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Series III, Volume VIII

Edited by Richard Smith, Patrick Salmon and Stephen Twigge

## The Invasion of Afghanistan and UK–Soviet Relations, 1979–1982

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**DOCUMENTS ON  
BRITISH POLICY OVERSEAS**

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## CONTENTS

|                                      | PAGES   |     |
|--------------------------------------|---|-----|
| PREFACE                              | ix  |     |
| ABBREVIATIONS FOR<br>PRINTED SOURCES | xxvi  |     |
| ABBREVIATED<br>DESIGNATIONS          | xxvii   |     |
| LIST OF PERSONS                      | xxix  |     |
| DOCUMENT<br>SUMMARIES                | xxxvii  |     |
| CHAPTER I                            | 7 December 1979 - 1 December 1981   | 1   |
| CHAPTER II                           | 17 December 1981 - 9 December 1982  | 293 |
| APPENDIX                             | JIC(80)(N) 4: Soviet Intervention in<br>Afghanistan—An Interim Assessment,<br>10 January 1980 | 433 |
| INDEX                                |   | 436 |



## PREFACE

This volume examines British policy towards the Soviet Union in a period dominated by the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. The British government faced a dilemma: namely, how to express strong disapproval of Soviet actions while still attempting to maintain a constructive bilateral relationship and at the same time to keep British policy in line with the Western Alliance. The consistent aim during this period was to maintain Western unity and impress on the Soviets that stable and productive East-West relations were only possible on the basis of political and military restraint.

The UK's relations with the Soviet Union had been strained since the Second World War, punctuated by brief honeymoons, the last of which—the Wilson-Brezhnev 'new phase' of 1975—was coming to an end when the volume opens.<sup>1</sup> The first document, entitled 'British Policy in East-West Relations,' sets the scene for the period covered by the volume. Dated 7 December 1979, it was intended as a blueprint for handling relations with the Soviet Union and was circulated widely to overseas Missions. The paper stated that the Soviet Union sought to defeat the West by all means short of war, and détente was little more than a tactic to secure technology, grain and credits without slowing their military build-up, relaxing their internal repression, loosening their grip on Eastern Europe or renouncing their freedom to intervene in developing countries.<sup>2</sup> It was produced following a Heads of Mission conference on East-West relations, held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in October 1979. However, East-West relations were not high on the agenda of the new Conservative government, led by Margaret Thatcher, which was preoccupied with domestic reform. The most pressing foreign policy issue for the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, was Rhodesia. Talks aimed at securing independence began at Lancaster House in September 1979 and ran for the next three months. Lord Carrington resolved to turn his attention to East-West relations as soon as Rhodesia allowed.<sup>3</sup>

In the meantime Peter Blaker, Minister of State at the FCO, set out the approach he thought the government should adopt towards East-West relations, taking up the clear lead set by Mrs Thatcher in opposition.<sup>4</sup> It was the Soviets who famously

<sup>1</sup> The fluctuations in UK-Soviet relations have been examined in previous *DBPO* volumes including: Series III, Vol. I: *Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968-1972*, Vol. II: *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1972-75* and Vol. III: *Détente in Europe, 1972-1976*.

<sup>2</sup> This contrasted with a Planning Staff paper, circulated in July 1979, on 'Managing Russia' which concluded that the Soviet threat needed to be kept in proportion and was perfectly manageable by a healthy united West. 'More constructively, it still makes sense to pursue the overall aim which lay behind the more sober definitions of détente in the early 1970s: the creation of a network of practical East-West relationships, in which the Soviet Union has a material stake, and which multiplies the links between the two sides, reinforcing the trend when the overall relationship is improving, and cushioning the shock when it deteriorates, as it is bound to from time to time' (FCO 33/3839, WR 021/14).

<sup>3</sup> Record of a Heads of Mission conference on East-West relations, 19 October 1979 (FCO 28/3701, EN 400/2).

<sup>4</sup> During the 1970s Mr Blaker consistently urged a firmer line towards the Soviet Union and produced a pamphlet on the subject entitled *Coping with the Soviet Union*.

## *UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

dubbed her the ‘Iron Lady’.<sup>5</sup> She had been sceptical of the value of the Helsinki Declaration<sup>6</sup> and had criticised the Labour government for cutting defence spending and expanding trade with the Soviet Union on subsidised credit terms. Mr Blaker believed British policy should aim to secure the respect of the Soviets rather than their good opinion. Britain should not necessarily seek to match what the Americans, French and Germans were doing, but should develop a businesslike relationship based on a realistic calculation of respective interests. This would require an active programme of exchanges and visits at all levels to meet the ideological challenge. Britain should also take on human rights cases, based on the Helsinki Final Act, and differentiate between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.<sup>7</sup> These sentiments were incorporated into the policy paper of 7 December, which clearly depicted the Soviet threat in belligerent terms.

### *The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan*

The decision by the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan had evolved gradually over the course of 1979.<sup>8</sup> The Soviet government had lost confidence in the communist regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), and by late 1979 suspected Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, who had taken office in October after a power struggle, of drifting towards American influence. By the end of 1979 it also felt it had less to lose internationally, with the ratification of the SALT II treaty by the US Senate in doubt and NATO having taken the ‘twin-track’ decision to modernise its Theatre Nuclear Forces by deploying Pershing II rockets and Cruise missiles in Western Europe. The decision to intervene in Afghanistan was formally ratified by the Politburo on 12 December in a short handwritten protocol entitled ‘Concerning the Situation in “A”’.<sup>9</sup> On Christmas Eve Soviet troops began to move into Afghanistan, and on the evening of 27 December they launched a coup in which Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal, brought from exile in Eastern Europe, was installed as head of a new government (No. 21).

The events leading up to the Soviet invasion did not go unnoticed in the West. In June 1979 the British embassy in Moscow anticipated a further strengthening of the Soviet military presence to defend the Afghan revolution, especially if a deteriorating internal situation could be blamed on external intervention and it could be argued that there was a threat to the ‘security, independence and territorial integrity’ of Afghanistan within the terms of article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty.<sup>10</sup> In November 1979 Christopher Mallaby, head of the FCO’s East European and Soviet Department (EESD), considered how the UK should react in the event of a Soviet invasion. It was clear, he thought, that the West could not stop an invasion, so should avoid ‘King Canute’ statements that only revealed

<sup>5</sup> See her ‘Iron Lady’ speech—*Britain Awake*—made at Kensington Town Hall on 19 January 1976. Full text can be found on the Thatcher Foundation website: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/>.

<sup>6</sup> Signed on 1 August 1975, it was the climax of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (see *DBPO* Series III, Vol. II). Her reservations about the Helsinki process are set out in Margaret Thatcher, *The Path to Power* (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 149-53.

<sup>7</sup> Minute by Mr Blaker on East-West Relations, 9 August 1979 (FCO 28/3680, EN 021/2).

<sup>8</sup> For the history of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan see Rodric Braithwaite, *Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan* (London: Profile, 2011).

<sup>9</sup> Translated Soviet and East German documents relating to the Soviet invasion are reproduced in Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Situation in “A”’: New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan’, *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 128-184 and ‘New Evidence on the War in Afghanistan’, *CWIHP Bulletin* 14-15 (Winter 2003-Spring 2004), pp. 139-271.

<sup>10</sup> Moscow telegram No. 329 of 4 June 1979 (FCO 37/2131, FSA 020/2).

## Preface

the impotence of the West. Instead the situation should be exploited to secure the maximum propaganda value in the developing world from the Soviets' 'cynical imperial behaviour'. The best outcome would be the slow escalation of the present situation which would ensure that the Russians 'are slowly and painfully educated in the limits of imperial power.'<sup>11</sup>

The invasion marked a watershed in East-West relations and confirmed perceptions of the Soviet threat set out in the 7 December despatch. This was the first occasion since the Second World War on which the Soviet Union had used armed force outside the borders of the Warsaw Pact, although it continued a trend for intervention established by using Soviet proxies, such as the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in South Yemen, and Cuba in Angola and Ethiopia. The official Soviet explanation for the invasion—that they had intervened at the invitation of the Afghan authorities in response to outside interference in the country and had had no hand in the coup—was unconvincing. The message from Karmal, announcing that he was taking over the government, was broadcast on Kabul Radio's wavelength but from a transmitter inside the Soviet Union. Kabul Radio was still transmitting music at the time. The clumsy international presentation indicated to Sir Curtis Keeble, the British Ambassador in Moscow, either 'carelessness for detail or a remarkable contempt for international opinion' (No. 24).

The Soviet action was condemned by Western and non-aligned countries alike. US President 'Jimmy' Carter, already reeling from the Iranian hostage crisis,<sup>12</sup> called the invasion the greatest threat to world peace since the Second World War, and it brought about the sharpest downturn in US-Soviet relations since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, the British embassy in Washington reported that Soviet intervention had at least brought 'the relief of certainty' to an America increasingly uneasy about human rights, Indo-China, Yemen, Ethiopia and SALT II (No. 30). The British government's response was more measured, with Mrs Thatcher informing President Brezhnev by letter that she was 'profoundly disturbed at recent developments' and making clear her belief that the people of Afghanistan had a right to choose their own government without outside interference (No. 7). She also made it clear, in what must have been an uncomfortable forty minute meeting for the Soviet Ambassador, that she was aware of no external intervention or aggression towards Afghanistan as claimed by Moscow, apart from that carried out by Soviet forces (No. 17).<sup>13</sup>

For Sir C. Keeble, the Soviet action was carried out in classic style: 'with the Iranian problem deflecting attention, substantial force swiftly applied, immediate liquidation of political opposition, and a public presentation of Goebbels-like effrontery'. The aim was to preserve the Afghan socialist revolution without the loss of too much political capital (No. 10). For the Soviets to accept that they had miscalculated, the Western reaction needed to be tougher than they expected, sustained over a long period and shared by non-aligned countries. In the first week

<sup>11</sup> Minute to Mr White, 8 November 1979 (FCO 37/2132, FSA 020/2).

<sup>12</sup> On 4 November 1979 revolutionary students stormed the US embassy in Tehran demanding the return of the Shah, and dozens of US staff were taken hostage.

<sup>13</sup> In Moscow the Soviet foreign minister, Mr Gromyko, noted to the DRA foreign minister that representatives of Western countries, 'particularly Thatcher', were trying to draw a parallel between the change of Afghan leadership and the introduction of Soviet troops. He thought it should be emphasised in the UN debate that there was no link between the two events—'This is purely coincidental.' Record of a meeting between A. A. Gromyko and Shah. M. Dost, 4 January 1980. Reproduced in the CWIHP *Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 161-2.

## *UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

of January 1980 both the FCO Planning Staff and the Joint Intelligence Committee produced assessments of Soviet motives for intervention and reached similar conclusions. Moscow could not risk losing its investment in a neighbouring country, particularly at a time when Iran was in chaos, and abandoning a 'socialist revolution' would have meant an unacceptable loss of face. It was doubtful whether the Soviets had plans for further expansion, but they were now well placed to extend their influence in Asia and advance towards the Indian Ocean and Gulf region. They could also seek to exploit border disputes that existed with Afghanistan and an increasingly unstable Pakistan. Another consideration for Moscow had been to avoid the prospect of having a second Islamic fundamentalist state on its border. The Soviet government had calculated that the effect on East-West relations was worth the risk, and that the Western response would be muted and short-lived. The danger was that the Soviets would consider their success cheaply bought and this would encourage similar future ventures (No. 23 & Appendix).<sup>14</sup> Retaliation was unlikely to force them to modify their intentions but would help determine the West's future credibility in Soviet eyes.

### *The response of the West*

In early January 1980 Sir C. Keeble noted that the 7 December despatch read well in the light of the Afghan adventure and should remain the basis for dealing with Moscow—'a relationship of mutual respect founded on consistent firmness and courtesy, pursued in close concert with our allies and designed to make it plain that the Soviet Union cannot attain the détente it seeks if it continues its expansionist policies' (No. 24). In an attempt to establish a unified Western response, the US Under-Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, travelled to London for a hastily arranged meeting with representatives from Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), Canada and Italy (No. 11). On the eve of the meeting Sir Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador in Washington, wrote to London that the United States was emerging from the 'post-Vietnam chrysalis': they were in the mood to shoulder responsibility abroad but did not want to do it alone.<sup>15</sup> The meeting proved a disappointment, with Douglas Hurd, FCO Minister of State, reporting that the US had no clear ideas on how to proceed and the French determined to block any action which threatened détente: 'A lot of hard work and clear thinking is required if this US initiative is to bear any fruit' (No. 13). On 4 January President Carter announced a series of unilateral measures against the USSR, including a grain embargo and limitations on high technology.

The British government also drew up a series of measures against the Soviet Union but was reluctant to act alone, preferring instead to press for discussion within NATO in an attempt to formulate a set of mutually consistent measures. All were agreed on the need to take action to prevent the Soviet Union from engaging in similar future ventures but some, notably the FRG and France, did not want to jeopardise détente by a hasty response (No. 22). Sir C. Keeble warned that 'a

<sup>14</sup> A US Defense Intelligence Summary, written around the same time, asserted: 'The broader implications of the Soviet invasion . . . lie in the significantly enhanced threat of destabilization of the countries of the region, notably Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries. Given the continued dependence on Middle East oil by the US and its allies, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan translates into a direct threat to the West.' 'Soviet invasion of Afghanistan' by the US Defense Intelligence Agency', c. February 1980. Reproduced on the Digital National Security Archive at <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/marketing/index.jsp>

<sup>15</sup> Washington telegram No. 4407 of 30 December (FO 37/2135, FSA 020/9).

## Preface

patchwork of minor gestures of irritation, with French dissent publicly registered, will weaken the effect of American action and encourage Soviet mischief making' (No. 32). Measures proposed by the Europeans tended to focus on diplomatic and political, rather than economic, sanctions. Members of the Cabinet were also sensitive to the effect any attempt to reduce credit or high technology exports might have on the British economy. Sir N. Henderson remarked that détente had been turned on its head. Rather than inhibiting the Soviet Union from taking hostile action through fear of disturbing the beneficial trade and cultural contacts it had built with the West, it was the West who had become fearful of losing important commercial relations with the USSR (No. 60). It was 15 January before a statement was issued recording the Alliance's view that the Soviet invasion could not fail to have a damaging effect on détente. Sir Clive Rose, the UK Permanent Representative to NATO, reported that if this statement were not followed quickly by practical measures the 'gap between the American and European reaction was likely to become all too apparent and exploited by the Russians' (No. 38).<sup>16</sup> On 24 January the British government announced measures against the USSR which included ending special preferential credit rates, not replacing the Anglo-Soviet credit agreement, cancelling military exchanges, applying the full rigour of COCOM restrictions to exports of sensitive technology and avoiding high level contact with the Soviets.<sup>17</sup> The big freeze had begun.

Sir N. Henderson conceded that the Europeans had grounds for complaint about the lack of adequate consultation from the Americans. The US had, for example, failed to consult before the State of the Union address on 23 January in which President Carter had announced a new commitment to the security of the Persian Gulf region. But the Ambassador pointed out that the criticism went both ways, with the US calling the European response irresolute. Although Britain was a conspicuous exception to this view, he added, 'that does not do us much good in Europe' (No. 52). Mrs Thatcher remained concerned lest the West's response was a 'nine-day wonder' as it had been in the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia (No. 53) but she was also aware of European sensibilities. In her letters to President Carter she counselled that the FRG had 'considerable human, political and economic investments in Berlin and East Germany and are wary of losing ground' (No. 43). In discussions with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt she questioned whether the European reaction had been partly to blame when he expressed disquiet over the US failure to consult (No. 55).

In mid-January 1980 Lord Carrington toured Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India to look at ways of supporting countries in the region against any further Soviet encroachment. He returned home with a long list of actions which included encouraging non-aligned (particularly Muslim) countries to continue denouncing Soviet actions; accelerating the sale of defence equipment to Oman, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states; providing friendly states with assessments of Soviet activities and intentions in the area ('Operation Commonsense'); providing counter-subversion assistance; and reviewing policy towards China, including arms sales (No. 41). At a meeting on 22 January the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD) supported the Secretary of State's proposals. The

<sup>16</sup> The fact that there was little unity in NATO over measures towards the Soviet Union did not go unnoticed in Moscow where Gromyko reported to the Politburo that Western countries were not in agreement with, and were not following, the US in applying sanctions. CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 17 January 1980. Reproduced in the CWIHP *Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 162-3.

<sup>17</sup> *HL Debs*, 24 January 1980, vol. 404, cols. 530-46.

## *UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

Committee also endorsed Mrs Thatcher's decision to write to the Chairman of the British Olympic Association, asking him to press the International Olympic Committee to change the venue of the 1980 Games, due to open in Moscow in July. Sir C. Keeble believed that a Western boycott was the single gesture that would most hurt the Soviet government. This view was shared by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine. He contended that if a boycott meant that Britain would have to embrace the use of sport for the first time as a political weapon, 'the end would justify the means' (No. 39). They both recognised, however, that the British Olympic Committee was an independent body and could not be forced to follow government instructions. The Foreign Secretary thought the best outcome might be if the government recommended against participation but the various committees, and participants, decided to go anyway (No. 26). President Carter wrote to the US Olympic Committee making it clear that the US should not participate in the Games if Soviet troops were not withdrawn. The idea of moving the Games was pursued but ultimately deemed impractical.<sup>18</sup>

At the end of January EESD produced a paper on 'Soviet foreign policy after Afghanistan' concluding that the UK faced a difficult period in East-West relations in which Western resolve was indispensable. If the Soviet Union faced firm and consistent opposition to its aims, self-interest might lead it to be less assertive in pursuing them, and it might seek instead to look for agreement in areas of mutual interest (No. 47). A darker summation of the situation was offered by Mr Johnson of EESD:

'The Russians will have assessed the Western reaction to Afghanistan as riven by doubt and conflicting national interests. They will have weighed up Western countries as vacillating, self-seeking, unwilling to give up the good life, too ready to take an optimistic view of likely Soviet actions, too subject to electoral winds of change, and in general too weak and split to offer serious resistance to Soviet expansion . . . and may also reckon that an alliance of equals is in the final analysis no match for one dominated by a single, determined and ruthless directing force' (No. 61).

'Soviet foreign policy after Afghanistan' was sent to No. 10, along with a suggestion from Lord Carrington that the Prime Minister meet with FCO officials to discuss Soviet policy. The meeting that took place a week later was attended by Lord Carrington, Rodric Braithwaite, head of Planning Staff, and Mr Mallaby. It was an attempt—largely successful—by the Secretary of State to overcome the Prime Minister's scepticism of the FCO's ability to handle the Soviets firmly enough, and to ensure that she had an alternative view to balance against those of her academic advisers.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Mr Hurd called his role in attempting to frustrate the Moscow Games 'the most foolish task with which I was ever entrusted as a minister'. It was clear from the outset that athletes and administrators were unlikely to abandon for political reasons an event in which they had invested so much time and ambition. Douglas Hurd, *Memoirs* (London: Little, Brown, 2003), p. 262.

<sup>19</sup> See Lord Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past* (London: Collins, 1988), p. 285 and Rodric Braithwaite, *Across the Moscow River* (London: Yale, 2002), pp. 51-2. For further reflections on Mrs Thatcher's relations with the FCO see George Walden (at that time the PPS to the Foreign Secretary), *Lucky George: memoirs of an anti-politician* (London: Allen Lane, 1999), pp. 208-14.

## *Preface*

### *Preventing future Afghanistans*

In a letter of 16 January 1980 to Mr Mallaby, Sir C. Keeble expressed the view that beyond the short-term objectives of making the Soviet leadership recognise that a similar operation conducted elsewhere would be likely to prove both dangerous and ineffective, the invasion of Afghanistan offered the West an opportunity to develop a global policy which exposed ‘the basic fallacy in the Soviet concept of *détente*’. The primary need was for consolidation of the UK’s relationships amongst the Allies and with developing nations, who received little but arms and dogma from the Soviet Union. Though the idea of the UK holding a unique position between Europe, the US and the Commonwealth was unfashionable, the UK was now in a position to exercise influence (No. 40). Even before the invasion of Afghanistan there was concern over Communist military interventions in the developing world, which had begun with the Cuban-backed installation of a Marxist regime in Angola. This was reflected in the 7 December 1979 paper which called for an examination of ways to prevent Soviet expansion in this area. A meeting was held in the FCO on 30 January 1980 to take the work forward. The aim was not to punish African countries close to the Soviet Union, but to seek to build on their need for links with the West in the hope of weaning them away from the Soviets. It was felt there was a need to identify possible future targets of Soviet opportunism and define the degree of Western influence in those countries with a view to working to prevent future ‘Afghanistans’ (No. 48). In addition, the overturning of the *de facto* understanding that Soviet forces would not fight outside the territories of the Soviet Union and her allies now meant that other neighbours looked vulnerable—in particular Yugoslavia and Iran (No. 37).

A final version of a paper on ‘The Management of East-West Relations’ was sent to Mrs Thatcher and discussed at a meeting with FCO officials on 20 May, before being submitted to OD Committee. The paper made a number of recommendations for restoring the coherence of the West, improving the North-South economic relationship, reviewing the scope for putting economic and other pressure on the Soviets, improving arrangements for giving military assistance in the Third World, developing capacity for long-range military intervention outside NATO, reviewing machinery for countering Soviet propaganda and developing links with Third World political organisations. In a covering letter Lord Carrington reiterated the view that the Soviet Union saw no incompatibility between *détente* and the continuation of the ideological struggle. The desire to equal the US as a world superpower drove Moscow to shift the world correlation of forces in their favour whilst being careful to avoid direct military confrontation with the West. The spread of Soviet economic, political and military power in the Third World was a threat to Western interests and must be checked if the East-West relationship was to be put on a more secure basis (No. 65).

This agenda was agreed by the OD Committee on 5 June 1980. In the course of discussion it was suggested that the large increase in Soviet power over the past decade was mainly a result of weak leadership from the US, with other contributing factors such as the insistence of the French on an independent posture and West Germany’s growing economic interdependence with Eastern Europe, leading to ‘disquieting political manifestations’. In these circumstances it was all the more important that Britain take a strong political and ideological lead. Though Britain’s resources, particularly economic, were limited, the English language was a source of great influence and Britain’s moral authority was respected in many countries, especially in the Commonwealth, where the settling of the Rhodesian

### *UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

problem had recently removed a major cause of contention (No. 67). Commenting on the paper from Moscow, Sir C. Keeble stressed that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was a reality and could remain so for many years. Any insistence on withdrawal, as a precondition for progress in other areas, would condemn the policy to failure in advance. The government had to avoid an unrealistic choice between détente and a freeze in relations, and plan for the long-term management of continuing East-West tension in which various aspects of East-West relations were dealt with on their merits, 'recognising the essential malevolence of Soviet policy and exploiting its weaknesses' (No. 69).

Sir C. Keeble's views fed into a paper by EESD on 'UK Policy in East-West Relations' prepared in response to the Secretary of State's request for a short paper on where things stood on East-West relations, especially the resumption of contacts (No. 72). The paper, submitted in mid-July, noted that Western countries had already begun to drift back to business as usual with Moscow. In May 1980 French President Giscard d'Estaing and President Brezhnev had met in Warsaw for a one-day summit, and in June Chancellor Schmidt visited Moscow for talks. It was not in Britain's interest to be left out of East-West contacts (this was a theme that would increasingly occupy the FCO over the coming years). At the end of July 1980 EESD reflected on the West's response to Afghanistan in a paper entitled 'Warning, Actions and Threats to Deter Soviet Moves' which admitted that a range of measures had been applied in a partial and piecemeal manner and that although they had had some political and economic impact, it was not certain whether this had been significant. The paper tried to draw lessons and suggest how the West could act in a more timely and coherent manner in a future crisis (No. 74). With strikes about to break out in Poland such a paper would not gather dust.

#### *Proposals for a Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan*

The greatest area of Soviet vulnerability was Afghanistan itself. In Kabul, the British Ambassador, William Hillier-Fry, voiced the question as to whether the Soviets had 'landed themselves in a mountainous and inhospitable Vietnam' (No. 21). The FCO thought there would be strong pressure to build up the scale of Soviet military intervention with the aim of the complete suppression of opposition but concluded: 'It is doubtful whether this aim can ever in fact be achieved, given Afghan history, terrain and social characteristics' (No. 9). However action was needed to try and change the situation in Afghanistan and at the end of January 1980 the Planning Staff drafted a note which concluded that a 'Treaty of Neutrality' for Afghanistan, guaranteed by the countries of the region including the Soviet Union, Iran, Pakistan, China and India, would be a good outcome of the crisis (No. 44). The proposal was fleshed out further by the Planning Staff as both a device for putting political pressure on the Soviets and a basis for a settlement. As the West could not force the Soviets to leave through military or economic pressure the neutrality proposal demonstrated that they were looking for a solution rather than confrontation, and could act as a rallying point for the non-aligned. One of the positive aspects of the invasion had been the hostile response from many non-aligned and developing countries (No. 59).<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Moscow looked to use the interest in finding a political solution to create more favourable conditions for the stabilisation of the situation in Afghanistan but viewed the current Western proposals as thinly veiled attempts to achieve the rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops and regime change. CPSU CC 'Politburo decision on Soviet policy on Afghanistan', 10 March 1982, with

## *Preface*

In pitching the neutrality idea to the Prime Minister, Lord Carrington noted that the demand for Soviet withdrawal would be more plausible if a positive solution to the Afghan problem could be found (No. 49). Despite initial misgivings from Mrs Thatcher—‘It would be *useless*’ was an early marginal comment—Lord Carrington put the idea to his colleagues at the European Council in February and the Nine launched the initiative as a positive step towards defusing the international situation. At this stage the idea was intended as a constructive proposal designed to allow the Soviets to withdraw without losing face and to demonstrate to Moscow that their fears of Western intervention in Afghanistan were groundless (No. 54). Sir C. Keeble thought it was unlikely to be accepted. If the Soviets could not subdue Afghanistan easily then the idea of neutrality might become attractive, but that point had not yet been reached. Nor would they welcome the implication in the concept of neutrality that their existing bilateral treaty with Afghanistan would cease and that the DRA government would be left to fend for itself (No. 56).

Lord Carrington floated his proposal for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, during meetings in Vienna in May 1980 and again at the United Nations in September. The only requirement from Britain was that a political solution must lead to the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces and to guarantees of non-intervention in the future by other states, including the USSR. The Soviets preferred to see the conclusion of bilateral treaties between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran, providing assurances of non-interference in Afghan affairs, namely the end of armed incursions. Complete withdrawal could not be discussed before guarantees of non-interference from outside were given and seen to be effective. Lord Carrington thought these positions were not irreconcilable, and that it should be possible to work out a formula which made commitments to both withdrawal and undertakings simultaneous, with a timetable settled at the outset (Nos. 59, 64, 77).

In May 1981 Lord Carrington decided to stimulate fresh diplomatic activity and picked up on a French idea for an international conference. The Prime Minister agreed to his proposal for a two-stage conference: stage one, involving the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, Pakistan, Iran and India, would work out arrangements to halt external intervention and safeguard against future intervention; stage two, involving Afghan representatives, would reach agreement on the implementation of the international arrangements worked out in stage one. The proposals were presented as a serious attempt to move towards a peaceful solution and to maintain international interest. Around the same time the Soviets were putting out feelers for a visit to Moscow by Lord Carrington. In April 1981, the Soviet Ambassador in London handed him a note at Northolt airport, which stated that the Soviet Union was prepared unilaterally to halt the deployment of SS-20 missiles. The note also indicated a willingness to develop bilateral political dialogue ‘by implication at a higher level’ (No. 95). Nigel Broomfield, now head of EESD, felt that the visit could be linked to the initiative on Afghanistan. Experienced Soviet-watcher Tony Bishop, of the FCO’s Research Department, thought the Soviet interest in dialogue with senior Western figures was aimed at drawing the US into talks with the USSR, regaining international respectability and restoring a peaceful image. The Soviets were ‘devoid of ideas but hoping that somebody outside will step in and provide some’ (No. 99).

report on ‘Proposal by Fidel Castro to Mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan’. Reproduced in the CWIHP *Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 167-170.

## *UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

In June the European Council gave their approval to the idea of an Afghan conference, and Lord Carrington went to Moscow in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers. The meeting between the two Foreign Ministers took place on 6 July. Following a morning of discussions Gromyko dismissed the proposal for Afghan neutrality as ‘completely divorced from reality’, largely over the question of DRA representation (No. 107). There was little surprise that the Soviets were not keen on the proposed conference, but there had been a hope that the wide international support for the initiative would make it difficult for them to reject it. Britain attempted to keep the initiative alive, stressing the offer remained on the table for negotiation. But, as Sir C. Keeble reported in October, ‘there is no choice open to the Soviet Union other than that between soldiering on in a long colonial war or admitting defeat. They are not yet ready for the latter’ (No. 114).

### *The response to martial law in Poland*

If the Soviet Union was not ready to accept defeat in Afghanistan, it was also reluctant to accept political change in Poland. Following the formation of the independent trade union *Solidarnosc* (Solidarity) in August 1980 Poland was paralysed by a political struggle that hovered between reform and repression.<sup>21</sup> On 13 December 1981 the government of General Jaruzelski decided to break the deadlock by declaring martial law, an act that once again posed problems for the Alliance over how best to handle East-West relations. There was little doubt that the Soviet Union bore a degree of responsibility for the repression in Poland. Moscow had placed political, military and economic pressure on the Polish government to deal with ‘anti-socialist activities’. In Sir C. Keeble’s opinion Poland was too crucial to Soviet political and security interests for the situation to be left to deteriorate, but the international penalties of direct intervention were judged to be so great that an ‘internal’ solution was preferable (No. 118). Again, the Western response was led by the US government, now led by President Ronald Reagan.<sup>22</sup> On 29 December, with little consultation, the US announced a series of economic and political measures, and put pressure on the European allies to follow suit. They made it clear that they wanted to see specific economic and political measures from Europe aimed at the Soviet Union as well as Poland.

The EC and NATO called for reconciliation in Poland through the lifting of martial law, the release of those detained, and the resumption of genuine dialogue between the Polish authorities and the Church and Solidarity. But the European allies were not fully convinced of the arguments for strong measures against the Soviet Union in circumstances short of direct armed intervention. There were wide variations in national positions and the measures proposed were largely political rather than economic. To shore up the Western position, Mrs Thatcher wrote to President Reagan expressing her support for a concerted European response and contending that the diplomatic focus should be directed at Soviet failures rather than differences between Alliance partners (No. 123). The Soviet Ambassador was called to the FCO on 5 February to hear the specific measures Britain had decided to take against the Soviet Union, including additional restrictions on the travel of

<sup>21</sup> UK relations with the Soviet bloc, including Poland, will be covered in a forthcoming *DBPO* volume.

<sup>22</sup> At National Security Council meetings held on 21, 22 and 23 December 1981 President Reagan was clear that the Soviets were behind the repression in Poland and that he wanted to take a tough line. There were also warnings from Mr Haig, the US Secretary of State, that pre-emptive US action risked splitting the Alliance (minutes reproduced at <http://www.thereaganfiles.com/>).

## Preface

Soviet officials in the UK, a reduction of bilateral technical co-operation, a proposal to renegotiate the terms of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty on Merchant Navigation and the introduction of a licensing system covering Soviet factory fishing vessels in UK waters. The Ambassador claimed, as the Soviets had done with Afghanistan, that it was the reaction of the West that amounted to interference in Poland's affairs rather than any actions of theirs (No. 130).

One area of immediate concern was the future of the West Siberian gas pipeline project in which many European companies had significant involvement, including John Brown Engineering Ltd with contracts worth £104m at stake. The Americans were unsympathetic to this project, regardless of the Polish situation, thinking the Europeans would become too dependent on Soviet gas and provide the USSR with a future source of hard currency. The West German and French governments were determined to go ahead with the project, despite US sanctions, and Sir N. Henderson was warned that US interference in the pipeline would cause a major transatlantic row (No. 124). Lord Carrington was concerned enough to suggest that Mrs Thatcher send an urgent message to President Reagan to bring the situation to his personal attention. Just prior to this she made her views known to Mr Haig who made an unscheduled stop in London on his way back to the US from the Middle East.<sup>23</sup> She suggested that the Europeans exchange some commitment on future contracts and agree not to undermine US measures in the future in return for exemption of existing contracts (No. 127). Although her government was ideologically attuned to America's new determination to oppose Soviet expansionism, which began under President Carter and then toughened under President Reagan, she did not unquestioningly follow all the demands for diplomatic and economic sanctions made upon the Alliance by the US and often took a similar view to the European allies.<sup>24</sup>

The pipeline issue became caught up in the wider question of political and economic relations with the Soviet Union. The climate for East-West trade changed following the invasion of Afghanistan and this trend was reinforced by the Reagan administration. The US traditionally took the view that trade should be subject to political control, whereas the Europeans considered trade beneficial in its own right. Some members of the US Administration believed the weaknesses of the Soviet economy rendered it susceptible to pressure and wanted to use economic and trade measures to extract political concessions over Poland or even secure more far-reaching changes in Soviet internal and external policy.<sup>25</sup> The Americans were concerned about the export of advanced technology and Western credit to the Soviet Union. However, the British government agreed with other West European countries that the Soviet economy, though in difficulty, was more robust than the US believed. In a background paper assessing the impact of Western measures on the Soviet economy, officials concluded that trade with the West accounted for only a small proportion of Soviet GNP, many Western imports could be sourced

<sup>23</sup> Mr Haig recalled that Mrs Thatcher 'with her usual perspicacity' identified the fundamental issue, that it was too much for the Europeans to punish their own economies and interests in support of policies that would inflict no noticeable wound on the Soviet Union. Alexander M. Haig, *Caveat* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 256.

<sup>24</sup> Mrs Thatcher called the pipeline issue, 'a lesson in how not to conduct alliance business.' Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 256.

<sup>25</sup> For example, at a National Security Council meeting on 24 May 1982 to review the December 1981 sanctions, President Reagan stated: 'The Soviet Union is economically on the ropes—they are selling rat meat on the market. This is the time to punish them' (minutes reproduced at <http://www.thereaganfiles.com/>).

### *UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

from neutral countries and any shortfall accommodated by belt-tightening. The leverage available through the imposition of broad trade restrictions was limited.<sup>26</sup> At the time of the Afghan crisis Sir C. Keeble had acknowledged that there were few countries in the world less vulnerable to economic measures or more ready to suffer a severance of external links than the Soviet Union. Similarly, in September 1981 Andrew Wood, from the embassy in Moscow, concluded in a memorandum on the 'Soviet Union: Will It Change?' that despite the increasing problems faced by the Soviet leadership, radical change was unlikely in the short or medium term. Change would become progressively harder to achieve without sending the system into shock and with the Soviet political structure so rigid, successors to Brezhnev would have little choice but to follow similar policies even whilst problems mounted (No. 112). As the pipeline dispute rumbled on throughout 1982, the FCO worked on a paper, drawing views from across Whitehall, on 'British Policy in East-West Economic Relations in the 1980s'. It concluded that the overriding principle in trade with the Soviet Union should be commercial advantage. Trade should not be used as a political weapon; nor be artificially encouraged for political reasons.

In March 1982 the Planning Staff took stock in a paper entitled 'Western Response to the Polish Crisis: Assessment and Prospects'. They concluded that repression would continue for some time and that Western measures towards Poland and the Soviet Union would not reverse this. There was still a serious risk of a Western split over Poland but Britain should continue to act as a catalyst for unity (No. 134). US policy, according to an analysis by the British embassy in Washington in August 1982, was that the West should keep its military guard up, its purses closed and its granaries open. The embassy also talked of Britain having to help 'pull the Administration's chestnuts out of the fire which they themselves have stoked' over relations with the rest of the Alliance. This was a task in which Britain had no choice, as in the last resort the Americans could live without the Europeans but the reverse was not true (No. 155).

#### *US-Soviet relations and the UK*

Sir C. Keeble observed that the relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union had never been determined in isolation or on its own merits but was the product of a whole complex of other policies and relationships, especially that between the superpowers (No. 138). In February 1980 he examined the state of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States noting that the Soviet leadership needed a controlled relationship with the US in order to feel secure. Whilst the immediate US reaction to Afghanistan might prompt a greater degree of caution in the Soviet leadership, in the longer term the Soviet Union would pursue its objectives according to its perception of the strength of purpose of the American President (No. 50).

The election of Ronald Reagan brought a fiercely anti-Communist President to the White House who was determined to take a more assertive approach in dealing with the Soviet Union. Any assumption by Moscow that his anti-Soviet rhetoric was confined to the election campaign was soon dismissed. Mr Gromyko told Lord Carrington, when the two met in New York in 1981, that US-Soviet relations were in disarray but through no fault of the Soviet Union (No. 111). The Soviet leadership attempted to appeal directly to the governments and peoples of Western

<sup>26</sup> 'British Policy in East/West economic relations in the 1980s: The likely effect of Western economic/trade measures on the Soviet economy', 1 October 1982 (EN 091/1).

## Preface

Europe who, they believed, still accepted the basic tenets of détente from the 1970s. President Brezhnev used his speech in February 1981, marking the opening session of the 26<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, to launch the Soviet 'Peace Programme'. He called for a summit meeting with President Reagan and renewed his call for NATO to stop the deployment of US nuclear missiles in Europe, offering to freeze the deployment of the SS-20s in return (No.86). This initiative was followed by a letter from President Brezhnev to Mrs Thatcher, delivered by the Soviet Ambassador on 9 March. In her response the Prime Minister made clear that if President Brezhnev wanted to reduce the level of armaments, and if he was prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan and engage in 'two-way' détente, he would find HMG willing to discuss these matters. However she could only judge the Soviet government by its actions: if deeds matched words they would find the British willing partners (No. 87).

Reviewing the US-Soviet relationship in March 1982 Sir C. Keeble thought there were those in the Soviet leadership questioning whether US policy was attempting more than just containing and counterbalancing Soviet power in Europe. Even so, in an era of 'mutual hostility and abuse' both countries still needed to avoid an uncontrolled relationship and retain an interest in dialogue, however unfruitful (No. 140). US policy towards the Soviet Union was analysed further in a paper produced in August 1982 by the British embassy in Washington (No. 155). President Reagan was described as a conviction politician with 'exceptionally crude' views on international affairs and policies 'harking back to the relatively clear-cut black and white concepts of earlier eras'. Soviet-American relations were governed by a policy of neo-containment stressing the need for Soviet *restraint* (by rejecting intervention in other countries), *reciprocity* (in complying with undertakings like Helsinki) and *linkage* (where the Soviet Union must satisfy US requirements in other policy areas if it wanted a satisfactory bilateral relationship).

Sir C. Keeble was confident that control of strategic armaments by bilateral agreement was a policy objective for both the USSR and the US and an area where Soviet-American understanding was inherently possible. The outlook for East-West relations was bleak but the Europeans should press the Americans for strategic arms reduction talks (START) to begin and for INF negotiations to continue. The other half of the NATO 'twin-track' policy on INF deployment was to open negotiations for arms reduction. This was an important factor in Alliance relations as many European governments were under pressure from domestic peace movements. Mr Broomfield noted that whatever the current difficulties over the Siberian pipeline, these would 'pale into insignificance' if the European NATO allies thought responsibility for the lack of progress on arms control lay with the US rather than the Soviet Union (No. 158, note. 1). Sir Iain Sutherland, British Ambassador in Moscow from September 1982, observed that the Soviets did not like President Reagan but they had the US Administration they deserved and which they in part had helped to create in failing to realise that the US mood was changing and the imbalance inherent in the Soviet view of détente was unsustainable (No. 177). Although Mr Gromyko had characterised the position of the British government as no more than an echo of the US military (No. 89) Britain's close relationship with America was not always unhelpful to Moscow. As the Soviets struggled to develop a stable relationship with the Reagan administration they looked to Britain as a sensible interlocutor with standing in Washington. During a conversation with Francis Pym (Lord Carrington's

## *UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

successor)<sup>27</sup> in New York in September 1982, Mr Gromyko recalled there had been many examples since the war of Britain's helping to find a way round differences between America and the Soviet Union (No. 161).

Following the death of President Brezhnev on 10 November 1982 President Reagan stated that an opportunity to improve East-West relations existed so long as the Soviets abided by acceptable standards of international behaviour. The British government was represented at the funeral by Mr Pym who took the opportunity to have meetings with Mr Gromyko and the US Secretary of State George Shultz. Mr Pym also explored the possibility of a US-Soviet summit to steady public opinion. He was sceptical about the likelihood of any change in Soviet policies but equally firm that the opportunity for exploring possibilities for change should not be turned down. He wanted the December NATO meeting to issue a separate declaration on East-West relations setting out 'in an eloquent and eye-catching form' their basic approach (No. 173). This would emphasise President Reagan's point that more constructive East-West relations were on offer if the new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, would do what was necessary to grasp the opportunity. Mrs Thatcher could not see the merit of an early summit and indeed the idea was politely rebuffed by Mr Shultz.

### *'The coldest spell is before the dawn'*

In March 1982 Mr Broomfield surveyed the state of UK-Soviet relations and concluded that they had 'been stripped of any fat'. He argued in a submission to Alan Goodison, assistant under-secretary, that a constructive bilateral relationship was needed to put across British views direct to the Soviet leadership and assess Soviet thinking and personalities at first hand (No. 135). At the same time Sir C. Keeble was dictating a despatch along similar lines, arguing that Britain had almost no contact with the world's second power and advocating a more positive attitude. He thought the government should take advantage of opportunities when they occurred, adding that political exchanges were 'not necessarily demonstrations of goodwill' (No. 138). This analysis was supported at all levels in the FCO. Julian Bullard, Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary and Political Director, thought there was a need to 'intersperse our current disapproving line with at least one or two concrete signs of interest' (No. 137). Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State, did not want to risk damaging Alliance solidarity or get out of step with major allies—especially the US—but did agree there were good reasons not to become too distant from the Soviets and endanger channels of political communication (No. 141).

The prospect of an immediate thaw was effectively put on hold during the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. The initial Soviet attitude to the Falklands conflict was cautious, but became more hostile to the UK. Soviet propaganda avoided reference to Security Council Resolution 502 and instead portrayed the crisis as one provoked by the UK's colonialist intransigence, supported by US imperialist ambitions in South America. They also took umbrage at the suggestion that they were providing Argentina with information on British fleet movements. However, in July EESD returned to the theme of bilateral relations. In order to redefine UK policy, David Manning of EESD produced a draft paper (No. 151) which argued that the absence of bilateral political dialogue

<sup>27</sup> Lord Carrington resigned as Foreign Secretary following the outbreak of the Falklands War in April 1982.

## Preface

was no longer in Britain's interest and was unlikely to persuade the Soviets to 'moderate their policies in ways we should like'. The main thrust of the paper, endorsed by Mr Broomfield, argued for political dialogue to be re-established on three levels—Foreign Minister, Deputy Foreign Minister and Political Director—with other exchanges at higher and lower levels on an *ad hoc* basis when in the British interest.

The idea of a visit by the Prime Minister was also mooted, with Mr Manning noting: 'Her ability to present the Western case forcefully and lucidly whilst eschewing false bonhomie, would be an educative process for the Soviet leadership.'<sup>28</sup> Given that East-West political exchanges were almost certain to increase it was considered important that a strong, independent British voice be heard in Moscow (No. 151). Sir J. Bullard was in no doubt as to who would carry off the honours in any meeting with Brezhnev (No. 156). In his valedictory despatch Sir C. Keeble noted that Britain was well placed to take the lead on the Western side in the East-West relationship—'the Prime Minister's standing is high and her words will carry weight here' (No. 157). But in the final analysis, proposing that Mrs Thatcher visit Moscow was felt to be a step too far and the idea was dropped from the final paper, entitled 'East-West Political Relations: UK policy towards the Soviet Union', sent by Mr Pym to No. 10 in September 1982. The paper also included a proposal to re-establish cultural exchanges in order to project Western values to the Soviet people.

Sir Iain Sutherland, on his arrival in Moscow (as Ambassador) in September 1982, noted his surprise and concern at the extent to which Britain had cut herself off from the USSR when Soviet policy was both more active and hesitant than for some time, economic difficulties more acute, the pace of social change accelerating and a new leadership imminent (No. 164). Mr Broomfield thought a number of developments had enhanced the UK's importance in Soviet eyes—pessimism over relations with the US, the cooling of relations with France since the accession of President François Mitterrand and uncertainty over the policies of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the independent line the UK had taken from the US over the pipeline dispute, and the victory in the Falklands campaign (No. 163). Mr Pym was due to meet the Prime Minister to convince her that the change in tack was necessary but within the FCO there remained doubt over whether his arguments would carry the day. The strident position adopted by Mrs Thatcher towards the Soviet Union caused disquiet. Mr Walden, head of the Planning Staff, expressed his concern about the 'tough stuff' the Planners found themselves drafting for the Prime Minister's speeches on the Soviet Union (No. 166).

Mr Pym met Mrs Thatcher for the long awaited discussion on East-West relations following his return from President Brezhnev's funeral. Disappointingly for the FCO, she opposed the idea of a senior British minister visiting Moscow and expressed scepticism about the utility of expanding political contacts or cultural relations, believing they might harm Britain's whole stance on East-West relations. She was prepared to contemplate a visit at a lower level, provided that it had a clear purpose, was consistent with the various undertakings given in the wake of

<sup>28</sup> Mrs Thatcher met the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, at Moscow airport in December 1979 during a refuelling stop *en route* to the G7 meeting in Tokyo. When Mr Kosygin tried to suggest that the boat people fleeing communist Vietnam were all drug-takers or criminals Mrs Thatcher asked disbelievingly: 'What? One million of them? Is communism so bad that a million have to take drugs or steal to live?' Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp.65-6.

### *UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

the Afghan invasion and that the US had advance notice (No. 172). This led to the prospect of talks between the Planning Staffs in the two Foreign Ministries and an invitation for Deputy Foreign Minister Ryzhov to visit London in 1983. However the 'big freeze' was far from over.

The volume closes with a despatch from Sir I. Sutherland (No. 177) reflecting on the legacy of the Brezhnev years. The Ambassador concluded that under President Brezhnev the Bolshevik Revolution had finally run out of steam. In foreign policy the Soviet Union in 1982 was back to where it had stood in 1964: facing a new arms race, with weaknesses in the socialist camp. Economic growth had brought higher living standards and supported an expensive foreign and military policy but little had been done to overcome structural weaknesses, and inefficiency and inertia in the system. Soviet society had turned from Communism to consumerism, and grown cynical and apathetic. Ultimately, the man who had led the Soviet Union for the last 18 years was 'an uninspiring and at the end an unloved leader who has left more problems than he solved'.

#### *Acknowledgements*

In accordance with the Parliamentary announcement cited in the Introduction to the Series, the Editors have had the customary freedom in the selection and arrangement of the documents including full access to all classes of FCO documentation. There has, however, in the case of the present volume been one instance when it has been necessary to excise certain passages from a document. These omissions are indicated with square brackets and appropriate footnote references.

Some of the official documents published or cited in this volume are not yet in the public domain and will not be transferred to The National Archives (TNA) in advance of their due date, but they have been marked for permanent preservation and will be released in the usual way. Documents not released at the time the volume went to press (for 1981 and 1982) have been given their departmental file reference. Documents for 1979 and 1980 have also been given their TNA reference. Documents quoted or cited in footnotes have only been accorded a file reference where it differs from that of the printed document to which they refer. Telegrams have been given the date on which they were sent, which in a small number of cases differs from the date when they were drafted. Omitted from the headings and formulations at the end of documents are some classifications regarding administration and circulation but the main security classifications are included. Some minor typing errors have been corrected.

The main source of documentation in this volume has been the archives of the FCO held, pending their transfer to TNA, by the Information Management Department (IMD). I should like to thank Simon Fraser, the Permanent Under-Secretary, and Christine Ferguson, Head of IMD, for their encouragement and support of the project. I am also grateful for the help given by Martin Tucker, the Head of Corporate Records, and members of his team including Rachel Cox, Caroline Puddephat and Elaine King.

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*Preface*

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RICHARD SMITH  
September 2011

## ABBREVIATIONS FOR PRINTED SOURCES

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Cmnd.  | Command Paper (London)   |
| CWIHP <i>Bulletin</i>                        | Cold War International History Project <i>Bulletin</i> (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1992f)   |
| <i>DBPO</i>                                  | <i>Documents on British Policy Overseas</i> (London: HMSO/ Routledge, 1984f.)  |
| <i>Parl. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C.</i>       | <i>Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, House of Commons, Official Report</i> (London, 1909f.)   |
| <i>Parl. Debs., 5th ser., H. of L.</i>       | <i>Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, House of Lords, Official Report</i> (London, 1909f.)   |
| <i>Public Papers: Carter (1979, 1980-81)</i> | <i>Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter</i> (Washington, 1981-82). Also available online through <i>The American Presidency Project</i> at: <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/">http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/</a> .  |
| <i>Public Papers: Reagan (1981, 1982)</i>    | <i>Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan</i> (Washington, 1982-83). Also available online through <i>The American Presidency Project</i> at: <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/">http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/</a> . |

## ABBREVIATED DESIGNATIONS

|         |   |       |  |
|---------|---|-------|--|
| 2ED     | Second European<br>Department, Soviet MFA                   | FBS   | forward based systems                                      |
| ACDA    | Arms Control and<br>Disarmament Agency                      | FCO   | Foreign and Commonwealth<br>Office                         |
| AFP     | <i>Agence France-Presse</i>                                 | FNLA  | <i>Frente Nacional de<br/>Libertação de Angola</i>         |
| ALCOA   | The Aluminium Company of<br>America                         | FRD   | Financial Relations<br>Department                          |
| APS     | Assistant Private Secretary                                 | FRG   | Federal Republic of Germany                                |
| ARMCO   | American Rolling Mills<br>Corporation (US Steel<br>Company) | FRUS  | Foreign Relations of the<br>United States                  |
| ASEAN   | Association of South East<br>Asian Nations                  | GLCM  | ground launched cruise<br>missile                          |
| AUS     | Assistant Under-Secretary of<br>State                       | HMT   | Her Majesty's Treasury                                     |
| BAOR    | British Army of the Rhine                                   | IAEA  | International Atomic Energy<br>Agency                      |
| BTU     | British thermal unit  | ICBM  | Intercontinental ballistic<br>missile                      |
| CBM     | confidence building measures                                | INF   | Intermediate range nuclear<br>forces                       |
| CDE     | Conference on Disarmament<br>in Europe                      | IOC   | International Olympic<br>Committee                         |
| CMD&D   | Conference on Military<br>Détente and Disarmament           | IPD   | Information Policy<br>Department, FCO                      |
| CMEA    | Council for Mutual Economic<br>Assistance                   | JIC   | Joint Intelligence Committee                               |
| COCOM   | Coordinating Committee for<br>Multilateral Export Controls  | LDC   | less developed countries                                   |
| COI     | Central Office of Information                               | MBFR  | Mutual and Balanced Force<br>Reductions                    |
| COMECON | Council for Mutual Economic<br>Assistance                   | MED   | Middle East Department,<br>FCO                             |
| CPSU    | Communist Party of the<br>Soviet Union                      | MFA   | Ministry of Foreign Affairs                                |
| CRD     | Cultural Relations<br>Department, FCO                       | MIFT  | My Immediate Following<br>Telegram                         |
| CSCE    | Conference on Security and<br>Cooperation in Europe         | MIPT  | My Immediate Preceding<br>Telegram                         |
| CTB     | Comprehensive Test Ban                                      | MOD   | Ministry of Defence  |
| DOD     | US Department of Defense                                    | MPLA  | <i>Movimento Popular de<br/>Libertação de Angola</i>       |
| DoE     | Department of the<br>Environment                            | MX    | missile experimental                                       |
| DOP     | Cabinet's Oversea and<br>Defence Committee                  | NAC   | North Atlantic Council<br>(NATO)                           |
| DRA     | Democratic Republic of<br>Afghanistan                       | NAM   | Non-Aligned Movement                                       |
| DUS     | Deputy Under-Secretary of<br>State                          | NATO  | North Atlantic Treaty<br>Organisation                      |
| EC      | European Community  | NENAD | Near East and North Africa<br>Department, FCO              |
| ECD(E)  | European Community<br>Department (External), FCO            | NNA   | Neutral and Non-Aligned                                    |
| ECGD    | Export Credit Guarantee<br>Department                       | NOFUN | No First Use of Nuclear<br>Weapons                         |
| EEC     | European Economic<br>Community                              | NSC   | US National Security Council                               |
| EESD    | East European and Soviet<br>Department, FCO                 | OD    | Cabinet's Oversea and<br>Defence Committee                 |
| ERD     | Economic Relations<br>Department, FCO                       | ODA   | Overseas Development<br>Administration                     |
| ESSD    | Energy Science and Space<br>Department, FCO                 | OECD  | Organisation of Economic<br>Cooperation and<br>Development |
|         |   | OID   | Overseas Information<br>Department, FCO                    |

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

|       |  |        |  |
|-------|--|--------|--|
| OPEC  | Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries      | START  | Strategic Arms Reduction Talks                             |
| PAP   | <i>Polska Agencja Prasowa</i> (Polish News Agency) | Telno  | telegram number  |
| PDRY  | People's Democratic Republic of Yemen              | TNF    | Theatre Nuclear Forces                                     |
| POCO  | Political Cooperation (EU)                         | TRED   | Trade Relations and Export Department, FCO                 |
| PPS   | Principal Private Secretary                        | TUR    | telegram under reference                                   |
| PQ    | Parliamentary Question                             | UIP    | United International Press                                 |
| PS    | Private Secretary                                  | UKDEL  | United Kingdom Delegation                                  |
| PUS   | Permanent Under-Secretary of State                 | UKMIS  | United Kingdom Mission                                     |
| RSFSR | Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic       | UNDP   | United Nations Development Programme                       |
| SAD   | South Asia Department, FCO                         | UNGA   | United Nations General Assembly                            |
| SALT  | Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty                   | UNHCR  | United Nations High Commission for Refugees                |
| SCG   | Special Consultative Group (NATO)                  | UNITA  | <i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i> |
| SCR   | Security Council Resolution (UN)                   | UNSSOD | United Nations Special Session on Disarmament              |
| SLCM  | submarine launched cruise missile                  | USA    | United States of America                                   |
| SPC   | Senior Political Committee (NATO)                  | USSR   | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics                        |
| SSBN  | Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (submarine)     | VS     | Verbatim Series, COI                                       |
|       |  | YAR    | Yemen Arab Republic  |

## LIST OF PERSONS

- Abrsimov, Petr**, Soviet Ambassador, Berlin, 1962-71, 1975-83  
**Acland, Sir Antony**, Permanent Under-Secretary, FCO, 1982-86  
**Adams, William**, AUS, FCO, 1980-84  
**Afanasiev, Viktor**, Editor-in-Chief, *Pravda*, 1976-89  
**Alexander, Michael**, Prime Minister's Private Secretary for Overseas Affairs, 1979-81  
**Alexandrov, I.** 'Pravda journalist' (pseudonym for officially sponsored articles)  
**Amin, Asadullah**, Head of KAM (Afghan secret police)  
**Amin, Hafizullah**, Prime Minister and President of Afghanistan, Sept-Dec 1979  
**Andreani, Gilles**, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, French MFA  
**Andropov, Yuri**, Chairman of the KGB, 1967-82; General-Secretary of the CPSU, 1982-84  
**Arafat, Yasser**, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, 1969-2004  
**Arbatov, Georgii**, Director of the Institute of US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1967-95  
**Archer, Graham**, South Asian Department, FCO, 1979-81  
**Armstrong, Sir Robert**, Secretary to the Cabinet, 1979-87  
**Atkins, Sir Humphrey**, Lord Privy Seal, 1981-82  
**Baker, James**, White House Chief of Staff, 1981-85  
**Barre, Mohamed Siad**, President of Somalia, 1969-91  
**Bayne, Nicholas**, Head of the Economic Relations Department, FCO, 1979-82  
**Beel, Graham**, Research Department, Soviet Section, FCO, 1972-94  
**Begin, Menachem**, Prime Minister of Israel, 1977-83  
**Benyahia, Mohammed Seddik**, Algerian Foreign Minister, 1979-82  
**Berlinguer, Enrico**, General-Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, 1972-84  
**Bishop, K. Anthony**, Research Department, Soviet Section, FCO, 1961-98  
**Blaker, Peter**, Minister of State, FCO, 1979-81  
**Bone, Roger**, APS to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1982-84  
**Braithwaite, Rodric**, Head of Planning Staff, 1979-80; AUS, FCO, 1980-82  
**Brement, Marshall**, staff member with the US National Security Council (USSR/East Europe/East-West relations), 1979-81  
**Brewster Jr., Kingman**, US Ambassador, London, 1977-81  
**Brezhnev, Leonid**, General-Secretary of the CPSU, 1964-82  
**Bridges, Thomas Edward, 2nd Baron Bridges**, DUS, FCO, 1979-83  
**Brooke Turner, Alan**, Minister, British Embassy, Moscow, 1979-82  
**Broomfield, Nigel**, Head of the East European and Soviet Department, FCO, May 1981-85  
**Broucher, David Stuart**, East European and Soviet Department, FCO, 1978-83  
**Brown, Harold**, US Secretary of Defense, 1977-80  
**Brzezinski, Zbigniew**, US National Security Advisor, 1977-81  
**Buckley, James**, US Under-Secretary of State for International Security, 1981-82  
**Bullard, Julian (later Sir)**, DUS Europe, 1979-82; Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary and Political Director, FCO, 1982-84  
**Burges Watson, Richard**, Head of the Trade Relations and Export Department, FCO, 1978-81  
**Burns, Robert Andrew**, Private Secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretary, 1979-82

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

- Burt, Richard**, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, US State Department, 1981-83
- Burton, Michael**, Head of the South Asia Department, FCO, 1981-84
- Butler, Sir Michael**, UK Permanent Representative to the EC, Brussels, 1979-85
- Bykov, Vladimir**, Minister-Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, London, 1978-83
- Callaghan, James**, Prime Minister, 1976-79
- Carrillo, Santiago**, General-Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, 1960-82
- Carington, Peter, 6<sup>th</sup> Baron Carington**, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1979- April 1982
- Carter, James Earl 'Jimmy'**, President of the United States, 1977-81
- Chatty, Habib**, Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, 1979-84
- Chernenko, Konstantin**, Member of the Soviet Politburo, 1976-84
- Chernenko, Mr.** Head of the Press Department, Soviet MFA
- Chevènement, Jean-Pierre**, French Minister of Research and Industry, 1981-83
- Cheysson, Claude**, French Foreign Minister, 1981-84
- Christopher, Warren**, US Deputy Secretary of State, 1977-81
- Clifford, Clark**, former US Defense Secretary and Presidential Emissary to India, 1980-81
- Coles, (Arthur) John**, Head of the South Asian Department, FCO, 1980-81;  
Prime Minister's Private Secretary for Overseas Affairs, Dec 1981-84
- Cooper, Richard**, US Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1977-81
- Coon, Jane**, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 1979-81
- Cornish, James**, Deputy Head of Planning Staff, FCO, 1979-80
- Cortazzi, Henry**, DUS, FCO, 1975-80
- Cresson, Edith**, French Minister of Agriculture, 1981-83
- de Cuellar, Javier Perez**, UN Secretary-General's Personal Representative on Afghanistan, April-Dec 1981; Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1982-92
- Czyrek, Jozef**, Polish Foreign Minister, 1980-82
- Daoud Khan, HRH Mohammad**, President of Afghanistan, 1973-78
- Dean, Lesley**, Second Secretary, British Embassy, Moscow, 1979-81
- Deaver, Michael**, White House Deputy Chief of Staff, 1981-85
- Demirel, Suleyman**, Prime Minister of Turkey, 1979-80
- Desai, Morarji**, Prime Minister of India, 1977-79
- Dobrosielski, Marian**, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister
- Dobrynin, Anatoly**, Soviet Ambassador, Washington, 1962-86
- Dole, Bob**, Republican Senator from Kansas, 1969-1996
- Dolgov, Vyacheslav**, Minister-Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, London, 1982-84
- Dost, Shah Mohammad**, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan, 1979-86
- Downing, David**, Counsellor (Scientific), British Embassy, Moscow, 1978-81
- Dubček, Alexander**, General-Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 1968-69
- Duncan, Michael John**, Counsellor, British Embassy, Moscow, 1982-83
- Eagleburger, Larry**, US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1982-84
- Falin, Valentin**, Deputy Head of the International Information Department, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1978-83
- Fall, Brian**, Head of the East European and Soviet Department, 1980-81, PPS to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, May 1981-84
- Fenn, Nicholas**, Head of the News Department, FCO, 1979-82
- Fergusson, Ewen**, AUS (Europe), FCO, 1978-82
- Follows, Sir Denis**, Chairman of the British Olympic Association, 1977-83

## *List of Persons*

**Foot, Michael**, Leader of the Opposition, 1980-83  
**Forlani, Arnaldo**, Prime Minister of Italy, 1980-81  
**François-Poncet, Jean**, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1978-81  
**Frost, Ellen**, Deputy Assistant Secretary, US Defense Department, 1977-81  
**Gailani, Sayed Ahmad**, Chairman of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, 1979-  
**Gandhi, Indira**, Prime Minister of India, 1980-84  
**Garside, Roger**, Deputy Head of Planning Staff, FCO, April 1980-81  
**Genscher, Hans-Dietrich**, Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor, FRG, 1974-92  
**Gierek, Edward**, General Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, 1970-80  
**Giles, Frank**, Editor of the *Sunday Times*, 1981-83  
**Gillmore, David**, AUS, FCO, 1981-83  
**Gillmore, Sir Ian**, Lord Privy Seal, 1979-81  
**Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry**, President of the French Republic, 1974-81  
**Glaspie, April**, US Embassy, London, 1977-81  
**Glitman, Maynard**, US Deputy Chief of Mission to NATO, 1977-81  
**Goodison, Alan**, AUS, FCO, 1981-83  
**Gordon, John**, First Secretary and Cultural Attaché, British Embassy, Moscow, 1980-82  
**Gordon Lennox, Lord Nicholas**, AUS, FCO, 1979-84  
**Gotlieb, Allan**, Under Secretary, Canadian Department of External Affairs, 1977-81; Canadian Ambassador to Washington, 1981-89  
**Graham, Sir John**, DUSS, FCO, 1980-82; UK Permanent Representative to NATO, 1982-86  
**Green, Andrew**, Economic Relations Department, FCO, 1979-82  
**Grinevsky, Oleg**, Head of the Near East Department, Soviet MFA  
**Gromyko, Andrei**, Soviet Foreign Minister, 1957-85  
**Gusarov, Viktor**, First Secretary, Second European Department, Soviet MFA, 1979-82  
**Gusaryev, Y. P.**, Interpreter, Soviet MFA  
**Gventsadze, German**, Counsellor/Interpreter, Second European Department, Soviet MFA  
**Haig, Alexander**, US Secretary of State, 1981-July 1982  
**Hailsham of St Marylebone, Lord**, Lord Chancellor, 1979-87  
**Hampson, Stuart**, PPS to Secretary of State for Trade, 1980-82  
**Hartman, Arthur**, US Ambassador, Moscow, 1981-87  
**Havers, Sir Michael**, Attorney-General, 1979-87  
**Healey, Denis**, Deputy Leader of the Opposition, 1980-83  
**Heap, Peter**, Head of the Energy, Science and Space Department, FCO, 1980-83  
**Helms, Senator Jesse**, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 1981-87  
**Henderson, Sir Nicholas**, British Ambassador, Washington, 1979-82  
**Heseltine, Michael**, Secretary of State for the Environment, 1979-83  
**Hibbert, Sir Reginald**, British Ambassador, Paris, 1979-82  
**Hillier-Fry, William Norman**, British Ambassador, Kabul, 1979-81  
**Howell, David**, Secretary of State for Energy, 1979-81  
**Howell, Michael**, Head of Chancery and Consul, British Embassy, Kabul, 1978-81  
**Hua Guofeng**, Prime Minister of China, 1976-80  
**Hulse, Christopher**, Defence Department, FCO, 1981-83  
**Humfrey, Charles**, Private Secretary to Douglas Hurd, 1979-81

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

- Hurd, Douglas**, Minister of State, FCO, 1979-83  
**Hussein, Saddam**, President of Iraq, 1979-2003  
**Ilychev, Leonid**, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, 1965-86  
**Jackson, Elizabeth**, Second Secretary, British Embassy, Moscow, 1981  
**James, Cynlais (Kenneth)**, Minister, British Embassy, Paris, 1976-81; British Ambassador, Warsaw, 1981-83  
**Jaruzelski, General Wojciech**, Prime Minister of Poland, 1981-85  
**Jay, Michael**, Private Secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 1982-85  
**Jøergensen, Anker**, Prime Minister of Denmark, 1975-82  
**Johnson, David**, East European and Soviet Department, 1978-82  
**Joseph, Sir Keith**, Secretary of State for Industry, 1979-81  
**Kádár, János**, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, 1956-88  
**Kania, Stanislaw**, General-Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, 1980-81  
**Karmal, Babrak**, Prime Minister of Afghanistan, 1979-81, President of Afghanistan, 1979-86  
**Keeble, Sir Curtis**, British Ambassador, Moscow, 1978-September 1982  
**Keline, Vladimir**, Charge d'Affairs, Soviet Embassy, London, 1978-81  
**Kennedy, Richard**, US Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Non-Proliferation Policy, 1982-93  
**Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah**, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-89  
**Kirilenko, Andrey Paulovich**, Member of the Soviet Politburo, 1957-82  
**Kirkpatrick, Jeane**, US Ambassador to the UN, 1981-85  
**Kohl, Helmut**, German Chancellor, 1982-98  
**Komplektov, Viktor**, Head of US Department, Soviet MFA, 1979-82  
**Kornienko, Georgi**, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, 1977-85  
**Kostandov, Leonid**, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, 1980-84  
**Kosygin, Aleksei**, Soviet Premier, 1964-80  
**Kovalev, Anatoly**, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, 1971-85  
**Kuzentsov, Vasily**, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 1977-85  
**Kvitsinky, Yuli**, Soviet Chief Negotiator, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1981-83  
**Kypriano, Spyros**, President of Cyprus, 1977-88  
**Lankester, Tim**, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1979-81  
**Lavers, Richard**, South Asian Department, 1977-81  
**Leusse, Bruno de**, Secretary General, French MFA, 1979-81  
**Lever, Paul**, APS to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1978-81  
**López Portillo, José**, President of Mexico, 1976-82  
**Louis Jr., John J.**, US Ambassador, London, 1981-82  
**Lucas, The Hon Ivor**, British Ambassador, Muscat, 1979-81  
**Luce, Richard**, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1979-81; Minister of State, FCO, 1981-82  
**Lunkov, Nikolai**, Soviet Ambassador, London, 1973-80  
**Lyne, Roderic**, APS to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1979-82

*List of Persons*

- Macgregor, John**, Private Secretary to Lord Trefgarne and Malcolm Rifkind, 1981-83
- McLennan, Gordon**, General-Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1976-89
- Maitland, Sir Donald**, Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 1979-80
- Makarov, Visily**, Principal Private Secretary to Mr Gromyko
- Malfatti, Francesco**, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1979-80
- Mallaby, Christopher**, Head of the East European and Soviet Department, 1979-80; Head of Planning Staff, Sept 1980-82
- Maltsev, Viktor**, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, 1978-86
- Manning, David**, East European and Soviet Department, FCO, 1980-83
- Marcos, Imelda**, First Lady of the Philippines, 1965-86
- Mazur, Yuri**, First Secretary, Second European Department, Soviet MFA
- Mengistu, Haile Mariam**, Head of State/President of Ethiopia, 1977-91
- Messe, Edwin**, Counsellor to President Reagan and NSC member, 1981-85
- Miers, Henry**, Head of the Middle East Department, FCO, 1979-83
- Miles, Richard**, Head of the Near East and North Africa Desk, FCO, 1980-84
- Mitterrand, Francois**, President of the French Republic, 1981-85
- Mladenov, Petar**, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, 1971-89
- Moberly, John Campbell**, AUS, FCO, 1979-82
- Moi, Daniel arap**, President of Kenya, 1978-2002
- Mondale, Walter**, US Vice-President, 1977-81
- Monro, Hector**, Minister for Sport, 1979-81
- Montgomery, Alan**, East European and Soviet Department, 1981-82
- Morgan, John**, Head of the Cultural Relations Department, FCO, 1972-80
- Morris, Robert**, Minister for Economic Affairs, US Embassy, London, 1978-81
- Munro, Colin**, Private Secretary to Minister of State, FCO, 1979-81
- Murray, Donald**, AUS, FCO, 1977-80
- Murrell, Geoffrey**, Research Department, Soviet Section, FCO, 1978-83
- Muskie, Edmund**, US Secretary of State, 1980-81
- Needham, Geoffrey**, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for the Environment
- Norbury, Brian**, PPS to the Secretary of State for Defence, 1979-81
- Nott, John**, Secretary of State for Defence, 1981-83
- Nudel, Ida**, Soviet human rights activist
- Orlov, Yuri**, Soviet nuclear physicist, dissident and a human rights activist
- Osborn, John**, Conservative MP for Sheffield Hallam, 1959-87
- Owen, Dr David**, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1977-79
- Pakenham, The Hon Michael**, First Secretary, British Embassy, Washington, 1978-83
- Palliser, Sir Michael**, Permanent Under-Secretary, FCO, 1975-82
- Palme, Olof**, Prime Minister of Sweden 1969-76, 1982-86; UN Special Emissary for Iran and Iraq, 1980-82
- Panjshiri, Ghulam**, Minister of Public Works, Afghanistan, 1978-79
- Papandreou, Andreas**, Prime Minister of Greece, 1981-89
- Parkinson, Cecil**, Minister for Trade, Department of Trade, 1979-81
- Parsons, Sir Anthony**, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, 1979-82
- Patolichev, Nikolai**, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister, 1958-85

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

- Pavlovsky, Ivan**, Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces  
**Percy, Charles**, US Senator and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 1981-85  
**Petrovsky, Vladimir**, Director of the International Organisations Department, Soviet MFA, 1979-86  
**Pham Van Dong**, Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1976-87  
**Pincher, Chapman**, journalist and author  
**Pompidou, Georges**, President of the French Republic, 1969-74  
**Ponomarev, Boris**, Head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, 1955-86  
**Popov, Viktor**, Soviet Ambassador, London, 1980-86  
**Posilyagin, Nikolai**, Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, London, 1982-84  
**Puja, Frigyes**, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1973-83  
**Puzanov, Aleksandr**, Soviet Ambassador, Kabul, 1972-79  
**Pym, Francis**, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, April 1982-83  
**Qaboos, bin Said al Said**, Sultan of Oman, 1970-  
**Qadhafi, Colonel Muamarr**, Leader of Libya, 1969-2011  
**Qotbzadeh, Sadegh**, Iranian Foreign Minister, 1979-80  
**Rakowski, Mieczyslaw**, Polish Deputy Prime Minister, 1981-88  
**Reagan, Ronald**, President of the United States, 1981-89  
**Renwick, Robin**, Counsellor and Head of Chancery, British Embassy, Washington, 1981-84  
**Rifkind, Malcolm**, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1982-83; Minister of State, FCO, 1983-86  
**Rose, Sir Clive**, UK Permanent Representative to NATO, 1979-82  
**Ruhfus, Dr Jurgen**, FRG Ambassador, London, 1980-85  
**Ryzhov, Nikita**, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, 1980-86  
**Sadat, Anwar Al**, President of Egypt, 1970-81  
**Sakharov, Andrei**, Soviet nuclear physicist and human rights activist  
**dos Santos, José Eduardo**, President of Angola, 1979-  
**Schmidt, Helmut**, German Chancellor, 1974-82  
**Semeonov, Viacheslav**, Deputy Head of the Second European Department, Soviet MFA  
**Sharansky, Anatoly**, Soviet-Israeli human rights activist  
**Sheinwald, Nigel**, East European and Soviet Department, FCO, 1979-83  
**Shultz, George**, US Secretary of State, July 1982-89  
**Shvedov, Aleksei**, Head of the First African Department, Soviet MFA  
**Shahi, Agha**, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, 1978-82  
**Sissons, Peter**, television journalist  
**Smith, Sir Howard**, British Ambassador, Moscow, 1976-78  
**Smith, Roland**, East European and Soviet Department, FCO, 1982-83  
**Soames, Lord**, Governor of Southern Rhodesia, 1979-80; Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords, 1979-81  
**Solomentsev, Mikhail**, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR, 1971-83  
**Stirn, Olivier**, Minister of State, French MFA, 1978-81  
**Strathcona, Lord**, Defence Minister, 1979-81  
**Sukhodrev, Viktor**, Interpreter, Second European Department, Soviet MFA

### *List of Persons*

- Suslov, Mikhail**, member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CPSU, Head of Ideology, 1947-82
- Suslov, Vladimir**, Head of the Second European Department, Soviet MFA
- Sutherland, Sir Iain**, British Ambassador, Moscow, September 1982-1985
- Tabeyev, Fikryat**, Soviet Ambassador, Kabul, 1979-86
- Taraki, Nur Muhammad**, President of Afghanistan, April-Sept 1979
- Taylor, Sir John**, British Ambassador, Bonn, 1981-84
- Thatcher, Margaret**, Prime Minister, 1979-90
- Thomas, Derek**, Minister, British Embassy, Washington, 1979-84
- Thomson, Adam**, Third Secretary, British Embassy, Moscow, 1981-83
- Thomson, Sir John**, High Commissioner, New Delhi, 1977-82; UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1982-87
- Tikhonov, Nikolai**, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 1980-85
- Tito, Josip Broz**, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1953-80
- Tolubko, Vladimir**, Soviet Deputy Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, 1972-84
- Trefgarne, Lord**, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1981-82
- Troyanovsky, Oleg**, Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1977-86
- Trudeau, Pierre**, Prime Minister of Canada, 1968-79, 1980-84
- Uspensky, N**, Second Secretary/Interpreter, Soviet Embassy, London, 1977-82
- Ustinov, Dimitriy**, Soviet Defence Minister, 1976-84
- Vance, Cyrus**, US Secretary of State, 1977-80
- Van Well, Günther**, State Secretary, FRG MFA, 1977-81
- Vest, George**, US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1977-81
- Vile, Martin**, Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong, 1979-80
- Walden, George**, PPS to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1978-82; Head of Planning Staff, July 1982-83
- Waldheim, Dr Kurt**, UN Secretary-General, 1972-82
- Walker, Peter**, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1979-83
- Warnke, Paul**, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977-78
- Watson Jr., Thomas**, US Ambassador, Moscow, 1979-81
- Watt, David**, journalist, *The Times*
- Weinberger, Casper**, US Defense Secretary, 1981-87
- Weston, P. John**, Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington, 1978-81; Head of the Defence Department, FCO, 1981-84
- White, William**, Head of the South Asian Department, FCO, 1978-1980
- Whitelaw, William**, Home Secretary, 1979-83
- Whitmore, Clive**, PPS to the Prime Minister, 1979-82
- Wilkinson, Richard Denys**, Planning Staff, 1980-83
- Wilson, Sir Harold**, Prime Minister, 1964-70, 1974-76
- Wilson, William**, Labour MP for Coventry South, 1964-83
- Wright, David**, Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong, 1980-82
- Wright, Patrick**, DUSS, FCO, 1982-84
- Wright, Sir Oliver**, British Ambassador, Bonn, 1975-81
- Wood, Andrew**, Counsellor and Head of Chancery, British Embassy, Moscow, 1979-82
- Wordsworth, Stephen**, Second Secretary, British Embassy, Moscow, 1979-81

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

**Zagladin, Vadim**, First Deputy Secretary of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1964-88

**Zamyatin, Leonid**, Chairman of the International Information Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1978-86

**Zemskov, Igor**, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, 1973-82

**Zhivkov, Todor**, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 1954-89

**Zorin, Valerian**, Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU

**Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad**, President of Pakistan, 1978-88

# DOCUMENT SUMMARIES

## CHAPTER I

7 December 1979 – 23 November 1981

|    | NAME  | DATE        | MAIN SUBJECT  | PAGE |
|----|---|-------------|---|------|
|    |   | <b>1979</b> |   |      |
| 1  | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                      | 7 Dec       | 'British policy in East-West Relations.'  | 1    |
| 2  | MR MALLABY<br>EESD<br>FCO                       | 21 Dec      | Minute to Mr Braithwaite: 'The Prevention of Soviet Expansion in the Developing World.'   | 6    |
| 3  | MR HILLIER-FRY<br>Kabul<br>Tel. No. 284         | 27 Dec      | Reports on Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and speculation that President Amin has been overthrown.                               | 7    |
| 4  | MR LANKESTER<br>10 Downing Street               | 28 Dec      | Letter to Mr Lever detailing a telephone conversation between President Carter and Mrs Thatcher concerning developments in Afghanistan.       | 8    |
| 5  | SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 4394 | 29 Dec      | Reports on proposals for Mr Christopher to visit Europe to discuss with allies the Western response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.        | 9    |
| 6  | SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 4395 | 29 Dec      | Details meeting at State Department and conveys US assessment of events in Afghanistan.   | 10   |
| 7  | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 800      | 29 Dec      | Conveys message from Mrs Thatcher to President Brezhnev concerning Afghanistan.   | 13   |
| 8  | SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 4401 | 29 Dec      | Details meeting with Mr Brzezinski concerning President Carter's message to President Brezhnev and Mr Christopher's visit to Europe.          | 14   |
| 9  | FOREIGN &<br>COMMONWEALTH<br>OFFICE             | 29 Dec      | Extract from briefing paper for a meeting with Mr Christopher and others on 31 Dec.   | 15   |
| 10 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 872         | 30 Dec      | Assesses the situation in Afghanistan as seen from Moscow.  | 17   |
| 11 | RECORD OF MEETING<br>FCO                        | 31 Dec      | Discussion between UK, US, FRG, Canada, France and Italy concerning future policy and next steps in response to Soviet action in Afghanistan. | 19   |

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

|    | NAME  | DATE        | MAIN SUBJECT  | PAGE |
|----|---|-------------|---|------|
| 12 | MR BLAKER AND<br>MR BREMENT<br>FCO                          | 31 Dec      | Record of a conversation concerning the prospect for insurgency in Afghanistan, the Muslim dimension for propaganda and the renewal of Western credit subsidies.          | 28   |
| 13 | MR HURD<br>FCO  | 31 Dec      | Minute to Lord Carrington expressing disappointment at the outcome of the six-power meeting (No. 11).   | 30   |
|    |   | <b>1980</b> |   |      |
| 14 | SIR C. ROSE<br>UKDEL NATO,<br>Brussels<br>Tel. No. 2        | 1 Jan       | Reports NAC meeting with Mr Christopher and possible actions to be taken by the Alliance in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.                               | 31   |
| 15 | TO MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street<br>PM/80/1             | 2 Jan       | Minute from Lord Carrington reporting developments over the holiday period and possible next steps, including a visit to region by the Secretary of State.                | 33   |
| 16 | MR HURD AND<br>MR BREWSTER<br>FCO                           | 3 Jan       | Record of a meeting at which the US Ambassador supplied the UK with a list of US actions.   | 34   |
| 17 | MRS THATCHER AND<br>MR LUNKOV<br>10 Downing Street          | 3 Jan       | Record of a meeting in which the Soviet Ambassador delivered a message from President Brezhnev stating Soviet action in Afghanistan due to 'acts of external aggression'. | 35   |
| 18 | TO HM<br>REPRESENTATIVES<br>OVERSEAS<br>Guidance Tel. No. 2 | 3 Jan       | Contains text of Mrs Thatcher's message to President Brezhnev and additional points concerning Soviet intervention.   | 39   |
| 19 | TO SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 17            | 3 Jan       | Reports the measures HMG is willing to take in response to US Ambassador's démarche (No. 16).   | 41   |
| 20 | MR HILLIER-FRY<br>Kabul<br>Tel. No. 12                      | 5 Jan       | Details discussions with Soviet Ambassador in Kabul.  | 44   |
| 21 | MR HILLIER-FRY<br>Kabul                                     | 5 Jan       | Details the origins and execution of the Soviet occupation, the formation of a new government and further developments.   | 45   |
| 22 | SIR C. ROSE<br>UKDEL NATO,<br>Brussels<br>Tel. No. 11       | 7 Jan       | Reports outcome of Senior Political Committee meeting on Afghanistan.   | 49   |
| 23 | MR MALLABY<br>EESD<br>FCO                                   | 7 Jan       | Minute to Mr White covering a note entitled 'Why did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan?'  | 51   |

*Document Summaries*

|    | NAME  | DATE   | MAIN SUBJECT   | PAGE |
|----|---|--------|--|------|
| 24 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                             | 7 Jan  | Annual Review for 1979.  | 53   |
| 25 | MR MALLABY<br>FCO                                   | 7 Jan  | Submission to Mr Fergusson outlining possible measures to be taken against Soviet Union.   | 58   |
| 26 | MR ALEXANDER<br>10 Downing Street                   | 8 Jan  | Letter to Mr Lyne conveying Mrs Thatcher's view on participation in the Olympic Games.   | 59   |
| 27 | TO MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street<br>PM/80/4     | 8 Jan  | Minute from Lord Carrington urging stronger action by HMG in the economic field in response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.   | 59   |
| 28 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                             | 9 Jan  | Letter to Mr Fergusson discussing Soviet motives in Afghanistan. Suggests that the invasion could mark substantial reassessment of Soviet policy.                              | 61   |
| 29 | SIR C. ROSE<br>UKDEL NATO,<br>Brussels Tel. No. 20  | 9 Jan  | Reports that allied consultations have been made more difficult as the US has already announced measures; France, Germany, Italy so far reluctant.                             | 64   |
| 30 | MR WESTON<br>Washington                             | 10 Jan | Letter to Mr Mallaby discussing the prospects for US-Soviet relations.   | 66   |
| 31 | TO MR LUCAS<br>Muscat<br>Tel. No. 99                | 11 Jan | Reports current activity on Afghanistan in the UN, NATO, EU and the press.   | 69   |
| 32 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 30              | 11 Jan | Suggests this is not the time for anti-Soviet crusade as such, but contends that wedges could be driven between Russia and Eastern European states.                            | 71   |
| 33 | MR MURRELL<br>Research Department<br>FCO            | 11 Jan | Minute to Mr Mallaby considering implications for Soviet foreign policy, and the Soviet attitude to détente, of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Western reaction to it. | 72   |
| 34 | TO SIR A. PARSONS<br>UKMIS, New York<br>Tel. No. 46 | 11 Jan | Relays text of proposed Parliamentary statement on Afghanistan.  | 75   |
| 35 | MR ALEXANDER<br>10 Downing Street                   | 14 Jan | Letter to Mr Lyne reporting a meeting between Warren Christopher and Mrs Thatcher at which text of a message from President Carter was conveyed.                               | 77   |
| 36 | MR HURD AND<br>MR CHRISTOPHER<br>FCO                | 14 Jan | Record of meeting covering Western responses to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  | 79   |

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

|    | NAME  | DATE              | MAIN SUBJECT   | PAGE |
|----|---|-------------------|--|------|
| 37 | PLANNING STAFF<br>FCO   | 15 Jan            | Draft paper outlining Soviet threat to Iran, Yugoslavia and other neighbours.  | 83   |
| 38 | SIR C. ROSE<br>UKDEL NATO,<br>Brussels Tel. No. 39                      | 16 Jan            | Reports first NATO Council meeting on implications of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the gap between US and European reactions.  | 87   |
| 39 | MR HESELTINE<br>Department of the<br>Environment                        | 16 Jan            | Letter to Lord Carrington regarding a potential boycott of the Olympic Games.  | 88   |
| 40 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow   | 16 Jan            | Letter to Mr Mallaby suggesting that Soviet invasion offers the West an outstanding opportunity to develop a global policy which exposes the 'basic fallacy' in the Soviet concept of détente. | 89   |
| 41 | TO MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street<br>PM/80/5                         | 19 Jan            | Minute from Lord Carrington detailing the outcome of his visit to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Pakistan and India. Contains an enclosure on possible Olympic boycott.                           | 92   |
| 42 | CABINET DEFENCE AND<br>OVERSEA POLICY<br>COMMITTEE<br>OD(80)1st Meeting | 22 Jan            | Topics under discussion include the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and possible responses, including a boycott of the Olympic Games.   | 96   |
| 43 | MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street                                       | 26 Jan            | Letter to President Carter on measures to be taken against the Soviet Union.   | 98   |
| 44 | PLANNING STAFF<br>FCO   | 28 Jan            | Note entitled 'Action on Afghanistan' suggesting support for patriots inside Afghanistan and organisations in exile, with Treaty of Neutrality guaranteed by all states in region.             | 100  |
| 45 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 94                                  | 30 Jan            | Reports on meeting with Mr Zemskov covering Soviet relations with the US.  | 102  |
| 46 | MR MALLABY, MR<br>FERGUSON AND MR<br>BULLARD<br>FCO                     | 30 Jan - 5<br>Feb | Minutes on the development of dissent in the USSR.   | 104  |
| 47 | EAST EUROPEAN AND<br>SOVIET DEPARTMENT<br>FCO                           | 31 Jan            | 'Soviet Foreign Policy after Afghanistan.'   | 106  |
| 48 | MR MALLABY<br>EESD<br>FCO   | 1 Feb             | Minute to Mr Fergusson discussing possible Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa post-Afghanistan and the need to plan against further Soviet expansion.   | 109  |

*Document Summaries*

|    | NAME   | DATE   | MAIN SUBJECT   | PAGE |
|----|--|--------|--|------|
| 49 | TO MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street<br>PM/80/8              | 1 Feb  | Minute from Lord Carrington detailing measures agreed at OD and how these actions can be put into place.   | 111  |
| 50 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                                      | 8 Feb  | 'The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.'   | 113  |
| 51 | SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 696               | 13 Feb | Reports on the possibility of a four power meeting on Afghanistan.   | 118  |
| 52 | SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 749               | 16 Feb | Discusses relations between Western Europe and USA post-Afghanistan.   | 119  |
| 53 | RECORD OF MEETING<br>10 Downing Street                       | 22 Feb | Mrs Thatcher, Mr Vance and Lord Carrington discuss a possible Olympic boycott.   | 121  |
| 54 | TO HM<br>REPRESENTATIVES<br>OVERSEAS<br>Guidance Tel. No. 20 | 22 Feb | Details EC proposals for a neutral Afghanistan 'to demonstrate that the Soviet Union's professed fears of western intervention in Afghanistan are groundless'.   | 122  |
| 55 | MRS THATCHER AND<br>CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT                       | 25 Feb | Record of a discussion on the international situation in the wake of Afghanistan.  | 123  |
| 56 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                                      | 27 Feb | Letter to Mr Fergusson discussing how future Soviet policy might develop.  | 128  |
| 57 | MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street                            | 3 Mar  | Letter to President Carter covering Afghan neutrality as a way of allowing the Soviets to withdraw; the necessity of improving Western defensive capability; increasing aid to Pakistan and Turkey; review of defence policy outside NATO. | 131  |
| 58 | PRESIDENT CARTER<br>Washington                               | 17 Mar | Letter to Mrs Thatcher discussing position in Southwest Asia, Pakistan & Turkey and suggesting allied efforts to restrict high technology transfers.   | 133  |
| 59 | TO SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington                            | 24 Mar | Letter from Sir D. Maitland enclosing a Planning Staff note on the Afghan neutrality proposal.   | 135  |
| 60 | SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington                               | 3 Apr  | Letter to Sir D. Maitland summarising the Western response to Afghanistan.   | 137  |
| 61 | MR JOHNSON<br>EESD<br>FCO                                    | 15 Apr | Minute to Mr Mallaby: 'An alternative view of Soviet foreign policy after Afghanistan.'  | 141  |
| 62 | LORD CARRINGTON AND<br>MR GROMYKO<br>Vienna                  | 17 May | Record of a discussion of a proposal for Afghan neutrality.  | 143  |

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

|    | NAME   | DATE    | MAIN SUBJECT  | PAGE |
|----|--|---------|---|------|
| 63 | MR MALLABY<br>EESD<br>FCO  | 19 May  | Minute to Mr Bullard on the prospect of the Soviets entering into negotiations on Afghanistan.  | 147  |
| 64 | MR MALLABY<br>EESD<br>FCO  | 20 May  | Minute to Mr Braithwaite recording a meeting between Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington on East-West relations and a future paper for OD.   | 149  |
| 65 | LORD CARRINGTON<br>OD(80)43<br>FCO                                       | 2 June  | Memorandum to OD on the 'Management of East-West Relations', and enclosing a Planning Staff Paper on the same subject.  | 150  |
| 66 | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 342                               | 3 June  | Conveys speaking notes for possible meeting with Mr Zemskov on a political settlement in Afghanistan.   | 157  |
| 67 | CABINET DEFENCE AND<br>OVERSEA POLICY<br>COMMITTEE<br>OD(80)15th Meeting | 5 June  | Management of East-West relations: agreement to carry forward recommendations in <a href="#">No. 65</a> .   | 159  |
| 68 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 402                                  | 11 June | Reports meeting with Mr Zemskov on possibility of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.   | 162  |
| 69 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow  | 17 June | Letter to Mr Bullard contending that Soviet troops will remain in Afghanistan for several years and that HMG must prepare policy for long-term management of East-West tension. | 163  |
| 70 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow  | 25 June | Letter to Mr Bullard discussing reports of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan.   | 165  |
| 71 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 457                                  | 2 July  | Reports meeting with Mr Zemskov on Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.  | 167  |
| 72 | EAST EUROPEAN AND<br>SOVIET DEPARTMENT<br>FCO                            | 15 July | Memorandum entitled: 'UK Policy in East-West Relations'.  | 168  |
| 73 | TO MR BROOKE<br>TURNER<br>Moscow   | 21 July | Letter from Mr Fergusson reflecting on East-West policy after Afghanistan.  | 173  |
| 74 | EAST EUROPEAN AND<br>SOVIET DEPARTMENT<br>FCO                            | 28 July | 'Warnings, Actions and Threats to deter Soviet Moves'.  | 177  |
| 75 | MR WOOD<br>Moscow  | 3 Sept  | Letter to Mr Johnson giving the current position of KGB activity against dissidents.  | 181  |

*Document Summaries*

|    | NAME   | DATE        | MAIN SUBJECT  | PAGE |
|----|--|-------------|---|------|
| 76 | TO HM<br>REPRESENTATIVES<br>OVERSEAS<br>Guidance Tel. No. 95 | 8 Sept      | Provides guidance on contacts with Soviet officials; some to be re-established 'without a wholesale return to business as usual'.   | 182  |
| 77 | SIR A. PARSONS<br>UKMIS, New York<br>Tel. No. 1341           | 24 Sept     | Reports Lord Carrington's talks with Mr Gromyko at the UN.  | 185  |
| 78 | MR GARSIDE<br>Planning Staff<br>FCO                          | 12 Nov      | Minute to Mr Mallaby reviewing policy towards Afghanistan and enclosing note by Mr Coles.   | 186  |
| 79 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                                      | 13 Nov      | Memorandum for Heads of Mission Conference analysing Soviet policy towards the West.  | 190  |
| 80 | RECORD OF MEETING<br>FCO                                     | 19 Nov      | Heads of Mission Conference discusses relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.   | 193  |
|    |  | <b>1981</b> |   |      |
| 81 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                                      | 7 Jan       | Annual Review for 1980.   | 195  |
| 82 | LORD CARRINGTON AND<br>MR POPOV<br>FCO                       | 21 Jan      | Record of introductory call by the new Soviet Ambassador.   | 199  |
| 83 | TO MR ALEXANDER<br>10 Downing Street                         | 30 Jan      | Letter from Mr Walden concerning relations with the Soviet Union and arguing that a new Cultural Agreement should be agreed as it works to advantage of UK in the battle of ideas.                      | 201  |
| 84 | TO HM<br>REPRESENTATIVES<br>OVERSEAS<br>Guidance Tel. No. 15 | 3 Feb       | Refers to press comment concerning recent trade talks with the Soviet Union and renewal of Cultural Agreement.  | 202  |
| 85 | SIR J. GRAHAM<br>FCO   | 12 Feb      | Minute to Mr Humfrey advocating a new approach to Afghanistan, adopting French proposal for conference of neighbours and other concerned governments, but excluding the Afghanis.                       | 204  |
| 86 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                                      | 5 Mar       | Reports President Brezhnev's speech of 23 Feb to the 26 <sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party in which he announced a moratorium on development in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles. | 207  |
| 87 | MR ALEXANDER<br>10 Downing Street                            | 9 Mar       | Letter to Mr Walden reporting meeting between Mrs Thatcher and Ambassador Popov, and enclosing message from President Brezhnev proposing arms control measures.   | 212  |

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

|     | NAME   | DATE   | MAIN SUBJECT   | PAGE |
|-----|--|--------|--|------|
| 88  | TO MR ALEXANDER<br>10 Downing Street             | 16 Mar | Letter from Mr Walden proposing that Lord Carrington visit Moscow for meeting with Gromyko.  | 218  |
| 89  | SIR C. KEEBLE AND<br>MR GROMYKO<br>Moscow        | 18 Mar | Record of a discussion covering the arms control moratorium and Afghanistan.   | 219  |
| 90  | MR BULLARD AND<br>MR KORNIENKO<br>Moscow         | 27 Mar | Record of a discussion covering East-West relations, the new US administration, Africa (Angola/Ethiopia), Poland and arms control.   | 224  |
| 91  | MR BULLARD<br>FCO                                | 28 Mar | Minute to Mr Burns reporting on his visit to Moscow: 'I got more out of this than I expected'.   | 230  |
| 92  | MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street<br>T 59/81     | 3 Apr  | Letter to President Brezhnev covering Afghanistan, arms control and Poland.  | 232  |
| 93  | MR BULLARD AND<br>MR POPOV<br>FCO                | 9 Apr  | Mr Bullard conveys HMG's concern over Warsaw Pact troop manoeuvres and possible military intervention in Poland.   | 233  |
| 94  | SOVIET NOTE                                      | 23 Apr | Translation of text delivered to Lord Carrington at Northolt airport by Mr Popov stating that Soviet Union was prepared to halt implementation of its current plans for modernisation of medium range nuclear weapons in Europe. | 235  |
| 95  | TO SIR J. TAYLOR<br>Bonn<br>Tel. No. 164         | 23 Apr | Analysis of Soviet Note (No. 94).  | 238  |
| 96  | TO MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street<br>PM/81/28 | 20 May | Minute from Lord Carrington proposing to stimulate fresh diplomatic activity on Afghanistan with a two-stage conference.   | 240  |
| 97  | SIR M. PALLISER<br>FCO                           | 29 May | Minute to Mr Walden reporting a meeting with Mr Suslov regarding the Popov message (No. 94).   | 241  |
| 98  | MR BROOMFIELD<br>EESD<br>FCO                     | 2 June | Submission to Mr Fergusson setting out advantages of Lord Carrington's proposed visit to Moscow; linkage to Afghan initiative and UK Presidency of the EEC.  | 242  |
| 99  | MR BISHOP<br>Research Department<br>FCO          | 8 June | Minute to Mr Johnson analysing the Soviet desire for dialogue and the Popov message (No. 94).  | 244  |
| 100 | TO MR ALEXANDER<br>10 Downing Street             | 9 June | Letter from Mr Lyne reporting arrangements for proposed international conference on Afghanistan.   | 245  |

*Document Summaries*

|     | NAME  | DATE    | MAIN SUBJECT  | PAGE |
|-----|---|---------|---|------|
| 101 | MR BROOMFIELD<br>EESD<br>FCO                        | 11 June | Submission to Mr Fergusson on steps that Sir C. Keeble should take to further Lord Carrington's proposed visit to Moscow.                             | 246  |
| 102 | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 365          | 15 June | Instructions concerning Lord Carrington's forthcoming visit to Moscow.  | 248  |
| 103 | TO HM<br>REPRESENTATIVES<br>OVERSEAS<br>Tel. No. 81 | 24 June | Contains text (adopted by European Council) of agreed initiative on Afghanistan for an international conference and two stage solution.               | 250  |
| 104 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 373             | 25 June | Reports on a meeting with Mr Kornienko. Mr Gromyko agrees to meeting with Lord Carrington on the Afghan initiative.                                   | 251  |
| 105 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                             | 25 June | Letter to Lord Carrington outlining the current state of Soviet foreign policy.   | 252  |
| 106 | LORD HAILSHAM AND<br>MR POPOV<br>FCO                | 30 June | Record of a meeting discussing a message from the Supreme Soviet, Israel's bombing of Iraqi nuclear reactor and forthcoming visit of Lord Carrington. | 255  |
| 107 | LORD CARRINGTON AND<br>MR GROMYKO<br>Moscow         | 6 July  | Record of a discussion on the international Afghan initiative.  | 257  |
| 108 | LORD CARRINGTON AND<br>MR GROMYKO<br>Moscow         | 6 July  | Record of a discussion covering TNF, CSCE, the Middle East and Poland.  | 262  |
| 109 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                             | 16 July | Letter to Mr Broomfield outlining next steps to keep the Afghan proposal alive following Lord Carrington's visit.                                     | 268  |
| 110 | TO HM<br>REPRESENTATIVES<br>OVERSEAS<br>Tel. No. 95 | 21 July | Encourages Posts to build support for the EU initiative prior to the forthcoming UNGA meeting.  | 270  |
| 111 | SIR A. PARSONS<br>UKMIS New York<br>Tel. No. 895    | 23 Sept | Reports Lord Carrington's meeting with Mr Gromyko at Soviet Mission in New York on US/Soviet relations.   | 272  |
| 112 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                             | 29 Sept | Letter to Lord Carrington enclosing a memorandum by Mr Wood: 'The Soviet Union: Will it Change?'  | 273  |
| 113 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 657             | 27 Oct  | Reports discussions with Mr Gromyko on Afghanistan, East-West relations, CSCE, Poland, Southern Africa, the Middle East and bilateral affairs.        | 279  |

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

|     | NAME                                  | DATE   | MAIN SUBJECT   | PAGE |
|-----|---------------------------------------|--------|--|------|
| 114 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow               | 28 Oct | Letter to Mr Broomfield commenting further on No. 113.   | 284  |
| 115 | MR BROOKE TURNER<br>Moscow            | 12 Nov | Letter to Mr Broomfield conveying his impressions of the ageing Soviet leadership.             | 285  |
| 116 | LORD TREFGARNE AND<br>MR POPOV<br>FCO | 23 Nov | Record of a discussion covering TNF deployment, trade, CSCE and Afghanistan.                   | 287  |
| 117 | MR GORDON<br>FCO                      | 1 Dec  | Summary of his paper for Mr Broomfield on British cultural and information policy in the USSR. | 290  |

CHAPTER II

17 December 1981 – 9 December 1982

|     |  |             |   |     |
|-----|--|-------------|---|-----|
| 118 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                          | 17 Dec      | Letter to Mr Fergusson reporting declaration of Martial Law in Poland and speculating on the extent of Soviet involvement.  | 293 |
| 119 | MR DUNCAN<br>Moscow                              | 17 Dec      | Letter to Mr Roland giving the current position on dissidents.  | 295 |
|     |  | <b>1982</b> |   |     |
| 120 | SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 3     | 2 Jan       | Reports on US measures taken against the Soviet Union and the expectation from Washington of action by the European allies.   | 297 |
| 121 | EAST EUROPEAN &<br>SOVIET DEPARTMENT<br>FCO      | 2 Jan       | Brief for Lord Carrington for an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels covering relations with the Soviet Union following events in Poland.   | 299 |
| 122 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                          | 7 Jan       | Annual Review for 1981.   | 300 |
| 123 | MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street                | 8 Jan       | Letter to President Reagan expressing support for concerted action by the Europeans but concerned that focus should remain on Soviet failures and not on differences between Alliance partners. | 302 |
| 124 | TO SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 59 | 18 Jan      | Expresses concern over US interference with existing European contracts for the Siberian gas pipeline.  | 303 |
| 125 | MR GOODISON<br>FCO                               | 20 Jan      | Minute to Mr Bullard on British action against the Soviet Union.  | 304 |

*Document Summaries*

|     | NAME  | DATE   | MAIN SUBJECT   | PAGE |
|-----|---|--------|--|------|
| 126 | SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 206          | 23 Jan | Reports on US policy towards the Soviet Union and expresses concern that unless Europeans take strong action the Alliance will suffer 'significant damage'.            | 305  |
| 127 | TO SIR N. HENDERSON<br>Washington<br>Tel. No. 154       | 29 Jan | Conveys text of a letter from Mrs Thatcher to President Reagan counselling that an accommodation on existing contracts is essential to allied unity over Poland.       | 308  |
| 128 | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                              | 1 Feb  | Letter from Mr Goodison suggesting the Russians are embarrassed by a military takeover in a communist country and uncertain how to proceed.                            | 310  |
| 129 | MR HEAP<br>Energy, Science &<br>Space Department<br>FCO | 3 Feb  | Minute to Mr Adams outlining the energy and political implications arising from the West Siberian gas pipeline project.  | 313  |
| 130 | LORD TREFGARNE AND<br>MR POPOV<br>FCO                   | 5 Feb  | Record of a meeting outlining measures taken by HMG in response to the declaration of Martial Law in Poland.   | 315  |
| 131 | TO MR WOOD<br>Moscow                                    | 11 Feb | Teleletter from Mr Sheinwald reporting a meeting between Mr Broomfield and Mr Dolgov on the prospects for Anglo-Soviet relations following events in Poland.           | 317  |
| 132 | MR BULLARD<br>FCO                                       | 19 Feb | Minute to Mr Broomfield recording a meeting with Mr Dolgov.  | 318  |
| 133 | LORD TREFGARNE AND<br>MR POPOV<br>FCO                   | 22 Feb | Record of a discussion of latest Soviet initiative on arms control tabled at Vienna, and the US decision to commence production of new generation of chemical weapons. | 319  |
| 134 | MR MALLABY<br>Planning Staff<br>FCO                     | 1 Mar  | 'The Western Response to the Polish Crisis: Assessment and Prospects.'   | 320  |
| 135 | MR BROOMFIELD<br>EESD<br>FCO                            | 2 Mar  | Submission to Mr Goodison contending that a wholly negative attitude toward Anglo-Soviet relations would endanger UK's political and economic interests.               | 325  |
| 136 | MR GOODISON<br>FCO                                      | 2 Mar  | Minute to Mr Bullard supporting Mr Broomfield's contention (No. 135) that the measures HMG are taking may be misjudged by the Soviets.                                 | 327  |
| 137 | MR BULLARD<br>FCO                                       | 4 Mar  | Minute to Mr Macgregor for Lord Trefgarne, endorsing Mr Broomfield's thesis (No. 135) that Anglo-Soviet relations matter.  | 327  |

*UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-82*

|     | NAME                                       | DATE    | MAIN SUBJECT  | PAGE |
|-----|--|---------|---|------|
| 138 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                    | 4 Mar   | 'The Relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union.'  | 328  |
| 139 | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                 | 9 Mar   | Letter from Mr Broomfield replying to No. 112: 'Your despatch has been a very useful contribution to our own mind-clearing exercise before engaging in these wider issues.'                         | 334  |
| 140 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                    | 11 Mar  | 'US/Soviet Relations.'  | 337  |
| 141 | LORD TREFGARNE<br>FCO                      | 11 Mar  | Minute to Lord Carrington contending that HMG should not distance itself so far from the Russians and advocating a number of possible initiatives and a less frosty attitude to the Soviet Embassy. | 342  |
| 142 | MR WESTON<br>Defence Department<br>FCO     | 17 Mar  | Minute to Mr Gillmore analysing the announcement by President Brezhnev of a Soviet moratorium on SS-20 deployment in European USSR.   | 343  |
| 143 | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                 | 18 Mar  | Letter from Mr Broomfield in reply to No. 138. Agrees that proposed initiatives are not very striking but 'should be enough to help sustain the dialogue whose importance you rightly stress'.      | 345  |
| 144 | MR MONTGOMERY<br>EESD<br>FCO               | 8 Apr   | Briefing paper for Mr Pym on East-West relations (following the resignation of Lord Carrington).  | 346  |
| 145 | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 210 | 15 Apr  | Reports a meeting between Mr Hurd and Mr Popov covering Moscow's reaction to the Falklands crisis.  | 349  |
| 146 | MR BROOKE TURNER<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 202 | 17 Apr  | Reports the position of Soviet MFA over the Falklands dispute.  | 349  |
| 147 | MR RIFKIND AND<br>MR POPOV<br>FCO          | 21 Apr  | Record of a discussion of the Falklands dispute and bilateral relations.  | 351  |
| 148 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow<br>Tel. No. 286    | 18 May  | Reports on President Brezhnev's <i>Komsomol</i> speech covering nuclear weapons in Europe and strategic arms.   | 354  |
| 149 | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                 | 26 May  | Letter from Sir J. Bullard in reply to No. 140.   | 355  |
| 150 | TO SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                 | 24 June | Letter from Mr Broomfield assessing what Soviet youth are really like.  | 359  |
| 151 | MR MANNING<br>EESD<br>FCO                  | 2 July  | Draft paper: 'East-West Political Relations: UK Policy'.  | 361  |

*Document Summaries*

|     | NAME   | DATE    | MAIN SUBJECT   | PAGE |
|-----|--|---------|--|------|
| 152 | MR BROOMFIELD<br>EESD<br>FCO                     | 13 July | Draft paper to Sir J. Bullard arguing that HMG should restore a dialogue to put across UK views and assess Soviet thinking at first hand.  | 364  |
| 153 | MR WALDEN<br>Planning Staff<br>FCO               | 22 July | Minute to Mr Smith commenting on No. 151 and agreeing with its general line.   | 366  |
| 154 | MR BROOMFIELD<br>EESD<br>FCO                     | 26 Aug  | Submission to Sir J. Bullard arguing that HMG should re-establish political dialogue with the Soviets and encourage the Prime Minister to visit Moscow.  | 367  |
| 155 | MR THOMAS<br>Washington                          | 27 Aug  | Letter to Sir J. Bullard enclosing a paper by Mr Pakenham on 'US Policy towards the Soviet Union: Theory and Practice'.  | 369  |
| 156 | SIR J. BULLARD<br>FCO                            | 31 Aug  | Minute to Mr Macgregor welcoming the suggestion that Mrs Thatcher be encouraged to visit Moscow to meet President Brezhnev.  | 380  |
| 157 | SIR C. KEEBLE<br>Moscow                          | 8 Sept  | Valedictory despatch.  | 381  |
| 158 | TO MR THOMAS<br>Washington                       | 17 Sept | Letter from Sir J. Bullard in reply to No. 155. Complains of the 'fissiparous tendencies within the [United States] administration which make it peculiarly difficult to deal with'.                                       | 388  |
| 159 | MR BROOMFIELD<br>EESD<br>FCO                     | 22 Sept | Summary of a paper: 'British Policy in East/West Economic Relations in the 1980s'.   | 391  |
| 160 | TO MRS THATCHER<br>10 Downing Street<br>PM/82/79 | 27 Sept | Minute from Mr Pym covering a paper entitled: 'East/West Political Relations: UK Policy towards the Soviet Union', and arguing that HMG should re-establish a regular pattern of political dialogue with the Soviet Union. | 392  |
| 161 | MR THOMSON<br>UKMIS New York<br>Tel. No. 1483    | 28 Sept | Reports on Mr Pym's meeting (in New York) with Mr Gromyko covering bilateral relations, arms control, CSCE, Afghanistan and personal cases.  | 396  |
| 162 | MR BROOMFIELD<br>EESD<br>FCO                     | 4 Oct   | Briefing note on policy towards the Soviet Union for Mr Pym's meeting with Mrs Thatcher.   | 398  |
| 163 | MR BROOMFIELD<br>EESD<br>FCO                     | 6 Oct   | Minute to Mr Jay referring to <a href="#">No. 157</a> and speculating on the Soviet view of the UK.  | 399  |