are based on localism. The greatest difficulty in the struggle against these guilds is the fact, that they not only exist for mutual help but that they are also organizations for the cult of the ancestors or local divinities. In regard to this religious superstition of the masses the struggle against the guilds in these quality must be avoided. and the attention of the workers must be concentrated on the fact that these organizations are not strong enough for the fullfilling of their economical task and that for this reason tradeunions must be established.

VI) The centralization of the unions should be realized in agreement to the industrial centres, in which already tradeunions exist. The solution of the problem if industrial or professional organizations must be organized depends totally on local conditions.

A.18 The Immediate Tactics of the CCP. *Chen Duxiu* (November 1922)⁸³

The world economic situation points out to the proletariat of the whole world three lines of tactics in their common struggle against the world bourgeoisie.

1) In Europe and America the bourgeoisie accomplished its task of overthrowing the feudal aristocracy and establishing its own rule a century and a half ago. In these countries the economic conditions of the proletariat have reached a stage when they can and must overthrow the bourgeoisie and take power into their own hands.

2) In Japan the bourgeoisie has reached a stage in development in which they have thrown off the yoke of foreign imperialism and share political power in their own country with the militarists and nobility. Japanese politics are the politics of semi-feudalism and semi-capitalism. The task of the Japanese proletariat is to force the bourgeoisie into conflict with the feudal class. This is the more necessary now that the bourgeoisie has concentrated its forces and is capable of putting up a fight against the feudal class.

3) In the Eastern economically backward countries, like China and India, the proletariat is subjected to the combined domination of foreign imperialism and native feudalism. Not only has the proletariat remained weak, but the bourgeoisie has failed so far to concentrate its forces against the foreign imperialist and the native feudal class. Frequently, the bourgeoisie reveals a desire to protect their interests by shielding themselves behind the feudal lords and imperialists. In such countries the proletariat besides conducting a struggle for its own class interest must adopt tactics to compel the irresolute and cowardly bourgeoisie to organize their economic forces and to take up the fight against the imperialist and feudal class. The proletariat must by its economic power make the bourgeoisie understand the necessity for establishing a united front with the proletariat to overthrow their

common enemy—the native feudal militarists and international imperialists. The victory of the United Front will of course be a victory for the bourgeoisie. But only in the United Front will the young proletariat be able to fight by actual deeds and not by the mere avowal of principles. It can only develop its strength and its own independent class struggle in the complex process of the struggle in the United Front.

The Third and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern basing themselves on the world economic situation, pointed out to the proletariat of the Eastern Countries two lines of tactics required in the immediate struggle viz.: the Democratic United Front and the Anti-imperialist United Front. In its immediate struggles the Chinese proletariat should adopt these two lines of tactics as two inseparably connected lines of tactics and to apply them to the practical questions of the day in order to eliminate the two obstacles that lie in the path of development of the Chinese nation, viz.: native militarism and international imperialism.

The Political Problems

a) Unification and Self-determination.

The state of affairs prevailing in China today is that the militarists relying for support upon the foreign powers, divide and rule China and quarrel among themselves. This state of affairs is a great hindrance to the concentration of the forces of both the bourgeoisie and the workers. We must oppose the policy of the militarists of “divide and rule,” and support the bourgeois movement for the unification of the country. We must hasten the unification of the various democratic bourgeois groups, prevent splits among them and also prevent them from cooperating with the militarists. If, before the consolidation of forces of the national unification movement takes place, a local popular rising breaks out against the local militarists and in favor of self-determination, and if a democratic provincial government is established, which is favorable to labor and does not rely upon the imperialists, we must support it in order to counteract militarist influence and imperialist exploitation.

b) Our attitude towards the Guomintang [GMD] Party.

Although the Guomintang Party suffers from many defects and has committed many errors, nevertheless it is the only revolutionary democratic group in China. It is therefore an important element in the democratic United Front. The proletariat must not only cooperate with this Party in the struggle for democracy and unification, but it must also urge it to adopt the slogans of “Anti-Imperialism,” “Support of Working Class Interests” and “Freedom” in order to widen the scope of the struggle. We must carry on propaganda among the workers within the Guomintang Party, speed up the development of their class-consciousness and make them understand that the Guomintang Party is not the party of the proletariat. If the Guomintang Party allied itself with reactionary and dark forces—for example—Chang Tso Lin [Zhang Zuolin], Tuan Chi Jui [Duan Qirui] and Tsao Kun [Cao Kun]—or compromises with the imperialists, we must ruthlessly oppose it. *In a*

word, in any struggle which we may take up or in any combination we may make with other parties, we must always show our true face to the masses. Furthermore, we must maintain our complete independence in any arrangement we may make in a United Front.

c) The anti-imperialist United Front.

The main forces of the anti-imperialist United Front must be recruited from among the workers, peasants and the petty-bourgeois revolutionary Party or its elements. The fight must be directed against all imperialists. At the same time however we may combine with certain parties in a semi-national movement against a particular group of imperialists (the bourgeois opposition to Japan, for example).

d) The question of parliament.

The present parliament has been in existence for ten years. Neither the 8th year M.P.'s nor the 6th year M.P.'s can claim to represent the will of the people. We must demand the election of a new parliament based on universal suffrage and free from the domination of militarist influence. We must also demand the formation of a new government. Even during the existence of the present government, however, we must commence a movement in favor of labor legislation and the recognition of Soviet Russia.

e) Relations with Soviet Russia.

Soviet Russia is the only power in the world which has abandoned the policy of imperialism. We must urge the Chinese government to commence direct negotiations with her and absolutely to prevent the interference of any third power in the questions of the resumption of commercial intercourse, the Chinese-Eastern railway, the navigation of the river Sungari, the Boxer Indemnity and the Mongolian question.

f) The Mongolian Question.

According to the laws governing the development of the State, nationalities representing various stages of economic development, of varying historical development and of various races and languages can at best form only a Federal Republic and the political system of a centralized republic can hardly be applied. This applies particularly to the political situation at present prevailing in China. We must respect the principle of self-determination. We cannot compel people with a different historical and economic development and of different language and race to share our imperialist exploitation and militarist oppression. On these grounds we must not only recognize the independence of Mongolia in principle but we must render them active support in their effort to destroy the special privileges of the nobility and the lamas, and to lay the economic and cultural foundation for the independence of the Mongolian people.

The Labor Movement

The CP is the Party of the working class. It should therefore be based upon the working class and its activity should be concentrated upon the organization of and

propaganda among the working class. The Chinese Labor movement now reveals a tendency towards national organization and political struggle as well as economic struggle. Apart from supporting the demands of workers for reduction of hours and labor, increases in wages and labor legislation, the CP must strive to direct the above-mentioned tendencies along the following lines in order to increase the fighting power of the workers.

a) Systematic political propaganda.

The object of this is to induce the working class to advance from the passive, reformist and purely economic movement to an active revolutionary political and economic movement.

b) The factory-councils movement.

The trade-union movement in itself is not sufficient, because by it the influence of the workers is organized mainly outside of the particular industrial enterprise. To organize the influence of the workers within the industrial enterprise, they must organize factory councils for the purpose of eliminating the foreman, abolishing the system of indentured labor and other evils.

c) The organization of national miners and railwaymen's unions.

So far only the organizations of the railway workers, seamen and miners are regarded as powerful factors in the working class movement in China. The seamen have a national organization [General Industrial Federation of Chinese Seamen, founded autumn 1920]. It remains for the railwaymen and the miners to organize in a similar manner. This, after the big strikes, should not be difficult.

d) The organization of a Triple Alliance of Railwaymen, Seamen and Miners.

In a country where the Labor Movement is weak, national federations will not exist for long unless there are some powerful unions which can act as its support. Therefore, before such a National Federation of Labor Unions is organized, efforts should be made to combine the railwaymen, seamen and miners into a Triple Alliance.

e) In order to consolidate and strengthen the working class struggle for power, we must advocate the centralisation of the national labor movement and combat the intrigues of anarcho-syndicalists to break up the labor organizations by their demands for independence and autonomy. At the forthcoming Second National Labor Conference to be held May 1st. 1923, we must submit resolutions on the centralisation of the national labor movement and decide upon the common tasks confronting the working class of the whole country. This conference must also set up a central bureau of the National Federation of Labor Unions whose tasks it should be to plan and direct the tactics necessary for the realisation of a national united working class front. This would avoid the danger of the wave of the Western capitalist offensive surging into China.

The Peasant Problems

The working class movement in the economically backward countries of the East cannot achieve its revolutionary tasks unless it is assisted by the poor peasant masses.

Agriculture is the basis of Chinese national economy. The peasants comprise at least 60% of the population. The most poverty-stricken of the peasants are the landless tenant-farmers who comprise more than half of the peasant population, viz. 120 millions. This class of landless tenant-farmers are oppressed by the upper strata of society and are naturally a friendly army of the working class which the CCP cannot afford to ignore. If it remains isolated from the peasantry, the CCP can never become a great mass party.

The burdens from which the Chinese peasants suffer are the following:

1) Owing to the importation of manufactured goods the cost of living increases more rapidly than the increase of prices of agricultural produce. The formerly self-sufficient peasants are compelled now to sell their land and are reduced to the position of tenants. The former tenant-farmers in their turn are reduced to the position of agricultural laborers, or become bandits or mercenary soldiers, or else go into the cities to work in the factories. The consequences of this are: a) The poor peasants are hostile to the invasion of foreign powers and b) the number of bandits increases and forms an inexhaustible reservoir from which the militarists draw their forces and perpetuate the state of disturbance in the country.

2) Owing to the corruption of the administrative officials, floods and drought cause untold suffering to the peasants.

3) The famine and the civil war cause a constant migration of the peasantry from one place to another. This causes the supply of tenant-farmers and agricultural laborers in various localities to exceed the demand and the resulting competition tends to intensify the exploitation of the tenant-farmers and laborers on the part of the landlords and employers.

4) As a result of the above-mentioned causes the peasants are compelled to borrow money for their sustenance. This leads to the prevalence of usury in the country which mostly affects the tenant-farmers.

To remove the sufferings the following measures are indispensable:

a) Limitations of size of holdings. The amount of land owned by a single person must be limited to a certain number of mows [*mu*, equivalent to $\frac{1}{6}$ of an acre]. All land exceeding the amount fixed i.e. the land of the big and middle landowners, must be divided among the local tenants.

b) Organization of peasant cooperatives. The custom has long prevailed in the villages for the peasants to collect money to make collective purchases in the cities. This custom must be extended to form cooperatives.

c) The organization of peasant banks. In Chinese villages there are usually clan and religious institutions which collect funds for the purpose of famine relief. These funds and the investments of the rich peasants should be utilized to form peasant banks for the issue of loans to the peasants at a minimum of interest.

d) The limitation of rent. Farmers' councils should be formed in all villages which shall fix the rent for the district for the ensuing year in accordance with the harvest.

e) State supply of land to the peasants. The State, out of funds raised through

land taxation, should set aside a sum to be devoted to enabling the surplus rural population to cultivate the hitherto untilled State lands.

f) Irrigation of the important river basins. The State shall grant a sum from the national or local revenues for the purpose of dredging rivers, the most important of which are the Yellow River [Huanghe] and the Hwai River [Huaihe]. This irrigation work will not only benefit the peasants but also improve the transport facilities for industry and commerce.

A.19 Comrade Chen Duxiu's Report to the Third Party Congress on Behalf of the CCP CEC (June 1923)⁸⁴

On behalf of the CEC, I am delivering the work report on the period since the Second Congress. CEC members are too few and cannot collect many materials. Also, because of persecution, many materials have been lost, and perhaps therefore the view is incomplete.

The CEC had only five members, so after the Party Congress the Hangzhou Plenum proposed enlarging the CEC by adding two members. However, Shanghai and Beijing opposed this proposal.⁸⁵ When persecution increased in Shanghai, the Beijing political situation was such that we could still go there for work, and thus the CEC moved to Beijing [end of November 1922]. The organization began to improve. Yet there was still not time to set about implementing our plans before the rampant reactionary clique, after the strike on the Beijing-Hankou railway, forced us to leave Beijing and return to Shanghai.⁸⁶ The plan to improve the organization could not be realized. Because persecution in Shanghai was extremely severe and because we wanted to prepare the Party Congress, the CEC moved to Canton [late April 1923]. Because the political situation was also not stable, we still cannot improve central organization.

The Shanghai and Canton small groups are formed from the local groups of these two cities. Many local small groups in Beijing, Hankou, and Changsha (Hunan) have already linked up to form regional small groups. The Zhengzhou small group collapsed during the Beijing-Hankou railway strike.

Party finances—practically all is received from the Comintern; party membership dues amount to very little. This year expenses received from the Comintern are 15,000 [yuan]. Of this 1,600 has been used for the Congress. These expenses are divided between each small group, but at the same time they are used for CEC work, liaison, and publishing the weekly.⁸⁷ We can only offer a detailed report for the last few months because the remaining materials fell into the hands of the French Concession police in Shanghai, and, moreover, owing to the arrest of one comrade, all usable material was lost.

At present the party has 420 members of whom 44 are abroad, 164 are workers,

37 are women, and a further 10 comrades are still in prison.

Last year we only had 200 party members; this year approximately 200 have joined, of whom 130 are workers.

After the Hangzhou Plenum, with interruptions, we published a paper; this kind of interruption was brought about by the strike. The paper has appeared a total of twenty-eight times, with each edition having an average printing of five to six thousand. But our daily paper encountered criticism in the early period and only now have we reached accord.⁸⁸ Beijing, Hubei, Canton, Shanghai, etc., published weeklies.

With respect to the incident of the Beijing-Hankou railway strike, we published a pamphlet and published declarations about many different situations. Formerly the journal *New Youth* [Xin qingnian] was published every month but now it has been changed into a quarterly. The monthly *Vanguard*⁸⁹ is published carrying articles of a general nature on China's political and economic conditions and on problems of the international political situation.

At the Second Congress we approved the "Resolution Concerning the Question of Cooperation Between Communist Parties and Democratic Revolutionary Elements" passed by the Congress of the Toilers of the East [held in Moscow in January 1922]. The development of events makes it clear that a united front has defects. After the Second Party Congress when we received the directive of the Comintern on joining the GMD,⁹⁰ we could not very quickly reconvene a Party Congress to discuss this question. Therefore, the CEC and the ECCI representative [Maring] discussed this question together.

Originally, the vast majority were all opposed to joining the GMD, but the ECCI representative persuaded the participants and we decided to advise all party members to join the GMD. From this time, our political position underwent a major change. Formerly, our party's policy was idealistic and contrived, but afterward we began to pay even more attention to the actual situation of Chinese society and participated in the current movement.

As decided by the Second Congress with respect to the "Movement to Strive for People's Rights," "Alliances to Strive for People's Rights" have been set up in Beijing, Canton, Shanghai, Shandong, Jiangxi, etc. In Beijing the majority of people joining this new organization are students; in Shandong and Canton the majority are workers.

Throughout we have opposed the warlords. When organizing the personnel of the Beijing-Hankou railway, we only wanted to struggle against the "Communications Clique" [*jiaotong xi*], which is why at that time we did not oppose Wu Peifu. But from the time of the strike, we did vigorously oppose Wu Peifu. However, it was not necessary for the CEC to have had relations with Wu Peifu.

We worked with the slogan "Down With Imperialism and Warlords." The slogan of "Down With the Warlords" already had an influence on the vast majority of Chinese society, but the slogan "Down With Imperialism" still has not had a very great influence. Party members should take more notice of the slogan "Down With Imperialism."

Now I would like to discuss union and propaganda work. With respect to Shanghai, its industry is the most developed, the most advanced, but workers' organizations are very backward. It needs a great effort to develop the movement. Many workers' organizations are empty, bearing just a name. We have connections with a small metallurgy workers' group. The GMD has connections with the sailors and tobacco workers. We must pay more attention to Shanghai.

Among the railway workers in the north, we had the best organization on the Beijing-Hankou line, but it collapsed at the time of the strike. The organization on the Beijing-Tianjin-Pukou line is only an empty shell; in reality it does not even exist. The organization on the Beijing-Fengtian line is secret. On the Tianjin-Pukou line, the workers are divided into many local associations. Until now, it has been very difficult to unite workers from different departments on the Beijing-Fengtian line.

The federations of Hunan, Hubei, and Guangdong have relations with us. The unions of the Hubei iron-smelting, tobacco, and textile industrial departments as well as the rickshaw organization all have connections with us. The Han-Shen labor union has good prospects and is China's largest labor union and can become a model. The strength of the Pingxiang miners' union was lost at the time of the February strike, but the organization was still preserved.

Almost all of the over 30,000 people of the Hunan union are under our control. The Pingxiang miners have also joined this federation. The Canton-Hankou railway organization also participated in this federation. The other organizations were set up by handicraft workers. The majority of labor organizations in Guangdong are handicraft industry workers' federations. The construction workers' organization is also under our control.

We only have thirteen female party members (should be thirty-seven).⁹¹ The women's movement in China is still not very developed. We have a bit of influence with the Canton and Hubei "Women's Rights Federation." This kind of federation has also been set up in Beijing and Shanghai.

Now I would like to raise some critical ideas about the work of the last year. First, we neglected educational work for party members; many difficulties encountered can be attributed to this. Many intellectuals cherishing a revolutionary spirit entered the party but do not understand our principles. Workers exhibit a tendency of being divorced from intellectuals, frequently lacking the desire for knowledge.

Propaganda work has been conducted with insufficient urgency. We pay very little attention to the peasant and youth movements, and we have not conducted work among the soldiers. We must carry out work among women; the number of female party members is far too small. With respect to propaganda work with the labor unions, we have not advocated any slogans. At present, for the workers we can only advocate the slogan of setting up a China General Labor Federation. Moreover, we cannot advocate the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the same time, we must propagate support in their midst for the democratic revolution.

In our party there exist serious tendencies of individualism. Party members frequently do not have complete faith in the party. Even if the party has a few faults, still it is not necessary to leave the party. We must correct our mistakes. In addition, relations between comrades in the party are not very close; they are very suspicious of each other.

Now I would like to discuss the mistakes of the CEC. In reality, internally the CEC is not organized; the five committee members often do not agree, and in this way work encounters losses.

The knowledge of the CEC is also insufficient; this was the cause of the defeat of the strike. Our political position is unclear. Everyone acknowledges that China needs to carry out a democratic revolution, but our views differ on how we should serve the democratic revolution. Some comrades still oppose joining the GMD. One reason is that our political viewpoint is not sufficiently clear.

Often we changed the location of the central authorities, and this brought about very great losses for work.

Now I would like to raise some critical ideas about individual CEC members. Chen Duxiu, because his view of the current political situation was unclear, made many mistakes. In addition, he is very easily stirred up.

Comrade Zhang Guotao is undoubtedly faithful to the party, but his thought is extremely narrow and thus he commits a great many mistakes. He organized a small group within the party organization, and this was a great mistake.

Comrade Deng [probably Deng Pei] during the Tangshan and Shuikou miners' strike made a very serious mistake and, moreover, in Canton created a great many difficulties. With respect to the regions, we can say that the Shanghai comrades have done too little party work. Beijing comrades, because they do not understand party organization, created a great many problems. Hubei comrades did not promptly guard against conflicts, and the workers' strength could not be increased. Only the Hunan comrades have done a very good job.

Canton comrades created a serious problem in handling Chen Jiongming, a mistake that has only just now been corrected.⁹²

A.20 Discussion on the Relation Between the CPC and Kuomintang [GMD]. *H. Maring* (June 1923)⁹³

I) Wanting to understand the mind of the Chinese comrades I put the question to Tschue Tsze Bo [Qu Qiubai]: please tell me in which way I must develop the viewpoint of the theses of Comintern and my interpretation of these theses in the conference? Must I give an analysis of the Chinese conditions and make a comparison with other oriental countries? "His answer was: Not in this way, it is necessary to be very concrete, to see the small facts which are dominating the mind of these

comrades who are inclined to make the relation with the GMD as loose as possible.”

I cannot follow totally this advice though I will not start with a deep theoretical analysis and though I will give as much attention as possible to the smaller arguments.

II) First of all I must oppose strongly the idea that for example comr. Chen [Duxiu] or I should want to dissolve our party. This is not said in the conference but such ideas are nevertheless developed. I am here as representative of IKKI [ECCI], I understand something of the discipline towards IKKI. Not for a single moment I was inclined to finish with the CCP. For which reason I work here in China? I think that it is only foolish to believe in my intention to cut out the life of the party.

On the other side worshipping GMD—absolutely false.

III) Second I must warn seriously against the division of the comrades in left and right. This has been done at the end of Chang Ko Tao's [Zhang Guotao] speech and though it is very easy to state this comrade is left and that one is right I have to state the fact that in the young organization very few comrades can explain why they regard the one left the other right.

IV) Something is wrong in the proceedings of whole this discussion after the speech of Tschen Tu Siu [Chen Duxiu]. The these of IKKI have to be the base of the discussion. IKKI is the general staff of the international movement. IKKI gives its instructions as orders which have to be followed by the party. The discusspeeches of Chang Ko Tao and Tsai [Cai Hesen] prove that they try to find possibilities of partywork forgetting these instructions too much.

The interpretation of Chang Ko Tao where he states that IKKI ordered those who are in GMD to stay there is absolutely *wrong*. When we remember that in August of last year already IKKI gave the order to the members of the party—not only for the south—to enter GMD—the order of January this year which says “it will be expedient for the members of the CP of China to remain in the GMD” confirms the order of August.⁹⁴ IKKI means that its orders are followed in China by the members of the party. IKKI cannot count with possibilities of this kind that members of the old Centralcommittee, who decided to accept the order of August last year are doing their utmost to make general orders of IKKI useless for the members of the party in general, like IKKI cannot count with opinions of such comrades who in the same time that they help in the establishment of a new GMD organization in Beijing propose that in the North where GMD has no branches our members should not try to develop branches. IKKI supposes that even in the CP of China there is something like discipline and cannot make its resolutions for China in such a way that some or other ingenious inventor manufactures arguments to make passive resistance and sabotage on the decisions of IKKI possible.

V) In the speeches of Tsai and Chang Ko T. carefully is left out to speak about the second part of the IKKI Theses where it is said that the central task in China is the nationalist revolution, that therefore the activities of the GMD and the young CP must be coordinated. Whereas IKKI states “that the working class is not yet differ-

entiated as a completely independent social force” Ho Sen proposes to establish an independent labour party. I prefer the marxian conclusion of IKKI to the illusionism of Ho Sen.

VI) The task of this conference is only to outline its tactics for the next party year on the base of the IKKI theses. The questions on which we should try to find answers are not: must we enter GMD or not? Must our members fulfill the central task of the CP by joining this GMD or must we concentrate us to establish an independent labourparty for a labourclass which is not differentiated as a completely independent force? No the matter of entering GMD is settled in two decisions of IKKI and I should advice the conference to follow the order which was given like Chang KT said after much discussion in IKKI and with the most important leaders of the international movement.

VII) Before us are very concrete and practical questions: how must we work in GMD. Which kind of help can we give them? By which means we must make sure the acceptance of the same practice by the comrades? How must we divide our few forces over the labourunionwork and the political work? How must we make sure that also the educational work of the leaders of our party is not neglected?

VIII) Before I will give my ideas about this practical questions I must make some other remarks to the speeches of CH. K. T. and Ho Sen. I depend on the translation which I get so I must state beforehand that mistakes in my answer are possible.

Ho Sen who defends the idea of a Labourparty tries to prove that the big bourgeoisie of China has no value for the nationalist revolution. Ho Sen sees yesterday and even today but he does not see tomorrow. His method of thinking is static not dynamic. Though the Chinese bourgeoisie partly finds its origin in the feudal elements, officials and militarists, though they have often close connections with the foreign capitalists in the process of growing this Chinese bourgeoisie gets its own national interests antagonistic towards the foreign capitalists. In the internal politics the demands of the Chambers of Commerce are pure revolutionary demands, they want to finish with the feudal power which is not broken in the first revolution. Abolishment Tuchunate [the system of military governors] and the want for the constitution are proves. They have not developed systematic fight for these demands, they try to arrive to realisation by compromises. But nevertheless their demands are revolutionary, and when it is true what Marx stated long ago: “democracy, the republic is the most favorable form of government for the proletariat to gather the revolutionary forces of the labourmovement,” we cannot state that the bourgeoisie of China is valueless for the national revolution. Characteristic for the wrong way of thinking of comr. Ho Sen, who cannot analyse the conditions dialectically, is that he comes with the proposal of the independent workersparty (because only proletariat revolutionary) in China whereas he should know that the development of labour as a political force depends on the development of the bourgeoisie.

IX) Wonderful is the explanation of Chang KT that we can make now only an antijapanese movement but not anglosaxon. It is not difficult for us to understand

that the nationalist movement demonstrates itself mostly as an antijapanese movement. Chinese Bourgeoisie is competing much more with the products of Japanese than other industry. The methods of Japanese imperialism are more open and more hurting nationalist feeling. But that the nationalist movement in China can only be antijapanese till the anglosaxons are defeated is new for me. When Chinese industry enters the field of production where they find Anglosaxons as their antagonists they will take stand against them as they take stand against Japan. We have to state the fact that the demand to increase the customtariff goes against all foreign capitalists and that the French demand to pay the boxers indemnity in goldfrances, the treatment of the houseboy in Schanghai by british police awake the same kind of antiimperialistfeelings against Britain and France as exists against the Japanese.

The fact that the nationalist propaganda has been poor and onesided, that the nationalist propaganda forgets too much the crimes of anglosaxon imperialism does not mean that with a good propaganda a clear understanding of imperialism cannot be spreaded and cannot result in a general antiimperialistic movement.

X) Both of them Hosen and Chang K T will base the tactic of our party on illusions and dreams.

The Great importance of Lenin is his close touch with the reality in Russia, his commonsense in application of his revolutionary tactics. Radek about this point Lenin and the opposition in the Brestlitovs[k]negotiations.

Marx about the task of the revolutionists.

XI) The exageration of our results in labourwork is ridiculous. How is it with the workers with whom we came in touch?

I am sorry to say that I came not much in touch with them. I have only investigated our methods of work and the ideas of comrades who have much touch. I state the fact that these informations of comrades Mau [Mao Zedong], Wang [Wang Hebo], Teng Pe [Deng Pei], and Wang Yung Tchang [Wang Yongzhang]⁹⁵ are all the same in this point: the workers are interested in the question of improving their conditions, their understanding of politic and classstruggle poor.

Wang who has a keen eye finds among the Pukow [Pukou] workers monarchist tendencies, the worker in the interior still means that politics are not on the world for him. The same Wang states that the Hongkongworkers are the most advanced in China—their political feeling is nationalist.

Mau explained to me: dominating interest for questions of daily life, not much political interest.

The same impressions I got from the informations of Teng Pe and *Wang Yung Tchang*. (Shan[dong])—

Even about the results in Hupeh we should not mislead ourselves. How we organized the railwayunion? What were these comrades appointed by the Communication department who could quietly organize. Why we went to workers under the flag of the "Laboursecretariate" and not of the Communist party?

What are the results of the work in *Shanghai* and *Tientsin*, where so many thousands industrial workers live?

We may say that we got the experience that we can farther develop unionwork but we should not make the mistake of mixing the idea of a workersparty and workersunion.

When ChangKT dreams of the power of labour he likes to work with millions. Comrade Mau told me that Hunan has 30 millions population and 30 till 40 thousand modern workers. He is at the end of his latin with labourorganization and was so pessimistic that he saw the only salvation of China in the intervention by Russia.

How scattered these 1.4 million workers are, how many of them are women and children in the textile and tobaccoindustry? How many of them where the foreign powers control the industry which means that nationalist feeling will develop itself in the workers?

The political interest of these modern workers will be before all interest in the nationalist movement.

XII) We only some months with a small weekly paper [*The Guide Weekly*] are trying to develop revolutionary character of the nationalist movement. When we seriously take up the task we must succeed. I am not like Mau so pessimistic that the Chinese nationalist movement can only succeed after the worldrevolution. Anyhow we have not to make speculations what will come first but in any case we have to act in the same way.

XIII) Development of Labourunions possible. Soon the time will come that the Laboursecreatariate will be substituted by real federation of unions. In these unions we continue our work to develop revolutionary spirit and take stand against all reformist tendencies the same from where they come.

We are also in the labourwork in a difficult position. After the first agressive moves defeats have come in many strikes. YMCA is bringing systematically reformist tendencies in labour.

We will fight against this proving to the workers that only by revolutionary struggle they can develop their power.

This revolutionary struggle will in this period mainly have revolutionary nationalist character.

XIV) When with the theses in hands there can be no doubt that we have to join GMD and that we have to make our central task the nationalist movement on the other side that we have to develop labourunions and the revolutionary spirit which is useful for the execution of our central task the question comes how work in GMD?

The answer has been given in the theses of ChenTS [Chen Duxiu]. Taking stand against the pure military activities of GMD against the cooperation with imperialist powers and their feudal agents we push to revolutionary propaganda and revolutionary activities. We push GMD to take leading of the nationalist movement. The comrades want to be sure that they will succeed and some very careful men will wait with our help till GMD is good. These comrades are in this way cutting of the possibility of fullfilling our headtask. Never revolutionists can adopt such a practice and never they can in their decisions depend on speculation.

XV) We heard that there is fear that we bringing the workers in GMD kill their revolutionary spirit. When communists are going in GMD they go there because they mean that the interests of the working class are best of all promoted by this tactic. Our spiritual power is strong has been said by KOTao [Zhang Guotao]. For this reason I don't fear the contact of Chinese communists inside GMD with other tendencies (when commu[nists] can go there why workers, tradeunionmen should not be inside GMD). I believe in our spiritual power, I believe that we can only win by this tactic. When we will create a strong left wing in GMD we must be consequent and not so careful that we will prevent GMD to become nationwide revolutionary party.

XVI) The discussions proving how poor is the marxian knowledge in our own group we publish our own propagandamaterial to enlarge the marxian knowledge. Our task is in this way threefold: the spiritual force of the members of our party we enlarge by educational work, the labourunions we develop by our strong efforts in the most important labourcentres of China and *last but not least* by giving our strong support for the development of the revolutionary nationalist movement, by developing the GMD as a revolutionary nationalist party we mobilize the force in China which will contribute powerfully in the international struggle against worldimperialism.

We give in this work our special attention to the mobilisation of the peasants. Doing this work we maintain our name as a communist party. We are not so opportunistic to think about changes of name. Our name can do for the task we have. The comrades who are so anxious to liquidate the communist party as such in order to make a "massparty of workers" or workers and peasants in their dreams stated that more than one party can combine their efforts in the nationalist movement. We think the same and for this reason the communist party of China, the pushing power in the nat.rev.movement, will live and grow.

XV) Necessary is a good majority for Chen's theses. Their character is absolutely in agreement with the these of IKKI, the comm. Party as a good centralized organization with a strong spirit or discipline has the duty to show to the International that its spiritualpower can develop a strong nationalist movement with a strong nationalist party.

A.21 Letter from Zhang Guotao to G. Voitinsky and Musin (16 November 1923)⁹⁶

Beijing Nov. 16th, 1923.

Dear com. Voitinsky and Mussin,

Your both personal favors reached to me one after the other. I am very thankful of you both friendly reminding me how I should work in our party. At the same

time I am very sorry that I did not write you on the Chinese situation frequently and fully. So it is quite possible that my friends in Moscow may misunderstand me.

In answering you all the questions which were put down by your both letters, of course by my personal views, in a completed way, it seems too difficult for me, as my language is so poor. But I shall do my best in a brief way.

I) Our relation with the Koumintang [GMD]

When the question of our relation with GMD arrived to the last party conference, Many of our comrades did not make their ideas very clear. in order to show the differences of opinions between me and the comrades who stood opposite to me, we may compare the ideas between Maring and me.

Com. Maring's opinion was as following:—

The labor movement in China is too weak and it practically means nothing. The CCP was organized in an artificial way and was born too early. At present only the nationalist movement can be developed in China. *GMD represents the nationalist movement* but it must be reorganized. *Now we have the opportunity to reorganize GMD and also there is such possibility.* Comintern regards that the central task of CCP in this time is nationalist movement and *Soviet Russia should support GMD.* So the Chinese communists must concentrate their efforts to reorganize GMD and work inside of GMD and develop GMD. All the political propaganda work of the CCP shall be done inside of GMD except the marxian educational propaganda work. *Labor movement should be carried on inside of GMD and workers all over China must be brought into GMD.* Only after the class consciousness of the workers inside of GMD should be developed, a left-wing of GMD will grow out. *Only at that time a real CCP can be formed. This is the only process of the Chinese revolutionary movement.*

Yes, we agreed that the Chinese Labor movement and C.C.P. is too young and too weak, only the nationalist movement can be developed in China at present and the central task of CCP in this time is the nationalist movement. But, is GMD representing the nationalist movement? is there possibility to reorganize GMD? and is this the only process of the Chinese revolutionary movement? Those are the points which we were in doubt.

When we were going to discuss this question, the comrades who stood opposite me cried: "Be honest to the nationalist movement and "Don't be afraid of GMD, labor movement will not loss itself inside of GMD." Instead of proving the correctness of their ideas by objective analysis, much such subjective terms were expressed by them. Even such simple mistakes, as "there is no labor movement in China and the so-called labor movement are really nationalist movement" and "to talk about class struggle means to destroy the unity of the nationalist movement," were made by some leading comrades. From this mistakes you shall see how this tactics was misinterpreted.

The main points of my remarks made in the last party conference were as following:—

1) The Chinese nationalist movement which is confined by its complex political and economical situation is something not the same as that in other colonics, such as in India and in Egypt. Up till now it is hardy to say that we have a pure nationalist movement. We have only a nationalist movement set against Japanese imperialists and which at the same time more or less utilized by the American imperialists. Instead of a nationalist movement against America and British Empire, there is a tendency, created by them, to pro-them. GMD which always only engaged in making government and carrying on military action compelled to compromise with this or that foreign imperialist and domestic militarist and therefore has ceased to be a nationalist party.

2) The Chinese bourgeoisie (That is, industrial capitalists bankers, and merchants) still very much depend upon the foreign capitalists in every direction, especially economically. Even there are some contradictions rising between the foreign imperialists and domestic bourgeoisie, but the domestic bourgeoisie is still far off as a conscious force set against the foreign oppression. (Except against Japanese oppression)

3) The force of the working class even is very young and weak but it has shown in their struggle that it already something. This force cannot be totally neglected. This is a labor movement and cannot be explained as a nationalist movement.

4) We cannot be expect that a nationalist movement which means a movement against all the strong powers in the world will come very easy. It needs some years. And a real nationalist party will not come out so easy as what you think. At the same time labor force is already something and it will be one of the strong factors of the coming nationalist movement.

5) GMD is now not representing the nationalist movement and must be reorganized. The question is that we need a force to compell GMD starting to reorganize itself. As long as we have no force to compel GMD, I see the possibility of reorganization of GMD is too uncertain.

6) Therefore in the present time we, communist, shall at first continue to propagate the nationalist ideas in general, and especially do our large part to organize the workers and peasants and bring them into the nationalist movement. Then in next step we shall use our forces to reorganize GMD or in any other form to set us in the combined nationalist movement.

7) At the same time we shall remain in GMD, organize branches for it and try to reorganize it. It means we work inside of GMD for the purpose to creat the possibility of reorganizing GMD or in general it means to find the new life of nationalist movement. This work do not mean the predominant one but as same important as work mentioned above (in paragraph 6). The idea that is to reorganize GMD right now and if not successful then leave GMD even within a short time cannot be agreed by us. We should remain in GMD for some years, because we must get something from GMD.

8) As the reorganization of GMD has not been achieved and it still concentrate its efforts for military action and to creat government, we, communists, in one side, must remain as an unit to propagate independently our own political ideas with

regard to the present Chinese situation and in the other side, the trade union movement must not pass from our hands to the GMD's hands.

9) We must not forget that to organize workers and to develop their consciousness is our special task. At the same time the process of the Chinese revolutionary movement is still not clear to us and it may be from the very beginning that the labor force will be the left wing of the combined nationalist movement. Therefore, in this time only in such labor centers where the communists has a strong hold we ourselves shall organize the GMD branches, but in such labor centers where the communists are still very weak and at the same time GMD has no any influence there, we shall not let GMD to organize branches and shall also not let their influence flows in. Only in Guanzhou and Hong Kong our work in the labor field is compelled to be carried on inside of GMD.

There were some more points which I want to point out for you.

1) At that time our comrades too much expect for the unity of nationalist movement. But GMD not only is not a real nationalist party but it is still not an organized party. It is too early to talk about unity of nationalist movement. Now we can only talk about creating some basis of the nationalist movement and thus opening a new life of nationalist movement and then combine the different factors into one combined nationalist movement.

2) The facts tell us that the coming of a real Chinese nationalist party needs some years. Many preliminary propaganda works must be done first. The Chinese people, even the revolutionists, up till now, don't feel the necessity to organize a party and revolutionary work means to them so narrow that it is only military action. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, himself, always strongly holds his old idea that the revolutionary process is first seize the political power by military force and then come to the period of education and propaganda. He and his followers also thinks first they must be in power and then organize a party.

If GMD will be a hopeful party, its leaders must first give up totally the ideas of organizing government and military action and sincerely accept the ideas of organizing a party first. When the GMD leaders have not give up their old ideas and their old ways of action, it would be no wise for Soviet Russia to support their struggling. Because GMD will never be successful in its struggle against the northern army and Chen Chien Ming [Chen Jiongming], Sun Yat Sen may soon be thrown away by his own generals *and the Canton government may soon be broken into pieces. To support the Canton government means not only useless but also means to delay the nationalist movement going to the right way of process.* Only after GMD was defeated and already gave up its old ideas and got accept the new ways, support can be given.

3) After the last party conference, attempts to reorganize GMD were maken by the new central committe of CCP but unfortunately it was not successful. After this so the new central committe of CCP said "It is hopeless to reorganize GMD from the top and we must reorganize it from the bottom." And it seems to me that now the EC [Executive Committee] of CCP concentrates its ideas to organize a young nationalist league. A personal letter of Com. Chen Too Su [Chen Duxiu] reached to

me recently and stated that he feels now the political theses (that is, the theses of our relation with GMD) adopted by the last party conference is somehow unpracticable. It proved quite clear that the plan of com Chen Too Su and Maring met difficulties and cannot carry out into life at present. And the difficulties were not set by the opponents of our party but by the actual situation.

4) When the Declaration of CCP for proposing a national congress [National Assembly] reached to Shanghai, at that time I was in Shanghai, a city communist conference of Shanghai was called to discuss on this declaration.⁹⁷ Some remarks was made by me as following:—"A national congress as planned in this declaration cannot be organized immediately. In one side we must propagate the idea of such a national congress and constantly demand it but, at the other side, we must hurry up to organize workers and peasants and go to the local nationalist organizations so that we can fulfil the plan given by this declaration." Though a few comrades spoke that the national congress must carry into life immediately and regard my ideas mean "sabotage" (The word "sabotage" was much used in the last party conference). But after a short discussion my ideas were accepted by that city conference. It shows clear that when we come to try to start some political movement then every Chinese comrade will understand how it is important to organize the workers and peasants. It is important as to organize or reorganize "a nationalist party," and we cannot wait that the real nationalist party comes out first and then to start to organize the workers and peasants.

5. Some one may say how young and weak is the CCP and how the CCP is incapable to organize the workers and peasants. Yes, we know quite well how CCP is. But as the nationalist mass party still lives in our heads, so we now can only push the poor CCP to bear the both tasks, that is to form a nationalist party and to organize the workers and peasants.

But now the situation is some changible and we have some new facts to discuss this question. The above lines only show how was this question in the last conference of the CCP There is such news which was appeared since last week that GMD will call a national party congress in Jan 15th 1924.⁹⁸ Therefore now we must concentrate our attention to the coming GMD Congress. In my last letter I preferred to write an article about this question for you but I shall postpone to write that article and turned to discuss this coming GMD Congress with you.

The news tells that every province should send six representatives to the GMD congress held at Canton in Jan 15th 1924 and three representatives of each province should be appointed by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and three will be elected by the provincial branches.

In the city communist conference of Beijing held at last Monday I made a report on the coming GMD congress. I prefer to write you the main points of my report which will show my ideas towards the coming Congress. The main points of my report was as following:—

A national GMD Congress which we have demanded since a year ago will come after two months. Though we have still not received any informations and instruc-

tions about this event from EC of CCP we must hurry up to discuss it and to prepare it.

Whether the congress can be held in time or not it depends on the war situation in Canton. But in Beijing now no one can tell how the war situation in Canton is and how it will be.

Whether this congress will be successful or not, I cannot tell exactly. But as the news tells that only 6 representatives sent from each province, then the representatives may be mostly the representatives of GMD generals and then very few representatives representing the ideas of the common GMD members. Thus the Congress will bring poor results.

First, we must demand the increasing of representatives especially such province like Kwantung [Guangdong] must largely increasing its representatives. We must propose that the prominent members of GMD, the revolutionists who are friends of GMD but are not members of it and the representatives of different nationalist and revolutionary organizations should be invited to the Congress. So the result will mean increasing of mass influences in this congress.

Second, we must demand the GMD members of different places hold their meetings to discuss the coming Congress. All the GMD presses should be mobilized to discuss and propagate about the coming Congress. And especially our presses should start to discuss this question right now.

Third, the EC of CCP should invite some progressive elements in GMD and non-GMD revolutionists to draft together a program for the coming congress and prefer it to the congress. *The coming congress will show how our relation with GMD ought to be.* If our program will be accepted by the congress, then it is very good and *if not, this group of revolutionists who draft the same program with us shall stand with us as the left wing inside of GMD.*

In this congress at least we must try to change the idea of seizing a province by military force first and then to fight for provinces and then to develop the GMD and turn into the idea first to organize a strong centralized party and then to carry on revolution. This is our main demand in that congress.

My report was accepted by this city conference, and decided to report it to the EC of the CCP and at the same time I was elected to draft the outlines of the said program as the basis for discussing in the next local party conference and then to send to EC of CCP for final decision.

Here I shall only tell one more fact about this question. In Shanghai some of GMD members developed a sentiment against our remaining in GMD since last month. Com. Li Sui-chang [Li Dazhao] went to Shanghai for this sake. It seems to me different opinions of GMD members with regard to our entering to GMD is developing and become gradually acute. But I did not get any information recently, so I cannot tell exactly.

II) The present situation of our party

In the concluding session of last canton conference of CCP when Maring greeted the success of last conference, he expressed that, at one side, the conference has

moved away the “obstacles” in solving the party organization question and, at other side, that he hope we, the comrades who do not satisfy the results of that conference, will not be “non-cooperation” and “sabotage.” Fortunately the “obstacles” not only did not go to “non-cooperation” and “sabotage,” but they are still as active as before. If those “obstacles” had really been moved away from CCP by Maring, I don’t know how maring will greet the success of that conference.

As soon as the conference was closed, the mistakes of that conference were shown out. The atmosphere of opposing the theses of our relation with GMD was developed in the branches of CCP and the opponents may be in majority. Moreover, such big branches like Changsha, Hankow [Hankou] and Beijing were trying to demand a party conference soon called once more to settle this question of our relation with GMD. At that time we not only did not utilize these opportunity to set against last conference and the new EC of CCP but also by our help such atmosphere was put down because we know quite well that our poor party was hardly to bear such blows.

In last party conference when the question of our relation with koumintang was hotly discussed some comrades did not proceed purely along the objective observations of the actual Chinese situation and, moreover, instead of avoiding the difficulties in that hot discussion, even utilized the troubles of our party organization question inside or outside of the conference to attack on me. I don’t know now that how I has been talked in Moscow. I shall answer openly: “yes, we are young, it is quite nature that we all together have maken many mistakes, even very simple mistakes, but some mistakes did not and shall never make.”

You both remind me that I must stand for the integrity of the young and still weak CCP and Com Mussin even expressed that he believes that I shall not try to create any new difficulties and dissensions in the party. Surely I have been and am being stand for the unity of our poor party. Communism which I regard as my life and the young Chinese communist movement in which from the very beginning I took part will never be harmed by my own hands.

In general speaking now our party has no trouble coming from last conference. Even some small troubles often come out in this or that branch of CCP, it is only because our party is not well organized and the members are too young and individualistic. Our party work make no progress recently largely because we meet the actual difficulties such as lack of means. Some decisions did not carry out by the new EC but it never means that the comrades prevented their carrying out. I shall now prefer to write a few lines about party work by my own views.

Since our conference decided the tactics with regard to GMD, it seems to me that the party organs now make no intensive propaganda or demand on GMD question. Even the declaration for a national congress published by our party, but no propaganda was maken on this proposal. Our party presses cannot published in time.

One of the best branches is the branch in Changsha which influenced by the war situation, together with the trade unions in Changsha are now in a position hardly to be active. The headquarter of that branch in Changsha was suppressed by general

Tao-Hen-Ti [Zhao Hengti, the military governor of Hunan]. The Supporting Diplomacy Society in Hankow [Hankou] which was a nationalist organization against Japan and recently set itself begin to attack British imperialists and upon which we based more or less to carry on nationalist movement in Hankow was also suppressed by the Tuchun of Hupei [Hubei]. The trade union movement in some places shows itself progress. As I did not get the whole information now I cannot tell exactly But at the same time there is also some crisis shown. There are some labor leaders in Shanghai who are more or less opposing to us plan to call national labor congress, national railway workers' congress and the workers conference of Beijing-Hankow line. Of course, there are some politicians stand to support the plans of these labor leaders. We have also the plan to call those conferences. Whether we can cooperate with them in a smooth way or not, it is still unknown. Politicians of Communication clique [*Jiaotongxi*] and Marshall Chang-Tso-Lin [Zhang Zuolin] and others are trying to utilize the workers for their struggle against Chili [Zhili] clique. Some workers' leaders seek for support from this or that politician. Chang-Tso-Lin's 10,000 dollars for the Beijing-Hankow Railway union were much spreaded among the workers. Too much hope for Chang Tso Lin's victory has been expressed by the railway workers. That a worker communist in the Beijing-Hankow Railway union in Hankow ran away with 2,000 dollars causes the loss of the communist confidence among the workers and the workers thus went to some other labor leaders who are more or less opposing to us. If those leaders would, in one side, get close relation with some politicians or Chang Tso Lin and, in other side, get confidence from the workers, In future it may be the main cause to split labor movement in central and northern China. Before these leaders have no any connection with any politicians, it is that we sending comrades to Mukden [i.e. to Zhang Zuolin's headquarters, Shenyang] opened their attempts. We have done the mistake of sending comrades to Mukden so now we may suffer the losses.

In conclusion, we must not neglect the good side of CCP While we saw the comrades who attended the last conference took an active part in discussing the political questions in a practical way. It show the growth of our party. I was very glad for this fact and mentioned this fact a few times in that conference. The CCP, the only one we have, organized by a group of young sincere revolutionists who want to act along the marxist line will have its future. I hope Comintern and Profintern will give us more support, especially for the trade union movement, so that the Chinese movement can be progressive more rapidly.

A few words shall be written on my personal conditions now. I am now working in Beijing. My task is to editor the Labor [Workers'] Weekly [*Laodong zhoukan*] in Beijing which distributed 2500 copies every week. At the same time I am in charge of the political committee of the Beijing branch CCP and work for the Committee for Organization of National Federation of Chinese Railway Workers. I also constantly write some articles of our party presses and GMD presses. But now I am not a pure worker for the party, so I must spend some time to work for myself. I myself spent one part of the money which given by the eastern department of Comintern

for buying the Chinese publications, but, of course, I must return this money within short time and send more publications to you. The publications which sent to you every two weeks one time, I think, have been received by you.

Hoping that you will send some publications to me and write me something about moscow and that you will answer promptly and give full criticism on what I write above.

Yours fraternally
K.T.Chang

A.22 Manifesto of the Third National Congress of the CCP (June 1923)⁹⁹

The Chinese people are doubly oppressed both by foreign powers and by warlords, and the nation's existence as well as the freedom of its people are in an extremely precarious state. Not only the workers, peasants, and students, but also the peaceful and moderate merchants feel oppressed.

The farcical confusion of the present Beijing regime; the increasing oppression and destruction of trade unions and students' federations by the northern warlords' regime; the unruliness of soldiers and bandits in Shandong and Henan; the threats by foreign powers to retract, on various pretexts, benefits granted by the Washington Conference; the atrocities committed by the Japanese sailors at Shashi and Changsha; the powers' forced cotton exports from China; the Guangdong fighting engineered by Wu Peifu and Qi Xieyuan; disorders in Sichuan fostered by Wu Peifu and Xiao Yaonan; civil war looming between the Zhili and Fengtian factions; and imbroglios among the various cliques within the Zhili faction: all these show how internal and external troubles have again beset the people. There is no salvation unless the people muster up their own strength in a national movement for self-determination. [All] this also demonstrates that the national revolutionary movement led by our party with the slogans "down with the warlords" and "down with international imperialism" is on the right path.

The GMD should be the central force of the national revolution and should assume its leadership. Unfortunately, however, the GMD often suffers from two erroneous notions. First, it relies on foreign powers for help in the Chinese national revolution. Such requests for help from the enemy not only cause the [GMD] to lose the leadership of the national revolution but also make the people depend on foreign power, thus destroying their confidence and spirit of national independence. Second, [the GMD] concentrates all its efforts on military action, neglecting propaganda work among the people. Consequently, the GMD loses its political leadership because a national revolutionary party can never succeed by relying solely on military action without winning nationwide popular sympathy.

We still hope that all the revolutionary elements in our society will rally to the GMD, speeding the completion of the national revolutionary movement. At the same time, [we also] hope that the GMD will resolutely discard its two old notions of reliance on foreign powers and concentration on military action, and that it will pay attention to political propaganda among the people—never missing an opportunity for [such] propaganda in order to create a true central force for the national welfare and a true leadership for the national revolution.

Considering economic and political conditions at home and abroad, and the sufferings and needs of [those] classes of Chinese society (workers, peasants, industrialists, and merchants) which urgently need a national revolution, the CCP never forgets for one moment to support the interests of the workers and peasants. It is our special task to conduct propaganda and organizational work among the workers and peasants. Still more central is our task to lead the workers and peasants into joining the national revolution. Our mission is to liberate the oppressed Chinese nation by a national revolution, and to advance to the world revolution, liberating the oppressed peoples and oppressed classes of the whole world.

Long live the Chinese national revolution!

Long live the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world!

Long live the liberation of the oppressed classes of the world!

A.23. Resolution on the Nationalist Movement and the Question of the GMD (June 1923)¹⁰⁰

(1) In colonial and semicolonial countries oppressed by international imperialism, it is possible to carry out the national revolution only by striking forcefully at the imperialists. This is the task such countries must accomplish in the world revolution.

(2) The current rulers of China are feudal warlords, not the bourgeoisie. The warlord government calls itself independent, but in reality it takes orders from the international imperialist powers. They do well as their managers running the finance, communications, and industry that are in the hands of the international imperialists. The Chinese bourgeoisie controls just an extremely small part of the daily production. The imperialists make use of their political power in China to obstruct the free development of Chinese industry. Therefore, semicolonial China must make the democratic national movement its central task in order to remove internal and external oppression.

(3) In accordance with China's social situation, there should be a powerful centralized party to act as the supreme headquarters of the democratic nationalist movement. China currently has a party. Only the GMD is a relatively democratic revolutionary party. At this time, because of the conditions of each class in society,

it is very difficult to create a bigger and more revolutionary party. Even if one could be created, it would only cause disunity and fragmentation of democratic revolutionary power.

(4) Because of the backwardness of industry, the Chinese working class is still in its infancy. The consciousness of the majority of the laboring masses is stuck in the patriarchal society. The tendency toward being apolitical is extremely strong. Only a minority of industrial workers have already realized the need for a democratic movement. Those who can really understand communism and CP organization represent an even smaller minority. Consequently, the workers' movement cannot yet powerfully rise up to create an independent social force that is needed for China's current revolution.

(5) Since the working class has not become powerful, naturally a strong CP, a great mass party, cannot be developed to meet the demands of the current revolution. Therefore, the ECCI passed a resolution that the CCP must cooperate with the Chinese GMD. CP members must join the GMD. The CCP CEC also feels this need and decided to enforce this resolution. The resolution has also been adopted by this Congress.¹⁰¹

(6) In joining the GMD, we must maintain our own organization and strive to absorb the truly class-conscious, revolutionary elements from the workers' organizations and from the left wing of the GMD in order gradually to expand our organization, tighten our discipline, and build among the masses a strong foundation for the CP.

(7) In the GMD we should pay attention to the following: (a) In political propaganda, we must uphold our true identity of noncompromise with any imperialist or warlord. (b) We must prevent the GMD from concentrating all its force on military activities while neglecting propaganda among the people; we must also prevent the GMD tendency toward compromise in the political movement and toward reformism in the labor movement. (c) Members of the CP and the SYL must unite and work in unison by words and deeds. (d) We must force the GMD toward Soviet Russia; always alert the GMD to the danger of being fooled by the arrogant and greedy foreign powers.

(8) We must strive to extend the GMD organization throughout the whole of China and to rally all Chinese revolutionary elements to the GMD to meet the requirements of the present Chinese national revolution. At the same time, our special work is to strive to promote an independent organization for the National Labor Federation and conduct both economic and political struggle. We must strive to lead the laboring masses from a struggle for daily livelihood to a political one. The current political struggle is naturally a nationalist movement—one to eliminate foreign influences and warlords. Thus, a large-scale national propaganda campaign should be launched among the laboring masses so as to expand the national revolution and the GMD. At the same time, it is also necessary to bring into our organization those revolutionary elements who are fully aware of the necessity of the national revolution and who have, furthermore, class consciousness. Widespread

propaganda on the “necessity of supporting the interests of the laboring class in the national revolution” should be carried out among the masses.

A.24 The First Revised Constitution of the CCP (June 1923)¹⁰²

Chapter One: Party Membership

1. Members of our party are not differentiated on the basis of nationality or sex. Those who acknowledge our party’s program and constitution and are willing to serve our party loyally can become members of our party.

2. To be granted probationary membership of the party, one must be sponsored by two people who have held party membership for over half a year, [the application] must be passed by a meeting of the cell [*xiaozu*], examined by the district committee [*difang weiyuanhui*], and approved by the area committee [*qu weiyuanhui*]. The probation period is three months for laborers and six months for nonlaborers; this period may be extended or shortened at the discretion of the district committee. A probationary member may only participate in cell meetings and enjoys the right to speak and to vote. Other duties are identical to those of a regular party member.

3. Party members accepted by the CEC must also go through a probationary period after their district committees have been notified. Those who hold membership in CPs recognized by the Comintern may become regular members of our party after having been checked by the Party Center [*zhongyang*].

4. When a party member voluntarily applies for withdrawal from the party, his or her application must be approved by the area [committee], the party membership card and other important documents must be returned, sponsors must guarantee that he or she will strictly keep all party secrets, and, in the event of violation of this commitment, the area executive committee will take appropriate measures to deal with him or her.

Chapter Two: Organization

5. In the countryside, in factories, railways, mines, barracks, schools, and other organizations and their surroundings, a party cell may be formed as long as there are between five and ten members. A cell head should be appointed by general acclaim. The cell will come under the district branch [or local *difang zhibu*]. Where there are less than five members, they should also have an organization, appoint a secretary by general acclaim, and be placed under the nearest area [committee] or be placed directly under the CEC. (If there is a district branch where there is no cell, it should be placed directly under the area executive committee; if there is

no area executive committee, it should be placed directly under the Party Center.)

6. If there are ten members in one locality and if approval is granted by the CEC, the area executive committee may send a person there to convene a full members' or delegates' congress. This congress is to elect three persons to form the district executive committee; it is also to elect three alternate members—when committee members have to leave their posts for any reason, they are to be replaced temporarily by alternate members. In localities where there is no area executive committee, the CEC is to send personnel down to organize a district executive committee. It will come under the Party Center. On the formation of the area executive committee, the area executive committee will take over responsibility and powers of the district executive committee.

7. If an area has more than two district executive committees and when the CEC deems it necessary to organize an area executive committee, it will send personnel to the area in question to convene a delegates' congress. The congress is to elect five people to form the area executive committee as well as three alternate members; if committee members have to leave their post for any reason, they are to be temporarily replaced by alternate members. When the CEC deems it necessary, it may entrust a district executive committee to take over temporarily the responsibilities and powers of the area executive committee. The jurisdiction of an area is determined by the CEC and is subject to constant change.

8. The CEC is to be composed of nine persons elected by the National Congress; five alternate members are also elected by the Congress; when members leave their posts, they must be replaced temporarily by alternate members.

9. The term of office for CEC members is one year; for area and district committee members it is six months. There is no set limit on the tenure of heads of cells, but they must be subject to reelection.

10. The CEC implements all resolutions passed by the Congress and deliberates and decides on our party's policies and all the methods of implementation; area and district executive committees implement resolutions passed by superior organs and, within their jurisdiction and authority, deliberate and decide on all methods of execution. Every committee is to elect a committee chair to take overall charge of party affairs; other committee members shall be responsible for separate duties but shall work together.

11. The resolutions passed by the National Congress or the CEC and special problems that arise unexpectedly are to be handled by special commissions made up of several party members who are appointed by area and district executive committees; when such special commissions convene meetings, the chair of such meetings must be a member of an area or district executive committee.

Chapter Three: Meetings

12. Each cell must meet at least once a week as convened by the cell head. All districts [*difang*] must convene a full members' meeting at least once a month (in