THE NATURE OF THE OPERATIONS OF MODERN ARMIES

V.K. TRIANDAFILLOV

Edited and with a Foreword by
Jacob W. Kipp

THE NATURE OF THE OPERATIONS OF MODERN ARMIES

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Foreword

This edition of V.K. Triandafillov's *The Nature of the Operations of Contemporary Armies* makes accessible to Western military historians and analysts one of the most important works in the development of Soviet military theory from the inter-war period. Triandafillov's volume became both a basic work in the development of Soviet theory of operational art and a model for the method of engaging in foresight in military affairs.[1] His work is noteworthy as an early attempt to come to grips with the military-technical characteristics of modern operations as they would shape the character of future war [*budushchaia voina*]. His approach explicitly acknowledges the reality that future war will be different from past combat experience, but stresses the need to study those trends affecting the character of armed conflict to understand the evolution of military art. It is a method conducive to the examination of radical breaks or "revolutions" in military affairs.

Triandafillov's *The Nature of the Operations of Contemporary Armies* belongs to such an era in military theory. A Janus-like work, this volume, built upon the accomplishments of tsarist military theorists, conditioned by Marxist-Leninist ideology, and informed by the systematic reflections on the experience of the First World War and the Civil War, became a keystone in the development of Soviet operational art. Triandafillov was credited with making a major contribution to the theories of deep battle, successive operations, and deep operations, and to the study of "future war."[2] First published in 1929 at the very beginning of Stalin's revolution from above, the volume provides key insights into the professional military's assessment of the need for the industrialization and militarization of the Soviet economy and society in light of the then-dominant assumptions about the Soviet Union's probable opponents in a future war.

Following Triandafillov's death in an airplane crash in July 1931, the work went through three posthumous editions in 1932, 1936 and 1937. In a bibliographic guide to the most important Soviet and foreign literature on various aspects of operational art and the study of future war, which appeared in 1933, I. Ivanov

listed the volume as the basic work in four out of twelve categories relating to operational art. These included modern operational means, the conduct of operations, meeting operations, and offensive operations. Ivanov also featured Triandafillov's book as crucial to the study of three specific aspects of the conduct of operations: command and control, transport, and rear services.[3] P.I. Vakulich likewise acknowledged the debt Soviet military science owed to Triandafillov's work, calling it "most serious and original, in the full sense progressive."[4]

Triandafillov's volume exemplified the contribution of Soviet military theory's application of a scientific approach to foresight in military affairs during one of its most dynamic and innovative periods, when the military leadership struggled to absorb the changes in modern warfare which had been emerging with mechanization. Sixty years after the author's death, his method still retains its value for military analysts and theorists, especially in another era of radical changes in military art.

Over the last decade Western military historians and analysts have come to appreciate the enduring contributions of Soviet officers to the study and conduct of war at the operational level, that is, at echelons above corps and on the scale of theater-strategic campaigns. This appreciation stands in stark contrast to the situation two decades ago when the very term "operational art" (*operativnoe iskusstvo*) was dismissed in the West as mere pretention, an artificial creation imposed between tactics and strategy without content, rigor or merit.[5] Such an evaluation of operational art was, however, not surprising, because Soviet theorists and practitioners were scarcely known to Western military historians, who dismissed Soviet theory as irrelevant ideological eyewash or categorized the theorists as crude epigones of the German military theorists who conceived and put into practice blitzkrieg. Owing to the distortions imposed upon military history by Stalinism and the continuing dictates of Party-guided history, the Red Army even in the early 1960s lacked a clear appreciation of the origins of operational art.[6] As Professor James J. Schneider points out in the introduction to this volume, that situation has changed significantly over the last decade. Much more is known about the origins of operational art and its significance for modern military theory.

THE MAN

V.K. Triandafillov (1894–1931) drew upon what were the most healthy and dynamic elements among the old military intelligentsia, that is, *genshtabisty/voenspetsy*, in Soviet service, and the young Red Commanders. He was one of the first products of the Soviet system of military education. His was a generation which for a little more than a decade managed to combine pen and sword, "knowledge" (*znanie*) with "know-how" (*umenie*), to the mutual advantage of both military science and military art.[7] Like many other young officers of the Red Army, his military career was the result of war, revolution and civil war, not family tradition or youthful dreams. Born on 14 March 1894 (N.S.), to a Greek peasant family in the village of Magaratszhik, near Kars on the Turkish border, he studied at the Trans-Caucasian Pedagogical Seminary. Upon completion of the seminary, Triandafillov was conscripted into the tsarist army at the outbreak of the First World War.[8]

A conscript and combat veteran, he was selected for officer training in 1915, one of those thrust into command by the heavy losses inflicted upon the tsarist army in the first year of the war. Upon commissioning Triandafillov returned to the front and rose to the rank of Staff Captain, commanding a battalion on the Southwestern Front. As a soldier-revolutionary he was popular enough with his fellow soldiers in the turbulent days of 1917 to be elected to command the 7th Army. Like many other soldiers, Triandafillov was radicalized by the revolutionary events of 1917 and joined the SRs. By the October Revolution he was a Left SR supporting the seizure of power by the soviets in the name of bread, land and peace. Both Kerensky's Provisional Government and that of Petlura in the Ukraine condemned him for this radicalism.[9]

When the Left SRs broke with the Bolsheviks over peace with Germany Triandafillov supported Lenin and Soviet Power. At the outbreak of the Civil War he joined the Red Army as a military specialist (*voenspets*), and thereafter commanded a company, battalion, regiment and brigade. He fought on the Ural Front against Dutov and on the South Front against Denikin. Joining the Communist Party in 1919, he was a natural choice for education as a Red *genshtabist* posted to the Military Academy of the RKKA in the same year.[10] He graduated with honors in 1923.

This extended tenure at the Academy was a result of the Soviet government's decision out of necessity to combine formal education with practical experience. From 1919–23 Triandafillov, like many of his fellow students, combined classroom study with short-term, staff assignments and tactical command on the various fronts of the Civil War. This gave him a solid basis for various professional studies of the most important operations of the Civil War.[11]

As General-Major A.A. Svechin, one of the Academy's most eminent professors, noted, these students were soldier-revolutionaries and not traditional student-officers. Young men, just arriving from the fronts of a bloody and bitter civil war, were already hardened veterans, having seen combat in the First World War as well as the Civil War. Full of enthusiasm for a cause but distrustful of professors from the tsarist Nikolaevsky Academy of the General Staff, who were suspected of being "class enemies," they refused to be intimidated by classical authorities or to accept the "school" solutions. Their test of instruction was its relevance to their own practical experience in the field. Svechin could see in the face of each man "... an idea which is blasphemous to the temple of science, that is, to bring in something of his own – to criticize thoroughly the ideas presented to them. Their enthusiasm merged with a scorn for the old forms of military science."[12] These extraordinary circumstances created a unique climate for the serious study of military art. Vigorous debate and sharp polemics were the order of the day.

General A.I. Verkhovsky (1886–1938), Professor of Tactics at the Military Academy and former Minister of War of the Provisional Government, saw the *voenspets*-professors, like himself, as military "realists," engaged in "a war on two fronts." The realists had to contend with conservatives, who wanted to maintain past views because they were sanctioned by history and the unchanging laws of military science, and the futurists, who, on the basis of their experience in the Revolution and Civil War, put their faith in crude military means and political agitation and trusted in class struggle to ignite revolution behind the enemy's lines. In assessing this struggle during the Academy's first decade, 1918–28, Verkhovsky concluded that it had been one full of vitality. The Red Army had made significant progress in the study of military science and military art.[13]

In such heady times a rough and tumble theory, conditioned by practical experience and guided by a militant ideology, became

the basis for a new military science. Its demand for a unity of theory and praxis was fulfilled in the "scientific" analysis of their own combat experience as reflected in the activites of the Military Academy's Military–Scientific Society.[14] Triandafillov delivered his first lecture to that body on 24 December 1919, when he discussed the recent offensive operations of the Southern Front against Denikin's Army.[15]

In the great debate over the approach to the study of military science and the articulation of a unified military doctrine, Triandafillov belonged to those in the center who resisted past authority, even as they studied military history, and rejected the myth of the world revolution advancing on the bayonets of the Red Army. In seeking a mature military theory to encompass the reality of modern war he stressed the role of critical insight as the chief vehicle for securing the unity of theory and praxis. He brought this approach to his studies of Frunze's final offensive against Baron Wrangel. As a brigade commander with the 41st Rifle Division, Triandafillov had taken an active part in these operations. At the same time, in his studies he persisted in showing their deficiencies in his contributions to the activities of the Academy's Military–Scientific Society.[16]

In 1921 he took part in the suppression of the Tambov Insurrection, when he served under M.N. Tukhachevsky. Triandafillov was closely associated with Tukhachevsky for the next decade. For Tukhachevsky, the "March Beyond the Vistula" in 1920 was the campaign most relevant to the development of Soviet military art in keeping with the class-nature of the Soviet state and the possibility of using the Red Army to bring about "revolution from without." Like many other Soviet officers, Triandafillov also wrote on the Polish–Soviet war; his first study on a tactical engagement during the final phase of the campaign appeared in 1922.[17]

In his major study of troop control during the 1920 campaign, Triandafillov accepted Lenin's self-critique of the Soviet leadership's mis-assessment of the revolutionary situation in Poland. This had led to a strategic disjuncture between the military means available and the political objectives sought, and doomed the operation to failure. An insufficient mobilization base in the shattered economy of War Communism and an inadequate logistical system connecting front and rear meant that during initial operations the Red Army was unable to achieve a favorable correlation of forces on the main axis of attack, and during the pursuit of a disorganized

but undefeated Polish Army to the Vistula the Red Army suffered an attrition of combat power so that at the culmination of the campaign its divisions had exhausted their combat power and were vulnerable to the Polish counteroffensive.[18]

In his study Triandafillov focused on the problem of operational troop control. He identified the failure of troop control at front and supreme high command levels as the key factor in undermining the coherent development of successive operations by multiple fronts throughout the theater campaign. An already risky campaign in these circumstances with the breakdown of cooperation led to defeat. The advance of S. Budenny's First Cavalry Army against Lvov in place of a coordinated blow towards Lublin in support of Tukhachevsky's Western Front's effort to envelop Warsaw from the north in late July was for him primarily a problem of ineffective control in which each front fought its own campaign without unifying direction to a common, decisive goal, in this case the destruction of the Polish forces before Warsaw. Triandafillov noted the failings of the RKKA high command in Moscow and both front commands, and singled out the overextended commitments of Southwestern Front, which in the summer of 1920 simultaneously had to control operations against Wrangel in the Crimea, keep a keen eye on the Romanian border, and provide direction for operations of 1st Cavalry Army, 12th Army and 14th Army south of the Pripyat Marshes. Southwestern Front Commander A.I. Egorov, in the words of Triandafillov, found himself caught trying to direct operations on two axes without staff support and did not feel "the beating pulse of the operations."[19]

Following his graduation from the Military Academy in 1923, Frunze chose his former subordinate to join the Main Staff of the RKKA, where he took over as Chief of the Operations Section in 1924. From there he moved on to command a rifle corps and then returned to Moscow as Deputy Chief of Staff for RKKA in 1928.

Charged with putting operational art into practice, Triandafillov began working on a major study on the nature of the operations of modern armies. The first part of this effort, which appeared in 1926, echoed Mikhail Frunze's injunction to study and prepare for total war by assessing the military potential of the state and its probable opponents. For Frunze, under the then existing conditions, any future war for the Soviet state would be a protracted struggle and not be decided by a single battle or even one campaign.[20] This attention to the economic and industrial founda-

tions of military power led to assessing the role of the rear in determining the scale of operations which modern armies could conduct. The throughput capacity of railroads, as the artery tying an attacking army to its rear, became the chief determinant of the depth of an operational advance, since an attacking force with severely limited motor transport to support its advance could not maintain a rate of resupply to sustain the tempo of advance against an opponent falling back on his own rail network. His subsequent studies built upon this foundation to lay out in detail the military context of the theory of successive, deep operations. In such deep operations he envisioned a reorganized system of road transport, which would make it possible to shift operational scale from 190–240 km to 320–400 km and, thereby, an army might achieve the destruction of an opposing army throughout the depths of its dispositions.[21]

The scale of operations in good measure also depended upon the density of forces in a particular theater of military actions, which, in turn, depended upon the nature of a given state's mobilization system. The hard realities of mobilization precluded any state from making use of its maximium mobilization potential into the initial period of war. Smaller states might approach such a potential rapidly but large states, especially agrarian ones like the Soviet Union or Poland, could not. Indeed, looking at the military situation in post-war Europe, Triandafillov concluded that the overall mobilization capacity of most states was substantially less than in the pre-1914 period for a complex set of reasons. The only unknown of true consequence was Weimar Germany, as Triandafillov noted: "The mobilization capabilities of Germany are difficult to foresee because at the present time it is difficult to foresee the circumstances of its mobilization."[22]

Triandafillov called attention to the process of technological development which was making possible the "mechanization" of warfare, but noted its limited impact upon the economically backward regions of Eastern Europe with their peasant rear. New automatic weapons, armor, aviation and gas would affect such a war, but would not become decisive. He also treated the problem of manpower mobilization and the reality of mass war quickly becoming a war of conscripts and reservists. This brought him to the problem of addressing the means of achieving breakthrough and sustaining pursuit in successive deep operations. Here he drew upon Frunze's use of shock armies against Wrangel for the breakthrough and the employment of echeloned strategic cavalry

forces to facilitate exploitation and pursuit. Deep operations would employ operational maneuver to encircle and destroy the opposing force. Success in such operations turned upon two related problems: the organization of an effective command and control system to coordinate the operations of several armies and the establishment of realistic logistical norms in keeping with the geographic-economic realities of the theater of military action.[23]

As Deputy Chief of Staff to the RKKA Triandafillov's views reflected some basic assumptions regarding the sort of war the Red Army would fight in the future. The Field Regulations of 1929 in its treatment of the offensive touched on many of the same themes developed by Triandafillov in greater detail.[24] While the new regulations did provide for successive, deep operations based upon a combined-arms offensive, the armies described by Triandafillov and the regulations were modernized versions of the Red Army from the Civil War.

THE SUBJECT

Although long in incubation, operational art by the mid-1920s had emerged as an intermediary category of military art between strategy and tactics. Strategy by this time had a new content in keeping with the realities of World War and Civil War. It embodied Lenin's redefinition of Clausewitz's formulation of war as a continuation of politics and stressed economic mobilization for total war: "The mobilization of all the resources of the country and the directing of the country's armed forces toward the achievement of the political objectives of the war have become the affair of strategy, that is, of the high command."[25] Tactics remained the conduct of combat in direct contact with the enemy. Between these two domains lay the "employment of the armed forces in the theater of military actions, the domain of operational art."[26]

The term "operational art" had first been used by A.A. Svechin in a series of lectures at the Academy devoted to strategy in 1923–24.[27] Svechin developed the concept of operational art within the context of a critique of existing strategic concepts and under the influence of the German military historian and analyst, Hans Delbrueck. Svechin's major points can be summarized as an explicit attack upon the old strategy-tactics dichotomy and the articulation of a new and very different approach in which

operational art assumed central importance. His main points can be summarized as the following: (1) the establishment of a political-economic foundation beneath strategy; (2) a division of strategy into two ideal types: attrition (*izmor*) and destruction (*sokrushenie*); (3) the delineation of operational art and the assertion of radically new understanding of the concept of operations; (4) a reduction of the role of combat; (5) denial of the importance of the single decisive engagement and the transformation of combat into an on-going, episodic process; (6) radical reduction of the role of march-maneuver as a major strategic factor; (7) emphasizing the role of transportation and communications in strategy and the significance of military-technical superiority.[28]

Svechin described operational art as the bridge between tactics and strategy, that is, the means by which the senior commander transformed a series of tactical successes into operational "bounds" linked together by the commander's intent and plan and contributing to strategic success in a given theater of military actions.[29] As Svechin formulated the relationship among tactics, operational art, and strategy, operational art emerged as the critical conceptual linkage for the conduct of theater war.

> Then, battle is the means of the operation. Tactics are the material of operational art. The operation is the means of strategy, and operational art is the material of strategy. This is the essence of the three-part formula given above.[30]

This domain of military art became the focus of Triandafillov's study.

Svechin's conceptualization of operational art coincided with Frunze's appointment as Chief of Staff of the RKKA and Chief of the Military Academy. At Frunze's initiative, a Chair of Army Operations was established at the Academy of the RKKA in 1924, but did not survive for long.[31] The content of that part of the Academy's curriculum was directed at the techniques required to conduct operations. The emphasis was more upon general commentary rather than practical preparation to conduct operations. Typical of this literature was M. Bonch-Bruevich's essay on principles of operational leadership in modern war. This laid out the content of an operational plan, outlining its features: mission statement, intelligence on enemy forces and their probable courses of action, information on the status of one's own forces, the specific missions of subordinated units, the structure of rear services, the organization of supply, and the support of the operation.

Bonch-Bruevich emphasized the role of troop control organs in turning the commander's intent to an operational plan, and outlined the various areas where the staff had to assess the situation. His list of such activities was extensive and encompassed all aspects of operational planning. Bonch-Bruevich emphasized the art of troop control and the role of staff calculations as critical to operational leadership and pointed out the role of the struggle for time in "all preparatory actions and during execution."[32]

THE METHOD

Triandafillov's method of studying operational art deserves attention because of both its content and impact. This is not the reflective work of the retired soldier-scholar looking back on past campaigns. The focus is upon future battles in future wars. The objective is to use past experience, current capabilities and trends to foresee the nature of future operations. Triandafillov's abiding concerns are those of a chief of staff entrusted with the dual tasks of training an army and planning operations.[33] In this regard Triandafillov followed in the footsteps of Svechin, who defined the role of military science in practical terms: "The conclusions of military theory do not represent incontrovertible exactitudes. . . . We are inclined to understand military theory as referring to any system of knowledge which aids us in understanding life and practice."[34]

Triandafillov devotes the first part of the study to those economic developments, socio-political shifts, and technological changes which are shaping the evolution of military art. They guarantee that future war will be different from past war. He treats technological developments in the post-First World War decade, beginning with infantry weapons and moving on to artillery, chemical weapons, tanks, communications and engineering support, and aviation. He examines not only the status of such weapons but also the probable trends in their further development, making effective use of the works of foreign military specialists in his assessment of these trends. Triandafillov then confronts the most burning question of his day: whether future armies would be small, professional, mechanized forces or million-man, mass armies. On the basis of an analysis of capitalist societies, he concludes that mass, mechanized armies will dominate future battlefields.

Writing in the late 1920s, he divides Europe into two military spheres, that is, the Western advanced capitalist zone and the Eastern underdeveloped zone, in which he includes the Soviet Union. In the West, mass, mechanized warfare has already become possible, but in the East economic underdevelopment means that these armies are based on a "peasant rear." Given the then-dominant Soviet assumptions about "threat," that is, concept of attack by the various successor states of Eastern Europe with the support of Britain, France, and other Allied powers, his categorization of Eastern Europe set the material-technical characteristics of that theater of military actions.[35] Mechanization, therefore, would for the immediate future only be an addendum in this theater to traditional, that is, infantry and cavalry, armies, so long as the national economies remain underdeveloped.[36] Experiments with small mechanized units to enhance the capabilities of the various combat arms are foreseen, as in the case of adding light tanks and armored cars to strategic cavalry.[37] Based on these assumptions, Triandafillov addresses the problems of mobilization and sustainment. He concludes the first section of his book by turning his attention to force structure and addressing the problems of combined arms and the logistical support of a modern army in the field.

Having set the context, he shifts his focus to the conduct of operations by modern armies. He defines the densities of various forces during deployment and the initial phase of an operation. Herein lay the "art" or skill portion of operational art. The key to success in this new art lies in the application of "scientific methods" to the problem of planning operations. He stresses the role of "calculations" in determining the feasibility of various courses of action in support of an operational concept. Such calculations will not predict the outcome of the operation, but they do serve the commander and his staff in planning operations.

Frunze played a leading role in promoting such an approach by invigorating the Military Academy's Higher Military-Academic Courses (*VVAK*) for senior Red Army commanders, which focused on the further education of brigade and higher commanders.[38] Frunze's commitment to this program brought more attention to the Chair of Strategy and its further development. He emphasized the need to change the content of the course on the conduct of operations by shifting from general observations to working out the practical details and techniques for the conduct of operations.[39] Over the next several years this led to the develop-

ment of a program of operational war-gaming in which students were expected to do the necessary calculations and estimates necessary to prepare for an army operation. This "applied" approach to training future commanders and staff officers was a major break with past Russian tradition and placed primary stress upon finding means in the educational process of unifying theory and practice. The leaders in the development of operational wargaming at the Academy were Triandafillov, K. Berends, and N. Varfolomeev, the Deputy Chief of the Department of Strategy.[40] The summer campaign of 1920 served as both a model and a case study for such operational gaming, since it embraced a major operational axis in a war aganst one of the most probable future opponents of the Soviet state.

While Triandafillov recognized a wide range of army operations, he chose to present to his readers the offensive of a shock army. He emphasized the need to achieve sufficient force to secure a breakthrough of a prepared defense and to advance into the depths of the enemy position. He applied various norms, that is, optimal numerical densities of men and fire, to calculate the necessary correlations of forces needed to accomplish these tasks, that is, penetration, breakthrough, exploitation, and pursuit, and identified the objective limitations which proscribe the temporal and spatial limits of such deep operations and, therefore, affect the course and outcome of such operations. He concluded that in a major war among large states no single operation could be decisive, and that final victory would go to the force which could conduct a series of successive and coherent operations. The question of integrating tactical engagements into operational successes and operational successes into strategic victory led him to examine in detail two other problems associated with the operational level of war – troop control and logistic capabilities.[41]

These elements set the very tone of the Red Army's new field regulations of 1929.[42] Slow mobilization potential, the scale of theater operations in Eastern Europe, and technological backwardness in these circumstances dictated a strategic posture during the initial period of a future war that would stress the attrition of successive operations, rather than decisive operations in the initial period of war. At the same time Triandafillov noted that the class nature of the Soviet state dictated a policy of socio-political transformation in areas liberated by the Red Army, that is, the extension of Soviet power into these conquered areas to bring about their effective mobilization and to disarm the forces of the counterrevolution.

THE IMPLICATIONS

By the late 1920s, M.N. Tukhachevsky had emerged as the most important opponent of such views. In their place he advocated a strategy of "destruction" (*sokrushenie*), that is, decisive offensive operations in the initial period of war with the intent of seizing the initiative and destroying the enemy force by means of deep operations and envelopment. This he deemed possible on the basis of the mass mechanization of the Soviet armed forces. Tukhachevsky promoted the idea of linking economic development to the requirements of a total war economy under the slogan of "militarization" (*voennizatsiia*).[43] Tukhachevsky, ever the young Red Commander, postulated a total war in defense of socialism in which the combination of a mass, mechanized Red Army and class struggle in the enemy rear would smash the opposing capitalist coalition and set in motion the revolution from without.[44] He stood the basic assumptions of Soviet strategic planning during the NEP on their head, rather than relying upon the proletariat to weaken the rear of attacking East European successor states supported by France and Britain and thereby give the USSR time to mobilize for protracted war.

For Tukhachevsky the vision of future war, a combination of mass, mechanized warfare and revolutionary upheaval, made a strategy of "destruction" the appropriate one for the Soviet state. He specifically criticized those military theorists, especially Svechin, whom he accused of underestimating the transformations being brought about by the First Five-Year Plan and, therefore, assuming that the Red Army in future wars would have to rely upon a "low economic-technological base" and, therefore, employ a strategy of "attrition" (*izmor*).[45] For Tukhachevsky, "attrition" and partial victory in a protracted struggle as strategic principles robbed the Soviet state of the possibility of putting into practice a new form of war, combining total war with revolutionary upheaval. He not only endorsed the Stalinist program of industrialization and collectivization as the necessary prerequisite for a strategy of "destruction," but also sought to stigmatize those favoring a strategy of "attrition" as class enemies, bourgeois theorists, and idealists. In seeking to establish his own credibility by invoking ideological purity and Party loyalty, Tukhachevsky contributed to the end of professional debate within the Red Army.[46]

Tukhachevsky juxtaposed the views of the old specialists/military theorists with those of the Red Army's "practical workers," among whom he included Triandafillov. Tukhachevsky was critical of those who saw *Blitzkreig* and lightning operations by elite professional armies as a way of avoiding a protracted war. His critics within the Red Army, however, detected just such a flight from reality in his own writings and accused him of writing science fiction, rather than forecasting the nature of future war. As one commentator stated his "strategy of destruction" had too much in common with the novels of H.G. Wells.[47]

Tukhachevsky naturally rejected this assessment. Foresight in military affairs required that the theorist assess precisely those tendencies of development which would bring about qualitative changes in military art. As he asserted in a study that went unpublished during his lifetime, projections of future capabilities required more than an extrapolation on past combat experience:

> Thus, the study of the experience of the imperialist war (First World War) from the point of view of employment of the basic combat types of armaments is a necessary first step toward correct preparation for future conflicts. But the study of that experience alone is not sufficient. One must be able to follow up just how newly appearing means of combat and operations will modify operational forms and how it is necessary to develop our own armaments in order to achieve the most effective use of military-technological resources, which the country's growing technology and industry could provide for war.[48]

By 1931 Triandafillov, whose career had been closely tied with Frunze, Svechin and Tukhachevsky, was revising his work on operations to postulate a mass, mechanized Red Army. He died before this process could be completed. However, his outline of topics and problems assumed a major shift in tactics and operational art based upon the threat environment, Soviet economic capabilities, and specific force structure changes in keeping with a mass, mechanized army. The threat assessment assumed an increased likelihood of conflict with major capitalist powers as a result of the Great Depression, increased instability in the capitalist system, and their opponents' more overtly anti-Soviet policies.[49] Writing at a time when Left Communists in the military were echoing M.N. Pokrovsky's call for a "certain monopoly" for their views in "scientific-methodological work" in order to ensure

their victory over "bourgeois objectivism", Triandafillov now accepted the possibility of creating a mass, mechanized army in the USSR through the Stalinist drive for heavy industrialization and sided with those who saw these changes as revolutionary, a "new stage of development of tactics and operational art."[50] His comments are, at best, a sketch without details. Soviet officers have been willing to assert that these few remarks anticipate the mechanization of successive deep operations as presented in the 1936 Field Regulations.[51]

The final edition of Triandafillov's book appeared in 1937 and coincided with Stalin's blood purge of the Red Army's officer corps. The climate of open discussion and debate gave way to totalitarian control. Thereafter, in light of the Stalinization of military science it became a work without context or roots. Even after a decade of de-Stalinization the contributions of Soviet military theorists, including Triandafillov, to the development of operational art in the 1920s were unappreciated.[52] Until *glasnost* and *perestroyka*, an appreciation of the contributions of that period to military theory, as General-Colonel V.N. Lobov noted in 1989, were little known and poorly appreciated even within the Soviet Armed Forces.[53]

THE EDITION

The translation by William A. Burhans is faithful to the original in style and meaning. Triandafillov's idiom and jargon have been preserved within the dictates of a modern military lexicon. This foreword seeks to place the author and his work in its Soviet context. Professor Schneider's introduction addresses *The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies* in the larger context of twentieth-century military thought and thereby underscores this work's contribution to the evolution of military art and the emergence of operational art. The editor hopes that other readers will find Triandafillov's work insightful and thought-provoking.

Jacob W. Kipp

NOTES

1. V.K. Triandafillov, *Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii* (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1929), p. 3 ff.

2. *Sovetskaia voennaia entsklopediia*, 2 vols. incomplete (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Slovarno-Entsiklopedicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1933), II, cols. 843–4.
3. I. Ivanov, "Voenno-tekhnicheskaia literatura po voprosam kharaktera budushchei voiny i operativnogo iskusstva," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 2 (March–April 1934), pp. 13–30. Ivanov explicitly linked future war [*budushchaia voina*] and operational art [*operativnoe iskusstvo*] in this bibliographic guide. The posthumous second (1933) edition of Triandafillov's book was cited as the basic work in four out of twelve major categories, that is, contemporary operational means, the conduct of operations, meeting operations, and offensive operations. Under the subtopics listed for conduct of operations, *Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii* was listed as the basic work for studying general questions, control of operations, and transport and rear.
4. P.I. Vakulich, "Predislovie k 3-mu izdaniiu," in V.K. Triandavillov, *Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii*, 3rd edition (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1936), pp. 5–7.
5. J. Walter Jacobs, "The Art of Operations," *Army*, No. 11 (November 1961), p. 64.
6. V.A. Semenov, *Kratkii ocherk razvitiia sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960), pp. 118–22.
7. E. Smyslovskii, "Voennaia nauka i voennoe iskusstvo," *Voennaia mysl' i revoliutsiia*, No. 3 (1922), pp. 11–20.
8. Vakulich, "Predislovie k 3-mu izdaniiu," in Triandafillov, *Kharakter*, pp. 7–8.
9. Ibid., and A. Golubev, "Vydaiushchiisia sovetskii voyennyi teoretik," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 3 (March 1968), p. 108.
10. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
11. Golubev, "Vydaiushchiisia," p. 108.
12. A.I. Reznichenko (ed.), *Akademiia imeni M.V. Frunze: Istoriia Voennoi ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoi ordena Suvorova Akademii* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972), p. 40.
13. A. Verkhovskii, "Evoliutsiia prepodavaniia taktiki v 1918–1928 gg.," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 11 (November 1928), pp. 50–52. On Verkhovsky's background and career see *Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), p. 126.
14. *Voennaia akademiia imeni M.V. Frunze: Istoriia voennoi ordenov Lenina i Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii Krasnoznamennoi Ordena Suvorova Akademii* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980), p. 41, citing Voennaia akademiia za piat' let, p. 168.
15. Ibid., pp. 42–4.
16. Vakulich, "Predislovie k 3-mu izdaniiu," Triandafillov, *Kharakter*, 3rd edition, pp. 7–9, 255. Triandafillov's study of the Perekop Operation was later reworked and published as part of the three-volume history of the Civil War. This essay is noteworthy for its attention to the problem of combined arms, especially the coordination of infantry and artillery in the attack, and the analysis of the role of the higher density of machine guns in this breakthrough operation. See N. Triandafillov, "Perekopskaia operatsiia Krasnoi armii (takticheskii etiud)," in Bubnov *et al.*, *Grazhdanskaia voina 1918–1921: Boevaia zhizn' Krasnoi armii*, I, pp. 339–57.
17. V. Triandafillov, "O Volkovysskoi operatsii," *Krasnaia Armiia: Vestnik Voenno-Nauchnogo obshchestva pri Voennoi Akakemii*, Nos. 10–11 (January–February 1922), pp. 34–43.
18. V.K. Triandafillov, "Vzaimodeistvie mezhdu zapadnym i iugo-zapadnym frontami vo vremia letnego nastupleniia Krasnoi armii na Vislu v 1920 g.," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 2 (February 1925), pp. 21–2.
19. Ibid., 26–7.

20. A. Golubev, "Obrashchena li byla v proshloe nasha voennaia teoriia v 20-e gody?," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 10 (October 1965), pp. 35–8.
21. V.K. Triandafillov, *Razmakh operatsii sovremennykh armii* (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 16–17.
22. V. Triandafillov, "Vozmozhnaia chislennost' budushchikh armii," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 3 (March 1927), p. 14, 37.
23. Triandafillov, *Kharakter*, 1st edition, pp. 1 ff.
24. *Field Regulations of the Red Army 1929* (Washington, DC: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1985), pp. 63–93.
25. P.I. Vakulich, "Sovremennaia operatsiia," in V.N. Levichev (ed.), *Voina i voennoe delo* (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat., 1933), p. 550.
26. Ibid.
27. N. Varfolomeev, "Strategiia v akademicheskoi postanovke," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 11 (November 1928), p. 84.
28. A.A. Svechin, *Strategiia*, 2nd edition (Moscow: Voennyi Vestnik, 1927), pp. 14 ff.
29. Svechin, *Strategiia*, 1st edn (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp.18–19.
30. Varfolomeev, "Strategiia v akademicheskoi postanovke," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 11 (1928), p. 84.
31. *Akademiia im. M.V. Frunze* (1972), p. 98.
32. M. Bonch-Bruevich, "Nekotorye osnovy operativnogo rukovodstva v sovremennoi voine," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 12 (December 1927), pp. 46–63.
33. V. Triandafillov, "K voprosu o polevykh poezdkakh nyneshnego goda," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No 4 (April 1946), pp. 5–18; *Krasnaia zvezda* (4 April 1926); and V. Triandafillov, "K voprosu ob ocherednykh zadachakh po usovershenstvovaniiu boevoi podgotovki vysshego komandnogo sostava," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 1 (January 1927), pp. 31–43.
34. V.V. Larionov and A.A. Kokoshin, "Introduction," in A.A. Svechin, *Strategy* (Minneapolis: East–West Publications, forthcoming).
35. R.A. Savushkin, *Razvitie sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil i voennogo iskusstva v mezhvoennyi period (1921–1941 gg.)* (Moscow: VPA imini V.I. Lenina, 1989), pp. 9–11.
36. Triandafillov, *Kharakter*, 1st edition, p. 54.
37. Ibid., pp. 70–72.
38. *Akademiia General'nogo Shtaba: Istoriia Voennoi ordenov Lenina i Suvorova I stepeni akademii General'nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR imeni K.E. Voroshilova*, 2nd edition (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), pp. 22–4.
39. Frunze, *Izbrannye proizvedenniia* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957), II, p. 35.
40. Varfolomeev, "Strategiia v akademicheskoi postanovke," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 11 (November 1928), pp. 92–3; Varfolomeev, "Operativnaia voennaia igra," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 6 (1928), pp. 18–35; K. Berends, "Shtabnye voennye igry," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 6 (1928) pp. 36–55; and V. Triandafillov, "Materialy dlia zadachi na shtabnuiu voennuiu igru," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, No. 12 (December 1927), pp. 31–45.
41. Triandafillov, *kharakter*, 1st edition, pp. 95 ff.
42. *Field Regulations of the Red Army 1929*, pp. 1 ff.
43. M.N. Tukhachevskii, "K voprosu o sovremennoi strategii," in *Voina i voennoe iskusstvo v svete istoricheskogo materializma* (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1927), pp. 129–33.
44. M.N. Tukhachevskii, "O kharaktere sovremennoi voiny v svete reshenii VI kongressa kominterna," in Kommunisticheskaia Akademiia, Sektsiia po izucheniiu problem voiny, *Zapiski*, I (1930), pp. 15–17.
45. Ibid., p. 21.
46. M.N. Tukhachevskii, "Predislovie k knige Del'briuka 'Istoriia voennogo iskusstva v ramkakh politicheskoi istorii'," in M.N. Tukhachevskii, *Izbrannye sochineniia*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), II, pp. 116–46.

47. Tukhachevskii, "O kharaktere sovremennoi voiny," in *Izbrannye sochineniia*, II, p. 30.
48. M.N. Tukhachevskii, "Novye voprosy voiny," in *Izbrannye sochineniia*, II, p. 181.
49. Triandafillov, *Kharakter*, 3rd edition (1937), pp. 235–6.
50. Ibid., p. 235.
51. Ibid., pp. 235–54.
52. G. Isserson, "Razvitie teorii sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva v 30-e gody," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 1 (January 1965), p. 36; and Golubev, "Obrashchena . . .," p. 35.
53. V.N. Lobov, "Aktual'nye voprosy razvitiia teorii sovetskoi voennoi strategii 20-kh-seredeny 30-kh godov," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 2 (February 1989), pp. 41–2.