

DICTIONARY OF THE MODERN POLITICS OF SOUTH-EAST

ASIA

Michael Leifer

Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia

Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia

Third Edition

Michael Leifer

London and New York

First published in 1995
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Second edition 1996

This edition first published 2001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

Typeset in Palatino by Keystroke, Jacaranda Lodge, Wolverhampton
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
St Edmundsbury Press, Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 0–415–23875–7 (hardback)
ISBN 0–415–23876–5 (paperback)

Contents

Introduction

Since the end of the Pacific War in August 1945, South-East Asia has evolved from a category of convenience employed by a military command for dispossessing Japan of its wartime gains into a distinct region within which geographic and institutional bounds coincide, with the notable exception of East Timor. The separate regional identity of South-East Asia has been registered primarily through the institutional evolution of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which, from an inauspicious beginning by five states in August 1967, has expanded to incorporate ten members by the end of the twentieth century. ASEAN has enjoyed mixed fortunes, however. In its enlarged form, it has failed to sustain the culture of close consultation and the self-confidence that distinguished its collective practice prior to the end of the Cold War and the advent of an acute economic adversity that afflicted the region with devastating effect towards the end of the 1990s.

South-East Asia comprises ten states (excepting the prospective new state of East Timor) situated to the east of the Indian sub-continent, to the south of the People's Republic of China and to the north of Australia with combined populations of just over 500 million. The region divides into mainland and island zones and displays a variety of cultural and religious legacies, which are a product of historical waves of migration. South-East Asia's human diversities are contained within territorial bounds inherited in the main from colonial rule so that society and polity are not necessarily congruent. And yet, despite an incipient separatism within the states of the region, secession has been the exception rather than the rule, so far. The circumstances surrounding the independence of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965 do not fit the conventional separatist model. The former Portuguese colony of East Timor, annexed by Indonesia in 1975 but whose inhabitants voted overwhelmingly for independence in August 1999, was never within the bounds of the Dutch East Indies. Those bounds served as the rationale for the territorial definition of the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed in August 1945. The colonial territorial legacy has been challenged in Indonesia's case, however, where political alienation in the Province of Aceh in northern Sumatra has been stimulated by the precedent of a referendum in East Timor. A corresponding alienation has been registered in Irian Jaya, the western half of the island of New Guinea. Irredentism has also been a general feature of the region but where successful it has been realized as a delayed process of decolonization; in the case of Irian Jaya, which was transferred from Dutch to Indonesian rule in 1963, and in Vietnam, which was united under Communist rule in 1975.

Within South-East Asia, there is no standard model of political system. Authoritarian governments prevail, however, despite a regional trend towards market-driven economics which has given rise to social changes of democratizing political consequence. At issue is the extent to which a process of economic recovery around the turn of the new millennium will accelerate that democratization. Parliamentary systems with prime ministers as heads of government exist in Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand but with very mixed expressions of democratic practice. The Philippines and Indonesia apply executive presidential systems but again very different in their models of democratic practice. Since 1998, Indonesia has emerged from authoritarian rule to a quasi-democracy but without totally eliminating the political role of its military establishment. Military-based administration is exercised blatantly in Burma (officially Myanmar since 1989), while Brunei provides the sole example of a governing monarchy. Vietnam and Laos continue to be subject to the monopoly rule of their respective communist parties.

Despite its political diversity, South-East Asia is not beset by a central conflict of the kind that continues to trouble neighbouring South Asia. There is great irony in the fact that during the early phase of the Cold War, the region was often described as the Balkans of the Orient in

an analogy with the turbulent and foreboding condition of south-eastern Europe before the outbreak of the First World War. At the end of the Pacific War, nationalism and communism, often opposite sides of the same political coin, contended with a weakened colonialism. The process of regional decolonization became drawn into global conflict, especially in Indochina that was to be afflicted by three successive wars over four and a half decades. By the onset of the 1990s, and with the end of the Cold War, the challenge of revolutionary communism had petered out, while governments in Vietnam and Laos had acknowledged the failings of Socialist economic dogma in the interest of market-driven development. Moreover, the international settlement of the Cambodian conflict in October 1991 marked a historic disjunction between global and regional issues leaving South-East Asia in a condition of relatively good regional order.

At the turn of the century, South-East Asia is not free of bilateral tensions, while contention over sovereign jurisdiction within the South China Sea puts four of ASEAN's ten governments at odds with one another. By contrast with the recent experience of south-eastern Europe, however, its relative condition suggests a zone of peace, which has been the idealized goal of ASEAN's governments since 1971. Such a picture is both valid and misleading. It is valid because of the absence of war, despite the domestic and international impact of acute economic adversity towards the end of the century. It is also misleading because of the possible return of the volatile contagion inherent in economic globalization with its devastating impact on currency, stock and property values with attendant social dislocation and consequences for political order and inter-state relations. In addition, the post-Cold War regional environment is notable for the shadow cast by a military modernizing China with irredentist claims at the maritime heart of South-East Asia.

ASEAN has attempted to cope with an uncertain environment marked by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and residual uncertainty about the staying power of the United States as well as a rising China by expanding its strategic horizons beyond its regional bounds. Its success in 1993 in promoting the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a multilateral security dialogue with the participation of all major Asia-Pacific powers, as well as the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, has had only limited benefit, while the Association is no closer to approximating to its ideal declaratory role of prime manager of regional order based on an adherence to common norms of inter-state conduct. Indeed, the so-called 'ASEAN Way' has been exposed as a piece of diplomatic rhetoric.

This dictionary of the politics and international relations of primarily post-Pacific War South-East Asia attempts to encapsulate the changing nature and experience of the region through individual entries arranged in alphabetical order. Information, analysis and commentary are provided about significant episodes and treaties, indigenous concepts and political parties and movements, and regional organizations. Biographical data are included on principal political figures, past and present, without any claim to being exhaustive. In an opening section, short essays deal generally with each of the ten states of the region, while the embryonic state of East Timor is dealt with in the body of the text. A guide to further reading, both general for the region and particular to individual states, has been included to aid further enquiry.

This volume is the third edition of a work that appeared first in 1995. Apart from filling in gaps brought to the attention of the author by diligent reviewers and readers, this edition incorporates significant political events and changes that were precipitated by the impact of regional economic adversity in the late 1990s. In preparing its different versions, I have enjoyed assistance at Routledge from Mark Barragry, Alex Clark, Christine Firth, Colville Wemyss, Victoria Smith, Fiona Cairns, Dominic Shryane and Sarah Eden as well as encouragement from John Ashworth, when Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science, as well as the loving support of my wife, Frances. Helpful advice on content has come from Kathleen Kazer, Duncan McCargo, Derwin Pereira, James Putzel, Paul Reddicliffe, Sabam Siagian and Michael Vatikiotis.

Michael Leifer
London, September 2000

Brunei, Sultanate of

The Sultanate of Brunei or *Brunei Darussalam* (Abode of Peace), which is located along the northern coast of Borneo, is the sole ruling monarchy in South-East Asia. Its head of state and government, Sultan **Hassanal Bolkiah** has been on the throne since October 1967. In August 1998, he installed his eldest son, Al-Muhtadee Billah, as Crown Prince. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Brunei exercised suzerainty over much of Borneo (giving its name to the island) and into the south of the Philippines archipelago. Its territorial extent was whittled down considerably over the centuries, while its separate identity was only preserved through British colonial intervention, albeit with further loss of territory. Brunei became a protected state in 1888 and only acquired internal self-government in 1959, with internal security powers transferred in 1971 when Britain gave up an automatic defence guarantee for a consultative defence arrangement. It became fully sovereign in January 1984 when Britain transferred its residual responsibility for foreign affairs. Brunei then comprised two territorial enclaves of some 5,765 square kilometres accessible from one another only by water and surrounded on the landward side by the Malaysian state of Sarawak. Its population is estimated at around 300,000, of whom some 230,000 are Malay-Muslim who dominate the political and bureaucratic life of the sultanate. Ethnic-Chinese, most of whom lack citizenship, number around 50,000. Non-Malay indigenous people add up to about 10,000, while the balance is made up of expatriates, including skilled professionals from the West and construction and factory workers from other parts of South-East Asia. The official religion is **Islam**, while the state is represented as a Malay Islamic Monarchy (***Melayu Islam Beraja***) in the interest of sustaining political conservatism. The sultan, by combing religious and royal roles, seeks to contain radical Islam, which is viewed as a threat to the established political order.

Modern Brunei is bound up with the discovery and exploitation of oil and natural gas. Onshore production of oil began in 1929 with the active involvement of the Shell Company, which in time became the joint venture Brunei Shell in which the government of the sultanate owns a 50 per cent share. Offshore oil production began in 1963 and corresponding natural gas production in 1973 with the involvement of Mitsubishi with the subsequent engagement of Elf Petroleum. A consortium comprising Fletcher Challenge Energy of New Zealand, Unocol Borneo Utara and the government of Brunei is involved in the biggest offshore drilling programme for a decade. Six operational offshore oil and gas fields account for virtually the whole of the sultanate's great wealth, either directly or indirectly through overseas investments funded from oil and gas revenues. National reserves have never been disclosed, nor has the great personal wealth of the Sultan and other members of the royal family. At one time, national reserves were estimated at over US$100 billion but are believed to have been run down dramatically as a result of the collapse with losses estimated at US$15 billion of the country's largest private company, Amedeo Development Corporation, headed by the Sultan's youngest brother, Prince Jefri. In March 2000, he was the subject of a civil law suit brought by the Brunei government for misappropriating funds from the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA), which he also used to head. The government sought to recover B$25.8 billion but the matter was settled out of court in May 2000 with an agreement that all assets acquired with funds derived from the BIA and under the control of Prince Jefri and his family be returned to the agency.

Brunei's economic tribulations came to a head during the peak of economic crisis within South-East Asia compounded in its case by the relatively low world oil price. By the turn of the century that price had recovered significantly to Brunei's advantage. In the past, the huge resources at the disposal of the state, which gave it (at US$25,000) one of the highest

average per capita incomes in the world, enabled the introduction of a unique system of social welfare. Free education and health care as well as guaranteed pensions and housing have been provided on a generous basis but have been under review because of changing economic circumstances. Economic planning has concentrated on developing alternative forms of employment to the energy industry and government service in the interest of political stability but with very limited success. In July 2000, radical economic reforms were announced in an attempt to broaden the revenue base before oil and gas reserves run out in twenty-five years.

The government of Brunei is literally a family business with the sultan as prime minister as well as holding the portfolios of finance and defence. One brother, Prince **Mohamed Bolkiah**, has been foreign minister since January 1984, while Prince Jefri was finance minister until his dismissal in 1998. During British protection, the current Sultan's father, the late Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, was persuaded to introduce a measure of democracy. Elections in September 1962 gave a majority of elective seats to the radical **People's Party** (*Partai Ra'ayat*) with links to the Indonesia of President **Sukarno**. In December 1962, after the Sultan had refused to convene the Legislative Council, the People's Party led by **A. M. Azahari**, launched a revolt, which was put down through British military intervention from Singapore. Brunei has been ruled by decree ever since without any reversion to electoral politics and with all political parties effectively proscribed. Moreover, in order to hold off British pressure for democratization, Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin abdicated in favour of his son Hassanal Bolkiah in October 1967 shortly before he was due to graduate from the British Military Academy at Sandhurst. Sir Omar remained a powerful and decisive influence behind the throne until his death in 1986. Following his father's death, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah sought to throw off the playboy image depicted in western media and to demonstrate a seriousness of political purpose in the absence of political change. Despite the neo-conservatism associated with the sultan, expressed in a ban on the public consumption of alchohol in January 1991, social delinquency has grown among a young unemployed sector. The vulnerability of monarchical rule is well understood in royal circles, especially to a military coup arising from social discontent. For that reason, the armed forces, on whom some 10 per cent of the national budget is spent, are well paid and provided for in modern equipment. The officer corps is also monitored and personal interests balanced in a way that ensures loyalty. Since the revolt was crushed in 1962, a battalion of British Gurkha Rifles had been deployed in the sultanate on rotation from their brigade headquarters in Hong Kong under a secret exchange of letters, ostensibly in a training role. In addition, the sultanate recruits an additional battalion of retired Gurkhas directly from Nepal. These forces serve as a deterrent against any challenge by rebellious elements.

In September 1984, shortly after independence, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations maintaining: 'We wish to be left alone and free from foreign intervention'. Brunei had been reluctant to assume full independence from Britain because of an acute sense of vulnerability arising from experience of hostile relations with both Indonesia and Malaysia. At one stage, Brunei had contemplated joining the Federation of Malaysia on its inception in 1963 but decided against political union. The **Brunei Revolt** had served as Indonesia's pretext for its campaign of **Confrontation**, while, during the mid-1970s, Malaysia had sought to destabilize the sultanate in part to consolidate its control in northern Borneo. It was only in the late 1970s that the evident cohesion of **ASEAN** (Association of South-East Asian Nations), to which Indonesia and Malaysia were strongly committed, encouraged Brunei to assume full independence and place its security in membership of ASEAN; which was openly pledged to uphold the sanctity of national sovereignty. Even then, independence was accomplished through a treaty of friendship with Britain in 1979 which contained a unique five-year grace period before the transfer of full sovereign status in January 1984. On independence, Brunei joined the Commonwealth and the Organization of the Islamic Conference as well as the United Nations and

ASEAN. It also participated in **APEC** from its advent in 1989 and the **ASEAN Regional Forum** (ARF) and the **Asia–Europe Meeting** (ASEM) from their respective inceptions in 1993 and 1996. Diplomatic relations have been gradually expanded beyond Britain, the United States, ASEAN and other major powers to the Islamic world and the People's Republic of China. Tensions still obtain with Malaysia, with whom Brunei is in dispute in its **Limbang Claim**: the district of Limbang was incorporated into Sarawak in 1890 after Britain's protectorate had been established. In addition, there are differences with Malaysia over maritime jurisdiction in Brunei Bay and also with China and Vietnam over corresponding jurisdiction within that part of the sea-space within the **Spratly Islands** which falls within Brunei's continental shelf. Among its neighbours, Brunei has enjoyed a special relationship with Singapore with which a common vulnerability over size and location has been shared. Singapore bases an infantry battalion in the Temburong enclave, while military exercises are conducted with Australian forces. Relations have improved significantly with Indonesia, which has assumed a protective regional role, while an underlying coolness remains in the relationship with Malaysia. A residual relationship has been maintained with Britain, which still plays an important role in training and servicing the Royal Brunei Armed Forces. An agreement to deploy the Gurkhas beyond 1998 was concluded between the Sultan and Britain's prime minister in London in December 1994, when they also signed a memorandum on defence sales. In addition, limited military links have been established with the United States.

see also: APEC; ARF; ASEAN; ASEM; Azahari, A. M.; Bolkiah, Hassanal; Bolkiah, Mohamed; Brunei Revolt 1962; Confrontation; Islam; Limbang Claim; *Melayu Islam Beraja*; People's Party; Spratly Islands.

Burma/Myanmar

Burma is the second largest country in South-East Asia with an area of 676,000 square kilometres. It is situated to the east of India and Bangladesh, to the south-west of the People's Republic of China and to the west of Laos and Thailand. Its coastline extends from Bangladesh to Thailand and fronts the Bay of Bengal. The country has a population of over 50 million, the vast majority of whom are devotees of Theravada **Buddhism**. A host of ethnic minorities, long disaffected from the central government, inhabit a horseshoe-like zone around the northern periphery of the state. Burma's primarily agricultural economy has not advanced beyond its condition under colonialism. Indeed, for some forty years, it has regressed economically in the charge of a military junta for whom power has become an end in itself reflected in defence expenditure consuming a third of the annual budget. In reconstituted form since 1988, that junta attempted to open the county to foreign investment and trade, in particular from the early 1990s but with only superficial success. The initial momentum of foreign investment has been reversed, partly as a consequence of external sanctions driven by a deplorable human rights record and evidence that the regime is engaged in narcotics production and trafficking. By the end of the decade, a World Bank study exposed the full depths of the country's economic malaise, including rising inflation and poverty as well as a high level of child malnutrition, which was attributed to incompetent management by the military regime. Its recommendation that major political and human rights were required before economic development could proceed fell on deaf ears in Rangoon.

Burma has been ruled continuously by a military regime since March 1962 when the armed forces, led by General **Ne Win**, seized power. In September 1998, in response to a popular challenge put down with great violence and bloodletting, Ne Win having abdicated formal responsibility in the previous July, the military government transformed itself into the **State Law and Order Restoration Council** (SLORC). In November 1997, SLORC was replaced by the **State Peace and Development Council** (SPDC). The change in nomenclature and in implied orientation did not change the substance of military despotism. Political opposition has been ruthlessly repressed, including the use of torture, while a continuing practice of forced labour led to Burma's being censured within the International Labour Organization in June 2000. On 18 June 1989, the name of the state was changed from the Socialist Republic of Burma to *Myanmar Naingngan*, which is a direct transliteration in English meaning Union of Peoples. The English spelling of the capital Rangoon was changed to Yangon. Under a draft constitution approved in April 1994 by a national convention but not yet in force, Burma will become known as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

Burma was colonized by Britain from the early nineteenth century and was accorded a limited form of self-government only in the late 1930s, when it was separated from the administration of India against a background of nationalist challenge. It was occupied by the Japanese during the Pacific War with the support of Burmese nationalists, who in 1943 were accorded a nominal independence. When it became apparent that the Japanese were going to lose the war, the Burma National Army rebelled against its military mentors in support of the Allied cause. Burma attained full independence in January 1948 after the British Labour Party administration had revised its gradualist timetable in the light of the demonstrable support enjoyed by the **Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League**, the militant nationalist movement led by **Aung San**. Initially self-styled as the Union of Burma, its governments have struggled to overcome the centrifugal political pull of its ethnically diverse population. Geography has combined with ethnicity to obstruct the reach of central power. The majority of Burmans adhere to Theravada Buddhism, as do some of the ethnic minorities, who also observe **Islam** and Christianity.

Burma began independence as a parliamentary democracy in inauspicious circumstances.

Nationalist leader Aung San had come to an agreement in January 1947 with the British government for the transfer of sovereignty a year later but in July 1947 he was assassinated together with six cabinet colleagues in a plot mounted by a political rival. Independence went ahead on 4 January 1948 with **U Nu** as prime minister. From independence, Burma was subject to violent internal upheaval as the government in Rangoon was confronted with insurrection by two Communist and a number of ethnic-minority insurgencies challenging both the identity and the constitutional arrangements of the new state. The ethnic minorities (including the Arakanese, **Chin, Kachin, Shan** and **Karen**) were distributed in concentrations around the northern perimeter of the country from east to south-west and tensions between them and the Burman majority had been inflamed during the Pacific War. These mixed challenges were contained by the early 1950s, in part because of the inability of the opponents of the central government to unite among themselves and also because of the success of the Burmese army in putting them down.

Because of its roots in the nationalist movement against both the British and the Japanese, the army led by General Ne Win displayed a sense of political entitlement which came to affect the future of the country. Violent challenge to the state and its integrity was succeeded by ferocious factional fighting within the ruling political party. It was to repair this situation that in July 1958, the prime minister, U Nu, invited General Ne Win to form a caretaker government and to prepare the country for fresh elections. Power was returned to civilian government in March 1960. With the electoral success of his faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, U Nu resumed office as prime minister. In March 1962, however, Ne Win mounted a coup in response to concessions by the government to the insurgent ethnic minorities and set up a Revolutionary Council to run the country.

Under military rule, the country became committed to an ersatz ideology called the **Burmese Way to Socialism**, which was a potted version of Marxist and Buddhist formulae. The declared purpose of the undertaking was Burma's development on an autonomous basis. In July 1962 the Revolutionary Council established the **Burma Socialist Programme Party** (BSPP) with the mission to realize the Burmese Way to Socialism. All other parties were abolished, while the BSPP served as the political arm of the army. In 1974 a new constitution was promulgated, the BSPP was opened up to a mass membership and the name of the state was changed to the Socialist Republic of Burma, with Ne Win in the office of president. Ne Win stepped down in November 1981 but remained in control as chairman of the BSPP. These changes in political form did nothing to arrest a relentless economic decline as the dogma, bureaucracy and corruption of the so-called Burmese Way to Socialism, combined with a policy of international isolation, affected the availability and distribution of basic goods in a country rich with natural resources and once regarded as the rice-bowl of South-East Asia. In addition, the cost of containing the disparate insurgencies served to bring the country closer to economic collapse. For a decade and a half, this continuing decline did not lead to any political reaction beyond the ready control of the military. However, acute economic crisis was signalled in 1987, when the government in Rangoon applied to the United Nations for Burma to be accorded the status of 'least developed country' in order to secure grants in aid.

Burma erupted in political turmoil when the government adopted desperate measures to cope with a deteriorating economy. Demonetization of larger currency notes in circulation in September 1987 provoked student unrest which exploded in demonstrations and violence in March 1988. This challenge was matched by ruthless military repression, which came to a head in August and September. In the interim, Ne Win resigned as chairman of the BSPP in July but failed to stem popular protest which responded to the inspiring leadership provided by **Aung San Suu Kyi**, the daughter of national hero Aung San, who had returned to Burma coincidentally to nurse her ailing mother. On 18 September 1988 the army chief of staff, General Saw Maung, assumed power on behalf of the military in an incumbency coup marking the culmination of an awesome bloodletting. All state organs were abolished by the new junta,

which styled itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The country was placed under martial law but SLORC promised that multi-party elections would be held for a constituent assembly. In the mean time, all references to the Burmese Way to Socialism disappeared from public pronouncements, while the junta sought foreign exchange to buy arms by according foreign entrepreneurs logging and fishing rights.

Political parties were allowed to register during 1989. Although more than two hundred emerged, only a handful of any significance were formed, above all, the **National League for Democracy** (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi. She was placed under house arrest in July 1989 just prior to the anniversary of the period of bloodletting in 1988. Nonetheless, the National League for Democracy won an overwhelming electoral victory at the polls in May 1990 over the **National Unity Party**, which was the political reincarnation of the BSPP. The constituent assembly in the form of a National Convention was not convened until 1993, however, while the position of the National League for Democracy was undermined through contrived expulsions, including that of Aung San Suu Kyi, who was kept in incarceration. SLORC's attempt to discredit her nationally and internationally was thwarted when she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1991. However, despite almost universal condemnation of its appalling human rights record, the ruling junta has held on to power, with Ne Win apparently influential in the background despite his ailing condition.

General Saw Maung stepped down as head of SLORC in April 1992, believed to be suffering from mental disorder, to be succeeded by General **Than Shwe**, who also assumed the office of prime minister. However, Ne Win's close confidant and head of intelligence as well as SLORC's first secretary, General **Khin Nyunt**, has been regarded as the more powerful figure and his proxy. He inspired the inauguration of the constituent assembly or National Convention in Rangoon in January 1993 suitably purged of dissident political elements. It took over a year of intermittent meetings before the armed forces were able to have their own way over a draft constitution promulgated in January 1994 but without the National Convention completing its work. At issue had been the insistence of the armed forces that the constitution make provision for their leading political role in a corresponding way to the amended terms of Indonesia's constitution. The draft constitution stipulated that the country's executive president, his or her parents, spouse and children must not be citizens or entitled to the rights or privileges of another state and must also have lived in Burma continuously for at least twenty years prior to election. This provision would disqualify Aung San Suu Kyi, whose late husband was a British citizen, who returned to Burma only in 1988. She was released unexpectedly from detention in July 1995 but without any other political concessions by SLORC. A boycott of the National Convention in November 1995 by the NLD had no political impact.

An ability to reinforce power at the centre has been matched with an increasing assertion of state power against dissident ethnic minorities. The revolt of northern Wa tribesmen against ethnic-Chinese dominance of the Communist Party in the late 1980s enabled the Rangoon government to exercise greater control over the flow of opium and military supplies to rebel minorities. Such control has been facilitated by effective cooperation with the government in Beijing, which has been a major source of arms transfers but in return for access to intelligence facilities in the Andaman Sea. In October 1993 a cease-fire was concluded with the Kachin Independence Army, regarded as the most significant of the insurgent groupings fighting against the government, which was formalized in February 1994. This accord meant that the armed forces could concentrate their efforts against the Karen and the Shan rebels to great military effect. By 1996, the government in Rangoon had effectively turned the tide of battle against the country's ethnic insurgencies, although armed resistance has been sustained by the Karen minority.

In foreign relations, Burma had been an early advocate of non-alignment, being represented at the historic **Asian-African Conference** in Bandung in 1955 and at the founding conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in 1961. Indeed, a passionate anti-colonialism had

prevented membership of the Commonwealth in advance of the arrangement made to accommodate India, which as an independent republic could not pledge loyalty to the British Crown. The military regime which assumed power in 1962 maintained the same commitment to non-alignment which complemented the aims of the Burmese Way to Socialism. The commitment did not prevent the development of a close association with northern neighbour China. That relationship was never allowed to become unduly deferential, however. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, Burma displayed a testy independence in response to evident intimidation. In September 1979 at the summit meeting in Havana, Burma withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement on the ground that it had ceased to be neutral enough under Cuba's chairmanship, which claimed a special relationship for the Soviet Union. However, international reaction to SLORC's violation of human rights, especially against its Muslim minority, caused the government in Rangoon to revise its view by the time of the Non-Aligned Summit in Jakarta in September 1992. Repressive action in 1992 against the Muslim **Rohingyas** minority in Arakan Province bordering Bangladesh drew condemnation from Islamic states, which Burma sought to counter by securing readmission to the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, Burma has been able to attract China's support as both an arms supplier and a patron of a kind, willing to help contain international criticism of its brutal repressive regime in return for extensive economic opportunities. China is also developing communication facilities which will enable direct physical access from its borders to the Indian Ocean while an extensive Chinese business/migrant presence has been established in upper Burma. The government of Thailand has been the most active among **ASEAN** (Association of South-East Asian Nations) states in practising the association's policy of constructive engagement viewed as more appropriate than one of shunning the Rangoon regime. In consequence, a Burmese delegation was invited by the Thai government to attend as guests at the annual meeting of ASEAN's foreign ministers held in Bangkok in July 1994. Equivalent status was accorded in July 1995 in Brunei when Burma's foreign minister signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and at the Bangkok Summit in December 1995, attended by Prime Minister Than Shwe. Singapore has been even more forthcoming with a visit to Rangoon by its prime minister, **Goh Chok Tong**, in March 1994. His appearance in the Burmese capital marked only the second visit by a head of government since SLORC assumed power. The prime minister of Laos had visited the country in 1992. Despite the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, western countries including the United States have continued to treat Burma as a political outcast. Burma joined the **ASEAN Regional Forum** (ARF) in August 1996 and ASEAN in July 1997 but without its government making any substantive concessions to Aung San Suu Kyi and her followers, who have been marginalized politically. Burma's integration within ASEAN has given rise to difficulties between the Association and some of its dialogue partners. For example, the European Union has denied visas to senior members of the military junta and refused to engage in multilateral meetings until a compromise agreement with the EU in August 2000.

The military government in Burma rules without consent but retains its position because of a caste-like sense of identity and loyalty among the officer corps and a system of patronage which ensures that commands to rank-and-file troops to fire on unarmed demonstrators are obeyed without dissent. One key to the political future of the country is the mortality of General Ne Win, who despite his advancing years and ailing physical condition remains the ultimate authority, like an oriental Stalin. Political change can only follow his death but will not be guaranteed by it.

see also: Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League; ASEAN; ASEAN Regional Forum; Aung San; Aung San Suu Kyi; Bangkok Summit 1995; Buddhism; Burma Socialist Programme Party; Burmese Way to Socialism; Chin; Kachin; Karen; Khin Nyunt; Khun Sa; National League for Democracy; National Unity Party; Ne Win; Nu, U; Rohingyas; Shan; State Law and Order Restoration Council; State Peace and Development Council; Than Shwe; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 1976.

Cambodia, Kingdom of

Cambodia is situated in the central-south of the Indochina peninsula and is 181,000 square kilometres in size. Its population numbers around 11 million and adheres in the main to the Theravada branch of **Buddhism**, which overlays an historically prior Hindu culture that still plays an important part in informing political traditions. A location to the west of Vietnam and to the east of Thailand has been an important factor in a turbulent and painful political experience since effective independence from French rule in 1954. Cambodia's location drew it into the **Vietnam War** at the end of which, in April 1975, the country descended into barbarism under the murderous rule of a local communist movement, the **Khmer Rouge**. That rule was overturned through an invasion by Vietnam in December 1978, which established a client government that endured changing form in the face of international ostracism to participate in a fragile coalition government with UN endorsement in October 1993. That coalition was displaced through a violent coup in July 1997 to leave government exclusively in the hands of **Hun Sen**, who had defected from the Khmer Rouge in the late 1970s and who had been prime minister under the Vietnamese-sponsored regime. His stable, albeit authoritarian, rule was confirmed by internationally-endorsed elections in July 1998.

Cambodia had become a protectorate of France in the mid-nineteenth century, which had the inadvertent consequence of preserving a separate identity from rapacious neighbours, especially the Vietnamese. The French restored Cambodia's historical monuments from the glorious Angkor period, which served to generate a sense of ethnic and cultural pride but hardly brought the country into the modern world. The French ruled Cambodia through the legitimizing vehicle of the royal family, preserving the institution of monarchy in the process. In 1941 they returned the title of king to the senior branch of the royal family in favour of **Norodom Sihanouk**, then in his late teens. It was assumed that he would be a pliant instrument of colonial rule, then subject to the authority of the government in Vichy. It was a gross miscalculation which had failed to take account of his innate ability to exploit the aura of monarchy among a predominantly peasant population which regarded him as semi-divine.

Cambodian politics after the end of the Pacific War was marked by factional struggles, which King Norodom Sihanouk overcame to personal advantage. The origins of those contemporary factions may be traced to the modest opening of the political system by the French on the restoration of their rule following the brief wartime interregnum inspired by the Japanese. In simple terms, these factions represented royalist, republican and revolutionary interests, with the latter enjoying support initially from the insurgent Vietnamese Communists. King Norodom Sihanouk exploited the aura of monarchy and French failure to restore colonial authority to outmanoeuvre his republican and revolutionary opponents. Through political theatre, he was able to claim the credit for France conceding independence in November 1953. After that independence had acquired international recognition with the **Geneva Agreements on Indochina** in July 1954, he went on to divest himself of the form of monarchy while retaining its substance. In order to enjoy full political freedom, he abdicated the throne in favour of his father Norodom Suramarit, reverting to the title of prince. He ruled the Kingdom of Cambodia as a populist but ruthless leader in part through the vehicle of ***Sangkum Reastre Niyum*** (Popular Socialist Community), a mass movement subject to his manipulation. Prince Sihanouk became head of state after the death of his father in April 1960 but was removed from power by a military coup in March 1970.

Prince Sihanouk's commitment to neutrality in foreign policy had served to keep Cambodia out of the Vietnam War until Communist use of his country's territory provided a pretext for his republican opponents to oust him when he

was visiting the Soviet Union. Cambodia then experienced five years of civil war, becoming the **Khmer Republic** under the leadership of Marshal **Lon Nol**, who proved to be incompetent and corrupt. Prince Sihanouk went into exile in Beijing where he established a united front in opposition to the new regime in Phnom Penh. He was joined in this front by a revolutionary faction led by a close-knit group of Cambodian intellectuals who had developed a salvationist ideology as students in France in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the local Communist Party espoused Stalinist dogma. The Khmer Rouge, as Prince Sihanouk had labelled them in a differentiation from the right-wing Khmer *Bleu*, were only a limited insurgency by the late 1960s. The overthrow of Prince Sihanouk changed matters, however, because of the threat which the coup appeared to pose to the revolutionary interests of Vietnam's Communists. They then invaded Cambodia to destroy Lon Nol's army and extracted the administration of the eastern part of the country from the government in Phnom Penh, within which they assisted the Khmer Rouge to become a formidable military force. Aided by association with Prince Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge fought their way to power by mid-April 1975 just two weeks before the fall of Saigon.

The Khmer Rouge under the leadership of the notorious **Pol Pot** subjected the people of Cambodia to a terrible ordeal in the name of revolutionary idealism between April 1975 and the end of 1978. They sought the total transformation of Cambodian society by murdering its political and religious elite and by driving the inhabitants of the towns into the countryside, where they engaged in a primitive and punishing agriculture. The failure of this crude collectivization by the newly named state of **Democratic Kampuchea** generated paranoid intra-party purges as treachery was deemed to be its cause, especially on behalf of the Vietnamese depicted as historical enemies and not ideological soul-mates. Military interventions into southern Vietnam in the late 1970s together with a tacit alliance with China caused the government in Hanoi to respond with *force majeure*. The Vietnamese invaded Cambodia on 25 December 1978 (as the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation) and by early January 1979 had established a new government of their own fabrication in ostensible charge of the **People's Republic of Kampuchea**. Prince Sihanouk, who had returned to Cambodia to experience house arrest, was able to leave the country on a Chinese aircraft and to go on from Beijing to the United Nations in New York to condemn both his jailors and the Vietnamese occupiers.

The Vietnamese invasion revealed the full extent of the horrors inflicted on the Cambodian people with an estimate of at least 1 million dead through execution, overwork, malnutrition and disease. Nonetheless, the new government in Phnom Penh failed to receive full international recognition. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia had taken place with the support of the Soviet Union and therefore was treated as a dimension of both Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet antagonisms. With the backing of a group of states in coalition which wished to reverse Vietnam's occupation, Cambodia was returned to civil war. The remnant of the Khmer Rouge army was given sanctuary in Thailand, where it was restored through Chinese military aid. Non-Communist factions, representing royalist and republican interests, emerged under freebooting leaderships but in June 1982 a coalition of all anti-Vietnamese factions was set up under the auspices of **ASEAN** (Association of South-East Asian Nations) which had assumed diplomatic responsibility for challenging Vietnam. That so-called **Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea** (CGDK), which served to register the international legitimacy of the Khmer Rouge, held together while Vietnam's circumstances changed adversely. Economic failure and the loss of Soviet countervailing power obliged it to withdraw its main force units in September 1989 and to leave the government in Phnom Penh to its own devices.

After a protracted diplomacy, an **International Conference on Cambodia** in Paris concluded an accord in October 1991 whereby the United Nations would assume responsibility for implementing a peace plan tied to general elections in 1993. The United Nations became involved when it had been demonstrated that the warring Cambodian factions were unwilling to come to terms. They did agree on establishing

a **Supreme National Council** under Prince Sihanouk's chairmanship as a formal repository of sovereignty which would delegate powers to **UNTAC** (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) with a supervisory role in administration and responsibilities for peacekeeping and conducting elections. That ambitious undertaking geared to establishing a neutral political environment which would permit popular choice to determine the country's future ran into early difficulty. The Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate with UNTAC in disarming and demobilizing their forces and in permitting access to its zones of control for registration of voters and actively harassed UN personnel. Their initial expectations of the collapse of the government in Phnom Penh had proved mistaken so they refused to participate in an electoral process seen as stacked against them. They charged that UNTAC had failed to verify the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and called for the replacement of the Phnom Penh administration by the Supreme National Council. They were prepared to participate in elections only if they would serve to advance their prospect of resuming power. The government in Phnom Penh engaged in lesser acts of violence in attempts to intimidate the faction nominally led by Prince **Norodom Ranariddh**, Prince Sihanouk's eldest son, which had attracted popular support. Those contending factions with force at their disposal were bent on abusing the rules of the electoral game in their own interest.

By early 1993, the Paris agreement appeared to be in serious jeopardy. The Khmer Rouge had called for a boycott of the elections, which they seemed determined to disrupt through acts of violence. Nonetheless, UNTAC went ahead with the elections as scheduled during 23–8 May, which were conducted surprisingly without serious disruption, despite intimidation of opponents by the **Cambodian People's Party** (CPP). Some 4.6 million voters had been registered, of whom nearly 90 per cent cast their ballots in a poll which the United Nations Security Council judged to have been free and fair. **FUNCINPEC** (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh won a narrow plurality with 58 seats in the Constituent Assembly of 120 members. The incumbent government's Cambodian People's Party secured 51, while the **Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party** obtained 10 seats.

The CPP contested the outcome, threatening territorial secession in eastern provinces; UNTAC stood firm but conceded a provisional coalition government, while the Constituent Assembly set about drafting a new constitution. That constitution, which reinstated the monarchy, was promulgated by Norodom Sihanouk on 24 September 1993. He was then enthroned nearly four decades after he had abdicated the throne. A new government was not announced until the end of October because of factional divisions within the CPP over how to cope with its political failure. Prince Ranariddh and the former prime minister, **Hun Sen**, became First and Second prime ministers respectively in a fragile coalition sustained from a common fear of the Khmer Rouge and of a loss of external assistance. Control of the armed forces and the police remained with the CPP, whose dominant position in the rural administration had not been challenged, despite the greater electoral success of FUNCINPEC.

The last UN peacekeepers left the country towards the end of 1993 with Cambodia displaying a measure of political stability beyond all expectations. That stability was illusory because of tensions within and between the component parties of the ruling coalition pointed up by an abortive coup in July 1994. The practice of coalition government pivoted initially on a working relationship between prime ministers Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen at the expense of the short-lived senior political position of FUNCINPEC attained through its electoral performance. Effective administrative and military power remained with the Cambodian People's Party, with the security forces at times a greater threat to law and order than even the Khmer Rouge, which had become a marginal factor in national politics. Corruption became endemic and attempts to curb it met with opposition from the political centre because of a need to reward and sustain key constituencies of support. For example, Finance Minister Sam Rainsy was dismissed in October 1994 because of his persistence in seek-

ing to eliminate corruption. He continued his campaign out of office and was stripped of his membership of FUNCINPEC before being expelled from the National Assembly in June 1995 without debate or vote. More draconian measures, inspired by Hun Sen, were taken against Foreign Minister Prince Norodom Sirivudh, who was imprisoned on a trumped-up charge of attempted assassination after being removed from office. Other human rights abuses and draconian press laws, on top of the murder and intimidation of journalists, pointed to the distance that Cambodia had travelled within only a few years since UNTAC had conducted free and fair elections in May 1993. By 1997, the working relationship between Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen had broken down with both sides competing to solicit defections from the Khmer Rouge. That issue served as a pretext for Hun Sen to seize power through a violent coup in Phnom Penh in July 1997, while Norodom Ranariddh was out of the country. That coup effectively ended coalition government to the advantage of the Cambodian People's Party, although its form was maintained with Foreign Minister Ung Huot assuming the office of First Prime Minister in place of Norodom Ranariddh. In the event, Prince Ranariddh and other FUNCINPEC exiles were prevailed upon to return to Cambodia to participate in elections in July 1998, which were supervised up to a point by international monitors. Those elections were won unsurprisingly by the Cambodian People's Party after which Hun Sen assumed the exclusive office of prime minister with Norodom Ranariddh relegated to chair the National Assembly. An ageing and ailing Norodom Sihanouk played a role in brokering an agreement whereby a new coalition government was formed in November 1998 but without any effective sharing of power, which had become concentrated in the ruthless hands of Hun Sen.

Ironically, the Khmer Rouge were unable to benefit from the degeneration of Cambodian politics after the advent of the coalition government in October 1993. The outcome of the UN-supervised elections in the previous May was a political defeat for them with defections ensuing. Initially, they controlled swathes of territory around Cambodia's periphery and about 10 per cent of its population. The coalition government in Phnom Penh mounted military actions against their positions in the west of the country in early 1994 without a conclusive outcome. Talks on national reconciliation in June 1994 failed; the Khmer Rouge were outlawed by the National Assembly in July. The Khmer Rouge responded by proclaiming a provisional government with **Khieu Samphan** as prime minister, while still acknowledging Norodom Sihanouk as king. Their military and political fortunes dwindled, however. A major blow to their credibility was the defection in August 1996 of **Ieng Sary**, a one-time deputy prime minister of Democratic Kampuchea and brother-in-law of Pol Pot. The final act to the tragic saga of the Khmer Rouge involved characteristic self-destruction. In June 1997, Pol Pot ordered the murder of his former defence minister, **Son Sen**, and members of his family, in an attempt to prevent a deal with the Phnom Penh government. He was then detained and sentenced to life imprisonment by a 'people's court' in July. He died in April 1998 in a remote jungle base, apparently of a heart attack. The final surrender of Khmer Rouge forces took place in December 1998 ending any prospect of a return to a murderous rule, whose legacy casts a continuing shadow over Cambodia.

After October 1993, despite persisting tensions with immediate neighbours Thailand and Vietnam, Cambodia sought regional integration through engagement with ASEAN. On signing the Association's **Treaty of Amity and Cooperation** in 1995, it became an observer at annual meetings of foreign ministers and also joined the **ASEAN Regional Forum** (ARF). Cambodia was expected to join ASEAN towards the end of July 1997, together with Burma and Laos, at a meeting of foreign ministers commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of its formation. The violent coup in Phnom Penh earlier in the month caused political embarrassment to ASEAN whose governments decided to postpone Cambodia's entry. Membership was attained only in April 1999 after fresh elections and a new government in Cambodia. Although Cambodia has been confirmed in its membership of ASEAN, its government has participated in an alignment of Indochinese states reminis-

cent of a pattern of relations during the 1980s when the country was subject to Vietnam's tutelage. In October 1999, Prime Minister Hun Sen took part in a meeting in Vientiane with counterparts from Laos and Vietnam at which they stressed the need to further strengthen their traditional solidarity.

see also: ASEAN; ASEAN Regional Forum; Bangkok Summit 1995; Buddhism; Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party; Cambodian People's Party; Democratic Kampuchea; Democratic Kampuchea, Coalition Government of; Domino Theory; FUNCINPEC; Geneva Agreements on Indochina 1954; Hun Sen; Ieng Sary; Indochina Wars; International Conference on Cambodia, Paris 1991; Kampuchea, People's Republic of; Khieu Sampan; Khmer Republic; Khmer Rouge; Missing in Action; Nol, Lon; Pol Pot; Ranariddh, Norodom; *Sangkum Reastre Niyum*; Sihanouk, Norodom; Son Sen; Supreme National Council; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 1976; United Nations: Cambodia 1991–3; UNTAC; Vietnam War.

Indonesia, Republic of

The Republic of Indonesia is the largest and most populous country in South-East Asia. It comprises a distended archipelago of some 13,000 islands that extend from south of the Indian sub-continent to north of Australia; the most sizeable and important of which are Sumatra, Java (on which is located the capital Jakarta), the major portion of Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawesi (Celebes) and **Irian Jaya** (West New Guinea). They comprise a land area of almost 2 million square kilometres. Its population of around 210 million is the fourth largest after China, India and the United States. Some 90 per cent of its citizens profess an adherence to **Islam** and constitute statistically the largest Muslim community in the world. The degree of religious observance varies, however, and orthodox Islamic practice is diluted and combined regionally with underlying Hindu–Buddhist and animist traditions. Islam has been denied a prerogative place in political life through a state philosophy, ***Pancasila***, which was enunciated before independence by the country's first president, **Sukarno**. *Pancasila* enjoins all Indonesians to believe in a single deity but permits them to worship any god of their choice. This philosophy was introduced initially in the interests of religious and cultural tolerance but was then exploited to serve the cause of political demobilization during the authoritarian rule of the country's second president, and former general, **Suharto**. An Islamic revival encouraged from the late 1980s for political advantage found expression in sectarian conflict between Muslims and the country's Christian minority from the late 1990s attendant on an acute economic adversity, which paved the way for the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998. A transitional rule under his constitutional successor, Vice-President **Habibie** enabled a return to democratic practice, which was followed by the election in October 1999 of **Abdurrahman Wahid** as Indonesia's fourth president. Although Indonesia is a unitary republic, a law came into effect in January 2001 that gave provincial administrations greater autonomy in education, health, land rights and transport policies as well as investment approvals.

Indonesia is a unitary republic without historical antecedent within its contemporary territorial bounds, which were established by a waxing Dutch colonial rule from the end of the sixteenth century. Independence was proclaimed by Sukarno and Vice-President **Hatta** on 17 August 1945 shortly after a cruel Japanese occupation from March 1942. Full international status was attained only on 27 December 1949 after a bitter national revolutionary struggle against the returning colonial Dutch, who refused to transfer the western half of the island of New Guinea. Their abortive attempt to undermine the integrity of the revolutionary republic through exploiting the cultural diversity of the archipelago left an abiding apprehension of foreign intervention among the country's political elite. Indonesian independence began with the practice of parliamentary democracy which was marked by fragile coalition governments and regional rebellion. In July 1959 President Sukarno set aside the parliamentary constitution with military support and imposed a **Guided Democracy** by restoring the revolutionary constitution which provided for an executive presidency. This political system was distinguished by intense competition between Sukarno, the armed forces and the large Communist Party of Indonesia. A conventional non-alignment in foreign policy was set aside in favour of membership of radical **New Emerging Forces** ranged against so-called **Old Established Forces** in company with the People's Republic of China. Sukarno embarked on a policy of coercive diplomacy (self-styled as **Confrontation**) which was successful in recovering the western half of New Guinea from Dutch control in 1963. Confrontation was employed again in an abortive attempt to thwart and then to dismantle the Federation of Malaysia. Indonesia left the United Nations in January 1965 in pique at its

failure when Malaysia was elected to a non-permanent seat on the Security Council.

In October 1965 an abortive coup (*see* ***Gestapu***) attributed to the Communist Party paved the way to a fundamental change in Indonesia's political system and priorities. The circumstances of the coup discredited Sukarno and enabled the armed forces led by Major-General Suharto with Muslim support to take violent measures against the Communists and their alleged supporters. On 11 March 1966 Sukarno was obliged to transfer executive authority (***Supersemar***) to Suharto, promoted to lt-general, who became acting president in the following year. Confirmed as president in March 1968, Suharto held office continuously with military support for over three decades. He secured re-election for a seventh successive term in March 1998 but was obliged to give up office within two months against a background of social and political unrest generated by economic collapse. For the most part, however, his authoritarian rule had provided a stable background for notable economic development, which rested initially on the exploitation of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas. Foreign direct investment enabled that process of development to extend to manufacturing for export generating high levels of growth. However, with accelerated development came a culture of corruption to the advantage, in particular, of Suharto's close family and business circle. The attendant structural weaknesses in the economy were exposed with the onset of devastating economic crises from the late 1990s.

Under President Suharto's proclaimed **New Order**, political participation was strictly controlled, while the media were subject to draconian controls. Parliamentary elections were resumed in 1971 but political parties were compelled to merge into two groupings entitled to canvass popular support only every five years. The government revived an association of functional groups, ***Golkar***, to serve as its electoral vehicle. *Golkar* secured approximately two-thirds of the votes cast in parliamentary elections between 1971 and 1997 but lost support dramatically after the political downfall of Suharto. Members of Parliament and political nominees, including representatives of the armed forces, made up the constitutionally supreme **People's Consultative Assembly**, which re-elected Suharto to a seventh consecutive five-year term of office in March 1998. Suharto had previously assumed the title of 'father of development' in a demonstration of his claim to legitimacy. By that juncture, however, Indonesia was deep in economic crisis. Suharto appeared determined to soldier on to the end of his term and had secured the appointment of Dr B. J. Habibie as vice-president on the assumption that he would be a politically unwelcome successor. In the event, a reluctance to meet the economic priorities of the International Monetary Fund served to accelerate the process of economic crisis, which gave rise to serious social and political unrest in Jakarta, in particular, including anti-Chinese violence. The catalyst in generating political change was a student-led activism, which was met by force from the security services killing four students at Trisakti University in Jakarta. It was in this turbulent context that Suharto found himself unable to reconstitute his cabinet and without the support of the armed forces leadership decided to resign on 21 May 1998. The end of his personalized quasi-monarchical rule left a political vacuum distinguished by the absence of viable national economic and legal institutions.

He was succeeded by Vice-President Habibie who restored the practice of democracy but attempted to use it to secure a fresh term of office. With the restoration of democracy, there was an explosion in the number of political parties. Forty-eight of them contested parliamentary elections in June 1999. The most successful was the **Indonesian Democratic Party (Struggle)** (PDI-P), which secured approximately 154 of 462 elective seats. It was led by **Megawati Sukarnoputri**, the daughter of the republic's first president. The PDI was one of three legal parties during Suharto's rule but PDI-P was its prevailing faction. A much diminished and divided *Golkar* came second with 120 seats. In third place with 58 seats, in alliance with smaller parties, was the Islamic **United Development Party** (PPP), another legal party from the Suharto era. Fifth with 51 seats was the **National Awakening Party**, which was new in

form but represented the interests of the moderate-Islamic ***Nahdatul Ulama*** and its leader Abdurrahman Wahid, which had once been a constituent part of the PPP. The ostensibly constitutionalist but modernist-Islamic **National Mandate Party** with 35 seats came last among the more successful participants. With the exception of the Islamic Crescent Star Party with 14 seats, 13 other parties secured 6 seats or less each.

The parliamentary elections placed Megawati as front runner for president. President Habibie faced resistance from a progressive wing within *Golkar* and was tainted politically by his close association with the Suharto regime. His political prospects were damaged irretrievably by a scandal at Bank Bali over funds siphoned off to fund *Golkar*'s and his election campaign as well as by his handling of the problem of **East Timor**. In the event, Habibie withdrew from the presidential contest. The way was not automatically left open for Megawati, however. She did not command a working majority either in the Parliament or in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the electoral college that elected the president and the vice-president. Moreover, an Islamic-based coalition had coalesced against her organized by Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party, who became the speaker of the MPR. In the event, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president on 20 October 1999 defeating Megawati by 373 votes to 313. She was then elected vice-president on the following day in an act of political reconciliation. President Addurrahman Wahid appointed a coalition government, including Professor **Juwono Sudarsono**, the first civilian minister of defence for some four decades. An early political confrontation occurred with General Wiranto, the former armed forces commander and minister of defence, who occupied the office of coordinating minister for political and security affairs. President Wahid suspended him from office in February 2000, from which he formally resigned in May, in a demonstration of supremacy of civilian authority. A subsequent cabinet reshuffle to the advantage of his political party suggested a reversion of Indonesian politics to the financially-driven factionalism of the 1950s as well as a neglect of national economic priorities reflected in the progressive weakening of the currency. President Wahid has adopted a populist style, marred by a willingness to tolerate the youth wing of his party acting as street gangs against his political critics. From before the onset of his presidency, Indonesia was wreaked with sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians on the Moluccan Island chain with around 4,000 fatalities as well as on Sulawesi and the island of Lombok. Separatist challenge in **Aceh** in northern Sumatra was mitigated with a cease-fire signed in May 2000, but it has rumbled on without imminent threat in Irian Jaya. The early promise of President Wahid's tenure gave way after six months to disillusionment at home and abroad as a result of his erratic and even inconsequential style of leadership, which neglected economic priorities. In August 2000, he sought to reassert his authority through reconstituting his cabinet at the cost of alienating the majority parties in the parliament as well as his vice-president. However, he failed to impose any effective control over the armed forces.

Indonesia returned to the United Nations in September 1966 and reinstated a declaratory policy of Non-Alignment, while forging close economic and political links with the United States and Japan as well as suspending diplomatic ties with China. General Suharto presided over the end of Confrontation of Malaysia and played a decisive role in cementing regional reconciliation through promoting the formation of **ASEAN** (Association of South-East Asian Nations) in August 1967. Within Indonesia, ASEAN was conceived as a vehicle for managing regional order to the exclusion of the major powers. Accordingly, its foreign minister, **Adam Malik**, opposed a Malaysian proposal to neutralize South-East Asia and pressed successfully in November 1971 for the ASEAN states to commit themselves to establishing the region as a **ZOPFAN** (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), albeit without operational expression. Indonesia's central place within ASEAN was registered in June 1976 when its secretariat was located in Jakarta. After Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, Indonesia experienced frustration in its regional policy because ASEAN's opposition to

its military occupation facilitated Sino-Soviet involvement in the conflict in contradiction to the Zone of Peace formula. However, its foreign ministers were able to play leading roles in the diplomacy of the Cambodian conflict. **Ali Alatas** served as co-chair of the international conference in Paris in October 1991 which resolved the conflict, although it was the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council which were instrumental in fashioning the final settlement. In August 1990, after the end of the Cold War, Indonesia restored diplomatic relations with China, which removed an impediment to a long-sought goal of assuming the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, whose summit was held in Jakarta in September 1992. Indonesia also hosted an **APEC** summit in Bogor in November 1994. Despite recurrent tensions with the United States over human rights, Indonesia has maintained an informal strategic relationship and has permitted US naval vessels access to the port of Surabaya for repair and supply. That relationship was augmented indirectly in December 1995 through an unprecedented security agreement with Australia that then fell victim to acrimony over East Timor in September 1999.

Indonesia had seized the eastern half of the island in December 1975 in an act of strategic denial to prevent the Portuguese possession from becoming subject to a left-wing government. Its integration into the republic in July 1976 was never endorsed by the United Nations. Under President Suharto's rule, Indonesia maintained its hold over the territory through ruthless repression. In January 1999, President Habibie unexpectedly offered the inhabitants of East Timor the choice between autonomy with Indonesia and full independence. A referendum in August 1999 under UN auspices produced an overwhelming vote in favour of independence but so-called pro-integrationist militia inspired and armed by the armed forces engaged in a scorched-earth policy in an abortive attempt to hold on to the territory. Indonesia's condition of economic adversity and international pressure obliged President Habibie to tolerate the intervention of a United Nations-sanctioned international force led by Australia to restore order and to transfer responsibility for the territory to the world body in October 1999. The initial act of annexation in 1975 had marked a continuity in strategic perspective from December 1957 when an **Archipelago Declaration** was proclaimed. That declaration asserted the same right of jurisdiction over waters surrounding and intersecting the islands of Indonesia as over its land space. Indonesia's archipelagic status, with prerogative rights, was recognized in the Convention concluded at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1982, which came into force in 1994. At issue is the ability of Indonesia's navy to command that archipelago with only fifteen patrol vessels at its disposal.

see also: Abangan; ABRI; Alatas, Ali; APEC; Archipelago Declaration 1957; ASEAN; Confrontation; Crocodile Hole; *Dwi Fungsi*; *Gestapu*; *Golkar*; Guided Democracy; Habibie, Dr B. J.; Hatta, Mohammad; Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle; Irian Jaya; Islam; Malik, Adam; Megawati Sukarnoputri; *Nahdatul Ulama*; National Awakening Party; National Mandate Party; New Emerging Forces; New Order; Old Established Forces; *Pancasila*; People's Consultative Assembly; *Santri*; Sudarsono, Juwono; Suharto; Sukarno; *Supersemar*; Timor, East; United Development Party; Wahid, Abdurrahman; ZOPFAN.

Laos, People's Democratic Republic of

The People's Democratic Republic of Laos was established on 2 December 1975 in succession to the Kingdom of Laos. The political change was effected by the ruling **Lao People's Revolutionary Party**, which had been created in the 1950s as a virtual branch of the Communist Party of Vietnam. The party had assumed power progressively during 1975 as a direct consequence of Communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam in April that year. It has ruled Laos continuously with close reference to the changing priorities of its senior fraternal partner in Hanoi.

Laos is an elongated landlocked state of around 240,000 square kilometres situated in the mainland of South-East Asia. The country is bounded to the north by the People's Republic of China, to the east by Vietnam, to the south by Cambodia, to the west by Thailand and minimally to the north-east by Burma/Myanmar. Its topography is very mixed with a great contrast between the fertile valley of the River Mekong to the west and the forested mountainous uplands in the east. A population of some 5 million is distinguished by an ethnic diversity, in particular between the lowland Lao with linguistic and cultural affiliations to Thailand, and the upland hill tribes who have kinship links across the eastern border in the upland area of Vietnam. The contemporary configuration of the state owes much to colonial intervention in the late nineteenth century, with a French protectorate established initially over the Kingdom of Luang Prabang in 1893. The imposition and expansion of French colonial domain prevented the absorption of the several local principalities between expanding Thai and Vietnamese states. An occupied France was obliged to give up territory west of the Mekong to Thailand in May 1941. Japan inspired the independence of Laos in April 1945 but the protectorate was reinstated at the end of August 1945 after Japan's surrender to the Allied powers.

The restoration of French rule and the establishment of the Kingdom of Laos was resisted by a nationalist revolutionary movement which received direction and military support from a patron movement in Vietnam. From the end of the Pacific War, the country was caught up in a wider struggle for Indochina whose prime locus was in Vietnam (*see* **Indochina Wars**). Civil conflict within the Lao elite over ideology and external patronage attracted intervention from the United States and Thailand as well as from China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam and was contained only temporarily by the settlement reached in the **Geneva Agreements on Indochina** in July 1954 which confirmed national independence. After a revival of conflict, a further settlement exclusively for Laos was reached in the **Geneva Agreements on Laos** in July 1962 and the country was ostensibly neutralized under a coalition government comprised of warring political factions. Neutralization failed and the country continued to be a hostage to the fortunes of competing sides in the **Vietnam War**. On 21 February 1973, just weeks after the **Paris Peace Agreements** for Vietnam, hostilities in Laos were ended by the **Vientiane Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos**. Another coalition government was established in which the balance of advantage shifted inexorably to the Communist side until their complete seizure of power in December 1975, when King Savang Vatthana abdicated.

Laos began its socialist era with a commitment to the same doctrinal priorities that inspired the ruling party in Hanoi. Indeed, Laos has moved in both domestic and international policy in parallel with that of its eastern neighbour, which has served as mentor and patron for a decade and a half. In July 1977 a **Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation** between Laos and Vietnam affirmed a special relationship in a context of deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations which overcame any Laotian desire at the time for greater political autonomy. Laos shared Vietnam's experience of miscalculating the pitfalls of an accelerated collectivization of agriculture and nationalization of industry and commerce and suffered economic distress as a consequence. That distress was aggravated from the onset of

the Cambodian conflict in which Laos sided with Vietnam to its cost. Parallel with Vietnam, Laos was obliged from the onset of the 1980s to sacrifice ideology and to embark tentatively on market-based economic reforms while striving to maintain single party rule. Those reforms were pursued vigorously from the mid-1980s concurrently with the ending of the Cold War and Vietnam's loss of Soviet patronage, which had the attendant effect of weakening but not dissolving the special relationship enshrined by treaty. Laos made corresponding adjustments in foreign policy by improving fractured ties with China and Thailand which have become important economic partners. In July 1992 in Manila, Laos acceded to **ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation** thereby securing observer status at annual meetings of ASEAN's foreign ministers. In July 1993 in Singapore, Phoune Sipaseuth, the foreign minister of Laos, took part in the inaugural dinner meeting of the **ASEAN Regional Forum**. Laos became a member of ASEAN in July 1997. However, in October 1999, a meeting in Vientiane of the heads of government of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam indicated a reversion to a political alignment in opposition to ASEAN that had been forged during the height of the Cambodian conflict.

Laos has long ceased to be a battleground in Indochina but has been troubled by a limited revival of insurgency on the part of the ***Hmong*** minority that were recruited by the American CIA to fight on the anti-communist side in the spill-over from the Vietnam War. Laos continues to be governed by an administration drawn from the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, which is the sole legal political organization and in which the military exercise a leading role. Since November 1992, the party has been headed by General **Khamtay Siphandon** following the death of the founding leader, **Kaysone Phomvihan**. **Nouhak Phoumsavan** assumed the office of state president, which Kaysone had also held but was replaced in February 1998 by Khamtay who gave up office as prime minister, while remaining party leader. General Sisavath Keobounphanh took over as prime minister. The ease with which political succession was accomplished indicated an underlying party control. Only one out of ninety-nine members of the National Assembly elected in December 1997 was not from the ruling party. Despite that control, Laos is a weak state with few resources in which substance agriculture is the primary occupation. Annual average per capita income is around US$250. Apart from limited exports of hydro-electric power, timber and coffee, Laos has been dependent on tourism, including gambling, economic aid and investment for foreign exchange. It was badly hit by the economic crisis that afflicted South-East Asia at the end of the 1990s, primarily as a result of Thailand's acute difficulties leading to collapse of its currency, the *kip*. In August 1999, its finance minister and the governor of its central bank were dismissed on grounds of mismanaging the country's fiscal and banking policy in terms that suggested an involvement in corruption. Laos faces major problems in creating an adequate infrastructure to overcome physical and human resources barriers to development. Despite the limited economic opportunities that Laos provides, its ruling party, like that in Vietnam, has been cautious in opening up the country to foreign influences that might pose a threat to its conservative political system. In that respect, the bridge across the River Mekong linking the country with Thailand, that was built with Australian aid and opened in April 1994, has not been a major stimulus to economic advance. From early 2000, Vientiane experienced indiscriminate bombings, while Vietnamese military assistance was provided to counter a revival of *Hmong* rebellion in moutainous Xiang Khouang Province.

see also: APEC; ASEAN; ASEAN Regional Forum; Domino Theory; Geneva Agreements on Indochina 1954; Geneva Agreements on Laos 1962; Indochina wars; Kaysone Phomvihan; Khamtay Siphandon; Lao People's Revolutionary Party; Nouhak Phoumsavan; Paris Peace Agreements 1973; *Pathet Lao*; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 1976; Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 1977; Vientiane Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos 1973; Vietnam War.