THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER

Volume 2: A The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760–1914

NEW EDITION

Michael Mann



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The sources of social power

VOLUME 2

The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760–1914

Distinguishing four sources of power in human societies – ideological, economic, military, and political – *The Sources of Social Power* traces their interrelations throughout history. This second volume of Michael Mann's analytical history of social power deals with power relations between the Industrial Revolution and World War I, focusing on France, Great Britain, Hapsburg Austria, Prussia/Germany, and the United States. Based on considerable empirical research, it provides original theories of the rise of nations and nationalism, of class conflict, of the modern state, and of modern militarism. While not afraid to generalize, it also stresses social and historical complexity. Michael Mann sees human society as "a patterned mess" and attempts to provide a sociological theory appropriate to this. This theory culminates in the final chapter, an original explanation of the causes of World War I. First published in 1993, this new edition of Volume 2 includes a new preface by the author examining the impact and legacy of the work.

Michael Mann is Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of *Power in the 21st Century: Conversations with John Hall* (2011), *Incoherent Empire* (2003), and *Fascists* (Cambridge 2004). His book *The Dark Side of Democracy* (Cambridge 2005) was awarded the Barrington Moore Award of the American Sociological Association for the best book in comparative and historical sociology in 2006.

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Preface to the new edition

This book is bold and ambitious. It charts and explains the development of power relations in the advanced countries of the world over 150 years and interprets this with the aid of a general theory of power in human societies. Readers of my first volume will be familiar by now with my argument that the development of human societies can be explained in terms of the interrelations of four sources of social power – ideological, economic, military, and political (the IEMP model). These sources generate networks of interaction whose boundaries do not coincide. Instead, they overlap, intersect, entwine, and sometimes fuse, in ways that defy simple or unitary explanations of society given by social scientists. More importantly, they also defy the ability of social actors to fully understand their social situation, and it is that uncertainty which makes human action somewhat unpredictable and which perpetually develops social change.

And yet this book is not as big in scope as my other three volumes. Unlike them, it is not global. One enthusiastic reviewer did begin his review of this one with the word "Colossal!" and ended saying "this volume stands alone for its heroic scope, and the depth of its analysis attests to the author's vision and determination" (Snyder, 1995: 167). Yet others were disappointed with what they saw as a narrowing of my scope compared to Volume 1. Here I am resolutely focused from beginning to end on Europe and America. I narrowed my focus firstly because in the "long nineteenth century" Europe and its white settler colonies constituted the "leading edge" of power in the world. This was the first period in world history in which one regional civilization came to dominate all four sources of social power across the world – ideological, economic, military, and political. This dominance was not to last long but it was still firmly in place in July 1914 at the end of the period covered by this volume. Yet this volume is even more tightly focused, for it largely ignores the global empires of these Powers. I have been criticized on both counts as being "Eurocentric," but I feel that this is misplaced for this is avowedly a book about only a part, albeit the most important part, of the world at that time. It was never my intention to ignore the global empires or the globe as a whole, and they are the subject matter of Volumes 3 and 4.

However, in my decision to focus on the leading advanced countries, methodological issues also played a part. I am often asked about my method. I confess to being methodologically unconscious. I just do what

I do without thinking much about my method. Joseph Bryant (2006) and Tim Jacoby (2004) give a much better explanation of my methodology and my ontology than I could ever provide. However, there are certain practical patterns to what I do. First, I cut down on the range of countries and regions by focusing on the leading edge of power, the most advanced civilizations at any one point in time. I have most obviously done that in Volume 2 where I only discuss the five leading countries in European civilization: Britain, France, Prussia/Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the United States (with Russia playing a more intermittent role).

Second, I then read everything I can on this edge within the limits of my linguistic abilities, but I stop reading when the result becomes simply to add detail or minor qualifications to my argument. I reached this point much sooner for earlier historical periods than later ones because in early history I could read almost everything published. But preparing Volume 2 was a learning experience for me. Even after deciding to focus on a few countries, my aspiration to read even half of what was available on them meant I was spending an inordinate amount of time and writing too much to be able to accomplish my original intent of including imperial history too, and of reaching the present day in my narrative. So I left the empires to Volume 3 (adding the American and Japanese empires), and I only reach up to today in Volume 4.

So with Volume 2 half-finished but already too long, I realized that if I was ever to reach the present day, I had not only to write more volumes but also to be much more selective in my reading. Luckily, technology then came to my aid. The development of online capabilities has added useful shortcuts to my reading task. In Volumes 3 and 4 I have been able to enter a period or problem by searching for relevant online university syllabi. The syllabi give me a sense of what every student is expected to read on the topic and the better ones also give me a preliminary sense of current debates. I then use recent book reviews and review articles in journals available to me online through UCLA's fine library resources to read further on current thinking. I soon learned to greatly prefer the type of book review that states clearly the book's arguments and data to the more self-indulgent review in which the author concentrates on giving his/her own opinions on the topic. Then I read the selected works. This method is probably the reason why I cite more books than journal articles, which I had not realized until Rogers Brubaker pointed it out to me. However, "read" is not always the most appropriate description for my treatment of books, because very often I "pillage" them, glancing though the table of contents and the index for sections that bear on the themes I am pursuing, neglecting the rest. This is a scholarly sin, of course, but it is absolutely necessary in any very general work, given the immensity of today's scholarly production.

The third aspect of my method in all my volumes has been to continuously zig-zag between theory and data, developing a general idea, then testing and refining it on the historical evidence, then back to theory, then once again to data and so on, and so forth. In one respect here this volume differs from Volume 1. There I had noted that explanations of why Europe pioneered the way to modernity cannot employ the comparative method, because there are no other "pristine" cases of such a breakthrough (Japan's remarkable breakthrough came through conscious adaptation of European institutions). All one could do was to compare Europe to the one case that might have broken through to industrial capitalism but did not do so – Imperial China. In Volume 2, however, I can deploy the comparative method, because Europe became divided into nation-states, which had enough boundedness and enough similarities and differences in their development to permit a comparative analysis of them. Some readers took my rejection of the comparative method in Volume 1 as being principled. But no, it was pragmatic, and in this volume reality allows me to do comparative research.

Once again, however, this volume expresses a distinctively sociological view of history, one that is more concerned with theoretical questions than is the case among historians, yet is more concerned with history than is the case among sociologists. This is true even in this volume, which does not have great geographical or historical breadth.

Let me state what I consider to be its strengths. I continue here my argument established in Volume 1 that "societies" are not unitary or systemic. Human societies are constituted by power networks – ideological, economic, military, and political power – which do not have the same boundaries. These networks are overlapping, intersecting, and entwining, forming much looser units than most sociologists have accepted. In the period covered in this volume, as I say on page 9, states harden into nation-states with a certain degree of boundedness. But they nonetheless entwine with a broader transnational "Western civilization" which was in a sense competing as a basic membership unit. Thus sociology's master concept, "society" kept metamorphosing between the nation-state and the civilization. But the similarity and the distinctiveness of each national unit, and the fact that they were erecting what I call "cages" around part of the lives of their subjects/citizens, enabled me to do comparative analysis of them.

These comparisons centre on what I identify as the two main actors of modern times: classes and nation-states. I argue that the two cannot be seen, as is conventional, as utterly separate from each other. Nor are they opposites, the one undercutting the other. Instead, economic and political power relations have developed entwined with each other, influencing rather than undercutting each other's development.

Recent trends in the disciplines of sociology and history have served to obscure this. When I began writing this volume, class analysis dominated. What was called "social history" focused overwhelmingly on class relations, and especially on the working class. There was then a reaction against this overemphasis in the form of a general "cultural turn" in which culture took over from the economy as the main object of study. Insofar as classes were discussed at all, this was in terms of discourses, symbolic communication, and the like rather than concrete labour relations or the material means of production. This was one result of the decline of the traditional left in Western society, which was occurring from the 1980s onward. But a new left was also emerging, centred not on class but on "identity" rights, especially those of gender and ethnicity. Writers on gender relations then took much attention away from class analysis, though some were concerned to specify the relations between class and gender. But those focusing on ethnicity virtually ignored class relations, and that has been especially true of those working on nations and nationalism. Thus class and nation have been kept apart, in separate boxes, class predominating at first, then nation, thus obscuring the fact that class and nation have developed together, entwined. It is now conventional, for example, to say that World War I represented the triumph of nation over class. Yet we shall see in both this volume and Volume 3 that their interrelations were far more complex than this.

I believe that this book remains the best treatment available of the development of the modern state. Chapter 3 presents my own theory of the modern state. My notion that states "crystallize" in different forms as a result of both their different functions and the pressure of different constituencies on them is better able to cope with the real-world messiness of political life. Second, my treatment of the five states is rooted in a detailed statistical analysis of their finances and employment records, and on this quantitative basis I can launch into some grand historical generalizations. In the course of this period, the main functions of the state changed radically. At the beginning of the period, its main function was in the financing and the fighting of war. Charles Tilly famously remarked that "war made the state and the state made war" (1975: 42). But I find this was only so in Europe up to the mid-nineteenth century. Nor did I think it likely that either his model or mine would fully apply to other continents. In fact, Centeno (2002) found that it only applied to the history of Latin America in a negative sense. There states rarely made war and they remained puny, and Herbst (2000) says more or less the same thing about postcolonial Africa. So the question there turns to "why did they not make war?" By the end of the century, Western state civilian functions, like building infrastructures, education, public health, and the first stirrings of the welfare state, had emerged to rival warmaking. It

was now a dual civil-military state, a character it retained during most of the twentieth century, although near the end of that century many states were predominantly pursuing civilian roles. They have lost their historic backbone. We can also see from my data that states developed greater infrastructural power over their territories, even though, surprisingly, their overall financial size was no greater as a proportion of the overall economy than it had been at the beginning of the period – because the growth of the economy was actually slightly greater than the growth of the state. It was not yet a Leviathan, nor was it as bureaucratic as is often assumed. On Sundays, U.S. President Harrison (in office from 1889 to 1893) would open the White House front door himself, because it was the butler's day off.

The third strength of my analysis of political power is the emphasis I place on the rise of the nation-state. This offers further justification of my oft-criticized, unconventional distinction between political and military power. The role of political power relations in this period is more in terms of collective power (power through people) than of distributive power (power over people). The rising costs of war followed by the growth of state infrastructures meant that people and their interaction networks were gradually mobilized into nations. The metaphor I use is that they were "caged" and "naturalized" within the nation-state. This was consequential because social relations – especially class relations – came to vary mainly according to the configuration of political power in each country. Although the economic power relations of capitalism varied across the advanced world, they were less important than national variations in political power in determining the various outcomes of labour conflict.

In the realm of classes, the period of this volume saw the phenomenal growth of a capitalism, which generated the first and the second industrial revolutions and massive economic growth. This led to the development of modern social classes like the capitalist, middle, working, and peasant classes. I focus for much of the time on the relations between workers and capitalists, although I discuss the middle class in Chapter 16 and the peasantry in Chapter 19. I show that the peasantry was capable of much more collective organization than Marx had argued, and that the middle class was very diverse, and not nearly as nationalistic as is often believed. In my book *Fascists* (2004), I show that they were not more susceptible to fascism than were other classes. All these classes were extremely important from the time of the French Revolution to World War I, because industrial capitalism became the fundamental economic power structure of society. Those sociologists who have criticized me for writing at length on class relations (on the grounds that class is passé) do not seem to grasp the realities in the long nineteenth century.

Yet class relations between workers and their capitalist employers have been ambiguous, in two different senses. First, workers do feel exploited, yet they must cooperate on a daily basis with their employer in order to obtain their daily bread. Thus conflict versus cooperation is a perennial choice for both workers and their employers. Secondly, when workers do organize, three possible forms of solidarity emerge: class solidarity among the working class as a whole, sectional solidarity among workers in a particular trade, and segmental solidarity among workers in a particular enterprise. Here I argue that whether conflict or cooperation predominates and which combination of these three forms conflict takes are explained more by political than economic power relations. Most specifically, the more workers are excluded from sharing in political power, the more likely they are to form class-based organizations, to find plausible the claims of socialists or anarcho-syndicalists, and to be attracted by the prospect of revolution rather than reform. Thus, the ordering in terms of the emergence of class, socialist and revolutionary sentiments runs from Russia, through Austria-Hungary and Germany, to France and Britain, and finally to the United States.

I now turn to considering criticisms and misinterpretations of the volume. Some have interpreted my analysis in variations in class consciousness as my saying that political power relations are more important than economic ones and so they conclude that this book is "state-centric" (e.g., Tarrow, 1994; Mulhall, 1995). I reject this. In my conclusion on page 737, I identify two phases of what I call dual determination. In the first phase, lasting until 1815, economic and military power relations predominated in the structuring of societies. But in the course of the nineteenth century, power shifted and by the end of the century economic and political power relations (capitalism and nation-states) predominated. On the face of it this would seem to give economic power relations some priority, which is not surprising given that these two phases correspond to the onset of the first and second capitalist industrial revolutions. It also implies that the advanced world became *more* state-centric and that is one of my main arguments in this volume. But these dualities are heroic simplifications of a very complex reality, and I should admit that I have always been a little uneasy with them. And comparable heroic simplifications of other times and periods would look rather different.

As far as class relations are concerned, I should point out that it is principally the variations between countries that are more explicable in terms of political power relations. That there was everywhere in this period pronounced labour discontent is explicable in terms of the nature of the economic power relations intrinsic to capitalism, while I also acknowledge that to explain the emergence of sectional and segmental organization, we need to also pay attention to craft and corporate structure. The

structure of capitalism is obviously also a *necessary* part of any explanation, and when we combine this with political power relations, we have a *sufficient* explanation of class outcomes. But I do not intend to elevate political over economic power in this period.

George Lawson (2006: 491) airs the possibility that my work as a whole contains an implicit hierarchy with military power at the top, followed by political power, then economic power, and finally ideological power. I think this would be a misinterpretation. Given that military power is neglected in most social science, I may mention it too much for most tastes. But my own view is that both military power and ideological power are rather more erratic in their effects than are the other two. They sometimes emerge powerfully in world-historical moments, militarism launching great transformative wars and ideological power turning occasionally transcendent and leading revolutionary changes in the way that people view the world. But otherwise military power stays on the sidelines in the form of a military caste minding its own business. Similarly, for the most part, ideological power largely reproduces dominant power relations (as Marxists argue). In this volume military power was important at the beginning and the very end of the period (except in the colonies, where it was continuously important), and it became more important again in the twentieth century, while ideological power never really matched the heights of the period of the much earlier emergence of the world religions or the heights of twentieth-century secular ideologies. I make more general comments on the interrelations and relative importance of the power sources at the end of Volume 4, but I reject the idea of any simple hierarchy among them.

Within Europe after 1815, this was largely a period of peace, so military power relations actually figure less in this volume than they did in Volume 1 or than they will in Volume 3. Their main entrances are at the beginning and the end. In the latter case we see evidence of the relative autonomy of militaries from civilian state control, and this was important in helping cause World War I. I discuss this in Chapter 21. In Volume 3, I briefly revisit these causes. And I should note that there I added to the explanation of the causes of this war greater emphasis on the thousand-year European tradition of militarism and imperialism. Europeans had long been from Mars. This chapter has received much praise and it is in many ways the clearest vindication of my overall model of human society. As I conclude, on page 796, the war "resulted from the unintended consequences of the interaction of overlapping, intersecting power networks." No one could control the whole or could predict the reactions of other nations, classes, statesmen, and militaries. That was why in August 1914 a disastrous war began, one that was to ensure the demise of European power, whose rise I had charted in Volume 1. Military power relations

were also to play a role in the denouement of class relations in the first half of the twentieth century. Only in countries that were effectively defeated in the two world wars were there serious attempts at revolution. This I show in Volume 3. These are examples of my most fundamental point: that we cannot explain major social developments in any period without considering the entwinings of more than a single source of social power. Ideological, economic, military, and political determinisms must all be rejected. However, in this period, having excluded colonies from my purview, military power and political power are closely entwined. In the advanced countries armies are no longer feudal, and paramilitaries and civil wars are rare. The wars discussed here are between states. It is really only the tendencies toward military castes, distinct from the civilian authorities, that maintain the autonomy of military from political power in this place, in this period.

Turning to ideological power, some criticize me for being too materialist, too instrumental, and too rationalist. In principle my model is none of these things, although my practice has sometimes faltered. I prefer the term "ideology" to "culture" or "discourse," not because I view ideologies as false or a cover for interests, as materialists sometimes say. By ideology I mean only a broad-ranging meaning system that "surpasses experience." "Culture" and "discourse" are too all-encompassing terms, covering the communication of all beliefs, values, and norms, even sometimes all "ideas" about anything. When used so generally, they presuppose a contrast between only two realms, the "ideal" and the "material," leading to the traditional debate between idealism and materialism. The material might be conceived of as "nature" as opposed to "culture," or as the "economic base" versus the "superstructure," or as joint economic/military interests (as in international relations "realism") as opposed to "constructivism" – or even as "structure" as opposed to "agency."

These dualist debates are perennial. After a period dominated by materialist theories of everything, we now have cultural theories of everything. As noted earlier, "nation" and "ethnicity" have largely replaced "class" as objects of research; they are said to be "cultural," whereas classes are said to be "material"; they are usually discussed without any reference to classes; and "cultural" and "ethno-symbolist" have largely replaced "materialist" theories of nations and ethnicities. Thirty years ago, fascism was explained in relation to capitalism and classes; now it is seen as a "political religion." My books *Fascists* and *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* suggest that this is not progress, but a shift among equally one-sided theories.

Nonetheless, I may have given the impression of being a materialist in four different ways.

(1) I use the word "material" when, to avoid confusion, I should have written "concrete" or "real." That is just an error of language, not of substance.

(2) I endorse John Hall's and Perry Anderson's description of my theory as "organizational materialism," and this often involves emphasizing the "logistics" and "infrastructures" of ideological power, sometimes at the expense of the content of their doctrines. My originality here lies clearly with the organization of power, and I continue to emphasize that. I also find myself at least as drawn to Durkheim's emphasis on religious rituals as to Weber's emphasis on doctrine. Nonetheless, I should not neglect either.

(3) I declare here on page 35 (as I also had in Volume 1, pages 471–2) that ideological power declined through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I still think this is broadly true within the most advanced countries, yet I did not discuss in this volume the major ideology of the period – racism. Lawson (2006: 492) goes further. He suggested to me that I neglect a whole series of nineteenth-century ideologies. He lists racism, Darwinism, colonialism, imperialism, nationalism, Marxism, and liberalism as the main ones. In one sense I do neglect the first four of them. But they form an interrelated group that was largely significant because of Europe and America's overseas empires. For example, racism was only important in this period in colonies and not mother countries, except for the United States. I do exclude empires from this volume, but I deal extensively with them and with this cluster of ideologies in Volume 3. As for nationalism, Marxism, and liberalism, I think I do discuss them in this volume.

(4) I declare that the extensive power of religion has continued to decline since the nineteenth century in the face of rising secular ideologies like socialism and nationalism. Having subsequently researched twentieth- and twenty-first-century fascism, ethno-nationalism, and religious fundamentalism, I now disown half of this statement. My emphasis on rising secular ideologies is correct, but I accept Gorski's (2006) criticism that religion has not generally declined in the world. I was generalizing only on the basis of traditional Christian faiths in Europe, which indeed still are declining, although much of the rest of the world differs. More specific criticisms with some force are that I have sometimes been too rationalistic about religions in earlier periods, and that I neglected the religious content of eighteenth-century politics (Bryant, 2006; Trentmann, 2006). Edgar Kiser (2006) is also right to see me as trying to lessen the rationalism and moving toward greater recognition of value- and emotion-driven behaviour in my later work on fascism (2004) and ethnic cleansing (2005).

My model of power ultimately abandons the distinction between ideas and materiality in favour of one between "ideas and practices combined" (or "action and structure combined") in each of four power networks. Nonetheless, ideological power is clearly more idea-heavy than the others. It comprises networks of persons bearing ideologies that cannot be proved true or false, couched at a sufficient level of generality to be able to give "meaning" to a range of human actions in the world – as religions, socialism, and nationalism all do, for example. They also contain norms, rules of interpersonal conduct that are "sacred," strengthening conceptions of collective interest and cooperation, reinforced, as Durkheim said, by rituals binding people together in repeated affirmations of their commonality. So those offering plausible ideologies can mobilize social movements and wield a general power in human societies analogous to powers yielded by control over economic, military, and political power resources. This is when ideology is what I call "transcendent," for it cuts right through institutionalized practices of economic, military, and political power.

The period discussed in this volume is not one of major ideologies. I hope that in this volume, ideological power autonomy comes through in my conception of an "ideological power elite" steering the direction of the French Revolution in Chapter 6. Elsewhere in this volume I stress that European states sometimes crystallize in terms of religious disputations, but if I do not deal extensively elsewhere in this volume with religion, it is because I believe that, with the exception of racism (which I discuss extensively in Volume 3), Europe did not see much ideological power in this period and place. Religion was declining and the great twentieth-century ideologies of nationalism, socialism, and fascism were just beginning to stir. Though people were beginning caged within the nation, nationalism was still a rather shallow emotion among the working and middle classes, becoming virulent (I argue in Chapter 16) largely among those deriving their employment from the state. I do not claim to discuss *all* ideas, values, norms, and rituals, only those mobilized in macro-power struggles. Schroeder (2006) gives my defence of this neglect: ideas cannot *do* anything unless they are organized. This is why the label "organizational materialism" still seems partly apposite, whatever the economic images it might set up in the reader's mind, for ideas are not free-floating. Nor are economic acquisition, violence, or political regulation – they all need organizing. But maybe I should drop the word "materialism" and just say that I have an organizational model of power and society.

I must acknowledge one final omission: the absence of gender relations from this book. I admit on page 34 that I have omitted in this volume the more intimate aspects of human life. To a certain extent I repair this neglect in Volumes 3 and 4, although I doubt if this extent will satisfy my

critics. In the end, my defence against this charge of neglect is only that I cannot do everything! But I think you will agree that I do a lot of things in this book.

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Preface

This is the second volume of what is intended as a four-volume study of the sources of social power. It delivers, however, only 63 percent of the coverage promised in Volume 1, ending in 1914, not in 1990, as I announced there. Volume 3 will cover the twentieth century (perhaps the whole century, by the time I finish). The theoretical conclusion to *The Sources of Social Power* will be Volume 4. I hope all who have expressed interest in my conclusions will still be around then.

I have worked on the research for this volume for more than a decade, beginning in the mid-1970s, when I believed *Sources* would be one normal-sized book. Over the years, I have benefited from the labors, advice, and criticism of many. Roland Axtmann and Mark Stephens helped me collect the comparative statistics in Chapter 11, and Mark also aided me with Chapter 5. Jill Stein helped to collect data on the French revolutionaries for Chapter 6. Ann Kane contributed substantially to Chapter 19, as well as elsewhere, especially Chapter 16. Marjolein 't Hart, John Hobson, and John B. Legler showed me unpublished data for Chapter 11. Joyce Appleby and Gary Nash set me almost straight about the American Revolution; Ed Berenson and Ted Margadant, about the French Revolution; James Cronin and Patrick Joyce, about British labor history; and Kenneth Barkin and Geoff Eley, about German history. Christopher Dandeker commented generously on Chapter 12; Ronen Palan, on Chapters 3, 8, and 20; and Anthony Smith, on Chapter 7. John Stephens was extraordinarily helpful for Chapters 18 and 19. Randall Collins and Bill Domhoff have been helpful in their responses to both volumes. I also thank an anonymous reviewer of the first draft of this book. His or her critique forced me to clarify some of my central ideas.

I thank the London School of Economics and Political Science and the University of California at Los Angeles for providing me with supportive working environments over the last decade. Both also provided seminar series whose excellent discussions helped me clarify many ideas. The LSE Patterns of History seminar flourished principally because of the excitement provided by Ernest Gellner and John A. Hall; the seminars of the UCLA Center for Social Theory and Comparative History have depended especially on Bob Brenner and Perry Anderson. My secretaries, Yvonne Brown in London and Ke-Sook Kim, Linda Kiang, and Alisa Rabin in Los Angeles, have treated me and my work perhaps better than we deserve.

I owe the greatest intellectual debt to John A. Hall, who has continued for many years to provide me with perceptive criticisms entwined with warm friendship. To Nicky Hart and to our children, Louise, Gareth, and Laura, I owe love and perspective.

1 Introduction

This volume continues my history of power through the "long nineteenth century," from the Industrial Revolution to the outbreak of World War I. Focus is on five Western countries at the leading edge of power: France, Great Britain,[1] Habsburg Austria, Prussia-Germany, and the United States. My overall theory remains unchanged. Four sources of social power – ideological, economic, military, and political – fundamentally determine the structure of societies. My central questions also remain the same: What are the relations among these four power sources? Is one or more of them ultimately primary in structuring society?

The greatest social theorists gave contrary answers. Marx and Engels replied clearly and positively. In the last instance, they asserted, economic relations structure human societies. Max Weber replied more negatively, saying "no significant generalizations" can be made about the relations between what he called "the structures of social action." I reject Marxian materialism, but can I improve on Weberian pessimism?

There is both good news and bad news. I want you to read on, so I start with the good news. This volume will make three significant generalizations concerning primacy. I state them outright now; the rest of the book will add many details, qualifications, and caveats.

1. During the eighteenth century, two sources of social power, the economic and the military, preponderated in determining Western social structure. By 1800, the "military revolution" and the rise of capitalism had transformed the West, the former providing predominantly "authoritative" power and the latter predominantly "diffused" power. Because they were so closely entwined, neither can be accorded a singular ultimate primacy.

2. Yet, into the nineteenth century, as military power was subsumed into the "modern state" and as capitalism continued to revolutionize the economy, economic and political power sources began to dominate. Capitalism and its classes, and states and nations, became the decisive

[1] I discuss only mainland Britain, excluding Ireland, which Britain ruled throughout this period. After hesitation I decided to treat the only major European colony as I treat other colonies (except for the future United States) in this volume: excluding them except as they impacted on the imperial country.

power actors of modern times – the former still providing more diffuseness and ambiguity; the latter, most of the authoritative resolution of this ambiguity. Again, because they too were entwined, neither can be accorded a singular ultimate primacy.

3. Ideological power relations were of declining and lesser power significance during the period. Medieval Europe had been decisively structured by Christendom (as Volume I argues); in 1760, churches were still (just) revolutionizing the means of discursive communication. No comparable ideological power movement appeared later in this period, although churches kept many powers and literacy had considerable impact. The most important modern ideologies have concerned classes and nations. In terms of a distinction explained later, ideological power (except in rare revolutionary moments; see Chapters 6 and 7) was more "immanent" than "transcendent" in this period, aiding the emergence of collective actors created by capitalism, militarism, and states.

Now for the bad news, or, rather, complicating news from which we can actually construct a richer theory more appropriate to deal with the mess that constitutes real human societies:

1. The four power sources are not like billiard balls, which follow their own trajectory, changing direction as they hit each other. They "entwine," that is, their interactions change one another's inner shapes as well as their outward trajectories. The events discussed here – the French Revolution, British near hegemony, the emergence of nationalism or of socialism, middle-class or peasant politics, the causes and outcomes of wars, and so forth – involved the entwined development of more than one power source. I criticize "pure" and monocausal theories. Generalizations cannot culminate in a simple statement of "ultimate primacy." The three statements I made earlier turn out to be rough and "impure" generalizations, not laws of history.

2. My rough and impure generalizations also fail to distinguish between Parsons's (1960: 199–225) distributive and collective power; yet their histories differ. *Distributive power* is the power of actor A over actor B. For B to acquire more distributive power, A must lose some. But *collective power* is the joint power of actors A and B cooperating to exploit nature or another actor, C. In this period Western collective powers grew simply and dramatically: Commercial capitalism, then industrial capitalism, enhanced human conquest of nature; the military revolution enhanced Western powers; the modern state fostered the emergence of a new collective power actor, the nation. Though other sources of social power helped cause these developments, these three "revolutions" in collective power were primarily (and respectively) caused by economic, military, and political power relations (the

"revolution" in ideological power – the expansion of discursive literacy – was less "pure"). Distributive power changes were more complex and "impure." The growing collective powers of states actually lessened the powers of political elites over their subjects, as "party democracies" began to displace monarchies. Nor did military or ideological elites generally enhance their distributive power over others. Yet two major and impure distributive power actors, classes and nations, did emerge – first in response to military and economic power relations, then as institutionalized by political and economic power relations. Their complex history requires more than a few sentences to summarize.

3. Classes and nation-states also emerged entwined, adding more complexity. Conventionally, they have been kept in separate compartments and viewed as opposites: Capitalism and classes are considered "economic," national-states "political"; classes are "radical" and usually "transnational," nations "conservative," reducing the strength of classes. Yet they actually arose together, and this created a further unresolved problem of ultimate primacy: the extent to which social life was to be organized around, on the one hand, diffuse, market, transnational, and ultimately capitalist principles or, on the other, around authoritative, territorial, national, and statist ones. Was social organization to be transnational, national, or nationalist? Should states be authoritatively weak or strong, confederal or centralized? Were markets to be left unregulated, selectively protected, or imperially dominated? Was geopolitics to be peaceful or warlike? By 1914, no simple choice had been made – nor has one yet been made. These considerations remain the key ambivalences of modern civilization.

4. Classes and nation-states did not go unchallenged throughout the history of Western civilization. "Sectional" and "segmental" actors (rivals to classes) and transnational and "local-regional" actors (rivals to nations) endured. I treat such organizations as notable political parties, aristocratic lineages, military command hierarchies, and internal labor markets as segmental power organizations. I treat such social movements as minority (and some majority) churches, artisanal guilds, and secessionist movements as essentially local-regional alternatives to national organizations. All affected the makeup of classes and nation-states, reducing their power and their purity.

5. The cumulative effect of all these interactions – among the sources of social power, between collective and distributive power actors, between market and territory, and among classes, nations, sectional, segmental, transnational, and local-regional organizations – produced an overall complexity often exceeding the understanding of contemporaries. Their actions thus involved many mistakes, apparent accidents, and unintended consequences. These would then act back to

change the constitution of markets, classes, nations, religions, and so forth. I attempt to theorize mistakes, accidents, and unintended consequences, but they obviously provide yet more complexity.

Thus the discussion in this volume will broadly push forward my three rough, impure generalizations while recognizing these five additional complications. They cope with the patterned mess that is human society, as must all sociological theory.

I discuss sociological theories in this and the next two chapters. Then follow five groups of narrative chapters. Chapters 4–7 cover the period of the American, French, and Industrial revolutions, which I situate amid transformations of all four sources of power. Two had begun far earlier – capitalism and the military revolution – but during the eighteenth century they helped foster ideological and political transformations, each with its own partly autonomous logic – the rise of discursive literacy and the rise of the modern state. I take all four "revolutions" seriously. From the Boston Tea Party to the Great Reform Act, from the spinning jenny to George Stephenson's "Rocket," from the Tennis Court Oath to the Karlsbad Decrees, from the field of Valmy to that of Waterloo – events were impure, presupposing varying combinations of the four power revolutions, carrying classes, nations, and their rivals forward in complex forms that often escaped their own control. Chapter 7 presents my overall account of power developments during this early part of the period, putting final causal emphasis on military states and commercial capitalism.

Chapters 9 and 10 focus on Prussian-Austrian rivalry in Central Europe and on the complex developing relations between class and national actors. They explain the eventual triumph there of relatively centralized nation-states over more decentralized confederal regimes. The conclusion to Chapter 10 summarizes the arguments of these two chapters and discusses whether Central European resolutions were general across Western civilization.

Chapters 11–14 analyze the rise of the modern state. I present statistics on the finances and personnel of the five states, and I disaggregate state growth into four distinct processes: size, scope, representation, and bureaucracy. The massive growth in size was military-led, occurring up to 1815, politicizing much of social life. It fostered extensive and political classes, as well as nations, at the expense of local-regional and transnational actors. Contrary to general belief, most states did not grow again until World War I. But after 1850, states – mainly responding to the industrial phase of capitalism – vastly extended their civilian scope and, quite unintentionally, this integrated the nation-state, fostered national classes, and weakened transnational and local-regional power actors.

Most functionalist, Marxian, and neo-Weberian theories of the modern state emphasize its increasing size, scope, efficiency, and homogeneity. Yet, as states grew and then diversified, their two emerging control mechanisms – representation and bureaucracy – struggled to keep pace. Representative conflicts centered on which classes and which religious and linguistic communities should be represented and where they should be represented; that is, how centralized and national should the state be? Although the "who" has been much theorized, the "where" has not. True, there are many empirical studies of states' rights in the United States and of nationalities in Habsburg Austria. But struggle between the centralized nation and local-regional power actors was actually universal, and the representative and national issues were always entwined. Because neither issue was resolved during this period, as states grew they became less coherent. This became glaringly evident in the disjunction between domestic and foreign policy: Classes became obsessed with domestic politics while political and military elites enjoyed privacy in foreign policy. Marxism, elite theory, and pluralist theory see states as too coherent. I apply my own "polymorphous" theory, presented in Chapter 3, to show that modern states "crystallized," often messily, in four main forms – as capitalist, as militarist, and with differing solutions to the representative and national issues. The conclusion of Chapter 14 summarizes my theory of the rise of the modern state.

The fourth group, Chapters 15–20, deals with class movements among middle and lower classes and with the emergence of popular nations after 1870. Commercial and industrial capitalism developed class, sectional, and segmental organizations simultaneously and ambiguously. I attribute outcomes mainly to authoritative political power relations. Chapter 15 discusses the "first working class," in early nineteenth-century Britain. Chapter 16 treats three middle-class fractions – petite bourgeoisie, professionals, and careerists – and their relations with nationalism and the nation-state. Chapters 17 and 18 describe the three-way competition for the soul of the worker among class, sectionalism, and segmentalism, which was authoritatively resolved by the varying crystallizations of modern states. Chapter 19 analyzes a similar resolution of the competition for peasants' souls among "production classes," "credit classes," and "segmental sectors." Chapter 20 presents a generalization of all this material and summarizes the relations among the sources of social power throughout the "long nineteenth century."

Thus Chapter 7, the conclusions to Chapters 10, 11, and 14, and Chapter 20 generalize the conclusions of this volume. But there was another conclusion, a truly empirical one, to the period. Western society

went over the top into the Great War, the most devastating conflict in history. The previous century had also culminated in a devastating sequence of wars, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and these culminations are discussed in Chapters 8 and 21. Chapter 21, explaining the causes of World War I, is a final empirical exemplification of my general theory. It rejects explanations predominantly centered on either geopolitics or class relations. Neither can explain why the actions taken were objectively irrational and were recognized as such by the protagonists amid calmer times. The entwining of classes, nations, and their rivals produced a downward spiral of unintended domestic and geopolitical consequences too complex to be fully understood by participants or controlled by polymorphous states. It is important to learn lessons from this decline and to institutionalize power so as not to repeat it.

The rest of this chapter and the next two explain further my IEMP model of power. I repeat my advice to the reader given at the beginning of Volume I: If you find sociological theory hard going, skip to the first narrative chapter, Chapter 4. Later, it is hoped, you will return to the theory.

The IEMP model of power organization

In pursuit of our goals, we enter into power organizations with three characteristics of form and four of substance that determine the overall structure of societies:

1. As noted earlier, organization involves collective and distributive power. Most actual power relations – say, between classes or between a state and its subjects – involve both, in varying combinations.

2. Power may be extensive or intensive. *Extensive power* can organize large numbers of people over far-flung territories. *Intensive power* mobilizes a high level of commitment from participants.

3. Power may be authoritative or diffused. *Authoritative power* comprises willed commands by an actor (usually a collectivity) and conscious obedience by subordinates. It is found most typically in military and political power organizations. *Diffused power* is not directly commanded; it spreads in a relatively spontaneous, unconscious, and decentered way. People are constrained to act in definite ways, but not by command of any particular person or organization. Diffused power is found most typically in ideological and economic power organizations. A good example is market exchange in capitalism. This involves considerable constraint that is yet impersonal and often seemingly "natural."

The most effective exercises of power combine collective and dis-

tributive, extensive and intensive, authoritative and diffused power. That is why a single power source – say, the economy or the military – is rarely capable of determining alone the overall structure of societies. It must join with other power resources, as in the two overall dual determinations I identify throughout this period. In fact there are four substantive sources of social power: economic, ideological, military, and political.

1. *Ideological power* derives from the human need to find ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices. Control of an ideology that combines ultimate meanings, values, norms, aesthetics, and rituals brings general social power. Religions provide most examples in Volume I and figure here along with secular ideologies like liberalism, socialism, and nationalism – all increasingly grappling with the meaning of class and nation.

Each power source generates distinct organizational forms. Ideological power is predominantly diffused, commanding through persuasion, a claim to "truth" and "free" participation in ritual. Its diffusion has two principal forms. It may be sociospatially "transcendent." That is, an ideology may diffuse right through the boundaries of economic, military, and political power organizations. Human beings belonging to different states, classes, and so forth face similar problems to which an ideology offers plausible solutions. Then ideological power spreads transcendentally to form a new, distinctive and powerful network of social interaction. Second, ideological power may solidify an existing power organization, developing its "immanent morale." Transcendence is a radically autonomous form of power; immanence reproduces and strengthens existing power relations.

2. *Economic power* derives from the need to extract, transform, distribute, and consume the resources of nature. It is peculiarly powerful because it combines intensive, everyday labor cooperation with extensive circuits of the distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods. This provides a stable blend of intensive and extensive power and normally also of authoritative and diffused power (the first of each pair centers on production, the second on exchange). Volume I calls such economic power organizations "circuits of praxis," but the term is too abstruse. I now abandon it in favor of more conventional labels for the forms of economic cooperation and conflict discussed in these volumes: classes and sectional and segmental economic organizations.

All complex societies have unequally distributed control over economic resources. Thus classes have been ubiquitous. Marx distinguished most basically between those who own or control the means of production, distribution, and exchange and those who control only their own

labor – and we can obviously go into more detail distinguishing further classes with more particular rights over economic resources. Such classes can also be broken down into smaller, sectional actors, like a skilled trade or a profession. Classes relate to each other vertically – class A is above class B, exploiting it. Yet other groups conflict horizontally with one another. Following anthropological usage, I term such groups "segments."[2] The members of a segmental group are drawn from various classes – as in a tribe, lineage, patron-client network, locality, industrial enterprise, or the like. Segments compete horizontally with each other. Classes, sections, and segments all cross-cut and weaken one another in human societies.

Volume I showed that segments and sections had hitherto usually predominated over classes. Classes were generally only "latent": Owners, laborers, and others struggled, but usually semicovertly, intensively, confined to an everyday, local level. Most extensive struggle was between segments. But if class relations begin to predominate, we reach a second stage: "extensive" classes, sometimes "symmetric," sometimes "asymmetric." Asymmetric extensive classes generally arrived first: Only owners were extensively organized, whereas laborers were locked into sectional and segmental organizations. Then, in symmetric extensive class structures, both main classes become organized over a similar sociospatial area. Finally we reach the "political class," organized to control the state. Here again we may distinguish symmetric and asymmetric (i.e., where only owners are politically organized) class structures. In his more grandiose moments Marx claimed that political, symmetric, extensive classes, and class struggle provided the motor of history. Yet, as discussed in Volume I (with the exceptions of classical Greece and early Republican Rome), classes were only becoming political and extensive just before the Industrial Revolution. In most agrarian societies a dominant class, organized extensively, "caged" subordinate latent classes inside its own segmental power organizations. This volume describes an uncompleted drift toward Marx's full, symmetric class struggle and the linked transformation of sections and segments.

3. *Military power* is the social organization of physical force. It derives from the necessary of organized defense and the utility of aggression. Military power has both intensive and extensive aspects, for it concerns intense organization to preserve life and inflict death and can also organize many people over large sociospatial areas. Those

[2] Rather confusingly, American class theorists have begun to use the term "segment" to refer to a portion of a class, what Europeans term a "class fraction." I stick to anthropological and European usage here.

who monopolize it, as military elites and castes, can wield a degree of general social power. Military organization is essentially authoritative and "concentrated-coercive." The military provides disciplined, routinized coercion, especially in modern armies. (Chapter 12 stresses the role of military discipline in modern society.) In its impact on the broader society, military power is sociospatially dual. It provides a concentrated core in which coercion ensures positive cooperation – for example, in slave labor in earlier historic societies or in ritualized "shows of force," as discussed in this volume. But it also provides a far larger military striking range of a more negative, terroristic form. Volume I stresses this especially in its Chapter 5, "The First Empires of Domination." In the modern West military power differs. It has been formally monopolized and restricted by states, yet military elites have kept considerable autonomy inside states, impacting considerably on society, as we shall see.

4. *Political power* derives from the usefulness of territorial and centralized regulation. Political power means *state* power. It is essentially authoritative, commanded and willed from a center. State organization is twofold: Domestically, it is "territorially centralized"; externally, it involves geopolitics. Both have impact on social development, especially in modern times. Chapter 3 is devoted to theorizing about the modern state.

The struggle to control ideological, economic, military, and political power organizations provides the central drama of social development. Societies are structured primarily by entwined ideological, economic, military, and political power. These four are only ideal types; they do not exist in pure form. Actual power organizations mix them, as all four are necessary to social existence and to each other. Any economic organization, for example, requires some of its members to share ideological values and norms. It also needs military defense and state regulation. Thus ideological, military, and political organizations help structure economic ones, and vice versa. Societies do not contain autonomous levels or subsystems, each developing separately according to its own logic ("from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production," "from the dynastic to the nation-state," etc.). In major transitions the fundamental interrelations, and very identities, of organizations such as "economies" or "states" became metamorphosed. Even the very definition of "society" may change. Throughout this period the nation-state and a broader transnational Western civilization competed as basic membership units. Sociology's master concept, "society," kept metamorphosing between the two.

The power sources thus generate overlapping, intersecting networks of power relations with different sociospatial boundaries and dynamics;

and their interrelations produce unanticipated, emergent consequences for power actors. My IEMP model is not one of a social system, divided into four "subsystems," "levels," "dimensions," or any other of the geometric terms favored by social theorists. Rather, it forms an analytical point of entry for dealing with mess. The four power sources offer distinct, potentially powerful organizational means to humans pursuing their goals. But which means are chosen, and in which combinations, will depend on continuous interaction between what power configurations are historically given and what emerges within and among them. The sources of social power and the organizations embodying them are impure and "promiscuous." They weave in and out of one another in a complex interplay between institutionalized and emergent, interstitial forces.

A revolutionary long century?

We have an obvious discontinuity from Volume I: Whereas it covered 10,000 years of human social experience and 5,000 years of civilized history worldwide, Volume II covers a mere 154 years and only the core area of a single civilization, Western Europe and its principal white colonial offshoot. Many broad-ranging issues discussed in Volume I are outside the scope of this volume. I cannot chart further (except in limited ways) one of its principal themes, the dialectic between empires of domination and multi-power-actor civilizations, since my civilization was merely an example of the latter. This volume replaces the macro with the micro.

There are good reasons for narrowing the scope. Western civilization now transformed the globe, and its wealth of documentation allows a finer grained narrative, linking macrostructures, group decision making, and individual human agency. I can also assay more comparative analysis. Some reviewers of the first volume assumed I opposed comparative analysis on principle. I do not. The more the cases and the closer they are in world-historical time, the more we can compare them. Provided we remember that my five cases were merely "countries" or "Powers," and not total "societies," they can be fruitfully compared. Most historians and sociologists also regard this period as essentially discontinuous from earlier history. They believe overall social development was ultimately determined by a singular, usually an economic, revolution. This is a simpler explanation than my IEMP model: not four sources but one fundamental source of power; not impure, interstitial entwining and metamorphosing, but a single dialectical system. Is their model of a single revolution useful?

Within about seventy years, first in Great Britain between about 1780 and 1850, then in Western Europe and America over the next seventy years, occurred what is generally acknowledged as the most momentous revolution in human history, the Industrial Revolution. It transformed the power of humans over nature and over their own bodies, the location and density of human settlement, and the landscape and natural resources of the earth. In the twentieth century all of these transformations spread over the globe. Today, we live in a global society. It is not a unitary society, nor is it an ideological community or a state, but it is a single power network. Shock waves reverberate around it, casting down empires, transporting massive quantities of people, materials, and messages, and, finally, threatening the ecosystem and atmosphere of the planet.

Most sociological and historical theory considers such changes "revolutionary" in the sense of their being qualitative, not merely quantitative. It dichotomizes human history around 1800. Classical sociological theory arose as little more than a series of dichotomies among societies existing before and after then, each considered to have a unitary, systemic character. The main dichotomies were from feudal to industrial society (Saint-Simon); from the metaphysical to the scientific stage (Comte); from militant to industrial society (Spencer); from feudalism to capitalism (Smith, the political economists, and Marx); from status to contract (Maine); from community to association (Tonnies); and from mechanical to organic forms of the division of labor (Durkheim). Even Weber, who did not dichotomize, saw history as a singular rationalization process, although he traced its development back farther.

There has been no letup. In the 1950s, Parsons identified a fourfold dichotomy revolutionizing interpersonal relations. These shifted from being particularistic to universalistic, from ascriptive to achievement-oriented, from affective (i.e., emotion-laden) to affectively neutral and instrumental, from being specific to a particular relationship to being diffuse across most relations. Preindustrial relationships were dominated by the former qualities; industrial societies, by the latter. Then the ghosts of Comte and Marx reappeared in Foucault's (1974, 1979) distinction between the classical and the bourgeois age, each dominated by its own "episteme" or "discursive formation" of knowledge and power. Giddens (1985) draws on all these writers in his avowedly "discontinuist" distinction between premodern societies and the modern nation-state.

Recently, some trichotomies have appeared, that is, arguments for a third type of society in the late twentieth century. These all suggest two transitions – from feudal to industrial to postindustrial; from

feudal to capitalist to monopoly capitalist, disorganized capitalist, or postcapitalist; and from premodern to modern to postmodern. Postmodernism is now rampaging through academe, although it only scuttles through sociology. Its vitality depends on whether there was indeed a preceding "modern" era. These third stages are outside the scope of this volume (they will figure in Volume III). But the revisions do not question the revolutionary, systemic nature of the first transition; they merely add a second one.

I begin to unravel these dichomoties and trichotomies by critiquing their two main assumptions and their one internal disagreement. First, they assume that this period qualitatively transformed society as a whole. Second, they locate the transformation in an economic revolution. Most are explicit; a few, covert. For example, Foucault never explained his transition, but he repeatedly described it as a "bourgeois" revolution in an apparently Marxian sense (but because he had no real theory of distributive power, he never made clear who is doing what to whom). I contest both assumptions.

But the unraveling can start with the disagreement between the dichotomies. Whereas some see the essence of the new economy as industrial (Saint-Simon, Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Bell, Parsons), others label it capitalist (Smith, the political economists, Marx, neo-Marxists, Foucault, Giddens, most postmodernists). Capitalism and industrialism were different processes occurring at different times, especially in the most advanced countries. Britain had a predominantly capitalist economy long before the Industrial Revolution.

In the 1770s, Adam Smith applied his theory of market capitalism to an essentially agrarian economy, apparently with little inkling that an industrial revolution was in the offing. If the capitalist school is correct, we must date the English revolutionary transformation from the eighteenth or even the seventeenth century. If the industrial school is correct, we may retain an early nineteenth-century dating. If both are partly correct, however, then there was more than one revolutionary process, and we must unravel their entwinings. Actually, economic transformations may have been even more complex. Current economic historians downplay the impact of the (first) Industrial Revolution, whereas others emphasize a "Second Industrial Revolution" that affected the leading economies from about 1880 to 1920. Relations between capitalism and industrialization also differed between regions and countries, and I shall show that economic transformation was not singular or systemic.

Was it a qualitative change? Yes on collective power, but no on distributive power. There was now indeed an unparalleled, truly exponential transformation in the logistics of collective power (as

Giddens 1985 emphasizes). Consider three measures of collective powers: the capacity to mobilize large numbers of people, the capacity to extract energy from nature, and the capacity of this civilization to exploit others collectively.

Population growth measures the increasing capacity to mobilize people in social cooperation. In England and Wales the entire process of human development had achieved 5 million population by 1640. After 1750, growth curved upward, reaching 10 million by 1810 and 15 million by 1840. What had first taken millennia now took thirty years. Across the globe the first billion of world population was not reached until 1830; the second took a century; the third, thirty years; and the fourth, fifteen years (McKeown 1976: 1–3; Wrigley and Schofield 1981: 207–15). During the previous millennia life expectancy mostly stayed in the 30s, then it improved through nineteenth-century Europe to fifty years and in the twentieth century to more than seventy years, a massive change in human experience (Hart, forthcoming). Similar acceleration occurred in virtually all forms of collective mobilization. Between 1760 and 1914, statistics on the communication of messages and goods, gross national product, per capita income, and weapon-kill ratios reveal a takeoff beyond all known historical rhythms. The growth of collective power mobilization, of what Durkheim called "social density," became truly exponential.

The ability of humans to extract energy from nature also greatly increased. In the agrarian societies discussed in Volume I, energy output depended overwhelmingly on human and animal muscle. Muscles required calories provided by agricultural produce, which required almost everyone's labor. There was an energy trap, with little left to spare for nonagricultural activity beyond supporting small ruling classes, armies, and churches. Landes (1969: 97–8) points out the difference coal mines and steam engines made: By 1870, British coal consumption exceeded 100 million tons. This generated about 800 million calories of energy, enough to supply the energy requirements of a preindustrial society of 200 million adults. The actual British population in 1870 was 31 million, but this energy was generated by only 400,000 miners. Humans' current ability to extract energy even threatens to exhaust the earth's reserves and destroy its ecosystem.

In historical terms, this rate of energy extraction is simply staggering. Agrarian societies might occasionally match the energy concentration of a coal mine or a large steam engine – for example, a Roman legion building a road or Egyptians constructing a pyramid – but these sites would be teeming with thousands of men and beasts. The approach roads, ending at great storehouses, would be choked with supply wagons. For miles around agriculture would be organized to deliver its

surpluses there. Such agrarian logistics presupposed an authoritarian federation of local-regional and segmental power organizations, coercively concentrating their powers onto this one extraordinary task. Yet, by 1870, steam engines were found everywhere in Britain, each involving perhaps fifty workers and their families, a few beasts, a shop, and a couple of supply vehicles. Energy output no longer required concentrated, extensive, and coercive mobilization. It diffused throughout civil society, transforming collective power organization.

This single civilization could now dominate the world. Bairoch (1982) has assembled historical statistics of production (discussed in Chapter 8). In 1750, Europe and North America contributed perhaps 25 percent of world industrial production and, by 1913, 90 percent (probably a little less, as such statistics understate the production of nonmonetary economies). Industry could be converted into massive military superiority. Quite small European troop contingents and fleets could cow continents and divide the globe. Only Japan, inland China, and inaccessible, unattractive countries remained outside the empires of the Europeans and their white settlers. East Asia then rebounded and joined the select band of pillagers of the earth.

Western collective power had been revolutionized, as dichotomous theories suggested. Societies were qualitatively better organized to mobilize human capacities and to exploit nature, as well as to exploit less developed societies. Their extraordinary social density enabled rulers and people actually to participate in the same "society." Contemporaries called this revolution in collective power "modernization," even "progress." They perceived movement toward a wealthier, healthier, and otherwise better society that would increase human happiness and social morality. Few doubted that Europeans, in their homelands and colonies, were inaugurating a qualitative leap forward in general social organization. We may be skeptical, even alarmist, about such "progress," but in the long nineteenth century few doubted it.

The time span of change was short, major transformations often occurring within single lifetimes. This was different from most structural changes described in Volume I. For example, the emergence of capitalistic social relations in Western Europe had taken centuries. People might experience some aspects of this (say, the commutation of their labor services into cash rent or forcible enclosure of their land), but it is doubtful if anyone comprehended the macrochanges under way. By contrast, nineteenth-century macroprocesses were identified by thoughtful participants – hence the emergence of the dichotomous theories themselves, which were really just relatively scientific versions of contemporary modernization ideologies.

Increasing self-consciousness and reflectiveness bring feedback effects. If social actors become aware of ongoing structural transformations, they may seek to resist them. But if, as here, transformations enhance collective powers, they are more likely to seek to harness modernization to their own interests. Their ability to do so depends on their distributive power.

At first sight, distributive power also seems to have transformed near the beginning of this period. Classes and nations appeared as relatively novel actors in power struggles, generating the sociopolitical events we call "revolutions." Volume I demonstrated that both class and national organization had been rare in agrarian societies. Now, as Marx, Weber, and others noticed, class and national struggles became central to social development. Distributive power, like collective, moved from particularism toward universalism.

Yet the results were curiously unrevolutionary. Consider the first industrial nation, Great Britain. Many distributive power relations found in Britain in 1760 were still there in 1914 – indeed, they are still there. Where they have changed, the transition was usually under way long before 1760. Henry VIII had introduced state Protestantism, the Civil War confirmed it, and the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries half secularized it. Constitutional monarchy was institutionalized in 1688; the erosion of the monarchy's powers, along with confirmation of its symbolic dignity, proceeded throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Agriculture and commerce early became capitalist; industry was molded by eighteenth-century commercial institutions, and modern classes have been absorbed into such capitalism. The House of Lords, the two ancient universities, the public schools, the City, the Guards, the London clubs, the administrative class of the civil service – all survive in power as a mixture of the old and of the nineteenth century. True, genuine power shifts also resulted – the rise of the middle class and of labor and the growth of party democracy, popular nationalism, and the welfare state – but the overall trend was less the qualitative transformation that dichotomous theories envisaged than more gradual changes indicating the massive adaptability of ruling regimes.

Perhaps Britain is extreme, in many ways the most conservative European country; but we find many similar patterns elsewhere. The religious map of Europe was settled in 1648, with no significant changes appearing since. The Christian religion has been half secularized ever since. True, there were two great overthrows of monarchies near the beginning of our period; but the American and French revolutions occurred before industrialization in those countries, and (as we shall see) the French Revolution needed a whole century to achieve

rather more modest changes than it first promised, and the American revolutionaries' Constitution rapidly became a conservative force on later distributive power relations. Elsewhere capitalism and industrialism shocked but rarely overthrew old regimes – two sociopolitical revolutions in France and Russia, compared to a host of failed ones and of more limited reforms elsewhere. Old regime and new capital usually merged into a modern ruling class in the nineteenth century; then they made citizenship concessions that also partly domesticated middle and working classes and peasantries. There has been even greater continuity in the major non-Western capitalist country, Japan.

Perhaps I have been selective, downplaying genuine distributive power shifts. But the opposite case, for a transformation in distributive power – especially in the Marxian dialectical sense of opposites clashing head-on in social and political "revolution" – seems implausible.

This also seems true for power distributed geopolitically. States became nation-states but continued to rise and fall while a few remained to contest the leadership over many centuries. France and Britain remained contenders from the medieval period right through this period, whereas the success of Prussia, the emergence of the United States, and the decline of Austria were more novel. The post–sixteenth century trend toward fewer, larger Powers was actually slowed by the Industrial Revolution (Tilly 1990: 45–7). The Industrial Revolution privileged the nation-state over the multinational empire and it privileged those states with large economies. We shall see, though, that these trends also depended on noneconomic power relations.

There is one main exception to the surprising continuity of distributive power. Power relations between men and women began a rapid, even revolutionary, transformation during this period. I have briefly described elsewhere (1988) the end of "patriarchy," its replacement by "neopatriarchy," and then the emergence of more egalitarian gender relations. The simplest indicator is longevity. From the earliest prehistoric times until to the end of the nineteenth century, men outlived women, by about five years over a life span of thirty to forty-five years. Then the discrepancy was reversed: Women now outlive men by five years over a life span of seventy years, and the differential is still widening (Hart 1990). I have abandoned my original intent to focus on gender relations in this volume. Gender relations have their own history, currently being rewritten by feminist scholarship. Now is not the time to attempt grand synthesis – although I shall comment on the connections among gender, class, and nation during this period. Except for gender, however, distributive power was transformed less during this period than theoretical tradition suggested. Classes and nation-states did not revolutionize social stratification.

Some sociologists and historians have remarked this. Moore (1973) argues that political development was affected more by older land-holding patterns than by industrial capitalism. Rokkan (1970) distinguishes two revolutions, the national and the industrial, each generating two political cleavages. The national revolution involved center-periphery and state-church conflict, the Industrial Revolution brought land-industry and owner-worker conflicts. Rokkan unravels the revolutionary dichotomy into a complex combination of four struggles, earlier ones setting down parameters for later ones. Lipset (1985) believes variations in twentieth-century labor movements were caused by the presence or absence of earlier feudalism. Corrigan and Sayer note the durability of the British ruling class – its "supposed reasonableness, moderation, pragmatism, hostility to ideology, 'muddling through,' quirkiness, eccentricity" (1985: 192ff.). Mayer (1981) argues that European old regimes were not swept away by industrialism: Only by perpetrating World War I and by overreacting to socialism by embracing fascism did they ensure their demise.

These writers make two points. First, tradition matters. Neither capitalism nor industrialism swept all away but were molded into older forms. Second, these writers go beyond the economy, adding various political, military, geopolitical, and ideological power relations to modes of production and social classes. Their arguments are often correct. Later chapters draw from them, especially from Rokkan, who perceived the significance of national as well as class struggles.

Nonetheless, distributive power relations were altered. First, classes and nations could not simply be ignored or repressed by old regimes. To survive, they had to compromise (Wuthnow 1989: III; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). But national struggles also entwined with classes, thus changing all power actors, not "dialectically," systemically but in complex ways often having unintended consequences. Second, the traditional rival power organizations of classes and nations – segmental or sectional and transnational or local-regional – were not eliminated but transformed. Loose networks controlled particularistically by old regime notables became more penetrative notable and clientalist political parties, keeping class parties at bay. Armed forces tightened from loose confederations of regiments "owned" by great nobles or mercenary entrepreneurs to modern, professional forces imposing highly centralized line and staff controls and discipline. The Catholic church buttressed its transnationalism with greater local-regional mobilizing powers to organize decentralizing power against the nation-state. All such organizations transformed the relations between regimes and masses.

In sum: Economic transformation was not singular but multiple;

collective power was revolutionized; most forms of distributive power were altered but not revolutionized; traditional dominant power actors survived better than expected; and power actors were aware of structural transformations but these were extremely complex. All of this carries implications for a theory of social change.

Social change: strategies, impure entwinings, unintended consequences

At the beginning of the period occurred three revolutions, all surprises to their participants. Britain's Industrial Revolution, initiated by Adam Smith's "hidden hand," was intended by no one and would have astonished Smith himself. Second, British settlers in America stumbled unintentionally into the first colonial revolution. Third, the French old regime was surprised by a political revolution intended by few of its participants. Power actors now debated whether further revolutions were repeatable or avoidable. Colonial revolutions are outside the scope of this discussion, but I do consider industrial and political revolutions.

Industrialization had been hard to initiate but was easy to imitate and adapt, provided some commercialization existed already. The successful adaptors ranged across Europe from northern Italy and Catalonia to Scandinavia and from the Urals to the Atlantic, and across America and Japan. Regimes strove to maximize profits and minimize disruption. Industrialization was adapted according to local traditions. Political revolution was the opposite, seemingly easy to initiate, difficult to imitate – once old regimes were alerted to its dangers. The revolutionary program could be modified: Regime and emerging power actors could choose or drift between modernization paths placing differing emphases on monarchical rule, the rule of law, economic liberalism, democracy, and nationalism. Half-conscious incorporative-repressive strategies ensured varied nonrevolutionary patterns of development.

Thus traditions were neither overthrown nor merely reproduced. They were modified or amplified according to clashes between "regime strategies-drifts" and the strategies-drifts of emerging classes and nations. By "regime" I mean an alliance of dominant ideological, economic, and military power actors, coordinated by the rulers of the state. These rulers, as we see in Chapter 3, comprised both "parties" (in Max Weber's sense) and "state elites" (in the sense used by elitist state theory). They sought a modernizing alliance to mobilize the emerging powers of classes and nations, or the state would fall to internal revolt or foreign powers. Regimes generally have greater lo-

gistical capacities than do those down below. However, their resilience depended on their cohesion. Party factionalism in an era of rising classes and nations encouraged revolution. I term their attempts to cope with the challenge of emergent social classes and nations "regime strategies." Not all regimes possessed them, and even the most far-sighted found themselves buffeted by complex politics into different tracks of which they were not wholly conscious. Thus most power actors drifted as well as schemed – hence strategies-drifts.

At first, almost all regimes ran along a continuum between despotic and constitutional monarchy. T. H. Marshall (1963: 67–127) argued from the British experience for a three-phase evolution toward fuller citizenship. The first involved legal or "civil" citizenship: "rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice." British civil citizenship was obtained through a "long eighteenth century," from 1688 until Catholic Emancipation in 1828. The second phase obtained "political" citizenship, comprising voting and participating in sovereign parliaments, over the century from the Great Reform Act of 1832 to the Franchise Acts of 1918 and 1928. The third, twentieth-century phase secured "social" citizenship, or the welfare state: "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to . . . share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society."

Marshall's theory has excited considerable interest in the English-speaking world (the best recent discussions are Australian: Turner 1986, 1990, and Barbalet 1988). Two of his types of citizenship turn out to be heterogeneous. Civil citizenship may be divided into individual and collective subtypes (Giddens 1982: 172; Barbalet 1988: 22–7). As we shall see, although most eighteenth-century regimes conceded individual legal rights, none yielded collective organizing rights to workers until the end of the nineteenth century or even until well into the twentieth. (See Chapters 15, 17, and 18.) I also subdivide social citizenship (Marshall's "sharing in the social heritage") into ideological and economic subtypes – rights to an education, allowing cultural participation and occupational attainment, and rights to direct economic subsistence. Through the long nineteenth century, ideological-social citizenship was attained by all middle classes (see Chapter 16), but economic-social citizenship remained minimal (as Marshall noted; see Chapter 14). Citizenship developed varied forms and rhythms, some of which undercut others. Citizenship perhaps has not been as singular a process as Marshall argues.

Moreover, as I have already (1988) argued, Marshall's evolutionism,

neglect of geopolitics, and Anglo centrism can all be faulted. Let us begin by asking a simple question: Why should classes – or indeed any other power actor – *want* citizenship? Why should they consider the state relevant to their lives? Most people had not hitherto. They had lived amid predominantly local or regional power networks, as influenced by transnational churches as by the state. We shall see that through wars eighteenth-century states enormously increased their fiscal and manpower exactions, caging their subjects onto the national terrain and thus politicizing them. Thus classes flexed their growing muscles on politics instead of concentrating as traditionally on fighting other classes in civil society. This "militarist" phase was then followed by other encouragements of the caged nation: office-holding disputes, tariffs, railways, and schools. As states transformed first into national states, then into nation-states, classes became caged, unintentionally "naturalized" and politicized. The nation was vital to citizenship (as Giddens 1985: 212–21 recognizes). We must theorize national as well as class struggle.

There were actually two citizenship issues: representation and the national question of who is to be represented and where. *Where* turned on how centralized and national or how decentralized and confederal the state should be. Despotism might be fought by decentralizing the state onto local assemblies, while linguistic, religious, or regional minorities normally resisted the centralized nation-state.[3] Enlightenment modernizers believed the two issues went together: the future belonged to representative and centralized states. Later evolutionary theorists like Marshall believed the nation-state and national citizenship were inevitable. Indeed, most Western countries today *are* centralized, representative, and citizen nation-states.

But such "modernization" has not been one-dimensional or evolutionary. The Industrial Revolution did not homogenize; rather, it modernized disparate regime strategies. The boost to collective powers provided by the revolution could be used by any regime – party democratic or despotic, centralized or confederal – to amplify its initial characteristics. Outcomes depended on both domestic politics and geopolitics. So did the undoubted overall movement toward the centralized nation-state. Regimes competed, flourished, and perished according to domestic class and national power struggles, diplomatic alliances, wars, international economic rivalry, and ideological claims resonating across

[3] Turner (1990) rightly criticized my neglect of religion and ethnicity in my 1988 essay. I now seek to remedy this by taking seriously the national question. Turner also criticized my emphasis on ruling class at the expense of lower-class strategies. This volume considers both, but continues to stress the former.

the West. As Powers rose, so did the attractiveness of their regime strategies; as Powers declined, so their strategies disintegrated. One Power's successful strategy might then change subsequent industrialization. German semiauthoritarian monarchy and greater American centralization were both partly the result of war. They then fostered the Second Industrial Revolution, the large capitalist corporation and state regulation of economic development.

Finally "impure entwinings" also muddied contemporaries' perceptions. Thus I edge away from "strategies" – from cohesive elites with transparent interests, clear vision, rational decisions, and infinite survival. Ideological, economic, military, and political transformations and class and national struggles were multiple, entwined, and developing interstitially. No power actor could comprehend and take charge of all this. In acting they made mistakes and generated unintended consequences, changing their very identities below the level of consciousness. The whole was a nonsystemic, nondialectical process between historically given institutions and emergent interstitial forces. My IEMP model can confront and then begin to make sense of this mess; dichotomous theories cannot.

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2 Economic and ideological power relations

It became conventional in the eighteenth century – and it has remained so ever since – to distinguish between two fundamental spheres of social activity – "civil society" (or just "society") and "the state." The titles of this chapter and the next would seem to conform to that convention. Though Smith, other political economists, and Marx meant by "civil society" only economic institutions, others – notably, Ferguson, Paine, Hegel, and Tocqueville – believed it comprised the two spheres discussed in this chapter. For them, civil society meant (1) decentered economic markets resting on private property and (2) "forms of civil association . . . scientific and literary circles, schools, publishers, inns, . . . religious organizations, municipal associations and independent households" (Keane 1988: 61). These two spheres carried vital decentered and diffused freedoms that they wished secured against the authoritative powers of states.

Yet, such a clear division between society and state carries dangers. It is, paradoxically, highly political, locating freedom and morality in society, not the state (obviously Hegel differed in this respect). This was so among the eighteenth-century writers resisting what they saw as despotism, and it has recently been so again as Soviet, East European, and Chinese dissidents sought to mobilize decentralized civil society forces against state repression. Yet states are not as distinct from the rest of social life as these ideologies suggest. Volume I showed that civil societies had first risen entwined with modern states. This volume shows that through the long nineteenth century, civil society became more substantially, though far from entirely, the province of the nation-state. This had implications for both economic and ideological power relations, and this is the central theme of this chapter. Thus the actual text of this chapter and Chapter 3 often refutes the separation implied by their titles.

Economic power: capitalism and classes

By 1760, Western economic power relations were becoming dominated by capitalism. Following Marx, I define capitalism in the following terms:

1. *Commodity production.* Every factor of production, including labor, is treated as a means, not an end in itself, is given exchange value,

and is exchangeable against every other factor. Thus capitalism is a diffuse form of economic power, except that it requires authoritative guarantee of:

2. *Private exclusive ownership of the means of production.* The means of production, including labor power, belong exclusively to a private class of capitalists.
3. *Labor is "free" but separated from the means of production.* Laborers are free to sell their labor and withdraw it as they see fit, without authoritative prohibitions; they receive a freely negotiated wage but have no direct claims of ownership over the surplus.

Marx correctly argued that capitalism revolutionized society's "productive forces" – collective economic power. That was the most obvious claim to "ultimate primacy" that this particular mode of economic production possessed in modern times. But Marx also argued that capitalism's "relations of production" – distributive economic power – was also revolutionizing society. Now the surplus could be extracted by "purely economic means" through production and markets themselves, without the need for assistance from independent ideological, military, and political power organizations. His contrast between capitalism and previous modes of production has been endorsed by many (Poulantzas 1975: 19; Anderson 1979: 403; Giddens 1985: 181; Brenner 1987: 227, 231, 299). I will disagree. Marx also argued that commodity production diffuses the *same* relations over the whole terrain of capitalism. Thus economic class struggle could become "pure," extensive and political, transnational, and eventually symmetrical and dialectical, as it had been but rarely before (though Marx did not quite admit this last point). He saw class conflict as the motor of modern development, generating its own ideologies, politics, and military struggles. Their forms would be determined "in the last instance" by the class dialectic of the capitalist mode of production. This would end, Marx hoped, and sometimes predicted, in the overthrow of capitalism by a revolutionary proletariat, instituting socialism and communism.

Obviously, Marx went wrong somewhere. He overestimated the revolutionary tendencies of the proletariat – and before it, of the bourgeoisie. Even where revolutions came close to success, they did so for reasons other than just class conflict. He exaggerated the economic contradictions of capitalism and he neglected ideological, military, political, and geopolitical power relations. All this is well known. But a conventional demolition job on Marx clouds our understanding of where *exactly* he went wrong and of how we might improve on him. Even if history is not the "history of class struggle," classes do exist,

competing with other power actors over human souls. In these days of Marxian retreat and postmodern nihilism, some historians seem to abandon class altogether (e.g., Joyce 1991). Yet this is to throw out the baby with the bathwater. It is better to make more precise our conceptions of classes and of their power rivals.

Marx was most explicit about class when describing the French peasantry:

> In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond, and no political organization amongst them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name. [1968, 170–1]

Chapter 19 shows that Marx was wrong about the "smallholding peasants" – they were actually prolific in their organization. But this passage is of more general interest. Historians and sociologists have often quoted it in connection with two other distinctions Marx made. The smallholding peasantry, they say, constituted a class "in itself" but not "for itself," with a common relationship to the means of production but incapable of collective class action. Marx was indeed saying this. But the commentators proceed to a second distinction: The peasantry were "objectively" but not "subjectively" a class. We must analyze, they say, two dimensions of class, objective economic conditions and subjective class consciousness, both necessary for class formation. Hunt, a historian of the French Revolution, says: "For Marx, class formation depended on both economic condition and culture, social category and consciousness" (1984: 177). The sociologists Westergaard and Resler announce that their major analysis of twentieth-century class structure starts from the question of "how objective cleavages of power, wealth, security and opportunity give rise to groups whose members are conscious of a common identity. [Is] 'class in itself' translated into an active consciousness of 'class for itself'?" (1975: 2–3).

It is appropriate that Marx should be misinterpreted, for his own polemic against idealism helped establish the dualism of objective economic reality versus subjective consciousness that underlies these commentaries. But Marx is not arguing this in the passage quoted. He explicitly included the "culture" of the peasantry in the supposedly objective aspect of class. Conversely, the "merely local interconnection" of the peasants, which prevented them acting (supposedly sub-

jectively) as a class, is actually economic. Marx said nothing about economic versus ideological aspects of class. Instead, he distinguished two predominantly economic preconditions of class: "similarity," which peasants possessed, and "collective interdependence," which he says they did not. Peasants' economic similarity gave them a sense of their class interests plus a broader cultural identity. But their ability to organize, equally economic in origin, was partial and locally confined. For Marx, classes were economic power organizations, and as such were defined by two criteria, the economic and the organizational.

Marx's broad economic criterion was "effective possession" of economic resources. In capitalism, the model generates two main antagonistic classes, capitalist owners and nonowning proletarians. He also identified an intermediary class of petits bourgeois owning its own means of production but not controlling the labor of others; and he left guidelines for coping with the emergence of the middle class(es) (see Chapter 16). Such classes might be considered "objective," but we might choose to define classes by other "objective" criteria. So-called industrial society theorists distinguish classes according to their specialized role in the division of labor, which method yields numerous occupational classes. Weberians identify classes according to market capacities, producing many classes based on ownership of property, scarce job skills, professional powers, and educational levels. How do we choose among these equally "objective" schemes?

In the extended passage quoted earlier, Marx gave us a second criterion: Classes possess organizational ability. The economic without the organizational criterion gives only what I term a "latent class" – corresponding roughly to the term "objective class" or "class in itself." Such a latent class is of little sociological interest. Theorists may develop what analytic categories they like, as ideal types, but only some of these help explain the real world. If classes are significant power actors in the real world they must be *organized*, extensively or politically. Throughout this volume I dissect the organizational capacities of class and other movements. What are their logistics? How and over what geographic and social terrain can they communicate messages, exchange personnel, and organize petitions, strikes, riots, revolutions?

Marx thought modern classes were involved in a head-on *dialectical* struggle with one another. The emergence of the capitalist mode of production gave bourgeoisie and workers organizational capacities rooted in production but totalized throughout society and throughout their life experience. He was partly correct. Such class organizations did emerge, capable of changing history. True, his view of the working

class was absurdly utopian – how unlikely that an exploited class would confound all of previous history and rise up to destroy all stratification. Nonetheless, Marx had discovered an essential truth: Capitalism had created potentially extensive, political and (occasionally) symmetrical and dialectical classes. Rare in earlier societies, such classes have been ubiquitous ever since.

Thus class consciousness is also a perennial feature of modern societies, though it is never pure or complete. Most dominant classes show ambivalent consciousness. They share a cohesive community and a keen defense of their own interests. What social group could be more class conscious than, say, the eighteenth-century English gentry or the nineteenth-century Prussian Junker landlords? Yet they usually deny that society is divided into opposing classes, claiming that segmental and local-regional organizations (perhaps underpinned by normative consensus) are more significant. Indeed, subordinate classes are usually embedded in such organizations, but Marx believed they could attain class consciousness. His model of rising class consciousness implicitly contained the four components I identified in an earlier book on the working class (1973: 13):

1. *Identity*. The definition of self as working class, as playing a distinctive role in common with other workers in the economy.[1] This self-conception need not be associated with class conflict.
2. *Opposition*. The perception that capitalists and their managers constitute the workers' enduring opponent. Identity plus opposition will generate conflict, but this may not be extensive. It may be limited to workplace, trade, or local community, not generalized to whole classes, legitimating sectional, not class, conflict.
3. *Totality*. The acceptance of the first two elements as the defining characteristics of (1) the workers' total social situation and (2) the whole society. The addition of (1) adds intensity to consciousness of sectional conflict, and (2) converts sectional consciousness to extensive class conflict.
4. *Alternative*. Conceiving of an alternative form of power relations to existing capitalism. This will reinforce extensive and political class conflict and legitimate revolutionary struggle.

I shall analyze the extent to which rising classes exhibit these components of class consciousness. Most people probably sense more of the first than of the second and of the first and second more than of

[1] In 1973, I wrote "in the productive process," a phrase I now replace with a more diffuse term, *economy*, in line with one of the general arguments of this volume.

the third and fourth. But it is rare that they single-mindedly drive anyone. We are also members of families, of cross-class communities and workplaces, of churches, of other voluntary associations, of nations, and so forth. Most of these identities confuse, some oppose, a clear-cut sense of class. Societies are confusing battlegrounds on which multiple power networks fight over our souls. In modern societies, class is just one of the more important forms of self-identity. But people in similar economic circumstances will also be influenced by other identities. Only a few will experience their lives as dominated by a class – or by a religious, national, or any other single – identity. When describing classes "acting" in later chapters, I am not conjuring up images of masses of people resolutely acting as if in heroic Soviet proletarian paintings. I am usually describing a few militants who really are so motivated, able to move large numbers by persuading them that their class sentiments are a more significant part of themselves than they had previously believed. Even then, most such persons may dearly wish they could continue being loyal producers, Catholics, citizens, and so forth.

I identify six main class actors: the *old regime* and the *petite bourgeoisie*, emerging through conflicts between old and new modes of production and political regimes in the first part of the period; the *capitalist class* and the *working class*, the two great extensive groups emerging in the second half of the period; the *middle class*, emerging throughout the nineteenth century; and the *peasantry*, of considerable significance throughout the period. I define these classes near the beginning of three chapters: the peasantry in Chapter 19, the working class in Chapter 15, and the other classes in Chapter 4.

These classes may seem familiar enough, especially within the Marxian tradition. But, unlike Marxists, I do not see classes as pure, defined only in terms of relations to the means of production. Whole, pure classes never organize major social change. Social movements we recognize as classlike can be distinguished at two levels. Where whole class movements emerge, they are impure, their force contributed by noneconomic as well as economic power networks. Considered as purely economic organizations, they are heterogeneous, incapable of much collective action (although fractions among them may possess their own particular organization). Four economic fault lines persistently weaken the solidarity of whole classes:

1. Economic sector fragments classes. Fractions of both capital and labor persistently organize differently, sometimes in conflict with one another. Agriculture usually generates its own subculture. Farm laborers rarely conceive of themselves as "proletarians," alongside industrial workers; peasant proprietors and smallholders generate

their own distinct movements. (See Chapter 19.) Interindustry differences and the rise of the public and service sectors add their own heterogeneity.

2. The direct relations of economic production may generate much smaller collectivities than a whole class – defined by a single enterprise, industry, or occupation. This may strengthen segmental, not class, organization. Solidarity may be highly developed within these boundaries but have few organizational connections with those supposedly in the same class. At the most they will constitute a militant sectional union movement; at the least they may form a segmental alliance with their employer, against other workers and employers.

3. Strata and fractions divide classes. The late eighteenth-century petite bourgeoisie actually comprised a varied collection of professionals, merchants, factors, shopkeepers, artisan masters, artisan men, and many others. Later, the "middle class" contained an elongated occupational hierarchy and three distinct fractions (professionals, careerists, and petite bourgeoisie). The working class contained groups with different labor-market powers, especially separating skilled from unskilled workers, and workers entrenched in internal labor markets from newcomer workers – often reinforced by ethnicity and gender. Such differences lead to distinct organizations – to the profession, the career, the craft union – separating them from other members of "their class." Internal labor markets, managerial careers, and other forms of hierarchical dependence have generated segmental organizations, reducing the prospects for class organization.

4. The nation-state crosscuts classes, forming national segments. There has never been one great transnational bourgeoisie or proletariat, although transnational class tendencies do exist (perhaps nowhere stronger than among the contemporary capitalist class). Normally the largest class actors have been nationally limited, thus the "British working class," the "French bourgeoisie," and the like. The national fragmentation of class has actually been rather complex, as we shall see later.

For these four reasons, relations of production do not merely generate whole classes. They too are a confused battleground on which our identities are fought over. Purely economic actors have been normally smaller, more specific, and more fragmented by internal sectionalism and crosscutting segmentalism than Marx's great classes. Nonetheless, his classes have played important historical roles. Why? Not because the "law of value" or some other economic law polarized all these economic particularities into great class camps. Instead, *non-economic* organizations have welded solidarities among these economically heterogeneous fractions, strata, and segments. Class conflict

arose in societies with ideological, military, and political power relations and was also molded by them. This point is usually made to explain why classes *lack* solidarity – for example, because they are split by religion. Yet noneconomic networks may also *generate* class solidarity. Marx's neglect of ideological, military, and political power is not merely of phenomena external to capitalism and class. Their organizations helped metamorphose disparate economic actors, often with opposing conceptions of identities and interests, into relatively cohesive classes. All my classes were created by the entwined development of the sources of social power. The "purity" of modern classes, though in historical terms rather developed, has been only partial.

We shall see that states, especially the developing nation-states, played a very substantial structuring role in the development of civil society and its classes. Not even revolutionary politics flow simply from the conflict between classes already "out there" in civil society. The class actors aroused during the French Revolution barely existed before the Revolution. They were created by its power processes – partly because militant ideologists worked hard to mobilize class sentiments, but mostly because they were unintentionally fostered by political power relations. States are also impure, being economic as well as political. They own property, they spend, and they tax. In the eighteenth century, rights to office, monopolies, and tax privileges provided economic rewards and generated factional, segmental politics. "In" parties were pitted against "outs," "court" against "country" parties. "In" parties were from landowning families, commercial oligarchies, or professions allied to the crown, whereas "out" parties began to consist of discontented factions of the same groups leading the petite bourgeoisie. Thus factional politics became entwined with class and sectional struggles generated by the transition from commercial-landed to manufacturing capitalism. "Ins," landed gentry, and commercial oligarchs solidifed into an old regime class, and "outs" and diverse fractions and strata solidified into a broadly petit bourgeois movement. This was not merely a class struggle; it also derived, in some cases predominantly, from the state's political economy. "Class" only became extensive and political as economic and political power struggles became entwined. Where factional political struggles were weaker, as in Germany (or Japan), there was no revolution, class politics were feebler, and feudalism changed into capitalism with little class struggle.

Parallel, if lesser, points can be made concerning ideological and military power relations. Marx believed that classes create their own ideology, articulating their own practical activity and interests. They might be aided by intellectuals like himself, but these are only arti-

culating an ideology already immanent in an already constituted class. This view poses two problems: First, as in other "instrumental" theories of action (e.g., neoclassical economics, exchange theory, rational choice theory), it is not clear that interests alone can drive forward the kind of action Marx was envisaging. Is it ever in the interests of the individual worker to expose himself or herself to employer and state power by starting a union, still less by erecting barricades or attacking cossacks? Classes do exist, but they have shared norms and passions, inspiring them to recklessness, sacrifice, and cruelty. These help them overcome their diverse economic membership to generate passionate collective behavior. Ideology may be immanent and transcendent among classes. Second, if ideology matters, so do ideologists. Eighteenth-century ideologists, secular and religious, found messages and communication media that transcended the diverse grievances of petite bourgeois segments, class fractions, taxpayers, those deprived of lucrative office, and so forth. Journalists, coffeehouse keepers, teachers, and others mobilized class consciousness. A century later, middle-class dependence on state education helped transform its own class and national consciousness (see Chapter 16).

Similarly, Engels believed that some types of military power aided class consciousness: Mass conscription in the Prussian army could train revolutionaries. I believe the reverse: In this period militaries tended to provide effective segmental discipline over subordinate classes, aiding the survival of regimes and dominant classes. Nonetheless, other military power organizations – guerrilla warfare and defeated armies – have assisted class formation, as we will see.

Thus classes were imperfectly, haltingly formed as multiple economic identities were welded together by the political, ideological, and military power networks with which economic struggles were always entwined.

This also renders problematic the culminating quality of class struggle for Marx: its symmetrical, *dialectical* nature. If class A is organized in relation to different power networks to class B, they may not meet head-on over the same terrain. Marx took the arena of conflict for granted, and so have most others. Capitalism is invariably defined transnationally, penetrating state frontiers sociospatially wherever there are commodities to exchange and profits to be won. But capitalism actually emerged within and between the territories of states. It became sociospatially structured by their domestic and geopolitical relations. Its classes could have three sociospatial forms, as could segments and, indeed, all power actors:

1. *Transnational.* Organization and struggle proceed right across state boundaries, without significant reference to them. Classes occupy

the global reach of capitalism. States and nations are irrelevant to class struggle, their power weakened by its global reach. With the use of a distinction explained later, interests are defined more by market than by territory. An example of a predominantly transnational class was the medieval nobility, linked by kin relations stretching across Europe, conducting its own class diplomacy and many wars. More pacifically this was how most classic theorists – from Smith to Marx to Durkheim – saw the future of capitalism. Modern classes would be transnational.

2. *Nationalist.*[2] All or some of the inhabitants of one state become a quasi-class whose economic interests conflict with those of inhabitants of other states. "Nations," or the more restricted "class-nations," compete with and exploit one another, each with its own distinctive praxis in the international division of labor. Nationalist classes encourage what I term "territorial" definitions of interest (to be discussed shortly) and aggressive geo-economic and geopolitical rivalry. An emphasis on the nationalist organizations supposedly dominant in their own times suffused the work of turn-of-the-century writers like Gumplowicz (1899) and Oppenheimer (1922), formalized by Rüstow (1981) into the notion of "superstratification," domination by one nation over another. The same historical tendencies informed Lenin's theory of imperialism and then more recent Marxian theory like Wallerstein's and Chase-Dunn's theories of the "world system" and contemporary theories of Third World dependency.

3. *National.* Class organization and struggle are territorially confined within each state, without significant reference to class relations in other states. Here class praxis is not "anchored" in international space. Classes might get caught up in domestic struggles over the identity of the nation, but their sense of nationhood is inward-looking – divorced from, and incompetent in, international affairs. They have no serious geopolitical or geo-economic interests in relation to either markets or territory and no considered predisposition toward war or peace. No major school of theory conceptualizes this model of class organization, but I emphasize its importance throughout this period.

These are ideal types. Real classes (and other power actors) normally embody elements of all three organizations. A class may contain

[2] In previous work, I used the label "inter-national" for this type of organization. For readers to understand such a label required them to pay close attention to its hyphen. The word "international," without a hyphen, is conventionally used to denote something close to my transnational organization (as in "liberal internationalism"). As "nationalist" conventionally conveys the rough sense of what I mean in this second type, it is to be preferred.

distinct fractions, one relatively transnational, another nationalist. Or class actors may feel the tug of two or three organizational forms simultaneously, reducing class coherence. Or one class may be far more nationally confined than another, as labor is when compared with capital today. Thus classes are less likely to meet dialectically head-on than Marx expected.

The structuring role of nation-states means that their geopolitics are also entwined with classes. It has been common to analyze the impact of class struggle on geopolitics (e.g., in the theory of social imperialism, discussed in Chapter 21). It is less common, but as necessary, to reverse the causality (as Skocpol 1979 and Maier 1981 have done). Capitalism and industrial capitalism were "made in Britain." British near hegemony, and the resistance it provoked in France, Germany, and elsewhere, reshaped the nature of class struggle. So has the more recent American hegemony. We cannot tell either story, of class struggle and geopolitics, without the other. Here I make the immodest claim that this was never attempted on such a broad scale before this volume.

Not only classes but the very conceptions of economic "interest" and "profit" are affected by geopolitics. We can distinguish two ideal-typical conceptions of economic profit and interest, here termed "market" and "territorial" (cf. Krasner 1985: 5; Rosecrance 1986; Gilpin 1987: 8–24). A market conception sees interest as privately held and furthered by possession of resources on markets, without regard to state territories, war, or aggressive diplomacy. It is transnationally and peacefully oriented. Capitalists will pursue profit wherever there are markets, regardless of state boundaries. Geopolitics do not here define "interest." Yet a territorial conception of economic interest sees profit secured by authoritative control of territory by the state, often by aggressive diplomacy and, in extremis, by war. The tension between market and territory, capitalism and geopolitics, is a theme of this volume.

Again, these ideal types do not exist in the real world. Capitalism and states cohabit the world, influencing each other. Six main strategies may be distinguished:

1. *Laissez-faire.* The state merely endorses (or is unable to change) existing market terms, and does not try to change them authoritatively.

2. *National protectionism.* The state interferes authoritatively but pragmatically and peacefully with existing market terms to protect its own economy (when dealing with nineteenth-century Germany, I subdivide protectionism into "selective" and "general coordinated" protection).

3. *Mercantilist domination.* The state attempts to dominate international markets, authoritatively controlling such resources as it can, moving toward diplomatic sanctions (perhaps in concert with allied states), even shows of force, but short of war and territorial expansion. The old mercantilist formula was that "power and plenty" were conjoined.

Most international political economy regimes combine these three strategies in varying degrees. Although they embody conflict, they do not usually spark off war (as in the conflict of "The Third World Against Global Liberalism" analyzed by Krasner 1985), but three other political economies imply further aggression:

4. *Economic imperialism.* The state conquers territory for direct motives of economic profit.

5. *Social imperialism.* Conquest is aimed primarily at controlling existing more than new territories and populations. It seeks to distract attention from conflict between classes or other groups within existing state territories. Lenin and Marxists have emphasized class distraction; Weber saw social imperialism as employable by whoever controls the state against whoever are the enemies. Regime motives primarily concern domestic politics, *Innenpolitik*; geopolitics, *Aussenpolitik*, are their by-product.

6. *Geopolitical imperialism.* The state attempts to conquer territory as an end in itself.

These six strategies reveal that "power and plenty," geopolitics and capitalism, territory and market, have been usually entwined. Even the two extremes are not entirely "pure." The British were largely attached to laissez-faire in the nineteenth century because the more warlike strategies (3 and 4) had helped form the British Empire and the Royal Navy, which now ensured that the international terms of trade were mostly *its* terms. At the other extreme Hitler adopted geopolitical imperialism, obsessed by world power and paying little attention to economics. Yet, even he thought this would bring profit to Germany. International political economy – for example, laissez-faire or protectionism – does not result from a "pure" calculation of economic interest. Real-life definitions of interest are affected by territory, by senses of national identity, and by geopolitics, just as geopolitics is affected by economic interest. Both are also affected by ideologies. No strategy was self-evidently economically superior to its principal rivals. Choosing or drifting into it normally resulted from the entwining of *Innen-* and *Aussenpolitik* and of ideological, economic, military, political, and geopolitical power networks. Thus later chapters will interweave the stories of emerging extensive, political, yet still "impure" classes and nation-states.

Ideological power relations

As I indicated in Chapter 1, I believe that ideological power declined somewhat in significance during this period. This does not render it insignificant, however. Chapters 4–7 treat ideological power as an essential and autonomous part of the rise of bourgeois classes and nations, especially influential in shaping their passions. Chapters 16 and 20 then continue this argument through the nineteenth century, describing the importance of state educational institutions for the rise of the middle class and discussing nationalism as an ideology. Chapter 15 distinguishes the main forms of socialist ideology found among working-class and peasant movements of the long nineteenth century; and Chapters 17–19 trace their development. I do not fully explore the potential autonomy of these later ideologies in this volume. That task is reserved for my third volume, which will treat socialist and nationalist ideologies together over the terrain of the twentieth century. The discussion that now follows concentrates on earlier periods.

I make two general points about ideological power in 1760. First, just like the other principal aspect of civil society, the capitalist economy and its classes, ideological power networks were split between transnational and national terrains. On the one hand, Europe – increasingly the "West" – was a normative community, its ideologies diffusing interstitially, "transcendentally" across states. On the other hand, states erected barriers to the free flow of messages – more effective if linguistic communities coincided with state boundaries. Then, throughout the period, the national tended to strengthen at the expense of the transnational, though the latter always survived. Second, the media of discursive communication were undergoing revolutionary expansion during the eighteenth century, enabling ideological power to play a somewhat autonomous role.

Europe had been an ideological community for a millennium. Values, norms, rituals, and aesthetics diffused across the continent. It had been a single Christian *ecumene*, then split into Catholic and Protestant halves. We see churches losing power within states but remaining entrenched within the family and at the local-regional level, especially in the countryside. The historic power and then partial decline of Christendom left an important legacy: Communication media were interstitial, not controlled by any single power organization. Because much literacy was church-sponsored, the media were not fully controlled by state or capitalism, hard though both were to try. Europeans had also diffused their ideologies through their settler colonies, modifying "Christian" to "white" and "Europe" to the "West." Ideological messages diffused throughout the West, relatively

unconfined by national boundaries. In comparative terms such autonomy of ideological power was unusual; neither Japan nor China possessed it to a comparable degree in early modern times. To be a Westerner was to participate in a partly transcendent ideological power organization, interstitial to the reach of other power organizations. This also means that the international arena was far from normless, as realists tend to argue.

Theorists emphasizing the rapid diffusion of ideologies throughout this period often claim it indicates "the autonomy of ideas" in society (e.g., Bendix 1978). That is not quite my own position. But I do not counterpose to such "idealism" a "materialism" that reduces ideas to their social base. My position is one of "organizational materialism": Ideologies are attempts to grapple with real social problems, but they are diffused through specific media of communication and *their* characteristics may transform ideological messages, so conferring ideological power autonomy. Thus the particularities of ideological power organization should be our object of study.

This means we must focus around 1760 on an ongoing revolution in "discursive literacy" – the ability to read and write texts that are not mere formulas or lists but presuppose literate mastery of conversation and argument. This volume charts various discursive ideologies across the long nineteenth century. Some were religious: Puritanism influenced early American history; moral Protestantism affected Britain; the Protestant-Catholic divide had an enduring role in Germany. Others were secular, usually disputing with religions: the Enlightenment, utilitarianism, liberalism, and the two greatest modern ideologies, of nation and class. All these ideologies were shared across extensive territories linked by the communication of discursive literacy.

Benedict Anderson (1983) famously observed that the nation is an "imagined community" in time and space. People who have never met, who have no direct connection – even the living, the dead, and the yet-to-be-born – supposedly become linked together in a "nation." As a secretary at UCLA explained to me about the American Thanksgiving holiday: "It's when we remember our ancestors who came over on the *Mayflower*." Her imagination was impressive since she is black. I add what Anderson, a Marxist, does not: If the nation was an imagined community, its class rival might seem even more metaphorical, a veritable "*imaginary* community." Nations were reinforced by enduring historical traditions, state boundaries (past or present), or linguistic or religious communities. How were classes, with little prior history (apart from ruling classes), which always live among and cooperate with other classes, to be conceived and created as communities? We shall observe the two imagined communities arising together as

discursive literacy diffused across societies beyond the particularistic old regime networks to which it had been hitherto confined.

Most ideological infrastructures were now provided, as Anderson says, by "print culture," though not simply by his "print capitalism." Texts were duplicated and circulated into the thousands. The usual measure of literacy is minimal: the ability to sign one's name in the marriage register. Throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this more than doubled in most countries, resulting in about 90 percent male and 67 percent female signing literacy in Sweden and New England, 60 percent and 45 percent in Britain, and 50 percent male literacy in France and Germany (Lockridge 1974; Schofield 1981; Furet and Ozouf 1982; West 1985). The male rise preceded the female, but by 1800, females were catching up. Signing does not measure discursive literacy – many signers could do little other writing and no reading – but it situates it amid a rapidly growing basic literacy. Discursive literacy was carried by nine principal media:

1. *Churches*. From the sixteenth century on, Protestant and then Catholic churches encouraged Bible reading and the reading and writing of simple catechisms. This was the basic cause of the surge of signing literacy. Church schools were responsible for most early growth in discursive literacy and dominated elementary education in most countries until the end of the nineteenth century. In 1800, devotional works still comprised most literary best-sellers.

2. *The military*. The "military revolution" of 1540–1660 centralized and bureaucratized armies and navies. Drills and logistical support became standardized; technology developed artillery and navies; the division between staff and line institutionalized written orders and map reading. Drill and naval signaling manuals became common among officers and noncommissioned officers, quartermasters and artillery and naval officers needed full literacy and numeracy, and higher officers increasingly "studied" in the modern sense. Increasing military manpower, reaching 5 percent of the total population at the end of the eighteenth century (Chapter 11), made this a significant medium of discursive literacy.

3. *State administration*. Before the mass expansion of the lower bureaucracy in the late nineteenth century (see Chapter 11), there was only a modest increase, concentrated in fiscal departments supplying armed forces. But the literacy of higher administrators became secularized as universities replaced churches and upper-class family life in educating administrators.

4. *Commerce*. Its massive seventeenth- and eighteenth-century expansion spread discursive literacy through contracts, accounts, and marketing methods. Literacy was greater in commercial areas and

occupations than among agriculture or manufacturing industry. Commerce also involved women, though less so as the workplace became separated from the household with industrialization.

5. *The profession of law.* Law occupied the ideological interface between church, state, and commerce. It doubled in size in most eighteenth-century countries, and its education broadened in scope.

6. *Universities.* Controlled by either church or state and supplying young adults for them and the law profession, universities rapidly expanded in the eighteenth century to become the principal trainer of higher level discursive literacy.

7. *The literary media.* The writing, printing, circulation, and reading of literary products rapidly expanded from the late seventeenth century on, transformed by capitalist production and market methods. It diffused down through middle-class households. Although its producers were mostly men, its consumers may have become mostly women (Watt 1963).

8. *Periodical media.* Newspapers, periodicals, and secular pamphlets virtually began at the end of the seventeenth century and expanded exponentially through the eighteenth.

9. *Discursive discussion centers.* Academies, clubs, libraries, salons, taverns, and coffeehouses all rapidly expanded as public discussion centers of printed discursive materials. Even barbers and wig makers stocked newspapers and pamphlets and served as discussion centers. All but salons were male-dominated.

Such diverse and only sporadically quantifiable rates of increase cannot be summed up into an overall index of discursive expansion. Nonetheless, throughout the eighteenth century, discursive literacy probably expanded much faster than basic literacy. A mass communications network was emerging. Who participated in it, and who controlled it?

Primary demand came first from churches, then from states, especially their militaries, and commercial capitalism. This marked out two broad alternative tracks. I take Britain as the prototype of a diffused "commercial capitalist" (similar to Anderson's "print capitalist") track, Austria and Prussia as the prototype of an authoritative "military-statist" route, with old regime France combining both. Both received a large moral-religious input from churches. In Britain commercial expansion generated a mass literate petite bourgeoisie, lawyers, universities, schools, and entrepreneurial mass-market techniques for the literary media. In Austria and Prussia army and administrative expansion linked lawyers, universities, schools, and the literary media more closely to the state. France, commercial and statist, experienced both expansions. Both routes linked the new to the old. "New" power

networks – of petite bourgeoisie and of professional officers and civil servants – were also linked with merchant and noble classes and with clerics. The result was different ideological fermentations, none entirely harmonious, in all three cases.

By 1760, states and capitalist classes were probably ideologists' main clients. Yet demand did not lead simply to effective control. Britain did not lack a state or churches, nor did Austria lack capitalism and churches. In each country churches, state, and classes had distinct, sometimes conflicting, demands and were themselves factionalized over modernization strategies. The result was interstitial space within which ideologists could operate.

But factionalism also split the ideologists. This was especially evident in the religion-science, capitalist-statist, and market-territory dilemmas implicit in the Enlightenment (Cassirer 1951; Gay 1964, 1967; Payne 1976). The philosophes privileged human reason. Reason was conceived, firstly, as a scientific "formal rationality" – they called it the *esprit systematique*, the systematic application of methodical calculation, a relentless questioning of all social arrangements to see whether they brought human happiness. But reason was also conceived of as "substantive," moral, and strongly influenced by religion. Reason could tell us what happiness and the good society actually were. Not everyone possessed full reason, but the stupidity of the populace, the naïveté of the savage, and the often defective reason of women were improvable by culture and education. Thus argued Kant's famous pamphlet "What Is Enlightenment?" Although most of the prominent philosophes were antireligious, their moralism was clearly derived from European religiosity and was paralleled by considerable moral ferment within the churches themselves. Ideology, like morality and passion, as well as science, was flourishing.

When applied to society, reason also contained a contradiction. On the one hand, formal rationality was decentered, fostered especially by the "invisible hand" of commercial capitalism. In the Anglo-American heartland of capitalism this encouraged a predominantly liberal regime strategy: laissez-faire political economy, individual civil citizenship, developing political citizenship for property owners, moral (often Protestant) individualism, and the duty to spread enlightenment and morality through private charity and voluntary work. These ideas also resonated in other countries because the philosophes were transnational, advocating programs regardless of state boundaries and communicating easily via their linguistic skills and incessant traveling. Yet, in absolutist Europe, the potential for substantive reason was identified more with modernizing states. While almost all philosophes respected the "freedom" and material progress of capitalism and of private

associations, most also saw that enlightened social responsibility invited legislative action. Kant embodied this ambivalence, believing both in enlightened absolutism and in the transnational diffusion of the Enlightenment to bring "perpetual peace" to the world. Philosophes using a "civil society versus the state" model could not sustain its fundamental dualism.

Ambivalence passed onto a new plane when capitalism's "hand" later became "visible." Though its ideologists presented laissez-faire as a natural law, it presupposed a class society in which some owned the means of production and others owned only their labor. Thus the "hand" embodied, while concealing, class power. It also embodied the geopolitical power of "national" capitalists, able to set the terms of trade over lesser capitalist nations. Free trade was then seen as British-dominated trade. Nineteenth-century ideologists of both rising classes and states contested the rule of the "hand" by advocating greater authoritative, territorial state power.

The entwining of classes and nation-states produced emergent dilemmas for power actors to which clear solutions did not exist. Indeed, as we saw with regard to classes, the very identity of classes and nations was still fluid, influenced by ideologists. Interstitial space existed for ideologists to propose their solutions and influence social identities. The Western ideological community explored developing, transcendent contradictions. Economic theory was riven between the market theory of Adam Smith and two more authoritative ideologies, the "national territorial" alternative of Friedrich List and the class alternative of Karl Marx. Their three-way disagreements soon resonated globally amid the struggles of Powers and classes.

Here is Ito Hirobumi, the principal author of Japan's Meiji constitution of 1889:

> We were just then in an age of transition. The opinions prevailing in the country were extremely heterogeneous, and often diametrically opposed to each other. We had survivors of former generations who were still full of theocratic ideas, and who believed that any attempt to restrict an imperial prerogative amounted to something like high treason. On the other hand there was a large and powerful body of the younger generation educated at the time when the Manchester theory [i.e., laissez-faire] was in vogue, and who in consequence were ultra-radical in their ideas of freedom. Members of the bureaucracy were prone to lend willing ears to the German doctrinaires of the reactionary period, while, on the other hand, the educated politicians among the people having not yet tasted the bitter significance of administrative responsibility, were liable to be more influenced by the dazzling words and lucid theories of Montesquieu, Rousseau and similar French writers. . . . It was in these circumstances that the first draft of the Constitution was made and submitted to His Majesty. [quoted in Bendix 1978: 485]

Was there ideological *autonomy* in this? Alternatively, were the philosophes – Hirobumi's Manchester theorists and German doctrinaires – mere aides, "organic intellectuals" in Gramsci's sense, to the Meiji and their Western equivalents? Did they merely offer intellectual schemes that dominant regimes were free to accept, reject, or amend? The ideological media were, after all, fulfilling specialized technical functions. They were expanding the ability to read catechisms, drill manuals, and commercial contracts. Perhaps ideologists were offering mere *immanent* morale to already formed classes and political regimes.

Yet ideologists also had two creative powers. First, classes and state factions were not already constituted but interstitially emergent. Ideologists helped create their "imagined communities," especially in the American and French revolutions (see Chapters 5 and 6), but also more generally. Second, discursive media also had emergent properties, partially freeing them from control. Most were not segregated, merely communicating technical knowledge for specialized clients. They were also jointly diffusing debates about general meanings, norms, rituals, and aesthetics. Modernizing ideologies – cameralism, the Enlightenment, the evangelical movement, social contract theory, political and "economical" reform, "improvement," political economy – diffused throughout the media. Their claims were universal, applying to both morality and science, influencing ideologies of nation and class. The three-way debates among the schools of Smith, List, and Marx did not merely concern the economic interests of classes and states. Much social experience was interstitial to class and state; Europe quested for modernization and the "holy grail" of progress. These writers were not mere economic pragmatists. They saw ideological conflict as moral and philosophical, concerning cosmological truth and morality as well as economics. All three were anchored in the Enlightenment: The world was improvable if reason was placed at the head of a social movement. As potentially *transcendent* ideologists, they might have more formidable resonance.

Thus the principal personnel of discursive media developed a sense of their own community. An ideological power elite – the intelligentsia, the intellectuals – appeared as a collective actor, just as the clerical, priestly caste had done in earlier ages. True, intellectuals were not united or "pure"; many remained loyal to their clients, and their clients battled to control them with rewards and punishments, licensing, and censorship. Nonetheless, the battle was recognized by the protagonists as real and novel: a struggle over enlarged powers of ideological mobilization. Entwined classes, nations, states, churches, and others were struggling for power. Solutions were proffered by a transcendent, revolutionized Western ideological community. I assess its

precise degree of autonomy and power in my narrative chapters. They were generally greater early in the period than later, when regimes had developed coping strategies, centered on confining most ideological power networks within state institutions.

Conclusion

Capitalism and discursive literacy media were the dual faces of a civil society diffusing throughout eighteenth-century European civilization. They were not reducible to each other, although they were entwined, especially in the more capitalistic westerly countries. Nor were they more than partly caged by dominant classes, churches, military elites, and states, although they were variably encouraged and structured by them. Thus, they were partly transnational and interstitial to other power organizations – only partly, however, and later chapters will chart a decline in both qualities. Civil societies were always entwined with states – and they became more so during the long nineteenth century.

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3 A theory of the modern state

Chapter 1 distinguishes clearly between military and political power. Yet modern states seem to merge the two, since they formally monopolize the means of military violence. This did not end the autonomy of military power organization, as Chapters 12 and 21 make clear, but it redirected it through organizations that were formally the state's. Hence this chapter treats military power within a broader discussion of political power.

I review five current theories of the state, plus the political concepts of Max Weber. I then proceed in three stages to my own theory. I begin with an "institutional" definition of the state and seek to specify the many institutional particularities of modern states. Then I seek to simplify this complexity by moving to a "functional" analysis, offering a polymorphous view of state functions. I assert that modern states "crystallized" (over the area covered in this volume) in several principal forms. Responding to the other three sources of social power, they crystallized as capitalist, as moral-ideological, and as militarist. Responding to their own political struggles, they crystallized at variable points on two continua, one "representative," running in this period from autocratic monarchy to party democracy; the other "national," from centralized nation-state to a loosely confederal regime. Most diffusely, they also crystallized as patriarchal, regulating gender and family relations. Finally, I discuss whether we can detect relations of hierarchy among these, so that one or more crystallizations may ultimately determine the overall character of the state.

Five theories of the state

It has become common to distinguish three theories of the state: class, pluralist, and elitist (sometimes called statism or managerialism) (Alford and Friedland, 1985). Because elitism is similar to realist international relations theory, I discuss the two together. But I divide elite theories into two, each with a distinct view of state autonomy. I call these two "true elitism" and "institutional statism." I also add a fifth theory, implied by many empirical studies, which I label cock-up or foul-up theory. I borrow from all five, especially from institutional statism.

Most class theories have been Marxist. Marx tended to reduce states to economic power relations. States are functional for modes of

economic production and for classes. Modern states have been determined by two phases of politicized class struggle, between feudal lords and capitalist bourgeoisie and then between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Applied to modern Western states, class theory has one tremendous virtue: It recognizes that they are in some fundamental sense capitalist. All five of my principal states during the long nineteenth century were already or rapidly becoming capitalist. But the vice of class theory is to regard this as their *only* fundamental property. True, Marx sometimes wrote as if other powers might be lodged in the state. I discuss the rather limited autonomies he allowed to the "Bonapartist state" in Chapter 9. Marxists see modern states as having only relative autonomy: Ultimately states service capital accumulation and class regulation. Marxists add "historical contingencies" and "conjunctures," but these are rarely theorized – they are added on empirically (as in Wolfe's 1977 history of modern states). Although class-plus-contingency indicates more empirical sensitivity than class alone, it does not transform the theory.

Most Marxists deny allegation of economic reductionism, but when they define the state they give the game away. Poulantzas (1978: 18–22), Jessop (1982), and Offe and Ronge (1982: 1–2) claim that states can be defined only in relation to specific modes of production – the "capitalist state" and the "feudal state" are possible concepts, they all say, but not the "state" in general. Those who do define the "state" do so only in terms of class relations: "The 'state' is a concept for the concentrated and organized means of legitimate class domination," says Zeitlin (1980: 15). In recent years some Marxists have become more hesitant. Jessop (1990) now emphasizes "contingency" in politics, arguing that the Marxian notion of state "relative autonomy" still offers too rigid an economic determinism. The capitalist class essentially pursues the "value form" but may have alternative accumulation projects (as I also emphasize in this volume). Dominant classes have "hegemonic projects" for which they may organize cross-class alliances, even sometimes for noneconomic purposes such as enhancing military power or morality. But he still only theorizes, and then qualifies, classes. Despite relative autonomy, conjunctures, or contingencies, Marxists have offered theoretically reductionist views of the state. This volume attempts to do better.

Most Marxists have become pessimistic about the chances for a proletarian revolution and advance "instrumental" or "structural" views of the capitalist state. Either modern state personnel are the direct instrument of the capitalist class (Miliband 1969), or they function structurally to reproduce capitalist relations of production (Poulantzas 1973). It is extraordinary that sociologists ever regarded

the "Miliband-Poulantzas debate" as being a significant controversy in state theory, as their debate was over such a narrow area when viewed from the perspectives of all other theories. Either way the state helps accumulate capital and regulate class struggle, sometimes even repressing capitalists whose sectional interests frustrate the interests of capital in general (there are many disputations on such points; for reviews, see Jessop 1977, 1982). These functions "required" a vast expansion of what Althusser (1971: 123–73) termed "repressive and ideological state apparatuses" – police, welfare agencies, education, mass media, and the like. The state is not an actor, but a place where classes and class "fractions" or "segments" (Zeitlin 1980, 1984) organize. Actually, states are *both* place and actor.

Class theorists who retain more optimism emphasize that capitalism still contains contradictions and class struggle, which is politicized and displaced onto the state as the "fiscal crisis of the state" (O'Connor 1973), "legitimation crisis" (Habermas 1976), or "crisis management" (Offe 1972, 1974; Offe and Ronge 1982). Offe distinctively accepts that the state has also become an actor, leading to a contradiction between its own institutional interests in compromising class struggle through developing welfare programs and the dynamic of capitalist accumulation, which continually seeks to subvert this and reduce state expenditure. Class theory has also generated an empiricist radical school, associated especially with C. Wright Mills (1956) and Domhoff (1978, 1990), who see states as less unified, composed of diverse institutions and branches colonized by power elites and class fractions. Apart from these radicals, most class theorists treat the state as passive and unitary: It is largely the central politicized place of capitalist society. State-society relations form a single system: The state, at the center of a "social formation" defined by its modes of economic production, reproduces their cohesion and their systemic contradictions. The modern Western state, thus, has, in the last instance, been defined by a single crystallization, as capitalist.

Unlike class theory, which seeks to explain all states, pluralist theory claims to explain only modern democratic ones. Pluralism is liberal democracy's (especially American democracy's) view of itself. Modernization shifted political power "from kings to people" (as Bendix's 1978 title suggests). Dahl noted that this consisted of two processes: (1) the emergence of institutionalized "contestation" between parties and pressure groups representing a plurality of interest groups in society and (2) the widening scope of "participation" by the people in this contestation. Combined, contestation and participation generate genuine democracy (which Dahl calls "polyarchy"). Since, as Dahl observes, contestation appeared early in the West, while par-

ticipation remained very limited, its history is more critical in my present period. I term Dahl's contestation "party democracy." For pluralists, a broadening party democracy is the ultimately defining crystallization of most modern Western states.

Through party democracy, states ultimately represent the interests of individual citizens. Classes may be seen as the most important interest groups behind parties (as for Lipset 1959) or as merely one among many types of countervailing interest groups whose composition varies among states (others being economic sectors, religious, linguistic, and ethnic communities, regions, gender, age cohorts, etc.). Few pluralists claim that all interest groups have equal powers or that party democracy confers perfect political equality on all. But most assert that Western liberal democracy generates enough competition and participation to produce government by competing and responsive elites, not government by a single elite or dominant class. Power inequalities are not cumulative but dispersed, says Dahl (1956: 333; 1961: 85–6; 1977).

Pluralism correctly recognizes the importance of party democracy in Western history (though perhaps it exaggerates how ultimately "democratic" modern states are). It also recognizes that there is more to society than classes. But it makes two mistakes. First, though it suggests a more complex state, like class theory it is ultimately reductionist and functionalist. It credits the state with no autonomous power – the state is still a place, not an actor; party and pressure group politics radiate inward to control the state. Second, it sees classes, sectors, religions, regions, and so forth, as analogous and systemic in their competition with one another. Again, like class theory, the state is unitary and systemic. Relations between government and plural interest groups form a democratic functional *system*. Plural interest groups have powers in proportion to the muscle of their constituency. These sum up to a single totality, "society." Democratic government reflects "society" and its "needs" as a whole.

For Easton (1965: 56), "the political system" is the "most inclusive system of behavior in a society for the authoritative allocation of values." Coherence is attributed to the "political system," the "polity," the "political community," or the "government." Pluralists eschew the word "state," probably because it conveys a more Germanic sense of "power." Nothing whatever flows from choosing one of these words rather than any other; I use the shortest one, state. Whatever word pluralists use they agree with the substance of Poulantzas's functionalist statement: The state is the "factor of cohesion" in society. Only the pluralist view of society differs from his. As we shall see, neither state nor society is usually that cohesive.

By contrast, writers in the third school, "elitists" or "statists," focus on autonomous powers possessed by the state. Yet they contain two quite different views of autonomy that need distinguishing. There would be no point in my distinguishing political power as the fourth source of social power unless one or both of these possessed considerable truth. Although both contain some truth, one contains much.

Elite theory first flourished at the beginning of the twentieth century. Oppenheimer (1975) emphasized the increasing powers through history of the "political class." Mosca (1939) located political power in centralized organization. A centralized, organized, and cohesive minority will always defeat and control the disorganized masses, he correctly argued. Yet Mosca and Pareto emphasized that the power of political elites originated elsewhere, in civil society, and is eventually vulnerable to new counterelites arising therefrom. Control over other resources (economic, ideological, or military) enabled rising elites to overthrow the fading political elite and organize their own power in state institutions. Thus classical elitists saw political power as a dynamic relation *between* the state and civil society – and this is indeed correct.

Yet, about 1980, sociological attention concentrated on centralized state powers. Theda Skocpol (1979: 27, 29–30; cf. 1985) defined the state as "a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed and more or less well co-ordinated by an executive authority . . . an autonomous structure – a structure with a logic and interests of its own." She wished to correct "society-centered" pluralist and Marxist theories with a "state-centered" approach. Although neither Skocpol nor her critics seem to have realized it, these remarks actually contain two quite different versions of state autonomy, which I term "true elitism" and "institutional statism."

True elitists emphasize the distributive power of state elites *over* society. Thus states are seen as actors. Krasner (1984: 224) states this flatly: "The state can be treated as an actor in its own right." Levi (1988: 2–9) also insists that "rulers rule." She sees states as rational actors, maximizing their own private interests, becoming "predators" despoiling civil society – a very American viewpoint. Kiser and Hechter (1991) have advanced a "rational choice" model of states that assumes states are single, unitary, rational actors. Poggi (1990: 97–9, 120–7), while recognizing that states are also "serviceable" (i.e., serving plural interests) and "partisan" (benefiting classes), argues that states are ultimately "invasive," preoccupied with "their own" interests. True elitists invert class and pluralist theory: Distributive power now primarily radiates outward from, not inward to, the state.

True elite theorists have one tremendous virtue. They emphasize

one aspect of states on which almost all class and pluralist writers have been inexcusably silent: that states inhabit a world of states and that states "act" geopolitically (Shaw 1984, 1988 is an honorable exception to Marxian silence, as are the radicals Mills and Domhoff). The few class theorists who discuss international relations tend to reduce them to modes of production and classes extended into the globe – the most recent such analysis being world systems theory. By contrast, theorists influenced by true elitism have emphasized geopolitics, war, and war finances (Giddens 1985; Levi 1988; Tilly 1990).

Elitists are reinforced by "realist" international relations theorists. Though little interested in the internal structure of states, realists see states as unitary power actors enjoying "sovereignty" over their territories. "Statesmen" are empowered to represent internationally an overall "national" interest. But among sovereign states there is no higher rationality or normative solidarity, only the exercise of distributive power, normlessness, and anarchy (Poggi 1990: 23–5). Thus foreign policy is made by states and statesmen systematically, "realistically" pursuing "their own" geopolitical interests against those of other states. The primary interest is security – vigilant defense coupled with intermittent aggression. Morgenthau (1978: 42) declared: "All history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war." Realism thus emphasizes cohesion of states within, zero-sum games, normlessness, and war without. Most international relations theorists, realists or not, stress the difficulties of establishing international norms. Where norms exist, they tend to attribute them to "hegemony" or coercion (e.g., Lipson 1985) or to "realistic" calculations of national interest such as develops in balance of power systems. Ideological solidarity among Powers can be only transient and interest-determined.

Realism has been criticized by a countertrend in international relations theory, emphasizing interdependence among states. Realists are blamed for neglecting transnational and transgovernmental power networks around the globe. These crosscut state sovereignty, reducing their cohesion and providing an alternative source of norms and hence of world order (Keohane and Nye 1977: 23–37). Because interdependence theorists focus on modern global capitalism, they rarely apply their arguments to previous centuries. They seem to agree with realists that balance of power or hegemonic powers usually ruled then. Rosecrance (1986) is an exception. He regards trading and imperial states as present in varying degrees throughout history, both embodying distinct normative systems. I develop similar arguments in Chapters 8

and 21. In multi-power-actor civilizations, like Europe or the modern West, geopolitical relations exist within a broader civilization embodying transnational and transgovernmental power networks and norms.

Realist and interdependence theorists also share a curious blind spot: They concentrate on how benign pacific international norms appear. Interdependence theorists see contemporary norms of cooperation as reflecting shared plural, material interests; realists see norms as generalized calculations of state interest. Yet many transnational or transgovernmental norms and ideologies might not be benign or reflect material interests expressed peacefully on markets. They might embody repressive class and other power-actor interests, they might encourage war in the name of higher ideals, they might even idealize war itself. Normative solidarities might lead to disorder. Disorder might not result from the absence of an international regime but from the presence of one. Realists prefer to avoid this problem. For example, in Morgenthau's realist historical narrative, periods of calm, rationalistic balance of power or hegemonic power are abruptly shattered by more violent interregna, as during 1772–1815 or 1914–45. But Morgenthau makes no attempt to explain these interregna. Since he has earlier described ideologies as mere legitimations or "disguises" of interests, he has no theoretical concepts with which to interpret periods in which diplomacy and war were themselves deeply infused with violent revolutionary and reactionary ideologies (1978: 92–103, 226–8). Indeed, I show that calculations of interest were always influenced by all of the entwined sources of social power, and always involved norms – sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent – emanating from complex attachments to the "imagined communities" of class and nation.

Realism and true elitism also tend to share with pluralism and Marxism an emphasis on a cohesive, systemic state – this time in the form of a singular elite actor. Krasner has argued that the autonomy of the state elite is greater in foreign than in domestic policy; it is relatively "insulated" from domestic class and interest group pressures. The state is a "set of roles and institutions having peculiar drives, compulsions and aims of their own that are separate and distinct from the interests of any particular group" (1978: 10–11). I use Krasner's "insulation" metaphor later in this volume, while qualifying his conclusion. Statesmen also embody social identities emanating from beyond the state itself; and statesmen are not cohesive.

On the first point, as Jessop (1990) has argued, central state resources are rarely adequate for ambitious statist projects. State elites need alliances with powerful groups "out there" in society. These are not usually alliances between two quite distinct groups. Laumann and

Knoke (1987) show that in contemporary America networks constituted by multiple organizations typically penetrate the formal division between state and society. State actors normally are also "civilians," with social identities. Domhoff (1990: 107–52) shows that most modern American "statesmen" are recruited from big business and corporate law firms. They form a "party" "representing" an international capitalist class fraction more than America.

All class theorists stress the dominant class identity and interests of statesmen. As a sociologist believing that social identities cannot be reduced to class, I broaden their line of argument in this volume. Though I support Krasner by demonstrating that nineteenth-century statesmen were indeed somewhat insulated from both popular and dominant classes, they could not be wholly insulated because they themselves possessed social identities. They were all white males, overwhelmingly drawn from the old regime and from dominant religious and linguistic communities. All these social identities mattered in their conduct of foreign policy, shaping the norms uniting them with, or dividing them from, other domestic and foreign power actors, sometimes reducing, sometimes increasing, international violence.

On the second point, few states turn out to be unitary actors. Keohane and Nye (1977: 34) pointedly ask of arguments asserting that "states act in their own interest": "which self and which interest?" State elites are plural, not singular. Some moderately statist writers acknowledge this. Tilly (1990: 33–4) accepts that reification of the state is ultimately illegitimate, as also, he acknowledges, is his neglect of social classes. These are just pragmatic and heuristic simplifications, he says. Skocpol recognizes that elite powers and cohesion vary. Constitutions matter. Democratic constitutions prohibit elite autonomies allowed to authoritarian ones. Her analysis (1979) of early modern revolutions centered state autonomy, reasonably enough, on the powers of absolute monarchs. In the period discussed here, monarchical powers usually approximate most closely true elitist notions of state autonomy, although autonomy is never absolute. But Skocpol's more recent collaborative work (Weir and Skocpol 1985), on twentieth-century welfare programs, locates elite autonomy among specialized bureaucrats, a more surreptitious, lesser form of autonomy. In Trimberger's analysis (1978) of "revolutions from above" in developing countries, the state elite differs yet again: It is a revolutionary alliance of bureaucrats and military officers. Thus state elites are diverse and they may be incoherent – especially in the period under discussion, when monarchies, the military, bureaucrats, and political parties cohabit states.

But Skocpol has also moved, seemingly somewhat unconsciously, toward a more fundamental revision of state autonomy. Let me again

quote her statement that the state "is a structure with a logic and interests of its own." "Interests" are obviously properties of actors – an expression of true elitist theory – yet "logic" need imply no actor or elite. State autonomy might reside less in elite autonomy at all than in the autonomous logic of definite political institutions, arisen in the course of previous power struggles, then institutionalized and constraining present struggles. Skocpol and her collaborators (Weir et al. 1988: 1–121) emphasize how American federalism and the party patronage system, institutionalized in the nineteenth century, then held back the development of U.S. state powers, especially in the area of welfare policies. Though they still intermittently assert that state elites (bureaucrats, technocrats, and party leaders) possess some autonomy as actors, Skocpol and her associates focus more on the autonomous effects exerted by state institutions on all political actors. Federalism, parties, the presence or absence of cabinet government, and many other features of what we call the "constitutions" of states structure power relations in quite distinctive ways. Laumann and Knoke (1987) offer a more empiricist institutional approach. They look for formal patterning of the interactions between state departments and pressure groups, concluding that the contemporary American state consists of complex "organizational" networks.

This is "state power" though rarely "elite power," as it relates more to collective than to distributive power. It affects more the forms in which politicized actors collaborate than who has power over whom. This theory would predict less that state elites dominate civil society actors and more that all actors are constrained by existing political institutions. Because states are essentially ways in which dynamic social relations become authoritatively institutionalized, they readily lend themselves to a kind of "political lag" theory. States institutionalize present social conflicts, but institutionalized historic conflicts then exert considerable power over new conflicts – from state as passive place (as in Marxian or pluralist theory) to state not quite as actor (as in true elitism) but as active place. Chapter 20 endorses such a view of the Western state.

I call this approach to state power "institutional statism," and I embrace it as part of my overall "organizational materialism." Because this period saw the emergence of a truly massive set of political institutions – the nation-state – the theory will prove to have considerable explanatory power in our discussion. True elitism may be usefully applied to the most authoritarian and dictatorial states – for example, to the Nazi or Stalinist state (though even there its assumption of elite coherence must be relaxed). Even in some of the states of my present period true elitism has useful things to say about absolutist

and authoritarian monarchs. But overall I shall rely far more on institutional statism to identify the predominant forms of state autonomy.

Naturally enough, many writers do not fit neatly into any of these schools of theory. Some draw from more than one. Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) argue that capitalism imposes limits on states, yet elites possess some autonomy. Laumann and Knoke (1987) draw on all four of the theories I have so far identified. Dahl has qualified his earlier pluralism by acknowledging that the concentrated power of corporate capitalism now jeopardizes democracy. And anyone with empirical sensitivity – like Dahl, Domhoff, Offe, or Skocpol – sees that all three schools have something valid to say about states: that states are both actors and places, that these places have many mansions and varying degrees of autonomy and cohesion, yet also respond to pressures from capitalists, other major power actors, and more general expressed social needs.

But much of the empirical work on state administrations does not stress any of the actors privileged by these theories – a state elite, the interests of capital, or the interests of society as a whole. Rather states are portrayed as chaotic, irrational, with multiple departmental autonomies, pressured erratically and intermittently by capitalists but also by other interest groups. Under the microscope, states "Balkanize," dissolving into competing departments and factions (Alford and Friedland 1985: 202–22; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985). For example, Padgett's (1981) dissection of the budgets of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development does not find that singular cohesive actor, *the* state, but multiple, sprawling, fragmented administrations. Adding foreign policy often worsens the confusion. In Albertini's (1952–7) painstaking reconstruction of the diplomacy leading to World War I, states are riven by multiple disputes, some geopolitical, others domestic, entwining in unanticipated ways far from the cohesion portrayed by realist-elite theory and as implied by class and pluralist theory. Thus, said Abrams (1988: 79), the very idea of *the* state mystifies: "The state is the unified symbol of an actual disunity. . . . Political institutions . . . conspicuously fail to display a unity of practice – just as they constantly discover their inability to function as a more general factor of cohesion."

Therefore, we might advance a fifth theory, which I describe with a traditional English expression: The state is not conspiracy but "cock-up." As this metaphor conveys quite the wrong meaning in American English, I translate it as: The state is not functional but "foul-up."

Most sociologists would regard cock-up or foul-up theory with disdain. They believe social life is patterned and ordered. Obviously, some states are more orderly than others, but is there not a certain

consistency to state blunders as well as state strategies? Surely, modern Western states are in some fundamental sense "capitalist" and "party democratic" (as Marxists and pluralists assert). They have contained monarchal and bureaucratic elites (as elitists observe). They are major or minor Powers, secular or religious, centralized or federal, patriarchical or gender-neutral. Such states are patterned. Granted the excesses of systemic theories, can we pattern states while not reifying them? Do we have to abandon substantive theory and construct our theory merely from the formal properties of maps of the dense organizational networks of modern political influence, as Laumann and Knoke (1987) do? Despite the considerable virtues of their organizational theory, and the parallels between their enterprise and my own, does it not sometimes miss the wood for the trees? The American state surely is at some "higher," macro level capitalist; it is also essentially federal and it possesses the most powerful militarism in the world. I would not have guessed this from their maps of complex organizational power networks. Indeed, by dismissing the notion that this might essentially be a capitalist state because organizational networks are rarely configured for the defense of capitalism (and so may sometimes react belatedly to a threat to their property rights), Laumann and Knoke (1987: 383–6) are in danger of repeating the old pluralist error of mistaking the terrain of open political debate and organization for the entire terrain of politics.

My more substantive version of organizational materialism comes in two stages. First, I identify the particular characteristics of political institutions. Marxism and pluralism, being reductionist, tend to neglect political particularities. True elitism-realism regards them as singular, exaggerating the power and cohesion of state actors; cock-up–foul-up theory overproliferates particularities. In beginning to identify general patterns of political particularities, we cannot do better than start with Max Weber. Weber has been sometimes identified as a true elitist, yet this characterization is wrong. Weber did not produce a coherent state theory, but he left us concepts with which to fashion one. An institutional approach tends to proliferate organizational complexity, as do Laumann and Knoke (using much more sophisticated data than I can aspire to for historical states). So in the second stage I look to simplify institutional proliferation, using my polymorphous theory of "higher-level state crystallizations."

Weber's political concepts: an institutional analysis

Above all, Weber was a theorist of the historical development of social institutions. He began his discussion of the state by distinguishing three

stages in its institutional development, characterized by the terms "political power," the "state," and the "modern state." In his first stage, political power existed though a state did not:

> A "ruling organization" will be called "political" insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given *territorial* area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. [This and the next two quotations are from Weber 1978: I, 54–6; his emphases.]

Thus political power is essentially territorial, and it is physically imposed by a specialized (implicitly centralized) staff. The "state" then emerged in the second stage:

> A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a "state" insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.

This institutional definition of the state has been widely endorsed (MacIver 1926: 22; Eisenstadt 1969: 5; Tilly 1975: 27; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985: 47; Poggi 1990, Chapters 1 and 2). Along with Giddens (1985: 18), I differ on one point: Many historic states did not "monopolize" the means of physical force, and even in the modern state the means of physical force have been substantially autonomous from (the rest of) the state.

Thus I loosen the ties between military and political power to generate my own definition, much influenced by Weber:

1. The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel
2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a
3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises
4. some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force.

This is an institutional, not a functional, definition of the state. It does not mention what the state does. True, the state uses force, but only as means to back up its rules, which are given no particular content. Of the theories considered here, only Marxist class theory and some realists specify state functions: to reproduce the social relations required by dominant modes of production (Marxists), or to pursue territorial security needs (realism). Yet states have undertaken multiple functions. Though states have indeed class and security functions, they also adjudicate disputes, redistribute resources among regions, age groups, and other interest groups, sacralize some institutions and secularize others, and do many other things. As different states pursue different functions with differing degrees of commitment, it is not easy to define

the state in terms of functions. Later I move to a functional analysis to identify different functional crystallizations of states.

From my definition of the state we can derive four particularities, shared by all states, of political institutions:

1. The state is territorially centralized. It does not wield an analogous resource to ideological, economic, and military power. Indeed, it must draw on these very resources, which are located outside itself. But the state nonetheless possesses another distinct power resource: It alone is inherently centralized over a delimited territory over which it has binding powers.

2. The state contains two dualities: It is place and persons and center and territory. Political power is simultaneously "statist," vested in elite persons and institutions at the center, *and* it is composed of "party" relations between persons and institutions in the center and across state territories. Thus it will crystallize in forms essentially generated by the outside society *and* in forms that are intrinsic to its own political processes.

3. State institutions are differentiated, undertaking different functions for different interest groups located within its territories. Whatever centrality, whatever private rationality, the state possesses, it is also impure, different parts of its body politic open to penetration by diverse power networks. Thus *the state need have no final unity or even consistency*. It might do so if societies possessed such final unity or consistency, but my model of societies as overlapping, intersecting power networks suggests that they do not.

4. The very definition of the state as a delimited territory suggests a further set of "political" relations between this state and other states – that is, *geopolitics*. Throughout his work, and especially when dealing with his own Imperial German state, Weber emphasizes that geopolitics help shape domestic politics. Collins (1986: 145) suggests that, for Weber, "politics works from the outside in," though Weber also sometimes emphasizes the reverse causation. Politics and geopolitics are entwined; the one should not be studied without the other.

I shall expand on these points after explaining Weber's third stage, the "modern state." It additionally

> possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of orders claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens . . . but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis.

Thus the modern state added routine, formalized, rationalized institutions of wider scope over citizens and territories. It *penetrates* its

territories with both law and administration (embodying what Weber calls "rational-legal domination"), as earlier states did not. Tilly (1990: 103–16) aptly describes this as "direct" rule and contrasts it to the indirect rule embodied in earlier states. But this is not merely a matter of the state increasing rule over society. Conversely, "citizens" and "parties" also penetrate the modern state. The state has become a *nation-state*, also representing citizens' internal sense of community as well as emphasizing the distinctness of their external interests in relation to the citizens of other states. Whereas the "legitimacy" problem in most historic states is, for Weber, primarily a problem of the cohesion between a ruler and his staff, he argues that in the modern state it principally concerns relations among rulers, parties, and the nation.

Weber sometimes selects one institution of the modern state for extraordinary emphasis: "monocratic bureaucracy," that is, bureaucracy centralized under one head. He famously wrote:

> The monocratic variety of bureaucracy is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization. . . . The development of modern forms of organization in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development of and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. . . . Its development is, to take the most striking case, at the root of the modern Western state. . . . [T]he needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable. The choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration. [1978: I, 223]

Weber saw bureaucratization dominating the entire West. Although he viewed the German state as a bureaucratic pioneer, he took pains to demonstrate that two states that might seem decidedly unbureaucratic – tsarist Russia and the confederal party–ridden United States – were also falling under its sway. Everywhere competing political authorities were subordinated to bureaucracy. A democratic regime, by centralizing responsibility, only furthered monocratic bureaucracy. He anguished over this "irresistible advance," asking rhetorically, "How can one possibly save any remnants of 'individualist' freedom in any sense?" and again, "What can we oppose to this machinery, in order to keep a portion of humanity free from this parcelling out of the soul, from this total domination of the bureaucratic ideal of life?" (1978: II, 1403; Beetham 1985: 81).

At one point Weber seems to have sensed that his argument was weak. He mused whether modernization increased the *power* of bureaucracy – without explaining what this sudden italicization means.

But then he concluded plainly that it did: "The power position of a fully-fledged bureaucracy is always great, under normal conditions overtowering. The political 'master' almost always finds himself vis-à-vis the trained official, in the position of a dilettante facing the expert" (1978: II, 969–1003, quoted from p. 991; for an excellent commentary, see Beetham 1985: 67–72).

Weber went badly wrong in suddenly endorsing a true elitist theory of bureaucracy. Bureaucrats have rarely dominated modern states, and state administrations have rarely been monocratic (see Chapter 13). There are both conceptual and empirical objections.

Curiously, empirical objections are found in Weber's dissections of his own Imperial German state. There he identified not just a powerful bureaucracy but three distinct political institutions: bureaucracy, a dual political executive (kaiser and chancellor), and parties (especially the Junker party). Weber did not confine the term "party" to formal political parties fighting elections. He meant any group collectively organized for the acquisition of power, including factions at court or in ministries or high commands. As Chapter 9 shows, at different times he stated that each of these three actors dominated the *Kaiserreich*. Note, however, that parties differ from the other two actors. The bureaucracy and the executive are compatible with true elitism, but party power derived from a two-way relation between center and territory: The Junkers were a class "out there" in civil society, yet were also entrenched in the military and other key state institutions. In his work Weber gave greatest weight to parties; they, not bureaucracies or executives, comprised the third actor in his tripartite model of social stratification, along with classes and status groups.

Although Weber did not have a final theory of the modern state, his ideas differed from the state theories identified earlier. He was not a reductionist: Unlike proponents of Marxism and pluralism, he saw that states had powers of their own. And unlike those of true elitism and realism, he did not lodge those powers merely in a central elite; nor were they necessarily cohesive. Like many other modern writers, Laumann and Knoke (1987: 380) identify Weber as a realist elitist and criticize his supposed neglect of the blurring of boundaries between the public and the private. But this was precisely his point when analyzing parties. Political power was simultaneously a centralized resource, a two-way relationship between center and territories, and a relationship among states. Weber did not mold these institutional elements into a coherent state theory. Yet, by remedying his key conceptual confusion, we are able to do so.

Weber's remarks confuse two conceptions of state strength, expressed in his cited quote as "penetration" and "power." Weber is right in

saying that bureaucracy increased penetration but wrong in saying that it simply increased power. He was confusing collective infrastructural and distributive despotic power. The former is emphasized by institutional state theories; the latter, by true elitism.

Despotic power refers to the distributive power of state elites over civil society. It derives from the range of actions that state elites can undertake without routine negotiation with civil society groups. It derives from the fact that only the state is inherently territorially centralized, fulfilling useful social functions that require this form of organization and that ideological, economic, and military power actors, organized on different bases, cannot themselves fulfill. Actors located primarily within states have a certain space and privacy in which to operate – the degree varying according to the ability of civil society actors to organize themselves centrally through representative assemblies, formal political parties, court factions, and so forth. They can alternatively withhold powers from central politics (discussed later) or undercut state powers by strengthening transnational relations abroad. A state with despotic power becomes either an autonomous actor, as emphasized by true elitism, or multiple but perhaps confused autonomous actors, according to its internal homogeneity.

Infrastructural power is the institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions. This is collective power, "power through" society, coordinating social life through state infrastructures. It identifies a state as a set of central and radial institutions penetrating its territories. Because the infrastructural powers of modern states have increased, Weber implied this also increased their despotic power over society. But this is not necessarily so. Infrastructural power is a two-way street: It also enables civil society parties to control the state, as Marxists and pluralists emphasize. Increasing infrastructural power does not necessarily increase or reduce distributive, despotic power.

Effective infrastructural powers, however, do increase collective state power. Because more of social life is now coordinated through state institutions, these will structure more of it, increasing what might be called the "territorial centralization" or the "naturalization" of social life. Infrastructurally more powerful states cage more social relations within their "national" boundaries and along the radial lines of control between center and territories. They increase national and geopolitical collective powers at the expense of local-regional and transnational ones while leaving open the distributional question of who controls them. Thus the explanatory power of institutional statism increases in the modern state as its collective, infrastructural powers massively expand.

Table 3.1. *Two dimensions of state power*

	Infrastructural power	
Despotic power	Low	High
Low	Feudal	Bureaucratic-democratic
High	Imperial/absolutist	Authoritarian

Despotic and infrastructural powers combine into four ideal types, as shown in Table 3.1.

The feudal state combined feeble despotic and infrastructural powers. It had little capacity to intervene in social life. It had considerable autonomy in its own private sphere but little power over or through society. The medieval king possessed the state; it was his household, his wardrobe, his estates, generating his own revenues. He could do as he pleased within it, but he could not do much to society outside. His rule there was indirect, depending on the infrastructures of autonomous lords, the church, and other corporate bodies. His army depended on their levies and these might decline his orders. The imperial state of Rome or China and European absolutism approximate to the second ideal type, with pronounced despotic but little infrastructural power. They could roar "off with his head," and if the person was within range, off came his head – but few were within range. Their armies were formidable but tended to fragment as generals became rival imperial pretenders. The modern Western liberal-bureaucratic state approximates to the third type, with massive infrastructures largely controlled by either capitalists or the democratic process (I shall not yet judge which). The modern authoritarian state – the Soviet Union when at its height – had both despotic powers and substantial infrastructures (though their cohesion was less than we often assumed).

From the sixteenth century on, a monarchical surge toward greater despotism provoked a representative backlash and massive political conflict. But infrastructural power grew fairly consensually as states partook in the exponential growth of the general collective powers discussed in Chapter 1. As Table 3.1 indicates, the unusual strength of modern states is infrastructural. Agrarian states could not even know the worth of their subjects, let alone tax them accurately. They could not tax income at all, assessed only crude indicators of wealth (size of landholding or house, value of goods brought to market, etc.), and relied on autonomous local notables to extract it. Yet today the

American and British states can both tax my own income and wealth "at source" – they know my approximate worth – and extract their cut without my even laying hands on it. Whoever controls these states has infinitely more control over me than agrarian states had over my ancestors. As Huntington (1968: 1) observed, the British, U.S., and Soviet (before 1991) states were more similar to one another than either were to historic states or to many states in developing countries – "the government governs," actually implementing cabinet, presidential, or Politburo decisions, capable of far more power mobilization at home and abroad than were their historic predecessors.

But not only state infrastructures expanded. A revolution in collective power logistics increased the infrastructural penetration of all power organizations. Civil society's capacity to control the state also increased. Modern societies contain both authoritarian states, effectively dominating everyday life in their territories (as no historic states did), and democratic-party states, routinely controlled by civil society (as only small city-states had been previously). This spelled the end for states in the upper left portion of Table 3.1 – autonomous and fairly cohesive, yet feeble, enjoying privacy from civil society but little effective power over it. Modern states and civil societies interpenetrate too tightly for autonomy without power.

This muddies our analysis. Given such interpenetration, where does the state end and civil society begin? The state is no longer a small, private central place and elite with its own rationality. "It" contains multiple institutions and tentacles sprawling from the center through its territories, even sometimes through transnational space. Conversely, civil society also becomes far more politicized than in the past, sending out diverse raiding parties – pressure groups and political parties – into the various places of the state, as well as outflanking it transnationally. Modern political power as place and actor, infrastructure and despot, elite and parties is dual, concerning both a center, with its multiple power particularities, and center-territory relations, with their power particularities. "Its" cohesion is always problematic. Only in one respect is "the state" singular: As infrastructural interpenetration increased, "it" tended to "naturalize" social life. The "power" of the modern state principally concerns not "state elites" exercising power over society but a tightening state-society relation, caging social relations over the national rather than the local-regional or transnational terrain, thus politicizing and geopoliticizing far more of social life than had earlier states.

Starting from Weber, in this section I identified the institutional particularities shared by all states. I then added the particularities of modern nation-states. Beyond these broad similarities states will differ

Table 3.2. *Power networks in nineteenth-century states*

Political institutions	Despotic state	Particularistic state–civil society alliance	Dominant classes	Multiple interest groups
Supreme executive	Absolute monarch, dynasty	Embedded in court and old regime	Embedded in feudal-capitalistic society	Constitutionally embedded in estates, parliaments, corporate privileges
Judiciary-police	Insulated royal courts	Embedded in corporate legal profession and universities	Embedded in property law	Civil citizenship (individual and collective)
Civil administration	Insulated corps of royal or bureaucratic officials	Embedded in old regime, new professionals, and universities	Functional for capitalism	Meritocratic bureaucracy answerable to parliaments
Parties, assemblies	One-party regimes (none in this period)	Limited legislatures, divide and rule, party oligarchies, court intrigue	1. Property franchise 2. Capitalist limits to parliamentary sovereignty	Political citizenship
Diplomacy	Insulated "statesmen"	Embedded in old regime	Embedded in propertied classes	Answerable to parliaments
Military	Insulated caste	Embedded in old regime and other particularistic groups	Embedded in propertied classes, answerable to civilian executives	Answerable to parliaments
Despotic power	High	Medium	Low	Low
Theory of state	True elitist-realist	Institutional statism	Class	Pluralist

considerably, according to time and place. In the next section I go into more detail, to list the main political institutions of Western societies during the long nineteenth century, beginning with those involved in domestic policy.

Nineteenth-century political institutions

Domestic policy

Table 3.2 gives the major institutions of central government (I deal later with central-local government relations). The first column lists the institutions, and the remaining columns analyze who controls them – with the aid of a distinction between "insulated" and "embedded" power. For a state to be despotic (as in true elitism), its networks must be insulated from civil society (as Krasner argued occurred in foreign policy). Column 2 lists forms of insulation that might free the state elite from civil society pressures and interests. But if state institutions are "embedded" in civil society, they will be controlled, as class and pluralist theories argue (columns 4 and 5).

But full despotism and complete insulation are unlikely. Because the state is both center and relations between center and territory, autonomy would require its territorial reach as well as its center to be insulated. Most fundamental of all, the state's resource base – its fiscal and manpower networks penetrating throughout civil society – must be insulated from civil society control. Yet such insulation has been rare historically. Raising revenue and troops normally required the help of local-regional notables. Insulation became even rarer in this period as political representation developed – aimed precisely at controlling such fiscal and manpower exactions. Full state autonomy or insulation, as specified in the second column of Table 3.2 and by the true elitist-realist theories, is unlikely. It presupposes insulation of all column 1 institutions. It is more likely that some are relatively insulated, others embedded in dominant classes, and still others in plural power networks (cf. Domhoff 1990: 26–8). Thus the state would be less coherent than any of the first three theoretical schools suggests. Insulation and autonomy might be possessed by parts, rather than by all, of the state.

More plausible is a "medium" level of despotic power, specified in the third column. State institutions may be embedded in more particularistic civil society power actors, as in Weber's account of the Junker party. According to him, the German monarchy had much autonomy from capitalists and from the citizenry in general because it had formed a particularistic alliance with the Junkers, a class formerly dominant in society, now greatly declined in economic power though