ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH ON TAIWAN

Language, Politics and Identity in Taiwan

Naming China

Hui-Ching Chang and Richard Holt

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Following the move by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist Party Kuomingtang (KMT) to Taiwan after losing the Chinese civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the late 1940s, and Chiang's subsequent lifelong vow to reclaim the mainland, "China" has occupied—if not monopolized—the gaze of Taiwan, where its projected images are reflected. Whether mirror image, shadow, or ideal contrast, China has been, and will continue to be, a key reference point in Taiwan's convoluted efforts to find its identity.

Language, Politics and Identity in Taiwan traces the intertwined paths of five sets of names that Taiwan has used to name China since the KMT came to Taiwan in 1949: the derogatory "Communist bandits"; the ideologically focused "Chinese Communists"; the seemingly neutral geographical designators "mainland" and "opposite shore/both shores"; and the ethnic and national label "China," with the official designation, "People's Republic of China." In doing so, it explores how Taiwanese identities are constituted and reconstituted in the shifting and switching of names for China; in the application of these names to alternative domains of Taiwanese life; in the waning or waxing of names following tides of history and polity; and in the increasingly contested meaning of names. Through textual analyses of historical archives and other mediated texts and artifacts, the chapters chart Taiwan's identity negotiation over the past half century and critically evaluate key interconnections between language and politics.

This unique book will be of great interest to students and scholars of Taiwan studies, Chinese politics, communication studies and linguistics.

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Preface

This book is dedicated to my parents, whose experience with and insights about Taiwan's politics have provided the inspiration for this project.

Writing about a place to which I am personally connected is a blessing with an added burden, as scholarly inquiry regarding every turn in Taiwan's multi-layered political evolution is simultaneously grounded in commitment and attachment. I hope this book not only offers fresh insight on how seemingly insignificant language sustains divergent Taiwanese identities through its acts in naming China, but establishes a different perspective in narrating Taiwan's histories.

This book benefits from the support of many: the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange provided a generous grant to allow me to devote time to the project; the University of Illinois at Chicago's various grants-in-aid, including those of the Office of Social Science Research, the LAS Dean's Award for Faculty Research in the Humanities, and the Faculty Scholarship Support program, have enabled me to conduct various research trips to Taiwan; my Fulbright Fellowship in Ukraine provided an added standard for comparison that sharpened my thinking, particularly with the help of Dr. Vladimir Manakin, among others.

My thanks also go to many colleagues in Taiwan, China, Russia, Poland and the United States—especially Dr. Todd Sandel—for their insights on earlier formulations of these ideas, as well as timely and professional assistance with the manuscript provided by the outstanding staff at Routledge. Particularly noteworthy has been the constant interchange of ideas with my co-author, Dr. Richard Holt. Most importantly, I am eternally grateful to those in Taiwan who continue to make Taiwan's history.

Hui-Ching Chang

Abbreviations

APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDF	Chinese Development Fund
CDRRM	Council for Design and Research on Recovering the Mainland
CSSTA	Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
CSTEA	Cross-Strait Tourism Exchange Association
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
ECFA	Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
GACC	General Association of Chinese Culture
KMT	Kuomintang Guomindang
MND	Ministry of National Defense
NICT	National Institute for Compilation and Translation
NP	New Party
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
RTA	Radio and Television Act
SEF	Straits Exchange Foundation
TSTA	Taiwan Strait Tourism Association
UDN	United Daily News

1 Naming China—political art as challenges

In 2001, a Taiwan reporter covering a meeting of the organization Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Shanghai called the People's Republic of China (PRC) "Chinese Communists" (*zhonggong*, 中共). Agitated, foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan[1] remonstrated:

> We are in the big Shanghai of the People's Republic of China, and yet you keep calling us "*zhonggong*, *zhonggong*." Such a term of address I have heard before, but now it has become a historical term and yet it still comes from the mouths of you Taiwanese reporters.[2]

This eruption reflects contentious relations between Taiwan and China, sparked by Taiwan's exclusion from that meeting for the first time since 1993. The next day at a press conference, president Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) purposefully and repeatedly called China "PRC" (*zhonghuarenmingongheguo*, 中華人民共和國), a taboo term never previously uttered by presidents of Taiwan to designate China.

"Chinese Communists" and "PRC," along with "Communist bandits" (*gongfei*, 共匪), "the mainland" (*dalu*, 大陸), "opposite shore/both shores" (*duian*, 對岸/*liangan*, 兩岸[3]), and "China" (*zhongguo*, 中國), comprise the five sets of names for China that Taiwan has used interchangeably, each traversing a unique trajectory and set of meanings. Following the move by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist Party Kuomintang (KMT) to Taiwan after losing the Chinese civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the late 1940s, and his subsequent lifelong vow to reclaim the mainland, "China"[4] has occupied—if not monopolized—the gaze of Taiwan, where its projected images are reflected. Whether mirror image, shadow, or ideal contrast, China has been, and will continue to be, a key reference point in Taiwan's convoluted effort to find its identity.

At times the relations between the two appear a tangled mess; at times a cordial partnership; and at times open enmity (amid other configurations) stitched irregularly on cultural, economic, political and other fronts. Like many states, Taiwan relies on language in the public sphere, using symbolic means to secure, establish and demarcate political reality. With its power disadvantage,

Taiwan has had to conscientiously marshal into service linguistic resources, with names for China serving as powerful tools.

To repudiate the CCP's legitimacy and bolster the image of the Republic of China (ROC) as true heir to the grandeur of Chinese cultures, in 1947 Taiwan was mobilized into joining the anti-Communist crusade by formal designating the CCP "Communist bandits" (*gongfei*), a name that persisted until officially banned in 1987. Two other names, *zhonggong* and *dalu*, were made official—along with extended adjectival phrases—only after *Temporary Provisions during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion* (hereafter, *Temporary Provisions*—also known as "Temporary Decree") ended in 1991, four years after cessation of martial law concluded the "bandit rebellion" era. After the Nationalists abandoned the idea of using Taiwan as a "recovering base," yet still portraying conflicts with China as "domestic" struggles, the ideologically focused "Chinese Communists" (*zhonggong*), often used as surrogate and supplement, in 1991 was made the official name (replacing *gongfei*) by the new Mainland Affairs Council (MAC).[5]

The seemingly neutral geographic name, "mainland" (*dalu*), a flexible name that can refer to people, land, or both, has transmuted, from a blood-connected, nostalgically imagined land eclipsing Taiwan, to a more geographically defined marketplace that for some time remained largely unexperienced. Following policies opening doors between China and Taiwan in the late 1980s, other geographic names such as "opposite shore/both shores" (*duian*/*liangan*) emerged and competed for predominance. While suggesting partnership, these names imply opposition toward China, breaking out of the "one China" policy and suggesting "two."

Ironically, perhaps the most provocative name is the ethnic and national label "China" (*zhongguo*), which changed from referring to both Taiwan and China (presumably held by the ROC) to, following rising Taiwanese consciousness, exclusively China. As Taiwan hovers between Taiwanization and Sinicization, "China" continues to bedevil people in Taiwan in terms of the semantic distance between "Taiwan" and "China." No matter which name denotes China, its official title, *People's Republic of China*, was never uttered on official sites, as the ROC denied its statehood until after 2000, when the locally-based DPP won the presidency and made naming China "China" or the "PRC" official policy, underscoring Taiwan's status as independent.

Nevertheless, "PRC" again disappeared from official discourse when the KMT returned to power in 2008. On February 7, 2011, president Ma Ying-jeou said at a government social function that, based on the principle "one China, each side having its own interpretation," Taiwan should not name China, "China," but call it "mainland" or "opposite side" ("Ma Wants a Return," 2011).

Taiwan's use of other-focused, yet self-referential, names is both unique and emblematic of similar situations in other nations. Nonetheless, Taiwan's task is in some ways, and as something of a hybrid endeavor, more complex: it must name a distant locale its constitution claims, but does *not* own; it must name an opponent who is not entirely an opponent, since it shares connections

of culture, ethnicity and economic interests; and it must disentangle distinctions between land and people, while managing the push-and-pull in response to international politics. Other and self are bound in competitive/cooperative engagement, as they become each other's reference point in realizing Taiwan's identity.

Having evolved through idiosyncratic contexts and multiple layers, these names—or identity categories—prove especially powerful in realizing Taiwan's "identity project" through the infusion of symbols into shared collective memory (Laitin, 1998, p. 264). Taiwanese identities are constituted and reconstituted in the shifting and switching of names for China; in the application of these names to alternative domains of Taiwanese life; in the waning or waxing of names following tides of history and polity; and in the increasingly contested meaning of names. Examining how names fashioning China's image are enacted and transformed throughout Taiwan's history, we explore recursively its reflected self-appraisals.

All about names

Names as political metaphor

Scholars have explored naming practices from multiple perspectives, such as history; linguistics; discourse and culture; rhetoric; and geography. They have examined naming locations to proclaim ownership and promote ideology (Azaryahu, 1997; Horsman, 2006; Lefebvre, 1991) and naming states (Coakley, 2009; Galasinski and Skowronek, 2001), ethnic groups (Alcoff, 2005), and opponents (Bhatia, 2005).

To appreciate how names and politics are intertwined one can take a metaphorical perspective, seeing names as symbolic devices that provide conceptual casing summarizing complex sociohistorical circumstances (Edelman, 1971; Miller, 1979). An assigned name aggregates "a series of normative associations, motives and characteristics … attached to the named subject" (Bhatia, 2005, p. 8). Each name carries a story, or stories, suggesting metaphorical links with behaviors and unfolding events, giving full expression to metaphors (Nevins, 2008). As names change with history, so do perceptions and the construction of political reality (Edelman, 1971; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Miller, 1979).

Conflicts about names confront nation-states, existing in, and shaping, history. Names compel patterns and construct political reality (Edelman, 1988; Miller, 1979), since "the very selection of a term … puts invisible boundaries for human perception and suggests attitudes for its evaluation" (Kiewe, 1998, p. 81). Name changes reshuffle power, altering ideological and political configurations, as names are assigned and appropriated in political agendas, mobilizing action while being resisted, disputed and contested (Bakhtin, 1986; Bhatia, 2005). Given the potency of names, Bhatia claims, "a site, a territory or people are first colonised by words and names before being physically occupied by soldiers, trading companies, and statesmen" (2005, pp. 13–14).

Names as discursive sites of struggle

Yet names are more than conceptual frames or political tools; their use is based in specific times and places and merged with disputing voices into vibrant language. They are symbolic devices helping construct meanings of named objects through interplay among basic and alternative definitions. Each name drives and is sustained by narratives through "collective remembering" (Wertsch, 2002) and actions propelled in this way deal with complex, varied political/cultural entities famously named "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1983).

Bakhtin (1986) said that language enters life through utterances, and life enters language the same way (p. 63). "[N]ames always invoke specific genealogical or legitimizing narratives, but they are limited by the need to connect with at least some aspects of lived experience" (Alcoff, 2005, p. 400). Cast into discourse, names automatically enter the lists, struggling for supremacy and survival; naming practices register ideological conflict, legitimize relations, and sustain power differentials (Fairclough, 1989).

Names, in charged arenas of conflicting interpretation, become targets for countless participants, each with unique perspectives, interests, and power (Bakhtin, 1986; Holt, 2004). Laitin's (1998) "identity project" and "identity category" provide frameworks to analyze how naming opponents fashions identity. Examining names as identity categories, managed by stakeholders to maintain a consequential identity project, implies a host of important considerations: who proposed the name/category; which supporters advocate it; who capitalizes on or benefits from it; how do stakeholders promote names differently and for what diverse purposes; how do names/categories define relationships between states and people; what resources make them effective; how do different players use these names to suit their political agendas; when other identity categories become available, whether one category attempts, competitively, to replace another, or serves as an addition to multiply the range of interpretations; what resources enable switches in identity categories and under what circumstances; and what makes an identity category a good candidate and bestows its potential.

To understand identity projects is to know that they signify active processes involving power struggles among assorted players. A given identity label—or name—is always "in process." Even if supported by governmental authority, propagation of specific identity categories cannot be pinned down to individuals, but is shared and endorsed—through multiple channels, means and the application of resources—by all involved with and participating in their construction. Any name said to be a potential identity label is continuously being shaped. Recursively reflected self-appraisals of states are pertinent not only to political authorities but also to their people, as is the seemingly inconsequential act of using names in various domains, allowing identity categories to spread and take hold, and even result in them becoming dominant metaphors.

Regardless of who the major stakeholders are, maintaining these categories takes hard work. If they are not to be empty labels, categories must be realized through rich interpretations with associations and stories to augment their

meanings. Stories about identity categories must, in Laitin's (1998) words, cascade into various discursive sites, whether political, cultural, educational, or others, to ensure the label functions effectively. This process occurs in different venues—official speeches, campaigns, written documents, and others—arising from sociopolitical circumstances. This facilitates the power of labels, sustained in use and re-use, and narratives that vivify them. Moreover, imbued with specific interpretations, identity categories can extend beyond their original meanings and connect to other elements of discursive domains.

While governments use identity categories as backdrops against which to interpret states' views of themselves, the chorus of alternative voices never sings in harmony. At times there are eruptions disputing identity labels and the support of, or dispute over, specific labels changes with variations in sociohistorical circumstance. Even if contestants are too weak to reject categories, they may fashion paradoxical commentaries or contradictory statements to weaken their power while appearing to support them. Similarly, identity categories can become hidden, dormant, out of style, or even vanish. Just as they gain power through implementation and use, they lose power through the actions of numerous stakeholders—identity brokers, and even contestants—who work hand in hand to reduce their effectiveness.

Taiwan's problem of how to name China is not merely a rhetorical exigency (Bitzer, 1968) engendered by events and situations, but a series of episodes recounting the struggle over the definition of other and self. Imagined communities (Anderson, 1983) enacted through names are realized recursively, as people in Taiwan negotiate their identities through how they view China. Moreover, each name traverses unique historical trajectories. In naming China, some names—"Communist bandits," "Chinese Communists," and "the mainland"—were officially endorsed by the government as "correct," while others assumed their positions either without such official certification or through decertification. Identity categories evolve through clear strategic measures, but alongside other processes less planned or organized.

Unique features of Chinese language and attitude toward words

Despite significant progress, analytical frameworks long utilized in metaphorical studies have not taken sufficient account of unique linguistic environments impinging on how metaphors are conceived, and the foundation upon which names take root. The multilayered linkage between language and politics depends largely on the idiosyncrasies of the language that is framing utterances about it. To understand Taiwan's identity project one must consider the ideographic nature of the Chinese language environment.

Unlike English, which comprises alphabetical letters, Chinese comprises characters, each complete in its meaning. Most of these are made up of one or more radicals, or basic meaning units, employed as semantic categories. As a logographic writing system of a noninflectional nature (verb forms do not change for person or tense, while nouns, singular or plural, maintain the same form),

Chinese is expressed in concrete shapes, impressions and sounds (Chen 1999). A Chinese character, or ideograph, "entails that its written shape be partly or largely a function of the meaning of the character" (Hansen, 1989, p. 79). Although each single-syllable character encodes phonetic value with meaning, Chinese is hardly monosyllabic—while a "character" has only one syllable, a "word," as a unit of speech, may have more than one syllable and more than one character (Chen, 1999; Liu, 1962).

Moreover, Chinese grammars are flexible and mobile (Liu, 1962); "the Chinese language has no grammar that irrevocably fixes and categorizes; that is, it has no parts of speech, number, gender, tense, declension, and so on" (Wu, 1989, p. 247). In a sentence, one may find the subject or other sentence parts omitted and no specification of gender, number, tense, mood and so on (Mair, 1994, p. xxviii); almost every word can be used as a noun, a verb, an adjective, or an adverb, depending on word order (Hansen, 1989). Since sentences are not especially important in Chinese syntax, clauses or phrases—strings of characters or expressions—are fundamental elements of Chinese composition. Chinese philosophy "treats all words as names and treats compound terms, phrases, sentences, and so on as mere strings of names" (Hansen, 1985, p. 500).

Unlike English names that can serve as independent concepts, Chinese characters can form strings of phrases and clusters of images, which can be shortened, extended and morphed into various other strings of words, or matched to modify and create different meanings. In the Chinese ideographic system, the domain of any given name/metaphor thus does not depend entirely on the word itself but on strings of words that combine to expand its boundaries. This flexibility makes names particularly effective as tools for political manipulation. Conceptions generated and supported are thus different, capable of being revised to suit political and other sociocultural needs more conveniently than would be the case with many other prominent languages. The resilience of Chinese, through building up strings of words and forming clusters of images, solidifies a name's essence while allowing it to expand.

However, the function of words in maintaining political order is also based on the Chinese cultural preoccupation with naming. Naming practices have always been an especially important part of Chinese cultures; grounded in Confucian principles demanding rectification (socially appropriate use) of names (*zhengming*)—or correspondence between name and substance—Chinese names can become supercharged metaphors. Ideally, one's manner of speech should be aligned with one's "name," that is, one's position vis-à-vis the social hierarchy, since names both designate and constitute relationships. Calling someone by a title—for example, by using kinship terms—not only shows respect but also defines the relationship (Blum, 1997).

Although the Confucian ideal is to ensure the mutual alignment of internal foundation and outward expression, political language endorsing external formality in naming China justifies efforts to establish hegemonic authority, especially through grand narratives. Rooted in the Chinese cultural focus on rectification, names for China become parts of conscious word games played by

identity brokers such as government authorities—through official policies and even codified law—and other political stakeholders, amid challenges from contesting voices. How China should be named becomes an important identity project lent legitimacy through *zhengming*'s cultural authenticity and the flexibility of the Chinese language.

Reflected Taiwanese identities in the names for China

Names for China have evolved through a variety of idiosyncratic historical-political contexts, and are intertwined in multiple layers and burdened with historical presuppositions reflecting ongoing struggles between Taiwan and China. "Communist bandits" from the late 1940s is officially obsolete, yet can be nostalgic or satirical in popular discourse. "Chinese Communists" and "mainland" persist, modified according to changing circumstances. "Opposite shore/both shores," from the 1990s, arise from increased contact, while "China" changed from meaning Taiwan and China, to more exclusively China. "PRC," taboo since 1949, entered following the rise of the DPP, especially after 2000, but was again supplanted by "mainland" or "opposite side" after KMT's return in 2008. These names are not self-referential, but other-focused in reflexively defining the self. At times overlapping and susceptible to unstable boundaries, these multifaceted symbols are intimately connected, and their unending reconfigurations help reconstruct alternative political identities for Taiwan. Beneath such political maneuvering is the interweaving of language, ideology and identity construction.

Gongfei, *zhonggong*, *dalu*, *duian*/*liangan*, and *zhongguo*/*zhonghuarenmingongheguo*, with their related expressions, manifest themselves and claim characteristic semantic territories in the evolution of Taiwan's identity projects. Since the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the dream (or obsession) of Chiang Kai-shek to take back the mainland and restore Chinese cultures, as well as that plan's revision and abandonment, has configured Taiwan's troubled identity negotiations, as it tries to disentangle its separation/connection with China: Taiwanese identities are defined vis-à-vis "China" and the centrality of "Chinese-ness."

This task is all the more challenging, considering encounters between Chiang and his followers (late Chinese immigrants from provinces outside Taiwan, or *waishengren*) and the island's inhabitants at the time (mostly early Chinese immigrants including Fukien immigrants and Hakka who migrated to Taiwan in the seventeenth century and who call themselves *benshengren* (people of this province) or *taiwanren*[6] (Taiwanese). This was, in the words of Phillips (1999), "less the restoration of historical ties than the attempt to forge an entirely new relationship" (p. 276). Transitioning from Japanese rule, Taiwan's identity projects via China had to be managed against the shifting ethnic relations of Taiwanese people and their complex, fluctuating array of national identifications among early and late Chinese immigrants, in negotiation with aboriginals and immigrants from Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

Yet rising local consciousness concerning the Nationalist government's early indoctrination of people in Taiwan as *zhongguoren*, together with China's continuing threats and claims to own Taiwan, have led a majority in Taiwan to label themselves as *taiwanren* (which may not or may not overlap *zhongguoren* or *huaren*) and some early immigrants even de-Sinicize themselves by denying a common Chinese ethnic ancestry. Taiwanese consciousness (*taiwan yishi*), developed throughout Taiwan's history as marked by events such as the February 28 incident in 1947[7]; the Korean War in the 1960s; and the Formosa incident in 1979[8] (Dreyer, 2003); was openly celebrated after the 1980s. As Taiwan's historical narratives have changed following social and political modifications, the fluid boundaries of national identity have also had to be renegotiated (Brown, 2004).

There is increasing awareness concerning "Taiwanese-ness" and the corresponding struggles to realize various identities, beginning with Taiwan's official title, "ROC," and its shortened name, "Taiwan." While some believe *zhongguoren* is the broader category and *taiwanren* merely a subset, others see the terms as conceptually equivalent and even interchangeable. Still others treat these labels as claiming different, mutually exclusive discursive spaces. Such confusion is further complicated when one considers the distinctions between *zhongguoren* and *huaren*: the former literally means "people of the central nation," the latter, "people of Chinese ethnicity." Not surprisingly, the seemingly politically charged *zhongguoren* and the culturally focused *huaren* intersect distinctively with *taiwanren*.

The inconsistency and changeability in such positions register as complex interconnections among culture, ethnicity and politics throughout Taiwan's history. The precarious balance between *taiwanren* and *zhongguoren* is unceasingly renegotiated through identity projects contingent upon the many images of "China"—whether seen as constituted by its banditry nature (as in *gongfei*); realized by its political ideology (*zhonggong*); presented as a geographical location by itself (*dalu*); positioned vis-à-vis Taiwan (*duian/liangan*); or labeled with its statehood acknowledged (*zhongguo/zhonghuarenmingongheguo*).

A recent statement by President Ma illustrates the muddy relations between *taiwan* and *zhongguo* and helps us comprehend how naming China involves not merely framing the other, but establishing self-identity. Responding to his 2012 presidential opponent, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen, and her "I am Taiwanese" campaign, President Ma stated on Facebook:

> I am a descendant of the Yellow Emperor[9] in blood and I identify with Taiwan in terms of my identity. I fight for Taiwan and I am Taiwanese.… In nationality, I am an ROC citizen and I am the President of the ROC.
>
> (Ma, 2011)

Ma's stated ancestral line (Yellow Emperor), identification (Taiwan), and nationality (ROC) all seem to occupy different discursive domains. By invoking "ROC citizen," the president tactfully emphasizes his Chinese-ness without calling

himself Chinese.[10] Nevertheless, by not calling the PRC "China" but naming it "mainland" or "opposite side," as Ma suggested on February 7, 2011, the "one China" principle can be upheld and "Chinese" remains a possible identifier for people in Taiwan. This contrasts with the DPP's practice, during the eight years it held the presidency, of treating "Taiwanese" and "Chinese" as mutually exclusive—Taiwanese should call China, "China," and reserve the name "Chinese" for people in China.

Ma's traversing of multilayered identities echoes, though it is not identical to, Rigger's (2003, p. 17) claim that there are at least four distinctive issues in Taiwan's national identity discussion: provincial original (ethnic/sub-ethnic identity); nationality (ethno-cultural identity); citizenship (political identity); and policy preference (for Taiwan's independence or Chinese unification). The relationship among these four strands is complicated—none serves as a proxy for the others—though they overlap at different times. This may explain why Ma answered the question guardedly, and though challenged by the DPP as evasive and ambiguous, and not identifying with Taiwan, succeeded in being reelected.

That result perhaps compelled the DPP to rethink its naming strategies, as hinted by interim DPP chairperson Chen Chu's use of "Chinese mainland" instead of "China" to name China, nine days after the party's 2012 defeat. Responding to comments that changing names revealed an altered DPP position toward China, the DPP's spokespeople asked others not to over-interpret, promising that the DPP would continue to use "China," not "mainland," as the formal name. The DPP's previous chairperson Tsai Ing-wen added that such names have always been used interchangeably in Taiwan, so there is no need to find import in the usage (Zheng, 2012). Despite this denial, that the DPP had to extend an explanation testifies to the power of naming—whether to use the two characters *dalu* is considered a grave matter and possibly a carefully calculated measure to placate concerned identity brokers.

Extricating "Taiwan" from the semantic territory of "Chinese" is no easy task, however, as it involves venturing beyond primordial ties of ethnicity and cultural heritage to more modern conceptions of citizenship. It must also respond to practical sociopolitical considerations while under China's continuing threat (Wu, 2005). The succession and intertwining of these names index Taiwan's transition from a marginalized province[11] of the ROC to a locale with its own national identity, and from being ambiguously out-of-focus to being concentrated concerning its identity. At each stage stakeholders apply linguistic resources to modify positioning between Taiwan and China.

Chapters to follow

This book traces the intertwined paths of five sets of names Taiwan has used to name China since the KMT came to Taiwan in 1949: the derogatory "Communist bandits"; the ideologically focused "Chinese Communists"; the seemingly neutral geographical designators "mainland" and "opposite shore/both shores"; and the ethnic and national label "China," with the official designation, "People's

Republic of China." Specifically, we apply Laitin's (1998) thoughts on identity projects to examine how these names have been promoted by political players as identity categories. To show the underlying power and ideological struggle in making identity categories, we also adopt Bakhtin's insights on multiple contesting voices (Bakhtin, 1986; Bruner and Gorfain, 1984).

Within the complex discursive terrain of modern Taiwan, inhabited by a variety of political symbols, each name charts its own territory, revealing Taiwan's self-appraisal in making its identities. Through textual analyses of historical archives and other mediated texts and artifacts, this book unfolds Taiwan's identity negotiation over the past half century and critically evaluates interconnections between language and politics.

Focusing on the period following the Nationalists' relocation to Taiwan in 1949 omits important prior influences under Japan and other rulers, unavoidably rendering Taiwan's history in limited terms. Nevertheless, since any research involves specific times and places for seeing—to frame it in Bakhtin's (1986) terms—in order to present a meaningful yet manageable account, we chose to discuss events transpiring primarily from that critical moment forward, since it was then that the conflict between China and Taiwan began to manifest differently. Particularly after the massacre of February 28, when the government killed many in the time of the "white terror," Taiwanese consciousness started to assume a more concrete shape. (To facilitate readers' understanding, a chronological listing of major political events in Taiwan has been included as Appendix A.) Also, despite various names for China, in this book we follow the common usage of referring to China as China, and Taiwan as Taiwan.

There are seven chapters in this book. Aside from the introductory chapter, Chapters 2 through 6 are devoted to each of the five names, and Chapter 7 concludes the book.

Chapter 2 traces the historical circumstances that led to more than 40 years' use of "Chinese Communists." *Gongfei* was used by the Nationalist government to invoke the familiar hero–villain script, framing PRC as a ferocious enemy to be exterminated at all costs. *Gongfei* served well for the Cold War policy of containing communism, and helped the KMT consolidate its rule over Taiwan. We then explore how diverse bandit-related expressions were expanded from the character *fei*, manifesting themselves at various discursive sites, helping construct China as wicked, savage and irredeemable, with the overriding goal of promoting a political myth that Chiang's army would eventually take back the mainland. A third section unpacks the historical narratives showing how *gongfei* waned, becoming dormant and removed from official discourse in the early 1980s, seeing itself revived roughly in the last decade as a nostalgic reference in limited venues such as personal essays. As it has lost its censorious implications in political realms, *gongfei* has also emerged in sarcastic remarks by supporters of Taiwan's independence (questioning KMT's changed positions) and also in promoting business opportunities. The chapter's last section engages the issue of how *fei*'s meanings have been revised and contested, as domestic and international politics continue to evolve in response to alternative conceptions of Taiwanese identity.

We then turn to the ideological identifier, *zhonggong*, or Chinese Communists, the banner word used for the longest period of time. The chapter starts by discussing unique linguistic features of this name and explores how it can morph among *zhongguo gongchandang* (CCP), *zhonggong*, and *gong*, and can be transformed from a noun to an adjective, both as identifier of ideology, and of a threatening opponent whom Taiwan must engage and defend against. We then trace how a new, comprehensive 1992 policy executed by the newly established MAC sought to rectify China's name from *gongfei* to *zhonggong* and how through this new identity project the CCP went from being viewed as under the shadow of the barbaric, gang-like *fei*, to an image as an oppositional, ideologically driven political party, and finally legitimate ruling authority. A third section further explores how *zhonggong* is positioned against other names such as *dalu*, *duian*/*liangan* and China/PRC, and how such positioning helps co-construct multilayered political realities. Last, the chapter focuses on how *zhonggong*'s narratives and linguistic structures help sustain and even facilitate the "one China" policy by defining the feud between Taiwan and China as domestic (between the KMT and CCP), not international. This all works to make Taiwan's sovereignty and identity seem less plausible or at best ambiguous, ensuring the flare-up of contesting voices from the political arena.

In the fourth chapter, we break down the name *dalu*, and some of its accompanying expressions, through in-depth examination of the three principal ways it has been construed previously and currently. We show how *dalu* was invoked as a highly emotionally charged name connected to the historically durable Chinese love of land (Fei, 1948), then supercharged by Nationalist propaganda with images of blood relatives (*tongbao*, "fellows from the same womb") suffering unimaginable horrors under an evil government—ones who "stole" the land, thereby earning the defamatory label *gongfei*, or "bandits." From this early depiction, outrageously lacking in nuance, we then show how the names *dalu* (the land) and *tongbao* get untangled, turning the romanticized motherland into a land of opposition, with the accompanying alternate expressions needed to delineate this reimagined relationship. We then analyze one expression, *dalu diqu* (mainland region), which has had status since 1991 as a constitutionally endorsed name intended to defuse conflict over the "one China" policy, particularly since the KMT reclaimed the presidency in 2008. We then discuss how *dalu* has been discursively interlaced with other names for China, with special attention to the competition over and sharing of "naming responsibility" between *dalu* and *zhonggong*. We conclude by showing how all these elements combine to guide Taiwan's search for its identity.

Our fifth chapter analyzes *duian*/*liangan* ("opposite shore/both shores"), which emphasizes the physical separation of Taiwan from China (facing each other across the Taiwan Strait), a name that paradoxically points up both their linkage and their detachment. Because the key word, *an*, "shore," is unambiguously tied to geography, it is enlisted by identity brokers to advance various ideological positions. We begin with the name's introduction in the late 1980s, concurrent with policies opening relations with China. These expressions served to shift the focus from exclusively China (as with previous names) to both China

and Taiwan, seen by some as a step in eventually moving toward a then embryonic Taiwan-centered discourse. Next we take up how the name *liangan* (especially in encompassing "*liang*," "two/both") empowered presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian (promoters of Taiwan's independence) to circumspectly assault the *ROC Constitution*'s troublesome "one China" policy, primarily by intensifying distinctions between China and Taiwan. We then show how current president Ma, using the "same" term, achieved an opposite goal of building closer ties with China even before winning the presidency in 2008: in Ma's discourse, we see "both shores" reintegrated into "one," albeit "one" whose unifying feature is subsumed under an overarching Chinese "grand culture" and heritage, an act some see as an attempt at de-Taiwanization. We conclude with a discussion of how these various iterations of *liangan* continue to influence the ongoing drama of Taiwan's identity politics, with particular reference to that which is faced by the DPP pursuing its own identity project.

The last name—the muddy and polysemous concept, "China"—is discussed in Chapter 6. First we lay the groundwork for the idea of "China," which has variously "represented a culture, a nation, and a state" (Wang and Liu, 2004, p. 573), all while encumbered with vast and convoluted history and emotion in forming the Chinese identity (Wu, 1994). Also analyzed is the linguistic construction of *zhongguo* and other similar concepts such as *zhonghua* and *huaren*, individually and collectively defined "Chinese-ness," and how the conception of *zhongguo* presumably serves as common denominator for ROC and PRC. We move on to delineate how *zhongguo* in the ROC's official discourse goes from being a term designating people in both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland ("our China"), to having its stronghold undermined as contestants tried to shift the term to designate only China ("their China"), and the implications of this for the "one China" policy. These transitions, via de-Sinicization, destabilize Chinese consciousness and create a polarized competition between Chinese-ness and Taiwanese-ness, amid possible overlap between the two discursive domains. In the fourth section we explore how, since 2008, a China-centered discourse has returned to Taiwan's official venues through using Chinese-centered phrases to name Taiwan, while avoiding *zhongguo* to name China. The chapter concludes with a discussion of changing semantic connotations of *zhongguo*, together with contesting voices concerning whether the PRC should be designated as independent, vis-à-vis the "one China" policy.

In our last chapter we revisit the link between language and politics. We start by recapturing how Taiwan's identity projects have been managed by various brokers in light of the five sets of names for China. We then move to discuss how transition between Taiwan's ruling parties has been accompanied by alternative uses of linguistic resources, the deployment of these names having been constrained by the ideologies of particular identity brokers. Reflecting on our portrait of identity negotiation as never-ending, in the third part we explore how Taiwan's identity has been, and will continue to be, renegotiated in the wake of Ma's victory in 2008 and in light of his term's end in 2016. In our last section we address possibilities for future research on the interconnections among language, politics, and identity negotiation.

Historical and cultural materials consulted

Names, as political metaphors, induce collective memory. Together with narratives sustaining such memories, they are enlisted to support identity projects, particularly as framed by the unique features of the Chinese language, both in its innate linguistic qualities and people's attitudes toward it. In more practical terms, how Taiwan establishes its identity while confronting an opponent of vastly superior power and influence, which is also a partner, especially in the economic sphere, inextricably involves expression in the symbolic representation of names.

This book seeks to answer the question of how rhetorical strategies and symbolic resources have been utilized by the Taiwanese government to manage a precarious balance of power. To explore how Taiwan's identity projects are manifested in the names it uses for China, extensive historical and archival data, from sources in Chinese and English, were consulted. These data include, among other sources, legal codes; governmental publications and official websites; legislative policies concerning naming practices; public documents and other artifacts; speeches and announcements by political figures; scholarly and popular books on political issues; texts produced by news media; and promotional materials generated by political parties/figures. The first author has also consulted Chiang Kai-shek's diaries at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.

For theorists and practitioners, the Taiwan–China question highlights an important element of world politics, given that Taiwan's "economic miracle" has made it a major sociopolitical player and China has risen to the status of world leader in human and economic resources. Clash and cooperation between Taiwan and China under the politically charged "one China" policy have rendered these symbolic processes more compelling. Analyzing multiple layers of self–other tension allows one to critically evaluate the link between language and politics under an ideographic linguistic system.

Notes

1. In this book, we follow the Pinyin system to transliterate Chinese names, unless the named person follows different systems (such as Wade-Giles, as in the case of many Taiwanese people) or as they are commonly known.
2. Retrieved October 10, 2004 from *Epoch Times* online edition, October 19, 2001. Online, available at: www.epochtimes.com/gb/1/10/19/n42649.htm.
3. *Liangan* is often translated as "both sides"; here we follow *an*'s original meaning—shore—translating it as "both shores."
4. Despite the five sets of names Taiwan's government has used and in spite of the polysemous nature of the name "China," to avoid confusion, in this book we will refer to the PRC as "China" and the ROC as "Taiwan."
5. *Xingzhengyuan dalu shiwu weiyuanhui*, 行政院大陸事務委員會, abbreviated *luweihui.*
6. There is some debate about whether Hakka are "Taiwanese." If "Taiwanese" are narrowly defined as only Fukien immigrants, Hakka are not Taiwanese, since most came from Guangdong Province. Taiwan's population comprises roughly 84 percent early Chinese immigrants, 13 percent late Chinese immigrants, and 2 percent aboriginals.