

A Psychology Press Book



# Social Identities

Motivational, Emotional and Cultural Influences

Edited by Rupert Brown and Dora Capozza

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# Social Identities

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The concept of social identity occupies a central position in contemporary social psychology. *Social Identities: Motivational, Emotional and Cultural Influences* reports recent developments in the analysis of motivational and affective aspects of social identity processes. The book also examines the cross-cultural generality of social identity theory explanations of intergroup competitiveness, which have strongly influenced international research in this area. People's social identities and self-evaluation are thought to be largely derived from group memberships; it is presumed that people are motivated to attain positivity in these identities by favoring the ingroup in intergroup comparisons. An increasing stream of research is being devoted to extending the applicability of social identity concepts to intergroup relations and related fields.

The editors present here a collection of contributions from leading figures in social psychology which explore the state of the art in social identity theory. The most prominent motivational theories of identification are reported. Central themes concern:

- motivations that lead individuals to join a group and identify with it;
- the role emotions have in favoring (or hindering) intergroup relations;
- the effect of emotions on intergroup behavior;
- how people react to social identity threats.

Aiming to shed new light on important social problems like prejudice, bigotry, and intense conflicts around the world, this unique volume will be indispensable to students and researchers of social psychology, sociology, and cultural studies.

**Rupert Brown** received his PhD from the University of Bristol in 1979. Since then he has taught at the Universities of Kent and Sussex, where he has held Chairs in social psychology. His research interests include intergroup relations, prejudice and its reduction, and acculturation.

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## Motivational, Emotional and Cultural Influences

Edited by Rupert Brown and  
Dora Capozza

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# Introduction

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## Chapter 1

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# Motivational, emotional, and cultural influences in social identity processes

*Rupert Brown and Dora Capozza*

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Our aim in this chapter is to examine three sets of issues that were little analyzed in the original social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986): the nature of group identification, the impact of culture on self-conceptions, and intergroup emotions. Theories of ingroup identification will be reviewed, such as the optimal distinctiveness theory of Brewer (1991) and the model of subjective uncertainty reduction of Hogg and Abrams (1993; see also Hogg, 2000). We will then consider research on cultural differences with regard to the self-concept and the influence on behavior of self-criticism and self-enhancement motivations (Heine, 2001; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Our aim is to analyze whether the relationship between need for self-esteem and intergroup differentiation, hypothesized by social identity theory and found in Western cultures, can also be valid for Eastern cultures. The subject of the final section will be intergroup emotions – the anxiety which is felt during early interactions with outgroup members; the empathy which may arise when knowledge of outgroup exemplars becomes more intimate; the anger, fear, and desire to hurt which are experienced when an attack injures members of the ingroup. We discuss how intergroup emotions can play a mediating role in many intergroup contexts, often controlling the positive effects of contact on intergroup representations and attitudes toward the ingroup and outgroup. Thus we hope to show how the recent motivational perspectives, an evaluation of the cultural generality or specificity of social identity processes, and the study of intergroup emotions have raised new problems and extended the range of group phenomena explained.

### **Motivations of identification**

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) was conceived to account for intergroup differentiation. According to this theory, people discriminate in favor of the ingroup, claim its prevalence in value-laden dimensions, and at times derogate the outgroup in order to enhance the value of their own belonging and social identity. The theory includes two basic concepts. One

concerns the need for self-esteem: individuals wish to evaluate themselves and be evaluated positively (see, e.g., Leary, 1999; Leary & MacDonald, 2003). This need regards both the personal and the social self; that is, the groups an individual belongs to. The other concept is that the value of self and the value of the ingroup are defined through comparison: namely, the ingroup is positively evaluated if it is perceived as being superior to relevant outgroups on salient comparison dimensions.

People differentiate in favor of the ingroup in order to construct or protect its superiority; the positive ingroup attributes enhance social identity and satisfy the need for self-esteem. In the original social identity theory, the reasons for identification are not fully elaborated; it can, however, be deduced that the basic (motivational) determinant is the fact that belonging satisfies the need for self-esteem.

Self-esteem is, thus, the focal need in social identity processes. The influence of this need emerges from the findings of research. The relationship between discrimination and personal or collective self-esteem has been studied (Corollary 1 of the self-esteem hypothesis; Hogg & Abrams, 1990). As results from Rubin and Hewstone's (1998) narrative meta-analysis indicate, the number of studies which have supported this relationship strongly exceeds the number of studies which did not. Moreover, the majority of the experiments that failed to support the hypothesis analyzed the effects of discrimination on self-esteem measured as a stable personality trait ("global personal trait"), a distal component of self-esteem, rather remote from the collective state self-esteem construct envisaged by social identity theory.

The relationship between perception of threat to ingroup value and differentiation directed to the retrieval of self-esteem has also been studied (see Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). The hypothesis of this relationship – a core construct in social identity theory – has been supported by numerous studies. It has been found that when the ingroup comes out as the loser in a task, or when it is perceived as being responsible for the outgroup unfavorable conditions, or is seen to be inferior on a salient dimension, its value is restored by derogating the outgroup or enhancing the importance of its positive attributes (Branscombe, 1998; Branscombe et al., 1999; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). The rediscovered value of the ingroup tends to increase collective self-esteem (Branscombe & Wann, 1994).

In the case of lower-status groups, in certain structural conditions, namely when intergroup boundaries are perceived as impermeable and own inferiority is perceived as legitimate and stable, ingroup value can be recovered through strategies of social creativity (Tajfel, 1981), as also shown by recent studies by Jetten and co-workers (Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, & McKimmie, 2005). The creativity strategies have the effect of enhancing identification. If inferiority is viewed as unstable, group identity may

become politicized and willingness to collective action may increase (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Jetten and co-workers (Chapter 5, this volume) also studied the identity enhancement strategies in minority groups that voluntarily break away from mainstream society.

The need to protect ingroup value can trigger acts of strong hostility. In work environments, for instance, males who see their superior status threatened by the other gender may react using an unusual expression of insult: sexual harassment in the sense of showing the female target some pornographic pictures (Maass & Cadinu, Chapter 6, this volume). However, the retrieval of ingroup worth, through outgroup derogation or ingroup enhancement, is found mainly in individuals who have a high ingroup identification (see also Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001).

Concerning the hypothesized positive relationship between identification and ingroup bias (Hinkle & Brown, 1990), which may also be derived from social identity theory, while some research has supported it (e.g., Perreault & Bourhis, 1999), others have singled out some moderating variables. The relationship may be qualified, for instance, by individual difference traits, such as allocentric or idiocentric orientation (Triandis, 1995). In certain structural conditions (e.g., for large categories), the relationship appears to be valid for idiocentric but not for allocentric people (Aharpour & Brown, 2000; Capozza, Voci, & Licciardello, 2000).

Regarding the relationship between identification and self-esteem, as we have seen, identification moderates the link between perceived instability of the ingroup value and differentiation in its favor (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). The determining effects of collective self-esteem on identification appear to be confirmed by the few studies where they have been analyzed (e.g., Capozza, Falvo, & Carlotta, 2000; Maass & Cadinu, Chapter 6, this volume; Yuki, 2003).

If individuals need to evaluate positively their personal identity and their affiliations, further motivations are also important. Individuals need to be able to feel a measure of certainty in regard to their self-concept and the social and physical world, and appropriate attitudes to express in a given social context. Experiencing uncertainty can be aversive since one feels some lack of control over the events in one's social milieu. The importance of the need for order and structure in human thought is implicit in some psychosocial theories of the self, such as self-assessment theories (e.g., Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000), self-verification theory (Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003), and individual differences approaches (e.g., Sorrentino & Roney, 2000). At a collective level, members of inferior groups at times adhere to ideologies which support the status quo in order to avoid the structural uncertainties that change implies (Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001).

According to Hogg and Abrams (1993; see also Hogg, 2000, 2004, Chapter 2, this volume), one of the strategies individuals use to reduce uncertainty is to refer to relevant categorical memberships (subjective

uncertainty reduction model). If in a given context an ingroup/outgroup distinction is salient, the individual perceives him/herself as included in the ingroup. Uncertainty is reduced because the ingroup prototypes are both descriptive and prescriptive: they absorb the attributes of the group and prescribe behaviors and attitudes. In the larger social context, one affiliation can become salient if it curbs temporarily important uncertainties. Therefore, in Hogg and Abrams' model, identification depends on the fact that the ingroup provides the individual with interpretations and meanings. Identification, in turn, elicits differentiation processes which serve to clarify the prototypes and enhance the value of the ingroup.

In an extensive research program, Hogg and co-workers have confirmed some hypotheses of this model (e.g., Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Hogg & Grieve, 1999). They found that uncertainty favors identification and fosters discriminatory choices in favor of the ingroup. Moreover, uncertainty influences the perceptions of homogeneity and leads to the preference for ingroups perceived as homogeneous (Jetten, Hogg, & Mullin, 2000). In one experiment, Reid and Hogg (2005) discovered that both the epistemic motivation and the need for self-esteem influenced identification. However, the epistemic motivation effect was found to be prevalent. In fact, it was only when uncertainty was weak that choices were driven by the need for self-esteem; that is, participants identified more with the higher-status ingroup.

From an evolutionary perspective, group life was the strategy which allowed the survival of the human species (Caporael, 1997). Accordingly, individuals are inherently inclined to live in collectives. They thus need to perceive themselves as included and assimilated, fearing that excessive singularity leads to exclusion and isolation. However, a further motivation is fundamental. Individuals also need to perceive themselves as distinctive: distinctiveness allows comparative evaluation and self-definition. The two needs are satisfied by belonging to groups that are clearly distinct from other groups or which adopt explicit rules of inclusion and exclusion. In optimal distinctiveness theory, identification – namely, self-definition in stereotypical terms, commitment toward the ingroup – depends on the extent to which belonging satisfies both these needs (Brewer, 1991, 2003; see also Brewer & Pickett, 1999; Brewer & Silver, 2000).

In studies performed to test this theory, it was found that instability in the satisfaction of one or the other of the two needs affects ingroup and outgroup perceptions. In fact, both when the need to feel assimilated and when the need to perceive oneself as distinct is salient the homogeneity evaluations of the two groups increase (Pickett & Brewer, 2001). When the need for distinctiveness is salient – that is, the outgroup is perceived as too similar to the ingroup – individuals whose affiliation is uncertain can be excluded from the ingroup, and its actual size is underestimated (Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002). A strategy which high identifiers adopt to satisfy

one or the other of the two needs is to accentuate own closeness to the ingroup prototypes (Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002). Assimilation to ingroup prototypes enhances the categorical contrast and, hence, ingroup distinctiveness. In one study (Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993), it was found that, when the need for distinctiveness is salient, people prefer to belong to minority rather than to majority groups regardless of the superior or inferior status of the minorities. Therefore, in choosing a particular group membership, satisfying the need for distinctiveness can prevail over satisfying the need for self-esteem.

People identify, therefore, with the ingroup which satisfies the need for self-esteem or with the ingroup which reduces salient uncertainties. People identify with the ingroup which satisfies the need to perceive themselves as assimilated but also clearly defined: these ingroups limit the boundaries of reciprocal altruism behaviors (for the evolutionary bases of optimal distinctiveness theory, see Brewer & Caporael, Chapter 7, this volume).

In an attempt to widen the heuristic power of social identity theory, Deaux (2000; see also Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Cotting, 1999) has proposed a further explanation (the functional model of social identities). A basic construct in this model is that the different types of group present in society – wide social categories such as political and ethnical memberships, or face-to-face groups, such as family or work teams – can function in different ways. The principles of depersonalization, perception of self and others as category exemplars, and comparative definition of ingroup worth, hypothesized by social identity theory, may not be valid for all groups. Groups may also differ with respect to the functions they serve for their members. Deaux et al. and Aharpour and Brown (2002) discovered that identification can depend on satisfying the need for self-esteem (sports teams), the need to reduce salient uncertainties (religious groups), the need for cohesion (trade unionists) or the need to evaluate oneself positively through downward ingroup comparisons (group of students from own faculty). These different identity functions seem to elicit different processes. Discrimination and prejudice, for example, may be especially elicited by identifications stemming from the satisfaction of the need for self-esteem (for further motivational approaches, see Castano et al., Chapter 4, this volume; Vignoles, Chrysochoou, & Breakwell, 2000).

Research generated by the numerous models stemming from the fertile social identity theory has, without doubt, extended the field of group phenomena explained. As we have seen, the motivations which intervene in social identity processes are manifold, and behavioral consequences are different, when one of them prevails. When identification derives from the joint satisfaction of the need for distinctiveness and the need for inclusion, a perceived decrease in ingroup distinctiveness evokes differentiation processes which may also concern the negative attributes of the ingroup (Pickett & Brewer, 2001). The accentuation of one's own negative traits,

which can be observed at times in real groups, serves to underline or protect one's own collective distinctiveness (see Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996).

Considering historical events, it is interesting how Hitler in *Mein Kampf* actively worked to construct the identity of the nascent National Socialist Party. Through many intergroup comparisons, Hitler differentiated the National Socialist Party from German bourgeois parties, from Marxism, from the Pan-Germanic and Christian Social Parties – the latter were influential political formations in Austria in the 1920s. The distinctive traits of own party were: young, confident, capable of winning over the masses, but also cynical, unscrupulous, anti-Semitic and racist. Adhesion to the party, a group with clear boundaries, could satisfy the needs for inclusion and distinctiveness, but also the need to reduce salient uncertainties, given the clarity of its prototypes: radical anti-Semitism, closeness to the masses, nationalism with explicit prominence of Germany (Capozza & Volpato, 2005).

When identification derives from the satisfaction of the need for self-enhancement and the need for distinctiveness, a perceived decrease in self-esteem *and* distinctiveness can produce intense differentiation processes. Hitler attempted to convince Germans of their failures and mistakes and the risk they were taking in losing their “racial purity.” He attributed to Jews the responsibility for “contamination” (“they ape Aryans,” “they bastardize Germans”) and for German failures. The aim was to provoke not one but many motivations for differentiation, separation, and anti-Semitism (for an interpretation of anti-Semitism based on the incompatibility of material goals, see the stereotype content model by Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).

The new models have widened the heuristic power of social identity theory. It is not difficult to predict that they will continue to stimulate new research pertaining to categorical inclusion and exclusion processes (optimal distinctiveness theory), social influence phenomena, and the singling out of identity types which most strongly foster intergroup discrimination and bias (functional model of social identities).

### **Social identity processes and cultural differences**

Motivational models have shown how social identity can work in different ways depending on the needs that group belonging satisfies. Moreover, the functional model of social identities maintains that in society there are several types of groups: groups of different structure (e.g., large categories vs. face-to-face groups) and with different orientations (e.g., collectivistic vs. individualistic) can produce different processes and favor specific configurations of social identity (e.g., self-stereotyping vs. personalized self, included in a net of significant relationships; Yuki, 2003). The need to distinguish between types of groups and types of social identities is stressed by other

investigators such as Lickel et al. (2000; social categories vs. dynamic groups) and Prentice, Miller, and Lightdale (1994; common identity vs. common bond groups).

A similar contribution may derive from comparing cultures; that is, from the analysis of the theory's adequacy when tested in Eastern Asian cultures. However, while models and studies concerning the self and individual motivations are numerous (Heine, 2001; Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), empirical evidence regarding ingroup bias is scanty and incoherent (Smith & Long, Chapter 8, this volume). Moreover, the studies do not always refer to such central concepts of social identity theory as identification, collective self-esteem, and salience of personal or social identity (for exceptions see Kakimoto, 1995; Yuki, 2003, and the studies on regional and ethnic identity in Hong Kong, e.g., Hong et al., 2004). Without referring to such concepts it is difficult to establish the coherence of data with the theory. Nevertheless, the data can supply useful information for the generation of new theoretical constructs.

We begin with studies using the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). It is interesting that some had the aim to contradict social identity theory; namely, the concept that in minimal groups ingroup bias derives from the need to enhance social identity. In one study conducted in Japan, student participants were examined in six groups of six (Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993). In each group, three participants were categorized as overestimators and three as underestimators. Of the six groups, three were assigned to the "multilateral" condition: a condition similar to the experiments on minimal groups. In this condition, each participant had to divide 500 yen between an anonymous member of the ingroup and an anonymous member of the outgroup. Participants knew that each player would receive an allocation of money both from a member of the ingroup and from a member of the outgroup; the final allocated quota would be the average of the two allocations. Once the task was concluded, each participant received the set quota.

In the "unilateral" condition (the other three groups), each participant was told that two of the six members (one overestimator and one underestimator) had been randomly selected to complete the allocation task, while the other four were occupied in other activities. Each participant believed that he/she had been chosen as one of the two allocators. It was explained that, for completing the allocation task, he/she would be paid 300 yen. It was also stressed that one allocator would make a choice for one pair of the other participants (one overestimator and one underestimator), and the other allocator for the other pair. According to Karp et al. (1993), the unilateral condition allows two interpretations of ingroup bias occurring in minimal groups to be compared: either one favors ingroup members so that the ingroup obtains more and, therefore, is worth more – personal

material interest does not influence the choices (social identity theory) – or one favors ingroupers because one thinks that they also favor us – personal material interest would be the determinant of ingroup bias. The behavior of allocators would be guided by the irrational belief in being able to control the choices of the other ingroup members through their own choices: by favoring ingroup members one is favored with the consequence of obtaining personal benefits (see also Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989, and a response by Turner & Bourhis, 1996).

According to Karp et al. (1993), ingroup bias in the unilateral condition would support the explanation based on social identity, while absence of ingroup bias would support the hypothesis of personal interest. Results indicate that participants favored the ingroup in the multilateral condition, but were egalitarian in the unilateral condition. Thus, Karp et al. concluded that the main determinant of ingroup bias is an expectation that our favors are reciprocated, rather than the need to enhance the ingroup or to benefit a person who shares our identity. Karp et al. argued that these findings disconfirm social identity theory since they show that categorization is not a sufficient condition, and interdependence in resource acquisition is a necessary condition, of ingroup bias (these results have been replicated by Jin, Yamagishi, & Kiyonari, 1996).

However, the multilateral/unilateral paradigm does not allow a proper test of social identity theory. In the unilateral condition, the fact that the reward of the allocator is set (300 yen) promotes comparisons between oneself and the other ingroup members, thus making personal identity prominent. The absence of ingroup bias in this condition could therefore depend on the fact that social identity is not salient. Furthermore, even if social identity were salient, there would be interpretative problems. The allocator (e.g., an overestimator) who wishes to make a discriminatory choice in the unilateral condition could allocate 300 yen to the ingroup recipient and 200 yen to the outgroup recipient. However, this allocator could suppose that the other allocator (the underestimator) also makes the same choice; that is, he/she gives 300 yen to the ingroup and 200 to the outgroup recipient. The result of the two choices would be an excessive heterogeneity of resources inside the ingroup (300, 300, and 200 yen). The egalitarian strategy, in the unilateral condition, could have the function of attenuating such heterogeneity (for the need for ingroup homogeneity when social identity is salient, see e.g., Voci, 2000). Thus, processes determined by social and personal identity can explain the results of Karp et al. (1993) and Jin et al. (1996).

Moreover – still with reference to the experiments on minimal groups – it is difficult to explain in terms of personal advantage the preference for the strategy MD (maximum differentiation) in the matrices in which MD is opposed to MIP + MJP; that is, to the strategy of maximum ingroup profit (Tajfel et al., 1971).

Yamagishi and co-workers have tried to demonstrate the insufficiency of social identity theory by also considering cooperative behavior in the Prisoner Dilemma game (Jin & Yamagishi, 1997; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). The paradigm of minimal groups (in general, categorization was based on aesthetic preferences) was used in all of the studies, and participants made their choices by allocating one quota of money to their partner, once playing with a member of the ingroup and once with a member of the outgroup. According to social identity theory, the cooperative choice – that is, the choice which, if reciprocated, is advantageous for both players – should be more frequent in the ingroup than outgroup condition or, in any case, it should be that more money is allocated to the partner in the ingroup than outgroup condition.

Yamagishi and co-workers also predict greater cooperation in the ingroup condition. However, according to them, preference for the cooperative choice would not be mediated by the affiliation to a common identity; it would derive only from the expectation that one's own favor is reciprocated. To contradict the interpretation based on shared identity, Yamagishi and co-workers (Jin & Yamagishi, 1997; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000) have developed some ingenious experimental paradigms. In one study, in addition to the ingroup/outgroup partner conditions – in which both players knew the respective memberships (“mutual knowledge”) – Jin and Yamagishi used two other conditions defined as “unilateral knowledge”. In these, the participant is informed that the partner, a member of the ingroup (unilateral ingroup) or a member of the outgroup (unilateral outgroup), knows his/her own membership but not that of the other player. Thus, the participant interacts with a member of the ingroup who does not know that the two players share the same affiliation, or with a member of the outgroup who does not know that the partner is a member of the other group.

Jin and Yamagishi (1997) hypothesized that in the mutual knowledge condition a higher reward should be allocated to the partner-member of the ingroup than to the partner-member of the outgroup. In contrast, choices should not differ between the two unilateral conditions, in which one knows that the partner is not informed of the membership of the other player. In fact, in this case, the participant does not expect cooperation either from the ingroup or from the outgroup member. In the case of the “ingroup conditions”, moreover, more resources should be allocated in the mutual knowledge than in the unilateral knowledge condition since in the latter one does not expect the cooperative choice to be reciprocated.

According to Jin and Yamagishi (1997), on the basis of social identity theory there should be no difference between the two ingroup conditions since, in both, the participant is disposed to cooperation with the partner who shares the same identity. Results confirm the hypotheses derived from their model of reciprocity expectation. In fact, the level of cooperation was highest in the condition “ingroup/mutual knowledge” and did not differ

between the other conditions. Specifically, these findings seem to contradict social identity theory. However, the fact of knowing that a partner does not know the fellow participant's group membership might generate an expectation of being perceived as a single individual – that is, it promotes the salience of personal identity. Social identity theory could thus explain the difference found between the conditions “mutual knowledge/ingroup” and “unilateral knowledge/ingroup” in terms of differential salience of social identity (see also Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000; corresponding results were found using social categories such as nationalities, instead of minimal groups, Yamagishi et al., 2005).

Thus, the studies made by Yamagishi and co-workers (e.g., Jin & Yamagishi, 1997; Karp et al., 1993) do not contradict social identity theory. As we will soon see, the tendency to minimize the importance of the social identity concept for explaining group behavior is also present in other investigators belonging to East Asian cultures (Yuki, 2003).

In relation to the expressions of ingroup favoritism, research findings appear inconsistent. Using the minimal group paradigm and tasks of resource allocation, Yamagishi and co-workers have found evidence of ingroup bias. In contrast, using the same paradigm and allocation measures, Wetherell (1982) discovered that Maori and Samoan children reliably used the cooperative strategy of maximum joint profit (New Zealand). Heine and Lehman (1997, Study 2) found significantly lower ingroup bias in Japanese rather than in Canadian participants – the groups in question were rival universities. In the case of the Japanese, Heine and Lehman also found that the higher-status group did not emphasize its superiority and that the group of lower status even stressed its inferiority. The value of one's own belonging did not seem to derive from the use of comparative strategies. Less ingroup favoritism was also found in cultures of Eastern Asia as compared to Western individualistic cultures by Bond and Hewstone (1988), Tinsley and Pillutla (1998), and Wade-Benzoni et al. (2002). And Chen and co-workers found that Chinese, but not American, students supported the losing minimal ingroup by derogating the outgroup (Chen, Brockner, & Chen, 2002; Chen, Brockner, & Katz, 1998). Finally, outgroup bias was revealed in Japanese students who compared their national ingroup with the Australian outgroup (Yamagishi et al., 2005) or evaluated patriotism in Japanese and Americans (Karasawa, 2003).

The inconsistency of such results, but above all the fact that ingroup bias seems less pronounced in East Asian cultures, has led Yuki (2003, p. 168) to argue that groups in such cultures have little inclination to compare with outgroups. In Hinkle and Brown's (1990) terms, their orientation could be considered as autonomous, not relational. That is, the value of the ingroup would not derive from the perception of its superiority vis à vis other groups, but from other considerations, such as better performance than in the past, or performance corresponding to ideal or absolute standards.

Smith and Long (Chapter 8, this volume) have also argued for such a hypothesis. The autonomous orientation determinants might be structural. In collectivistic Eastern cultures the structure of intergroup relations, perhaps by being relatively stable and clear-cut, would make the comparison with the lower- or higher-status outgroup less relevant, thus reducing competitiveness.

Autonomous orientation as assumed by Yuki (2003) and Smith and Long (Chapter 8, this volume) involves the following considerations. First of all, in East Asian cultures, rivalries between groups should be less determined by the need to enhance collective identity but could derive more from the divergence of material goals. Moreover, the fact that in these cultures the modal group has collectivistic values and non-relational orientation – that is, it functions differently from the modal group in Western cultures – supports the validity of the taxonomic extensions of social identity theory (Deaux et al., 1999; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; for distinctions regarding collectivistic groups, see Brewer & Roccas, 2001). The original social identity theory cannot explain such cultural differences. By incorporating such diversity, taxonomic theories comprise them in the explanation. Finally, the fact that ingroup value derives from intragroup evaluations (e.g., temporal comparisons) supports the validity of recent motivational theories of identification (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Hogg, 2000). In East Asian cultures, identification could depend on the satisfaction of the need to reduce salient uncertainties more than on the satisfaction of the need for self-esteem. Indeed, with respect to Western cultures, Eastern cultures seem to be less open to change (Schwartz, 1992; see also Hogg, Chapter 2, this volume), and uncertainty avoidance is high in Japan (Hofstede, 1980).

According to Yuki (2003), social identity theory also does not explain group behavior in Eastern Asian cultures because the group in these cultures is not a set of individuals perceiving one another on the basis of a shared categorization (Turner, 1987). Rather, it is a network of relationships in which individuals perceive themselves as being included. In such a network, individuals are aware of their singularity and the distinctiveness of their role. The prototypical group is family, conceptualized as a network organized in few cardinal relations. Larger groups, such as nation, would also be systems of roles, massive and complex. In this type of group, conceiving oneself in a depersonalized manner – as interchangeable exemplars of the same category – would not be functional since individuals must perceive their diversity in order to play their specific role. To explain this type of group, the traditional concept of social identity is irrelevant (Yuki, 2003) or only occasionally relevant (Yamagishi, 2003).

Finally, the lower ingroup bias found in Eastern Asian cultures could depend on the fact that, in such cultures, motivation to self-criticism prevails over motivation to self-enhancement. For example, in Rosenberg's

(1965) self-esteem scale, Japanese participants generally score lower than Canadian participants (Heine, Takata, & Lehman, 2000). In Japanese people the false uniqueness effect (Myers, 1987) – that is, the belief of being more competent than the average exemplar of a category to which one belongs – does not occur (Heine et al., 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Japanese examine information about themselves with more attention when it indicates their inferiority than when it indicates their superiority; the opposite result is found for Canadians (Heine et al., 2000). Among Japanese people the effect of compensatory self-enhancement (Baumeister & Jones, 1978), which is the tendency to compensate for one's own inferiority in some dimension by declaring one's own prevalence in others, does not occur (Heine, Kitayama, & Lehman, 2001).

It is possible that the motivation to self-criticism does not extend from personal to social self, given the attachment for the ingroup in Eastern cultures and the fact that the attitude of self-criticism has the function to improve the performance of one's personal role within the ingroup (for a different view, see Heine & Lehman, 1997). As has been said, lower ingroup bias or its inconsistency may depend on non-relational orientation which in turn may depend on the structural attributes of the social context.

Our final analysis concerns the studies on social identity performed in Eastern Asian countries which perceive reunification with China as possible (Taiwan) or have recently returned under the sovereignty of China (Hong Kong, in 1997). These studies make explicit reference to self-categorization theory (e.g., Hong et al., 2004; Li, 2003), optimal distinctiveness theory (e.g., Chiu & Hong, 1999), and the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; see Hong et al., 2004).

In one study, Schack and Schack (2005) analyzed the representation of national, regional, and ethnic categories in students and employees in Hong Kong. Schack and Schack found that, two years after the handover, in cognitive representation a superordinate category was present (East Asians) including Hong Kongers, Mainland Chinese, and Japanese. The “values of Confucius”, similar historical roots, and physical features were the common traits of the three groups. Within this cluster, however, participants operated clear distinctions. They differentiated Hong Kongers from Mainland Chinese, assigning to Hong Kongers the attributes of modernity and greater Westernization, and Hong Kongers from Japanese for the higher Westernization of Hong Kongers. These distinctions made regional identity *optimal* (Brewer, 1991), namely self-perception and self-presentation as Hong Kongers (or primarily Hong Kongers) rather than as Chinese (see Brewer, 1999a; and for the representations prior to the handover, Lam, Lau, Chiu, Hong, & Peng, 1999).

In the context of annexation, researchers tried to single out the conditions which could favor the formation, in the people of Hong Kong, of a common identity, inclusive of Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese. In one study,

carried out in Hong Kong shortly before the handover, Fu, Lee, Chiu, and Hong (1999) created two experimental conditions. In one condition student participants were given the task of writing an essay on the Japanese government's responsibility in the death of a Hong Kong patriot (David Chan, who died in 1996 during a demonstration in favor of Chinese – and not Japanese – possession of the Diaoyu Islands). In the other condition, they had to write an essay on the responsibility of the Beijing government. In the first condition, the context made salient the Chinese versus Japanese ethnic belonging; in it, both participants who defined themselves as “primarily Hong Konger” (the great majority) and those who defined themselves as “primarily Chinese” were not against the assimilation between Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese (e.g., using Potunghua language in everyday communication). The condition “responsibility of the Chinese government” instead made salient the categorization Hong Kongers/Mainland Chinese, based on political and economic distinctions. In this condition, participants who identified themselves as “primarily Hong Konger” were less favorable to the assimilation compared with participants with primarily Chinese identity or the condition of Japanese responsibility. The frequent salience of common ethnic identity can make the relations between the two Chinese communities harmonious.

There are, however, conditions which can hinder cooperation with the Mainland Chinese. A critical factor is represented by the administrative actions on the part of Beijing authorities, who may not respect the need for distinctiveness of many Hong Kongers (see Brewer, 1999a). Another critical factor was singled out by Hong and co-workers (e.g., Hong et al., 2004). This group of researchers hypothesized and found two implicit theories which people use to explain the behavior of individuals and groups (Hong et al., 2003; Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001; Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001). One is entity theory. People who subscribe to this theory are convinced that human character is fixed. They believe, that is, that individuals are defined by static traits, which influence their behavior; the effect of situational factors is limited. Groups are conceived as sets of individuals sharing stable dispositional attributes (namely, essentialistic). The other theory is defined as incremental. People subscribing to it tend to believe that human character is malleable, and behavior is influenced by contextual factors. Group members are not ascribed with common attributes, but with common needs and goals which can change when changing the social context (e.g., intergroup). The distinction entity/incremental was assessed in different cultures, such as North America and Hong Kong (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997); it is not correlated with authoritarianism or conservatism and only weakly with cognitive elaboration styles, such as personal need for structure or attributional complexity (see Hong et al., 2004).

Hong and co-workers (2004) linked in an original way the two lay theories with self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987) and the common

ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000); they proposed, in fact, that the entity/incremental variable moderates the effects of the self-categorization level – inclusive or exclusive of outgroup – on outgroup evaluations. With respect to the condition in which the two groups are perceived as separate, in the condition in which ingroup (e.g., Hong Kongers) and outgroup (Mainland Chinese) are perceived as included in a common ingroup (Chinese), the outgroup evaluation improves for incremental theorists, but not for entity theorists, who are inclined to view categorical attributes as static.

The moderation hypothesis was confirmed in two studies (Hong et al., 2004). In one, concerning the relationship between Hong Kongers and Mainland Chinese, the only participants (students in Hong Kong) who did not evaluate Mainland Chinese negatively were incremental theorists who defined themselves as “primarily Chinese”. There was no difference between the other groups: entity theorists/primarily Chinese, entity theorists/primarily Hong Konger, incremental theorists/primarily Hong Konger. In the second study, participants – Asian American students – showed less prejudice toward African Americans in the condition in which American identity was salient than in the condition in which Asian American identity was salient. However, this finding concerned only the “supporters” of malleability (both lay theory and salience of identity – American vs. Asian American – were experimentally manipulated).

Thus, the perception of a common affiliation may not be sufficient to promote positive evaluations of the outgroup. Beliefs regarding the non-malleability of human character can hinder the common identity effects. It is interesting how historical and contextual factors favored the identification of a result which may broaden Western theories of intergroup relations.

Studies on the relations between ethnic and national identity have also been carried out in Taiwan (e.g., Li, 2003) and Malaysia and Singapore (e.g., Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002).

### **Studying intergroup emotions and their effects**

As is well known, Tajfel (1978b) defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept that derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and *emotional significance* attached to that membership” (p. 63, our emphasis). Given the prominence of the words “emotional significance” in that classic definition, it is remarkable how little attention affective processes have received in research inspired by social identity theory, at least until the last decade. A scrutiny of the early work that was concerned with developing, testing, and extending the theory reveals that the majority of it was concerned with explaining variations in different forms of intergroup differentiation in

perceptions, judgments, and behavior (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Brown, 1984a; Tajfel, 1978a, 1982; Turner & Giles, 1981). What is striking about this by now large social identity literature is how much of it is concerned with behavioral or cognitive phenomena that are affectively “cool” or neutral, and how little with the “warmer” emotional processes of liking, disliking, fearing, or admiring ingroups and outgroups. Whether as an independent or a dependent variable, affect was strangely neglected by social identity theory in the first twenty years of its existence.

Such an omission is surprising not just because Tajfel (1978b) clearly thought that emotions were important, as we saw above in his definition, but also because social identity processes are often invoked to explain phenomena such as prejudice and intergroup hostility, phenomena which most commentators would agree have a strong emotional component (Allport, 1954; Brown, 1995; Jones, 1997). And yet it was recognized early on in the genesis of social identity theory that liking (and disliking) outgroups was not usually strongly correlated with the conventional measures of ingroup bias and often seemed to be controlled by different variables (Brewer, 1979; Brown, 1984b; Turner, 1981). The following three examples may be considered. Brewer and Campbell (1976), in their large-scale study of interethnic attitudes in East Africa, found that the perceived cultural and linguistic similarity between the 30 ethnic groups they surveyed was predictive of the attraction that group members expressed toward other groups: similarity being linearly and positively related to attraction. On the other hand, indices of intergroup evaluation along various trait dimensions showed no such linear relationship with similarity, and factor analysis revealed the attraction measures to be orthogonal to the evaluation ones. In an experimental study of reactions to identity threat, Brown and Ross (1982) incorporated both affective measures (e.g., dislike of and annoyance toward the outgroup) and more conventional ingroup bias indices (e.g., evaluations of ingroup and outgroup on value dimensions). The former proved more consistently responsive to the threat variable and were largely uncorrelated with the evaluative bias measures. Struch and Schwartz (1989) found that group identification was implicated in predicting Israeli participants' aggressive intentions toward an ultra-orthodox religious outgroup – the effects of conflicting goal perceptions were more intense for high than for low identifiers. However, that measure of aggression was not at all correlated with the less affectively tinged measure of ingroup bias in group trait ratings. Moreover, the latter measure was only weakly – and paradoxically – *negatively* related to perceived conflict, and not at all to identification. All in all, then, it appears plain that evaluating one's group slightly more favorably than another (the standard indicator of ingroup bias) is not at all the same thing as actively derogating or disliking that other group. As Brewer (1999b) wisely observed, ingroup love should not be equated with outgroup hate (see also Brown & Zagefka, 2005).

Fortunately for students of intergroup relations, three developments subsequent to the publication of social identity theory have helped to place affective processes squarely back onto people's research agendas. The first was an article by Stephan and Stephan (1985) that identified anxiety as a causal ingredient in many intergroup encounters. Stephan and Stephan persuasively argued that, whether stemming from a perceived lack of familiarity with appropriate interactional norms or from a history of antagonism between the groups concerned, intergroup anxiety would be likely to have negative consequences for the quality of the subsequent intergroup behavior and attitudes. This prediction proved prescient. In several studies of intergroup contact, intergroup anxiety has repeatedly been found to lead to less favorable intergroup attitudes (e.g., Greenland & Brown, 1999; Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Wilder & Shapiro, 1989).

The resurgence of theoretical interest in the contact hypothesis in the 1980s (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Miller & Brewer, 1984) proved to be a second stimulus for the study of intergroup emotions. Traditionally, contact studies have used a number of affectively laden measures to assess the efficacy of different kinds of contact: social distance, intergroup liking, intergroup forgiveness, and various measures of prejudice (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998). The fact that these theoretical elaborations of the contact hypothesis all drew on social identity theory principles, albeit to derive different implications, provided an important spur for social identity theory researchers to take affective processes more seriously. We return to the role of affect in contact shortly.

The third development was Smith's (1993) seminal chapter on intergroup emotions. Drawing simultaneously on appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988; see Garcia-Prieto & Scherer, Chapter 10, this volume) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), Smith delineated various intergroup contexts that would be likely to be appraised by group members in particular ways, thus giving rise to certain emotions (e.g., fear, anger) and consequent action tendencies (e.g., avoidance, moving against). Two features of Smith's account are particularly significant. The first is that it is a genuinely intergroup theory, in the sense that it is the perception and appraisal of the intergroup situation by people whose group identities are salient that is proposed as the key causal factor in generating intergroup emotions. In other words, although individuals' own specific situations may or may not be likely to instigate an emotional response, because their group memberships are fully engaged, their appraisal of how the ingroup stands in relation to an outgroup becomes a determining factor. The second aspect of Smith's model is that it makes predictions about *specific* emotional reactions to situations rather than just diffused emotional states (e.g., anxiety). This gives it considerable potential as a theoretical and practical tool. Already, some of its central predictions have received