ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOKS

Routledge Handbook of Political Management

Edited by Dennis W. Johnson

Routledge Handbook of Political Management

The *Routledge Handbook of Political Management* is a comprehensive overview of the field of applied politics, encompassing political consulting, campaigns and elections, lobbying and advocacy, grassroots politics, fundraising, media and political communications, the role of the parties, political leadership, and the ethical dimensions of public life. While most chapters focus on American politics and campaigns, there also are contributions on election campaigns in Europe, the Middle East, Russia, Australia, East Asia, and Latin America. In addition to a thorough treatment of campaigns and elections, the authors discuss modern techniques, problems, and issues of advocacy, lobbying, and political persuasion, with a special emphasis throughout the volume on technology, the Internet, and online communications as political tools.

Grounded in the disciplines of political science, political communications, and political marketing, this book explores the linkages between applied politics and social science theory. Leading American and international scholars and practitioners provide an exhaustive and up-to-date treatment of the state of this emerging field. This publication is a major resource for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and scholars of campaigns, elections, advocacy, and applied politics, as well as for political management professionals.

Dennis W. Johnson is professor of political management and former associate dean of the Graduate School of Political Management, George Washington University. He is author of *Congress Online, No Place for Amateurs*, and *The Laws that Shaped America* (forthcoming). He is editor of *2008 Presidential Election* (forthcoming) and author (with Gary Nordlinger) of *Campaigning in the Twenty-first Century* (forthcoming). He is also senior editor of the *Journal of Political Marketing* and serves on the editorial boards of the *Journal of Information Technology and Politics* and the *Journal of Public Affairs*. He is a member of the American Association of Political Consultants, the International Association of Political Consultants, and the European Association of Political Consultants.

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Introduction

Dennis W. Johnson

Political management is a growing field of study at American colleges and universities, and in institutions of higher education throughout the world. Political management is sometimes referred to as applied politics or applied political science; in the field of communications it is referred to as applied political communications; and in the disciplines of commerce and marketing it is referred to as political marketing.

Whatever the academic label, scholars and students are showing increased interest in understanding how modern sophisticated elections are carried out, how activists are using the latest tools of electronic advocacy, how corporations and non-profits are tapping into the skills and practices of political campaigners, and how throughout the world there is a growing professionalization of election campaigns.

This *Handbook* brings together forty-nine of the leading scholars and practitioners from throughout the world to discuss the growing importance of political consultants, modern campaign techniques, and the growing revolution in technology in campaigns, public policymaking, and governance.

Part 1 gives a general overview of the field of political management and looks at it from the perspective of three academic disciplines. Chapter 1 is an overview of American political consulting, from its inception in the 1930s to recent times. In this chapter, I discuss the early days of political consulting, show how the business has developed over the years, and how it has branched out from candidate elections to several other fields. In Chapter 2, Paul S. Herrnson and Colton C. Campbell survey the dimensions of present-day election campaigns in the United States. Among other things they discuss the role of political parties and group efforts in election campaigns, and analyze the effect of campaigns on election outcomes. Fritz Plasser, in Chapter 3, surveys elections globally, analyzing, among other things, the professionalization of campaigns throughout the world, the changing models of campaign practices, and the worldwide activities of campaign consultants.

In the next three chapters, political management is analyzed within the context of the theories and scholarly literature of three fields of study. Stephen C. Craig surveys the literature of political science in Chapter 4. A growing body of political science research explores the ways that campaigns shape voter behavior and election outcomes. In a related field, Lynda Lee Kaid, in Chapter 5, demonstrates how political management has had "long-standing ties" to applied political communications and to the discipline of political communications. In Chapter 6, Wojciech Cwalina, Andrzej Falkowski, and Bruce I. Newman look at the scholarly record of

their field, political marketing, and show how it and political management both have similar grounding and where they differ.

The second part of the *Handbook* deals with American political campaigns and elections. In Chapter 7, David Dulio and Terri L. Towner write about the permanent campaign. Campaigning in the United States, especially for the presidency, seems to go on forever, starting well over a year before the general election, and in some cases, not even ending once the president is elected to office. Much has changed in the way campaigns are conducted, and some of biggest changes have come in the area of technology, from the early days of radio and television, to computer-assisted telephone interviewing, e-mail and YouTube videos. Stephen K. Medvic explores the evolving challenges and opportunities of the technological revolution in Chapter 8. One of the most important elements of political communication is finding the right message and breaking through the clutter of thousands of other messages that people receive each day. Brian C. Tringali in Chapter 9 outlines several of the sophisticated techniques used in modern campaigns to determine what works and what does not.

Just a generation ago, political communication was fairly straightforward: radio, the three television networks, newspapers, and print material. That was the "stone age," writes Peter Fenn in Chapter 10, which surveys how profoundly media communication has changed and what new challenges await candidates for public office. They are called "monster PACs," the new political action committees that have been created in the last decade that bring in an extraordinary amount of money and political clout. In Chapter 11, Steve Billet examines these PACs and discusses their influence and motives. Nearly thirty years after the landmark 1974 Campaign Finance Reform amendments, Congress enacted new campaign reform legislation. It was meant to cure some of the excesses in campaign spending, such as so-called soft money. But, as Anthony Gierzynski writes in Chapter 12, the new law, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), not only created needed reforms, but also led to several unintended campaign spending consequences. One of the most important evolutions—some might say revolutions—in campaign communication has been the use of the Internet and online communication. Emilienne Ireland, in Chapter 13, discusses how the Internet has developed as an indispensable communications tool, and how it is transforming the way campaigns are conducted.

The 2004 presidential election saw the use of the most sophisticated communication tools in this extraordinarily tight battle between George W. Bush and John Kerry. Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy and Stephan Henneberg, in Chapter 14, analyze this extravagant, bitter, and expensive contest from the perspective of business marketing, the candidates as products, and the impact of advertising. Television advertising can be extraordinarily expensive, and in a presidential campaign, literally hundreds of millions of dollars are spent trying to persuade voters through this medium. In Chapter 15, Robin Kolodny and Michael Hagen examine the data of television buying and try to resolve this question: what drives the cost of political advertising? Running for office, particularly in modern times, is a difficult, complex, and often frustrating experience. Ronald A. Faucheux, who himself has been a statewide officeholder as well as a veteran political consultant, looks at the difficulties of seeking office in Chapter 16.

For years, conservatives have poured money and support into recruiting the next generation of leaders and followers, and in developing core conservative values and ideas. Kathleen Barr, in Chapter 17, argues that if Democrats and progressives are to take back power, they must have the ideas, money, and infrastructure to beat conservatives and Republicans at their own game. For nearly three decades, there has been a growing activism among Christian conservatives and others who consider themselves part of the Religious Right. They form a key bloc of strength in the Republican Party, and their values and issues have done much to shape the national agenda. Mark J. Rozell in Chapter 18 looks at the historical roots of the Religious Right and its impact today.

Part 3 looks at elections and campaigning throughout the world. Fritz Plasser and Günther Lengauer in Chapter 19 survey the importance of television advertising and television coverage

of elections on a worldwide basis. Despite the rise of the Internet and other online communication, Plasser and Lengauer argue that television continues to be the "driving force" in campaigning throughout the world. Mobile telephone technology has been used in many parts of the world to advance political participation and political causes. In many ways, the United States is relatively behind the times in mobile technology. Julie Barko Germany and Justin Oberman in Chapter 20 discuss what the rest of the world can teach America in using mobile phones for political causes.

Dominic Wring in Chapter 21 looks at modern British campaigns, and the enormous influence that political consultants and marketers have had in campaigns, especially during the Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair eras. In Chapter 22, Marco Althaus looks at modern campaign techniques in Germany. The political parties have lost some of their grip and influence, and in German elections there is a new reliance on informal networks, viral marketing and ad hoc campaigning. Dahlia Scheindlin and Israel Waismel-Manor look at how Israeli elections have been transformed and particularly look at the role and influence of American political consultants in Chapter 23. In December 2007, Vladimir Putin won overwhelming support in parliamentary elections amid widespread cries of voter fraud and government abuse. Derek S. Hutcheson in Chapter 24 looks at this election and puts it into the context of modern Russian elections and campaign techniques.

In Chapter 25, Ian Ward looks at the growing professionalization of campaigning and elections in Australia. He concludes that Australia, like other advanced democracies, is heading into a new postmodern phase, with greater reliance on consultants and a more presidential-like focus on party leaders. Louis Perron, in Chapter 26, looks at recent political campaigns in the Philippines. Often characterized as loud, boisterous affairs, Philippine campaigns are in fact a "fascinating mix of traditional patronage politics and modern high tech campaigns." In Chapter 27, Christian Schafferer surveys the growing dimensions of modern campaigning in the Asian market, with a particular focus on electioneering in Taiwan. Eduardo Robledo discusses the triumph of Vicente Fox and the defeat of the long-ruling party PRI in the 2000 elections. In Chapter 28, he discusses whether this was the result of a long transition or a sudden triumph of political marketing.

Part 4 turns to lobbying, advocacy, and political persuasion. Lobbying has long been a staple in American political life. In Chapter 29, Conor McGrath and Phil Harris give an historical analysis of how the lobbying industry was created, showing that lobbying and influence peddling have been central to American politics for a very long time. One of the newest and most promising forms of communication and advocacy comes from online resources. Brad Fitch in Chapter 30 discusses the best practices of online advocacy for associations, non-profit organizations, and corporations. One of the most important and sometimes difficult of tasks is to form and keep together a group of like-minded individuals who can be called on to voice their concerns to officeholders. In Chapter 31, Edward A. Grefe discusses the building of constituencies for advocacy in the United States and in other democracies.

Douglas Lathrop in Chapter 32 discusses the growing use of political consultants in the field of issue advocacy. He discusses how political consultants have become involved in this field, their effectiveness in affecting public policy, and the larger implications for the legislative process and governance. Military and defense spending are an extraordinary component of the US federal budget. Julius W. Hobson, Jr, in Chapter 33, uses a case study of the Crusader artillery system to see the interplay of politics, national priorities, and hardball lobbying. Marco Althaus looks at grassroots advocacy in the European Union. In Chapter 34, he writes that while still in its infancy, grassroots advocacy is changing the dynamics of European business and politics.

In Part 5, we look at political parties, political management, and democracy. Maik Bohne, Alicia Kolar Prevost, and James A. Thurber look at the interplay of political consultants and American political parties. They conclude in Chapter 35 that consultants have played an important role in keeping political parties strong, but have changed the dynamic by injecting a

"fluid, non-hierarchical, and loosely-coupled network structure." One of the most important developments in recent American campaigns is identifying likely voters and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts. Peter Ubertaccio in Chapter 36 argues that if both parties use network marketing techniques they may help reverse the trend of declining party organizations. In Chapter 37, Jennifer Lees-Marshment looks at the governments of Tony Blair in the UK and Helen Clark in New Zealand, and discusses how both leaders, with varying degrees of success, have used market-orientation techniques. Phil Harris, Conor McGrath, and Irene Harris reach back to Niccolo Machiavelli to discuss what they characterize as "Machiavelli marketing." In Chapter 38, they argue that political marketing, good governance, lobbying, ethics, and effective communication with the consumer are "all issues developed from an understanding of Machiavelli's thought."

Scandal, personal shortcomings, and ethical lapses are recurring themes in American campaigns and public affairs. Candice J. Nelson in Chapter 39 discusses such nefarious problems and the attempts to reform American campaigns and the legislative process. The final chapter, by Bonnie Stabile and Susan Tolchin, looks at a persistent problem in American life, the angry, cynical citizen. Using a case study of the debate over stem cell research and other biotechnologies, Chapter 40 addresses the question of how to win over a cynical public.

At the end of the book, in About the Editor and Contributors, there are short biographical statements for each of the authors and the editor. In addition, there is a comprehensive list of Resources that were cited in the forty chapters.

Part 1

The Field of Political Management

1

American Political Consulting

From its Inception to Today

Dennis W. Johnson

Today in the United States, political consulting is a vibrant, mature business that plays a key role in shaping and managing political campaigns. Political consultants measure public opinion, design television and web advertisements, target and identify likely voters, raise campaign funds, write blogs and maintain websites, and research the records of candidates and opponents. They use their skills and experience to develop sound messages and overarching campaign themes, to formulate and carry out campaign strategy, and above all, to help their candidate achieve victory. A very select few political consultants are household names; but the vast majority work behind the scenes, unseen and unknown to the general public. Some consultants are generalists, responsible for the overall running of a successful campaign; but the large majority of consultants are specialists who focus on a particular aspect of a campaign.

Political consultants have used their skills, experience, and techniques to move beyond candidate races, such as contests for governor, senator, or president. Consultants now reach down the electoral food chain and assist candidates at the local level of government. They work in the growing market of ballot initiatives, where issues are voted upon, rather than candidates. American consultants have branched out to candidate elections in other countries, and they have increasingly been involved in issue advocacy battles, both at the federal and the state level of policy making. In addition, corporations concerned about their image or those that find themselves engaged in a tough policy fight have turned to political consultants for assistance.

Early Years of Political Consulting

For much of the early years of US history, the political parties were the central focus of campaigns, fundraising, and organization. As Paul S. Herrnson and Colton C. Campbell write in Chapter 2, during the earlier part of the twentieth century the political party began giving way to the individual candidate. Candidates hired their own campaign managers and brought on people who could help raise money or could round up voters and get them to the polls. Very often, these campaign workers were volunteers, often friends or co-workers of the candidates. In many instances, they worked for free, or for the love of politics, or the admiration of the candidate. Some had good political instincts, had politics in their blood, and made valuable contributions.

But who would do this for a living, going from campaign to campaign, offering skills and services? Election scholars generally consider that the beginning of political consulting as a

business was a husband–wife firm called Campaigns, Inc., created in the early 1930s. Clem Whitaker, a newspaper publicist, and his wife, Leone Baxter, who had worked for a local chamber of commerce, pioneered the use of campaign publicity in California elections. Whitaker and Baxter helped their clients win state-wide referenda, they developed grassroots lobbying techniques to pressure state lawmakers, and employed nasty opposition research tactics against author-activist Upton Sinclair, who was running for California governor. Later, they helped defeat California governor Earl Warren's proposal for a state-wide medical insurance plan; and in perhaps their biggest triumph, Whitaker and Baxter were hired by the American Medical Association to fight against President Harry Truman's 1948 plan for national health insurance.[1] In all, Whitaker and Baxter won seventy out of seventy-five of the campaigns for which they were hired.

Whitaker and Baxter had created a new business. They helped define messages, shape campaigns, spread the message to constituents, and influence lawmakers through grassroots pressure. They did this during nearly every election cycle, for a variety of mostly conservative clients, both individual candidates for office and corporate causes. Nevertheless, Whitaker and Baxter considered themselves in the business of public relations, not political consulting. For the most part, they had the business to themselves during the 1930s and 1940s.

Especially with the advent of television, candidates and parties turned to public relations specialists. During the 1952 presidential election, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai E. Stevenson turned to New York advertising agencies to help craft their message for this new medium.[2] Professional assistance was now filtering down to other elections as well. By 1957, Alexander Heard found that forty-one public relations firms were offering campaign services.[3]

Soon, however, others not working for public relations firms would become involved in the business of politics. Joseph Napolitan, a former sports writer for a local Massachusetts newspaper turned campaign professional, was probably the first operative to be called a "political consultant." By and large, those who began to call themselves political consultants were generalists, who managed campaigns, perhaps wrote radio or television scripts, and helped formulate campaign strategy. By the late 1950s, David L. Rosenbloom found that perhaps thirty or forty professionals were managing campaigns, and like Napolitan, those who stayed with the business cycle after cycle, were the foundation of the political consulting business.[4]

A few political scientists, like Rosenbloom, began to take notice. Writing in 1956, Stanley Kelley, Jr was one of the first political scientists to recognize the importance of campaign consultants. In the 1970s, Dan Nimmo and David L. Rosenbloom discussed the first years of campaign management, followed by Larry Sabato's seminal book on the rise of political consultants in 1981.[5]

Polling for Candidates

Survey research is the key to that most important of campaign questions: what is on peoples' minds? Not surprisingly, polling research was one of the first tools sought after by political parties, candidates, and even office holders. Yet, during the 1930s and 1940s political polling and campaign predictions had fallen on tough, skeptical audiences. During the 1936 presidential election, a popular magazine, *The Literary Digest*, boldly predicted that governor Alf Landon of Kansas would readily beat incumbent president Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt overwhelmed Landon, carrying the electoral votes of forty-six out of forty-eight states in one of the most lop-sided elections in the twentieth century, and the popular magazine folded in disgrace. Pollster George Gallup, using more reliable scientific techniques, correctly predicted the Roosevelt landslide, but in 1948, like nearly every other close observer, predicted that incumbent president Harry Truman would lose to New York governor Thomas E. Dewey. Survey researchers Gallup, Archibald Crossley, and Elmo Roper all had made the mistake of stopping

their polling well before the election, and missing the surge in Truman support during his fabled "whistlestop" campaign.

Despite the flaws of survey research, Franklin Roosevelt used the services of in-house pollsters Emil Hurja and Hadley Cantril. In the 1950s, Eisenhower relied indirectly on the services of the Gallup polling organization. But it wasn't until the 1960 presidential campaign that a major candidate, John F. Kennedy, employed a professional pollster, Louis Harris. Harris had become a private political pollster in the late 1950s, and helped guide the 1960 campaign of Kennedy. By 1963, exhausted from the demands of private political polling, Harris abandoned private political polling and began writing a weekly newspaper column, worked with national news organizations, and created the Harris Poll.[6] Up until this time, polling was still done through personal interviews and time-consuming number crunching; only during the late 1960s would telephone interviews become the norm, and even later would technologies such as the CATI system (computer assisted telephone interviews) and random-digit dialing be employed.

Private polling became an integral part of election campaigns during the 1960s and early 1970s, and a small number of pioneering survey researchers set up shop. On the Democratic side, William R. Hamilton (Hamilton and Staff)[7] began polling in 1964; Patrick Caddell (Cambridge Survey Research) became the pollster for the 1972 presidential campaign of George McGovern. Peter D. Hart (Hart Research) has polled for an extraordinary range of Democratic candidates. Since 1974, Hart has served as an election consultant to CBS News and has conducted polls for the *Wall Street Journal*. Hart's campaign work comes through partner Geoff Garin, who heads Garin-Hart-Yang Strategic Research Group. At one time, roughly 80–90% of all Democratic private polling business emanating from Washington was done by the firms run by Hamilton, Caddell, and Hart. Of these firms, Garin-Hart-Yang remains at the forefront of the private political polling profession.

On the Republican side, there were four early private polling firms. Richard Wirthlin (Decision/Making/Information, then the Wirthlin Group) began in 1969 and was best known as an early adviser to Ronald Reagan. Robert M. Teeter (Market Opinion Research, Detroit), worked for a wide variety of candidates and was presidential pollster for Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and George H. W. Bush. Arthur Finkelstein worked closely with conservative Republicans, while V. Lance Tarrance (Tarrance, Hill, Newport, and Ryan, Houston) polled for Reagan's 1984 re-election and Republican clients in the South and West.

The techniques and sophistication of polling have evolved over the years. Survey research has been supplemented by focus group analysis, by dial-meter research, and more recently by mall testing techniques and online surveys. Today, polling and survey research is at the heart of any sophisticated, professionally run campaign. By 2007, there were approximately seventy-six firms who were in private polling and research business in the United States.[8]

Media Firms

When Dwight Eisenhower ran for president in 1952, his campaign turned to the New York advertising firms of Ted Bates & Company and Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborn (BBDO). Another early advertising firm used in presidential campaigns was Jack Tinker and Partners. During the 1960s, however, media firms were created that specialized in political campaigns.[9] One of the first such media consultants was Tony Schwartz, working closely with general consultant Joe Napolitan. Schwartz is best known for his "Daisy" commercial for the Lyndon Johnson presidential campaign of 1964. He is also the author of a seminal book on political advertising, *The Responsive Chord*.[10] Another pioneer media consultant was Charles Guggenheim, who began working for Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson in the 1956 election, then worked for a variety of liberal candidates and causes. By the early 1970s, however, Guggenheim was out of the business, burned out by the pace and disillusioned with the direction of political advertising.

Several of the pioneer media firms began working in the late 1960s, including David Garth (David Garth Associates, New York), Marvin Chernoff (Chernoff/Silver Associates, Columbia, South Carolina), Robert Squier (Squier and Associates, Washington, D.C.), Robert Goodman (The Goodman Group, Brookland, Maryland), Douglas Bailey and John Deardourff (Bailey/Deardourff, Washington, D.C.), and Roger Ailes (New York).

A second and third generation of media firms were created in the 1970s through 2000, and by 2007, there were seventy-eight media consulting firms working in American elections.[11] One veteran media advisor, who began working in the 1980s, Peter Fenn, outlines in Chapter 10, the extraordinary changes that have occurred in the media advertising business over the past twenty-five or thirty years.

Reaching Out to Voters

The Eisenhower presidential campaign in 1952 was the first to use direct mail in an effective way, but it wasn't until 1964, during the presidential campaign of Republican Barry Goldwater, that direct mail came into its own. From the lists of activist conservatives compiled during that campaign, Richard Viguerie was able to create a list of over 12,000 donors. In 1972, the presidential campaign of George McGovern was the first Democratic campaign to compile a large list of probable donors, and to use direct mail to solicit them. Since then, creating, expanding, and maintaining lists of supporters and donors has become big business for campaigns.

Apart from Viguerie, some of the pioneer direct mail firms were Butcher-Forde Consulting (Irvine, California), known for its work with the California Proposition 13 "tax revolt" in 1978; Roger Craver of Craver, Mathews, Smith, and Company (Vienna, Virginia), a Democratic firm, working with liberal Democratic causes. Probably the best known direct mail firm was Karl Rove and Associates, thanks to Rove's later high profile role in the Bush II White House. In 2007, there were 126 firms that engaged in political direct mail.[12]

For many years, Jack Bonner (Bonner and Associates, Washington, D.C.) and Walter Clinton (the Clinton Group, Washington, D.C.), dominated the field of political telemarketing. Today, there are twenty-eight firms that specialize in telephone and direct contact services.[13] Telemarketers provide services such as voter identification and persuasion, volunteer recruitment, fundraising, mobilization of activists, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts, and coordination with direct mail activities. A tactic employed by some telemarketing firms has come in for heavy criticism: the use of push-polling. Under the guise of a legitimate poll, anonymous telephone marketers feed misleading or inaccurate information to voters receiving the telephone calls. This practice has been condemned by the American Association of Political Consultants; nevertheless, it still persists in isolated races.

Beyond Candidate Campaigns

Political consultants have also worked in ballot issue and direct democracy contests. Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia provide for some form of direct citizen involvement in ballot measures, recalls, initiatives, or referendums. Further, eighteen states allow constitutional amendments offered by citizen initiative, and twenty-two states permit statutory amendments created by citizens. In recent years, citizens campaigns have placed before state voters such issues as term limits, gambling, ban on same-sex marriages, and campaign finance reform. A wide variety of issues has been resolved by direct citizen involvement. Among them, there have been efforts to ban cockfighting in Arizona, restrict the size of hog farms in Colorado, allow medical use of marijuana in Maine, restrict bear wrestling in Michigan, and to permit dental technicians to sell false teeth directly to patients in Florida.[14] In some cases, the ballot initiatives are handled on a

purely voluntary, amateur basis. This was the original intent: the essence of populism, where citizens, acting alone or as concerned groups, would roll up their sleeves and have a direct voice in government and lawmaking. But for the most part, citizen initiative and control has been far overshadowed by costly, sophisticated campaigns.

Ballot initiatives have become big business: high-stakes, high-cost operations that involve professional political consultants throughout the election process. During the 2004 election cycle, $540 million was raised to mount direct democracy contests throughout the United States; during the 2006 cycle, the total was $648.4 million.[15]

Nowhere is this more true than in California, indeed the land of milk and honey for political consulting firms. Direct democracy became a part of the California constitution during the early years of the twentieth century, in response to the push for greater populism and citizen input. But for many years, Californians did not use the initiative, referendum, or recall provisions. That all changed in 1978, when Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann offered Proposition 13, a popular and successful measure that called for property taxes to be cut in half. Jarvis and Gann called in direct mail specialists William Butcher and Arnold Forde, who built up an impressive grassroots network of anti-tax advocates. Thereafter, ballot issues proliferated in the state. By 1988, California voters were faced with forty-one ballot questions when they went to the polls. By 2000, millions of dollars were poured into California ballot issues, mostly from corporate and business interests, and increasingly from business and labor interests nationwide.

In 2003, California governor Gray Davis was booted out of office, movie actor Arnold Schwarzenegger became the chief executive, and political consultants and television stations reaped a payday of $70 million before the recall fight was over.[16] In 2005, during an off-election year, where there were no candidate elections held in California, there were nonetheless eight contentious ballot issues. Altogether, those trying to defeat and those trying to pass the ballot measures spent an astounding $417.2 million. By contrast, all 2004 presidential candidates in the primaries and general election spent a total of $880.5 million.[17] The great share of the money spent on ballot initiatives went for television advertising, direct mail, billboards and newspaper ads, and GOTV drives. Special political skills were tapped as well: law firms specializing in the ballot initiative process, petition signature firms that gathered up millions of signatures for the measures to go on the ballot, and coalition building firms that lined up celebrities and sympathetic groups.

Down Ballot Campaigns

State-wide candidates (like those for governor, US senator, state attorney general), congressional candidates, and big city mayoral candidates aren't the only office seekers who use professional consultants. Starting in the 1990s, local candidates increasingly began to use the services of political consultants. Each week, *Congressional Quarterly*'s "Campaign Insider" would publish the names of candidates and the consultants that they had hired. Here is a profile of just one week: a candidate for the Harris County (Houston, Texas) commissioner, a candidate for Florida secretary of state, a candidate for the Texas Supreme Court, and a candidate for the Norfolk County (Massachusetts) district court each hired a professional media consultant. Candidates for the California Board of Equalization, the San Francisco Superior Court, and the South Carolina Agricultural Commission all hired consultants.[18]

Consultant services, of course, cost money, and the more professional services a campaign uses, the greater the cost of running the campaign. A well-financed multi-million dollar campaign can afford a full range of survey research and focus group studies, produce television spots, maintain a first-class website, use direct mail, hire a candidate and opposition research team, telemarketers, and fundraising specialists to keep the money coming in. By contrast, a campaign that has only a

$50,000 budget may be able to hire a campaign manager, send out a piece or two of direct mail, order yard signs and bumper stickers, but nothing else. As more and more down ballot candidates seek to employ campaign consultants, there is greater pressure to raise funds to pay for those services.

Issue Advocacy

Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter paved the way for political consultants to work in issue campaigns, particularly with their successful work with the American Medical Association and its fight against so-called "socialized medicine" (a term coined by Whitaker).

Over the years, political consultants have been recruited to assist in issue fights and causes. Ironically, the next big issue management fight dealt with the same issue fought by Whitaker and Baxter in 1948. The campaign against the 1992–1993 Clinton national health care plan was particularly successful. The plan, created by the Clinton administration with First Lady Hillary Clinton as its public face, was a complex, unwieldy 1,342-page document. There were competing Democratic and Republican plans, and nearly every health care interest had endorsed some kind of proposal.[19] But the public simply didn't understand the Clinton program. In one pointed example, when members of a focus group heard the Clinton proposal described to them, 70% approved of it; when the name "Clinton" was attached to it, that very same proposal dropped by 30–40%. Big business organizations, originally interested in some sort of reform, turned against the Clinton plan. So, too, did the health care and insurance industries. Chief among the critics was the Health Insurance Association of America, which crafted an effective $15 million issue advocacy advertising program, featuring Harry and Louise, a well-read, concerned married couple sitting in their kitchen despairing over the supposedly unintelligible Clinton plan.[20] The Health Insurance Association had brought in Ben Goddard of Goddard-Claussen/First Tuesday, a California-based political consulting firm, to craft the "Harry and Louise" ads.

Since then, issue advocacy has been an important part of the portfolio of the political consulting business. As Doug Lathrop points out in Chapter 32, issue advocacy groups have spent over $400 million in a recent two-year session of Congress trying to get their views heard. Much of that money went directly to consulting firms that conducted the polling and focus groups, crafted the media advertising, and, just like in a candidate campaign, created the overarching themes and with discipline drove home the message.

International Campaigns

American political consultants have also brought their skills and experience to campaigns throughout the world. Joseph Napolitan was one of the first such consultants when he helped engineer a re-election victory for Ferdinand Marcos in the 1969 Philippine presidential election. Since then a steady flow of American consultants have worked in a wide variety of international elections. American consultants have worked in Canada, throughout Latin America, and as far away as the island of Mauritius. They have trained candidates in image building in Austria, crafted thirty-second television spots for candidates in Colombia, conducted focus group sessions in Italy, helped build party organizations in Hungary, and developed computerized voting files in Ireland.[21] A number of the authors in this *Handbook* have discussed the reach and impact of American consultants, and I invite you to read their analyses. In Chapter 26, Louis Perron discusses some of the challenges of the Philippine election process and looks at some of the American consultants in the post-Marcos era. Further, Dahlia Scheindlin and Israel Waismel-Manor discuss the Americanization of election campaigns in Israel in Chapter 23; Eduardo

Robledo discusses consultants and the 2000 Mexican election in Chapter 28; and in his overview of campaigns worldwide, Chapter 3, Fritz Plasser discusses the impact of growing professionalization.

As the following chapters will suggest, the business of political consulting will continue to flourish and grow, not only in the United States but also throughout the world. Despite occasional outbursts from lawmakers and the public about the need for clean-running elections and reform, the ineluctable fact is that candidates want, need, and for the most part appreciate the services and expertise provided by professional political consultants. Professional consultants are indispensable players in modern, sophisticated campaigns.

Notes

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7 Throughout this chapter, the original name of the political consulting firm is given; many of the firms have gone through name changes as partners leave, are added, or the firm is merged with another.

8 "Political Pages, 2006–2007," *Campaigns and Elections* (March 2007). The numbers should be used only as a rough guide. See also, Johnson, *No Place for Amateurs*, 241–7, for a listing of the leading political polling firms.

9 Diamond and Bates, *The Spot*.

10 Tony Schwartz, *The Responsive Chord* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973).

11 "Political Pages, 2006–2007". See also, Johnson, *No Place for Amateurs*, 247–54, for a listing of the leading media firms.

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2

Modern Political Campaigns in the United States

Paul S. Herrnson and Colton C. Campbell

Elections are central to the struggle for power in democracies, and political campaigns bring meaning to those struggles. Like much of our political landscape, the participants, strategies, and campaign tactics involved in elections have shifted over time. Early campaigns were inexpensive, nonpartisan, and highly personalized events geared toward persuading a small percentage of the population. By contrast, many contemporary campaigns are orchestrated events that entail large sums of money, professional campaign organizations, political parties, interest groups, volunteers, and complicated targeting and marketing strategies involving millions of voters. The one principle that has remained relatively constant is that the candidate who garners the most votes wins. This winner-takes-all principle applied to the campaigns for colonial legislatures held prior to the United States' founding, and it continues to hold true for most contemporary elections. With some exceptions, most notably the requirement that presidential candidates win a majority of the Electoral College vote, it applies to nomination contests, general elections, and run-off elections.

The Strategic Environment and Electioneering

The types of campaigns that characterize a democracy are shaped by the strategic environment in which they take place.[1] This typically includes the constitutional design of the political system, the nature of the offices candidates seek, the laws and rules governing party nominations or general elections, and the relatively enduring aspects of a nation's political culture involving citizens' attitudes toward politics, politicians, political parties, and interest groups. The strategic environment also encompasses the methods available for candidates, parties, advocacy groups, and others participants in elections used to communicate with voters. These methods have evolved over time from word of mouth and pamphlets to television advertising to Internet web sites. A final element of the strategic environment is the immediate—and very fluid—political setting. This may involve national factors such as the state of the economy, presidential popularity, and the mood of the public, as well as local factors involving the partisanship and competitiveness of the district where an election is being held, whether an incumbent is seeking reelection, and local conditions and events.

The strategic environment influences the roles of candidates, political parties, and interest groups in the campaign process.[2] The institutional design of the American political system, including the separation of powers, federalism, bicameral legislatures, and the further decentralization of

state and local offices, which formally separates elections for political offices from one another, allows for wide latitude in tailoring campaigns to fit state and local traditions, political conditions, and the preference of voters. It also tends to grant those who hold elected offices independent claims to exercise political power. These institutional features enable voters to hold individual officeholders accountable for their performance in office.

The US system contrasts sharply with the party-focused campaigns that are common in parliamentary democracies, such as Great Britain, which do not spread power to as many separate different political institutions or encourage voters to hold individual candidates responsible for their entire party's performance in office. (See Chapter 21, by Dominic Wring on British campaigns.) Moreover, the United States' single-member simple-plurality elections, in which the voters in a given district cast one vote and the candidate receiving the most votes wins, also encourage independence among candidates and officeholders and give voters the motivation to make discrete assessments of individual candidates for office.

The widespread use of these single-member simple-plurality elections also discourages the formation of third parties and minimizes their prospects for success, helping to reinforce the United States' two-party system. This system differs substantially from democracies such as Italy and Germany that use proportional representation, in which parties and political groups are allocated seats in legislative bodies in proportion to their share of the vote. (See, for example, Chapter 22, by Marco Althaus on German elections.) Proportional representation lends itself to the formation of many political parties, and by tying the electoral fortunes of candidates of the same party together it encourages those candidates to practice greater teamwork in elections than do US candidates.

Of course, the nature of election constituencies also influences the conduct of campaigns. Candidates running for offices that have small districts comprising few voters, such as a city council, can run campaigns consisting primarily of grassroots activities. Door-to-door canvassing, newsletter drops, house parties (also called "meet and greets"), and yard signs typically form the core of these campaigns. Meeting with local newspaper editorial boards can also be important. Candidates for offices that have geographically large districts, such as the presidency or statewide office, must run much more complex campaigns. The same is true of House members and candidates from large cities. These campaigns require considerably more planning, money, and professional expertise. Most rely on television, radio, direct mail, and mass telephone calls for communication. Even their grassroots efforts are influenced by complex voter targeting analyses.

The rules governing the nomination process strongly influence the types of campaigns that candidates wage.[3] Candidates who must win a party nomination through a primary election, as is used to select general election candidates in most states, or a caucus, like that used in Iowa, create campaign organizations to wage their nomination campaigns. Candidates who are selected in private meetings where dues-paying party members decide among themselves who should win the party nomination do not need to assemble an organization to mount a nomination campaign. The first approach, used in the contemporary United States, results in candidates possessing general election campaign organizations that are more or less independent of party committees. The second approach, which was used in the party-centered era in the US, and remains in use in most modern industrialized democracies, produces election campaigns that are primarily conducted by party committees rather than candidates.

Campaign finance especially shapes political campaigns. Whether campaigns rely on public funds furnished by the government, funds raised by political parties, or funds that candidates must raise from individuals, interest groups, party committees, or their own resources has a tremendous impact on campaign independence from other organizations and campaign conduct. Of course, campaign finance laws can have a significant impact on whom candidates turn to for money. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and its predecessors, including the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 and its amendments, regulate the flow of money in presidential and congressional elections. (See Chapter 12, by Anthony Gierzynski on financing American elections.) Among other things, they determine which individuals and organizations can legally make contributions and expenditures in federal elections and, in some cases, establish limits for these transactions. Similar effects are due to the myriad of state and local laws that govern the financing of state and local campaigns. These laws are important. Not surprisingly, candidates who rely on public funds, including some presidential candidates, invest less time and energy in raising money than those who finance their campaigns with funds raised from private sources. Indeed, the money chase in most US elections is a campaign in and of itself. This sets the United States apart from most Western democracies, where parties raise most of the campaign money or receive the lion's share of the public campaign subsidies from the government. Campaigns in those nations are generally dominated by party committees; candidates are much less in the front and center in these party-focused campaigns.

Broader societal conditions also affect the nature of political campaigns. Public attitudes toward parties, candidates, and politics more generally influence the style and tenor of campaigns. Candidate-centered campaigns typically occur in locations and eras where the citizenry are ambivalent about parties and politics. Such campaigns are often characterized by populist themes or anti-government or anti-politician rhetoric. Party-focused elections are more prevalent in places and times where voters consider political parties part of the natural order of government and society, such as the nineteenth-century United States and contemporary Europe.

Finally, technology plays a very important role in the conduct of campaigns. Campaigns are first and foremost about communicating to and mobilizing voters to show up at the polls. As technology advances the methods available for voter outreach also improve. This has several other implications for campaigning. First, those with the most ready access to the means for reaching out to voters are among the most influential in elections. Thus, wealthy candidates, political parties, and interest groups are the most likely to benefit from technological innovation. Second, innovations can alter the balance of power between different participants in the election process. For example, television, with its potential for unmediated candidate-to-voter contact, increased the degree to which campaigns focus on candidates, as opposed to parties.[4] Third, technological improvements can lead to refinements in the planning and execution of campaign strategies. The advent of direct mail, e-mail, and computerized databases, for instance, provided candidates, parties, and interest groups with opportunities to tailor their appeals to specific groups of voters. (See Chapter 8, by Stephen K. Medvic on technology and campaigning.)

Political Campaigns in Early America

The first campaigns for public office in America were markedly different from those waged in the twenty-first century, in large part because the voting population was so different. Roughly 5% of the overall population was eligible to vote in colonial times, as voting was restricted primarily to white, male, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, landowners. Additionally, politics was a part-time enterprise: colonial and later state legislatures conducted legislative business for just a few months each year and the compensation received by most elected officials was minimal to nonexistent, barely making up the time lost at their actual professions. Given this narrow electorate and the limited direct financial pay-off for elected officials and their followers, political campaigns were highly elitist, personal, and fairly inexpensive. They more closely resembled extended semi-private conversations among society's elite than the very public communications of contemporary campaigns that intrude on the lives of virtually everyone who owns a television. Political discussions took place without the benefit of political parties, campaign commercials, rallies, or large fundraising events.

Political campaigning in the new American states was not too dissimilar. Aspirants for public office held quiet meetings and corresponded with those few individuals who were eligible to vote. Campaign conversations generally were well-reasoned discussions of the great issues of the day between candidates and voters. In short, candidates did not take to the stump, there were no organized rallies, nor did candidates or parties launch full-blown public relations campaigns. Even the presidential elections of this period did not have the massive communications, voter registration, and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives that typify modern elections. Electioneering entailed a small number of gentleman candidates requesting the votes and political support of others similarly situated in society.

By the early 1820s through the early 1900s, however, the elite-level principled discussions of colonial days gave way to organized rallies, speeches, parades, and other popular events designed to convey a message and mobilize the masses. Party machines fostered bonds between themselves and voters both during and between campaign seasons, with the goal of building a loyal voter base.[5] The result was the emergence of strong identification and partisan loyalties among most voters to a particular party. As such, parties became the major vehicles for virtually every facet of the campaign process: from candidate recruitment, to the nomination process, to the resources needed to communicate with the electorate, and to the party symbols and labels that gave meaning to voters and helped them choose candidates.[6]

Party-dominated campaigns eventually lost ground to candidate-focused campaigns due to one set of progressive reforms passed in the early 1900s and a later set passed in the 1960s and 1970s. Both sets of reforms sought to limit the role of the party organizations in the nomination process and general election. The people planning and conducting campaigns were no longer reliant on party loyalists, but instead on a personal team assembled by—and beholden to—the candidate, such as professional political consultants. Consequently, candidates were "marketed" not as party members, but as individuals. Candidates and their campaign managers made the strategic and tactical decisions as well as supervised the day-to-day activities of the campaign.[7] They were responsible for hiring the staff and the political consultants to carry our fundraising, research, communications, and most other campaign activities. And they used new-found survey research techniques to develop their own public images and to select the issues and themes that formed their message, as well as choose the specific forms of media—such as radio, television and direct mail—to convey that message directly into voters' living rooms. Perhaps most important, candidates, not political parties, became the central focus of fundraising appeals. Almost every candidate organization hired individuals to raise funds using appeals based on the candidate's background, experience, and stance on issues, and who had expertise in more modern techniques, such as direct mail solicitations and bundling.[8]

Political Campaigns in the Modern Era

Political campaigns in the modern era continue to revolve primarily around candidates and the staff hired to mount their campaigns.[9] Candidates are responsible for assembling their own campaign team. They and those individuals with whom they surround themselves are responsible for the conduct of their own election campaigns. According to at least one study, in the 2004 federal election cycle, presidential candidates, national party committees, general election candidates for Congress, and various interest groups spent nearly $2 billion on such professional consultant services.[10] Party organizations and some interest groups, however, have become increasingly involved in closely contested elections to assume a greater role in the candidate-centered system. While less visibly involved in localities where these contests are officially nonpartisan and party labels do not appear with the candidates' names, parties and outside groups help recruit candidates and provide many, especially those running for Congress, with traditional

grassroots support, such as fundraising and campaign organization, as well as communicating with and mobilizing voters. Additionally, parties and interest groups participate through independent, parallel, and coordinated campaigns designed to influence both the political agenda and the voters' behavior.[11]

Candidates and Campaign Management

Campaign management in most elections for Congress, state legislatures, local and municipal offices—or down-ballot races—is now dominated by candidate campaign organizations. Figure 2.1 depicts the level of professionalism of different campaigns, where campaign professionalism is measured by the number of major campaign activities performed by a paid campaign aide or political consultant. Ranging from 0–12, the measure includes campaign management, press relations, issue or opposition research, fundraising, polling, mass media advertising, direct mail, web site construction and maintenance, mass telephone calls, GOTV activities, legal advice, and accounting. It shows that the typical House campaign employs roughly six professionals. The number is larger for Senate campaigns, which average between eight and nine campaign professionals per candidate organization. Most of these campaigns hire such experts to manage activities that require technical expertise, such as polling and media advertising, in-depth research, or connections with sources of funds, which as the figure demonstrates, has a significant impact on the number of votes candidates receive. Presidential campaigns, not surprisingly, are off the chart in terms of campaign professionalism. In campaign activities where a typical House candidate would hire consultant or campaign aide and a Senate candidate might hire a team of consultants,



Figure 2.1. The Professionalism of Different Campaigns

Source: Paul S. Herrnson, *The 2002 Congressional Campaign Study* (College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, 2002); and Paul S. Herrnson, *The Campaign Assessment and Candidate Outreach Project* (College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, 2001).

Notes: The figures represent the number of major campaign activities performed by a paid campaign aide or political consultant. The activities are: management, press relations, issue or opposition research, fundraising, polling, mass media advertising, direct mail, web site construction and maintenance, mass telephone calls, GOTV activities, legal advice, and accounting. The data for federal offices are from 2002; data for state and local offices are from 1997–1998.

presidential campaigns often hire a team of consultants for each state or region. Campaigns for the state legislature and for judgeships tend to hire fewer campaign professionals. However, the trend toward more sophisticated and expensive campaigns has led to more professionalized campaign organizations for elections further down the ballot.

Do such campaign organizations have a significant impact on election outcomes? If House campaigns are typical, then the answer is a resounding yes. Congressional challengers and open-seat contestants are typically helped the most by fielding a professional campaigning organization, sometimes increasing their vote share by as much as five percentage points.[12] While this may not be enough to defeat an entrenched incumbent, hiring a team of skilled campaign aides and political consultants can help a candidate raise more money, attract more media attention, and wage a more competitive campaign. In some cases, it may be critical in bringing about victory.[13]

The Role of Party and Group Efforts in Contemporary Campaign Politics

At the national level party organizations in Washington, D.C., have assumed an important role in the recruitment of congressional candidates. National party organizations, particularly the Democratic and Republican congressional and senatorial campaign committees, actively identify and encourage some candidates to run for Congress and discourage others.[14] The same is true of legislative campaign committees in many states. These party committees provide modest encouragement and advice for large numbers of politicians who wish to run for Congress, or a state legislature. They instead commit a significant amount of time courting certain candidates to run for the few seats they anticipate will be competitive. This is done through a variety of methods, including providing poll results demonstrating the person's popularity with voters or potential for winning, and promising to provide campaign contributions and assistance with fundraising, communications, and other campaign activities should the candidate win the nomination.

In primary contests where the party leaders who direct these committees believe that one candidate will be more viable in the general election than the others, these leaders and committee staff may actively discourage the others from running. Usually candidates who are ideological extremists are discouraged from running in favor of moderates. The 2006 mid-term elections provide a noteworthy example. In its successful effort to retake the House of Representatives, rather than rallying its liberal base, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) sought moderate-to-conservative candidates who could attract more traditional voters. Such de-recruitment strategies can be very effective at winnowing the field of potential candidates. However, in a few cases where they fail, and where party leaders believe one potential contender would be much stronger in the general election than another, the congressional campaign committees actively back one primary candidate.

Like political parties, many interest groups recruit candidates for public office. These include various labor unions; the Club for Growth, an anti-tax group that supports Republican candidates who favor free-market economics; the League of Conservation Voters, an environmental group that supports mainly Democrats; and EMILY'S List (whose motto is "Early Money is Like Yeast. . . . It makes the dough [i.e. money] rise"), which seeks to elect pro-choice Democratic women. Unlike political parties, however, these organizations become extremely involved in contested nomination contests, with some providing candidates with endorsements, monetary contributions, and campaign assistance during the primary season. They also supply campaigns with volunteers; air campaign advertisements on radio and television supporting one candidate (or opposing others); make similar appeals via mail, e-mail, or telephone; and mobilize their members on primary day.

Political parties and interest groups are much bolder about participating in the opposing party's nomination contests. The 2002 California gubernatorial contest provides a particularly

noteworthy example. Incumbent governor Gray Davis, who faced only token opposition in his race for the Democratic nomination, spent an estimated $10 million attacking former Los Angeles mayor and moderate Richard Riordan in the Republican primary. His goal was to boost the prospects of conservative businessman Bill Simon, who Davis and most Democrats considered the less viable of the two opponents. The plan ultimately succeeded as Simon defeated Riordan by roughly 49% of the vote to 31% in the Republican primary, and Davis went on to defeat Simon by 47% to 42% in the general election. Ironically, Davis was recalled in late 2003, less than a year after being reelected.

The influence of political parties and interest groups in the conduct and management of campaigns depends primarily on the resources those organizations can bring to bear on the campaign. In the case of presidential elections, the two major-party candidates, and some minor-party contestants, have sufficient financial and personnel resources to wage substantial campaigns. Party committees and allied interest groups typically assist presidential campaigns by providing financial and organizational support, communications, and voter mobilization assistance. In return, they may ask a candidate to visit a particular locality, make an effort to boost the prospects of a candidate for lower office, or draw attention to one or more issues when making a speech. The same type of cooperation exists in most gubernatorial campaigns.

Political parties, particularly congressional, senatorial, and state legislative campaign committees in many states, assist legislative candidates with hiring campaign aides and political consultants and with management, fundraising, communications, and other aspects of campaigning requiring specialized expertise.[15] These party committees maintain lists of qualified consultants, facilitate matchmaking between consultants and candidates, and provide some campaigns with general strategic and organizational advice. They also hold training seminars for candidates, campaign aides, and political activists.

However, in a small number of elections featuring candidates in very close contests, political parties and other groups often play larger roles.[16] Party operatives take a vigorous interest in ensuring these campaigns hire staff and consultants that have the ability to wage a strong campaign. They help the campaign write a sound campaign plan, and party field-staff routinely visit campaign headquarters to provide strategic advice and to report to their party committees about the campaign's progress. In a few cases, party committees, and some interest groups, dispatch some of their personnel to work full time on a campaign as well as state legislative or congressional staff to work in the final weeks. While most candidates appreciate the support they receive from these organizations, it can stir tensions because the campaign's own aides consider themselves experts on their candidate or the local strategic environment and the party and interest group aides consider themselves as experts on campaign politics. Some candidates and campaign aides view party and interest group personnel to be outsiders and are resentful of the roles they seek to assume in the campaign. Nevertheless, even these candidates and their aides usually accept advice from these individuals because to do otherwise could result in their campaigns being cut off from large contributions and other forms of campaign assistance.

Fundraising

The roles of party committees and interest groups in fundraising have increased considerably. The parties' congressional, senatorial, and state legislative campaign committees have become especially aggressive and adept at raising and channeling campaign money to specific candidates, namely those in competitive elections. In the first quarter of 2007, for instance, the DCCC raised $19 million while the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) raised $15.8 million.[17] Additionally, to boost its campaign coffers in order to protect its new majority the DCCC has implemented a new biannual dues structure that requires members to raise money specifically for the DCCC. Besides their regular party dues, House Democrats are now

required to pay the DCCC either $75,000 or $100,000—depending on different factors such as committee assignments—over the course of the two-year election cycle.[18] Members can meet their individual goals any number of ways: by hosting events specifically for the DCCC, making telephone calls, e-mailing or mailing solicitations, and by meeting with certain donors.

Some party committees and interest groups assist candidates with fundraising, provide candidates with lists of potential donors and give them advice on how to solicit contributions from them. They use letters, newsletters, e-mail, briefings, and other methods to circulate favorable information about the candidates they support to other donors that fall within their sphere of influence. And some organizations, mainly party committees, ask powerful officeholders to use their political muscle to encourage donors to contribute to other candidates who are in need of funds. This so-called "buddy system" works particularly well when legislative incumbents are paired with non-incumbents who share their political views.

The new roles of party committees and interest groups in fundraising have had a number of important consequences. They have contributed to the development of a more nationalized system of campaign finance and enhanced the parties' and interest groups' abilities to influence the flow of money in that system. They have the ability to regulate the flow of contributions to individual campaigns. Indeed, a direct effect of these organizations' efforts to control the flow of money to some campaigns is that others are starved for cash and unable to compete for votes.

Communications and Voter Mobilization

Although politicians and political consultants continually refine the techniques they use to gauge the public's mood, those used in the modern era are, for the most part, the same as those used in the era that preceded it. The major difference is that political parties and, to a lesser degree, interest groups have assumed larger roles in taking the electorate's political pulse. Some of these organizations take polls to encourage prospective candidates to run for office. These same organizations also use polling data when formulating their own campaign strategies and deciding how to distribute their campaign resources. In addition, party committees and interest groups routinely disseminate the results of national surveys and other research through newsletters they send to candidates, the media, and political activists. These organizations also conduct polls in a limited number of competitive elections and share the results with the candidates in those contests in order to improve the campaigns' decision making. Party and interest group polling has increased these organizations' influence in contemporary elections.

With the exception of the introduction of Internet and satellite television uplinks, only incremental changes have taken place in the techniques campaigns use to communicate with voters. What have changed are the roles of political parties and outside groups in assisting candidates gain access to, and in some cases utilize, these techniques. In the 1980s the parties' congressional campaign committees and some state legislative committees helped candidates with communicating with voters in several ways. Some candidates received basic party issue packages that also were sent to political activists or were given the use of generic television ads and assistance in customizing them with voiceovers and text. Others benefited from more individualized assistance, including extensive issue and opposition research, help with message development, and the use of party facilities and media experts in writing, recording, editing, and disseminating television, radio, and direct mail advertisements.[19]

These organizations continue to provide generic communications assistance to many candidates, but changes in technology have made it more cost-effective for candidates and consultants to tape and edit their own campaign ads. The typical House campaign, for instance, devotes more than one-third of its budget to broadcast media advertising (see Figure 2.2). Another one-fifth is committed to direct mail, campaign literature, and other communications. The remainder is committed to staff salaries, fundraising, other forms of overhead, and research.



Figure 2.2. The Budget of a Typical House Campaign

Source: Paul S. Herrnson, *Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004).

Note: Figures don't add to 100% due to rounding.

Parties continue to provide candidates with access to generic television ads, and they furnish access to satellite technology to candidates, mostly congressional incumbents, in Washington, D.C., that enables the candidates to interact in real time with their constituents. Most of the communications assistance that parties provide directly to contemporary campaigns involves furnishing candidates competing in close races with timely feedback on campaign ads. Using streaming video on the Internet, party communications staff can typically provide candidates with commentaries on their ads in a matter of hours, and sometimes even in minutes. In addition to the assistance they provide to campaign organizations, party committees (and some interest groups) also directly communicate with voters to influence the outcome of some elections.

Voter mobilization is a campaign activity that is often less candidate centered and involves substantial party and interest group involvement. The transference of funds raised by national party organizations to state and local party committees has helped local party organizations playing a greater role in these efforts. Similarly, financial and organizational improvements made by labor unions, conservative Christian groups, and other organizations have enabled them to play a larger role in mobilizing voters. The Democratic Party and labor unions had long established a coordinated voter mobilization program, which gave many Democratic candidates an advantage over Republicans, even when the former were outspent. The Republicans responded in 2002 by organizing their own nationally directed voter mobilization program, referred to as the "72 Hour Task Force." In 2004 the Republican Party took another step forward by introducing micro-targeting techniques developed in marketing research into the political arena. Micro-targeting involves creating voter files that combine previous election results with individuals' voter turnout histories, contact information, and demographic and consumer

information that is correlated with political preferences.[20] These data are used to identify partisan voters, and in some cases swing voters, and target them for personalized voter contacts to get them to vote.

The Impact of Campaigns on Election Outcomes

The pressures of modern campaigns are enormous. They consume time and energy as well as intellectual and financial resources. Successful campaigns for president, and statewide, as well as many congressional and some local offices typically require the analysis of massive amounts of data on previous voting patterns, the commissioning of polls to gauge voters' views about the issues and the candidates, the formulation of a campaign strategy, and the raising and spending of campaign funds. Attracting endorsements and free media coverage is also very important. Campaigns also require strong grassroots organizations for voter registration and GOTV drives. Political parties, labor unions, some trade associations, organizations associated with the religious right, and other causes assist some candidates with voter mobilization efforts.

Nevertheless, candidates do not begin (or end) the election season as equals when it comes to performing the tasks associated with campaigning or attracting the support of the media, parties, or interest groups. The power of incumbency provides overwhelming advantages to current officeholders. Some of these advantages come into play during the campaign season; others are relevant well before a prospective challenger may even decide on whether to run.

First, merely holding office provides most incumbents with resources they can use to strengthen their visibility and ties to their constituents well before the campaign season starts.[21] Pre-election efforts at generating name recognition and constituent approval provide incumbents with significant advantages once the election begins. Members of Congress, for example, are able to call on their congressional staff to help draft speeches, conduct research, write letters to constituents, perform casework, and win funding for federal projects or favorable tax considerations for local industries—allowing the member to claim credit for all of these efforts.[22] Free mailings, unlimited telephone service to home districts, Internet web sites, and access to television and radio recording studios, interpreting services, and graphic services assist members in broadcasting their accomplishments. The news media typically give the activities of sitting officeholders a reasonable amount of free news coverage. Although most of these efforts are considered part of a legislator's job, not campaigning, they enable members of Congress to increase their popularity among constituents, which, in turn, provides tremendous benefits once the campaign season begins.[23]

Second, as many challengers know all too well, incumbents have a clear advantage in campaign funding. Political action committees (PACs) and wealthy individual donors prefer to support incumbents more than challengers because they see incumbents as solid investments.[24] In the case of House incumbents, for example, the fact that more than 90% routinely win reelection encourages campaign donors who wish to influence public policy to funnel their resources to legislators who have a near-permanent hold on power rather than those who have little chance of acquiring it. During the 2006 congressional elections, for instance, incumbent House members of both parties raised roughly three times more money than their general election challengers. PACs were particularly generous with incumbents. Those in two-party contested elections raised, on average, nearly $531,000 from PACs, as opposed to the less than $43,000 raised by House challengers.[25] Additionally, many incumbents are able to use surplus money at the end of an election to finance skeletal campaign organizations between election cycles. These campaign organizations then fend off challengers, communicate with supporters, and prepare for the next election. Despite enacting various campaign finance reforms over the years, incumbents have perpetuated an election system that works to their advantage.

Third, when involved in close races, incumbents can rely on a disproportionate share of money and manpower from their party organizations and interest groups. Local party committees often provide assistance with registering voters, GOTV drives, direct mail, and providing campaign volunteers. State party committees help with other voter mobilization activities and money. While national party committees frequently provide information about voters, issue and opposition research, assistance with campaign communications, and fundraising to most candidates in competitive elections, protecting incumbents is their number one priority. They typically distribute substantial resources to incumbents in danger of losing their seats. They also frequently make independent expenditures designed to undermine whatever headway a challenger has made in building voter support. PACs and other interest groups also marshal their resources to come to the aid of incumbents in hotly contested contests. Often taking the form of television, radio, and direct mail advertisements, this spending is usually comparative or negative in tone and intended to undermine an opponent rather than enhance the reputation of the preferred candidate.[26]

Despite their near overwhelming advantages not all members of the US House, the US Senate, state legislatures, or the occupants of other offices win reelection. The benefits of incumbency do not automatically ensure success. In some situations, the national political climate combines with the local conditions and the efforts of individual candidates to enable a challenger to unseat even the most entrenched incumbent. Newly gerrymandered districts can also cause difficulties for incumbents. They have historically been less favorable to incumbents than other districts—although the House districts drawn following the 2000 census seem to have had the opposite influence.[27] Officeholders implicated in scandal are occasionally subject to voter backlash.[28] Moreover, a strong party agenda can force incumbents to confront difficult issues, which sometimes turns them out of office in a tidal wave that washes in large numbers of the opposing party. During the 1994 elections, for example, Republicans railed against what they labeled a White House and Democratic-controlled Congress that were corrupt and out of step with voters. They offered as an alternative a national platform called the "Contract with America" and succeeded in winning control of both Houses of Congress for the first time in forty years. In 2006 the Democrats took a page from the Republican playbook by offering their "Six for '06" campaign agenda that outlined six broad legislative goals, along with a promise for a new direction on the Iraq war. Combined with their attacks on the Republican-led administration's response to Hurricane Katrina and the scandals that roiled the Republican-controlled Congress, the Democrats were able to win back both houses of Congress for the first time in twelve years. It is important to note that these instances are more the exception than the norm. In general, few challengers are able to mount the sort of campaign needed to overcome the advantages of incumbency and changes in party control of Congress have been relatively rare.

Conclusion

Political campaigns in the United States have progressed through many stages, often in response to changes in the larger strategic environment in which elections are conducted. Early in US history, before the days of mass suffrage, campaigns consisted primarily of informal caucusing among those few political elites who enjoyed the right to vote. With the rise of mass suffrage and strong party organizations, the party-centered era took hold. During this period, local party machines dominated most aspects of political campaigning, including candidate selection, recruitment, campaign strategy, and the implementation of the campaign itself. Regulatory reform and broader systemic change in society resulted in candidates becoming more self-selected and campaigns becoming more candidate centered. Political parties and interest groups responded to the candidate-centered system, finding ways to assume important supplement roles

in elections. Despite this last set of changes, most elections in the United States remain candidate centered and uncompetitive. Top-of-the-ticket races, such as presidential and gubernatorial contests, may generate strong competition, but the vast majority of congressional, state legislative, and local elections usually begin and end with the incumbent enjoying a commanding lead.

Notes

The views expressed here are those of the authors and not of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the United States government.

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3 See Robert L. Dudley and Alan R. Gitelson, *American Elections: The Rules Matter* (New York: Longman Publishers, 2002); and Harold F. Bass, Jr., "Partisan Rules, 1946–1996," in *Partisan Approaches to Postwar American Politics*, ed. Byron E. Shafer (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 1998), 220–70.
4 See Larry Sabato, *The Rise of the Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections* (New York: Basic Books, 1981).
5 A. James Reichley, *The Life of the Parties: A History of American Political Parties* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), ch. 7.
6 See John H. Aldrich, *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
7 See David Menefee-Libey, *The Triumph of Campaign-Centered Politics* (New York: Chatham House, 2000).
8 See Robert J. Dinkin, *Campaigning in America: A History of Election Practices* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989); Sandy L. Maisel, *Parties and Elections in America: The Electoral Process*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); and Dennis W. Johnson, "The Business of Political Consulting," in *Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections*, ed. James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 37–52.
9 See David A. Dulio, *For Better or Worse? How Political Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2004).
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11 Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*, 117–24, 157–61.
12 Stephen K. Medvic, *Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2001), 115.
13 Medvic, *Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections*, 115, 129–32; Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*, 237–8; and Paul S. Herrnson, "Campaign Professionalism and Fundraising in Congressional Elections," *Journal of Politics* 54 (1992): 859–70.
14 Paul S. Herrnson, *Party Campaigning in the 1980s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); and L. Sandy Maisel, Cherie Maestas, and Walter J. Stone, "The Party Role in Congressional Competition," in *The Parties Respond: Changes in American Parties and Campaigns*, 4th ed., ed. L. Sandy Maisel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 121–38.
15 Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*, 105–16; and Robin Kolodny, "Electoral Partnerships: Political Consultants and Political Parties," in *Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections*, ed. James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 110–32. See also Robin Kolodny and Angela Logan, "Political Consultants and the Extension of Party Goals," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31 (2) (1998): 155–9.
16 Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*, 96–131.
17 Lauren W. Whittington, "DCCC Fundraising Surges," *Roll Call*, April 19, 2007, http://www.rollcall.com/issues/52_111/news/18060-1.html.
18 House Democrats assign biannual dues on a sliding scale. Those in leadership owe $600,000, for instance, while rank-and-file members sitting on nonexclusive committees pay $125,000. Members of the five exclusive committees—Appropriations, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Rules, and Financial Services—each owe $150,000, while the chairs of those committees are responsible for $300,000.
19 Herrnson, *Party Campaigning in the 1980s*, 46–111.

20 Matt Bai, "The Multilevel Marketing of the President," *New York Times Magazine*, April 25, 2004.
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23 Michael John Burton and Daniel M. Shea, *Campaign Mode: Strategic Vision in Congressional Elections* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 139.
24 Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*, ch. 6; Peter L. Francia, John C. Green, Paul S. Herrnson, Lynda W. Powell, and Clyde Wilcox, *The Financiers of Congressional Elections* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 99–121.
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26 Ken Goldstein and Joel Rivlin, "Political Advertising in the 2002 and 2004 Elections," University of Wisconsin at Madison, Wisconsin Advertising Project, 2002, updated February 2005, ch. 5, www.polisci.wisc.edu/tvadvertising/Analysis%20of%20the%202000%20elections.htm.
27 However, the districts drawn following the 2000 elections form an important exception to that generalization. See, e.g. Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*, 242–3.
28 See, for example, Gary C. Jacobson and Michael Dimock, "Checking Out: The Effects of Bank Overdrafts on the 1992 House Election," *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (1994): 601–24.

3

Political Consulting Worldwide

Fritz Plasser

The worldwide market for political consultancy and campaign communication is a multi-billion-dollar market. In the United States nearly $2 billion flowed through consultants in 2003–2004 federal elections. About 600 professional consultants were paid more than a combined $1.85 billion according to a review conducted by the Center of Public Integrity. Abundant spending on campaign communication and strategic advice is not confined to the United States. Total expenditures for the recent Brazilian and Mexican presidential campaigns exceeded $600 million. About 60% of that amount has been spent on campaign communication and the production of vivid television spots crafted by top media consultants and advertising agencies. In Russia the gray market in elections is at least $1 billion a year. In the Asia-Pacific region more than $1 billion is spent on campaign communication every election cycle. Even in Western Europe where expensive paid political television advertising campaigns are rare exceptions and campaigns are planned and directed by professional party managers, there are business opportunities for external political consultants. In the United Kingdom Labour and the Tories spent more than $2 million on outside consultants in 2005. About the same amount has been spent in Italy in 2006 by Forza Italia and Ulivo on strategic advice by American overseas consultants. In 2006 even in a small country such as Austria the Social Democrats spent considerable money on advice and services provided by a team of top US consultants.

Extensive spending on campaign consultancy can also be observed in developing and emerging democracies often funded by international democracy assistance programs.[1] A rough estimate of current annual total party aid worldwide—often concentrating on campaign-related aid and covering the expenditures for the services of political consultants—would be approximately $200 million.[2] The flow of campaign money in some of the least developed countries in Asia and Africa is almost surreal. The annual worldwide election market can be roughly estimated at $6 to 8 billion depending on the respective election calendar and election cycles.[3] Although the bulk of campaign spending covers expenses for paid media, buying airtime, production of television spots, print advertising, posters, organization of mass rallies and logistics, and only a fraction of the total expenditures is direct income to political consultants and their firms, the political market of 123 electoral democracies worldwide is a flourishing business for campaign professionals, pollsters, marketing experts and advertising agencies.

Until recently no systematic research on the practices of political consultants outside the United States had been carried out apart from anecdotal evidence. In the meantime there are numerous studies dealing with the ongoing internationalization of professional political

consulting.[4] Starting with the worldwide proliferation of modern campaign expertise and the activities of overseas consultants, I will concentrate on country-specific consultancy practices before discussing the variety of role definitions of a worldwide sample of campaign professionals based on the Global Political Consultancy Project.[5]

Professionalization of Campaigning Worldwide

During the last decades, the style and practice of election campaigns have been modernized and professionalized according to country- and culture-specific variations.[6] A comparison of actual changes in campaign practices shows several macro-trends, which can be observed in industrial democracies as well as in democracies of economically less developed countries.[7] The first and presumably most important trend is the exclusive television-centeredness of campaign communication. Television nowadays is the primary source of news in almost all countries. Campaigns are won or lost during an intensive encounter between candidates and parties primarily fought on television. The contestants are trying to present their topics in a favorable way and to reach undecided voters with carefully defined messages and planned, camera-ready events.

The second macro-trend is the growing importance of paid television advertising with consequently increasing campaign expenditures.[8] While there were worldwide only four countries in the 1970s permitting candidates and parties the purchase of television time, it was also possible to buy television time for political advertising in sixty countries at the end of the 1990s. With the exception of Western European democracies where only six countries allow paid political television advertising with considerable limitations, paid television campaigning replaced the traditional media and forums of campaigning such as posters, print ads and mass rallies in most of the countries.

The third macro-trend is the growing importance of television debates between leading politicians. Such debates represent the culmination of election campaigns in at least fifty countries, compared to only ten countries at the end of the 1970s.[9] This in turn leads to the fourth macro-trend: the increased personalization of election campaigns. Even in countries with party-centered election systems and strong party organizations, campaigns increasingly focus upon the personality of top candidates.[10] The communication of messages requires a messenger. In media-centered democracies this means that party leaders take over the central communication tasks in front of the television cameras. Attentive observers of campaign practices in Western Europe, where the prevailing election formula is proportional representation and the decisive vote is the vote for a party, speak of a trend toward presidentialization in the sense of moving away from party-centered election campaigns to media-centered personality campaigns.[11]

The fifth macro-trend is the growing importance of professional campaign managers and external political consultants. The worldwide diffusion of American campaign techniques and the progressive professionalization of leading staff members within the party headquarters transformed election campaigning from an activity of amateurs into a highly professional enterprise.[12] Both observations point to specialists, who are either recruited from a circle of external political consultants or well-educated and qualified party staff members.

The transformation of political campaign practices during the past decades can be divided into *three* consecutive phases, which in practice, of course, are overlapping (see Table 3.1).[13] The first phase could be described as a party-dominated style of campaigning based on substantial messages, programmatic differences, a party-oriented press and the loyalties of core groups of the electorate. The second phase, starting in the 1960s, was characterized by the spread of television as the dominant medium of political communication. In order to cope with the structural requirements of a visual and scenic medium, candidates and parties had to accept the standards of a new media logic based upon the communicative abilities of the candidates, their competence of

Table 3.1. Modeling Changing Campaign Practices Worldwide

Phase	*Traditional*	*Modern*	*Postmodern*
Mode of Political Communication Systems	Party-dominated	Television-centered	Multiple channels and multi-media
Dominant Style of Political Communication	Messages along party lines	Sound bites, image and impression management	Narrow-casted, targeted micro-messages
Media	Partisan press, posters, newspaper adverts, radio broadcasts	Television broadcasts through main evening news	Television narrow-casting, targeted direct mail and e-mail campaigns
Dominant Advertising Media	Print advertisments, posters, leaflets, radio speeches and mass rallies	Nationwide television advertisements, colorful posters and magazine adverts, mass direct mailings	Targeted television advertisements, e-mail campaigns and telemarketing, web-based videos, YouTube and blogs
Campaign Coordination	Party leaders and leading party staff	Party campaign managers and external media, advertising and survey experts	Special party campaign units and more specialized political consultants
Dominant Campaign Paradigm	Organization and party logic	Television-focused media logic	Data bank-based marketing logic
Preparations	Short-term, ad hoc	Long-term campaign	Permanent campaign
Campaign Expenditures	Low budget	Increasing	Spiraling up
Electorate	Cleavage- and group-based stable voting behavior	Erosion of party-attachments and rising volatility	Issue-based and highly volatile voting behavior

Source: Plasser, *Global Political Campaigning: A Worldwide Analysis of Campaign Professionals and Their Practices* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 6.

self-presentation, impression management and the creation of camera-ready events.[14] With these changes a new entrepreneurial profession entered the political market place: political consultants specialized on strategic communication, image-building, the production of television spots and extensive opinion research.[15] A new style of candidate-centered politics replaced the old style of party-centered election campaigns; and since the parties did not have any experts in that field, they hired external advisors, especially advertising and marketing experts for strategic planning and management tasks.[16]

The third, still developing phase of political campaigning is characterized by a fragmentation of television channels and target groups, the intrusion of Internet and bloggers into the campaign process as well as the transformation of large-scale campaign messages into micro-messages targeted to carefully defined voter segments. The negative tone of mass media reporting becomes more intensive and reacts upon advanced techniques of news management. The increasing professional competence of public relations experts and media advisors is defining, shaping and spinning campaign news and this leads to another factor changing the practice of electioneering: the marketing-revolution of campaigns.

In confrontation with the progressive erosion of party loyalties and the growth of voter mobility the practice of selling politics has been replaced step by step by a political marketing approach.[17] Standardized campaign operations characterized by political marketing contain: careful segmentation of the electoral market, strategic positioning toward the political opponent,

research-supported development of micro-messages appealing to the needs and emotions of selected groups of target voters, rigid message discipline and intensive use of focus groups.[18]

Core features of traditional campaign practices were:

- their concentration upon the personal communication with voters in form of canvassing, door-to-door contacts, party meetings and mass rallies;
- the importance of the party press, the widespread use of posters, stickers, brochures and print ads or radio speeches of party politicians and candidates to mobilize the core voters; as well as
- a party- and organization-centered approach to planning and waging election campaigns.

In comparison, professional campaign practices are based on:

- the available media formats of political television and professional techniques of news management, impression management, arranged camera-ready events and the potential of viral marketing activities;
- but equally upon political television advertising in the form of free air time or as paid television advertising campaigns replacing traditional campaign media such as posters, print ads and mass rallies by web-based videos, e-mails, direct mail-campaigns; as well as
- professional political consultants, pollsters, media, marketing and political management experts responsible for primarily candidate-centered and media-driven campaigns.[19]

Regarding the professionalization of election campaigns, the United States is considered to be a role model of campaigning in the view of European, Latin American and Asian campaign managers. Campaign techniques originally developed in the United States found worldwide acceptance.[20] In fact, American presidential election campaigns have become a political shopping mall for foreign campaign managers, a virtual political supermarket for new campaign techniques and campaign innovations, which they leave after their selective shopping tours with filled baskets. The most widespread model for the transfer of select techniques and innovations of American election campaigns is the *shopping model*, where concrete practices and methods of American election campaigns suitable for unproblematic use in the national context are imported to Europe, Latin America or Asia in modified form.[21] There would be, however, more consequences in the case of taking over the *adoption model*, where foreign campaign managers also try to accept the strategic axioms of American campaign activists and transfer the political logic of competition in American presidential campaigns to their national parliamentary campaigns. In the end this would actually lead to a transformation of the worldwide campaign styles in the direction of "global reproduction of American politics."[22]

While the *adoption model* results in a gradual standardization of election practices following the American role model of campaigns in media-centered democracies (for which no empirical evidence exists until now), the *shopping model* leads to a hybridization of the international practice of election campaigning. *Hybridization* of campaign practices stands in this context for a supplementation of country- and culture-specific campaign traditions by select components of a media- and marketing-oriented campaign style which, however, needs to be oriented in no way exclusively on the American role model.[23]

The British campaign for the general election of 2005 represents an impressive example of hybridization of European election campaigns. The Conservative Party hired two Australian campaign experts, Lynton Crosby and Mark Textor, specialists in marginal-seat campaigns (regional mobilization of target groups in highly competitive districts), as well as negative attack campaigns, who took over the planning and management of the Conservatives' campaign. At the same time the Conservatives imported software from the strategic data bank maintained by the

Republican Party in the United States during the presidential campaign of 2004. The Labour Party on the other hand relied, just like during previous general elections, on the expertise of a team of high ranking political consultants from the United States, who had given strategic and advertising advice to the Democratic presidential candidates during the American presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. Directing the campaign of the Labour Party, however, were British campaign strategists who themselves had been involved in the planning of American presidential election campaigns as foreign experts in the past years. The British example of a selective takeover of foreign expertise, which agrees with the institutional and cultural rules of the national competitive system, corresponds better with the manifold reality of European or Latin American election campaigns than the misleading idea of a global standardization of campaign practices.

Worldwide Activities of Political Consultants

American overseas consultants have played a leading role in the worldwide proliferation of professional election campaign techniques. The extremely high number of political consultancy firms within the United States, the intensifying competition for lucrative contracts, the increasing cost of overheads at the full service-companies, and the cyclic dynamics of the political consultancy business caused leading representatives during the 1980s either to switch to corporate consulting and public affairs management[24] or motivated them to look for new markets outside the United States. Pioneers of the political consulting business such as the legendary Joseph Napolitan made their first experiences as American overseas consultants during the 1960s. At the end of the 1990s more than 50% of all American top political consultants had worked as overseas consultants in around eighty countries.[25] Clearly the most important market for the services of American overseas consultants is Latin America, followed by Western Europe, East-Central and Eastern Europe, while the electoral markets of Asia and Africa have only been entered on a commercial basis by few American consultants so far.[26] Although only a small fraction of American overseas consultants can be classified as super consultants, earning more than 50% from their work overseas, a global electoral market for American political consultants has evolved, contributing to the worldwide diffusion of American campaign techniques and campaign expertise.

According to our Global Political Consultancy Survey, one-third of the interviewed party managers and consultants outside the United States have cooperated with an American consultant during the last years.[27] In the late 1990s, American consultants worked in almost all Western European countries. The situation is similar in the new democracies in East-Central Europe, where market-driven activities of American overseas consultants, combined with donor-driven activities of democracy assistance programs, have led to a sustainable influx of American campaign expertise. American consultants frequently have been involved in Latin American countries, worked in Australian campaigns, traveled to the Philippines and South Korea and temporarily left their footprints also in Russian presidential campaigns. With the notable exception of Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia and India, where severe cultural and regulatory constraints represent a barrier that is only rarely overcome by US consultants[28] and francophone Africa, where French top consultants dominate the electoral markets, American consultants shaped campaign practices worldwide to a considerable degree.[29] (On Philippine elections, see Chapter 26 by Louis Perron; on Asian elections see Chapter 27 by Christian Schafferer.)

In addition to market-driven activities of prominent US consultants, campaign training seminars, trade journals and academic programs such as the high-quality curriculum of the Graduate School of Political Management (GSPM) at the George Washington University, contributed to the worldwide diffusion of American campaign expertise. In addition, democracy assistance programs of such organizations as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), International Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute (NDI) or the US Agency for

International Development (USAID) invested hundreds of millions of dollars in campaign-related aid to emerging democracies.[30] Using the expertise and services of US consultants, but increasingly from other countries, donor-driven party aid covers fundraising, platform development, message development, polling, recruitment and training of staff and volunteers, door-to-door outreach, media relations, ad writing and placement, public speaking for candidates, and get-out-the-vote campaigns.[31] These programs also provide instructive training opportunities for domestic campaign staffers interested in state of the art techniques of political management. In addition, transnational and regional political consultancy associations have a key function in the worldwide dissemination of professional campaign know-how (see Table 3.2). These networks are platforms for exchanging experience and discussing the latest trends and innovations in international election campaigns. In the meantime there is a worldwide network of professional associations emerging, indicating the globalization and professionalization of the political consultancy business.

Although every year more than a hundred US consultants spend considerable time overseas as campaign advisors, media experts, pollsters, webmasters or guest speakers at professional conferences and party campaign manager seminars, the international demand for American political consultants actually concentrates on a few superstars of consultancy business. Largely they are former advisors of American presidential candidates or leading figures of the American political consultancy business. Celebrities in the international consultancy market are the former Clinton advisor Dick Morris, who has been involved in dozens of Latin American presidential campaigns in Mexico, Argentina, Honduras, Venezuela, Uruguay and Guyana, worked as consultant in dozens of Western and Eastern European campaigns and recently acted as campaign consultant to the Yushenko presidential campaign in the Ukraine. Also there is James Carville, who with Philip Gould and Stanley Greenberg founded in 1997 the London-based opinion polling group and transnational consulting organization GGC/NOP; Carville is also partner in the global political consultancy and strategy company Greenberg Carville Shrum. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research is also a pre-eminent international political consultancy firm. The team around Stanley Greenberg has been involved in campaigns in over sixty countries so far and was consulting among others in three campaigns of Tony Blair (United Kingdom), the 1998 election campaign of Gerhard Schröder (Germany), and the 1999 and 2001 campaigns of Ehud Barak (Israel). In 2006 they advised the Labour candidate Amir Peretz in Israel, the successor to Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, several Latin American presidential candidates and were also involved in numerous West European parliamentary campaigns.

Table 3.2. Transnational and Regional Political Consultancy Associations

Platform	*Founded*	*Members (approx.)*
International Association of Political Consultants (IAPC)	1968	120
American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC)	1969	1,100[a]
Associacao Brasileira de Consultores Politices (ABCOP)	1991	100
Association of Professional Political Consultants (APPC) (UK)	1994	35[b]
European Association of Political Consultants (EAPC)	1996	75
Associacion Latinoamericana de Consultores Politicos (ALACOP)	1996	60
Associazione Italiana Consulenti Politici (AICP)	1999	50
Association of (Russian) Political Consulting Centers (ACPK)	2000	40[b]
German Association of Political Consulting (degepol)	2002	70
Asia Pacific Association of Political Consultants (APAPC)	2005	50
Asociacion Espanola de Consultores Politicos (AESCOP)	2007	20

Notes:
a Additionally there are about 600 corporate members.
b Only corporate membership for consulting firms.

An impressive example of the increasingly global market activities of American top consultants is VOX Global Mandate SM, a worldwide operating cooperation of three leading consulting firms headquartered in Washington D.C. and London. It offers its services to candidates, political parties and democracy movements worldwide. Top strategists of these three consulting firms have been involved in more than 500 presidential, prime minister and party election campaigns worldwide. Similarly impressive is the list of clients of Penn, Schoen and Berland (PSB), which offered polling operations and strategic advice in over seventy campaigns outside the United States. PSB offered its services to more than twenty presidential campaigns in the Far East, Latin America, Western Europe, Georgia and Ukraine. PSB also was involved in Slobodan Milosevic's overthrow in the Serbian presidential election of 2000, which may go down in history as the first poll-driven, focus-group-tested democratic revolution based on the expertise of American consultants.[32]

The heavy engagement of American overseas consultants leads increasingly to the paradox of American consultants facing each other as campaign opponents. Examples of such paradox competitions between American consultants are the parliamentary election in Israel 2006 (James Carville, Stanley Greenberg and Robert Shrum versus Arthur Finkelstein), Italy 2006 (Frank Luntz versus Stanley Greenberg), Mexico 2006 (Dick Morris versus James Carville) and the Ukraine 2006, where former Clinton's Chief of Staff John Podesta and former Clinton's Press Secretary Michael McCurry advised Yushenkov's Our Ukraine bloc, while the former campaign manager of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, Paul Manafort, advised Yanukovych's Party of Regions. The third candidate, Yulia Tymoshenko, refrained from hiring American overseas consultants and relied on the advice of prominent European consultants. (On the Israeli elections, see Chapter 23 by Dahlia Scheindlin and Israel Waismel-Manor; on Russian elections, see Chapter 24 by Derek S. Hutcheson.)

In the 2006 Ukraine presidential election as well as in the 2007 parliamentary elections, candidates and parties exclusively used the expertise of Western political consultants, while the 2004 Ukraine presidential campaign stood for a clash between two cultures of consultants: The pro-Western coalition *Nasha Ukraine* (Our Ukraine) was supported by a team of high ranking American consultants (among them PSB and Aristotle International Inc.), while the Yanukovych election group, which was preferred by the Kremlin, got support for its campaign from the elite of Russian spin doctors such as Gleb Pavlovsky, the Head of the Foundation for Effective Politics, and dozens of other leading Russian political technologists. Pavlovsky, Markov and other Russian top public relations consultants had been hired on request of the Kremlin and Russian business corporations invested about $300 million in Yanukovych's campaign. Similarly conflicting consultancy battles also took place in Georgia and in other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, where the Kremlin tried to influence the outcome of the elections based on strategic and economic motives.

A fierce *guerra de asesores* is also fought on the heatedly contested Latin American consultancy market, where often two teams of US consultants have found themselves in opposing camps during election campaigns.[33] Since the 1980s, leading figures of the American consultancy business have been specializing on Latin American *campanas electorales*. Top consultants such as Ralph D. Murphine have been involved in sixteen Latin American presidential campaigns; others such as Gary Nordlinger focused on the subpresidential level and specialized on gubernatorial and mayoral campaigns. Super consultants such as Dick Morris, James Carville, Stanley Greenberg, Douglas Schoen and Gary Nordlinger—just to mention a few—spend considerable time in Latin America and have been involved in dozens of presidential and gubernatorial campaigns. Their competitors are not only American colleagues and domestic Latin American consultants, but with increasing frequency also top French consultants, who are trying to get a hold on the Latin American electoral market. French *conseils politiques* such as Jacques Seguela (Havas), Stephane Fouks (EURO RSGG Worldwide) and Thierry Saussez (Image et Strategie) have been involved

in several presidential campaigns in Latin American countries during the past years, but also top Russian consultants such as Igor Mintusov (Niccolo M.) and Alexei P. Sitnikov (Image Kontakt) exported Russian campaign know-how to Bolivia, Chile, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

However, the fiercest competition in Latin America does not take place between overseas consultants from the United States and Europe, but between Latin American *consultores politicos*, who specialized on interregional campaign consulting. Two to three dozen Brazilian, Argentine and Venezuelan political consultants divide the Latin American consultancy market up between themselves and compete for attractive consultancy contracts. Carlos Manhanelli, the founder of the Brazilian professional association ABCOP, has been engaged in more than 200 campaigns in Brazil and other Latin American countries. The activities of the former superstar of Brazilian consultancy business, Duda Mendonca, are legendary; he helped Luiz Lula de Silva win the presidency and appeared as a highly paid and visible advisor in dozens of Latin American election campaigns until his career experienced a setback in 2005 following his involvement in the *escandalo do mensalao* (political corruption and illegal party financing). Another Brazilian super consultant is *publicitario* Nizan Guanaes (DM9, São Paulo), who was the top advisor of Fernando Cardoso in 1994 and 1998 and managed the election campaign of Jose Serra, going up against consultant Mendonca in 2002. Prominent *consultores politicos* such as Carballido, Chavarria, Hugo Haime, Felipe Noguera and Pessoa, to name only a few leading figures, have frequently been involved in presidential and gubernatorial campaigns across Latin America.[34] In the meantime Latin American election campaigns have become multinational operations in political management. In 2006 in Venezuela there were, besides the domestic advisors, also consultants from Mexico, Cuba and the US engaged in the campaign. In other campaigns there was a mix of Brazilian, Argentine, American and Russian consultancy styles, resulting in a *hibridez de estilos communicionales y technologias*, as attentive observers described the reality of consultant- and money-driven campaigns in Latin America.[35]

As mentioned before, US political consultants have no monopoly on the international electoral market and since the 1990s, they have seen themselves confronted with increasing competition by a new generation of highly professional regional consultants, many of whom made their first professional experiences as staff members of American consultants before they founded their own companies. One example showing the spin off of American consultants' expertise is the election campaign in Israel in 2006. As in past elections Amir Peretz, the candidate of the Labour Party, relied on the know-how of Stanley Greenberg and Mark Penn and Doug Schoen, while Benjamin Netanyahu, the candidate of the Likud Bloc, used the hard-hitting advice of Arthur J. Finkelstein from New York City. But the winner, Ehud Olmert and his newly founded Kadima Party, was exclusively advised by younger Israeli consultants who had cooperated with American consultants as domestic junior partners in earlier campaigns.

While American overseas consultants operate on the highly competitive electoral markets in Latin America, French *conseils politiques* control the lucrative market in the francophone countries of Africa. Thierry Saussez (Image et Strategie), who advised Jacques Chirac, Alain Juppe, Edouard Balladur and in 2007 Nicolas Sarkoszy in France, specialized on consulting African presidential candidates, and has been involved in large-scale and highly expensive presidential campaigns in numerous countries such as the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Togo and Congo-Brazaville.[36] Claude Marti and Bernard Rideau are also French superstar overseas consultants, and have been active, along with others, as political consultants in Burkina Faso, Gabun, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo among others. Besides French *conseils politiques* there were also American top consultants such as Paul Manafort involved as strategic advisors in Angola, Congo, Nigeria and Somalia during the past years. With the exception of South Africa, where the African National Congress (ANC) uses American consultants along with domestic experts and the opposition party Democratic Alliance engages British and West European advisors, the African electoral market is primarily an area of business for French political consultants.

Next to the American overseas consultants, leading Latin American *consultores politicos* and French *conseils politiques*, also Russian spin doctors have established themselves on the international political consultancy market since the middle of the 1990s. They first concentrated on the neighboring CIS countries but in the meantime also have invaded overseas markets. The increased international activity of leading Russian spin doctors is a reaction to incisive changes within the domestic consulting scene as well. Since a few years ago the Russian political consulting market has been characterized by a process of concentration in the direction of large-scale firms with links to the Kremlin parties of power.[37] Today the consultancy market is already dominated by a few large multi-disciplinary corporations such as the Center of Political Research Nikkolo M. (Igor Mintusov and Ekaterina Egorova), the Foundation for Effective Politics (Gleb Pavlosky), Image-Kontakt (Alexei P. Sitnikov), Novkom and the Center of Political Technologies.

Apart from freelancing *prshchiks*, a pejorative Russian term for superficial image-handlers, the Russian elite consultants do not see themselves primarily as political consultants, but as political technologists, which can mean

> a policy analyst or political consultant; it can mean an expert in "black PR" or in containing the political environment; but it can also mean a Kremlin insider or a political provocateur. What makes political technologists a different species from the other election strategists or PR consultants is their direct or indirect connection to the Kremlin.[38]

In Vladimir Putin's managed democracy the access to the corridors of power and to state-controlled administrative resources are preconditions of successful campaigns.[39]

Following the recent incisive reforms of the Russian electoral process such as the abolishment of the direct election of half of the Duma representatives, the introduction of a party-centered list-voting system, and the nomination of provincial governors instead of their direct election, attentive observers expect a dramatic curtailment of the Russian consultancy market. In order to finance their staff and overheads between the election cycles, the remaining Russian consulting firms will appear even more often as advisors outside of Russia. Already Russian political consultants have been involved in election campaigns in Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. Beside their operations in CIS countries and several East-Central European countries, some top Russian consultants have also been engaged in campaigns in Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Obviously the Russian style of consultancy, preferring hard-hitting attacks, using dirty technologies, "black PR," and their expertise in influencing the electoral process through administrative resources and media structures[40] seems to correspond to a Third World-style of campaigning prevalent in fragile electoral democracies in the Latin American, Asian and African regions.

In the Asia-Pacific region mainly Australian campaign professionals appear as overseas consultants. Sydney-based firms such as Anderson & Company, the Hawker-Britten political consulting group, and Malcolm McGregor, Ian Kortlang, John Utting and Nick Straves, to name only a few leading Australian consultants, offer their services not only to Australian and New Zealand candidates but also to clients in Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. Recently two Australian top consultants, Lynton Crosby and Mark Textor, have been in charge as campaign managers of the British Conservatives. Similar to the African electoral market, the Asia-Pacific region represents an emerging market for international consultants. At present only a few professional political consultancy firms are operating in the market, but the recent founding of an Asia-Pacific Association of Political Consultants is a sign that the Asian consultancy market has started to move as well. (On Australian elections, see Chapter 25 by Ian Ward.)

Prominent representatives of the Asian political consultancy business, which so far has only been accessible in exceptional cases for selected American overseas consultants, are in Japan.

Takayoshi Miyagawa (Center for Political Relations Inc.), Hiroshi Miura (Ask Co.), a political consulting firm that so far advised already more than 200 Japanese candidates, and Kazuo Maeda, a professional campaign advisor in Tokyo. Political consultants who are known outside their own countries are Kim Hak-Ryang from South Korea and Wu Hsiang-hui from Taiwan. The interregional consulting networks in Asia are currently only loosely tied and election campaigns in countries such as Japan, India and Taiwan are almost exclusively supported by domestic expertise.[41]

The political consulting networks in Western Europe are comparatively also loosely tied and quite informal.[42] Few European political advisors are working outside their own countries. Interregional political consulting in Western Europe is limited to regular meetings and campaign manager seminars organized through the networks of conservative or social democratic parties and serving the mutual exchange of experiences. While American overseas consultants have been engaged in most West European countries, there exists only a handful of European political consultants who have been involved in four of five European parliamentary campaigns outside their own country. The regional fragmentation of the European consultancy markets has several causes. On the one side is the market for strategic consultancy services strongly segmented by party loyalties and the ideological background of external consultants, on the other side the professionalization of political management in Europe has taken a completely different direction than in the United States or in Latin America.

External professionalization is characteristic for the United States. Candidates hire professional, external advisors who offer their specific expertise to a candidate against payment. However, in Europe *internal* professionalization dominates.[43] Qualified staff members who are fully employed at the party headquarters meet more or less those political management and strategic tasks in parliamentary election campaigns that are fulfilled by external consultants in the United States.[44] If external communication and campaign consultants are contracted by European parties, they work in a team with internal staff experts and are tied to the programmatic party lines as well as the strategic decisions of leading official party managers. On the contrary, advisors of American candidates are obliged primarily to their candidates, which consequently leads to autonomous, party distant, exclusively candidate-centered election campaigns.[45]

In spite of the regional fragmentation and internal professionalization of the European practice of political management, the European consultancy market has started to move during the past years. A new generation of ambitious and qualified entrepreneurs founded consulting firms in Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Sweden, and media, public affairs and corporate consulting in Europe has turned into a growth industry. But in spite of the multitude of European consulting firms the degree of professionalization of the political consultancy business still differs significantly from that in the US. It is predominantly former politicians, party managers or political journalists who start a second professional career as self-employed advisors. The majority of these newly founded consulting firms specializes in media consulting, public relations, media training and coaching, and primarily uses the advantages of professional contacts and personal networks from their previous activities. Only during the last few years has a definite professional development in the direction of strategic political consulting taken place. In the meantime several European universities offer special programs and MA curricula for political management, political consultancy and public affairs management. The graduates of these programs represent the second generation of European political advisors, who are equally familiar with the techniques of American consultants in Washington, D.C., as they are with the practices of European lobbying in Brussels. Should an increased coordination and cooperation of European party alliances develop within the next few years, this could also lead to a Europeanization of national election campaigns and the formation of a genuine European consultancy market.

Professional Orientations of Political Consultants Worldwide

The worldwide proliferation of modern campaign techniques has resulted in an ongoing process of professionalization and internationalization of electioneering and campaign practices in media-centered democracies. As seen in Table 3.3, rather than an American-dominated one-way transfer we have to differentiate between several paths of diffusion of modern campaign expertise determined by country-specific institutional arrangements, regulatory frameworks, electoral laws, candidate-centered versus party-centered campaign styles and external versus internal professionalization of campaign managers, putting severe constraints on campaign and consultancy practices worldwide.

Table 3.3. Campaign Regulations and Campaign Practices in Thirty-Seven Countries

Countries	*Public Funding of Campaigns*	*Ceiling on Campaign Expenditures*	*Restrictions on Political Advertising Practices*	*Dominant Medium of Political Advertising*	*Development of General Campaign Strategies*	*Frequent Cooperation with US Overseas Consultants*
Argentina	Yes[a]	Yes[c]	No	TV-ads, Mass Rallies	Consultants	Yes
Australia	Yes	No	No	TV-ads, Direct Mail	Party staff	Yes
Austria	Yes	No	No	Print-ads, Posters	Party staff	Yes
Bolivia	Yes[a]	No	No	TV-ads, Mass Rallies	Consultants	Yes
Brazil	Yes[a]	No	Yes	TV-ads, Mass Rallies	Consultants	No
Bulgaria	Yes	Yes	No	Posters, Mass Rallies	Party staff	No
Canada	Yes	Yes	Yes	TV-ads, Direct Mail	Party staff	Yes
Chile	No	No	Yes	Posters, Print-ads	Party staff	No
Columbia	Yes[a]	Yes[c]	No	TV-ads, Mass Rallies	Consultants	Yes
Czech Rep.	Yes	No	No	Posters, Print-ads	Party staff	No
Finland	No	No	No	TV-ads, Print-ads	Party staff	No
France	Yes	Yes	Yes	Posters, TV-ads	Consultants	Yes
Germany	Yes	No	No	Posters, Print-ads	Party staff	Yes
Greece	Yes	No	No	TV-ads, Posters	Party staff	Yes
India	No	No	Yes	Mass Rallies, Posters	Party staff	No
Indonesia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Mass Rallies, Posters	Party staff	No
Israel	Yes	Yes	No	TV-ads, Posters	Consultants	Yes
Italy	Yes[a]	Yes[c]	No	TV-ads, Posters	Party staff	Yes
Japan	Yes[a]	Yes[c]	Yes	Posters, Print-ads	Party staff	No
Mexico	Yes[a]	Yes[c]	Yes	TV-ads, Mass Rallies	Consultants	Yes
Netherlands	Yes	No	No	Print-ads, Posters	Party staff	No
Norway	Yes	No	No	Print-ads, Posters	Party staff	No
Poland	Yes	Yes	No	TV-ads, Posters	Party staff	Yes
Portugal	Yes	Yes	No	Posters, Mass Rallies	Party staff	No
Romania	Yes	No	No	TV-ads, Posters	Party staff	Yes
Russia	Yes[a]	Yes	No	TV-news, Print-ads	Consultants	No
South Africa	Yes	No	Yes	Radio-ads, Mass Rallies	Party staff	Yes
South Korea	Yes[a]	Yes[c]	Yes	TV-ads, Posters	Consultants	No
Spain	Yes	No	No	Posters, Mass Rallies	Party staff	No
Sweden	Yes	No	No	Print-ads, Posters	Party staff	No
Switzerland	No	No	No	Posters, Print-ads	Party staff	No

Taiwan	Yes[a]	Yes[c]	No	TV-ads, Mass Rallies	Consultants	No
Ukraine	Yes[a]	Yes[c]	Yes	TV-ads, Mass Rallies	Consultants	Yes
United Kingdom	No	Yes	No	Print-ads, Posters	Consultants	Yes
United States	Yes[b]	Yes[d]	No	TV-ads, Direct Mail	Consultants	N/a
Uruguay	Yes[a]	No	No	TV-ads, Mass rallies	Consultants	Yes
Venezuela	No	No	No	TV-ads, Mass rallies	Consultants	Yes

Sources: Reginald Austin and Maja Tjernström, *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003); Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha, *The Sage Handbook of Political Advertising* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2006); Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, *Foundations for Democracy: Approaches to Comparative Political Finance* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001); Fritz Plasser, *Global Political Campaigning: A Worldwide Analysis of Campaign Professionals and Their Practices* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).

Notes:

a Covers only marginal proportion of total campaign expenditures.

b Public finance is optional for presidential candidates only, congressional candidates don't have access to public campaign finance.

c Frequently circumvented.

A comparison of institutional backgrounds of the electoral process in Australia, Latin America, Europe and Asia with the institutional context in which political consultants operate in the United States only offers few indicators for similarities. Political campaigns in the US are candidate-centered, strongly influenced by capital and media as well as highly professional, largely autonomously management and marketing operations.[46] In most countries outside the United States campaigns follow the traditional model: they are party-centered and labor-intensive, they receive free air time on television, are publicly supported and primarily planned and coordinated by party staff members.[47] Yet, candidate-centered campaign styles compared to party-centered styles represent only *one* essential differentiation. Other important context factors of the political consultancy practice include:[48]

- the electoral system (e.g. majority or plurality vote system versus proportional election system, density of the election cycle, candidate versus party elections);
- the system of party competition (e.g. number of party activists, dominant cleavages within electorate, ability of the organization to mobilize party followers, member versus voter parties);
- the legal regulations of election campaigns (e.g. public versus private campaign financing, limits on expenditures, access to television advertising, time limits for official campaigns, candidate nomination, primaries);
- the degree of professionalization of election campaigning (professional sophistication of campaign management, expertise and use of political consultants);
- the media system (e.g. public versus dual versus private media systems, differentiation of the media system, level of modernization, professional roles of journalists, autonomy of mass media, degree of media competition);
- the national political culture (e.g. homogeneous versus fragmented cultures, hierarchical versus competitive political cultures, degree of trust in the political process, political involvement, high versus low turnout cultures);
- the political communication culture (e.g. professional self-image of political journalism, closeness versus distance of the relationship between politics and media, degree of mutual dependencies); and
- the degree of modernization in society (e.g. degree of societal differentiation and segmentation, industrialized versus information society, socioeconomic mobility).

In the light of these criteria the situation of political competition differs substantially in the majority of electoral democracies worldwide from the one in the United States, a fact that consequentially is reflected in the different professional role-interpretation of political consultants. The data of the Global Political Consultancy Survey, a worldwide survey among over 600 campaign managers and political consultants from forty-five countries, which was conducted between 1998 and 2000, allow insights into the professional role definitions of political consultants and campaign managers and allow a typological differentiation of different approaches and orientations.[49]

A typology of the evaluations of success factors of a campaign resulted in two groups representing different types of strategic approaches toward a professional campaign. Consultants belonging to the first type have been classified as *Party-Driven Sellers* while the second type could be characterized as *Message-Driven Marketers*. Party-Driven Sellers concentrate on party-related success factors such as a strong and effective party organization, the programmatic policies of their respective parties and, while also stressing the importance of the candidates' personalities, they seem to be primarily party-focused. For Party-Driven Sellers the centerpiece of a campaign is the product of party-related factors. They try to sell the policy agenda of their party even when concentrating on the communicative role of their top candidates, who are regarded as party advocates, representing and communicating party positions and partisan arguments.[50]

In contrast, Message-Driven Marketers are more concerned about the strategic positioning of their candidates and developing messages that appeal to the expectations of specific target groups. Apparently, Message-Driven Marketers are more inclined to define campaigns in terms of political marketing operations, where segmentation, strategic positioning and targeting are seen as essential prerequisites of professional politics.[51]

Message-Driven Marketers concentrate more on resources such as the availability of campaign funds and tend to evaluate the role of external advisors and campaign consultants as far more important than Party-Driven Sellers. These two types of professional role definitions differ also substantially regarding their estimations of party-related campaign factors. Message-Driven Marketers seem to be more party distant, doubting the relevance of a strong party organization within the overall campaign operations.[52] Sixty percent of the political consultants interviewed in forty-five countries operate as party-centered Party-Driven Sellers, 40% correspond more with the political marketing logic of Message-Driven Marketers. Table 3.4 reveals the distribution of these two different styles of professional role definitions within select areas.

A majority of campaign professionals from seven out of ten areas worldwide are following the first type of professional role definition and can be classified as Party-Driven Sellers. Operating in

Table 3.4. Professional Campaign Styles by Areas (1) (percentage)

Campaign Professionals Classified as . . .	*Party-Driven Sellers*	*Message-Driven Marketers*
India	97	3
East Asia	84	16
Australia, New Zealand	79	21
South Africa	77	23
Western Europe	73	27
East-Central Europe	72	28
Other CIS Countries	67	33
Latin America	50	50
Russia	41	59
United States	15	85
Political Consultants Worldwide	**60**	**40**

Source: Global Political Consultancy Survey (1998–2000).

different media environments and shaped by different institutional arrangements and cultural traditions, these campaign professionals share a common point of reference: their party-focused approach toward campaign strategy. Among campaign managers from Latin America there was found at least a balanced distribution of selling versus marketing approaches. Apparently, one-half of Latin American *consultores politicos* are following a more traditional party-focused approach, while the other half seem to be influenced by the logic of *marketing politico* when reflecting about essential factors of a campaign.[53] Also a majority of Russian campaign experts prefers already a political market approach. Weak party organizations, concentration on strong leader personalities and a diffuse voter market favor a technocratic approach at the mobilization of disillusioned, largely detached voters.[54]

American political consultants come closest to the type of Message-Driven Marketers. Eighty-five out of 100 American campaign consultants interviewed could be classified as driven by strategic message development based on market segmentation and targeting operations. Comparing the composition of these types, more than 40% of respondents classified as Message-Driven Marketers are American political consultants, whereas only 5% of Party-Driven Sellers are from the United States. Data from the Global Political Consultancy Survey offer indications that the focus of modern campaign strategies also shifts toward candidate- and message-centered factors among political advisors from traditionally party-centered cultures such as Austria, Germany, Italy or Sweden.[55] This transformation seems to be especially pronounced among political consultants with strong affinity to the US role model of modern election campaigning.

Although only a minority of campaign professionals outside the United States could be classified as Message-Driven Marketers, we should be careful about concluding that party-focused approaches toward campaign strategies can be regarded as constant and resistant to advanced professionalism as represented by the American style of campaigning. While in the US emerged a division of labor between political parties and external consultants, with advantages for both sides, frequently tensions can be observed in West European campaign headquarters when party managers, fixed upon their organizations, are confronted with the strategic recommendations of party-external marketing consultants.[56]

Looking at the distinction between strategic orientations of party-internal and party-external campaign experts, we can assume that the ongoing professionalization of campaign management seems to be contradictory to party-centered styles of campaigning. Contrasting select core components of campaign strategies, we found divergent perspectives between Party-Driven Sellers and Message-Driven Marketers. Party-Driven Sellers tend to focus their campaign strategy on the national party organization and on the mobilizing force of strong party organizations, preferring a centralized and coordinated approach. Message-Driven Marketers primarily concentrate on available financial resources and on the central campaign message based on market segmentation and the expectations and emotions of target voter groups. In this case internal party managers primarily choose large-scale mobilization campaigns and personal voter contacts, while external consultants prefer targeted advertising campaigns on television, direct mail and phone banks. Finally, the American presidential campaign 2004 so far represented the most intensive mobilization campaign (ground war) as well as the so far most expensive television campaign (air war). Presidential and congressional candidates, political parties and affiliated advocacy groups combined aired 1.1 million 30-second spots, sent 5.5 billion mailings to target households, mailed 1.3 billion personal e-mail messages to target voters, made 120 million telephone calls and organized 30 million household visits by campaign volunteers during the 2004 presidential and congressional campaign season.[57]

A second cluster analysis based on evaluations of campaign experts regarding the importance of several mass media for advertising strategies resulted in *three* distinct types of orientations. Respondents belonging to the first cluster could be characterized as *Mobilizers*. While estimating

the influential power of television, their communication strategies focus also on radio and on traditional forms of political advertising such as street posters and mass rallies.

The second type can be described as *Broadcasters*. This group of campaign managers is far more television centered, obviously highly attracted by the possibility of reaching a mass audience. In addition, radio and advertisement in daily newspapers are regarded as effective channels to communicate central campaign messages to target voter groups. Broadcasters also rely on traditional forms of political advertising strategies but to a significantly lesser degree than Mobilizers. Generally, Broadcasters tend to evaluate direct mail campaigns as slightly more effective than street posters and mass rallies.[58]

The third cluster seems to represent an advanced style of campaign communication. Political consultants belonging to this group can be described as *Narrowcasters*. While centered on paid television advertising campaigns as the most effective form of campaign communication, they also evaluate targeted communication forms such as direct mail as exceptionally important aspects for their advertising strategies. The Internet, as a new medium to communicate with connected voters via e-mail, banner ads and web-based videos, is seen as an enormously powerful campaign tool by Narrowcasters. Traditional advertising channels, such as print media advertising, large-scale street poster campaigns and mass rallies, seem to be regarded as outdated and as a waste of money and energy. Table 3.5 shows the area-specific distribution of these three distinct approaches to effective campaign communication.[59]

These data offer indicators for a combination of traditional and modern styles of political communication in most of the regions studied. West European political consultants differ significantly from the modus operandi of American political consultants. Two-thirds could be classified as television-concentrated, appealing to a mass public and trying to optimize the reach of their campaign messages. On the contrary, American political advisors prefer a rather *postmodern* strategic communication logic. Three out of four interviewed US political consultants could be classified as Message-Driven Marketers. Confronted with a multitude of news channels, "media clutter" and the declining effect of large-scale advertising campaigns in national networks, they focused upon segmented advertising campaigns in local cable channels, target group-oriented direct marketing activities and on the potential of the Internet and YouTube.[60]

On first sight the distribution of different political communication styles among political consultants seems to reflect the degree of modernization of the media systems in the respective regions. But with the exception of India and South Africa and the majority of African countries, where the media revolution of election campaigns only started recently, television is now almost everywhere the dominant medium. We should therefore expect that Latin American campaign

Table 3.5. Professional Campaign Styles by Areas (2) (percentage)

Campaign Professionals Classified as . . .	*Mobilizers*	*Broadcasters*	*Narrowcasters*
India	68	32	0
Russia	53	43	4
Other CIS Countries	50	39	11
South Africa	50	50	0
Latin America	50	45	5
East Central Europe	48	47	5
East Asia	24	73	3
Western Europe	15	74	11
Australia, New Zealand	8	64	28
United States	4	19	77
Political Consultants Worldwide	**35**	**45**	**20**

Source: Global Political Consultancy Survey (1998–2000).

managers, just like their West European and East Asian colleagues, will direct their communication strategies primarily toward television. Yet, one-half of all Latin American campaign managers interviewed has been classified as Mobilizers who continue to believe in traditional forms of campaign communication and voter mobilization. Western European political and campaign managers on the other hand see themselves mostly as Party-Driven Sellers and regard television as the core medium of strategic self-presentation and communication. Although they are recognizably influenced by the American role model and every second one had direct contacts to American political consultants during the past years, their professional self-image is oriented on the institutional rules of the game of parliamentary party-centered democracies.[61]

The data of the Global Political Consultancy Survey show that the political consultants and campaign managers outside the United States have more in common than expected. Generally the differences between the role definitions of consultants outside the United States are less pronounced than their distance to the professional style of American political consultants. American consultants prefer a marketing-oriented, party-distant campaign style while the majority of campaign experts outside the United States represents a party-centered "selling approach." In spite of observable tendencies toward Americanization there remains a substantial difference between consultancy styles and professional orientations of campaign professionals outside the United States and the professional role models of American political consultants. Their approach is unparalleled and seems to represent a unique style driven by institutional and media factors characteristic for the American electoral democracy.

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4

Political Science and Political Management

Stephen C. Craig

Do campaigns really matter? There is a good bit of academic literature suggesting that they do not—or at least not as much as politicians and the media tend to think they do. It has now been more than half a century since President Franklin Roosevelt's campaign manager, James Farley, offered what is known as Farley's Law: that most elections are decided before the campaign even begins. More recently, in an analysis of presidential elections, Thomas Holbrook concluded that the *general* level of support for candidates during a campaign season is a function of national conditions (which vary primarily from one election to the next), while *fluctuations* in candidate support over the course of a single election year occur mostly in response to campaign-specific events. While Holbrook acknowledged that these events (including the so-called "convention bump," debates, blunders by one of the candidates, and so on) do have an impact, national conditions (measured in terms of *consumer sentiment* and *presidential job approval*, both factors that are in place before the general election campaign begins in earnest) ultimately matter a great deal more in determining who wins and who loses.[1]

Similarly, James Campbell conceded that *nonsystematic* campaign events (those that are idiosyncratic to a particular election, for example, Truman's relentless attacks on the "do-nothing" Republican Congress in 1948; Kennedy's strong performance in the first-ever televised presidential debates in 1960; the violent clashes between police and anti-Vietnam protesters during the 1968 Democratic national convention in Chicago; Ford's apparent misstatement about the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe in a 1976 debate), can have significant—and even decisive—effects on the outcome of an extremely close contest. Yet he argued that such events were important precisely *because* the elections in question were close.[2] In most instances, with the great majority of votes falling into place very early (because of the effects of partisan attachments, the national economy, incumbency, and selective perception and overall indifference on the part of voters) and one candidate often running clearly ahead of the other(s), nothing that happens during the campaign is likely to have more than a marginal impact.

The analyses by Holbrook and Campbell apply specifically to the top of the ticket, but there are reasons to suspect that short-term forces such as issues, candidate traits, and campaign events may have even less impact on lower-level races where voter attention is typically limited, and where factors such as partisanship and incumbency often appear to be decisive regardless of what happens or doesn't happen over the course of the campaign.[3] Overall, the conventional wisdom within the academic community has been that campaign events and the decisions made by candidates and their advisors matter relatively little, except under the most unusual of

circumstances.[4] That wisdom may be changing, especially after the spectacular failure of forecasting models to predict accurately the outcome of the 2000 presidential election.[5] Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence seems to indicate that most campaigns at all levels are over, or almost over, before they even begin.

Candidates, consultants, and the political media would disagree, of course, and there is a growing amount of academic research to suggest they may be right—at least up to a point. In the present chapter, I will review some of that research and discuss how campaigns can shape election outcomes in a variety of ways, including the following:

- *persuading* voters, especially independents and others who initially are undecided or have weak preferences, to support one candidate or the other;[6]
- *activating* latent predispositions, primarily partisanship, that is, providing cues that lead Republicans and Democrats to make a choice in line with their underlying loyalties;[7]
- *educating* voters by providing information about (1) economic and other conditions for which elected officials can be held accountable (punished or rewarded); and (2) whether the issue stands of candidates are consistent with their own views and self-interests;[8] and
- *mobilizing* potential voters who, absent the stimulus (general or targeted) provided by the campaign, would otherwise be inclined to stay home on election day.[9]

While this list may not exhaust all of the possibilities, it serves as a reminder that campaigns are often about more than simply changing people's votes.[10]

In contrast, the "minimal effects" school of academic research is rooted in the fact that many citizens decide whom they are going to support before the campaign begins and remain firm in that choice throughout.[11] In the last twelve elections (1960–2004), for example, between 31 and 55% of presidential voters claim to have made a decision by the time their favored candidate entered the race, and a majority in each contest (between 54 and 70%) did so during the nominating conventions or before.[12] William G. Mayer has defined the "swing voter" as someone "who could go either way, a voter who [reflecting either ambivalence or cross-pressures] is not so solidly committed to one candidate or the other as to make all efforts at persuasion futile."[13] Based upon comparative ratings for major-party candidates on the 101-point feeling thermometer (a measurement device whereby people evaluate political objects according to how "warm" or "cold" they feel toward them), Mayer identified swing voters as those with scores ranging between –15 and +15 (that is, they rated one candidate no more than 15 "degrees" higher or lower than the other). His analysis revealed, first, that in presidential elections from 1972 to 2004, these individuals averaged a mere 23% of all voters; and, second, that although they were more likely than those with more polarized evaluations to change their preferences during the campaign, the number that actually did so was fairly small (approximately 15%).[14]

Although a campaign that captures the lion's share of these switchers has a good chance of winning, especially in a close race, there is a growing body of academic research that suggests that the other processes described above are important as well. How important? According to Michael John Burton and Daniel M. Shea, the answer to this question depends in part on who you are:

> A political scientist who is interested in the big picture of American elections . . . will tend to find that, in most elections, most of the time, campaigns just do not matter very much. A political journalist, on the other hand, looks for "news" (dramatic stories, sensational events), and will therefore seek out the hot campaign, complete with attention-grabbing characters and tragic ironies that emphasize the volatility of elections. A political practitioner, by contrast, is intimately familiar with the details of campaigns, the assumption being that the quality of the campaign is the most important factor in the outcome of the election. . . .[15]

As political scientists, Burton and Shea recognize that "[i]t is a rare campaign strategy that can elect candidates whose background, ideology, and partisanship are at odds with the people they are seeking to represent. There are half a million elective offices in the United States," and it is possible to predict with considerable accuracy "the outcome of races for the vast majority of them."[16] That said, academics are nonetheless increasingly aware that the final distribution of votes on election day, and sometimes even the identity of winner and loser, can be influenced by factors unique to the particular race in question. Those factors come in many varieties, beginning with the ebb and flow of day-to-day events that define the campaign and shape the media's coverage of it.

Campaign Events

The "minimal effects" perspective is based on the predictability of election outcomes and, to a lesser extent, of the individual voting decisions that produce them. According to Andrew Gelman and Gary King, campaigns provide voters with the information they need to cast a ballot consistent with their pre-existing attitudes and interests.[17] Since many of these attitudes and interests are known in advance, it is possible to make accurate projections about how most people will vote and which candidates are likely to be successful. This does not mean, however, that campaigns are irrelevant (for example, a candidate who chooses not to engage his or her opponent at all will surely lose), but rather that "[t]he critical thing about the campaign is its very existence."[18] When all is said and done, campaigns are about moving "basically rational partisan commitments back where they belong";[19] the strategic and tactical choices made by candidates and consultants (including variations in these choices across campaigns) simply do not matter all that much.

I will return to the informational role of campaigns later, but for now let me suggest that the argument here essentially has to do with whether the glass is half-empty or half-full. Is there a predictability to election outcomes that is rooted in the tendency for individual voters to cast their ballots based on considerations (party identification, incumbency, economic trends, presidential performance, and perhaps others) that are fixed, known in advance, and beyond the control of any campaign? Absolutely. But within these broad parameters, is it possible that campaign events and the actions of candidates have more of an impact than the "minimal effects" school would have us believe? Once again, the answer is yes. Although Holbrook found, for example, that the national economy and presidential approval were easily the most important factors influencing the outcomes of presidential elections in the late 1980s and early 1990s, his analysis revealed that the nominating conventions, presidential debates, and day-to-day campaign events played a meaningful (if usually modest) role as well.[20]

Research by Daron Shaw confirms that conventions and debates have a significant impact on presidential outcomes, as do campaign appearances,[21] television advertising (measured in terms of gross ratings points), and the occasional candidate blunder (gaffes and ill-advised comments of one sort or another) and outside event.[22] Consistent with Gelman and King's contention that campaigns serve mainly to reveal voters' "enlightened preferences," these effects tend to be larger and more durable for candidates who are doing several points better or worse in the trial-heat polls than expectations based on forecasting models;[23] they occur most often among mismatched partisans (whose initial preference was for the other party's candidate) and undecideds.[24] Campaign events also can influence election outcomes by shaping voter turnout; that is, exposure to campaigns of greater intensity (living in a presidential battleground state, for example) increases the probability of people making it to the polls on election day.[25]

Shaw's assessment of the importance of campaign advertising, especially in close races, is affirmed by Richard Johnston, Michael G. Hagen, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, whose analysis of the 2000 presidential election led them to conclude, first, that Al Gore "won the news war" that

took place during the closing days of the campaign (news coverage was largely favorable); but, second, that this advantage was more than offset by the sheer volume of televised ads on behalf of George W. Bush in pivotal battleground states. Had the Democratic nominee "saved up more resources for the last week and seriously closed the ad gap" in these states, Johnston and his colleagues believe that he probably would have been able to win an electoral majority.[26] The importance of earned media is evident in a recent study that examines voter reactions to the third debate between President Bush and John Kerry in October 2004. As one of the best opportunities for obtaining information about candidates (issue positions, rhetorical skills, ability to handle themselves under pressure), debates would seem to have great potential for shaping citizens' vote choices. Indeed, watching the Bush–Kerry debate did have an impact on viewers' evaluations of the candidates—but that impact was mediated by the particular "instant analysis," if any, to which a person was exposed (those who watched NBC News offered more favorable assessments of the president, while those who watched CNN.com gave higher marks to his Democratic opponent).[27] Numerous other studies indicate that while the overall impact is not always strong, debates sometimes have significant effects on vote intention, issue preferences, and perceptions of candidate personality.[28]

Campaign Strategy

In contemporary campaigns, one of the first decisions that candidates must make is whether to hire professional consultants. These are the men and women "who help to develop and deliver a candidate's strategy, theme, and message to the electorate," and the possibility that they might play a key role in shaping election outcomes has only recently begun to attract the attention of academic scholars.[29] Consultants themselves certainly believe that they provide essential services ("even to the point of self-deception")[30] and, increasingly, so do candidates, the media, and other political insiders. In 2004, for example,

> one of the first battles waged among contenders for the . . . Democratic [presidential] nomination was for the services of heavyweight political consultant Robert Shrum. This competition was a reflection not only of Shrum's skills but also of his reputation, that is, landing him as an advisor would automatically enhance the credibility of any candidate, especially in the eyes of journalists covering the campaign. . . .[31]

Whether because of this essentially self-fulfilling prophecy (hiring consultants makes candidates credible, hence they attract more/better press and raise more money—each of which contributes, more than anything the consultants actually do, to a better showing on election day), or because the services and strategic advice they provide help to persuade and mobilize voters on behalf of their clients, there is now some empirical evidence suggesting that candidates who hire consultants tend to fare better than those who don't.

According to Paul Herrnson, a higher degree of "professionalization" (referring to whether consultants were hired to handle fundraising, advertising, polling, and various other facets of the campaign) was associated with greater success in the 1992 congressional elections, especially among challengers and open-seat candidates.[32] Similar results were reported by Stephen Medvic for House races in 1990–1992, with pollsters appearing to have a greater impact than other types of consultants (at least among challengers).[33] There also are indications that consultants who are better known and more highly regarded by their peers tend to have the greatest success with regard to both fundraising and attracting votes.[34]

But what, one might wonder, do talented consultants *do* to achieve this level of success? Describing campaigns as communication events, Medvic offers a "theory of deliberate priming"

which suggests that "campaigns attempt to deliberately prime voters to utilize criteria in making voting decisions that work to the advantage of the campaign," that is, they generate messages intended to "resonate when they tap into voters' predispositions" (including their beliefs about whether one party or candidate is better suited to dealing with the issue in question); decisions about which issues and traits to emphasize, and how, are made with the advice of professional consultants, most notably pollsters and media specialists.[35] Part of this process involves identifying and then addressing the issues that are most salient to voters. As Medvic notes, however, another (and some might say more important) part involves campaigns priming voters on issues and traits that are likely to work in their favor. What we are talking about here is something called *issue ownership*, which exists when a preponderance of voters believe (based on "a history of attention, initiative, and innovation")[36] that one party or the other is better able to handle an issue or problem. Democrats, for example, are seen as better for helping the poor and protecting social security, while Republicans are usually favored on national defense and dealing with terrorism.[37]

Numerous studies have examined the issue ownership phenomenon and the extent to which it leads to campaigns in which candidates end up talking past one another, each side emphasizing its strengths and avoiding issues on which the party is seen as being relatively weak. Indeed, there appears to be a tendency in presidential, House, and Senate races for candidates to focus (in their speeches, paid ads, and other campaign communications) on issues that "belong" to their party.[38] At the same time, some studies show a fair amount of issue convergence[39] (or diversity),[40] with candidates occasionally (1) trespassing on issues typically associated with the other party (more common among those who are trailing in the polls);[41] (2) trying to "steal" an issue by giving it a particular spin (for example, Bill Clinton's support for the death penalty, which was accompanied by rhetoric that stressed crime prevention as well as punishment);[42] (3) addressing issues that are not clearly owned by either party (crime, immigration);[43] or (4) discussing other-party issues that are highly salient to voters at a given moment in time.[44]

For any of this to work, of course, campaign messages must be received by voters in something close to their intended form. In a study of 1988 US Senate elections, Jon K. Dalager found a very tenuous match between campaign themes (as identified by leading political journals) and the issues thought to have been important by citizens in their own state's Senate race.[45] Communication is a reciprocal process and, according to Dalager, it does not appear that voters always hear what the candidates are trying to say. Perhaps this is why the evidence is mixed as to whether issue ownership strategies actually help candidates to achieve their ultimate goal of electoral victory. Some studies suggest that campaign appeals are more effective when they deal with party-owned issues,[46] but others conclude that this is not necessarily the case. John Sides, for example, looked at Senate and House races in 1998, 2000, and 2002 and found that once other factors were taken into account, there was no significant relationship between how much candidates emphasized owned issues and the percentage of the vote they received.[47]

Readers will recall, by the way, that Medvic's theory of deliberate priming refers not only to issues, but also to personal traits that might work in a candidate's favor. Research suggests that issue and trait ownership tend to go together, that is, candidates own certain traits that are associated with party-owned issues. Thus, for example, "Republican Party ownership of national defense makes Republican candidates' claims of strong leadership qualities more credible; Democratic Party ownership of issues related to the social safety net makes more plausible Democrats' assertions that they feel the electorate's pain" (in other words, that they should be viewed as more compassionate and empathetic than their opponents).[48] The implication is that candidates will benefit when they are able to prime voters to give greater weight to party-owned traits when deciding whom to support and, importantly, that they will find it easier to persuade voters that they themselves possess those traits. Alternatively, data from presidential elections from 1980 to 2004 indicate that candidates actually gain the most when they score high on traits normally associated with the other side, that is, when they trespass.[49]

Moving from communications and message development to other elements of campaign strategy, the insights derived from academic research are fairly modest. A handful of studies have considered how campaigns choose to allocate scarce resources, specifically money (especially for televised ads) and time (candidate appearances). In presidential races, the unsurprising conclusion is that apart from national television buys, both parties usually concentrate their efforts in competitive battleground states; there also is a tendency for candidates to allocate more resources in response to an opponent doing the same in a particular state.[50] During the pre-nomination phase, established candidates are likely to emphasize the acquisition of delegates, while those who are less well-known (and who therefore lack the resources to compete effectively in delegate-rich primaries) focus on a smaller number of contests where success might generate support among both voters and financial contributors.[51]

A more prolific area of inquiry has to do with the decision to attack. Although not very popular among most voters (at least that's what they say when asked),[52] negative campaigning is something that occurs fairly often in campaigns at every level. Some candidates are, however, more likely to attack than others. Based primarily on data from presidential and US Senate elections, it appears that the strategic choice of "going negative" (as reflected in campaign ads, press releases, or media reports) is more likely to be made by (1) challengers;[53] (2) trailing candidates;[54] (3) those engaged in competitive races;[55] (4) candidates who have been attacked by their opponent;[56] (5) Republicans;[57] and (6) men.[58] In addition, there may be a tendency for the level of negativity to escalate as election day draws near.[59] All of this begs the question of whether negative campaigning actually works as intended, that is, does it help candidates attract votes and increase their chances of winning the election? In specific instances the answer is undoubtedly yes, but it is less clear that negative messages are more effective than positive messages on any sort of consistent basis.[60] This topic is dealt with more fully by Lynda Lee Kaid in Chapter 5, so I will not dwell on it here. I do, however, want to examine negative campaigning briefly within the context of another subject area in which political scientists have lately produced quite a bit of interesting and illuminating research: voter turnout and mobilization.

Voter Turnout and Mobilization

As noted earlier, one effect of campaigns may be to mobilize (or perhaps demobilize) potential voters and thereby shape the election outcome by determining the kinds of people who go to the polls on election day. An influential study some years ago by Stephen Ansolabehere, Shanto Iyengar, and others used both experimental data and an aggregate-level analysis of Senate campaigns to show that negativity is associated with lower turnout; the authors speculated that attack ads discourage some individuals from participating by lowering their sense of political efficacy (referring to the belief that ordinary citizens can use their votes to influence what the government does).[61] That negative campaigning is a demobilizing force quickly became the conventional wisdom, and to some extent remains the conventional wisdom[62] despite mounting evidence to the contrary. For example, Deborah Jordan Brooks' re-analysis of the same Senate races studied by Ansolabehere, Iyengar and others led her to conclude that the relationship between campaign tone and voter turnout is not statistically significant.[63] Indeed, a growing number of empirical studies suggest that negative campaigning *stimulates* turnout[64]—at least under certain circumstances,[65] and so long as the level of negativity doesn't cross over the line and degenerate into mudslinging.[66] What could account for such an effect? Paul Martin concluded that any or all of three psychological mechanisms may be involved: republican duty (negativity encourages participation by generating a perceived threat to the community); threat (attacks foster anxiety about specific candidates, hence greater interest in the election and an increased

likelihood of voting); and closeness (negative messages generate turnout by signaling to citizens that the race is tight and their vote may therefore be decisive).[67]

Looking at this from the candidate's point of view, going negative provides one avenue for a campaign to manipulate the composition of the electorate and thereby enhance its prospects for electoral victory. Another and more direct approach would be to mobilize voters the old-fashioned way, through a grassroots effort that gets more of your candidate's supporters to the polls than those who are backing the opponent. As the moment of decision nears, campaigns are advised that

> everything you have done to this point is about the GOTV [get-out-the-vote] effort. Everything. You've canvassed, mailed, advertised, phoned, raised money, and delivered your message again and again and again. Why? To move voters and activate your base for support on election day. But voters get busy . . . and best intentions to vote are out the window. Now, after months of campaigning, your job, your one and only job, is to remind, remove obstacles, and motivate your [supporters] to do their civic duty.[68]

There are many aspects to grassroots mobilization, of course, including some (such as the initial canvassing of voters and identification of likely supporters) that take place well in advance of the final GOTV push. Further, some efforts to increase turnout are undertaken by individuals and groups whose motivation is primarily civic-minded, that is, their goal is to encourage people to vote regardless of which side of the partisan fence they happen to be on.

Much academic research has focused on activities of the latter type, and the consensus is that they do make a difference—not a huge difference necessarily, but a difference nonetheless. A series of field experiments by Donald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber, for example, indicated that the probability of a person's voting can be increased by appeals to his or her sense of civic duty, especially when those appeals are made face-to-face rather than by mail, phone call, or printed leaflet;[69] in fact, individuals who are mobilized to vote in one election also appear more likely to participate in future contests.[70] Looking specifically at the impact of phone calls from both professional and volunteer phone banks on young voters, David W. Nickerson found that (1) only calls made during the closing days of the campaign are effective at boosting turnout; and (2) the content of the message matters less than the manner in which it is delivered (rigid adherence to a prepared script does not appear to be effective).[71]

In one sense, the impact of partisan mobilization is clear-cut: people who are contacted (in whatever manner) by a political party or by someone representing a specific campaign tend to vote in higher numbers than those who are not.[72] There is, however, the question of whether mobilization actually increases turnout—or does it just seem that way because parties and candidates reach out to people who are expected to vote in the first place (because they are richer, better-educated, older, and have voted in the past)? Although these individuals *are* the ones most likely to be contacted in a competitive race,[73] the results of a field experiment conducted during the 2002 Michigan governor's race indicate that personal canvassing, phone calls, and door hangers all have a positive effect on turnout even with other factors (such as prior voting history) held constant.[74] In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that personal contact has a greater impact on occasional voters than on those who participate regularly.[75] Properly targeted, such activities may also help to generate votes (which, after all, are the campaign's main interest) for the sponsoring candidate or party on election day.[76] Overall, then, the academic literature leaves little doubt that mobilization activities can help to produce positive outcomes, especially in a close race.

The Education of Voters

Democratic theory has never been specific about how much information and knowledge is needed in order for individuals to be able to fulfill the obligations of effective citizenship. Most would agree, however, that at a minimum one must have a basic understanding of the policy differences that exist between candidates for office, and between the parties they represent. Without such an understanding, the public will be unable to cast its ballots wisely and, hence, unable to hold elected leaders accountable for their actions. Unfortunately, more than half a century of empirical research has left the distinct impression that "voters have a limited amount of information about politics, a limited knowledge of how government works, and a limited understanding of how governmental actions are connected to consequences of immediate concern to them."[77]

Much of the knowledge that citizens do possess concerning candidate and party differences is acquired within the context of spirited electoral competition. According to Gelman and King, the instability in public opinion polls that frequently occurs during presidential (and other) elections is a direct result of information flow; that is, as voters acquire additional information about candidates and issues, their initial preferences sometimes shift as they become better able to make choices that are consistent with their pre-existing political attitudes, beliefs, and interests.[78] Numerous studies reveal that a significant amount of learning occurs during campaigns, though it is less clear how different media (especially newspapers vs. television news vs. paid ads)[79] contribute to this learning, whether patterns of learning are similar at all levels of competition (presidential vs. statewide vs. legislative vs. local),[80] whether campaigns tend to narrow the information gap between the relatively more and less politically engaged segments of the electorate,[81] and whether the tone of a campaign (positive vs. negative) affects learning.

Given their growing interest in negative campaigning generally, it is surprising that the latter question has not received closer scrutiny by political scientists. Negative campaigning, and negative advertising in particular, is frequently defended for providing information without which it would be "much more difficult for the voters to make intelligent choices about the people they elect to public office."[82] As for whether voters learn more from positive or negative ads, however, the jury is out: some studies suggest that there is little difference between the two,[83] while others conclude that negativity promotes greater learning.[84] If the latter is true, it could be due to any of several factors, including (1) the higher issue content of negative ads;[85] (2) that negative ads heighten feelings of anxiety, thereby causing voters to seek out more information about candidates' issue stands or other attributes;[86] and (3) the tendency for people to have greater recall of negative ads;[87] and/or (4) to give greater weight to negative information than to positive information.[88]

The practical importance of all this is that information affects how people vote. In a study of presidential elections from 1972–1992, Larry Bartels found that fully informed women were consistently more likely to vote Democratic (often by a wide margin) than women who were less informed, while fully informed Protestants and Catholics were usually at least somewhat more Republican than their less-informed counterparts.[89] Focusing on policy views rather than vote choice, Scott Althaus estimated fully informed opinion by assigning the preferences of the most highly informed members of a given demographic group to all members of that group (also taking into account the influence of other demographic variables). He concluded that the average difference between actual and fully informed opinion on various issues was about seven points—not a huge number perhaps, but enough to switch a group's collective preference from one side of an issue to the other in several cases.[90] Studies such as these suggest that information about political issues helps citizens to recognize their self-interest and vote accordingly, and that campaigns play a crucial role in facilitating that process. Whether or not this is a good thing (should people vote for their own interests or for the interests of the larger community?) is a question that I will leave for others to answer.