Developing Cultures

Case Studies

Edited by

Lawrence E. Harrison
co-editor of *Culture Matters*

and Peter L. Berger

Developing Cultures

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Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

LAWRENCE E. HARRISON

In April 1999 a group of scholars, journalists, politicians, and devel-
opment practitioners met in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to discuss
the relationship between cultural values and human progress. What
motivated the organizing of the symposium, and what has motivated
my work on culture over the past quarter century, was the notion
that values, beliefs, and attitudes are a key but neglected component
of development and that the neglect of cultural factors may go a
long way toward explaining the agonizingly slow progress toward
democratic governance, prosperity, and social justice in a great many
countries of Africa, Latin America, the Islamic world, and elsewhere.
Understanding how culture influences the behavior of individuals
and societies, and what forces shape cultural change, can, I believe,
accelerate the pace of progress.[1]

In the 1999 symposium, sponsored by the Academy for Interna-
tional and Area Studies of Harvard University, a wide range of views
was presented. Many thought that cultural values were influential in
the political, economic, and social evolution of societies; but others
disagreed. Economist Jeffrey Sachs argued that cultural values played
an insignificant role and that other factors, particularly geography,
mattered far more. Anthropologist Richard Shweder argued that the
symposium was based on a false premise because the idea of "prog-
ress," and indeed the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which offers a widely accepted definition of progress, is a Western
imposition on the rest of the world.

A year later, in the spring of 2000, the papers prepared for the symposium were published in the book *Culture Matters*,[2] along with commentary by its coeditors, Samuel Huntington, then Chairman of the Harvard Academy, and me. The book received favorable critical attention in *The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal*, *The Boston Globe*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Time,* among other newspapers and magazines. Eight foreign language editions have been published: two in Chinese (Beijing and Taipei), and one each in Estonian, German, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, and Spanish. A ninth, in Arabic, was contracted in 2005. *Culture Matters* was also I'm glad to report, for several years a best-seller at the World Bank bookstore.

During the final session of the symposium, we proposed to consider what might be done to strengthen the values and attitudes that nurture progress. None of us believed that culture is genetically determined. Everyone believed that culture is acquired—transmitted from generation to generation through the family, the church, the school, and other socializing instruments. Nonetheless, it was clear in that final session that we were not prepared to address cultural change and what promotes or impedes it. We could not satisfactorily disaggregate "culture" into components that would lend themselves to understanding *how* culture influences the behaviors that promote progress. We all agreed that culture changes, but many were uncomfortable discussing measures to encourage or facilitate cultural change. Hence, my introduction to *Culture Matters* called for a comprehensive research program aimed at better understanding cultural transmission and cultural change, and particularly the factors that drive change.

By the spring of 2002, two years after the publication of *Culture Matters*, we had raised the money necessary to make that research program possible. Since then, more than sixty professionals, mostly scholars but also journalists, development practitioners, politicians, and businesspeople, have participated in the Culture Matters Research Project (CMRP), administered by the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

The goal of the CMRP is to produce guidelines for strengthening the values and attitudes that nurture human progress as defined by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

• The right to life, liberty, and security of person

- Equality before the law
- Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
- The right to take part in…government…directly or through chosen representatives
- [The right to assure that] the will of the people [is] the basis of the authority of government
- The right to an [adequate] standard of living
- [The right to] adequate medical care and necessary social services
- The right to education.

As I mentioned, anthropologist Richard Shweder views the UN Declaration as an imposition of Western values, as did the American Anthropological Association when it opposed the Declaration. Allegations of Western bias notwithstanding, I believe that the vast majority of the world's people would today agree with the following affirmations, which are essentially a restatement of the UN Declaration:

Life is better than death.
Health is better than sickness.
Liberty is better than slavery.
Prosperity is better than poverty.
Education is better than ignorance.
Justice is better than injustice.

I want to stress as forcefully as I can that the CMRP guidelines will only prove useful when political, intellectual, and other leaders *within* a society conclude that some traditional values and attitudes are obstacles to bringing about the kind of society to which they aspire. Any efforts to impose the guidelines from outside, whether by governments or development assistance institutions, are almost certain to fail.

To produce the guidelines, the CMRP sought to address three tasks:

Task 1. What are the values and attitudes that influence the political, economic, and social evolution of societies?
Task 2. What are the instruments and institutions that transmit cultural values, beliefs, and attitudes, and how amenable are

they to application or modification for the purpose of promoting progressive values?

Task 3. What can we learn about the role of culture and cultural change from case studies, including studies of societies that have experienced political, economic, and social transformations?

With respect to the values and attitudes that matter (Task 1), the CMRP has produced a typology of cultural values that derives principally from the work of the Argentine journalist and scholar Mariano Grondona, who is a professor of political science at the National University of Buenos Aires and has been a visiting professor at Harvard. The typology consists of twenty-five factors that are viewed very differently in cultures conducive to progress and cultures that resist progress. By disaggregating "culture," the typology offers specific value, belief, and attitude targets for change. The typology is presented in the CMRP overview book *The Central Liberal Truth* by Lawrence Harrison, published by Oxford University Press. The title of that book derives from Daniel Patrick Moynihan's aphorism: "The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself."

The instruments and institutions of cultural transmission and change studies of Task 2 include child-rearing practices, several aspects of education, religion, the media, political leadership, and development projects. The Task 2 essays make up the companion volume, *Developing Cultures: Essays on Cultural Change.*

To develop a better understanding of the complicated cause-and-effect interplay of cultural and other factors in the evolution of societies (Task 3), we commissioned twenty-seven case studies, most of them of countries but also a region (Eastern Europe), a province (Quebec), a city (Novgorod, Russia), a Yoruba town in Nigeria, and an ethnoracial minority (African Americans). They break down by regional or civilizational grouping, or ungrouped (India), as follows:

Africa	**Latin America**
Botswana	Argentina
South Africa	Brazil
Yoruba community in Nigeria	Chile
	Mexico
	Venezuela

Confucian Countries	**Orthodox/Eastern Europe**
China	Eastern Europe
Japan	Georgia
Singapore	Novgorod
Taiwan	Russia
India	**The West**
Islamic Countries	African Americans
Egypt	Ireland
Indonesia	Italy
Pakistan	Quebec
Turkey	Spain
	Sweden

The guidelines to the case study writers were very broad. We were looking for the answers to four questions:

1. How have cultural values and attitudes influenced the evolution of the society?
2. What other factors have influenced the evolution of the society?
3. How have other factors influenced cultural values and attitudes?
4. Is there evidence of cultural change? If so, to what can it be attributed?

Many of the societies studied are success stories—striking political, social, or economic transformations. Others show some degree of transformation but also continuities with a lagging past. Still others have experienced little change.

My hope at the outset was that patterns would emerge from the case studies that would translate into useful lessons as we worked to develop the guidelines for cultural change that are the goal of the Culture Matters Research Project.

Notes

1. I appreciate that the word *progress* implies a value judgment with which some people may be uncomfortable. I use it in this book as shorthand for the goals of democratic governance, an end to poverty, and social justice articulated in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2. Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington, eds., *Culture Matters* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

Some Reflections on Culture
and Development

PETER L. BERGER

The present volume is one of the products of Lawrence Harrison's Culture Matters Project, which in turn is the outcome of many years of work by Harrison on the relation of culture and development. Harrison has been a key figure in what could be called a neo-Weberian renascence in recent years—a widening recognition by social scientists that one cannot understand a long list of economic and political changes without taking account of their relation to culture. I am not sure whether Harrison feels comfortable with the epithet "neo-Weberian" (I have not asked him), but I am sure that, if there is a section of the hereafter reserved for important social scientists, Max Weber must be happily chuckling over Harrison's enterprise. This volume, as it happens, comes out a little more than a century after the publication of Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, which has become an enduring point of reference for those convinced that "culture matters."

The volume contains a collection of highly competent and interesting case studies. Harrison has taken upon himself the formidable task of integrating the insights coming out of these studies. I will not try to compete with him in this. Rather, what follows are some general observations on the *problematique* of the Culture Matters Project. Inevitably my approach has been greatly influenced by the research on what we have been calling "economic culture," going back to

1985, of the center I have been directing since then—the Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs at Boston University (CURA). It pleases me greatly that a number of the authors of the present volume are scholars associated with CURA. I have subsumed my observations under nine headings.

Questions of Definition

I have some difficulty with the term *progressive values* as it has been used in Harrison's formulation of the Project's agenda, for two reasons. First, the term suggests a liberal political position, which I have no particular quarrel with, but which (as an orthodox Weberian) I consider to be a moral judgment that should not be used in social-scientific discourse. And second, it also suggests a philosophical idea of progress with which I disagree: I don't think that there is "progress" *tout court* in history, although there are certain "progresses" if one looks at history in a moral perspective (such as, for example, the "progress" from acceptance of slavery to the conviction that it is intrinsically unacceptable). One advantage of thinking of multiple progresses instead of unilinear progress is that this implies the possibility that this or that moral achievement could be reversed. However, I understand and agree with Harrison's intention in his formulation. I will interpret it as the quest for values that are congenial to the development of a market economy and of democracy. Since the work of CURA has dealt primarily with the former, I will make this my principal focus here.

Capitalist and Democratic Values

There is a widespread view that capitalism and democracy are obverse sides of the same coin, and consequently that values conducive to the one will also be conducive to the other. This view has been prominent in American political rhetoric for quite a long time, and by no means only on the right of the political spectrum. It is not altogether erroneous, but I think that the relation between the two institutional phenomena, and between the values legitimating them, must be understood in a more nuanced way. I have argued for this in my book *The Capitalist Revolution* (1986), and my understanding

has been sharpened by the multicountry study of business and democracy which CURA undertook with the South African Centre for Development and Enterprise (see the book coedited by Ann Bernstein and myself, *Business and Democracy*, 1998).

Proposition: A market economy is a necessary but not sufficient condition of democracy. Historically, capitalism and democracy did not originate simultaneously; with great regularity, the former preceded the latter. The same sequence can be observed repeatedly in more recent times (as in southern Europe, Latin America, and eastern Asia). This does not mean that this sequence is inevitable; there may be exceptions (India may be one). But the trend is clear. It is not difficult to explain: A market economy creates the social space in which institutions of civil society can develop, and these institutions in turn facilitate the emergence of a democratic polity. But the values congenial with these two institutions are not identical. Thus, for example, so-called post-Confucian values have almost certainly been conducive to the economic success stories of eastern Asia, but they are not intrinsically favorable to democracy (take, for instance, the sublime indifference to democracy of the Hong Kong business elite). Conversely, values congenial with democracy—notions of equality and solidarity—may be inimical to the development of a market economy (as in Latin American populism). A Weberian insight here: The consequences of particular value constellations are typically indirect and unintended.

Proposition: While the development of a market economy does not inexorably lead to democracy, it releases democratizing pressures which, under favorable conditions, may lead to full-blown democracy. It seems to me that this is the best way to look at the current situation in China. Once again, though, the aforementioned sequence is the likely course of events. (If you will, one should bet on *perestroika* preceding *glasnost*, which describes the Chinese case, rather than the two happening simultaneously, which may be an explanation of the difficulties in post-Communist Russia.)

Internal Pluralism

The discussion of these issues frequently suffers from what may be called the "Westphalian fallacy"; that is, the notion that cultural boundaries coincide with political ones, so that entire societies can

be analyzed and compared in terms of their values systems (in a sort of paraphrase of the formula of the Peace of Westphalia, *cuius regio eius religio*). In actual fact, though, the values operative within any society deemed "national" are rarely monolithic. There are, typically, numerous regional, ethnic, and religious variations, entire subcultures with divergent values, and even "culture wars" within societies. This pluralism, of course, is even more evident if one thinks in terms of "civilizations." Thus the current discussion of the values of "Islamic civilization" has made increasingly clear the diversity of values in the Muslim world. This does not mean that the notion of Islam per se generating certain values is altogether mistaken: There are indeed Islamic values—such as those pertaining to the status of Islamic law, the relation of religion and the state, the status of women and of non-Muslim minorities. And these values do impinge on the development of both capitalism and democracy. But at the same time one must be cognizant of the vast differences existing within the Muslim world (for example, between southeast Asia and the Middle East).

One look at American society, with its sharp internal value conflicts (such as over abortion, homosexuality, and the meaning of the separation between church and state), should make one wary of any monolithic view of culture within a given society. What is more, these intrasocietal value conflicts can be exported. This is manifestly the case with the globalization of "Western values." Thus people in post-Communist Europe are inundated with quite contradictory values emanating from "the West"—cowboy machismo versus feminism, technocracy versus environmentalism, "Anglo-Saxon" capitalism versus a European "social market economy," and so on. Put simply, we do not only export "American culture," we also export all the American "culture wars," by way of different institutional carriers.

Cultural Elements Conducive to Modern Economic Development

The long shadow of Max Weber still falls over the current discussion of this issue. This is not the place to expand over where Weber was wrong in his view of the matter (he was wrong, for instance, about Chinese culture). But Weber was not only right in the way he formulated the question, but at least in some of the elements of what he called the "Protestant ethic" as a factor in the genesis of modern capitalism. These elements are subsumed under his concepts of "ratio-

nalization" and "life-discipline"; that is, modern capitalism requires values that approach life, or at least economic life, in a calculating manner emancipated from magical thinking, and values of self-denial leading to saving and thus to the primitive accumulation of capital (the latter set of values Weber also described as "inner-worldly asceticism"). Whatever may have been the role of Protestantism in the genesis of European capitalism (something that historians have argued now for over a hundred years), I think that something analogous to the "Protestant ethic" continues to be very important for any population taking the first steps in modern economic development. This can be empirically demonstrated by looking at the values of overseas Chinese as these relate to their phenomenal economic success throughout eastern and southeastern Asia, or by comparing Catholics and "new Protestants" in Latin America, or for that matter looking at the role of Opus Dei in the modernization of the Spanish economy (here actually a Catholic case of "inner-worldly asceticism"). Put simply, if one wants to take the first steps into modern economic success, it is very helpful if one holds to values that favor hard work and thrift over the gratifications of immediate consumption. To these should be added a value not emphasized by Weber—holding in high esteem the education of one's children.

But none of these values operate autonomously or inexorably. They are always in interaction with noncultural factors, notably with macroeconomic and political forces. Thus even the most fervent "Protestant" values lead to social mobility in a macroeconomic disaster area (say, in northeastern Brazil), or in a situation where the state suppresses all entrepreneurial activity (as in Communist China before the recent economic reforms). Under such unfavorable conditions the "Protestant" values are, as it were, latent: They continue to be present subliminally, waiting to be activated if and when conditions change.

Vanguards

Different groups within a society have different values, which are relevant to the groups' role in economic development. Extending the previous point about internal value pluralism, one can then say that some groups serve as vanguards of modern economic development.

This has been true in earlier periods of history—for example, in the economic role of Jews in various European countries, or of Huguenot

refugees in Germany and the Netherlands. More recently, there is the role played in India by so-called "trading castes" (such as the Marwaris). Often these vanguard groups are ethnic or religious minorities. Examples of the former are, again, the overseas Chinese, but also Lebanese in Africa or Japanese in Brazil. Examples of the latter are Parsis in India and, curiously, Old Believers in Russia. Frequently, of course, the economic success of such vanguard groups leads to resentment and hostility on the part of what in southeast Asia are called "sons of the soil" (a globalization, if you will, of classical European anti-Semitism). If, as a result of this, the vanguard group is suppressed, this can be a powerful factor inimical to economic development.

Timing

Let me put it this way: So far as their economic functionality is concerned, values should come with an expiration date. There is not only the aforementioned latency, when certain values lie dormant until the time arrives when, suddenly, they become economically functional. This is presumably also the case with values that are politically functional as being favorable to democracy. An example of this might be the congregational polity of the Puritans, with theological roots that had nothing to do with politics, but which became politically functional later on both in England and in the American colonies. There is also the obsolescence of certain values, which are economically functional at one time but lose that functionality, and may even become counterproductive, at a later time.

I think that this is eminently the case with the values of the "Protestant ethic." As I indicated previously, Weber was almost certainly right in his view that some form of "inner-worldly asceticism" is crucially important in the early stages of modern economic development. Conversely, a hedonistic ethic is uncongenial to such development. But in a later stage of economic development this may no longer be the case. Put simply, a highly developed economy of the postindustrial type may no longer need masses of hard-working, self-denying people. It can afford a lot of hedonistic self-indulgence.

Take the case of so-called Japanese "groupism." It has been argued, correctly in my opinion, that following the Meiji Restoration the samurai values of discipline, obedience, and group solidarity were

successfully demilitarized and effectively mobilized in the industrialization of Japan. The same values continued to be functional in the "economic miracle" in the wake of World War II. It has been also argued that these same values are now downright dysfunctional in the postindustrial, knowledge-driven economy of contemporary Japan. In other words, these values have probably passed their expiration date. Contrast India: There is a dreamy, "other-worldly" quality to much of Indian culture, which arguably was uncongenial to modern economic development. But these same values may now, suddenly, have become very functional as a knowledge-driven economy has come to be established in certain (still limited) sectors of Indian society. The enormous success of the computer industry centered in Bangalore (and beyond that the singular mathematical and scientific aptitude of many Indians) may well be related to this emergence from latency of widely diffused values in Indian society.

Needless to say, entire cultures change over time. Thus the Puritan cultural heritage of America has mutated into a vastly more hedonistic culture today, though I suspect that elements of the earlier culture survive (as, for example, in the American propensity to engage in moral crusades, or in the fanaticism of various lifestyle ideologies). Thus cultures that used to be permeated by a specific religious ethos sometimes secularize with amazing rapidity (e.g., southern Europe, Ireland, Quebec). Conversely, cultures or groups deemed to be highly secularized suddenly generate passionate religious revivals (e.g., the Orthodox revival in Russia, or the eruption of a resurgent Islam among the children of secularized elites in the Middle East, or the phenomenon of the *haredim* among secularized Jews in Israel and elsewhere).

Alternate Modernities

These considerations relate in an important way to the concept of "alternate modernities" (as expounded, among others, by Shmuel Eisenstadt and Tu Weiming). This concept is directed against what I have called the electric-toothbrush theory of modernity: Drop an electric toothbrush into the Amazon jungle, and after a generation the place will look like Cleveland. That is not the way in which modernization happens. Different societies react differently to the modernizing forces of science and technology (which constitute the key

engines of modernity), and different versions of modernity are there-fore possible.

This is even so within Western civilization: American modernity is different from European modernity (not least by the crucial fact that the latter is highly secularized while the former continues to be robustly religious). And within Europe, modern England is not like modern France or modern Germany (not least with regard to the in-stitutions of democracy). But the concept of alternate modernities is even more important in non-Western societies, where there has been a recurrent, often vehement call for accepting the fruits of modernity without thereby accepting an entire package of Western values.

The clearest case of such an alternate modernity is that of Japan, the first non-Western society to modernize successfully. It was the genius of the Meiji oligarchs to rapidly acquire modern science and technology, along with a number of Western political and social in-stitutions (such as civil law and compulsory mass education, not to mention a modern military), while at the same time retaining and to some extent reinventing traditional elements of Japanese culture (such as state Shinto and the emperor cult). There are some indications that this synthesis of foreign and Japanese cultural elements has now come under considerable stress (as in an increasing individuation in tension with "groupism"), yet Japan continues to be a thoroughly modern society with a distinctly non-Western culture. Sometimes the notion of an alternate modernity has been deployed as a political ideology by nativist movements and authoritarian governments (militant Is-lamists are an example of the former, the "Singapore School" rhetoric about "Asian values" of the latter). However, there are examples of alternate adaptations to modernity that have nothing to do with any political agenda. Thus there is an alternate Chinese form of capital-ism, both among overseas Chinese and increasingly now in mainland China, which combines thoroughly modern economic behavior with traditional Chinese personalism (*guangxi*). The aforementioned com-puter industry in India affords another interesting case—people who are thoroughly cosmopolitan and in command of the most up-to-date technology, but many of whom are pious Hindus (often Brahmins) who celebrate traditional rituals, take caste very seriously, and have arranged marriages. There are at least aspirations toward alternate modernities in other parts of the world, such as Latin America (a modernized "integral Catholicism"), Russia (a modernized version of the old Slavophile ideal), and of course in the Muslim world (an

"Islamic modernity"). The success or failure of these aspirations will depend on economic and political factors that have little to do with culture.

These considerations in turn lead back to an issue discussed some decades ago in the context of modernization theory—whether there is a "core modernity" which transcends the differences between societies. I cannot possibly expand on this issue here, but a few observations are in order: I'm sure that there is such a thing as a "core modernity"—that is, an agglomeration of ideas, values, and habits without which modernity is not possible—but it is not clear just what this core must consist of. I distinguished a long time ago between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" elements of modernity—the former being necessary to modernity, the latter subject to considerable modification or even rejection (see my book, with Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness*, 1973). I will take the liberty of repeating an illustration that I have frequently used in teaching: If you are, say, an African country intent on creating a national airline you must train or import pilots who, while they are in the cockpit of the plane, must behave exactly like pilots of a Western airline. If they do not, your planes will crash. The cognitive and behavioral requirements for these pilots can be listed, and they are all "intrinsic." What you do in the cabin, however, is largely "extrinsic"; that is, you have a lot of leeway. You can put your flight attendants in traditional garb, you can pipe African music through the PA system, you can serve African food, and so on. Indeed, you might find that these exotica prove attractive to tourists and thus make your airline more competitive, which will also tempt you to invent some African traditions never heard of before. But that is another story.

The current debate over cultural globalization has resurrected the same problematic. The CURA study of globalization and culture (see the book coedited by me and Samuel Huntington, *Many Globalizations*, 2002) points, I think, in the same direction. There is indeed an emerging global culture of Western, mainly American provenance, which is very powerful both on the elite and popular levels. But it is not an inexorable juggernaut running over indigenous cultures worldwide. Rather, it is subject to innumerable modifications and localizations, not to mention resistances. What is more, there are what Tulasi Srinivas, a CURA researcher who directed the India portion of the aforementioned study of cultural globalization, has called "counteremissions," cultural influences originating outside the West,

now impinging on Western societies and modifying the modernity of the latter (for an important example, the cultural impact of so-called "New Age" spirituality). In sum: Modernity is not a seamless garment.

Reverse Causation

The main focus of this Project has been on the way in which culture impinges, positively or negatively, on modern economic and political developments. But Harrison also asks whether and how these developments, if successful, act back upon culture. Undoubtedly they do. I would hypothesize that the major effect is by way of individuation, which I think is due to the weakening of taken-for-granted institutions that is the well-nigh unavoidable consequence of modernization. Thus the successful economic development of southern Europe has greatly affected traditional social patterns. Who could have imagined some decades ago that Italy, the traditional home of a fervent familism, including the cult of *la mamma*, would today have one of the lowest birth rates in the world? Democracy too impinges on culture. As the new democracy became firmly embedded in Western Germany, old patterns of hierarchy and deference have given way to a much greater civility in everyday life (and not only in relations between the state and the public). Democracy creates citizens, as capitalism creates consumers, and both human types assert themselves against traditional hierarchies. Consumers demand customer service, citizens insist on civil rights. These aspirations have cultural consequences which go beyond their original location in the economic and political institutions of society.

   In sum: There is an ongoing reciprocal relation between culture on the one hand, and economic and political development on the other.

Policies

An important question raised by this Project is the capacity of policies to change culture. Generally speaking, I tend toward skepticism, if one is thinking of policies deliberately geared to change culture. Even totalitarian societies have a hard time in transforming culture, as in the failure of Communism to produce the "new Soviet man."

But economic and social policies certainly affect culture in an indirect way, as they do when they seek to promote capitalism and/or democracy. Certain policies also affect culture negatively, a prime example being the generation of a culture of dependency by the modern welfare state.

The most direct impact of policy upon culture comes by way of the educational system. There are many cases of educational institutions, typically administered or fostered by the state, which are antagonistic to the market economy or democracy. The effect of radical Islamic schools has been much discussed recently. There are less extreme examples, as in the disparagement of economic and technical skills in the educational systems of many Latin American countries. Thus educational policy is probably the most important area to look at in this connection.

I have earlier mentioned the role of vanguard groups for modern economic development. Their efficacy can be either hampered or encouraged by specific policies. Radical affirmative action and xenophobic immigration laws can greatly hamper such efficacy. On the other hand, policies can encourage such vanguards to contribute to the economic development of a society. There are historical precedents to this, as when Poland invited Jews and Prussia invited Huguenots with the express intention of acquiring economically useful populations. One might explore the way in which the economic potential of so-called "popular Protestantism" could be encouraged in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa. Needless to say, such policies will often have to confront deep-seated antagonisms. But to follow up these questions would go beyond the limits of these observations.

Part I
Africa

1

Explaining Botswana's Success

STEPHEN R. LEWIS, JR.

Botswana has come to be known as the "African Exception." Its re-cord of economic growth and political democracy stands in stark contrast to virtually all other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). I will argue that Botswana's success is closely related to how its found-ers built the new nation on those parts of traditional culture which were compatible with or essential to democratic development.

Beginnings

In the 1950s the Bechuanaland Protectorate was an economic and political backwater. In 1885 Britain had unilaterally declared its "protection" for Bechuanaland in order to forestall any expansion by the Germans in Southwest Africa and Paul Kruger's Transvaal Re-public. Then in 1895, three chiefs (Khama III, Bathoen I, and Sebele I) traveled to Britain to ask Queen Victoria's government for further assistance, on a mission arranged through the London Missionary Society (LMS). This was an early example of what became a long-standing practice. Botswana used some foreigners, the LMS, to help the country deal with other foreigners: the Boers, Cecil Rhodes's Brit-ish South Africa Company, and the British government. For decades, many people expected Bechuanaland to be absorbed into South Africa—an eventuality provided for in the Union Agreements that

ended the Anglo-Boer War. Botswana's chiefs, aided by allies in Britain, waged a long and successful campaign against incorporation. Eventually the policies of South Africa's National Party government, culminating in the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 and South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, ensured that the British would not hand over Bechuanaland to South Africa, though South Africa continued to press for it.

In the early 1960s, as constitutional development emerged in the protectorate, the general situation was grim. By 1965, the thinly populated, landlocked country was surrounded by white minority regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Southwest Africa. A multiyear drought eventually destroyed more than one-third of the national cattle herd (the country's only asset), and an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease prevented farmers from moving cattle to market before they starved. Grants-in-aid from the British covered half of the operating budget and the entire development budget.

There were only a handful of university graduates, and the first government secondary school was not established until the eve of independence. There were five kilometers of paved road in a country the size of France. Perhaps ten times as many Botswanan citizens held wage jobs in South Africa as were in modern cash employment in Botswana itself. Its per capita income was about 10 percent of the world average, placing it among the world's poorest countries.

To add insult to injury, the capital was in Mafeking, in the Cape Province of South Africa. As a prohibited immigrant in South Africa, Botswana's most important political figure, Seretse Khama, could not even travel to the capital of his own country. As Sir Seretse and his successor, Quett (later Sir Ketumile) Masire, Botswana's first and second presidents, often said, "When we asked for independence, people thought we were either very brave or very foolish."

The Record

World Bank data show that from 1965 to 1999, Botswana achieved the world's highest rate of growth of per capita income: over 7 percent per annum. By comparison, GDP in SSA was growing 2.6 percent annually, so average real income fell over thirty-five years. Botswana's GDP grew 10.6 percent and exports 10.5 percent annually. Manufacturing exports, starting from essentially a zero base in 1965, grew

over 16 percent per year from 1975 to 1999. Growth in modern sector jobs was about 7.5 percent per year at least since around 1980, two to three times the rate of population and labor force growth; employment of Batswana, as the citizens of Botswana are known, in South Africa declined to a small fraction of the labor force. External debt is negligible, and for several years foreign exchange reserves have exceeded two years' imports. In 1965 Botswana's income per capita was about 60 percent of SSA and about 10 percent of the world average. By 1999, Botswana's income per head was six times that of the rest of SSA, and 60 percent of the world average.

Diamonds accounted for much of the growth of Botswana's GDP. De Beers announced a discovery at Orapa in 1967. By 1982 Botswana had two major mines at Orapa and Jwaneng, and by 1990 it was the world's largest producer of diamonds. But any observer of development knows that the presence of mineral wealth does not guarantee broader economic success. Indeed, the political and economic difficulties of managing mineral wealth often lead mineral-rich countries—Nigeria and Venezuela are contemporary examples—into severe economic, political, and social trouble. Botswana's nonmining economy has grown more than 10 percent annually—a growth rate that would also have led the world. Further, while Botswana is De Beers's largest supplier of rough diamonds, Debswana, Botswana's diamond mining partnership with De Beers, transfers more than 75 percent of its profits to the Botswana government and now owns about 15 percent of De Beers.

Cattle ownership continues to be a major source of rural wealth and rural aspirations, but agricultural development has been a serious disappointment, despite massive government investments in agriculture and rural development. By the late 1990s, annual expenditures by the Ministry of Agriculture amounted to over 60 percent of value added in agriculture. Other factors also cause concern: economic disparities, unemployment among school-leavers, the very high rate of HIV/AIDS infection, and high defense costs.

Botswana held its first multiparty elections in 1965, eighteen months before independence, under a constitution unanimously agreed upon by a multiparty conference and later endorsed unanimously by the Legislative Council, which had been established in 1961. Since independence, Botswana has held elections every five years, from 1969 to 2004. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won 81 percent of the vote in 1965, and its majority shrank over the succeeding thirty-

four years. Twice (1969 and 1984) a sitting vice president lost his seat in the elections. Opposition parties are particularly strong in the urban areas. There have been two constitutional successions in the Presidency: from Seretse Khama to Quett Masire in 1980, following Khama's death, and from Masire to Festus Mogae in 1998, following Masire's decision to retire.

Transparency International has ranked Botswana as having the lowest perceived corruption in Africa. Botswana also was ranked second best (behind Chile) among all developing countries, and less corrupt than a number of OECD countries, including Japan, Spain, Belgium, Greece, and Italy. Since the 1980s, several independent weekly newspapers have provided lively (sometimes sensational) coverage of political news, with sixty to eighty thousand copies sold each week, mainly in cities and larger villages.

Botswana has played an important role regionally. It was a respected member of the Front Line States during the struggles for liberation in Southern Africa. In 1980 it was a key advocate and architect of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (now Development Community, or SADC). Botswana was selected to chair SADC for fifteen consecutive years, reflecting its standing with both peers in the region and with donors. Botswana has sent troops on UN peacekeeping missions, and its leaders have taken an active, if quiet, role in dealing with difficult domestic problems in several other countries.

On the negative side of the political ledger, both BDP and opposition politicians, as well as many other observers, have expressed concerns about inequities in distributing the fruits of economic development and the political consequences. Controversy continues around government development policies for the Basarwa (or San, or Bushmen) peoples. A famous court case on gender discrimination, brought by a woman named Unity Dow, garnered Botswana a good deal of adverse attention. The courts ultimately found, as she had charged, that the Citizenship Act (which granted citizenship to the children of male, but not female, citizens if the spouse was a noncitizen) was unconstitutional. Unity Dow herself is now a judge.

With the huge exception of HIV/AIDS, an epidemic that has exploded since the mid-1990s, Botswana's progress has been impressive both socially and economically. Government revenues were heavily reinvested in health care, and in primary, secondary, and tertiary education; education rates for females are generally higher than for males.

Water supply projects, first in major villages and then in smaller ones, gave virtually everyone access to potable water. Botswana now has one of the best systems of paved roads on the continent (over 5,000 km, compared to 5 km at independence). Monthly grants were introduced for all citizens over the age of sixty-five, and they have made a major impact in reducing poverty among the aged. A large network of NGOs operates in all fields, from education and health to women's issues, social services, services for the disabled, and youth services.

Roots of Success: Traditional Society and Deft Choices

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as impulses for political independence were stirring in Bechuanaland, most people in the protectorate were still living in a traditional society. Their lives were regulated by the seasons, since agriculture—crop farming or animal husbandry—was the dominant economic activity. However, a substantial portion of adult males (one-third of those aged twenty to forty) as well as many women, worked in South African mines, farms, and factories.

The British ruled Bechuanaland through classic indirect rule: the ordinary person was governed by his or her chief, or by a subchief or a headman in the area. The colonial district commissioner worked with the chief. Europeans (perhaps 1 percent of the population) and the very small Asian and mixed-race communities had more direct contact with the colonial authorities. The chief presided at *kgotla*, the traditional gathering place in the village which served as a judicial chamber, administrative body, or advisor to the chief, as the occasion demanded. The *kgotla* was and continues to be a central institution in Tswana culture and governance. The chief adjudicated disputes and dispensed justice, allocated land—for arable farming, grazing, home sites, and commercial ventures—and distributed stray cattle at his discretion. He made decisions on educational policy and public works projects, told people when it was time to plow or harvest, and was, in general, responsible for managing the lives of his subjects.

A Setswana saying conveys an important attribute of traditional culture: "Kgosi ke Kgosi ka batho": a chief is a chief by the will of the people. Chiefs generally consulted people before making a decision on matters of any importance. While they did not necessarily abide by the consensus in the *kgotla,* the tradition of consultation and seeking consensus is deeply important in Tswana society. A chief

would seldom venture an opinion in the *kgotla* until all who wished to opine had done so.

The churches were a presence through most of the country, and chiefs were the first converts to Christianity. Initiation rites continued, but now circumcision and ritual sacrifices were barred. Prayers for rain replaced (or were performed alongside) rainmakers. Liquor was banned. The churches were a major source of the education and health care available to Batswana, and they were seen to be bringing useful skills to the country and its people. The first speaker of the National Assembly was the Reverend Dr. Alfred Merriweather, the missionary doctor who headed the Scottish Livingston Hospital in Molepolole. His successor as speaker was the Reverend Albert Lock, also of the United Congregational Church, successor to the LMS.

Many of the chiefs were progressive in their attitudes toward modernization, often encouraged by missionaries. The Bakgatla National School, opened in 1923 in Mochudi, was a self-help project pushed by the Bakgatla Regent, Isang Pilane, who respected modern ideas and wanted his people to learn the skills the whites possessed. Chief Linchwe I sent Bakgatla to South Africa so they could bring back education to develop his people. Tshekdi Khama fought for more rights for Africans within the protectorate, established a secondary school, and promoted modern agriculture. So while many factors in traditional society, including the power of witch doctors and sorcery, inhibited change or progressive ideas, powerful countervailing forces came from some of the chiefs.

There was relatively little formal education beyond primary school; modern farming methods for crops and livestock had not penetrated very deeply into traditional life. Farming in drought-prone Bechuanaland was highly risky, but those risks were simply part of what life had to offer. Traditional society also produced skepticism about new ideas and jealousy of those who moved ahead by their own efforts, inhibiting change and discouraging progressive activities. In the 1950s Quett Masire became the first master farmer and the largest African producer of grain in the protectorate. His high yields and large harvests were widely attributed to witchcraft rather than the elaborate system of dryland farming he had developed through reading, observation, and experimentation. Aspirations for men included working in the mines long enough to accumulate savings for some cattle, a wife, a home and family; some had the ambition to be a clerk in the colonial government.

Among ethnic groups in Southern Africa, the Tswana have one of the weakest military traditions, and more bellicose tribes pushed them to the periphery of the arable land. A Setswana proverb holds that "the big battle should be fought with words," and their skill at diplomacy has deep historical and cultural roots. Their survival in a relatively harsh and risky physical environment and climate depended on a good deal of cooperation, especially in times of extreme drought. And a strong tradition held that those who had resources should assist those who lacked them.

Respect for others, integrity, modesty, lack of personal pride, and honesty were important virtues. Eschewing showiness helped avoid "prestige" projects and unnecessary expenditures after independence. For many years only the president flew first class to international meetings, or had the use of an official car with a driver. Until the late 1970s or 1980s, ministers and permanent secretaries drove pickup trucks in the capital. In the 1970s, when the minister of agriculture discovered a delegation from the Botswana Meat Commission staying in a five-star hotel in Europe, he made them move immediately to a cheaper one.

Colonial Authorities and Constitutional Change

The British colonial authorities provided honest administration but very little development of physical or human resources. A colleague in Botswana once observed, with some anger, "The British left us with nothing!" He then paused, thoughtfully, and added, "On the other hand, the British left us with nothing." There was no large settler community claiming political power, no bureaucracy of privileged civil servants, no large houses of colonial rulers, no inheritance of inferiority that plagued many other former colonies. Nor did Botswana endure the rapacious rule of the Belgian Congo or other exploited colonies in Africa. A blank slate was in many ways a blessing,

Successive resident commissioners and those who reported to them had occasionally had stormy relationships with some chiefs, notably Tshekedi Khama, a nephew of Khama III, who was particularly independent and self-confident. These disputes generally arose when commissioners tried to exercise greater control over areas that were the chiefs' prerogative. The colonial authorities established a Native (later African) Advisory Council in 1919 and a European Advisory

Council in 1920 (though very few whites then lived in the territory). A Joint Advisory Council (JAC), established in 1951, had eight members from each of the other advisory councils and four government members. In 1956 the government asked the JAC to begin debating and commenting on proposed legislation for the protectorate, though laws were still promulgated by the colonial government in London.

A major conflict erupted in 1948, and its eventual resolution heavily influenced Botswana's political history. Seretse Khama, grandson of Khama the Great, was heir to the chieftainship of the Bangwato at his birth in 1921. Khama and his successors ruled several other tribes as paramount chiefs, and presided over a larger population than any of the other seven paramount chiefs acknowledged by the British. While Seretse was in his minority, the tribe was ruled by his uncle, Tshekedi Khama, as regent. Tshekedi was a powerful force in the protectorate.

In 1948, while in London studying law, Seretse fell in love with and married an English woman, Ruth Williams. South African elections had just been won by the racist National Party, which made strong representations to the British about this mixed marriage. An enormous controversy, reported in the world press, surrounded Seretse's marriage. Tshekedi was outraged, since Seretse had married without his permission, outside the tribe, and to a white woman. At a confrontation in the *kgotla* in Serowe, Seretse argued the case for his marriage, and the overwhelming majority sided with him. Tshekedi and Seretse became estranged, and the British banned Seretse from the protectorate. By 1956, Seretse and Tshekedi reached an accommodation: both would renounce claims to the chieftainship, and Seretse and his family were permitted to return. Later reforms provided for elected tribal councils to advise chiefs, and by 1959 such arrangements had been finalized throughout the territory. First Tshekedi and then Seretse served as secretary to the Ngwato Tribal Council.

One exceptionally positive aspect of colonial rule in its final decade was the role of Peter Fawcus, who arrived in 1954 and became Resident Commissioner in 1959. He and his legal advisor, Alan Tilbury, worked closely with Khama and Masire on virtually every aspect of the legal and constitutional changes in Bechuanaland from 1961 to 1965. Fawcus and a few other dedicated officers identified with the democratic, nonracial aspirations of the BDP leadership and were powerful allies of the African leadership. Fawcus's well-documented history of encounters with the whites, the chiefs and, sotto voce, the

British government, show his deft hand in moving the process along. Fawcus also fought for more financial resources for Bechuanaland, increasing annual expenditures in the protectorate by twentyfold between 1954 and 1965.

Working with (some would say directed by) Peter Fawcus, the JAC developed a new constitutional arrangement that went into effect in 1961, following approval in London. It established an African Council (elected from the local ward level up through each tribal *kgotla*), a European Council, and a Legislative Council (LEGCO) of ten Africans (eight selected by the African Council, and two appointed), ten Europeans (also eight elected and two appointed), one Asian, and ten government officials, with the resident commissioner presiding. This was the first body in the territory with the power to pass legislation. LEGCO established its own rules of procedure, based on those at Westminster. Debate was lively, and the record of voting on contentious issues showed no systematic pattern of division along lines of race or tribe, or among royals, commoners, or government officials.

Traditional patterns of consultation were extended to national legislative and administrative institutions. For example, LEGCO published any proposed legislation in the government *Gazette* two weeks before it was debated. Between 1961 and 1964, LEGCO dealt with a wide range of legislation aimed at providing the territory with the basic laws an independent nation would need.

Racial discrimination was a contentious issue in the protectorate. A LEGCO Committee on Race Relations held hearings and took evidence throughout the country. The exercise showed the white members how much racism existed and how deeply the African majority felt about it. Some people, including members of the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP), pressed for legislation that would make racial discrimination a crime subject to punishment. LEGCO passed a bill that established machinery for determining whether discrimination had occurred and provided for penalties. However, the law was never implemented, and it lapsed on schedule at the end of 1967.

In addition to LEGCO, an Executive Council had been established with four members of LEGCO (two black, two white) effectively acting as political ministers. Civil servants gained practice in dealing with politicians, rather than simply with more senior colonial authorities, and four politicians gained experience as political heads of administrative departments. Simultaneously, the African Council undertook several major committee studies and reports and began

to reform institutions of local government. They soon substituted democratic processes for the autocratic rule of local chiefs.

In 1963 Peter Fawcus invited the three political parties, the chiefs, and the whites to select three representatives each (the Asian community selected one) to a Constitutional Conference. The conference produced a draft constitution for self-rule; given Britain's budgetary support, they left foreign affairs and finance to colonial authorities. The conference, and then LEGCO, unanimously adopted the draft, which was then accepted by the authorities in London.

The Role of the Botswana Democratic Party and its Leadership

In November 1961, Seretse Khama, clearly the leading figure in the protectorate, convened the African members of LEGCO and proposed that they form a new political party to compete with the BPP, also founded that year. A committee was appointed to draft a party constitution, and the party was formally launched in 1962. Seretse Khama was elected president with Quett Masire as secretary general. Masire served as chief organizer until 1980, when he succeeded Khama as president of Botswana.

Most of the party's founding members were active in LEGCO, and they came from all parts of the country. The BDP was explicitly a national, nontribal and nonracial party. Over the succeeding months, the BDP leadership traveled throughout the country talking with teachers, farmers, civil servants, and locally prominent individuals. They recruited members, solicited ideas, and discussed popular aspirations for an independent Botswana. A party newspaper, *Therisanyo* ("Consultation"), was edited by Masire. Once the national constitution had been approved, the leadership took the message to every village in the country. By the time elections were held in March 1965, the BDP had organized in every constituency; it won 81 percent of the vote and twenty-eight of thirty-one constituencies.

Most BDP leaders had attended secondary school and were therefore among the relatively well-educated Batswana. Virtually all had studied in South Africa and experienced the racism there. Only Seretse Khama had traveled outside Africa for a university education. The party's fortieth anniversary brochure profiles sixteen people who provided "Shoulders of Giants." Twelve were teachers or heads of schools at one time or another; over half had attended Tiger Kloof,

the LMS school in South Africa. They were committed to education for themselves and for the electorate, and they brought both intellectual curiosity and academic rigor to their lives in politics. They set high standards and held younger people to them.

Both Khama and Masire traveled abroad to learn how electoral politics and policy making were done in other countries. They sent other politicians and civil servants to other countries to learn as well. They encouraged people to bring back their observations about both successes and failures. Masire noted in a speech to the first parliament in 1966, "our progress has been so rapid because we have benefited from the experience *and the mistakes* of others." [My emphasis]

The BDP had studied other constitutions before drafting their own proposals for the constitutional conference. They brought in specialists from other countries to run seminars for cabinet members and for the entire parliament, to ensure that politicians and civil servants understood the basis for the decisions they would be asked to make. The practices established in the 1960s were maintained for many years, even as the government became more complex and the bureaucracy grew.

When they were campaigning for the first election in 1965, leaders of the BDP found that ordinary Batswana were realists. Having scratched for a living on the land, they knew one couldn't demand more in payment than the harvest yielded. Frugality and saving were not just virtues; they were necessities of life.

The BDP leaders searched for a "golden mean" on the role of chiefs and of customary laws and practices. They wanted to remove the arbitrary power of the chief over an individual, but with a minimum of disruption in traditional customs. Between 1961 and 1966 the chieftainship was completely redefined. The elected district councils governed all citizens within the district boundaries regardless of race or tribe. Land boards assumed the power to allocate land, and since their members came from the area, local custom and history would be respected. The constitution provided for a House of Chiefs to advise the National Assembly on customary affairs. No one could be a member of both the House of Chiefs and Parliament, so a chief who wished to enter elective politics would have to resign the chieftainship—as Seretse Khama had done in 1956.

Chiefs retained their roles as adjudicators of disputes and dispensers of justice according to customary law. Thus, for the average citizen, the legal system would not change after independence.

An appeals court ensured congruence among customary, statute and common law, and also provided uniformity in the application of the law and a forum for appeal. Customary courts were established in urban areas and the new mining towns, so that both urban and rural Batswana could bring cases for adjudication without a lawyer. Today, 75 to 80 percent of all civil and minor criminal cases are still settled in customary courts.

The reform of chieftainship was doubtless eased by the fact that Seretse Khama was of royal heritage. He and the other BDP leaders believed that the chieftainship was a divisive force, since tribesmen were taught to feel a loyalty to their chief above country. Khama, Masire, and the other leaders were anxious to avoid the divisions on tribal and ethnic lines that had plagued other African countries. They asked that the 1964 census not record racial or tribal affiliation, in order to forestall any attempt to rate tribes or races by electoral size. The BDP leadership preached unity and *non*-racialism (not *multi*-racialism, which they associated with South Africa's approach) as key elements of the party's election manifesto. Characteristically, Khama and Masire felt the objectives were to achieve real democracy at both local and national level and to move allegiances from the tribe to the nation. It was not necessary to denigrate the chiefs in order to accomplish those goals.

The strong Tswana tradition of consultation was embraced by the BDP leaders. It influenced how they recruited party members, how they approached the electorate, and how they formulated policy and made decisions. The *kgotla* tradition of people speaking their minds candidly was easily transferable to a system of democratic elections with a bill of rights that protects freedom of speech and encourages widespread consultation. Consultation could also help educate people about the choices they faced and the consequences of their choices, and the leadership frequently cited their belief that "the essence of democracy is an informed electorate."

In the run-up to the 1965 preindependence elections, much of their electioneering was devoted to explaining, in meeting after meeting, the nature of the new constitution, the nature of political parties, and the way an independent government would work. Candid feedback to the leadership was seen as important in formulating policies that would respond to people's needs. The first priorities the districts listed were access to good water, primary education, health care, better roads and communication, and better access to markets for livestock

and crops. The BDP government listened, responded in its budgetary allocations, and was richly rewarded by its electoral support in most rural areas.

Seretse Khama's role as BDP leader was critical. He carried the large Bangwato vote because of his royal heritage, and was popular in other parts of the country for the same reason. Further, he was a charismatic man, eloquent and witty in both Setswana and English, and at ease with people of any station in life, race, or background. While Seretse's leadership gave the BDP a substantial advantage, Masire's organizational efforts made the BDP election victory broad and enduring. The BDP became much more than the reflected charisma of one person.

Living next to South Africa also was important. At independence, most political leaders, regardless of their party affiliation, had lived, worked, gone to school, or traveled in South Africa. They had seen the results of a political, economic, and social system based on race. All were determined to avoid any such thing in Botswana, though different political parties approached the matter in different ways. Motsamai Mpho, one of the founders of the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP), was an African National Congress (ANC) man, while another of its founders, Philip Matante (later the first leader of the opposition after independence) was a Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) protégé. The PAC was antiwhite and confrontational in its approach, while the ANC was ideologically inclined to socialism but was nonracial in its membership. As Mpho and Matante split in 1963, they led two different parties to the constitutional conference, where neither contributed much.

The BDP was proud that it did not proclaim any "isms," that its approach was based only on whether something would work in Botswana. In his opening speech to the first Parliament, Khama noted: "The foreign policy of my government will be dictated by reason and commonsense.…Our first duty will be toward the people of this country rather than to any world political ideologies." Masire added, "We do not care whether we are called capitalist or socialist…what interests us is to see Botswana developed."

The "Four National Principles" were adopted in the 1960s: Democracy, Development, Unity, and Self-Reliance. The leaders noted that these principles represented the opposite of what the country experienced before independence: there was no democracy at either local or national level; there had been no development; people thought

of themselves as tribesmen first, not as Batswana; and they relied on the British for both financial support and international security. Those conditions would change at independence. Moreover, they knew that any progress on these key issues was potentially reversible: the principles would have to be constantly reiterated and used as a guide to policy choices.

The Policy-Making Process

The principles of both consulting with and educating the electorate lie at the heart of the policy-making process in Botswana. During the republic's formation, the leadership recognized that selecting a policy involved a choice and a process for making a decision, that one should know something of the costs and benefits of the alternatives, and that all choices involved calculated risks. From 1961 to 1964, working with LEGCO and the Executive Council, they developed a practice of involving civil service technical experts in direct discussion with cabinet ministers and other politicians. Politicians should understand the technical aspects of constraints on their choices, and experts should know directly of political leaders' concerns.

In 1975, for example, Botswana decided to establish its own currency, the pula ("rain"), and to stop using the South African rand. The pula was issued in August 1976, after a year of widespread publicity about the new currency and its effects on everyday lives. Planning for the pula meant new legislation (establishing a central bank, regulating commercial banks in Botswana, etc.), but an independent currency would also require decisions for the first time on monetary and interest rate policies, exchange controls, levels of foreign exchange reserves, and the currency's par value. Therefore, a macroeconomic planning unit was established in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) as was a working group between the Bank of Botswana and MFDP.

Before "Pula Day," seminars were held for the Economic Committee of the Cabinet—the cabinet plus senior civil servants—and for all-party parliamentary caucuses covering the balance of payments, why foreign exchange reserves rise and fall, the effects of changes in the exchange rate between the pula and other currencies, and so forth. By the mid-1980s, it was normal to discuss exchange rate policy in parliament and even among the public.

Anticipation of future developments has been an important part of Botswana's approach. In planning for drought, animal diseases, and possible disruptions of energy supplies or possible South African sanctions, the government mobilized foreign or local experts to analyze the issues. It then planned, educated, and executed accordingly.

For many years Botswana enjoyed the highest flow of foreign aid per capita of any country in Africa. In contrast to many countries where donors or donor consortia effectively dictated terms or priorities to the host government, Botswana actively managed its relationships with donor agencies to make their priorities fit those of the government. The long tradition of relying on some foreigners to help deal with other more troublesome ones was used productively in Botswana. Technical assistance personnel were often seamlessly adopted as part of the civil service, and consultants were used in negotiations with mining companies, banks, and even donor agencies. The self-confidence long shown by many traditional leaders like Khama III and Tshekedi carried over to the independent government. The leaders did not mind acknowledging that they lacked some skill or knowledge; nor were they unwilling to make a decision when needed.

The Challenge of HIV/AIDS

Since the mid-1990s and before, the country's biggest challenge has been the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Available data show Botswana as having one of the world's highest infection rates. Botswana shares with the rest of Southern Africa a history of migrant labor that made the spread of HIV/AIDS especially likely. With a system of open communication, free press, widespread consultation, careful planning, good budgeting, and a well-developed health care system, how could this tragedy have taken place? There is, of course, no easy answer to this question, but based on personal observation and conversations in Botswana over many years, I offer some hypotheses.

Botswana acted early to address the spread of the disease. By the mid-1980s, well ahead of most countries, there were posters in ministries, factories, and mines promoting condom use, for example. However, several factors inhibited education, accelerated the spread, and slowed an assault on the problem. A cultural reluctance to discuss sex explicitly, especially in public, hampered effective education. The

great shame associated with the disease has also inhibited preventive and educational campaigns. Further, traditional attitudes made sexual relationships outside marriage acceptable. Traditional Tswana attitudes toward gender relationships put older men in a position to exploit younger women. The effect can be seen in the gender-specific infection rates, though the differentials are not much different from the rest of SSA.

Aspects of policy formation also may have had an impact. Over time, as government and its bureaucracy grew, some of the constructive practices of earlier years atrophied. The culture of open analysis has to some extent deteriorated. It is less common for junior officers, however talented, to meet with either senior civil servants or ministers. As a result, those with decision-making responsibility are not exposed to the full range of options. Ideas, observations, and proposals, good or bad, do not bubble up in the process, and those farther down in the organization are often not attuned to the concerns of the decision makers. This would have a deleterious effect on all policy and planning, and it may be particularly important in understanding the HIV/AIDS crisis.

The policy response may also reflect the unique nature of the health professions. Clearly, any effective approach to containing the epidemic must involve a multidisciplinary effort in both public and private sectors involving people in health, education, NGOs, churches, labor unions and businesses, traditional leaders, and local and national elected officials in every part of the country as well as international expertise and resources. But for many years, Botswana's Ministry of Health maintained an effective monopoly, based on professional expertise, on policies and procedures to deal with the epidemic. This was directly contrary to the extraordinary involvement of many different people in interministerial approaches, residential commissions, and task forces used in everything from mining negotiations to contingency planning for drought or for sanctions by South Africa. The failure to address HIV/AIDS in a timely and effective way may represent the obverse of the many successes of the policy process in dealing with other complex issues in Botswana.

Changing a Culture and Sustaining the Change

The leadership in Botswana accomplished a massive transformation of the system of governance and developed an effective process for

making economic policy in a very short period. These changes laid the basis for a record of economic and political success unmatched in Africa or most of the developing world. It did so by fully understanding the culture and traditions and making only those changes necessary to achieve larger objectives: creating a unified, self-reliant, democratic country in which people could develop economically. The leadership borrowed good lessons from elsewhere and tried to understand failings in other countries so they could avoid similar problems. None of Botswana's three presidents, Khama, Masire, or Mogae, has followed the path of many other heads of state in monopolizing expertise in order to maintain power, or using their powers to eliminate rivals by consigning them to insignificant tasks or worse. There were risks to leading in an open and accountable way, but Khama and his successors took those risks knowingly. The tradition of openness and consultation was used in developing virtually every major policy initiative. And, they did not pick fights that were not essential to their long-term objectives.

BDP leaders would occasionally remark that while they hoped not to lose any elections, they wanted to establish a tradition of treating opposition parties and leaders fairly and even-handedly, just in case they found themselves in the opposition someday. They knew their society expected rulers to behave in a seemly fashion and to serve the interests of their people. Since they were subject to regular referendums on their success by the electorate, they listened to what people were demanding. But even when it cost them votes, they were not afraid to say that they would not do some things, like providing large subsidies for urban services such as water and power.

While sensitivity to the existing culture is critical for making changes in it, it is also important to attend to how the culture is evolving over time. Despite the massive reforms of the mid-1960s, interest in the chieftainship and the potential for interethnic rivalries continues to be high. A proposed expansion of the House of Chiefs will reemphasize the country's ethnic fragmentation.

In a more sinister vein, witch doctors continue to be a force in society. The HIV/AIDS epidemic and the despair it has occasioned seem to have reinforced the appeal to "traditional medicine" in some extremely pernicious ways (e.g., the advice that having sex with a virgin will cure HIV/AIDS). Some ritual murders still occur. The downsides of traditional culture and of ethnic conflicts have endured side by side with other features more conducive to democracy and economic

development. Nonracialism and nontribalism must be fought for every day.

Final Observations

Botswana's successes in political and economic development reflect the extension of some important aspects of traditional culture together with modifications pushed by the leadership that emerged in the years before independence.

The practice of having the chief consult and listen in *kgotla* before making decisions was a critically important element of traditional culture that carried over into modern democratic institutions. The cut and thrust of political debate in Parliament or in political campaigns was nothing new to those who had debated serious matters in *kgotla*, such as whether Seretse Khama should bring his white bride home to Serowe. Culture can be expressed as a collection of habits of both mind and practice; these habits were critical to the evolving culture of a new democracy.

Traditional society was composed of modest and frugal people, who knew the meaning of uncertainty and risk from farming. Even chiefs were not given to pomp or conspicuous consumption. The BDP appealed to these sentiments, and they took seriously the wisdom of rural people in framing legislation and government programs and setting the government's own priorities. Traditional frugality paid benefits in shaping the government's approach to fiscal policy after independence. Modesty and a concern for those less fortunate made it easier to develop an incomes policy that attempted to keep wage and salary differentials within reason. The history of natural disasters made planning ahead for drought and other contingencies, including development of reserves of grain, oil, and foreign exchange, seem a logical course of action.

Chiefs may have been quite autocratic in traditional society, but they were also held to the law, both by their own people and by the colonial authorities. This tradition, as well as a general respect for the law in rural areas, and the honesty of the colonial government gave Botswana a tradition of honesty and avoidance of corruption that served it well. The tradition of extensive consultation throughout government also helped ensure that no one person or small group

within government could appropriate resources illegally or pervert a major project.

The leadership that took Botswana into independence knew South Africa and the problems of a society organized on the basis of race, and this affected their view of racial and tribal issues. A unified country was their objective, and they molded legislation, the constitution, and their practices within the BDP to achieve that result.

Three sets of problems now face Botswana. First, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, even if fully contained immediately, will present the country with major economic, social, and perhaps political problems in the coming decades. Already fifty thousand children are orphans in a population of 1.6 million. Given the high infection rates, the number will grow substantially. Second, Botswana is unlikely to see major increases in diamond or other mineral output in the next decade. There is nothing on the horizon to replace this principal engine of economic growth. It has never been easy to diversify the economy. A much slower rate of economic growth may be in the offing.

Third, expectations have become very unrealistic following nearly forty years (two generations) of exceptionally rapid economic growth. Per capita incomes have increased by a factor of ten to fifteen times; the great majority of citizens have participated either directly through new jobs or indirectly in improved water, health, housing, and education. Older people have recently begun to refer to the younger generation as "diamond children"; their expectations for material well-being are vastly beyond the dreams of their parents or grandparents.

Against this background, the fact that democratic politics in Botswana are lively and active represents perhaps the best hope for the future. A group of experienced newcomers has successfully entered the political arena. Forty years is not a long time to establish new traditions and to complete a change in culture from one based on a rural subsistence economy to one that is urban and modern. But Botswana's consistent ability to sustain some important elements of traditional culture—particularly the tradition of consultation and respect for the law—makes one optimistic about its future as well.

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2

Culture and Development

Questions from South Africa[1]

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What are the relationships between culture and political and economic development in South Africa? This paper is not an attempt to answer that enormously complex question. Rather, it is itself a series of questions. We consider four facets of South African culture, sketch their outlines, and build up more detailed questions on the relationship between each particular cultural element and development.

The overall form of the questions is this: What is the *net effect* on development of cultural attitudes and practices? Some cultural themes will clearly be negative for growth, some clearly positive, many (if not most) mixed or neutral. Wherever possible, questions will aim at suggesting a research agenda designed to "net out" cultural effects on development.

We believe these are interesting questions not for South Africa alone, but more widely, considering this country's distinctive cultural makeup. South African culture is very different from that of developed world cultures, but also exceptionally permeable and available to global culture because it lacks a high culture of its own. It is also strongly influenced by the continued presence of substantial settler minorities, subgroups of which act as "fragments" of metropolitan cultures in the sense suggested by Louis Hartz.[2]

The four types of South African culture we discuss here are politicized culture, consumer culture, popular culture, and "deep" culture.

Politicized Culture

Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson argue that all traditions are, if not invented, at least quite regularly and self-consciously revived in order to fulfill specific social or political purposes. This idea has been given considerable empirical support in South Africa in the last decade.[3] We describe three striking examples of tradition being invented to create politicized culture. This discussion is guided by two questions: Is this politicized culture purely instrumental—a weapon to be used in battles with, among other people, the settler middle class? And even if politicized culture is only very tenuously rooted in older and deeper cultural forms, what are the likely consequences for development?

Politicized Ubuntu

Ubuntu—roughly translatable as "humanness," the decency that all owe to one another—has in recent decades gained prominence as a term defining the cultural characteristics of black South Africans as economic and political actors. Its central ideas, usually expressed in one of the indigenous languages, are that "people become people through one another" and "the king is king through the people." First brought to prominence by antiapartheid clerics, *ubuntu* was used to define antiapartheid politics as against the inhumanity of apartheid and equally against the inhumanity into which the antiapartheid struggle had sometimes degenerated. More recently it has been adopted by the African National Congress (ANC) government as one goal of the state bureaucracy and been held up by the government and progovernment ideologues (or "African intellectuals") as a model to guide postapartheid behavior.

However, the extent to which *ubuntu* has specific content or widespread cultural reach beyond these vague and uncontroversial slogans is brought seriously into question by both qualitative and quantitative evidence. A prominent black businessman and member of the ANC national executive reflected on a problem with *ubuntu*: that

it "has been packaged for consultants to peddle to companies that are at a loss" about how to proceed. Much of what he sees defined as *ubuntu* "is a very reductionist use of the concept as it has existed historically." Instead, the ANC is "trying to develop the concept" because, "denuded of our historical base…we are trying to find something common out there, which is largely mythological—and there is nothing wrong with that—society flourishes on mythology."[4]

Several questions relevant to this topic were attached to a broad nationwide survey of 2,250 people conducted in South Africa in March 1999.[5] The findings are revealing. Respondents were asked: "What do African people in southern Africa have in common with one another which might help them catch up in development?" Under 3 percent of people mentioned *ubuntu* or traditionalism or ancestor worship or anything essentially "African." Nor did they mention the extended family system, or racial or ethnic pride and solidarity as a basis for development. These results do not mean that Africans have no sense of cultural origin or respect for traditional beliefs, simply that they generally do not see them as relevant to current problems and their solutions.

But whether politicized *ubuntu* is authentic or inauthentic, a mere slogan or a widely held belief, the question remains: What goals does it set and what limits does it place on state, corporate and individual action? This question could be the basis of a very interesting research project.

For the moment, what seems clear is that the top socioeconomic status groups among blacks certainly exploit African identity in jobs and career strategies. But this strategy gains its force precisely because it operates against a background of almost totally Eurocentric political and business ideologies. African identity is played as a card in struggles for votes, senior government jobs, and lucrative positions in corporate hierarchies.

Afrocentric Management Theory

Some South Africans are serious advocates of the argument that the relatively slow assimilation of black South Africans into the higher echelons of multinational corporations is due to their distinctively African culture. This culture allegedly differs in its basic assumptions from the allegedly Western assumptions that inform the corporate

cultures of the MNCs. One Afrocentric management writer, for example, opines that

> South Africans have to make their own economic and corporate management solutions based upon indigenous challenges and circumstances. We would be running at an inconceivable speed into an economic swamp if we were to assume Western management practices for our challenges and circumstances....The community concept is inherent in the Afro-centric culture, which is about Africans putting Africa at the centre of their existence. It is about Africans anchoring themselves in their own continent, its history, traditions, cultures, mythology, creative motif, ethos and value systems exemplifying the African will.[6]

This type of African perspective has recently become quite significant in South Africa and has resulted in the publication of several books. Advocates of this concept suggest that imported corporate culture is alien to indigenous African assumptions and that business success in Africa can therefore best be achieved by facilitating the emergence of an indigenous management style. In South Africa, this argument is sometimes reduced to a simple racial proposal: the white corporation has a culture that frustrates black managers.

Interestingly, however, empirical research on South African managers disputes this. It shows that, with the exception of a greater valuation of masculinity (over femininity) by black managers compared to their white counterparts, black South African managers are in fact *closer* in their value systems to white South African managers than they are, for example, to mixed race (formerly known as Coloured) or Indian South African managers.

Equally, as one interviewee noted, *ubuntu* provides no value system to guide how one functions in a company situation. For example, *ubuntu* might imply that one cannot fire an employee under any circumstances. The interviewee went on to note that the "lack of parameters about where *ubuntu* begins and ends is problematic," underlining the point that *ubuntu* has not translated well into the radically different setting of a modern company.[7]

It would seem, then, that Afrocentric management theory is, even more than politicized *ubuntu*, essentially a recently manufactured weapon designed to be used by black South Africans on the battlefield of middle-class rivalry. Even so, it is important to know more about its consequences. For instance, how successfully have proponents of Afrocentric management theory influenced the actions of firms?