ROUTLEDGE
THE IMAGINATION
Jean-Paul Sartre

The Imagination

'No matter how long I may look at an image, I shall never find anything in it but what I put there. It is in this fact that we find the distinction between an image and a perception.'

– Jean-Paul Sartre

L'Imagination was published in 1936 when Jean-Paul Sartre was thirty years old. Long out of print, this is the first English translation in many years. *The Imagination* is Sartre's first full philosophical work, presenting some of the basic arguments concerning phenomenology, consciousness and intentionality that were to later appear in his master works and be so influential in the course of twentieth-century philosophy.

Sartre begins by criticizing philosophical theories of the imagination, particularly those of Descartes, Leibniz and Hume, before establishing his central thesis. Imagination does not involve the perception of 'mental images' in any literal sense, Sartre argues, yet reveals some of the fundamental capacities of consciousness. He reviews psychological theories of the imagination, including a fascinating discussion of the work of Henri Bergson. Sartre argues that the 'classical conception' is fundamentally flawed because it begins by

conceiving of the imagination as being like perception and then seeks, in vain, to re-establish the difference between the two. Sartre concludes with an important chapter on Husserl's theory of the imagination which, despite its sharing the flaws of earlier approaches, signals a new phenomenological way forward in understanding the imagination.

The Imagination is essential reading for anyone interested in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, phenomenology, and the history of twentieth-century philosophy.

This new translation includes a helpful historical and philosophical introduction by Kenneth Williford and David Rudrauf. Also included is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's important review of *L'Imagination* upon its publication in French in 1936.

Kenneth Williford is Associate Professor of Philosophy at The University of Texas, Arlington, USA.

David Rudrauf is Assistant Professor of Neurology at The University of Iowa, USA.

Jean-Paul

Sartre

The Imagination

Translated by
Kenneth Williford and David Rudrauf

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We'd also like to thank Andrea Swenson for letting us take over and 'trash' her apartment for a translation frenzy early in the process.

As is customary, the translators blame each other for any flaws remaining in this translation.

I (KW) would like to dedicate this work to the memory of Denny Bradshaw who first showed me the importance of

Sartre's early phenomenological works and to Panayot Butchvarov, Denny's mentor and then my own, whose course on Sartre at The University of Iowa was the stuff of academic legend and whose philosophical breadth and depth continues to astound.

I (DR) would like to dedicate this work to my father, Jacques Rudrauf to whom I owe an understanding of a certain French intellectual tradition and discourse that was pivotal in the making of this translation.

TRANSLATORS' INTRODUCTION

Kenneth Williford and David Rudrauf

SARTRE'S *ANNI MIRABILES*

Duly acknowledging the element of arbitrariness in all such claims, it is still fairly safe to say that the thirteen-year period stretching from September 1933, when Sartre began his nine-month residency at the Institut français de Berlin, to the publication of 'Existentialism is a Humanism' and *Anti-Semite and Jew* in 1946, stands as a truly remarkable period of productivity in the annals of philosophical *and* literary biography. During this period Sartre wrote and published (though not always in the order written) no less than five philosophical classics: *The Imagination* (1936), *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1937), *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* (1939), *The Imaginary* (1940), and *Being and Nothingness* (1943). Remarkable as that is, in the

same period he wrote (or rewrote) and published (or premiered) no less than seven literary classics: *Nausea* (1938), *The Wall* (1939), *The Flies* (1943), *No Exit* (1944–45), *The Age of Reason* (1945), *The Reprieve* (1945), and *The Respectful Prostitute* (1946). If one thinks of other significant works published right after 1946, like *The Chips are Down* (1947) and *Baudelaire* (1947), this should serve as a reminder of the arbitrariness just mentioned.

And if one thinks of smaller, but not unimportant pieces, like 'Intentionality: a fundamental idea of Husserl's phenomenology' (1939) and 'Consciousness of self and knowledge of self' (1948), one will gain a still better sense of the fecundity of this period and its long afterglow. Sartre's perceived importance as a philosopher and writer has continued to wax and wane inside and outside of France, but no one who has spent careful time in the pages from his *anni mirabiles* can fail to be unmoved, if not fully persuaded, by his overall vision or seriously doubt his philosophical breadth and depth, the occasional interpretive or argumentative lapse notwithstanding.

THE UNEXPECTED SIGNIFICANCE OF SARTRE'S EARLY PHENOMENOLOGICAL WORKS

As academic years go by and old ideological obstructions melt into the past, we continue to witness a deepening appreciation of Sartre's early phenomenological works on the part of philosophers from many different intellectual orientations and micro-traditions inside and outside of France. Outside the home country, this development has been encouraged by new and better translations and scholarship. The interest in these works on the part of recent Anglophone philosophers of

mind we find particularly notable, though Sartre has always had some presence in even the most 'analytic' sectors of twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy.[1] For example, one finds him cited or engaged by Roderick Chisholm, Jay Rosenberg, Panayot Butchvarov, and Daniel Dennett, to name only four.[2]

In the late 1980s Bryan Magee, chatting with Hubert Dreyfus, once quipped that he found it '. . . difficult to believe that Sartre will survive as a philosopher. . . .' One can perhaps forgive Magee, but Dreyfus, whose love for Merleau-Ponty should have taught him better but whose even greater love of Heidegger evidently obstructed his vision, should have been able to foresee that the great resurgence of interest in the problems of consciousness, already well underway at the time in Anglophone philosophy of mind, would eventually lead to the rediscovery and re-appropriation of these Sartrean gems.[3]

When philosophers as responsible, rigorous, and stolidly 'analytic' as Colin McGinn and Joseph Levine can freely acknowledge a deep debt to Sartre's phenomenological works, we can feel as if Anglo-American philosophy has reached a new level of maturity and has, almost in spite of itself, understood something of lasting value, something that faddish ideological preoccupations had perhaps prevented others, indeed both 'analytic' and 'Continental'—though for different reasons—from seeing.[4] The mention of Colin McGinn, whose 2004 book, *Mindsight* was heavily influenced by Sartre's *The Imaginary*, brings us closer to our present concern.[5]

THE IMAGINATION AND *THE IMAGINARY*

Critics as widely separated in general orientation as Daniel Lagache and Roland Barthes have well understood the

significance and originality of Sartre's *The Imaginary*.[6] It is not too unknown that forty years after its publication, Barthes, in the very year of his tragic death—which was also the year of Sartre's death—dedicated his 1980 *Camera Lucida* (*La chambre claire*) 'In Homage to *L'Imaginaire* by Jean-Paul Sartre'. But it has largely been forgotten that in a 1941 review of *The Imaginary*, Lagache summarized these matters lucidly:

> The interest of M. Sartre in the problems of the imagination is not new. It's not just that this writer has already revealed himself to the philosophical public through a penetrating and sometimes acerbic historico-critical study of the imagination. Already nearly fifteen years ago Sartre completed his first dissertation on images, a dissertation that remains unpublished and that has probably passed in part into his subsequent works. But that was only a point of departure. Since then, the thought and orientation of the author have been enriched and strengthened. The essential change has been his intimate contact with phenomenology and existential philosophy. On the other hand, Sartre has continued to affirm himself not only as a philosopher but also as a poet and more precisely as a novelist. *Nausea*, his principal literary work, nourished on existential philosophy, treats precisely 'of the nauseous disgust that characterizes the realizing consciousness' in an autobiographical form. This formula, borrowed from the end of *The Imaginary*, is a significant reminder of the ties that can unite the poetic work with the philosophical and scientific work. Need we recall further that the hero and narrator of *Nausea*, in whom it is difficult not to see an imaginary Sartre, gives up writing an historical work, that is to say, a work about existing things, to undertake a novel, that is to say, to produce an

> irreal? Even the moral recovery within which this decision takes place is an authentically Sartrean trait. In truth, the imagination is indeed 'the problem' for Jean-Paul Sartre.[7]

Philosophically and psychologically, that problem, for Sartre, is fundamentally about the proper characterization of the difference between imagination and perception and their respective objects. The difference is phenomenologically manifest, and we all make the distinction as a matter of common sense. But how do we characterize this difference in a rigorous and philosophically responsible way? Moreover, what are the implications, both ontological and practical, of the imaginative type of 'negating activity'—our relating imaginatively to objects and states of affairs that *do not exist* or *are not present* or *are not thus*—for our understanding of consciousness? The imagination is the vehicle of our relation to nothingness *par excellence*. Readers of *Being and Nothingness* will recall the centrality of the 'negating' capacity of consciousness in that work. *The Imagination* and *The Imaginary* are thus, of course, essential reading for those who wish to gain a full understanding of his *magnum opus*.

Lagache goes on to write a review of *The Imaginary* that rewards close scrutiny. But our theme is not *The Imaginary*, which English readers can now enjoy in Jonathan Webber's translation. Nor is it Sartre's 1926–27 dissertation, 'The Image in Psychological Life', written under the direction of the philosopher and psychologist, Henri Delacroix, for the *diplôme d'études supérieures* and alluded to here by Lagache, who was Sartre's friend and classmate at the Ecole Normale Supérieure at the time of its writing. It is, rather, that 'penetrating and sometimes acerbic historico-critical study' known as *The Imagination*.

According to Simone de Beauvoir's *The Prime of Life*, Henri Delacroix commissioned Sartre to write a book on the problematic of the image and the imagination for publication in a series, *Nouvelle Encyclopédie philosophique*, then being brought out by the F. Alcan publishing house. Sartre produced one book, *L'Image*, but Alcan accepted only the first part, which was published as *L'Imagination*. The second part, which was to become *L'Imaginaire*, interested Sartre far more, as its highly original, constructive account went well beyond history and criticism.[8] In spite of the fact that *The Imagination* has, rightly, been eclipsed by *The Imaginary*, the former merits careful study for a significant number of reasons.

THE IMPORTANCE OF *THE IMAGINATION*

To begin with, there is the fact that Sartre himself conceived of *The Imagination* as an historical and critical propaedeutic to *The Imaginary*. On the historical side, Sartre displays his *normalien* sweep and penetration with considerable fluidity, if occasional diffuseness. His references, all of them on target, range from Aristotle and the Epicureans and Stoics, through the early moderns and Kant, right up to Bergson, Alain (Émile Chartier), William James and, of course, Husserl. His discussions of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume are illuminating not only for the light they shed on Sartre's own appropriation of the tradition but also for the possible insights into the thinking of the 'greats' themselves that they contain.

Sartre's discussion of the problematic of the image, with its primary but not exclusive emphasis on nineteenth and early twentieth century French contributions, is, again, not merely of interest to historians of French philosophy and psychology and to Sartre scholars, it is of intrinsic philosophical value.

The theoretical temptations and confusions, the muddled acceptance of a sloppy and undisciplined sort of introspection—half descriptive and half driven by *a priori* assumptions—all unearthed in great detail by Sartre, have not entirely disappeared from today's cognitive science and its own attempts at self-understanding and methodological clarity, though things have been improving. But, indeed, for the historian and the Sartre scholar there is much to glean. In particular, *The Imagination* contains some of Sartre's fullest discussions of the French philosophers, notably Henri Bergson and Alain, whose role in Sartre's philosophical development has often been obscured by the impact of Husserl and Heidegger. And like *The Imaginary* and the *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, *The Imagination* indicates beyond any doubt that Sartre possessed an extremely impressive grasp of not only the relevant philosophical works but also of the relevant empirical psychology of his day, French, German, and, to some extent, English as well.[9]

After the publication of the sprawling *Being and Nothingness*, and after his literary fame and ascension to the politico-public sphere, it became easy to forget that Sartre's first four, smaller phenomenological works were disciplined, scholarly, and generally tightly argued pieces of philosophy. This is, after all, not that surprising given that at the time of their writing it seemed, as likely as not, that Sartre would make his living as a *lycée* professor or in higher academia. But it has also become too easy to forget the foundational role the pieces play in the house, or houses, that Sartre built.

SYNOPSIS OF *THE IMAGINATION*

The Imagination is divided into four chapters prefaced by a short introduction and finished off with a short conclusion,

though there are some subdivisions within the chapters.[10] Most of the subdivisions are untitled and indicated by a triangle of asterisks (which we have retained), but in Chapter III there are titled subsections. Generally the historical narrative and critical dialectic run in parallel, leading up to the stage setting for Sartre's own constructive account (in *The Imaginary*), which then appears as both a logical and historical next step.

Sartre's introduction to *The Imagination* contains as concise, forceful and clear a statement of his conception of the two heterogeneous modes of being—the spontaneous *for-itself*, intrinsically conscious of its own existence, and the essentially inert world of objects, the world of being *in-itself*—as any he ever made. And it offers a brief but very evocative description of the phenomenologically manifest distinction between perception and imagination, which sets the stage.

In Chapter I, 'The great metaphysical systems', Sartre argues that the early modern greats, Descartes, Leibniz, and Hume, had already exhausted the space of logically possible solutions to the problem of the image *relative to the assumption* that the image is, in itself, on a par with the objects of perception and is thus like a thing, a view of images he refers to as a type of 'thingism' (*chosisme*). The early modern tradition of thinking on the problematic of the image *begins*, according to Sartre, with the assumption that imagination is not essentially different from perception. The problem then becomes recovering the spontaneous distinction between the two, a distinction we, and the philosophers in question, have no trouble making pre-theoretically. Under normal conditions at any rate, no one is in danger of confusing, say, a centaur imagined with a centaur perceived. And putting to the side for the moment the problematic cases he will discuss in detail in *The Imaginary*

(dream, delusion, hallucination), one would be hard pressed not to grant him this.

As Sartre tells the tale, Descartes tried to solve the problem by claiming that the exercise of the pure intellect is the necessary and sufficient basis for distinguishing 'true images', images that correspond to real objects in the world beyond the mind, from 'false images', the images making up the world of dream, delusion, and fancy. The 'true images', the theory goes, display a coherence and order that the 'false images' lack, and one must infer, on the basis of the intellectual grasp of this coherence, or its lack, which set of images is which.

For Sartre's Leibniz, who wished to treat thought and images as, in a certain sense, continuous, the distinction comes down to that between the clear and confused 'expression' of an object. Relative to the intellectual capacity of the mind in question, a particular 'expression' of an object will seem either clear or confused; the greater the intellect, the greater the scope of clarity. The Leibnizian ontology, Sartre maintains, intellectualizes the perceptual image, robbing it of its genuinely 'non-conceptual' character as a brutely given datum. From there, Leibniz attempts to recover the phenomenological distinction in quasi-mathematical terms. Thoughts constitute our 'clear ideas', and images our 'confused' ones. The confusion for a particular finite mind derives from the fact that the image conceals within itself an infinite and therefore fundamentally intellectually impenetrable set of relations. What we call thought involves 'object expressions' that are finitely articulable and thus seem transparent to us, devoid of resistance or opaque givenness. What we call an image, on the other hand, involves 'object expressions' that contain a plenitude of constituents, thereby outstripping our finite powers of analysis and thus appearing to us as brute, irrational data.

But to an infinite intellect, it would all appear as clear as pure thought. To put it in contemporary terms, the phenomenology of God would be entirely cognitive. God experiences all things the way we experience, say, the thought that two plus two is four. If our capacities were but expanded, the taste of coffee, say, would no longer be a matter of acquaintance with that brutely given flavour; it would become a matter of something generically similar to the experience of mathematical insight. At the level of metaphysics, for Leibniz, there are, strictly speaking, only monads and their thoughts; images are, so to say, 'upwardly' reducible to thoughts. And their appearance is a function of the finitude of our minds. God would have no problem.

In stark contrast to Leibniz's thoughts, Hume's thoughts are 'downwardly' reducible to images. Strictly speaking, in Hume's view, we are aware only of images, and images are conceived of as being like things. The distinction between ideas and impressions, ideas being the less vivid copies of the latter, is the sole, and, according to Sartre, manifestly inadequate, tool Hume has at his disposal for attempting to recapture the distinction between perception and imagination. But thought itself, on the Humean model, is just the quasi-mechanical play of ideas governed by the laws of association. These laws correspond to a set of fundamentally external relations between image-things, and thus the synthetic power of thought, which traffics in the grasp of intrinsic relations and essences, is revealed to be a sort of illusion. Hence there is here no real hope of distinguishing between the world of delusive images and the world of 'true' ones by an appeal to pure thought in the manner of Descartes. But doing so on the basis of degrees of vivacity proves to be theoretically intractable as well as phenomenologically implausible, Sartre argues.

The theories of Descartes, Leibniz, and Hume represent, for Sartre, the three possible *types* of solution to the problem of the image open to one once one assumes that images are fundamentally like the objects of perception, or things. The Cartesian solution will make a radical distinction between image and thought and make it the purely theoretical job of the latter to distinguish between the perception of reality and the world of dream and fantasy. Leibnizian panlogicism will reduce image to thought at the metaphysical level and make the phenomenological distinction between the two into a mere function of our finitude. Humean panpsychologism, on the other hand, will reduce thought to the play of images and try, dismally, to capture the difference between perception and imagination with the distinction between vivid impressions and their fainter copies. All of these solution types Sartre will find again and again throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And all of them, he will argue, are fundamentally unsatisfactory. The assumption upon which they all rest, that the image is at bottom just like a perceived thing, must be rejected. We must start over.

Chapter II, 'The problem of the image and the effort of psychologists to find a positive method', traces the historical and dialectical development of these possible positions through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. J.S. Mill, Sir Francis Galton, Paul Broca, Charcot, Hippolyte Taine, Ribot, William James, Alfred Binet (the inventor of what would become known as the IQ test), Edward Titchener, Henri Bergson, the psychologists of the Würzburg School, as well as lesser known figures such as Victor Brochard, Luigi Ferri, Albert Spaier, and Ignace Meyerson (not to be confused with the better known Émile Meyerson) all enter the sustained discussion. The range of positions on the image

here represented is seen to move within the tripolar framework already mapped out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But two main highlights of the chapter readily offer themselves.

First, Sartre presents a sustained discussion of Bergson, whose *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (or *Time and Free Will*, as many English-speaking readers know it) had, years before, been instrumental in drawing Sartre into philosophy. While Bergson's attempt to inject fluidity, temporality, synthetic elements, and a certain organicism into his conception of the image could be viewed as a step in the right direction, Sartre concludes that Bergson's account still makes the fundamental and disastrous assumption of 'thingism'. No matter how imbued with spontaneity the images are made out to be, their mode of being remains essentially that of things.

The second highlight is Sartre's discussion of the work of the Würzburg School of psychology (including Oswald Külpe, Narziß Ach, Karl Bühler, Karl Marbe, and Henry Jackson Watt), the heretical descendants of Wilhelm Wundt who, in violation of Wundt's views about what was amenable to study on the basis of introspective methods, had claimed to find through these very methods, once again, the old radical Cartesian distinction between pure, imageless higher thought processes and the image.[11] The works of Bühler, Ach, Marbe, and Watt all come in for discussion by Sartre, as does the relation of the School to Husserl and his *Logical Investigations*.

In Chapter III, 'The contradictions of the classical conception', Sartre forcefully spells out the impasses that, he argues, necessarily issue from the assumption that the image is fundamentally like a perceived thing. The problem of distinguishing the real, perceived world from a world of imagination becomes theoretically insoluble, which is in direct contrast to

our immediate, pre-theoretical grasp of this distinction. Equally intractable is the problem of clearly articulating the relationship between images and thought. Along the way, Sartre provides interesting analyses of the work of Albert Spaier and Alain on the image, relates the discussion to the philosophical motives behind the denial of the very existence of the image on the part of J.B. Watson and the behaviourists, and alludes to Lagache's 1934 *Les hallucinations verbales et la parole*, which will come to play an important role in the section of the *The Imaginary* entitled 'Pathology of the imagination'.[12] The chapter ends with a call for a new approach to the image, an approach that is firmly rooted in our pre-reflective grasp of the radical distinction between perception and imagination and yet is not merely inductive but eidetic as well. It is, of course, in Husserl that Sartre finds the sought-after method.

Chapter IV, 'Husserl', contains some of Sartre's first published (if not first written) interpretations and appropriations of key elements of the fundamental concepts of Husserlian phenomenology: intentionality, empty vs. filled intendings, the noetico-noematic correlation, the positional characters of different act types, active vs. passive syntheses, time-consciousness, reflection-in-memory, the Husserian *epochē*, the foundational eidetic function of phenomenology vis-à-vis empirical psychology, intentional *Erlebnisse*, the notion of antepredicative (or prepredicative) evidence, and the distinction between hyletic data or matter and animating intentional form. Along with a reading of *The Imaginary*, one can gain from a study of Sartre's discussion a much fuller sense of his understanding of these essential, technical phenomenological concepts, an understanding of which he tends to presuppose in other works. Indeed, as Lagache hints in his review, the very titles of the two books can be seen in a

Husserlian light, if the word 'imagination' suggests the noetic, the psychological acts of imaginative consciousness as such, the word 'imaginary', in addition to its rich set of other connotations in French, suggests, in this context, the noematic, the irreal, intentional correlates or objects of all such acts of consciousness.[13]

Centred around a discussion of Husserl's famous treatment of Albrecht Dürer's *The Knight, Death, and the Devil*, Sartre broaches the topic, which will become of central importance in *The Imaginary*, of the relation between the matter or *hylē* of an image, and the intentional form or *morphē* through which we 'animate' the matter and, in the case of the image properly so called, aim at what is not perceptually present. The discussion of the intentional animation of Dürer's engraving also leads naturally to questions about what Sartre will come to call the 'image family'. In the case of photographs, paintings, mimicry, etc., the matter of the image is clearly distinguishable from the irreal or absent objects intentionally aimed at through that matter. The matter, which is literally perceived and is literally present, is what provides acts of imagination with their quasi-presentational aspect. We use what is literally present to consciousness to aim at what is not present. And this partly accounts for the tendency to think of imagination as a kind of perception. But we can easily shift our attitude and view the reproduction of the engraving as lines printed on paper, or focus on the perceived movements of the mimic as such, and forget about the person mimicked, the *object* of the mimicry. But in the case of acts of imagination that rest upon no such clearly sensorily mediated hyletic data, or, if one prefers, purely mental images as such, the matter is elusive. It seems to disappear along with the shift out of the imaginative attitude. Thus, Sartre maintains, we may have to leave the field of

eidetic phenomenological investigation and limit ourselves to formulating empirical hypotheses about the identity of the matter of these purely mental images. Readers of *The Imaginary* will recognize this new problematic immediately.

Returning to Husserl, Sartre does not imagine that the Phenomenologist has provided a complete theory of the image in his published works. Sartre was well aware that Husserl's published work represented only a fraction of his total oeuvre, and he suggests, rightly, that Husserl had probably developed his ideas on image-consciousness at much greater depth in his courses and unpublished writings.[14] Nonetheless, to the extent that he does not find a clearly drawn distinction in Husserl between the matter of purely mental images and the bi-stable matter of images projected on the basis of photographs, paintings and the like, he is unsatisfied and sees the necessity of blazing a new trail, a trail he will blaze in *The Imaginary*.

MERLEAU-PONTY'S REVIEW OF *THE IMAGINATION*

We have included in this volume a new translation of Merleau-Ponty's generally favourable review of *The Imagination*, which appeared in 1936 in the *Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique*. The review can itself serve as an excellent introduction to *The Imagination*, but it is also of interest in that it gives some sense of Merleau-Ponty's attitude towards Sartre *the philosopher* at the time. Much has been written on the relationship between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. And though we do not wish to articulate a position on the relationship at present and would never dream of detracting from Merleau-Ponty's achievement, we do believe that some of this literature has been rather

unfair to Sartre. Perhaps the time is right for a reassessment of their philosophical interaction.

NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION

> The translation [*Die Legenden des Nā-ro-pa*] is a faithful picture of the translator's tragic illness. Part of it is what a psychiatrist calls 'word-salad' and unintelligible even to a German speaking person; the remainder is intelligible nonsense.
>
> Herbert V. Guenther

Generalities

The text we used for this translation is that of the sixth ('Quadrige') edition published by the Presses Universitaires de France in 2003. The text was corrected by Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre, Sartre's adopted daughter and literary executor.

We took a quasi-'archaeological' approach to this translation. Of course, we wanted the text to read as smoothly as possible, but our main aim was not simply to make it easy for the contemporary reader to 'understand' the text. Rather, our main aim was to render the text so that it reads to the English reader the way it reads to the French reader, insofar as this is possible. This does not always mean a preference for literal translation or word-for-word translation but a serious effort to find the closest possible English expressions that capture not only the basic meaning but also the style and the multiple threads of connotations and historico-critical elements that are buried in the text and its 'inter-text'. These are apparent to and even pivotal for the French scholar reading Sartre. This was all the more a duty for us since Sartre was 'more' than a philosopher (in the narrow sense of the term), as we all know. He was also a writer and a leftward thinking intellectual (even