

# The Making of Rhodesia

Hugh Marshall Hole




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
Editorial Adviser: JOHN RALPH WILLIS



CECIL RHODES, 1889

# THE MAKING OF RHODESIA

HUGH MARSHALL HOLE



"All that Red—that's my dream!"  
CECIL RHODES.

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THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO  
MY DAUGHTER MONICA  
AND TO THE MEMORY OF  
MY WIFE  
BOTH OF WHOM SHARED WITH ME THE JOYS  
AND ADVENTURES OF THE EARLY  
DAYS OF RHODESIA



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## PREFACE

THE evolution of the British colonies which bear the name of Rhodes, their founder, has never, so far as I am aware, been described as a consecutive whole. Disconnected episodes have at different times excited attention and provoked controversy, but their correlation has not yet been presented to English readers and many of their details have been published in a garbled shape. My justification for attempting to piece the story together and to clear away some misconceptions lies in the fact that I lived in various parts of Southern and Northern Rhodesia for twenty-three years, and was in close personal contact throughout with the men who participated in the events of their stirring history. Many of these men have passed into the realms of silence, and before long no eye-witness will be left.

I desire gratefully to acknowledge the assistance which the Board of the British South Africa Company has rendered by allowing me to refer to early records and original reports. I wish also to record my indebtedness and thanks to Mr. E. A. Maund and Mr. Leo Weinthal, C.B.E., for some of the photographs, to Mr. H. H. Kitchen of the British South Africa Company for drawing the maps, and to Mr. J. G. MacDonald, O.B.E., and other Rhodesian friends for supplying deficiencies in my narrative. In preparing the early chapters I was greatly helped by the late Mr. Rochfort Maguire, President of the Chartered Company, who was intimately connected with many of the events recorded in them.

It is perhaps impossible for one who has served the Company from its inception to escape altogether the imputation of partiality, but I have honestly endeavoured to present the simple truth and to glose over no shortcomings.

H. M. H.

*London,*  
*February, 1926.*



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# THE MAKING OF RHODESIA

## CHAPTER I

### THE GENESIS OF THE MOVEMENT

THE project upon which Cecil Rhodes embarked thirty-six years ago, of creating a British Colony in the heart of Africa, has long since passed beyond the experimental stage. Its justification is now in the hands of the small but enterprising body of settlers in Southern Rhodesia who have lately, on their own initiative, shouldered the management of the great estate provided for them by the genius of its founder and by the patient and only partially requited labours of that remarkable corporation the British South Africa Company, whose history is, in fact, the history of the country itself.

The genesis of the movement which ultimately received the sanction of a Royal Charter may be traced to two principal influences.

The first of these was the persistent tradition, handed down from remote antiquity, that vast deposits of gold lay ready for the miner in Central South Africa, and the second was the impulse which came upon Englishmen, almost suddenly, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, to acquire fresh tracts of Africa for future development, to link South with North, and to create a Tom Tiddler's ground from which other European Powers should be excluded.

In the beginning these two influences operated independently and either of them might in time have become strong enough, unaided by the other, to have inspired a British enterprise. When they were ultimately merged they advanced with a rush which swept aside all opposition,

and what had at first been the dream of a few adventurers rapidly assumed the form of a solid commercial movement.

It is proposed at the outset to trace briefly the history of each of these two ideas up to the point where they became united in the mind of one man, and as the gold was the earlier attraction in point of time, so it will be dealt with first in this narrative.

It is unnecessary to do more than recall the legend of wealth which, through ancient and mediæval history, has clung about Mashonaland, long thought to be the Ophir of Biblical lore. It was this that prompted the Portuguese expeditions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: it was for gold that the miners of Zimbabwe, unidentified to this day, built the walls and towns, and sunk the shafts, which remain as enduring monuments to their industry, and it was the gold-glamour which made the mysterious Empire of Monomotapa a household word in Europe up to comparatively recent days.<sup>1</sup> The builders of Zimbabwe played their part and passed from the stage; the coast lands were occupied in turn by Arab traders and Portuguese adventurers. None of these were destined to establish themselves in the interior as a nation; the barbarous Kaffir tribes survived them all, and one is sometimes driven to speculate as to whether this virile race may not be destined to outlast even the present colonists of South Central Africa.

The history, mythical or actual, of these successive occupations belongs to another period, and has been well told by other pens. The following pages will deal with the latest phase only of Rhodesia's long history, during which the vague and doubtful rumours of hidden riches have gradually taken concrete shape in blocks of veritable gold.

The story dates back fifty or sixty years, and begins at a time when Mashonaland and Matabeleland were unknown, save to a few intrepid hunters who toiled painfully into the

<sup>1</sup> Interest in these legends and speculation as to their veracity was strangely but unmistakably revived by the publication in 1885 of Rider Haggard's celebrated romance, *King Solomon's Mines*.

interior from Durban or Capetown, and risked health and life in the pursuit of ivory. One of these, Henry Hartley, a well-known elephant hunter, whose wanderings led him more than once into the remote regions of Mashonaland, was struck by the shallow excavations and heaps of quartz which he saw in many parts of the country, and which were obviously the work of human hands. Hartley was one of the British settlers of 1820, and had his home at Bathurst in the Cape Colony, whence for many years he made expeditions into the interior for trade and hunting, but it was not until 1866 that he was able to put into practice the idea of obtaining scientific investigation of the mineral potentialities of the quartz reefs, which he knew to be so widely distributed in this part of Africa. In that year he fell in with a young German scientist named Carl Mauch, and engaged or invited him to accompany his next expedition.

On their return, in the latter part of 1867, Mauch wrote a letter to the *Transvaal Argus*, describing, in extravagant language, the result of his visit to the Northern goldfields. After narrating the discovery of two bodies of auriferous rock, one of which he traced for eighty and the other for twenty-two miles, he proceeds:—"The vast extent and beauty of these goldfields are such that at a particular spot I stood as it were transfixed, riveted to the place, struck with amazement and wonder at the sight, and for a few minutes was unable to use the hammer. Thousands of persons might here find ample room to work in this extensive field without interfering with one another." <sup>1</sup>

These fascinating phrases produced an immense impression in South Africa. Men began to talk about expeditions and stamp batteries; syndicates were formed, and Mauch was beset with inquiries as to the locality and accessibility of his discoveries. The reports reached Great Britain, and in the following year (1868) appeared a pamphlet by Mr. Richard Babbs, entitled *The Goldfields of South Africa*, a few sentences of which I will repeat, as they afford some explanation of the remarkable rush which followed the

<sup>1</sup> Letter from C. Mauch to the *Transvaal Argus*, 3rd December, 1867.

publication to the world of Mauch's reports. The writer says that Mauch had no hesitation in asserting that the goldfields in the interior were richer than those of California or Australia. "When he saw the white reefs of auriferous quartz glistening in the sun as they cropped out here and there, he was startled by the conception of the wealth before him. Thousands of holes some ten feet deep give evidence of old native workings, and bear out Dr. Livingstone's remark about the gold washing carried on in wooden bowls by the Kaffirs in time past."

*The Times* also had several articles on the discoveries, couched in hardly less glowing language, and in the same year published an assay of some specimens of quartz from the new fields, furnished by the Bank of England, and showing 1185 ozs. of gold and 60 ozs. of silver to the ton! <sup>1</sup> Was it to be wondered at that amateurs from England, and even professional diggers from Australia and California, began to flock towards Durban, which was then regarded as the nearest port to the new El Dorado?

Almost simultaneously with the reports of Hartley and Mauch from Mashonaland, a discovery of gold-bearing reefs was made at Tatin, or, as we now call it Tati, on the southwestern side of Matabeleland, and it was to that district, as being more accessible, that the first prospecting parties gave their attention. As it turned out, the Tati goldfields monopolised the rush, and the disappointments met with there, followed by the counter-attraction offered in 1870 by the diamond discoveries on the Vaal River, checked the impulse which might otherwise have led to a thorough exploration of the more remote regions to which Mauch had drawn notice.

Among the earliest arrivals at Tati was Sir John Swinburne, who, as the representative of a company styled "The London and Limpopo Company," undertook in 1869 an expedition to secure digging rights from the Matabele chief; and about the same time another company, bearing the familiar-sounding name of the "South African Goldfields and Exploration Company," despatched a party to

<sup>1</sup> *The Times*, 11th September, 1868.

Mashonaland, under the leadership of Thomas Baines, an experienced colonial traveller who had accompanied Dr. Livingstone on his then recent expedition to explore the lower courses of the Zambesi River.

Swinburne's venture resulted in the well-known "Tati Concession," which was specially excluded from the Rudd-Rhodes Concession, and exists to this day under independent management; but, of the various companies formed to develop the mines in the Tati area, only two or three survived the stress and trials of the early 'seventies, and even these led a chequered existence until, many years later, the arrival of the railway line enabled them to work on a payable basis.

Baines in his turn obtained a mineral concession from the chief, and as, later on, much will have to be said regarding the Matabele tribe and its politics, it will only be necessary here to indicate briefly the position at the time of which I am speaking.

Mziligazi, the original leader of this offshoot of the Zulus, who had conducted the tribe from Zululand to the country which they have since inhabited, died in 1868, but before his death he had by annual raids acquired sovereignty over a wide extent of country, reaching from the Gwaai River on the west to the Sabi on the east, and from the Zambesi to the Limpopo, and had reduced to subjection the various weaker tribes occupying it. During 1869 the Matabele were ruled by a regent, Um-nobata, a relative of the deceased chief, pending the removal of a doubt as to what had become of the legitimate heir, Kuruman, who had quarrelled with his father and disappeared. Some time was spent in investigating the claims of a pretender from Natal, who alleged that he was the true Kuruman, but upon these breaking down, the tribe proceeded to elect a permanent successor, and in December 1869 their choice fell upon Mziligazi's younger son, Lobengula, so well known later in connection with the occupation of Mashonaland.

His formal investiture as Paramount Chief took place in February 1870, and Baines, who had been waiting for this event to take place, immediately visited him to prefer

his demands for a concession. He had just returned from an extended journey made on behalf of his company through Mashonaland, during which he had reached a point 150 miles due south of the Portuguese settlement of Zumbo on the Zambesi (*i.e.* somewhere between the modern town of Salisbury and Sinoia), and had discovered old "Mashona" workings in many parts of the adjacent country, as well as some ruined buildings, which he assumed to be the former dwellings of missionaries from Zumbo. On learning that the question of the succession had been determined, he thought to secure the grant of a mining area from the new chief. But Lobengula was not to be drawn into any rash undertakings. He informed Baines that having been so recently appointed he could neither give land nor fix boundaries, and Baines had to content himself with a verbal promise of the right to dig for gold in a district limited by the Gwailo (Gwelo) River on the west, and the Ganyana (Hanyani) on the east. This was confirmed in August 1871 by a written document under Lobengula's sign-manual—the famous "Baines Concession"—among the provisions of which were a clause stating that the chief alienated no portion of his kingdom, and an undertaking by the concessionaire to recognise his sovereignty.<sup>1</sup>

The next year or two were occupied by Baines in a vain endeavour to raise capital in order to develop the rights which he had obtained. The moment was unpropitious. The Franco-German War had depressed the money markets of Europe, and, when a recovery took place, the rich discoveries of diamonds on the Vaal River and in Griqualand West diverted men's thoughts from the gold so far away in the north. In spite of strenuous efforts on Baines' part to revive interest in Mauch's goldfields and his own enterprise, the necessary funds were not subscribed.

As a last resource, Baines sunk his own small means in the purchase of a quartz-crushing machine, and made

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note that even in those days the Portuguese claimed Mashonaland, for, immediately after the publication of the Concession, the Governor of Quilimane, Senhor Carlos de Costa, lodged a protest against the district between the Gwelo and Hanyani rivers being worked without Portuguese sanction.

arrangements to travel, almost alone, to the Mashonaland goldfields, but disappointments had told upon a constitution already impaired by many arduous journeys in unhealthy climates. His new plans were frustrated by an attack of dysentery, to which, after a long illness, he succumbed in May 1875.<sup>1</sup>

After Baines' death no further steps were taken to open up the Mashonaland goldfields for many years. Some of the mines in the Tati district were worked for a time in a spasmodic manner, but the more certain rewards of the diamond fields kept men away, and any attempts to prospect in other parts of the country were instantly repressed by the Matabele and their chief. Lobengula was always obsessed by a dread that his country would be overrun by gold-seekers if he once allowed them a foothold. He was ready to give encouragement to a limited number of hunters, who curried favour with him by presents of European goods, and he extended this indulgence to a few missionaries whom he found useful as business advisers in matters relating to the white men, but he was suspicious of all new-comers, and cherished a special hatred for the Boers, knowing their tendency to penetrate further and further into the interior, and the tenacity with which they clung to any ground on which they had once settled. Probably also he entertained a lively memory of the days when they had driven his father and people out of the Transvaal. His attitude towards the generality of travellers in his country was tolerant, but no more, and there was always present in the minds of the few resident Europeans an uneasy feeling as to what might happen if his young braves got beyond control, and a conviction that they were living with a sword suspended by a thread above their heads.

<sup>1</sup> Baines was by profession an artist, and one of no mean ability, as his well-known paintings of the Victoria Falls attest. In 1855 he accompanied Gregory's expedition to North Australia; in 1858 he travelled with the brothers Charles and David Livingstone, but separated from them owing to a quarrel; from 1861 to 1868 he was the companion of Chapman in his endeavour to reach the Zambesi from the West Coast of Africa, and in the latter year he made his first expedition to Matabeleland. Although past fifty at this time he possessed all the energy and elasticity of a young man.

No mining enterprise could have been promoted under such conditions, and for years no serious attempt was made to explore the country's resources. Had not other causes begun to operate—notably the revival of interest created by the successive discoveries of gold at de Kaap in 1883 and at Witwatersrand in 1886—the mineral wealth of Rhodesia might have remained unproved until this day.

The second influence which was an agent in the ultimate creation of the Chartered South Africa Company was the idea of British expansion.

It is a remarkable fact that the two nations which secured the earliest foothold in South Africa, and which therefore had the first and best opportunities of extending their dominion over the interior, should have allowed so many years to slip by without taking a single step towards securing the back country with its vast and unknown possibilities, and should have been stirred at length into activity by the colonising schemes of other and younger Powers.

In the case of the Portuguese this impetus came too late. They might have possessed Africa from Angola to Mozambique. It needed all the efforts of Serpa Pinto and Paiva d'Andrade to save their coast colonies from being cut up, in the general partition which followed the scramble for Africa by other European Powers. In the case of Great Britain the movement was too late to save Damara-land, and was only just in time to prevent the great inland territories between the Congo and the Cape from being appropriated by Germans, Boers and Portuguese.

Prior to Dr. Livingstone's first journey to the Zambesi in 1850, nothing was known, and little was cared, about these regions. During the succeeding twenty-three years the great explorer had the field to himself. His prodigious geographical discoveries appealed to a comparatively small section only of the British public, but the revelations which he made as to the extent and horrors of the interior slave trade, the mystery of his long disappearance, Stanley's sensational expedition for his rescue, and the pathetic circumstances of the missionary's lonely death, stirred men's feelings to their depths, and excited a wave of senti-

mental enthusiasm about those dark portions of the continent which had previously been merely the subject of scientific speculation.

The immediate and tangible result of Livingstone's explorations north of the Zambesi was the establishment of a few missionary settlements on the shores of Lake Nyasa and in the Shiré highlands. Although intense eagerness had been excited, not only in England and Scotland, but also in France and Germany, for the further exploration of the great Central African Lakes, the idea of colonisation did not occur to any of these until long after Livingstone's death in 1873, and while a number of minor expeditions were organised and the details of Livingstone's rough outlines were gradually filled in, no overt step was taken by Britain, or by any other Power, to assert dominion over a single square mile of the immense area which now stood disclosed. It was Stanley's travels in continuation of Livingstone's great work which first kindled the spark, and converted the academical interest of Europe into a practical scheme of occupation.

The movement started in an unexpected quarter. In 1876, while Stanley was still investigating the sources of the Congo, Leopold, King of the Belgians, convened a Conference of the Powers at Brussels, to discuss the opening up of the interior of Africa to European commerce and industries, and to consider a united policy for the extinction of the slave trade. The result of this Conference was the formation of an international association for carrying out the above objects, and national committees to collect funds for the common cause.

Upon Stanley's return from his Congo researches in 1878 the Association assumed a new and special rôle—that of civilising the Congo basin, and laying the foundations of a great State, to be controlled by the Committee, with Leopold as its President. No apology is necessary for briefly recapitulating the salient features of this movement—familiar as they must be to many of my readers—partly because it was the *causa causans* of the partition of Africa, in which Cecil Rhodes' schemes bulked so large at a later

date, and partly also because the southern border of the Congo Free State was the wall which eventually opposed itself to Rhodes' ideas of extending British influence northwards.

Between 1879 and 1883 Stanley, the organiser and administrator of this undertaking, with a view to paving the way for the government of the Congo basin by the International Association, had founded several European stations and had challenged the Arab régime, which for so many years had dominated Central Africa. There is no need to enter into the complicated negotiations and by-play which ensued between France, Portugal and England, each struggling for a share in the regions watered by the Congo, beyond pointing out that they led to the Conference of Berlin in 1884 and the succeeding year, and ultimately to the formation of the Congo Free State, with Leopold as its sovereign. The boundaries of the State were roughly sketched out at the time, but its precise limits were not immediately settled, and were purposely (and fortunately) left open on the southern side and towards Lake Tanganyika in deference to British claims, although these latter were of the most nebulous nature.

The Conference of Berlin was the starting-point in the race for Africa. Great Britain's neglect to occupy the territories lying ready for her grasp had for some time been succeeded by a positive aversion from meddling with African affairs, owing to the manner in which her fingers had been burnt in the Transvaal and in Zululand, but even British Ministers now became alive to the necessity for vigorous action.

An opportunity presented itself in Bechuanaland, and as the events which followed there had a direct and important bearing on the northern expansion of British territory, and the creation of the Chartered Company, they must be considered in some detail.

Authorities for historical data in this chapter :

*Missionary Travels in South Africa*, by David Livingstone.

*The Gold Regions of S.E. Africa*, by Thos. Baines.

*The Partition of Africa*, by J. Scott Keltie.

*Blue Book C.* 4739.

Files of the following South African newspapers between 1865 and 1872 :—

*Grahamstown Journal, Transvaal Argus, Natal Mercury, Transvaal Advocate, Natal Herald, Natal Witness, Natal Colonist, Times of Natal, Eastern Province Herald and Colesberg Herald.*

The following English newspapers :—*The Times*, 1868, *Field*, 1871, and *Daily News*, 1872.

## CHAPTER II

### BECHUANALAND : THE CORRIDOR TO THE INTERIOR

THE recapitulation of the events which led up to the British Protectorate in Bechuanaland may seem unnecessary, and even wearisome, but it must always be borne in mind that the Royal Charter of the British South Africa Company was the crystallised result of a flux of movements and counter-movements. The Boer intrigues in Bechuanaland had behind them the shadow of a far more dangerous threat, namely, the aspiration of Germany to become the paramount Power in South Africa. Had Bechuanaland fallen into the hands of the Boers the key to the northern territories would have been lost, and British expansion, if not irretrievably thwarted, could only have proceeded with the greatest difficulty.

Properly to comprehend the series of movements which extended British influence up to the confines of Matabeleland, it is necessary to hark back to the early 'seventies. By a piece of diplomacy, which has sometimes been described in less complimentary terms, England, soon after the discovery of diamonds on the Vaal River, had acquired Griqualand West in the teeth of Boer opposition. The northern boundaries of the new province were, by design or accident, loosely defined, and it was discovered later that a strip of territory had been taken in which in reality belonged to the chief Mankoroane of the Batlapin tribe. Owing to the uncertainty as to the precise boundary, this strip became a sort of no-man's-land, and as such offered an irresistible bait to Boer adventurers from the neighbouring Transvaal.

Mankoroane had always aspired to British recognition, and, on the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, had issued a bombastic proclamation styling himself "Para-

mount Chief of the Batlapin nation," and asserting his claims, "under the advice of his august ally Queen Victoria," to far more territory than he really had any rights over. These pretensions, however, were not accepted by other Bechuana chiefs, and some of them sought an opportunity to oust Mankoroane from his assumed paramountcy.

Events in Griqualand soon provided this. In 1878 serious native disturbances arose, and in fact a rebellion broke out, to quell which Colonel Charles Warren, R.E., was sent up from the Cape. The disaffection of the local Griquas found native sympathisers over the border; several white traders in Southern Bechuanaland were murdered, and some of the tribes, under the leadership of one Luka, son of Jantje, took up arms, and identified themselves with the cause of the Griqualand rebels.

In consequence of this outbreak Colonel Warren, in June 1878, led a small punitive expedition into Bechuanaland itself. For a year the country was under military occupation, and ultimately the natives were pacified, and a sort of makeshift British Administration was instituted. The Rev. John Mackenzie, a prominent member of the London Missionary Society, was recognised as the Government agent, and continued in that capacity after military operations had ceased. In this manner the way was paved for an orthodox British Protectorate, which would have been justified on far stronger grounds than have existed in the majority of similar cases.

But the Government of the day was in no mood for such a step. Its attitude, and that of the British public, may be gleaned from a remark addressed by Colonel Lanyon (the Administrator of Griqualand) to Mackenzie at this time. "The people of England dislike any more annexation, and many of them are sensitive about interfering with the inherited rights of Native chiefs and tribes." It is true that there were people at the Cape who were less complacent. There was Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner, who saw further than most men into the future, and realised that the ultimate supremacy in the interior, and indeed in South Africa as a whole, lay between British

and Boer. There was also Mr. Hofmeyr, who was fully alive to the importance of keeping the British out of any territory which might be available for further Boer occupation. For the time being, however, the home policy prevailed. In spite of the security which the short British occupation had produced; in spite of the vehement protests of Mackenzie and his missionary colleagues, who urged that the expedition had so broken down the authority of the chiefs that they would never again be able to maintain peace and good order among the natives; in spite too of the strong representations of Sir Bartle Frere and of the moral obligation resting on Britain of substantiating and maintaining her occupation in the interests of the natives themselves; in spite even of the entreaties of the very chiefs, who voluntarily ceded their territories in order to assure a Protectorate, the Little Englanders had their way, and Southern Bechuanaland was, in April 1881, abandoned to its fate.

What that fate might have been is well indicated in Mackenzie's letters of the period. What immediately happened was that, after three years of good order, Bechuanaland suddenly became an Alsatia, and was handed over to anarchy and outrage!

This was the opportunity for the Boers. The retrocession of the Transvaal in 1881 gave them encouragement to take advantage of the condition of the country. Under the pretext of settling a dispute between Mankoroane and Masow, another chief on the Transvaal border, a number of filibusters entered Bechuanaland. Posing as champions of Masow, they settled down in the neighbourhood of what is now Vryburg, and constituted themselves a Republic—the notorious “Stellaland.” Practically the same thing happened a little further north, where the Bechuana chief Montsioa of Mafeking was at loggerheads with a chief called Moshete, living just over the Transvaal border. Montsioa's country was invaded and steps were taken to form a second Republic to be called “Goshen.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sometimes referred to in the records of the period as “Land Goosen,” and in one instance, in the *Contemporary Review*, as “Goschen”!




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# AFRICA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AT THE TIME WHEN CECIL RHODES ENTERED POLITICS 1882



At this point Cecil Rhodes, who for many months had been keeping a watchful eye on the Bechuanaland question, which so vitally concerned his dream of northern expansion, stepped publicly into the arena.

Ostensibly to inquire into the question of the boundaries of Griqualand West, the imperfect settlement of which had left the position of Mankoroane's territory in doubt, Rhodes obtained from the Cape House of Assembly in May 1882 the appointment of a commission, and was himself selected as one of its members. On arrival in the disputed territory, he found that Stellaland included a large number of farms occupied by Transvaal Boers, who had settled within Mankoroane's limits. He had two parties on the spot to deal with, and saw that if he could secure a cession of the district from the native chief, as well as the consent of the Boers to be annexed to Cape Colony, he would obtain an indefeasible title from both disputants. In each case he was successful. Mankoroane, whose only concern was to be relieved from the Boer threat, cheerfully agreed to the cession, and the Stellalanders, after some little persuasion, consented to annexation, and signed a petition to that end. But a third party had to be reckoned with—the Cape Parliament—and, disregarding Rhodes' representations and entreaties, it decided to reject the annexation policy. In this it was guided by Mr. Hofmeyr, whose idea was that the northern territories should be kept open for the Transvaal—the very thing which Rhodes was anxious to prevent, for he knew that Bechuanaland was, to use his own expression, the "Suez Canal to the interior," and he knew that Paul Kruger was, equally with himself, alive to this fact.

An attempt to induce the Imperial Government to step in was also unsuccessful. It is true that Rhodes extracted a conditional promise from Lord Derby to establish a protectorate in Bechuanaland, if the Cape Colony would bear half the cost, but the Cape refused to meet him even to this extent, and he was once more baffled.

At this time he was convinced that there was a power behind the Boer trekkers into Stellaland and Goshen, and

that that power was Paul Kruger. He accordingly redoubled his efforts, and, in August 1883, made a speech in the Cape House, which strikes so prophetic a note that some passages are worth repeating verbatim.

The question before the House was a motion by Mr. Scanlen, to allow the Cape Government to be represented on the occasion of the visit to London of the delegates who were to discuss modifications to the Pretoria Convention of 1881, which gave autonomy to the Transvaal. Rhodes dragged in a characteristically irrelevant amendment, suggesting that a Resident should be placed by the Cape Colony with Mankoroane. He informed the House that the real question was "Whether Cape Colony is to be confined to its present borders, or is to become the dominant State in South Africa—whether, in fact, it is to spread its civilisation over the interior. . . . We want," he said, "to get rid of the Imperial factor in this question, and to deal with it ourselves, jointly with the Transvaal. We must not disregard the legitimate interests of the Transvaal, but we are bound to think first of the interests of this Colony. . . . I respect the Transvaal, but as politicians we have to look to our position as the future paramount State of South Africa. . . . The question of the Union of South Africa is bound up in this Bechuanaland question; but I regard the question first in its consequences to the interests of Cape Colony. I have been favoured with reports from Tati, and I have learned how great are the prospects of the territory beyond the Transvaal. . . ."

Rhodes' references here to the Transvaal were exceedingly adroit. He felt that its policy of expansion had the sympathy of a large section of the House, and he therefore placed the Transvaal and the Cape Colony side by side, hinting at the possibility of their union in the future as sister States of a United South Africa. Imperial interference in the affairs of South Africa had in the past been a failure, and the Imperial factor was to be excluded as far as possible. But his words have been imperfectly understood, some of his critics having gone so far as to interpret this speech, and a later one made in July 1884,

as demonstrating that he was intriguing for a Transvaal annexation of Bechuanaland! In reality nothing was further from his thoughts. His object throughout was British expansion, but it was the Cape Parliament which he was addressing, and unfortunately at this time British prestige was not at its highest in Cape Colony, or indeed in any part of South Africa. Rhodes knew quite well that if he banged the big drum of Jingoism in Capetown or in Bechuanaland he would not only lose his point, but would arouse bitter opposition. He had a crafty opponent in Hofmeyr, whose policy was "Africa for the Afrikanders," and northward expansion for the Boers. Rhodes always followed the direction of least resistance, and, on the present occasion, this meant to keep the British Government in the background, and to urge the annexation of Bechuanaland by the Cape Colony, using the latter purely as a stalking-horse.

He failed, however, to carry his amendment, and in his earnest endeavour to save Bechuanaland for British interests was compelled, after all, to have recourse to the Imperial factor. Accordingly he approached the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, who was induced by his constant importunities to make strong representations to the Colonial Office as to the urgent necessity for setting up a Protectorate, and so shutting off permanently all idea of an extension of the western border of the Transvaal.

The late Lord Randolph Churchill is said to have once exclaimed, "What an army we might have if only we had no War Office!" Had he addressed himself to the task of expanding British influence in South Africa he would doubtless have been more comprehensive in his regrets. Rhodes' representations, even backed as they were by Sir Hercules Robinson, would have had short shrift with the Colonial Office of 1883 had not the Home Government, in the nick of time, received a severe shock owing to the annexation by Germany of Angra Pequeña.<sup>1</sup> This sudden

<sup>1</sup> A British warship (the *Boadicea*) which had been sent from Capetown to Angra Pequeña in November 1883, returned with the disconcerting news that she had been met there by the German corvette *Carola*, and had been informed that she was in German waters, and that Herr Luderitz had acquired rights over the coast as far as the Orange River.

blow, coupled with the repeated appeal by the Boer delegates for complete independence, roused the Government at length from its lethargy, and Lord Derby and his colleagues began to see reason in Sir Hercules Robinson's arguments. In February 1884 a Protectorate was proclaimed and the "Suez Canal to the interior" was saved. At the same time the western boundaries of the Transvaal were definitely laid down by the London Convention.

It is hardly necessary to enter into any detailed narrative of the settlement and administration of Bechuanaland. The Rev. John Mackenzie, who was selected as the first Deputy Commissioner, was unsuccessful in his attempts to induce the squatters of Stellaland, still less the freebooters of Goshen, to recognise British authority. Mackenzie, like Rhodes, was an Imperialist, but, while the objects of the two men were identical, their methods were diametrically opposite. Mackenzie was wholly lacking in diplomacy, and believed that he was furthering the cause of British expansion best by adopting a stone-wall attitude. "The British Government has annexed you: the subject is closed to further discussion." This was the tone which he took up towards the land-holders of the two so-called Republics. But what did they care about the British Government? They had Kruger behind them, and Kruger had just outwitted the British Government! The Boers had thrashed the *rooinekes* at Majuba, and they could thrash them again!

Rhodes, who succeeded Mackenzie as Deputy Commissioner in August, found the country in a state of open rebellion and anarchy, and although his conciliatory policy had a good effect in Stellaland, he fared little better than his predecessor in Goshen, where matters speedily began to assume a serious aspect. General Pieter Joubert, appointed by the Transvaal Government "Commissioner of the Western Border," was despatched to Rooi-Grond (the "Republican" head-quarters), nominally to assist in effecting a settlement, but really to secure Goshen for the Transvaal in defiance of the London Convention. The utmost pitch of audacity was reached when Kruger, on

the 16th of September, 1884, "proclaimed and ordained" the territory of the contending chiefs Moshete and Montsioa to be under the protection and control of the South African Republic.

This was a false move on the part of the President, and so far from jockeying the British out of their Protectorate, it had the unexpected effect, not only of spurring the Government to vigorous action, but also of alienating a good deal of the Cape sympathy. A mass meeting held at Capetown on September the 24th passed a resolution asserting that Imperial intervention was necessary to maintain the trade-route to the interior and to protect the native tribes from oppression, and that failure to maintain the boundaries laid down by the Convention of London would be fatal to British supremacy in South Africa.

Without any further delay, Colonel Sir Charles Warren was appointed Special Commissioner, with authority to take a military expedition to Bechuanaland to remove the filibusters, to pacify the country, to reinstate the natives in their own lands, and to adopt such measures as might be necessary to prevent further depredations. Kruger was formally called upon to withdraw the obnoxious proclamation, and Warren was ordered to hold Bechuanaland until a further policy was decided on. The proclamation was at once withdrawn, and, upon Warren's arrival with a force of 4000 men, Kruger met him and Rhodes at Fourteen Streams, on the borders of the Transvaal and Cape Colony, and pledged himself to abide for the future by the ordained boundaries.

The following is a quotation from a speech made by Rhodes in the Cape House of Assembly on June the 30th, 1885, when for the first time he pointed out publicly the danger to British interests which had so narrowly been averted.

"Do you think that if the Transvaal had Bechuanaland it would be allowed to keep it? Would not Bismarck have some quarrel with the Transvaal; and without resources, without men, what could they do? Germany would come across from her settlement at Angra Pequeña. There would

be some excuse to pick a quarrel—some question of brandy, or guns, or something—and then Germany would stretch from Angra Pequena to Delagoa Bay. I was never more satisfied with my own views than when I saw the recent development of the policy of Germany. What was the bar in Germany's way? Bechuanaland. What was the use to her of a few sand-heaps at Angra Pequena and the interior with this English and Colonial bar between her and the Transvaal? If we were to stop at Griqualand West, the ambitious objects of Germany would be attained."

Although Sir C. Warren sought to ignore the pledges given to the Boers of Stellaland that their titles should be respected, thereby causing great umbrage to Rhodes, who protested strongly against this breach of faith,<sup>1</sup> his expedition was successful in re-establishing British prestige in Bechuanaland, but it cost about a million and a half sterling, which might have been saved to the Treasury had the policy advocated by Rhodes in 1882 been adopted. On September the 30th, 1886, the southern portion of Bechuanaland, *i.e.* that between Griqualand West and Mafeking (Montsioa's town), was constituted a Crown Colony. In the meanwhile Warren had concluded treaties of friendship and protection with the chiefs in the northern portion, of whom Khama was the most important, and a Protectorate was on the same date proclaimed from Mafeking up to latitude 22°, which included all territory lying on the western border of the Transvaal. President Kruger's hope of extending his boundaries on that side was now definitely at an end. There still remained, however, the northern border separating the Transvaal from Matabeleland, and we shall see later what strenuous efforts were made to keep this side open for Boer expansion.

<sup>1</sup> Space will not permit a more detailed account of the differences which arose over the settlement. Rhodes objected bitterly to Warren's racial prejudice against the Boers and to his adoption of the rough-shod methods which had already proved a failure under Mackenzie. The controversy was pursued for some weeks in the columns of *The Times*, and ultimately the more conciliatory policy advocated by Rhodes was endorsed by the Secretary of State.

Authorities for historical data in this chapter :

*Austral Africa, Losing it or Ruling it*, by John Mackenzie.

*John Mackenzie—South African Missionary and Statesman*, by W. Douglas Mackenzie.

The following *Blue Books* : C. 3419, 3841, 4036, 4194, 4213, 4252, 4432, 4643 and 4889. The last mentioned contains an admirable summary of the history of the various Bechuana tribes and of the events which led to the agreement between Mr. Rhodes and the inhabitants of Stellaland, 1884.

The extracts from Mr. Rhodes' speeches are copied from *Cecil Rhodes : his Political Life and Speeches, 1881-1890*, by "Vindex."

## CHAPTER III

### EARLY STEPS TOWARDS THE NORTH

IN 1886 Mr. Rhodes faced the problem of securing for Great Britain all that was left of Central and Southern Africa. As Matabeleland and Mashonaland were not only nearest to his base of operations, but were in more imminent danger of annexation by European Powers than other parts of this huge area, it was to these two countries that his initial efforts were directed. Nor was there any time to lose, for Boers, Germans and Portuguese had all turned longing eyes towards the land reputed to be so wealthy. The Boers were inspired by the lust of horizon which ever prompted them to push northwards; the Germans recalled the almost forgotten discoveries of their explorer Mauch, and the Portuguese were alarmed lest their ancient, if somewhat legendary, claim to the sovereignty of Monomotapa should be jeopardised in the general scramble for territory in which European States were indulging.

The Boers had already led a card in this four-handed game, and it is interesting to note that they began to think of Matabeleland about the same time that they were making their first encroachments in Southern Bechuanaland, *i.e.* in 1882, and less than a year from the date when the Gladstone Ministry crowned its policy of scuttle by signing the Pretoria Convention. The following letter found later at Lobengula's kraal by Mr. F. R. Thompson—one of the parties to the Matabele Concession—throws a remarkable light upon the tactics adopted by the Boers in making their preliminary overtures :

“ *Marico,*  
“ *The South African Republic,*  
“ *March 9th, 1882.*

“ *To the great ruler, the Chief Lo Bengula, the son of Umzilikaise, the great King of the Matabili nation.*

“ GREAT RULER,

“ When this letter reaches you, then you will know that it comes from a man who very much desires to visit

you, but who, being a man of the people, cannot get loose to make such a long journey. Therefore he must now be satisfied with writing a letter to carry his regards to the son of the late King of the Matabili, our old friend Umzilikatse. When I say that I desire to see you, it is not to ask for anything, but to talk of something, and to tell Lo Bengula of the affairs and things of the world, because I know that there are many people who talk and tell about these matters, whilst there are but few who tell the truth. Now when a man hears a thing wrong, it is worse than if he had never heard it at all. Now I know that Lo Bengula has heard some things wrongly, and for this reason would I tell him the real truth. Now you must have heard that the English—or as they are better known the Englishmen—took away our country, the Transvaal, or as they say, annexed it. We then talked nicely for four years, and begged for our country. But no; when an Englishman once has your property in his hand, then is he like a monkey that has its hands full of pumpkin seeds—if you don't beat him to death, he will never let go—and then all our nice talk for four years did not help him at all. Then the English commenced to arrest us because we were dissatisfied, and that caused the shooting and fighting. Then the English first found that it would be better to give us back our country. Now they are gone, and our country is free, and we will now once more live in friendship with Lo Bengula, as we lived in friendship with Umzilikatse, and such must be our friendship that so long as there is one Boer and one Matabili living, these two must remain friends. On this account do I wish to see Lo Bengula, and if I may live so long, and the country has become altogether settled, and the stink which the English brought is first blown away altogether, then I will still ride so far as to reach Lo Bengula, and if he still has this letter, then he will hear the words from the mouth of the man who now must speak with the pen upon paper, and who therefore cannot so easily tell him everything. The man is a brother's child of the three brothers that formerly—now thirty-two years ago—were at Umzilikatse's, and then made the peace with him which holds to this day. He still remembers well when the first Boers, Franz Joubert, Jan Joubert, and Pieter Joubert, came there, and when they made the peace whereby Umzilikatse could live at peace and the Boers also, and the peace which is so strong that the vile evil-doers were never able to destroy it, and never shall be able to destroy it as

long as there shall be one Boer that lives and Lo Bengula also lives.

“ Now I wish to send something, to give Lo Bengula a present as a token of our friendship. I send for Lo Bengula, with the gentleman who will bring him this letter, a blanket and a handkerchief for his great wife, who is the Mother of all the Matabili nation. I will one day come to see their friendship. The gentleman who brings the letter will tell you all about the work which I have to do here. Some bad people have incited Kolahing, and so he thought he would make fortifications and fight with us, but he got frightened, and saw that he would be killed, therefore I made him break down the fortifications, and pack all the stones in one heap, and he had then to pay 5000 cattle and 4000 sheep and goats for his wickedness. Now there is another chief, Gatsizibe—he came upon our land and killed three people and plundered them—he must also pay a fine, or else we will punish him or shoot him, because we will have peace in our country.

“ Now greetings, great Chief Lo Bengula from the Commandant General of the South African Republic for the Government and Administration.

“ P. J. JOUBERT.”<sup>1</sup>

Whether these sycophantic protestations ever elicited a reply from the “ Great Ruler ” is not known. It is highly probable that they missed fire, for Lobengula was of a very different calibre from Montsioa and Mankoroane, and was not likely to be inveigled into a Boer alliance by the sorry gift of a blanket and a handkerchief. Doubtless, however, General Joubert was anxious to know something about the man he was dealing with, and sent the letter as a *ballon d'essai*, to be followed up by more definite action if its result were satisfactory. There were Boers at this time living in Matabeleland who enjoyed the chief's friendship, and spent their time in hunting and collecting ivory with his permission, and Joubert and Kruger were in communication with these, and would have found them useful as agents in subsequent negotiations. Looking at other and simultaneous attempts by the Boer leaders to “ burst their kraal,” and trespass beyond the limits assigned to them by the Pretoria

<sup>1</sup> The text of this letter is taken from *The Transvaal from within*, by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick.

Convention—attempts in Zululand, Swaziland and Bechuanaland—there can be no doubt that, in 1882, the Transvaal leaders had made up their minds to secure for their own people the rich pasturage of Mashonaland and Matabeleland.

In May 1885 Sir Charles Warren received word from a trustworthy correspondent in Shoshong, Khama's capital town in Northern Bechuanaland, that the Boers had by no means abandoned their idea of getting a foothold in Mashonaland (which they knew to contain the finest agricultural land in South Africa), and by this means of acquiring a base from which they could make a flank attack upon Matabeleland, and gradually by conquest overspread the whole of what is now Southern Rhodesia. The communication went on to refer to quiet movements on the part of both Germany and Portugal, with a view to obtaining concessions in these regions, and pointed out that both were only watching the policy of Great Britain before taking definite action.<sup>1</sup> These reports abundantly indicated the danger which Rhodes, a little later, pointed out in his speech, already quoted, in the Cape House, and although he did not then specifically allude to Portugal, he never lost sight of the possibility of her attempting to revive her ancient influence.

The establishment of a Protectorate over Khama's country in August 1885 brought all territory south of latitude 22° under British control. It also placed England on equal terms with the Transvaal and Portugal in respect of Matabeleland. From this moment the struggle between British, Boers and Portuguese for the upper hand in Lobengula's country began in earnest, and it was only through extraordinary efforts on the part of Rhodes that the victory ultimately rested with the first named.

During that year a party of three officers—Major Sam Edwards, who had a long and intimate acquaintance with Matabeleland and was *persona grata* with the chief, Lieut. E. A. Maund, of Sir Charles Warren's force, and Lieut. C. E. Haynes, of the Royal Engineers—was despatched to

<sup>1</sup> This information was confirmed about the same time by the Vicomte E. de la Panouse in a report sent to Sir C. Warren. Both statements appear in *Blue Book* C. 4558. Further confirmation was supplied in the reports by Messrs. Edwards, Maund and Haynes referred to below.

Lobengula, with the object of informing him of the Protectorate over the country on his southern border, and of assuring him that our Government was well-disposed towards him.<sup>1</sup> Rumours had been spread about that Lobengula meditated an attack upon Khama, the bone of contention being the strip of country between the Macloutsie and Shashi Rivers, which was claimed by both chiefs, and was generally known as the "Disputed Territory." Lobengula took umbrage at Khama's action in "making the line" (22°) without consulting him, and abated not one inch of his claim.<sup>2</sup> The dispute was an old one, and dragged on, without any serious attempt at a settlement, until 1887. Early in that year Mr. Sam Edwards, who had returned to civil life, and another old interior hunter, Mr. John Fry, returning from a visit to Bulawayo, informed Sir Sidney Shippard, the Deputy Commissioner of Bechuanaland, that there was an evident desire on the part of Lobengula and his people to come under British protection, and that the great obstacle to its realisation was the question of the boundary. They thought, however, that Lobengula would consent to a decision being left to the arbitration of the British Government.

It is evident that the settlement of Montsioa's and Man-koroane's countries resulting from the British Protectorate, and the freedom from Boer depredations which they had since enjoyed, appealed strongly to the Matabele chief, who had an ancient grudge against the Boers. Had they not driven his tribe out of the rich Marico district, where his father, Mziligazi, had first settled, and were there not constant rumours of plots to oust them from Matabeleland in the same way? The only people who had stood up to them in South Africa were the English, and, plentiful as their mistakes had been, Lobengula knew well their reputation for just dealing with native tribes that sought to live on friendly terms with them and for stern measures against

<sup>1</sup> Each of these three officers sent in a valuable report of observations on the Matabele and subject tribes and on the mineral and agricultural potentialities of their country. Their statements constitute the first official accounts of this region. They are printed in *Blue Book C.* 4643 (Transvaal).


<sup>2</sup> *Blue Book C.* 5237.



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SAM EDWARDS

*[To face p. 27.]*

those that opposed them. True their prestige had been besmirched by the rout at Majuba Hill, and the subsequent discreditable peace, but the peace was not a matter which would appeal very forcibly to a native mind. The object lesson of Cetewayo's downfall was a far more convincing one, and this had left a lasting impression on Lobengula, as on all the great chiefs of South Africa. The Protectorate accepted by Khama was having its effect in native territories more distant than Matabeleland. The important chief Lewanika, whose country lay far to the north across the Zambesi, but marched with Lobengula's on the southern side, made inquiries, about this time, of Khama as to his relations with the British.

It is easy to understand, therefore, that, when taken in conjunction with the Boer threat, and the increasing difficulty of excluding white adventurers, the action of Khama in accepting British protection had great weight on the mind of Lobengula, whose country was now jostled by European States on three sides. Since the establishment of the Protectorate, white prospectors were finding their way into Matabeleland from Khama's country, and to cope with this immediate trouble, and in the continued absence of Sir John Swinburne, the original concessionaire, Lobengula decided to put Sam Edwards <sup>1</sup> in charge of the Tati district, and issued to him the following "commission":

*"To Samuel Howard Edwards.*

"As the laws of my country are not suitable for the government of Europeans and others engaged in mining, or who may be resident within the Tati district, now I, Lobengula, King of the Amandebele nation, do hereby authorise you, S. H. Edwards, with power to delegate the authority hereby

<sup>1</sup> Edwards was the son of one of the pioneer missionaries who settled on the Kuruman River, in the Bechuanaland country, in the early part of the nineteenth century, but forsook missionary work for the more attractive life of an ivory and cattle trader. Robert Moffat, writing in 1842, said that he purchased a farm and slaves in Cape Colony and became a "hoary-headed infidel." The son, known to all the natives of those parts as "Samu," was born in Bechuanaland, and was one of the first hunters and traders in Matabeleland. He visited Mziligazi, in Moffat's company, in 1854, and spent his early life in expeditions into many parts of the interior. He acquired a great influence with Lobengula, who held him in the deepest regard. At the time mentioned he had just been appointed Manager of the Tati Gold Mining Company. He died at an advanced age in 1922.

granted to whomsoever you may think fit, for me, and in my name, to make by proclamation all such laws and regulations as you may consider expedient and necessary, for the peace, order and good government of the Tati district, and to represent me in all matters occurring in the said district, and further with authority to you to appoint fit and proper persons to carry out and administer all laws made by you for maintaining peace, order and good government. . . . [*Here follows a description of the boundaries of the Tati district.*]

“ And I engage to protect you, the said S. H. Edwards, or whoever you may appoint in your stead, and give you such assistance as you may require, for giving effect to the powers hereby granted.

“ Given under my sign-manual and seal at Umvangew (? Mhlangeni) this 24th day of February, 1887.<sup>1</sup>

His  
LO X BENGULA  
Mark.”

A copy of this was sent to Sir S. Shippard, the Commissioner of Bechuanaland, and another to the chief Khama, many of whose people were at work in the Tati mines, and about the same time Lobengula wrote to Shippard complaining of the arbitrary way in which the boundary of the Protectorate had been fixed, without his consent, and saying that the white people were coming into his country “ like wolves,” and making new roads without his permission.

On receipt of these communications, Shippard, taking the hint from Edwards and Fry as to Lobengula’s leanings towards closer relations with the British, wrote to both him and Khama, suggesting that the vexed question of the disputed territory should be left to the arbitration of the British Government, but the chief did not respond very cordially to the proposal, which was therefore dropped at the time, to be renewed later in a different form.

In July 1887 Mr. J. S. Moffat (son of Robert Moffat the missionary, and brother-in-law of David Livingstone) was appointed Assistant Commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The British policy, as communicated to

<sup>1</sup> C. 5237. . . 23, 24.

him in a despatch from Sir Hercules Robinson, both as regards the Protectorate and any extension of it which might be possible towards the Zambesi, was to assist the native chiefs to repel the invasion of their territories by freebooters and others desirous of possessing themselves of their lands, but to abstain from interference with native administration, and to discourage for the present any tendency towards settlement by Europeans.

Moffat was advised, after visiting the principal chiefs in the Protectorate, to approach Lobengula with friendly overtures, to assure him that the Protectorate implied no hostility to him, and to acquaint him that Her Majesty's Government was willing to assist, by every means, in the settlement of the boundary question. If this mission proved successful, periodical visits, with the object of promoting the extension of British influence and trade to Matabeleland and Mashonaland, would be arranged.

Reference may here be briefly made to an incident which sheds further light on the policy of the Government, which was to avoid any direct action in the direction of annexing Matabeleland, but to say "Hands off!" to other Powers.

The attention of Lord Salisbury was drawn to an official map, issued from Lisbon, which showed, as Portuguese territory, a large part of Matabeleland. The Prime Minister at once wrote and informed Portugal that, under the Berlin Act, no claim to territory in Central Africa could be recognised which was not supported by occupation. This pronouncement put a somewhat strained construction on the Berlin Act, which referred to *coastal* territory,<sup>1</sup> but Lord Salisbury adhered to his point, and stated that no foreign pretensions to Matabeleland would be allowed, and that the Zambesi should be regarded as the natural northern limit of British South Africa—a dangerous admission in the light of subsequent events. For the time being the matter ended with this *communiqué*, but the Portuguese did not yield without many further attempts to substantiate their claim to the interior.

Before describing the steps which Moffat took to further

<sup>1</sup> General Act of Berlin Conference, 1885, Article 35.

the policy which was outlined in his instructions from Sir Hercules Robinson, it will be desirable to give a somewhat detailed account of the Matabele people and of their chief Lobengula, whose fortunes, from this moment were so intimately interwoven with the movement towards British expansion.

Authorities for historical data in this chapter :

*Blue Books* Nos. C.4588 (Transvaal), C. 4643 (Transvaal), C. 5237.  
*The Transvaal from within*, by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick.