Russian Jews on Three Continents

Migration and Resettlement

Edited by
Noah Lewin-Epstein,
Yaacov Ro'i and Paul Ritterband

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The Cummings Center for Russian and East European Studies
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Contents

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Acknowledgements

An international group of experts in a variety of fields gathered on the campus of Tel Aviv University in December 1993, in order to take a closer look at the three-quarters of a million Jews who emigrated from Russia in the past 20 years, those who received them and those who were left behind. Their discussions ranged from the political determinants of changing Soviet policy, through the social contingencies associated with moving or staying, to the resettlement of immigrants and their impact on the receiving societies.

Russian Jews on Three Continents, Migration and Resettlement is, in large part, a product of that conference, which was sponsored by the Cummings Center for Russian and East European Studies and the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Tel Aviv University, and the City College, Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York.

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Noah Lewin-Epstein
Yaacov Ro'i
Paul Ritterband

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Introduction

NOAH LEWIN-EPSTEIN

By now the figures are well known: over a period of six years, between 1 January 1989 and 31 December 1994, some 800,000 Jews emigrated from the regions of what formerly constituted the USSR. Five hundred and forty-five thousand of these migrants arrived in Israel and the remainder headed west, mostly to the United States. Migration is not unfamiliar to Russian and Soviet Jews. Indeed, as Gitelman points out in his broad historical overview, since the 1880s no group of Jews has migrated as often, in as great numbers, and with such important consequences. Yet, both the size of the recent migration wave, relative to the size of the Jewish population in the region of origin, and the rate of migration were unprecedented. These factors alone underscore the urgency of a comprehensive understanding of the antecedents, patterns and impact of this wave of migration.

What transpired during those years was nothing short of a great exodus. As such, it raises important questions concerning the attributes of the immigrants and their experiences after emigration. Any attempt to address these questions must take into account that this phenomenon took place within a complex social and historical context, the study of which is best undertaken from multiple vantage points.

Comprehensive analysis of the motivations and background of those who chose to leave the Soviet Union and its successor states (FSU) is of primary importance. This, however, is only one side of the story. Concomitant with migration, a new situation emerged for those who remained. Clearly, the reality of FSU Jewry, depleted by 30–40 per cent and its demographic composition dramatically changed, has considerable implications for the future of this population. Moreover, as a direct result of the decline in Jewish numbers throughout the FSU, Israel experienced a staggering 14 per cent increase in its Jewish population. Israel is also undergoing economic restructuring and, more fundamentally, faces serious questions concerning its Jewish identity and cultural boundaries.

The number of immigrants to the United States during the period under discussion was rather small compared with the total population of the receiving society, and even relative to the American Jewish

population. Yet, the immigrants' integration into American society did not follow a predicted path and their impact on American Jewry is not easy to gauge.

The perspective guiding the preparation of this volume stresses the interrelatedness of the events experienced by FSU Jews on three continents, and places them within a wider social and historical context. In order to do so, it brings together recent research carried out in disciplines spanning the spectrum of the social sciences — history, political science, anthropology, sociology, economics and demography. While each chapter highlights a distinctive aspect viewed through the lens of a particular discipline, in the aggregate the chapters tell a story of broad dimensions, ranging from the political determinants of changing Soviet policy through the social contingencies associated with moving or staying, to the resettlement of immigrants and their impact on the receiving societies.

Often in social sciences the interpretations of events and relationships given by researchers prevail over those of the actors who were involved in the events and are taken (or mistaken) to represent reality itself. A unique feature of the present volume is that accounts of persons who themselves played a part in defining and implementing policies concerning recent Soviet Jewish emigration, and of those who actually emigrated or chose not to, are woven into and enrich the scholarly analyses. These testimonies are not necessarily 'more real', but they provide an added dimension to our understanding of this momentous historical event.

In his sweeping overview of Russian and Soviet Jewish migration, Gitelman sets the conceptual scheme for studying the recent wave of migration by pointing out three characteristics of primary importance: the volume of emigration, variation in the destination of emigrants, and the composition of the emigrant population. Volume is a particularly salient dimension of any population movement. During the past decade alone the volume of migration from the Soviet Union and its successor states fluctuated wildly, and the same is true if one examines the long-term pattern. These fluctuations generally reflected changes in Soviet policy on emigration. In order to understand these patterns, then, one must address the determinants of Soviet policy on emigration in general and Jewish emigration in particular. Broadly speaking, these determinants can be divided into external and internal factors. The former are associated with international politics such as Soviet-US relations, Soviet Middle East policy, and the increasing involvement in international affairs of voluntary and other non-state organizations. The internal factors include Soviet state ideology, local manpower requirements and Soviet ethnic policy.

A widely-held view, which is elaborated by Gitelman, holds that while both internal and external forces played a role in determining the volume of emigration, policy variation over time (especially in the 1970s and 1980s) was strongly linked to US-Soviet relations. This notion is controversial, however, and has been the subject of ongoing debate. Indeed, it is discussed by Ro'i, Salitan and Schifter who present concise arguments on both sides. In his review of Soviet official positions and policies from the time of the establishment of the state of Israel, Ro'i points out that the regime's negative position toward emigration was based on ideology as well as pragmatic considerations. Certainly, emigration was viewed as problematic for economic planning and as likely to have an unsettling effect on Soviet society. From this perspective, he argues that in order to understand the factors affecting emigration policy one must examine those circumstances where policies diverged from this fundamental stance. An examination of such instances reveals that while both domestic and foreign policy considerations were involved in determining emigration policy, it was nearly always the former which prevailed.

Salitan presents a similar position, contending that the domestic context surrounding emigration was more significant for emigration policy. A comparison of Soviet policy concerning Jewish emigration with that on German nationals is used to prove this thesis. She argues that there is no evidence of the predominance of foreign relations in emigration policy since in the German case emigration was curtailed even as relations between the two countries were warming up. The shift in emigration policy came about as part of the major reform effort undertaken during the Gorbachev era, which fundamentally altered the structure of the regime. Thus, Gorbachev's administration announced that emigration applications would be reviewed in a more favourable light and dealt with more speedily; concomitantly, a number of decrees and laws gradually removed emigration restrictions.

The importance of internal processes notwithstanding, Soviet-US relations appear to have affected Jewish emigration at critical points. This is illustrated most vividly by Schifter, a major actor in US-Soviet negotiations in the Gorbachev period. While never a key issue in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, Jewish emigration did become an essential part of its fabric, especially in the 1970s. Schifter underscores the close links between migration policy and Soviet-US relations when he states that the first, very modest change in many years in Soviet migration policy came against the background of a Soviet decision to engage seriously in arms reduction talks. His first-hand account of negotiations over the principle of free emigration, as well as over the emigration of particular Jews, not only

illuminates the decision-making process within the Soviet and US bureaucracies, but also the human dimension of international politics. This account, of course, evaluates changes in Soviet emigration policy from the perspective of the role of the US government, largely to the exclusion of other factors. Yet, one cannot overestimate its importance and contribution to the understanding of the forces involved in the historical event under study.

Normally, one views migration policies as referring to a nation's management of incoming migration, and in some instances, as in the case of the USSR, to policies regarding the exit of citizens. Compared with this perspective the Israeli case is unique. Inspired by the perception that Jewish emigration from the USSR would be an historic opportunity to strengthen the country by increasing its population and enhancing considerably the quality of its human resources, Israel's leadership formulated a vigorous policy to actively seek ways to facilitate emigration. While Soviet policies largely determined the volume of migration, Israeli policy during the 1970s and the ensuing decades focused mainly on ensuring that Israel would be the destination of the emigrants. It is against this background that Dominitz examines the view of Israeli policy makers that the 'dropout' phenomenon was a serious threat to the Israeli polity, to Israel's potential for growth and economic development and to the migration process itself. When emigration from the Soviet Union was formally legitimized in terms of reunion with family members in Israel, they feared that the phenomenon of so many Jews turning to the US after having left the USSR with an entry visa to Israel would provide the Soviet authorities with an excuse to once again close the gates to emigration. As a result of these considerations, Israeli leaders voiced disapproval of the assistance provided to Jews who sought to reach the US, and took measures to minimize the possibility of dropping out. The dropout phenomenon of the late 1970s and the 1980s was not forgotten when the gates of the Soviet Union opened in 1989. This was manifested in the routes of exit and transit stations which Israel established so as to minimize the possibility of dropping out.

Israel's position that emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union to destinations other than Israel should be minimized, exacerbated relations with American Jewry and the organizations facilitating migration to the US (HIAS and the JDC), which were already strained by an earlier decision of the state to restructure its absorption policy. The Israeli government's decision in 1968 to take complete responsibility for immigrant absorption met with strong opposition from the Jewish Agency and the Jewish Diaspora. Adler points out that the ability to raise funds in the Jewish Diaspora, as well as the viability

of the Jewish Agency, was at stake. It can be argued that the Jewish Agency has not regained its central position following that decision and that its role has continued to decline, focusing primarily on the weakest and most needy immigrant groups.

Concomitant with these structural changes, a new policy emerged which would further weaken the grip of the establishment on immigrants. The direct absorption schemes of the 1980s evolved in the 1990s into a program labelled the 'absorption basket'. Although still assisting immigrants financially, this program shifted the initiative and much of the responsibility for adaptation to the immigrants themselves. The bureaucratic and political implications of these changes have been substantial, but as yet there is no conclusive evidence concerning the relative efficacy of the policies of the 1970s and the 1990s. Indeed, the very different nature of the migration (its size and composition) in the two periods renders any comparison almost unfeasible.

Hailed for their free-market orientation and for reducing state paternalism, direct absorption and the 'absorption basket' met a serious challenge when confronted with the massive size and unusual composition of the immigration from the FSU in the early 1990s. The government's dilemma is poignantly described by Tzaban. The large influx of professional personnel (engineers, scientists, physicians, artists) most of whom were unlikely to find work in Israel in their profession, posed a serious policy problem: should the Israeli government abstain from action and let nature take its course, whereby many would suffer hardship and others might seek their fortunes elsewhere? Or should it increase publicly funded employment opportunities, or provide resources for retraining? As is often the case when faced with such choices, the government did a little of each. Several thousand immigrant professionals (mostly scientists) were guaranteed employment (at least temporarily) as a result of government grants to universities and other research institutions. Others enrolled in publicly funded retraining programs that would adapt their skills to the Israeli economy. Most immigrants with professional backgrounds, however, discovered there was little demand for their particular qualifications and either remained jobless or entered the labour market in lower-grade — less attractive — occupations.

While the above dilemma basically concerns the potentially most productive component of the immigrant population, others relate to the aged and infirm. Although protected by Israel's welfare safety-net which benefits all citizens, as new immigrants with limited information and poor language skills, they are less likely to realize these rights.

Then there are the large number of single-parent families, an exceptional phenomenon for a migrant population and one which, given its dimensions, poses new challenges to Israeli society. At issue here is the extent of the state's responsibility toward the immigrants in an era of individualism and free-market economy. Prior to elaborating on absorption dilemmas, however, a closer examination of the decision to migrate and its effect on Soviet Jewry is in order.

Following the Soviet Union's decision, during Gorbachev's term, to permit free emigration, the focus shifted to the motivations of Soviet Jews and the potential for absorbing them in Israel and other societies. Limitations on civil liberties, discrimination and overt anti-Semitism have frequently been cited as central factors which propelled Jews to exit the Soviet Union. But can these explain dissimilarities regarding the decision whether or not to leave, the timing of emigration and the choice of destination? In the early 1970s most Jewish emigrants cited Zionist themes as their motivation. This tendency weakened with the passage of time, and a decade later, only a minority shared this view, as two-thirds (and in some years, over 80 per cent) of the emigrants headed for the United States. Following the dramatic changes in the FSU, Jews who resided there were faced with new opportunities as well as new uncertainties. It was in this context that their decision to leave or stay was made.

Studying the motivations for emigration is not only an important part of learning about the immigrants; it is crucial for understanding the process of migration and for projecting future trends. This is the rationale underlying Brym's survey of Jews still residing in the FSU. About one-third of those interviewed in 1993 were planning to emigrate. By far the most commonly-stated cause for migration was economic. Over half of those planning to emigrate stated that the precarious economic situation had caused them to consider emigration. Among the factors discouraging emigration, the most commonly cited was cultural affinity to their country of domicile. For those planning to migrate somewhere other than Israel, economic, cultural and family reasons were similarly prevalent. Notably, almost one-third of those planning to migrate to the West said they would go to Israel if they could be assured of work in their profession. The role of local economic conditions in affecting the tendency to migrate can be glimpsed from the lower emigration from Moscow and St. Petersburg compared with the rest of the FSU. The proportion of Jews employed in industry in Moscow and St. Petersburg was half that in other parts. Industry was the first sector to decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving many workers (including Jews) to face economic hardship. Such conditions are especially conducive to

migration, but they are not the sole determinants. Family networks and friends play an important role. The propensity to emigrate was higher in cases where family members or friends were living abroad and this affected the destination of migration as well. Yet the single most important factor affecting emigration plans is still Jewish identity.

Over the years, considerable effort has been devoted to the study of emigrants from the FSU. Unfortunately, the characteristics of those who have not emigrated and the consequences of emigration for the remaining Jewish community have been given less attention. The chapter by Tolts is an important contribution to redressing this lacuna. Tolts stresses the fact that migration to Israel and the US has had considerable consequences for the population characteristics and the already existing demographic erosion of Russian Jewry. The effect of the recent migration wave has been more significant than changes in the entire previous thirty years. The age structure of the Jewish population, which had a large proportion of elderly persons to begin with, has become even more skewed in that direction. Birth rates are declining and are doing so at a faster rate among Jewish endogamous than mixed couples. The disproportionately large emigration of families with children has affected the age distribution, and the already low sex-ratio has been further aggravated. One obvious consequence is the increased likelihood of intermarriage. It is not an overstatement to conclude from these patterns that Russian Jewry is a demographically dying population.

Although Jews comprise only a minuscule fraction of the population of the FSU, their emigration in recent years has been the topic of some concern for the general population. Levinson notes that attitudes toward Jews in present-day Russia are composed of a combination of symbolic and instrumental considerations. Opinion polls taken in the 1990s reveal that when presented with a list of five minority nationalities, respondents perceived Jews as being most distant from Russians. In fact, they viewed Jews as 'domestic foreigners'. In the 1990s an open debate arose over the brain drain, giving rise to arguments both for and against emigration. Many commentators saw emigration as detrimental to the FSU. Some argued that a fundamental change must take place in Russia so that nationality would no longer be a central issue in the evaluation of individual members of society. Proponents of this position pointed out that there was a search for talent worldwide, regardless of nationality, and that Russia must not remain behind in this regard. At the same time a minority still seems to hold the view that Russia would be better off if all Jews were to leave. Paradoxically, the policy permitting the departure of Jews was viewed as a mistake by those who hoped to liberalize Russian society.

This contention relates not only to the problem of human resources but also to the moral stance which Jews represent and which will be missed when they emigrate. The very destiny of Russia, it is argued, is dependent on a Jewish presence among its citizens.

The complex and often paradoxical opinion of Jews held by Russian society and its intellectual élite defies the conventional view of many scholars that Russians are divided in their attitudes toward Jews into two camps — outright anti-Semites and liberals. Indeed, in his discussion of the debate within the intelligentsia concerning Jewish emigration, Weinerman carefully portrays the extent to which anti-Semitic attitudes are ingrained in Russian culture and are intertwined with the quest for a liberal society. Hence, he argues that even if the intelligentsia and the cultural élite are able to steer Russian society on a new course, it is not at all clear that the position of Jews would be significantly altered.

Returning to those who decided to migrate, a sizable minority chose the United States as their destination. They joined their brethren who had followed the same path in earlier periods. Indeed, since the recent wave of migration was primarily 'pushed' by the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than 'pulled' to the Jewish homeland, many more emigrants would have turned to the United States had it not been for a change in US policy which took effect in October 1989. The new immigration policy set a ceiling of 50,000 Soviet refugees to be admitted annually, abruptly shifting the distribution of migration destination from the course it had taken in the 1980s. Following this change in policy, the flow of Jewish immigrants from the FSU has maintained a steady pace and, according to some estimates, over 170,000 entered the United States between 1990 and 1994.

The experience of Soviet Jewish immigrants in the United States is addressed by Chiswick, Gold and Ritterband. For comparative purposes, Chiswick studies Jewish immigrants within a broader framework of international migration which distinguishes between refugees and economic migrants. His analysis focuses on Jews who migrated from the Soviet Union prior to 1990 and who were classified as refugees. They are compared to arrivals from other countries who entered the United States as economic immigrants. Available data show that Soviet immigrants residing in the United States more than five years have slightly lower language proficiency and earn an average of 10 per cent less than other European immigrants (many of whom are from the British Isles). This gap varies with education, whereby the least educated face the greatest obstacles and the highly educated are at no disadvantage. While considerable attention has been devoted to the highly skilled migrants from the FSU, these

findings reveal that older, somewhat less educated Russian Jews appear to experience the most hardship.

But economic success is only one facet of social integration. As Gold points out, Soviet Jews have tended to cluster in the US in what can be termed Soviet Jewish enclaves. These enclaves are characterized not only by neighbourly relations but by a great degree of self-sufficiency, with trade and services catering to co-ethnics. The enclave also provides an information network and the basis of community. The presence of a large number of elderly immigrants further encourages the geographical concentration and frequency of social interaction that exists within the enclave.

International migration takes on a variety of forms, depending on the specific circumstances and societies of origin and destination. Most often, migrant populations, especially those whose motives are economic, consist largely of young, single males. Refugee migration is more likely to involve whole families and comprise a wider age distribution. In the case of Soviet Jewish immigrants, it seems that an overriding concern was the wish to secure a future for their children. This is evident from the large number of immigrant families with children, and is especially significant when contrasted with the demographic composition of the population that remained behind. In their comprehensive review of the demographic characteristics of immigrants from the FSU who arrived in Israel between 1989 and 1994, Paltiel, Sabatello and Tal identify age structure, household composition and socio-economic characteristics as the most consequential attributes affecting the immigrants' adjustment and their potential impact on Israeli society. The presence of three-generational households, in many cases centred around single mothers, poses a hardship but also a strategy for adaptation. For single mothers who must find employment in order to support their children, the presence of a grandparent in the household often provides a solution for child-care and the additional resources needed for housing. For them, this may be the only means of succeeding in their new homeland.

Many Soviet immigrant families share apartments with other families. Most often these families are related, but sometimes they are not. These housing arrangements derive in part from the immigrants' gravitation to communities with better employment opportunities in which housing expenses are higher. Consequently, immigrants have shied away from more remote areas where thousands of housing units constructed in anticipation of their arrival remain vacant. This reality underscores a fundamental flaw in government policy whereby housing was given top priority in terms of resources for, and as an instrument of, immigrant absorption. It was not understood by officials

that what mattered most to immigrants from the FSU, accustomed to housing scarcity and crowding and to universal employment, was to have a job. In a society little differentiated by material possessions, their high levels of education and professional status were not only a means of support but the source of their social standing and self-esteem.

Much has been written about the educational levels of the immigrants from the FSU and their occupational characteristics. An extraordinarily high proportion of those who arrived in Israel had been employed in scientific and academic occupations. Many of these immigrants have not yet found work in areas related to their training. In fact it has been argued that difficulties in the labour market have slowed down the migration process and deterred the professionally trained from migrating to Israel. Demographic figures indeed show a reduction over time in the proportion of immigrants with professional training. Yet the smooth form of this decline does not support the notion of a reaction to the tight Israeli market, and is more likely a result of the dwindling pool of highly trained personnel. Be that as it may, many highly educated immigrants are still employed in service occupations for which they are over-qualified. Taken together with the high proportion whose wages are paid in cash (about 15 per cent of all wage earners in 1993), this suggests that one of the responses to the oversupply of labour has been the emergence of a secondary, informal employment sector. It may be asked whether this phenomenon will disappear in time or whether it will become a permanent feature of the Israeli economy. The answer depends primarily on the ability of Israel's society and the economy to exploit the recent wave of immigration as a lever for economic restructuring and expansion.

While we often think of immigration to Israel in terms of absorption and assimilation of the immigrants, the unprecedented rate of immigration in the past five years raises the question of whether or not the Israeli economy can adjust to accommodate it as well as benefit from it. According to Flug, Kasir and Ofer, the most important consequence of the recent wave of immigration is its potential to improve the structure of the economy by reducing the relative size of the public sector and accelerating the contraction of traditional branches (agriculture and construction). At the same time, the composition of the immigrant labour force could significantly contribute to the expansion of high technology branches. This can only be achieved, however, by the injection of substantial financial resources for the expansion of the infrastructure and for research and development that would increase the capacity for technological

production. From the point of view of public policy, the government's role in these developments would include overall initiation and major investment, as well as subsidies for risk-taking in large-scale projects. It is estimated that new investment needs may be as large as half of the current stock of Israel's industrial capital. Such resources clearly do not exist within Israel, and foreign assistance is required. In this respect, the loan guaranties provided by the United States are crucial since lack of capital could hinder the economic transformation and the absorption of immigrants, turning an extraordinary opportunity into an overwhelming burden.

Moving from the economic and structural aspects of migration to the cultural dimension, the study of Russian Jews on three continents highlights the dilemmas of identity in ways that a single study in a single location cannot. The hope of American Jewry, which invested so much effort in assisting Soviet Jews to emigrate, was that the latter would participate in Jewish life as the former perceived it, that they would quickly join the American Jewish community and would contribute to its revitalization. Similarly, in Israel, the macro-benefits of absorbing this highly educated and trained population were quite obvious; moreover, it was hoped that the immigrants would assimilate rapidly into Israeli culture. For many of the Jews in the FSU, being able to manifest their Jewish identity and living a Jewish life as they understood it were important considerations in the decision to emigrate. Even for those who chose to stay, Jewish identity was not meaningless. On the contrary, there are those who argue that Jewish identity played a role in their decision to participate in the re-structuring of state and society in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's disintegration. But what is meant by Jewish culture and identity? While Jewish identity clearly contains a common core, the perception of Jewishness cannot and need not be one and the same for populations that have undergone such different experiences.

Jewish immigrants from the FSU to the US appear to have stronger Jewish identification than American Jews. This is manifest in their interest in Jewish publications and in their family and social network ties with Israel. For the most part, their value system and ideological bent differ from those of American Jews. As a consequence, the path of adaptation followed by immigrants from the FSU is neither that of assimilation nor is it clearly one of ethnic solidarity. As pointed out by Ritterband, Soviet Jews have their own way of identifying as Jews. Although it may seem that Jews from the FSU attempt to isolate themselves from the majority Jewish population, an alternative interpretation is that their actions and patterns of organization represent a quest for acceptance on their own terms.

In describing the peculiarities of their Jewish identity, Ritterband also notes that at least in the first generation Soviet immigrants maintain their own version of Jewish identity. For immigrants from the FSU, being Jewish was something they were constantly reminded of, both by their neighbours and co-workers and by the authorities. It was not necessarily a consequence of their own choosing. Ritterband, like Gold, notes that national and, to some extent, religious aspects play a strong role in the Jewish identity of Russian Jews and that the religious dimension itself has different components for Russian and American Jews. 'Jewishness' is experienced in divergent ways, and it is these differences that raise concerns among American Jewish leaders that a separate Russian Jewish community may be emerging alongside established American Jewry. Yet, as Ritterband points out, in many respects Jews who immigrated to the US in the 1980s and the 1990s do not differ much from first-generation immigrants in the past.

As we have already seen, Jewish identity was the single most important factor affecting the tendency of Jews in the FSU to emigrate and to choose Israel as their destination. This, of course, is not new, nor is it surprising. The policy implications, however, have not escaped notice by the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency. In line with its pro-active approach, Israel developed a program to encourage teenagers to experience Israeli society with the intention of shaping their identities in the process. The chapter by Markowitz on youth in the Na'ale program is not only one of the few studies on the cultural transition of Russian Jewish teenagers; it is also enlightening in that it addresses the more general issue of identity formation in one of its more crucial stages, namely adolescence. The study shows both the initial cultural gap and the way in which Israeli culture 'grows' on these youngsters and plays a role in their development. The fact that they have not yet made *aliya* and are faced with alternative choices is captured in the notion of 'shopping' for an identity. Although this process is likely to be particularly pronounced among those teenagers who left their parents behind, it may be similarly experienced by teenagers who immigrated with their families. Moreover, the process of seeking and choosing an identity is one faced by adults as well, as they have the option of remaining culturally detached from 'Israeliness' and its particular form of 'Jewishness'.

There is a clear conceptual link between Gold's and Ritterband's discussions of the Soviet Jewish community in the United States and Ben-Rafael, Olshtain and Geijst's examination of identity, language, and community among Soviet Jewish immigrants in Israel. Language is crucial to the integration of a group into society. It is a central dimension of acculturation and while it is not surprising that

immigrants who have a better mastery of the Hebrew language feel more at home in Israel and express more positive attitudes regarding their immigration experience, acculturation should not be confused with assimilation. This is one of the central 'messages' concerning cultural aspects of Soviet Jewish immigration presented in this volume. While open to new identities, immigrants of the 1990s want neither to shed their old ones nor to distance themselves from Russian culture. After some time in the new society most immigrants acquire some facility in the language of their new surroundings, yet they do not devalue their own cultural resources. They are ready to interact with the veteran population but feel more at home among their own people. Contrary to the simple assimilation model, the more complex pattern that emerges reveals that most immigrants are inclined to maintain certain elements of their earlier culture. Hence, acculturation may take place without assimilation. Given that Israeli society in the 1990s is much more flexible and Zionism much less vigorous than it used to be, it is quite possible that immigrants from the FSU will establish themselves as a middle class, mostly secular, acculturated group, which is able openly to retain allegiance to the old culture.

From a societal point of view, the educational system is the crucial element in the acculturation process. Sever contends that, historically, Israeli schools have been a focal point for assimilation of new immigrants. In the process, many immigrant youngsters drifted into 'marginality' — a state of non-participation in mainstream social and cultural frameworks. It is precisely the intolerance of cultural diversity embedded in the concept of assimilation which was largely responsible for this marginality. Accepting cultural heterogeneity means recognizing young immigrants and their parents as possessing resources valuable to Israeli society. This in turn will lead to more symmetric interaction between immigrants and social agencies and expedite integration. Returning, then, to a theme highlighted previously, accepting cultural diversity should not be viewed as a threat; rather it has the potential for facilitating immigrant integration into society.

Another area of considerable importance in this respect is military service. Participation in the army is probably the one experience common to almost all Jews in Israel. For immigrants, the army provides an opportunity to be accepted into mainstream Israeli society by virtue of having performed its most demanding service. Throughout the years, the army has also played a central role in the acculturation of new immigrants. Although military service in Israel is, with few exceptions, compulsory, the military establishment has traditionally relied on commitment to the collective and strong

personal motivation for eliciting high levels of performance. The recent arrivals from the FSU, who were driven more by the 'push' of events there than by the 'pull' of the Zionist calling, brought to the fore questions of motivation for military service. The urgency of this issue derived in large part from the massive size of the immigration.

Carmeli and Fadlon address the topic of military service as perceived by Soviet immigrants, using data collected from draftees-to-be. Their findings reveal a strong awareness on the part of immigrants of the importance of military service. At the same time, immigrants are reluctant to translate these generalized attitudes into performance. Expressed willingness or unwillingness to serve in the army appears to be related to both material and cultural adjustment to Israel and, among older immigrants, to past experiences in the Soviet army. Positive views towards service are often associated with instrumental qualities: potential draftees express interest in areas of service that provide marketable skills and experiences. Here, too, it is evident that although espousing established values concerning the army, the immigrants do not necessarily follow these with cultural performance. Societal values are re-interpreted and modified by them to assume more individualistic and instrumental, rather than ideological characteristics.

The complexity of Jewish identity and its relation to location is nowhere more noticeable than among Jews who have chosen to stay in the FSU. In considering the decision not to migrate one cannot ignore the practical difficulties associated with emigration: learning a new language, abandoning a satisfying and influential position and experiencing downward social mobility. Many are unwilling or are unable to cope with the task of starting afresh. Yet, the decision to stay is always temporary, never final, since under different circumstances the time to emigrate may actually come. The latter point tacitly emerges from the presentations of two people who have not emigrated. Gozman has been active in various roles in the political reforms that have been the focus of discussion in the FSU in the past few years. In the early 1990s he was a government official and has since played a role in the establishment of Russia's Democratic Choice Party. Some understanding of his decision not to emigrate can be gleaned from the distinction he makes between being a Jew as a passport entry, that is, as a result of a decision by the authorities, and becoming Jewish as a conscious choice. Jews, he argues, leave Russia primarily for negative reasons: socio-economic difficulties and anti-Semitism. Jews left the Soviet Union in the late 1980s to escape the degrading circumstances of state anti-Semitism, lack of freedom and simply poverty. He contrasts this with his decision to remain, which

was inspired by positive motivations, the wish to participate in the historic events taking place and to help effect changes that will produce a better society. He argues that he has no fewer ownership rights to Russia than professed Russian patriots 'who speak bad Russian'. At the same time, he feels, his choice does not negate his identity as a Jew.

A similar position is expressed by Finberg, who explains his personal decision not to emigrate from the Ukraine as deriving from his participation in the re-structuring of Jewish life there. Finberg holds the position of head of a research and development centre and he is on the editorial board of several magazines. He paints a picture of an intellectual involved in social change and the depth of this involvement means that there would be much to lose were he to leave. Paradoxically, it is his outsider status which sensitizes Finberg to the struggle for universalist causes, such as the survival of humanity and civilized values. Hence, it is not the absence of Jewish identity but precisely its presence that led to his decision to stay and actively participate in the intellectual and social life of the Ukraine.

A contrary view is presented by Voronel who made *aliya* in the 1970s — a time when the issue of identity seemed simpler and the rationale for emigrating less ambiguous. In answering the questions: 'Why did I decide to leave the Soviet Union?' and 'Why did I choose to come to Israel?' he shares with the reader his perception of the events in the Soviet Union which in fact shaped his Jewish identity. The dissident movement of the 1970s was comprised overwhelmingly of Jews dissatisfied with life in the USSR. The authorities labelled the dissident movement Zionist before any such notion actually matured in the thoughts of the dissidents themselves. Their primary goal was to distance themselves from Soviet society's values and norms. They were frustrated with the degradation of Jews in what they perceived as a badly organized prison for the country's nearly 300 million citizens. Given the hardships the dissidents faced, an extremely strong motivating force was required and this could only be found in the realm of the symbolic. The truth that everybody understood at that time was that no other country aside from Israel could resonate as a symbol of faith and source of inspiration. Hence, the language of Zionism emerged as much from the need for an abstract idea that could sustain them in the struggle against the authorities as from primordial ties with their Jewish brethren. While Voronel stresses the difference in motivations driving the Jews who immigrated in the 1970s and in the 1990s, he also notes some commonality deriving from their shared culture. He contends that the negative attributes of Soviet immigrants have a tendency to be dropped rather quickly and those

characteristics which unite them — such as a craving for education, an orientation towards creative activity and respect for culture — prevail and contribute to Israeli society.

Throughout its short history the state of Israel exhibited a strong collective commitment to the in-gathering and absorption of the Jewish Diaspora, even in the face of adversity and substantial hardship. Admitting all Jews who wish or are forced to reach its shores and integrating them into society are the essence of Zionist ideology, and for many represent the rationale for Israel's existence. In this context immigration policy (*aliya ve-klita*), as well as much research, has fostered an asymmetric viewpoint which focuses on the incorporation and assimilation of the *olim* while disregarding the consequences for Israeli society. In the early 1990s more than at any time in the past one could hear statements alluding to the enormous contribution of immigration from the FSU to Israeli society. While these statements represented a recognition of the unique composition and the sheer size of this wave of migration, they also responded to an implicit fear over the 'price' to be paid by Israeli society. Indeed, apprehensions have been expressed regarding the economic burden that the veteran population must bear and the diversion of resources from Israel's needy segments. Such concerns have clearly turned up in attitude surveys. Lewin-Epstein, Menahem and Barham reveal the ambivalence with which many veterans face the prospect of a large-scale influx of *olim* into their communities. Most Israelis recognize the potential benefits associated with the recent immigration, but many do not actually want the immigrants in their community, fearing the consequences of the change in composition and population density of their neighbourhoods. Perceived competition for resources also plays an important role. Those holding more secure and rewarding positions in the stratification system express more favourable attitudes than jobless persons. While on the macro-level the Israeli economy may benefit from the recent immigration, many individuals feel that they themselves may be worse off as a consequence of the large influx of highly educated and skilled immigrants.

The impact of immigration on individuals and on society as a whole is not limited to the socio-economic sphere. The recent wave of migration represents a 'critical mass' that has the potential to alter the normative and symbolic order of society as well. This topic is addressed by Amir, Remennick, and Elmelech in their chapter on the politics of reproduction and family planning. At issue are divergent cultural perspectives and the possibility that orientations and practices of immigrant women from the FSU will carry over into society at large. This threat generated a concerted effort by official and voluntary

agencies aimed at educating and socializing immigrant women. From this perspective, assimilation, which means immigrants abandoning 'the old ways', is not simply a mechanism for successful adaptation and integration of the new immigrants, but also the means by which the dominant culture resists change and continues to prevail.

The cultural dilemma is also manifest in religious life, which is not discussed in this volume. Decades of communist reign weakened traditional beliefs and effectively halted religious learning and practice among Soviet Jews. While variation does exist among the immigrants from the FSU, correlated especially with age and region of emigration, most Soviet Jews claim to be 'non-religious' but do not consider themselves atheists. A sizeable minority describe themselves as 'traditional', and some, primarily those who resided in Central Asia and the Caucasus, have become more religious following their immigration. The religious life of FSU immigrants in Israel has not yet been comprehensively studied, but occasional survey data reveal that they tend to perceive religion as a private and highly personal matter. Belief in God does not necessarily translate into religious practice and, most importantly, they hold a uniformly strong, negative stance regarding the role of religion in public life. These attitudes, along with other cultural preferences of the Soviet Jewish population, are already challenging prevailing arrangements in the cultural and political spheres of life in Israel, and are likely to become more forceful with the passage of time.

With regard to change, another aspect not addressed in this volume is the potential effect of the recent immigration on Israel's political arena. Although it is commonly believed that Soviet immigrants were a decisive factor in the Labour party's victory in the 1992 elections, it is also argued by students of Israeli politics that their vote represented disappointment with the handling of their *klita* by the party in power rather than identification with Labour's platform. It should also be recalled that at the time of these elections most immigrants had been in Israel for less than two years and were hardly attuned to the nuances of Israeli politics. A Soviet immigrant party established prior to the 1992 elections failed to pass the threshold for a seat in the Knesset.

One thing is quite clear, however: immigrants are a heterogeneous group. The fact that almost half the immigrants locate themselves in the centre of the left-right continuum, and the remainder are about equally distributed to the left and to the right of the centre, suggests that on crucial issues like the peace process and Israel's future boundaries, they are unlikely to behave *en masse*. The only difference from the veteran Israeli population is that they will probably be less

extreme (in both directions) in their dispositions. The impact, then, of Soviet Jews on Israeli politics remains to be seen.

In conclusion, this volume addresses a phenomenon of extraordinary change, from various vantage points and at multiple levels. The chapters were written at a time when new realities were still unfolding, and they are intended to convey the profundity as well as the import of these processes. Often the study of migration focuses exclusively on the migrants, their motives, experiences and adjustment. But in the process of migration, especially one of the magnitude witnessed in the case of Soviet Jews, the impact goes way beyond the migrants themselves. In the successor states of the FSU the sheer demographic change brought about by emigration raises serious questions regarding the viability of the Jewish community remaining there. In Israel, two years after mass immigration ended, Soviet Jews are largely viewed as an integral part of Israeli society. This, however, is as much an indication of societal change and increasing acceptance of cultural diversity in Israeli society, as of immigrant assimilation. Even in the United States, Jewish religious and community life is forming new patterns as Soviet Jews become part of American society. As to the immigrants themselves, one hundred years after East European Jews partook in the largest modern Jewish migration, their descendants from the FSU have followed in their footsteps. If the achievements of the former are any indication, the latter have a promising future to look forward to.

I

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

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1

'From a Northern Country': Russian and Soviet Jewish Immigration to America and Israel in Historical Perspective

ZVI GITELMAN

It was a peculiar way to start a religion. The first words God spoke to the first Jew were not some majestic declaration of God's presence, power or oneness, but a pithy command to migrate: '*Lekh lekha me-artzekha umi-moladetekha umi-beit avikha. Ve-e'eskha le-goy gadol...*' (Go forth from your country, your birthplace and your father's household. And I shall make you into a great nation.) Two words, three syllables, and the Jewish people were on their way. They have never stopped moving. Indeed, an entire *sidra* of the Tora is devoted to chronicling the early migrations: '*vayis'u...vayahanu*' (and they went forth...and they encamped) becomes a kind of motto of the Israelites and their descendants. Their formative experiences are connected with migration: the formation of the nation in Egypt, the acceptance of the Tora while wandering in the Sinai, the entry into Canaan to form a sovereign nation and state, and then the exile and formation of a diaspora people. When other peoples of the ancient Near East disappeared, the Jews survived, probably because they made their religion portable and did not differentiate between religion and nationality until modern times. Though some places were designated as sacred and the land itself was deemed holy, Jews did not generally make a fetish of particular locales. Jerusalem was preserved in Yavne, Sura in Cordova, Pumpeditha in Volozhin and, most recently, Slobodka in New York and Jerusalem. It is little wonder that the classic texts of Jews are in various languages: Hebrew, Aramaic, Arabic, Yiddish and others.

Jews are most prominent in modern European migrations. Of 65 million people who migrated from Europe to the Americas between

1840 and 1946, four million, or six per cent, were Jews, though they constituted only two per cent of the European population in that period. Thus, the intensity of Jewish migration was three to four times that of general European migration. More Jews migrated in those years than existed in the entire world at the end of the eighteenth century.[1]

Jews have exhibited three radically different psychological reactions to being migrants. Some display a sojourner mentality, having but loose attachments to the country of their residence and its laws. This is particularly true of Jews ghettoized by force or choice. A Jewish quip says that when a trader arrives in a new place he asks, '*Mit vos meg men nit handlen?*' (What may one not trade in?). In the United States recently several Hasidic institutions fraudulently used federal educational funds, no doubt reflecting the conviction that sacred ends justify abuse of the laws of a land which is but a temporary abode.[2]

Others go to the other extreme, as has often been noted, and become super-patriots of their country. Still others are outwardly ordinary citizens but they are dogged by an insecurity which leads them to acquire multiple nationalities and passports, store money in several countries, and invest in items such as diamonds, which can be easily transported should one have to flee. Constant migration, then, has shaped the collective psychology of Jews, albeit in different ways.

More broadly, the migration and dispersal of Jews have influenced their culture and economy. In many times and places, Jews have acculturated and assimilated, overwhelmed by more powerful and attractive cultures. But because of the power of other cultures, some Jews have chosen to isolate themselves from them as far as possible. In between these diametrically opposed reactions is cultural borrowing, sometimes an exchange and sometimes a one-way process. Words, ideas, food, clothing, art, music and humour are among the items which are exchanged or adopted.

The economic structures of mediaeval and modern European and Afro-Asian Jewish societies have been shaped not only by restrictions imposed by church and state, but also by the very fact of dispersal. Dispersal led Jews to acquire many languages. Together with the presence of relatives and fellow Jews in many countries, this positioned Jews very well for international commerce. It is not accidental that Jews were as over-represented in the foreign ministries and foreign trade apparatuses of the socialist countries, before being forced out of them, as they were among international capitalists and bankers. The capitalist Rothschilds and Warburgs have their equivalents in the socialist Litvinovs and Minces. Moreover, Jews also tend to have a more global perspective than many others. Because of

their roots in other countries and the presence of fellow Jews around the world, Jews are generally more concerned with international affairs than others of similar education and social status.

Migration is so closely associated with Jews that they and others have constructed myths in which migration plays a central role. For Jews, wanderings in the diaspora became God's punishment, mitigated by an ultimate redemption and a final return migration to the Land of Israel; for Christians, Jewish dispersal was the punishment for deicide, with its precedent in Cain's punishment for fratricide. Jews and Christians could agree with Leo Pinsker's observation that the Jew 'is everywhere in evidence and nowhere at home'.

RUSSIAN AND SOVIET JEWISH MIGRATION

Since the 1880s, no group of Jews has migrated as often, in as great numbers, and with such important consequences as the Jews of Russia and the FSU.[3] The mass immigration of Russian/Soviet Jews played a great role in shaping the character of the two largest Jewish communities in the world, those of the United States and Israel. American Jewish and Israeli politics, religion, culture and economics have been, and are still, profoundly influenced by those who came and are coming from the FSU.

From 1881 to 1912, 1,889,000 Russian Jews emigrated: 84 per cent of them to the United States, 8.5 per cent to Britain, 2.2 per cent to Canada, and 2.1 per cent to Palestine.[4] It was as if all the Jews of the USSR in 1989 had emigrated, since the number of émigrés in that early period was 450,000 more than the total number of Jews listed in the Soviet population census of that year. Russian Jews constituted over 70 per cent of Jewish immigrants to America from 1881 to 1910. They made up 48.3 per cent of all immigrants coming from Russia to America.[5] Between 1899 and 1913 an annual average of 90,000 Russian Jewish immigrants came to the United States, precisely the same average annual FSU immigration to Israel between 1989 and 1993. The difference is, of course, the immensely greater size of the United States. Thus, the present immigration to Israel is proportionately much greater than the earlier immigration to the United States. The dimensions of the current emigration from the FSU become even more vivid when we realize that 43 per cent (roughly, 2 out of 5) of the Jews enumerated in the 1989 census left between 1989 and 30 September 1993.

Jews differed in many respects from other immigrants from Russia to America. They were only 4.1 per cent of the Russian Empire's population in 1897 but constituted 44 per cent of its émigrés

(1899–1910).[6] The disproportionate emigration among Jews is seen in Table 1.1.

TABLE 1.1 IMMIGRANTS TO AMERICA FROM RUSSIA BY NATIONALITY (per cent)

Finns	Germans	Jews	Lithuanians	Poles	Russians
8.5	5.8	43.8	9.6	27	4.4

Source: Samuel Joseph, *Jewish Immigration to the United States* (New York: Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, 1914), Vol. LIX, No. 4 (145), p. 165.

Jewish immigrants were also very different in their age, sex and occupational distribution. There was a high proportion of women among the immigrants, an indication of an intent to stay and not merely to reside temporarily and earn money which could then be taken home. The presence among Jews of both very young and very old age cohorts is a further indicator of permanent, family migration. Many of the distinguishing characteristics of Jewish immigrants to America can be see in Table 1.2, compiled by a Soviet analyst in the 1920s.[7]

TABLE 1.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS FROM THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

	Jews	Poles	Russians	Lithuanians
Ages to 14 and over 44	30.4	11.7	9.7	9.7
Women	43.3	30.5	15.0	29.4
Having a trade, specialty	67.1	6.3	9.1	6.7
Peasants, unskilled workers, domestics	25.0	93.2	88.1	92.7
Traders	5.3	0.1	0.9	0.1
Illiterate over 14	26.0	35.4	38.4	48.9
Returned to Russia	11.1	29.7	42.2	27.2
Previously in USA	2.1	6.9	4.1	3.5
Dollars per person	12.8	11.9	19.2	11.1

The overwhelming majority of non-Jews were peasants or unskilled workers, whereas two-thirds of the Jews claimed some trade

or skill. Many will perhaps be surprised by the comparatively high rate of illiteracy among adult Jews, though it is lower than among any other group from Russia. Jews were approximately in the middle of the immigrant groups as regards literacy, West and North Europeans having higher rates, Slavs and south Europeans lower rates. The explanation for seemingly low Jewish literacy may lie in the high proportion of women among the Jewish immigrants, men being more likely to have received some education. For those years for which data are available, we find that nearly 20 per cent of Jewish men, but nearly 37 per cent of Jewish women, were illiterate.[8] Finally, the rate of return to the native country was lower among Jews than among any other immigration group, except for the Irish. In the period of mass immigration, for every 100 Jews immigrating, only eight returned or went to a third country.[9] Among ethnic Russians, over one-half returned to Russia or went to third countries, a net migration smaller than that of any other group except southern Italians.[10]

The most common explanation for the huge Russian Jewish migration is that Jews were fleeing political and social persecution, both of which had escalated as of 1881.[11] Others point out that large-scale Jewish emigration had begun a decade before the May Laws and pogroms and that it was driven by economic deprivation and a population explosion as well.[12] Curiously, no one seems to have paid attention to chain migration: the fact that one family member or friend emigrated greatly increased the chances that others would follow. No doubt, much of the migration was motivated by considerations of family unification.

DIMENSIONS OF CONTEMPORARY SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION

The emigration of the 1970–90s dwarfs even that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If one takes the Jewish population of the USSR reported in the 1970 census as a benchmark, for that was just before the beginning of mass emigration, one finds that the number of émigrés was 43 per cent of the 1970 population. A total of 1,215,563 Jews emigrated from the USSR/FSU between 1968 and 1994, the great bulk after 1970. This is slightly more than half the number who left the Russian Empire from 1881 to the outbreak of World War I. However, considering that the 1897 Jewish population of the Russian Empire was over two and a half times as great as the Jewish population of the Soviet Union in 1970, and that the million émigrés of our era left within a far shorter period of time, the intensity of emigration in our day is even greater than that during the 'classic' period of Russian emigration.

Of all emigrants from 1968 to 1994, almost two-thirds (751,203, or 61.8 per cent) went to Israel. Most of the rest, approximately 322,200 (26.5 per cent), immigrated to the United States.[13] There was some, secondary migration from Israel, mainly to the US, but it was probably no more than ten per cent for the entire period. Ironically, the USSR, which permitted no Zionist activity until the late 1980s and had no diplomatic relations with Israel for two decades, has supplied more *olim* than any other country in the world. People having origins in the USSR now constitute the single largest sub-group in Israel's Jewish population.

There have been large variations in two dimensions of the emigration: volume and destination, and smaller variation in a third dimension: composition. The volume of emigration has fluctuated wildly: 914 people emigrated in 1986, but over 186,000 did so in 1990. This was due not to radical shifts in the desire to leave the USSR but to the vagaries of Soviet policy. The volume of *vyzovy* remained quite high, though when emigration was severely depressed, naturally fewer people applied to leave because this was likely to bring them grief, and only rarely an exit visa. The variation in applications for *vyzovy* was always smaller than that in the number of people actually leaving.

THE POLITICS OF SOVIET EMIGRATION

Why did the mass emigration of Soviet Jews, not seriously envisioned after the 1920s, become an issue on the international political agenda, thus enabling foreign pressures to be exerted successfully on the USSR to change its traditional policy of barring emigration? In the broadest sense, the issue was legitimized by a sea change in the international system. As James Rosenau points out, there are today a larger number of actors in world politics than ever before and a growing number of them are not states. Interest groups, multinational corporations, ethnic and religious groups, and international organizations have come to play larger and more effective roles in the international arena, breaking the monopoly once enjoyed by sovereign states. Education and the mass media have involved ordinary people more in world affairs. They have become more questioning of authority and have a stronger sense of political efficacy.[14] Technology has made the transmission of political messages more rapid and effective; the Iron Curtain was increasingly penetrated by messages the regime did not want to hear. The high levels of education and urbanity of both Western and Soviet Jews made them likely candidates for political involvement. Western Jews felt guilt at not having saved more of European Jewry during the Holocaust and shame at their political impotence in the 1930s. The

inspiration of the American Black Civil Rights Movement, the consensual nature of the Soviet Jewry issue, the origins of so many Western and Israeli Jews in Russia, and traditions of cross-boundary solidarity all played a role in mobilizing world Jewry on behalf of Soviet Jews and their emigration. Of course, Soviet Jewish activists took the lead and, like other national and cultural dissidents, defied a sclerotic Soviet regime, using the new international arena and the new technology to protect themselves to the extent possible.

Western governments responded to calls for action for several reasons. Like the Jews themselves, some felt guilt about the Holocaust and their immigration policies of the time, which effectively condemned hundreds of thousands to death. Conservatives rejoiced in the campaign, for it was directed against the 'evil empire'. Liberals could join in what was a genuine human rights issue. American President Jimmy Carter had successfully struggled to make human rights a legitimate concern not only of international bodies but of individual governments. Just about all American Jewish organizations were advocating the issue, so elected officials felt they could only gain by supporting it.

The USSR was under pressure to change its traditional policy, pressure that was coming also from the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to Soviet Germans. But Soviet responses were inconsistent, at times accommodating, and at times rejecting. What explains the shifts in Soviet policy? Some see them mainly as a function of East-West relations: when the USSR wished to ingratiate itself with the West, particularly the United States, it opened the faucet of emigration. To show its displeasure, it closed it. If one draws a curve representing the state of Soviet-American relations and graphs the flow of emigrants, the two lines will be roughly parallel. No doubt, there were some domestic considerations influencing Soviet policy, as Yaacov Ro'i shows in this volume,[15] though those who argue that they were dominant and determining fail, in my view, to produce convincing evidence. Salitan argues that 1976–79 was a period of tension in US-Soviet relations and yet there was a high volume of emigration. I would view tensions over Angola, the Horn of Africa, stalled SALT negotiations and Sino-American *détente* as irritants, not major conflicts. By contrast, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was followed by a steep drop in emigration, began a major downturn in the superpower relationship. Renewed emigration under Gorbachev, Salitan argues, was the outcome of his commitment to the rule of law.[16] I am less impressed by Gorbachev's commitment to the rule of law than by his strong desire to win Western support for his political and, especially, economic policies.

Robert Brym's statistical analysis showing that there is no correlation between US-Soviet relations and emigration is also flawed, in my view, because he takes the volume of trade between the two countries as the sole measure of their relations. Many factors affect the volume of trade, not least of which are economic calculations. Trade was not simply a function of political relations and it is far too crude a measure of them. Brym argues that US-China and US-Soviet trade, as well as the American consumer price index and the net increase in the size of the Soviet labour force do not correlate with emigration. I am not surprised since I do not see these as sufficient, and in some cases, even relevant, measures of Soviet-American relations. Brym argues further that in the 1970s the Soviets permitted Jewish emigration because they were worried by an oversupply of highly educated personnel; by the 1980s there were labour shortages, so emigration was curtailed. This is more plausible, but the evidence cited is somewhat sparse.[17] As the chapter by Ro'i shows,[18] the opening of the archives in the FSU may make it possible to ascertain what actually determined Soviet emigration policy, who the policy makers were, and what alternatives were debated.

The second dimension which has fluctuated considerably is the destination of the émigrés. Roughly speaking, there have been three waves of emigration since 1970, as defined by both volume and destination. The first wave came between 1971 and 1974, consisted of 100,000 people, and headed almost exclusively to Israel. This has been called a 'Zionist' emigration, motivated by ideology, but it was only partly that. Religion and tradition, and not Zionism alone, motivated Georgian Jews and others from the western territories of the USSR who were statistically over-represented in this wave. Thus, between 1968 and 1976, a quarter of the Israeli immigrants came from Georgia, where in 1970 only 2.5 per cent of the Jewish population resided. They were not fleeing the Soviet Union. Jews in Georgia suffered significantly less discrimination than Jews elsewhere in the country, but those who left were expressing their traditional values, which included both a religious-based yearning for Zion as well as a commitment to close-knit, hierarchical families. Thus, when the head of a family decided to emigrate, many would follow. The Zapadniki, or Westerners, that is, those who had become Soviet citizens as a result of the annexation in 1939–40 of the Baltic republics, eastern Poland and Bessarabia-Bukovina, were far less acculturated than those living under Soviet rule after 1917 or 1921. The Zapadniki had stronger memories of, and commitments to, Hebrew, Yiddish and Zionism. About one-third of the *aliya* of the 1970s came from these areas, whereas they were probably no more than 10 per cent of the Jewish

population in 1970. By contrast, only about 40 per cent of the *olim* came from Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine, which together had 81 per cent of the 1970 population.

The second wave of immigrants came largely from the three Slavic republics and headed for America. From 1975 to 1989 (inclusive), 68.6 per cent of the émigrés did not settle in Israel. The trend away from Israel sharpened in 1978. By 1988, 89 per cent were resettling in the United States.

After 1976, about 85 per cent of those arriving in America came from Russia and Ukraine. About 90 per cent of those leaving Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Odessa, where Jews were most acculturated, chose the United States, not Israel, as their destination. On the other hand, those from cities incorporated into the USSR later were less likely to go to America. For example, in 1974, 55 per cent of those leaving Moscow and Leningrad went to the US, but only one-third of those leaving Lvov, formerly in Poland, and three per cent of those departing Chernovtsy, formerly in Romania, did so. Fewer than ten per cent of those who left Vilnius and Kaunas (Lithuania) went to America in 1974, but 51 per cent of Kievans and 58 per cent of Kharkovites did so.[19]

Thus, there was a direct relationship between involvement in Jewish culture and the propensity to immigrate to Israel. The Jews of the Slavic republics, many of them third-generation Soviet citizens, cut off from Jewish culture for decades, had little reason to go to Israel and they sought political and cultural freedom, economic opportunity and social equality in the West. Since they left on Israeli visas, 'dropped out' in Vienna and transferred to Rome where American Jewish organizations facilitated their entry to the US, they became a bone of contention between the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency, on the one hand, and the American Jewish community, on the other. Frustrated by the general lack of *aliya*, and embarrassed by the fact that tens of thousands of Soviet Jews chose not to go to Israel, Israelis charged that American Jewish organizations were seducing the immigrants in order to justify their staffs and budgets. In turn, most of the American Jewish community declared their support for freedom of choice for the émigrés and rejected the kind of Zionism-by-coercion which Israelis seemed to them to advocate. American Jews were fascinated, energized and mobilized by the immigration of tens of thousands of people from the territories from which their ancestors had come. Soviet Jewry became the consensual issue for American Jews, even more consensual than support of Israel whose economic problems and political policies had begun to divide them. At the same time, American Jewry continued to support *aliya* financially and

politically. In their ongoing debate, Israelis and Americans ignored the fact that the background of the émigrés, on the one hand, and the economic and political difficulties of Israel in the post-Yom Kippur war era, on the other, clearly stipulated a preference for the United States, quite apart from myths of seduction. The image of America as the *goldene medine* which had fired the imagination of the immigrants of an earlier era could still move large numbers of people.

The direction of emigration was abruptly reversed in October 1989 when the United States, perhaps under Israeli pressure, announced a change in policy. In 1989, 59,024 Soviet immigrants settled elsewhere than Israel, almost all in the US. The new American policy limited Soviet immigration to 50,000 a year, and the Jewish organizations presumed that of these 40,000 would be Jews. The effect of this change was immediate. In 1990, 85 per cent of the largest single emigration in Russian Jewish history went to Israel. Only 31,283 Jews came to the United States and 181,759 went to Israel. Not just the destination, but the nature of the immigration, had changed again. These were not 'born again' Zionists but panicky refugees who viewed with dismay the economic deterioration of the USSR, growing ethnic strife, and the emergence of a public, virulent, grass roots anti-Semitism.[20] This is clearly a case of 'push', rather than 'pull', driving the emigration. In 1992–93 there were two more subtle changes in the nature of Soviet emigration. First, the trickle of immigrants to America became a steadier flow, with 45,745 arriving in 1992 and 35,581 in 1993.[21] In effect, however, it was only those with first degree relatives already in the US who were likely to be admitted.

The second change is less easy to measure. It is likely that, except for immigrants from strife-torn regions such as Tajikistan and Georgia, a large proportion are leaving the FSU today not so much out of fear of imminent chaos but because there is a prolonged political and economic crisis in most of the former Soviet republics, because the steady departure of other Jews leaves them more lonely and insecure, and, probably most of all, because they have close family and friends abroad. It is likely that chain migration alone will sustain a steady outflow of Jews both to Israel and to the United States.

WHY DO THEY EMIGRATE?

Motivations for emigration are usually as mixed in one individual as they are varied across individuals. Some find it difficult to sort out their reasons for emigration. Examining the results of four American and three Israeli surveys of immigrants in the 1970s, Benjamin Pinkus concluded that both *olim* and immigrants to America were motivated

by 'push' factors (rejection of the USSR) in equal measure. Jewish considerations were somewhat more salient to *olim*, as might be expected, whereas desire for economic improvement was more important to American immigrants.[22] Younger and better educated emigrants preferred America to Israel. Physicians, dentists, architects and academics tended to go to Israel, where government programs made it easier for them to stay in their professions, whereas scientists and 'specialists in technical professions' preferred the West. Thus, in the 1970s choice of destination, when available, was determined by Jewish background, age, occupation and family considerations.

In a study of over a thousand emigrants, the Helsinki Commission of the US Congress found that one-half said they had left the country because of 'discrimination on the basis of nationality', 31 per cent cited the desire to be reunited with family abroad, and 35 per cent left because of 'limitations on my civil rights'.[23]

In four studies I conducted among Soviet emigrants over a 20-year period, I noticed a clear and substantial shift in motivations for emigration. Nearly two-thirds of *olim* interviewed in 1972 cited variations on Zionist themes as their primary motivation for *aliya*. But when I re-interviewed the same people in 1975, Zionist motivations were cited less frequently, though a large proportion still claimed to have been mainly 'pulled' to Israel. Perhaps in 1972 Zionist rhetoric seemed the 'appropriate' response by those new to Israel, but it was no longer perceived as such three years later. Or, it was an authentic response in 1972, shortly after arrival, but after living in Israel for several years people no longer thought in abstract and ideological terms.[24]

In a 1980 study involving 1,161 Jewish, Russian and German emigrants, the single most important emigration motivation for Jews was no longer Zionism but a desire to join family members abroad. Russians cited political alienation from the Soviet system most often, while over half the Germans gave as their primary motive the desire to live among other Germans.[25] In a third study, conducted in 1985 among 600 Jews from the non-European USSR who had moved to Israel, I found that only 16 per cent cited Zionist reasons for coming to Israel, 40 per cent said their main motivation was to live among Jews, and 23 per cent wanted to be close to family.[26] Data I have calculated from the Soviet Interview Project, conducted in 1983 among over 3,000 immigrants in America, also show the desire to be with family as the modal response to questions about motivations for emigration, with anti-Semitism and political alienation cited next most frequently.[27]

The most recent, and by far the largest, wave of Israeli immigration was the least Zionist, as might be expected. In my 1992 survey of over

800 *olim*, fewer than three per cent mentioned Zionism as a motivation for emigration. Relatives in Israel, the outburst of popular anti-Semitism, and economic deterioration in the FSU were the most frequently mentioned spurs to emigration, though about 15 per cent also mentioned a desire to live among Jews, perhaps an indirect expression of their insecurity in an ethnically troubled FSU. Finally, my recent survey of 550 immigrants in Chicago revealed anti-Semitism as the most frequently mentioned motivation for emigration, with family reunification following close behind. Thus, emigration has clearly acquired a built-in, self-perpetuating dynamic: the more people who emigrate, the greater the number of potential émigrés. Family and friends of those who have left themselves confront the question of leaving or staying.

WHO ARE THE EMIGRANTS? GEOGRAPHY, GENDER AND AGE

There have been significant shifts in the geographic composition of the emigration. As noted, the emigrants of the 1970s came disproportionately from the western territories and Georgia, and the American immigration was dominated by those from Russia and Ukraine. Central Asian Jews went mostly to Israel. The different geographical structure of the Israeli and American immigrations persists even in the most recent emigration (1989–92) where one would expect, in light of its hasty flight, that these differences might be minimized. However, as can be seen, Russia supplies a larger proportion of the Israeli immigrants and Ukraine supplies a larger proportion of the American ones.

Table 1.3 shows that the predominance of Ukraine and Russia in the American immigration continues into the 1990s. This is to be expected. For the cultural-historical reasons adduced earlier, Russian and Ukrainian Jews were less pulled to Israel than to the United States. Since after 1989 American policy, in effect, limited immigration largely to first degree relatives of those already there, the geographical patterns established earlier tend to replicate themselves. The proportion of Russian and Ukrainian Jews going to Israel rose in the latest period because the reservoirs of emigrants in other parts of the FSU had been drawn down, and because in the panic of 1989–91, people went where they were admitted, rather than where they might have preferred to go. Once a substantial Russian/Ukrainian migration came to Israel, the prospects increased for further migration from those republics, which contained by far the largest concentration of Jews in the FSU. Central Asian and Georgian Jews consistently go to Israel in greater numbers than to the US. The same is true of those from

TABLE 1.3 REPUBLICS FROM WHICH IMMIGRANTS CAME TO ISRAEL AND THE US[a] (per cent)

Israel '89		Israel '90		Israel '91		Israel '92		US '89		US '91		US '92	
Ukraine	28.0	Ukraine	31.9	Russia	30.3	Russia	37.6	Ukraine	48.4	Ukraine	35.7	Ukraine	44.5
Russia	24.6	Russia	24.3	Ukraine	26.9	Ukraine	20.9	Russia	21.2	Russia	21.1	Russia	21.4
Cnt.Asia	15.5	Cnt.Asia	14.0	Cnt.Asia	12.6	Cnt.Asia	13.5	Belorus.	16.1	Belorus.	10.3	Belorus.	12.6
Moldavia	11.6	Belorus.	12.8	Belorus.	10.9	Azerb.	9.6	Cnt.Asia	4.8	Moldavia	9.7	Cnt.Asia	7.4
Belorus.	8.8	Moldavia	6.5	Moldavia	10.5	Moldavia	6.9	Moldavia	4.3	Cnt.Asia	8.3	Moldavia	5.4
Baltic	5.1	Azerb.	5.5	Azerb.	5.7	Belorus.	5.2	Baltic	2.5	Baltic	2.4	Baltic	2.9
Azerb.	5.0	Baltic	4.1	Baltic	2.1	Georgia	4.3	Azerb.	2.0	Azerb.	2.2	Azerb.	2.6
Georgia	2.0	Georgia	0.1	Georgia	0.9	Baltic	2.0	Georgia	0.3				

Sources: HIAS, *Statistical Abstract, 1989*, No. 4; Ministry of Immigrant Absorption (Israel), *Statistical Information on Soviet Immigrants, 1989*; for 1991 and 1992, data supplied by HIAS and Ministry of Immigrant Absorption; in 1990 HIAS did not compile statistics for the immigrants.

(a) Belorussia (Belarus); Moldavia (Moldova); Central Asia (for US, Uzbekistan only); Azerbaijan (for Israel, includes North Caucasus).

Azerbaijan, though not to the same extent. Year-to-year fluctuations in the proportion of emigration composed of people from different republics can be explained, for the recent period, by the relative and varying degrees of strife and calm in these areas, changing economic circumstances, and other non-systemic factors.

There is striking consistency in the gender composition of the emigration. In the years 1975, 1981 and 1987–92, the proportion of women among American immigrants varies only between 51 and 55 per cent. In contrast to the earlier Russian immigration to America, these are neither sojourners nor people who had to earn passage for their families coming to the United States. Today's immigrants are permanent settlers. However, there are signs of an emerging group of immigrants, mostly in Israel, who are returning to the FSU to do business, keeping their Israeli citizenship and nominal residence, but spending long periods of time in their former country. Americans of Soviet origin are also a growing presence in the FSU, though clearly as temporary residents.

Younger people are over-represented in most migrations in comparison with their proportion in the general population. They have less invested in their places of origin and may be more open to new opportunities and challenges, and better equipped physically to take them on. This has been true of the Soviet (or FSU) Jewish migration. In 1970, 26.5 per cent of the Jewish population of the Russian Republic was over 60, but the percentage of those over 60 among Soviet emigrants has consistently ranged from 15 to 23. The recent immigration to Israel is also younger than the 1970 RSFSR population, and the latter has become even more radically skewed to the older cohorts. Thus, in 1989, 1990 and 1992, the percentage of those over 60 coming from the FSU ranged from 17 to 24. By 1989, the median age of Jews in the FSU reached 50, and 23.6 per cent were over 65.[28] It is striking that despite the mass migration of recent years, it is still a selective one, with younger people over-represented.

The characteristic of the emigration most frequently remarked upon is its high level of education and commensurate professional makeup. Since this is widely known and discussed, we will only mention that consistently over the past twenty years about 40 to 50 per cent of the emigrants have come with some form of higher education. There are almost no illiterates among them, and the proportion of those with higher education among those under the age of 60 is very high indeed. The consequences of this educational makeup for the host societies and the immigrants themselves are many and complex, but they will not be dealt with in this chapter. It should be observed, however, how different this emigration is from the Russian

Jewish emigration of 1881–1914. The vastly higher levels of education and the professional makeup of the current waves are testimony to the ambition, skills and talents of Soviet Jews. But it must be said also that it was the Soviet regime which gave Jews opportunities in education and vocation denied to them by the tsars, while at the same time robbing them of the culture which earlier waves of migrants had brought with them, admittedly only to abandon much of it in their new dwelling places. The challenge to Israel and the American Jewish community now is to restore to their rightful owners the culture taken from them, while at the same time preserving the skills, talents and culture which they gained in over seventy years of Soviet rule.

THE IMPACT OF THE EMIGRATION ON THREE SOCIETIES

Only cursory mention will be made here of the impact of the mass migration on the FSU, Israel and the United States. Obviously, the migration has radically depleted the Jewish population of the FSU, still the third largest Jewish population in the world. Because so many younger people have left, the trends toward low fertility and high mortality that have marked the European Soviet population over recent decades have been further strengthened. The size of the Jewish population in the FSU is shrinking rapidly. This shrinkage clearly impedes efforts to reconstruct Jewish communities and Jewish life in the FSU. On the other hand, migration strengthens direct and personal ties between Jews in the FSU and those abroad, and between them, on the one hand, and Jewish and Israeli organizations, as well as the State of Israel, on the other.

The United States has not had substantial Jewish immigration since the 1950s, except for Israelis and Soviet Jews. The latter will not have a great demographic impact on a shrinking Jewish community because of their low fertility. If their high rates of intermarriage carry over from the FSU — they are quite similar to rates among American Jews — they will not contribute to stanching the flow away from Jewishness and Judaism. In the short run, their economic impact is modest, but it could be very significant within a few years. In my Chicago study, I found very high geographical and income mobility among immigrants who had been in the US for five to ten years. They are remarkably successful economically and vocationally. Moreover, despite popular perceptions in America and triumphant articles in Israeli newspapers, Soviet immigrants are very strongly identified as Jews although very weakly affiliated.[29] Because American Jews tend to measure Jewish commitment by organizational affiliation and philanthropy, and Soviet immigrants fall short on both scores, an

impression is created — a false one, in my view — of a lack of Jewish commitment on the part of the immigrants. In our survey of 1,300 Jews in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk), fewer than ten per cent agreed that to attend synagogue or demonstrate openly one's belonging to the Jewish people were very necessary in order to consider oneself a 'real Jew'.[30] The challenge for American Jewry is to translate the strong Jewish identification of the immigrants into forms which will be recognized by, and have an impact on, American Jewry.

The impact of the immigration on Israel has been enormous and much commented on. The demographic change alone is remarkable. The military and economic potentials, some of which have already been realized, are as great as the cultural and social challenges.

THE FUTURE OF EMIGRATION FROM THE FSU

Israeli politicians and other interested parties often make dramatic but irresponsible public predictions about the size of future immigration from the FSU. In fact, the volume and direction of future emigration depends on three variables, all very hard to predict: 1) the political, economic and social situations in the various parts of the FSU; 2) the same situations in Israel, and especially the employment situation, which is of the greatest concern to the immigrants; 3) the immigration policy of the United States. There is a fourth and increasingly important variable, the immigration policy of Germany. The optimal conditions producing immigration to Israel are, obviously, instability and economic deterioration in the FSU, peace and prosperity in Israel, and highly restrictive American and German immigration policies. A bad situation in both the FSU and Israel, combined with liberalized American and/or German immigration, would have obvious consequences. One can play out several scenarios using different combinations of these variables. The point is that they cannot be predicted easily. Moreover, each acts independently of the others, so the possible combinations of variables are many, as are the effects on migration patterns.

Certain trends, all of them conditional, can be observed. Israel has benefited greatly from the near-hermetic sealing of most countries to immigration. Were Western Europe, Canada and the United States to open their doors more widely, a highly unlikely prospect, there would undoubtedly be a significant outflow of unemployed and under-employed Soviet *olim*. On the other hand, steady progress in employing Israeli immigrants in reasonable jobs will encourage further *aliya*. Moreover, there is considerable domestic pressure in the United States to further restrict immigration. If Russia and Ukraine become more

politically and economically stable, and ethnic strife does not flare up, it will be harder to make the case that Jews from those areas are in greater need of refuge than Haitians or many Asian, African and Latin American groups. On the other hand, the results of the December 1993 Russian election warned that the situation of Jews in the FSU could deteriorate drastically. These examples are only by way of illustrating the multi-dimensional complexity of emigration flows.

There is, however, one relatively certain predictor of further emigration and its destinations: family reunification. In our 1993 survey of Jews in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg, 46 per cent said they had close relatives in Israel and about 25 per cent in the United States. About two-thirds had distant relatives in Israel and nearly half had such relatives in the United States. In October 1991, visiting a Jewish school in Samarkand, I was struck by the fact that three-quarters of the class raised their hands when I asked how many had relatives in the United States, and every single student had a relative in Israel. These family ties are the surest predictor of further immigration, should conditions allow. In our Russian survey, we found that those with close relatives in Israel had more positive attitudes toward Israel, were more inclined to recommend emigration to Israel to Russian Jews, and were more likely to leave themselves than those who had only distant relatives in Israel. The latter, in turn, were more likely to have a positive attitude toward Israel than those who had no relatives at all in Israel. Thus, the assumption that negative feedback from *olim* causes Jews in the FSU to develop negative attitudes to Israel may not be entirely warranted.

In the early 1990s, the social climate in most parts of the FSU favoured emigration. In a February 1991 survey of the general population, almost five per cent of those in the Russian Republic, but only half that proportion in Lithuania, expressed a desire to leave the Soviet Union forever — and this was before the breakdown of the system and the breakup of the country.[31] In our Russian survey, 30 per cent of Moscow and St. Petersburg Jews and 36 per cent of those in Ekaterinburg thought the best thing for Jews to do was to emigrate to Israel. Over 20 per cent overall recommended emigrating to the United States. Slightly over a quarter felt that Jews should stay in Russia and nearly 20 per cent did not know which course of action to recommend. Over 60 per cent of the respondents did not (in 1993) intend to emigrate, but a quarter were sure they would leave at some time. Only 15 per cent stated they would 'never' leave. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, 42 per cent said that if they left they would go to Israel; in Ekaterinburg, 59 per cent would head for Israel. One-third of those in Moscow and St. Petersburg but only 20 per cent of those in

Ekaterinburg would go to the United States. The difference is probably due to the fact that many more people in the two big cities have close relatives in the United States and therefore better chances of being admitted there. Less than four per cent expressed a desire to emigrate to Germany. Of course, these results are only a snapshot of a moment in time, and it would be wrong to project them on to a future where circumstances in the sending and receiving countries may change radically. To view the emigration realistically one needs a video or movie camera, not a snapshot. A series of snapshots which would give us longitudinal data would be helpful but I do not know of such. Decisions to leave are made on the basis of family circumstances, material interests, emotions, and, increasingly rarely, ideology. Every one of these changes, sometimes very rapidly. The volume and direction of emigration change accordingly.

VISIONS FULFILLED

The Zionist dream seems on the way to fulfilment, if not quite in the way envisioned by its dreamers. The Jewish people is becoming concentrated in two main centres, Israel and the United States. Low fertility, high mortality, increasing rates of intermarriage and assimilation are shrinking the American community, as they are the rest of the diaspora. If present trends continue, Israel is likely to contain the largest concentration of Jews in the world, though not primarily as a result of *aliya* but of the erosion of the diaspora. A Jew who accompanied the first diaspora to Babylon 2,600 years ago said in the name of God:

> Hineni mevi otam me-eretz tsafon, ve-kibatztim mi-yarketei arets, bam iver u-fiseah, hara ve-yoledet yahdav, kahal gadol yashuvu heina...Ki fada ha-shem et Yaacov u'gealo mi-yad hazak mimenu. [I shall bring them from a northern country, and I shall gather them from the ends of the earth, the blind and lame among them, the pregnant one and the one who gives birth, a great crowd shall return here...For God has redeemed Jacob and rescued him from a hand mightier than his.]
>
> Jeremiah, 31:7, 10

Jeremiah did not mean Russia by that 'northern land', but that is how it has turned out.

The last word belongs to another diaspora Jew whose comments on the Bible may not be in the canon, but are in the hearts of millions of Jews and non-Jews alike. As anyone who flies with El Al knows, Jews like to converse when they travel. And so it was, that when that quintessential Russian Jew Tevye der Milkhiker was riding on a train with Sholem Aleichem, he remarked:

> Ashrekho Yisroel — I am lucky I was born a Jew, and so I know the taste of exile and of shlepping around the world, and of *vayis'u vayahanu* — [and they went forth, and they encamped]...Since they taught me that lesson in *lekh-lekho* — [go forth] — I've just kept going...Tevye asks no questions. When they tell him to go, he goes. You see, Mr. Sholem Aleichem, today we meet right here, on the train. Tomorrow it might take us to Yehupetz. A year from now it might throw us off to Odessa, to Warsaw, or even to America. Unless the Lord above would look around and say: 'You know what, *kinderlekh*? I'll just bring down the messiah to you.' I wish he would do that, if only out of spite!...Meanwhile, be well, have a good trip, and give my regards to our Jews, and tell them over there they shouldn't worry: our old God is still alive.[32]

Indeed.

NOTES

1. Jacob Lestschinsky, 'Jewish Migrations, 1840–1946', in Louis Finkelstein (ed.), *The Jews*, Vol.IV (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1949), pp. 198–200.
2. See Thomas Lueck, '20 New York Schools to Lose US Grants', *New York Times*, 21 October 1993 and 'Pell Grants Seen Attracting Fraud', *New York Times*, 29 October 1993.
3. On modern Jewish migration, see Mark Wischnitzer, *To Dwell in Safety* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1948) and Ronald Sanders, *Shores of Refuge* (New York: Henry Holt, 1988). On Jewish migration from the Russian Empire, see Arcadius Kahan, *Essays in Jewish Social and Economic History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), Chs. 2,4,5 and Simon Kuznets, 'Immigration of Russian Jews to the United States: Background and Structure', *Perspectives in American History* 9 (1975) pp. 35–126.
4. D. S. Pasmanik, *Sud'by evreiskogo naroda* (Moscow: Safrut, 1917) p. 145.
5. Samuel Joseph, *Jewish Immigration to the United States* (New York: Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, 1914), Vol. LIX, No. 4 (145), p. 101. For the period 1881–1910, Joseph counts 1,119,059 Jewish immigrants to America. The discrepancy between his figures and Pasmanik's is due not only to the two additional years included by Pasmanik, but also to the fact that before 1899 immigrants were classified by country of birth or residence, not nationality or ethnicity, so that figures for the years before that are necessarily estimates.
6. Ibid, p. 165.
7. V. V. Obolensky (Osinskii), *Mezhdunarodnye i mezhkontinental'nye migratsii v dovoennoi Rossii* (Moscow, 1928) p. 25, quoted in N. L. Tudorianu, *Ocherki rossiiskoi trudovoi emigratsii perioda imperializma* (Kishinev: Shtintsa, 1986) p. 175. According to Joseph, p. 186, 45 per cent of Jewish immigrants had no occupation. Table 1.2 may include only those who claimed an occupation.
   It is a sad comment on the atmosphere in the USSR in the 1960s and 1970s that an obviously Jewish author, Shifra Abramovna Bogina, who wrote two detailed monographs on immigration to the United States, never once mentions Jews. See her *Immigratsiia v SShA nakanunie i v period grazhdanskoi voiny (1850–1865)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965) and *Immigrantskoe naselenie SShA* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1976). Bogina's colleague in Moscow, Maia Berzina, devotes six pages to Jews in her monograph on immigration to Canada. See her *Formirovanie etnicheskogo sostava naseleniia Kanady*

(Moscow: Nauka, 1971). A former colleague of Bogina and Berzina suggested to me that Bogina's obvious Jewishness made her very cautious, whereas Berzina, 'who is only half-Jewish', could take more 'risks'!

8. Joseph, *Jewish Immigration to the United States*, p. 147.
9. Lestschinsky calculates that from 1908 to 1925, only 5.2 per cent of all Jews who immigrated left the US, the lowest proportion among 12 nationalities. See op. cit., p. 1227. Table 1.2 shows 11.1 per cent returnees among Jews, but the figures include those who were not initially registered as immigrants. Some may have changed their status once in the United States.
10. Tudorianu, *Ocherki rossiiskoi trudovoi emigratsii*, p. 181.
11. See, for example, Joseph, *Jewish Immigration to the United States*, p. 101; Wischnitzer, *To Dwell in Safety* and Sanders, *Shores of Refuge, passim.*
12. Lestschinsky and Cherikover, cited in Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 50.
13. Sources include, for the pre-1967 era, Yaacov Ro'i, *The Struggle for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948–1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 328; publications of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (USA) and HIAS (New York). On the *aliya* of the 1970s, see Zvi Gitelman, *Becoming Israelis: Political Resocialization of Soviet and American Immigrants* (New York: Praeger, 1982); Tamar Horowitz (ed.), *The Soviet Man in an Open Society* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989); on the immigration to the United States, see, Dan Jacobs and Ellen Paul, *Studies of the Third Wave* (Boulder: Westview, 1981) and Rita Simon (ed.), *New Lives* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985).
14. James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
15. Yaacov Ro'i, 'Soviet Policy towards Jewish Emigration – An Overview', in this volume.
16. Laurie Salitan, 'Domestic Pressures and the Politics of Exit: Trends in Soviet Emigration Policy', *Political Science Quarterly* 104, 4 (1989–90), 671–87. Salitan elaborates her argument in her monograph, *Politics and Nationality in Contemporary Soviet-Jewish Emigration, 1968–89* (London: Macmillan, 1992). My assessment of her argument may be found in *Political Science Quarterly* 107, 4 (Winter 1992–93) p. 781.
17. Robert Brym, 'Soviet Jewish Emigration: A Statistical Test of Two Theories', *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 18, 3 (1988), pp. 15–23, and 'The Changing Rate of Jewish Emigration from the USSR: Some Lessons from the 1970s', *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 15, 2 (May 1985), pp. 23–35. Even more speculative arguments are made by John Scherer who opines that the 'Soviets probably decided to issue an approximate number of visas by five-year periods and made annual adjustments depending on the political situation and on the number of visas required to fulfil the Plan. The large number of visas issued in 1979 (before the invasion of Afghanistan) was due to a desire to fulfil the plan. 'If emigration does not rise in 1986 [it didn't], it probably will not rise during the decade [it did, and to unparalleled heights]' — John Scherer, 'A Note on Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1971–84', *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 15, 2 (May 1985), pp. 37–44.
18. Ro'i, 'Soviet Policy towards Jewish Emigration'.
19. Calculated from data in Zvi Alexander, 'Netunim statistiyim shel ha-yetsia', *Hainteligentsia hayehudit bi-Vrit ha-Moatsot* 4 (June 1990) and 'Jewish Emigration from the USSR in 1980', *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 11, 2 (1981), pp. 3–21.
20. For an analysis, see Zvi Gitelman, 'Glasnost, Perestroika and Antisemitism', *Foreign Affairs* 70, 2 (Spring 1991)., pp. 141–59.
21. I am grateful to Dail Stolow of HIAS for supplying me with data on Soviet Jewish immigration to the United States.
22. Benjamin Pinkus, 'National Identity and Emigration Patterns Among Soviet Jewry', *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 15, 3 (November 1983) p. 16.
23. Multiple answers were permitted so the total exceeds 100 per cent. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Report to the Congress of the United States on the Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Findings and Recommendations: Two Years After Helsinki*, mimeo (Washington, DC, 1 August 1977) B-2.

24. Zvi Gitelman, *Becoming Israelis: Political Resocialization of Soviet and American Immigrants in Israel* (New York: Praeger, 1982).
25. Of the sample, 100 were German, about 471 Russians and the rest Jews. See Wayne Di Franceisco and Zvi Gitelman, 'Soviet Political Culture and "Covert Participation" in Policy Implementation', *American Political Science Review* 78, 3 (September 1984), pp. 603–21.
26. Zvi Gitelman, 'Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Relations among the Jews of the Non-European USSR', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 14, 1 (January 1991), pp. 24–54.
27. Details of the project may be found in James Millar (ed.), *Politics, Work and Daily Life in the USSR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) Ch. 1.
28. Mark Tolts, 'The Balance of Births and Deaths Among Soviet Jewry', *Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* 2, 18 (Summer 1992), p. 23.
29. This point was first made by Francine (Fran) Markowitz in 'Jewish Identification and Affiliation of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in New York City — A Needs Assessment and Planning Study', (New York: Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, June 1985).
30. Survey on 'What it Means to be a Jew', conducted, in cooperation with the author, by Vladimir Shapiro and Valery Chervyakov, Jewish Research Center, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences.
31. Robert Brym, 'The Emigration Potential of Russia and Lithuania: Recent Survey Results', in Tanya Basok and Robert Brym (eds.), *Soviet-Jewish Emigration and Resettlement in the 1990s* (Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1991), pp. 29–30.
32. Sholem Aleichem, 'Vekhalaklakos', in *Ale Verk fun Sholem Aleichem* (New York: Sholem Aleichem Folksfond Oisgabe, 1925), Vol. 2, pp. 229–30.

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II

FROM EMIGRATION TO ABSORPTION: POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

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