COLD WAR HISTORY

# The Iran–Iraq War

## New international perspectives

Edited by
Nigel Ashton and Bryan Gibson

# The Iran–Iraq War

This volume offers a wide-ranging examination of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), featuring fresh regional and international perspectives derived from recently available new archival material.

Three decades ago Iran and Iraq became embroiled in a devastating eight-year war which served to re-define the international relations of the Gulf region. The Iran–Iraq War stands as an anomaly in the Cold War era; it was the only significant conflict in which the interests of the United States and Soviet Union unwittingly aligned, with both superpowers ultimately supporting the Iraqi regime.

*The Iran–Iraq War* re-assesses not only the superpower role in the conflict but also the war's regional and wider international dimensions by bringing to the fore fresh evidence and new perspectives from a variety of sources. It focuses on a number of themes including the economic dimensions of the war and the roles played by a variety of powers, including the Gulf States, Turkey, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. The contributions to the volume serve to underline that the Iran–Iraq war was a defining conflict, shaping the perspectives of the key protagonists for a generation to come.

This book will be of much interest to students of international and Cold War history, Middle Eastern politics, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.

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**The Iran–Iraq War**
New international perspectives
*Edited by Nigel Ashton and Bryan Gibson*

# The Iran–Iraq War

## New international perspectives

**Edited by Nigel Ashton and Bryan Gibson**

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In assembling this volume the editors have incurred a number of further debts. We are grateful to Andrew Humphrys, the Senior Editor for Strategic Studies at Routledge, for scrutinising our proposal so carefully and for his support in the publication of this volume. We are also particularly grateful to the contributors to this collection for their cooperation in turning their original conference papers into polished chapters. We appreciate their attention to points of detail and their tolerance of our dogged pursuit of stylistic homogeneity. Most importantly, all of the contributors proved willing to work with us in pursuing the central theme of this volume: the international impact of the Iran–Iraq War. Drawing this defining conflict out from under the shadow of subsequent events, especially the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Western invasion of Iraq in 2003, is a large part of the goal of this volume. We also seek to further certain existing historiographical debates about the war as discussed in our introduction. While the reader will be the final judge of how far these goals are successfully achieved here, we believe this volume advances scholarly understanding and debate about this pivotal conflict. Any shortcomings or errors which may remain here are of course the sole responsibility of the editors.

# 1 Introduction

*Nigel Ashton and Bryan Gibson*

Three decades ago Iraq and Iran became embroiled in a devastating eight-year war. Much more than a bilateral struggle, the Iran–Iraq War served to re-define the international relations of the Gulf region. It drew in a particularly wide array of outside powers including the United States, France, Turkey, Israel and the Soviet Union, all of which played controversial roles. The Iran–Iraq War stands as the only significant Cold War era conflict in which the interests of the United States and Soviet Union unwittingly aligned, with both superpowers supporting the Iraqi regime. The significance of the war has proven enduring in terms of the re-shaping of Iraqi and Iranian society, with the former embarking upon a genocidal campaign against the Kurds and the latter solidifying its revolutionary status, as well as in terms of the geopolitics of the Gulf region, with Iraq subsequently launching the 1990 invasion of Kuwait which led to the introduction of sanctions and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Our knowledge of the Iran–Iraq War has advanced considerably in recent years, with much new documentary evidence becoming available thanks in particular to mandatory reviews of documents in Western archives and the release of captured Iraqi materials. In the light of this wealth of new evidence, this volume re-assesses our current understanding of the Iran–Iraq conflict in an international context. It addresses a number of its central features, including Iraq's regime politics, the economic dimensions of the war, the formulation of American policy, the war's impact on the Gulf, and the role of other players including the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Soviet Union, France, and Turkey.

It is particularly important to re-examine the conflict at this juncture for a number of reasons. Firstly, with the withdrawal of American troops at the end of 2011, Iraq's potential to exert influence throughout the Gulf as in independent actor has increased significantly. Meanwhile, Iran's continuing clash with Western interests in the region, which also manifests itself in Iraq itself, might well lead to further conflict in this economically and strategically vital region. Since the Iran–Iraq War was a defining historical moment for both countries, and continues to shape the outlook of the political elite, particularly in Tehran, it is essential to grasp the impact

of the war in order to understand Iran and Iraq's subsequent and current foreign policies.

The historiography of the Iran–Iraq War has gone through four distinct phases, precipitated in large measure by events in the region. The first phase of scholarship coincided with the waging of the war itself and its immediate aftermath. Scholars and analysts attempted to judge the dynamics of the conflict from inside the events themselves. The majority of works consisted of journalistic accounts and think-tank analyses, although a few serious academic studies did appear, mainly towards the end of the war. But with the conclusion of hostilities on 20 August 1988, the war ceased to provide cover stories depicting the gruesome realities of modern warfare, and interest in its study outside specialist academic circles slowly waned. Indeed, one commentator lamented in early 1990 that 'in the relatively short time since Iran accepted a ceasefire with Iraq, the Gulf war has faded from public view and concern with remarkable speed.'[1]

This first phase of scholarship was subject to all of the familiar pitfalls of the writing of very contemporary history including a relative dearth of primary sources, particularly pertaining to decision-making and strategy, the distorting effects of propaganda, and straightforward uncertainty as to the war's outcome. Initially, serious scholars were reluctant to engage in analysis of the war. Scholarly caution was prudent to the extent that Iran had just undergone a revolution and uncertainty prevailed over how it would frame its foreign policy. Would Ayatollah Khomeini behave like a 'turbaned Shah' or would he pursue a novel, ideologically driven foreign policy?[2] Saddam Hussein's calculation in launching the war in September 1980 was by contrast relatively straightforward: Khomeini constituted an implacable ideological foe, and the opportunity presented by perceived Iranian weakness in the wake of the revolution and the purging of the armed forces should be seized. While initially apparently successful, the Iraqi invasion was characterised by gross strategic errors and before long Iranian resistance began to turn the tide of battle. This was not what Saddam – or anyone – had expected. Because of the dramatic shift in the regional balance of power, it took experts some time to adjust to the situation and begin to draw conclusions. But as the war progressed, and Iran evicted Iraqi forces from its territory, a small number of scholarly works began to appear, offering a first glimpse of how the war was viewed in the West.

The first detailed study of the Iran–Iraq War by Stephen R. Grummon appeared in 1982, entitled *The Iran–Iraq War: Islam Embattled*. This provided a valuable initial analysis of the conflict, examining its root causes, the first two years of hostilities, the role of third-party mediators, and the superpowers' responses to the war. It was, however, limited by its brevity and the dearth of primary sources.[3] Later that same year Shahram Chubin, an Iranian expert, published *Security in the Persian Gulf 4: The Role of Outside Powers*, which analysed the military-supply relationships between the three

regional powers – Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia – and the United States and the Soviet Union. Though not dealing specifically with the Iran–Iraq War, Chubin's work presented detailed background information on the military-supply relationships in the region that existed prior to the conflict.[4]

As the war moved to Iraqi territory from 1982 onwards, uncertainty continued to prevail over its outcome, with Iraq fighting a series of desperate defensive battles to blunt successive Iranian offensives. Scholarly caution continued to prevail and commentary on the war still remained confined to the domain of journalists and think-tank analysts. In 1987, President Reagan's controversial decision to re-flag Kuwaiti tankers and the revelations regarding America's complicity in the Iran–Contra scandal, which had broken in November 1986, catalysed a heightened interest in the war. Although the Middle Research and Information Project (MERIP)'s reports had already focused a great deal of attention on the war, the increased American presence in the Gulf in 1987 prompted other scholarly journals to follow suit. Thus, in the spring of 1987, an important issue of *Foreign Affairs* appeared, featuring a number of seminal articles on the war. In particular, Nita M. Renfew's 'Who Started the War?' and Shireen T. Hunter's 'After the Ayatollah' offered penetrating analyses of the causes and likely effects of the war. Renfrew challenged the established notion of Iraqi culpability for the outbreak of the war, arguing that Iran had initiated the conflict by aggressively seeking to subvert Iraq's secular order. At the same time, Hunter focused on the precarious political situation in Iran, including the declining health of Ayatollah Khomeini and the domestic impact of the seemingly endless war. She speculated about the future course of Iranian policy in the light of these developments. Later that year, in its winter 1987 issue, *Foreign Affairs* published a piece by Barry Rubin titled 'Drowning in the Gulf', which provided a thought-provoking analysis of the reasons behind Reagan's decision to re-flag Kuwaiti tankers. Rubin argued that the Kuwaitis had skilfully manipulated the Reagan Administration by playing off American and Soviet antagonism through the tactic of presenting the same request to both powers, knowing that each would try to outbid the other. In doing so, the Kuwaitis ensured that their interests were safeguarded.[5] The themes of culpability for the outbreak of the war, the role of ideology in Iranian politics and the relationship between local actors and the superpowers raised by Renfrew, Hunter and Rubin became key, enduring areas of subsequent historiographical debate about the war. They are reflected in particular in the contributions to this volume by Chris Emery, Rob Johnson, Artemy Kalinovsky, and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen.

The events of 1987 also prompted the appearance of a number of broader studies of the war, whose authors could not be aware that the conflict would soon end. For instance, in 1987 Edgar O'Ballance, a prolific writer on modern warfare, published *The Gulf War*. O'Ballance worked as a

freelance journalist throughout much of the 1980s, and was able to obtain first-hand details of the conflict. While his work was for the most part one of narrative, O'Ballance did provide a useful technical account of the military operations of the war. Unfortunately, due to the timing of its publication, O'Ballance's narrative stops in April 1987, just short of the significant events of late 1987 and 1988.[6] Similarly, Anthony H. Cordesman's painstaking analysis of Iran and Iraq's military action between 1984 and 1987, *The Iran–Iraq War and Western Security, 1984–1987*, stops short of the war's dramatic conclusion. Nevertheless, Cordesman's work is valuable because it was the first major politico-military analysis of the war's impact on US security.[7] The impact of the war on the US role in the Gulf has loomed large in its subsequent historiography and is reflected in the contributions to this volume by Judith Yaphe, Malcolm Byrne, and Chris Emery.

Unlike O'Ballance, who never returned to complete his work on the war, in 1990 Cordesman, with the help of Abraham R. Wagner, published a more comprehensive study, entitled *The Lessons of Modern War, II, The Iran–Iraq War*. Like Cordesman's earlier work, this book made a significant contribution to the historiography of the war, this time more specifically in the field of military history, offering a detailed analysis of the forces, operations, and weaponry used.[8] A final addition to this group of scholars writing originally just before the war's conclusion is Majid Khadduri, whose book *The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq–Iran Conflict* appeared in 1988. Khadduri developed a new approach to the historiography of the outbreak of the war, arguing that its root cause was the confessional divide between Sunni-dominated Iraq and Shi'a Iran. Building to some extent on the work of Renfrew, Khadduri argued that revolutionary Iran had goaded Iraq into attacking it pre-emptively. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980 was effectively an act of national self-preservation.[9]

While interest in the war declined somewhat in its immediate aftermath, in 1989 John Bulloch and Harvey Morris published *The Gulf War*, which was effectively a popular history of the conflict which cut little new historiographical ground.[10] More significant in terms of trends in the war's historiography was the publication in 1989 of Behrouz Souresrafil's *The Iran–Iraq War*. Though Souresrafil is a journalist by trade, his book was a well-researched and detailed historical account of Iran–Iraq relations and the factors which led the two countries to go to war. Significantly, Souresrafil argued that the main cause of the war and its prolongation was Khomeini's need to secure his position and his revolution.[11] To this extent Souresafil furthered the debate about the Iranian role in the origins and perpetuation of the conflict sparked by Hunter's work.

A more general work of some significance which appeared in this immediate post-bellum period was Dilip Hiro's *The Longest War: the Iran–Iraq Military Conflict*. While this work is marred to some extent by Hiro's uncritical acceptance of various conspiracy theories about the war and his limited

analysis of the political struggles which took place inside Iran between 1985 and 1987, it did offer a detailed analysis of the war informed in part by Hiro's first-hand experience as a journalist behind the front line.[12]

During the same period, scholars also turned their attention to a more comprehensive analysis of the international context of the war. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp's *Iran and Iraq at War*, published in 1988, challenged the notion that the war had persisted because it served the purposes of the superpowers, Israel, and the Arab states. They argued instead that Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini both saw the war as an opportunity to consolidate their power and to crush opposition, while rallying the majority of their citizens to the flag.[13]

The end of the war also sparked a number of studies resulting from academic conferences. The first major contribution was a book edited by Efraim Karsh, *The Iran–Iraq War: Impact and Implications*, published in 1989 by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, which was the product of a conference on the war held in September 1988. The scope of this work was wide-ranging. It offered a detailed analysis of the belligerents, the regional implications, including the war's impact on the Gulf States, Turkey, and Israel, the international implications, including chapters on American, Soviet, and European policies toward the war, the war's economic consequences, and finally its strategic and military implications. To date, this work remains the most comprehensive single-volume analysis of the Iran–Iraq War.[14]

At the same juncture, Christopher C. Joyner edited a volume of papers from the International Studies Association's annual conferences in 1988 and 1989. This wide-ranging collection, *The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy*, published in 1990, also opened up new avenues in the historiography of the war. Its particular value lay in its analysis of the war's diplomatic and legal dimensions, including articles on the re-flagging of Kuwaiti tankers, the role of the United Nations, the war's implications for maritime warfare and neutrality, and a penetrating analysis of the legal issues facing Iranian and Iraqi negotiators.[15]

It would be misleading to suggest that only Western academics were interested in analysing the implications of the Iran–Iraq War at this juncture. In 1988, a coalition of Iranian universities and research centres convened the International Conference on Aggression and Defense to discuss the war. The result was a volume of papers edited by Farhang Rajaee, many of which had been translated into English from Farsi, which analysed the genesis and persistence of the war, the role of superpowers, and the international legal implications, including debates over the right of self-defence and the need to reform and modernise the laws of war.[16] This volume enriched the historiography of the war in English by providing a wide range of Iranian perspectives.[17]

Interest in the lessons of the Iran–Iraq War was dramatically revived by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. This ushered in the second

phase in the war's historiography during the 1990s, as scholars sought to re-assess the conflict through the prism of subsequent Iraqi and Western actions. Familiar Western historical paradigms were mined to explain Iraqi actions, and Saddam Hussein was recast in the role of a 1930s dictator, bent on ruthless territorial expansion. This period also saw revisionist efforts aimed at casting American support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War in a new light, which were the by-product of the volte-face in America's policy towards Iraq, and especially towards its leader, Saddam Hussein. A number of specialised analyses of the war, dealing with specific issues such as its social origins,[18] the implications of the attacks on maritime shipping,[19] and its economic implications,[20] were also published.

In 1990, an important study on the military implications of the Iran–Iraq War, *Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East*, was published by the United States Army War College. Authored by Stephen Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II, and Leif R. Rosenberger, it examined the implications of the war for American security following Iraq's victory over Iran. The authors came to two important conclusions. First, that despite Iran's decision to settle for the *status quo ante*, by the time of its victory at Fao in 1986, Iraq had implemented a process of creating a flexible army which was capable of dominating the region after the war. This conclusion was significant because it helped explain Saddam Hussein's actions toward Kuwait in late 1990. The second conclusion of this work was controversial: the authors suggested that Iran had used chemical weapons during the war and that the gassing of the Kurds at Halabja might not have been perpetrated by Iraq but by Iran as well.[21] While the first conclusion has been supported by significant evidence, the second conclusion remains in dispute. For instance, in 2007 Joost Hiltermann published *A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja*, which examined this question in detail. He concluded that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that Iran had used chemical weapons either during the Iran–Iraq War or at Halabja.[22] In any event, the Army War College study spurred an important strand of historiographical debate surrounding the development of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme and the use of chemical weapons against civilians and on the battlefield during the Iran–Iraq War. Hiltermann's detailed and authoritative study is the most important additional contribution in this field to date.

A further work which excited new controversy about the war appeared in 1991, not long after the end of the Gulf crisis. Entitled *My Turn to Speak*, the memoirs of former Iranian premier Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, provided new material which fuelled the existing debate about the United States' role in instigating the conflict. Bani-Sadr alleged that the United States, Israel, and Iranian royalists, had plotted the destruction of the Iranian regime 'by means of an external war'.[23] He went on to claim that President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had met with Saddam Hussein during a visit to Amman in July 1980, where he gave

Saddam the approval to attack.[24] This was the first instance in which the United States was accused directly of providing Iraq with a so-called 'green light' to attack Iran. This allegation has continued to provoke historiographical debate. Chris Emery examines this question in detail based on the most recently available sources in this volume.

In 1992, Stephen Pelletiere published another important contribution to the study of the war titled *The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum*. While his earlier study had proven to be quite controversial, this work was a detailed politico-military analysis of the war. Significantly, Pelletiere argued that Iraq's victory in the war was not the result of a combination of its attrition strategy and good fortune, but that the Iraqis had spent two years preparing for their final offensive. This work was an important contribution to the understanding of why Iraq managed swiftly to defeat Iran at the end of the war, an outcome which surprised most observers at the time.[25]

Few further major contributions to the historiography of the conflict were made during the remainder of the 1990s. The only significant exception was Adam Tarock's *The Superpowers' Involvement in the Iran–Iraq War*, which appeared in 1998. This work tied the Iran–Iraq War to the Gulf crisis, pointing to the increased American involvement in the initial conflict on Iraq's side and contrasting it with the post-Gulf crisis relations between the two states. It identified Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the Iran–Iraq War as the primary catalyst for America's hard line against the Iraqi regime throughout the 1990s. Tarock examined the roots of the war, the Soviet response to the war's outbreak, the developing American 'tilt' towards Iraq, and the unintended alignment of American and Soviet interests. He argued that the superpowers' involvement in the conflict fuelled the fire of war and encouraged, at times, Saddam's belligerency and aggression.[26]

From 2002 onwards, a third phase in the historiography of the war began. With the prospect, followed by the reality, of an American invasion and occupation of Iraq, the Iran–Iraq War was revisited, and selectively mined for vindication by commentators seeking to justify or condemn American actions. This phase of the debate about the war was characterised by a preponderance of polemics over dispassionate scholarship. Numerous works on Iraq flooded the market, with journalists, scholars, and analysts either trumpeting or disputing the George W. Bush Administration's claims that Iraq possessed WMD and posed a threat to the West.

One of the best examples of this polemical turn is Stephen Hughes' *The Iraqi Threat and Saddam Hussein's Weapons of Mass Destruction*. This work even went so far as to attempt to tie Osama bin Laden to Saddam Hussein, in an effort to make the case for war.[27] This work, and another by Kenneth M. Pollack,[28] slanted the historical discourse of the Iran–Iraq War by emphasising Iraq's use of WMD in the 1980s as a basis for the American invasion of Iraq. Unfortunately for the authors who developed this

argument, it has subsequently become clear that the case for war in terms of the threat presented by Saddam's WMD capabilities was grossly exaggerated. At the same time, other well-known writers, such as Dilip Hiro in his work *Iraq: In the Eye of the Storm*, entered the fray to counter exaggerations and debunk a number of myths about Iraq's capabilities.[29]

In among the various polemics, some important new scholarship about the Iran–Iraq War did appear.[30] Efraim Karsh's survey of the war, published in 2002, examined a number of unexplored issues, including the role of child soldiers.[31] Kenneth M. Pollack's *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991* discussed the Iran–Iraq War at length and provided a detailed assessment of Iraq's military capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Pollack's book was particularly helpful in developing understanding of the dramatic transformation of the Iraqi Army as the war progressed, building upon Pelletiere's earlier works.[32] Finally, Lawrence Potter and Gary Sick's edited volume, *Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War*, presented an important collection of papers originally delivered to an international conference held in October 2001. Many of the contributors, including Richard Schofield, M. R. Izady, Joost R. Hiltermann, and Gerd Nonneman, were leading authorities in their respective fields. Significantly, the volume examined a number of relatively unexplored issues, such as how tensions surrounding the Shatt al-Arab waterway contributed to the outbreak of the war, the role of the Kurds in the conflict (beyond Halabja), how Iraq's Shi'a population experienced the war, the impact of the war on Iran, the perspective of the Gulf States towards the conflict, and the use of chemical weapons. To date this volume remains the most innovative collection of papers on the war.[33] In addition to these works, several authoritative histories of Iraq were published or appeared in revised editions during the early 2000s.[34]

The 2003 invasion of Iraq, while calamitous from almost every point of view, did at least eventually produce an unexpected boon for researchers, in the shape of the vast trove of Iraqi documents captured by American forces. These are now lodged at the National Defense University at Fort McNair, Washington DC and the Hoover Institution attached to Stanford University.[35] They provide researchers with the potential to gain unprecedented insights into the decision-making process of Saddam Hussein's regime and include audio recordings of Saddam's meetings with his inner circle and generals going back to the beginning of the 1980s. As a result, new perspectives on the way the Iraqi political system operated during the Iran–Iraq War are now beginning to surface. The first major contribution to draw on these sources was Kevin M. Wood's 2009 book, *Saddam's War*, which has since been followed up with two other books, *The Saddam Tapes* and *Saddam's Generals*, both in 2011.[36] Other researchers, including one of this volume's editors, Bryan R. Gibson, have also used declassified documents obtained in American archives to develop new perspectives on the war.[37]

At the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, then, as the American invasion and occupation begin to take on the guise of historical events rather than contemporary politics, we appear to be entering a new, fourth phase of scholarship on the Iran–Iraq War. In the light of the newly available sources, particularly those from inside Iraq, the Iran–Iraq War can be reconsidered as an event in its own right, rather than as a curtain-raiser for the invasions of Kuwait in 1990 and Iraq in 2003.

The contributors to this volume have drawn considerably on these newly available sources in preparing their chapters. For example, the chapter by Kevin M. Woods and Williamson Murray considers the Iraqi conduct of the war, using the captured high-level Iraqi sources. Ibrahim al-Marashi's chapter likewise draws heavily on these sources to consider civil–military relations under the Ba'athist regime and the techniques employed to control and mobilise the Iraqi population. Pierre Razoux's contribution on French policy utilises previously unavailable classified French documents to chart the changing course of France's relations with both belligerents, particularly Paris's arms-supply relationship with Iraq and the tortured course of the Franco-Iranian antagonism. Elliot Hentov considers the Turkish role as a neighbouring regional power which was able to profit economically from the war while maintaining a delicate political balancing act. He also shows how the war played an important role in affecting Turkey's handling of the Kurdish question. Meanwhile Artemy Kalinovsky uses newly available Soviet sources to reconsider Moscow's own balancing act during the war, attempting to maintain its client relationship with Iraq at the same time as it sought to cultivate Iran as the key regional power.

The volume is organised around a series of sections addressing the following themes. Part I considers the waging of the war from both the Iraqi and Iranian perspectives and includes the chapters by Kevin Woods and Williamson Murray, Ibrahim al-Marashi, and Rob Johnson. Part II looks at the economic dimensions of the war, with contributions from Farzin Nadimi on Iranian oil policy and Glen Rangwala on the financing of the war. Part III covers regional perspectives, including a chapter on the role of the Gulf States by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen and the chapter on Turkey by Elliot Hentov. Part IV looks at American policy towards the war with contributions from Judith Yaphe, Malcolm Byrne, and Chris Emery. Finally, Part V considers international perspectives and includes the chapters by Pierre Razoux on French policy and Artemy Kalinovsky on the Soviet role.

In sum, this volume seeks to advance the ongoing historiographical debate over the international impact of the Iran–Iraq War through the application of new sources and fresh approaches. The discussion of the evolving historiography of the war above serves to underline that the salient features of any event will change depending on the vanishing point from which light is shed upon it. Nevertheless, this volume aims to move beyond the monotone shades cast by the invasions of Kuwait and Iraq and

to recognise the Iran–Iraq War as a complex, defining event in itself, worthy of discrete study irrespective of the teleological pull exerted by the events of 1990 and 2003.

## Notes

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