ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS

Turkey's Democratization Process

Edited by
Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Ávalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet

Turkey's Democratization Process

Since the end of the 1980 coup d'état Turkey has been in the midst of a complex process of democratization. Applying methodological pluralism in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of this process in a Turkish context, this book brings together contributions from prominent, Turkish, English, French and Spanish scholars.

Turkey's Democratization Process utilizes the theoretical framework of J. J. Linz and A. C. Stepan in order to assess the complex process of democratization in Turkey. This framework takes into account five interacting features of Turkey's polity when making this assessment, namely: whether the underlying legal and socio-economic conditions are conducive for the development of a free and participant society; if a relatively autonomous political society exists; whether there are legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms; if there exists a state bureaucracy which can be used by a democratic government; and whether the type and pace of Turkish economic development contributes to this process.

Examining the Turkish case in light of this framework, this book seeks to combine analyses that will help assess the process of democratization in Turkey to date and will be of interest to scholars and researchers interested in Turkish politics, democratization and Middle Eastern studies more broadly.

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Preface

This book is the result of a multi-disciplinary research project carried out in the field of social sciences that aims to address the process of Turkish democratization. Academics from Turkish, English, French and Spanish universities joined forces in order to fully comprehend the global impact of the profound transformations and the interactions of different actors that have taken place in Turkey in recent years and how this is influencing the polity in its path towards democratization.

As this book was nearing publication, the May and June 2013 protests broke out in Turkey, images of which were seen around the world. The mass demonstrations and the way in which the government managed and responded to them form part of the process of Turkish democratization analysed in this book.

The seeds of this publication were planted in 2008 during the research seminar “Democracy and Democratization in Turkey” held 21–23 November in La Cristalera Residence Hall at the Autónoma University of Madrid. At that time, 14 academic experts from different fields covering Turkey’s economy, culture, society and politics met under the aegis of the R&D project: “Political relations and human exchanges between Spain and the Muslim world” (1939–2004; SEJ2005–08867-C03–01/CPOL). The points raised during these seminars were developed and extended first during the R&D project “Spain in the face of political reforms and migrations in the Mediterranean and the Muslim World” (2009–11; CSO2008–06232-c03–01/cpol), then during the subsequent R&D project “The Arab-Islamic world in movement: migrations, reforms and elections and their impact on Spain” (CSO2011–29438-C05–01) and finally during a symposium held on 18 and 19 December 2009 at the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies (CEPC) and the Círculo de Bellas Artes respectively, thanks to the public funding (Acción Complementaria) CSO2009–06186-E/SOCI. All of these projects were financed by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Science and Innovation.

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Political parties

AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, Justice and Development Party)
ANAP (*Anavatan Partisi*, Motherland Party)
AP (*Adalet Partisi*, Justice Party)
BDP (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, Peace and Democracy Party)
BP (*Birlik Partisi*, Unity Party)
CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, Republican People's Party),
CKMP (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*, Republican Peasants' Nation Party)
DEHAP (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*, Democratic People's Party)
DP (*Demokrat Parti*, Democratic Party)
DSP (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, Democratic Left Party)
DTP (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, Democratic Society Party)
DYP (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, True Path Party)
FP (*Fazilet Partisi*, Virtue Party)
GP (*Genç Parti*, Youth Party)
HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, People's Democracy Party)
HP (*Halkçı Parti*, Populist Party)
MÇP (*Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*, National Work Party)
MDP (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*, Nationalist Democracy Party)
MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, Nationalist Action Party)
MNP (*Milli Nizam Partisi*, National Order Party)
MSP (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, National Salvation Party)
Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*)
RP (*Refah Partisi*, Welfare Party)
SHP (*Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi*, Social Democratic People's Party)
SODEP (*Sosyal Demokrat Partisi*, Social Democratic Party)
SP (*Saadet Partisi*, Felicity Party)
TİP (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, Turkish Workers Party)

Turkey
Administrative Divisions

- International Boundary
- Province Boundary
- Province Capital
- National Capital

Turkey has 81 provinces.
Provinces have the same name as their capitals.

0 100 200 kilometers
0 100 200 miles

Part I

Introduction and context

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1 Democratization processes in defective democracies

The case of Turkey

Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Ávalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet

In the 12 June 2011 elections in Turkey, the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* Justice and Development Party) claimed its third consecutive victory at the ballot box, winning a comfortable majority that once again made it possible to form a single-party government. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the head of the AKP, is the first political leader in the history of Turkish elections to increase the percentage of votes won by his party in three consecutive general elections. In the elections, the AKP received 49.83 per cent of the votes, giving them 326 seats. However, this overwhelming victory at the polls did not translate into the two-thirds majority needed to unilaterally adopt a Turkish constitution (which would require 367 seats) or even the 330 seats that would allow the party–after agreement in the Parliament on procedures for adoption and the president's approval–to call a referendum to endorse the change.

The main opposition parties, CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, Republican People's Party), MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, Nationalist Action Party) and the independent candidates backed by the BDP (*Barış ve Demokrasi Parti*, Peace and Democracy Party), were allocated 135, 53 and 36 seats respectively, corresponding to the percentage of votes they won: 25.96 per cent, 13.01 per cent and 6.63 per cent. After the elections, however, the YSK (*Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*, Supreme Electoral Board) decided to strip deputy (MP) Hatip Dicle, a candidate backed by the BDP, of his seat, since he had been sentenced to one year and eight months in prison for disseminating propaganda on behalf of the banned PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*, Kurdistan Workers' Party). This decision was very controversial, since it was not clear why the YSK had allowed Dicle to run in the first place. His seat was filled by Oya Eronat, an AKP candidate, thus increasing the number of deputies representing that party to 327.

The newly formed Grand National Assembly of Turkey confronted a tough challenge: to draft and approve a new constitution to replace the 1982 Turkish constitution written under the auspices of the military junta that ruled the country after the coup d'état in 1980. Although the different political groups agreed that a new constitution was needed, there was no doubt that the debates in Parliament were nonetheless going to be intense. The political parties that made up the Grand National Assembly of Turkey spoke for very different sectors of society, which made reaching an agreement more complex.

However, as other authors have noted before, a successful constitution requires the greatest possible consensus. In Turkey, then, it is crucial to reconcile different viewpoints: liberal, conservative, Turkish and Kurdish nationalist, and religious and rigidly secular sensibilities, among others. This fact is extremely important. Ozbudun and Gençkaya have already asserted that 'the Turkish experience in constitution-making can be described as a series of missed opportunities to create political institutions based on broad consensus' (2009: 3). Indeed, in a discussion of this issue in a comparative study on Italy, Spain and Turkey, McLaren asserted: 'it is consensual rule-making that would ultimately seem of utmost importance in explaining differential consolidation in Italy, Spain and Turkey' (2008: 268).

Thus, in its third term, the AKP Government faced a key moment for the Turkish political system. The objective of this book is to contribute an analysis that can help to make an assessment of the process of democratization in Turkey to date.

Theoretical framework

Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle have singled out the different dimensions of an overall process of democratization: 'the breakdown of the previous regime,[1] democratic transition, regime consolidation, and democratic persistence', specifically noting that the transition process 'entails the creation of the basic political institutions of a new democratic system and the drafting of new rules for regulating the political behaviour of citizens, organisations and governing elites' (1995: xii). This is what O'Donnell would call the first transition, from 'the previous authoritarian regime to the installation of a democratic government' (1989: 20). During this transition process, there are expectations, as Linz says, 'that political authority will soon be derived only from the free decision of an electorate' (1990: 28). This political moment is characterised by its uncertainly, and there is no unanimity in academia in terms of establishing the end of the transition process, which includes free non-fraudulent elections and usually also involves the establishment of a new, democratic constitutional framework (Linz 1990: 28), (Huneeus 1994: 35). Linz and Stepan consider transition complete

> When sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de iure*.
>
> (Linz and Stepan 1996a: 3)

It follows, then, that the authors caution that it is possible for a democratic transition to remain incomplete, since there may be non-elected

institutions, such as the army, that unlawfully control part of the political sovereignty or there may be such a high degree of disagreement between the elites and the majority of the population about the new democratic institutions that normal evolution and consolidation are impeded by a serious threat of illegitimacy (Linz and Stepan 1996a: 4). Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle also note in this respect that a transition 'may culminate in a new regime but that regime may not even be fully democratic' (Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995: 3).

This situation gives rise to serious disputes regarding the application of the concept of democratic consolidation to those regimes that do not possess the basic characteristics to be qualified as fully democratic. O'Donnell speaks of a second transition 'from this [democratic] government to the consolidation of democracy or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a democratic regime. I am speaking of political democracy (or polyarchy, according to Robert Dahl's useful and widely used definition)' (O'Donnell 1989: 20). Regarding democratic consolidation, Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle argue that 'democratic consolidation, as we define it, requests full conformity with all the criteria inherent in a demanding, multifaceted procedural definition of democracy' (Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995:3). Also these authors suggested that the study of democratic consolidation is an even more complex phenomenon than that of transitions. The most recent research lines in this topic have focused on the actions of elites and on agency,[2] while 'consolidation is much more complex and it involves a much larger number of actors in a wider array of political arenas' (Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995: 3).

Linz and Stepan clearly state that it is not possible to speak of democratic consolidation unless the following three conditions are met: the existence of a state; a democratic transition that has been brought to completion (this is not the case if the freely elected government cannot impose, either *de iure* or *de facto*, its authority in certain areas because of confrontations with 'authoritarian enclaves', 'reserve domains' or military 'prerogatives'); and finally, the implementation of a democratic government that respects the constitutional framework and fundamental rights and freedoms. The authors assert that 'only democracies can become consolidated democracies' (Linz and Stepan 1996b: 14).

Schedler is one of the authors who have made an exhaustive study of the use of the term 'democratic consolidation', analysing some of the difficulties in its application. For some academics, it connotes a process, while for others it implies a point of arrival, a result, a target. This author suggests that the meaning of this concept, termed 'nebulous' by Pridham (1995: 167), depends on our empirical viewpoints and 'the type of regime we want to avoid or attain' (according to our normative horizons) (Schedler 1997: 2). For Schedler, democratic consolidation (in accordance with other authors like O'Donnell (1996) and Schneider (1995), who had already made note of

this) is ‘indeed an intrinsically teleological concept’ (Schedler 1997: 5). The author lists five concepts of democratic consolidation: avoiding democratic breakdown, avoiding democratic erosion, institutionalising democracy, completing democracy and deepening democracy. If liberal democracies must face the challenge of preventing an ‘erosion of democracy’ then semi-democratic regimes[3] not only must prevent a regression to authoritarianism, but they must continue to push the evolution of the regime towards full democracy (Schedler 1998: 95). Moreover, for Schedler

> in semi-democracies which face the task of democratic completion, any talk about “the consolidation of democracy” is misleading. It suggests that a democratic regime is already in place (and only needs to be “consolidated”) when in fact the issue at hand is constructing a fully democratic regime.
>
> (Schedler 1998: 99)

Merkel (2004) and Puhle (2005) use the term defective democracies to describe regimes that hold elections with a series of democratic requisites but that at the same time lack one or more of the characteristics shared by ‘embedded democracies’.[4] The authors note four types of defective democracies: 1) Exclusive democracy, which contains criteria for excluding the suffrage of certain groups, usually based on questions of ethnicity, religion or gender. 2) Tutelary democracy, characterised by the existence of reserved domains outside the scope of democratically elected governments and veto players that may exercise their powers either by constitutional or extra-constitutional means, such as the military or oligarchic groups. 3) Delegative democracies, where ‘the mechanisms of horizontal accountability, the checks and balances between the different powers, are out of order’. In this case, for example, a lack of judicial independence would be one of its symptoms. 4) Illiberal democracy, where the practice of the rule of law does not work well, constitutional norms are not properly implemented and human rights and fundamental liberties are not guaranteed. Some cases of defective democracies have a mixed profile that combine the characteristics defining each category.

In a regime with a defective democracy, if what Schedler calls ‘completing democracy’ (1998: 95) is to be produced, some alteration must occur in the existing institutions and regulations that are impeding the development of a fully democratic regime. As Valenzuela (1990) has noted, the process of democratization in this case cannot be based on the ‘habituation, assimilation, or routine’ of these non-democratic institutions, but some alteration must occur in the existing institutions. This alteration can be encouraged by the political class or by civil society–not just internal groups, but also external actors.

This work will study the case of a particular defective democracy, Turkey, which is undergoing a democratization process whose ideal goal would be to

accomplish a full democratic regime. The term 'embedded democracies' as defined by Wolfgang Merkel (2004) and the members of the 'Defective Democracies' research project is very useful in terms of making the desired type of liberal democratic regime operational. This concept goes beyond other well-known definitions of democracy such as the one coined by Dahl as polyarchy in 1971. Still, it focuses on a specific and limited list of elements necessary to establish a democratic regime that can be taken separately, but that are also connected and mutually reinforcing.

Bearing in mind all of the positions, Linz and Stepan's theoretical framework (1996a) serves as a very useful analytical element to examine the process of democratization in Turkey at the present time, although this particular case is not one of democratic consolidation but about a prior stage. For these authors, consolidated democracies–within the essential framework of a sovereign state–have five interacting arenas in place that reinforce one another:

> first, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society; second, there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society; third, there must be a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms and independent associational life; fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government; fifth, there must be an institutionalised economic society.
>
> (Linz and Stepan 1996a: 7)

The analysis in this book focuses on the evolution of these five arenas in the Turkish case.

As noted on p. 5, there is some controversy regarding the use of the term democratic consolidation for regimes that are not fully democratic. However, this book starts from the premise that the arenas defined by Linz and Stepan to analyse problems of democratic transitions and consolidation are equally valid for the analysis of democratization processes in defective democracies.

In conclusion, the challenge before us is to analyse the processes of democratization that do not fully correspond to either the concept of transition or the concept of consolidation. The starting point is a regime that holds elections that meet a minimum of the democratic criteria for pluralism, inclusivity and transparent, open and contested elections, but which nonetheless have severe restrictions in other spheres, such as the existence of reserved domains, serious problems in the implementation of the separation of powers and their reciprocal control, and severe restrictions in the spheres of political and civil rights. We agree with Schedler when he asserts that if these political regimes are undergoing a democratization process, this process entails 'democratic completion' and is not about consolidating the current features of the regime (1998: 95–96).

The Turkish case

A 2012 report from Freedom House qualified Turkey as partly free, giving it a score of 3 for both political rights and civil liberties (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free). The Turkish state can claim prior democratic experience, a full institutional framework and a civil society capable of channelling significant proposals for change. Its history, however, has also been marked by coups d'état and severe restrictions in the sphere of political liberties and fundamental rights.

After the 1980 coup when a military junta seized power, the country underwent a transition overseen by the army that ensured that members of the military would play a decisive role and substantially cut back on individual rights and freedoms, as evidenced by the constitution approved in a 1982 referendum. This would have produced, according to the criteria of Linz and Stepan (1996a:3) mentioned pp. 4–5, an incomplete transition. The regime that emerged after the coup could be considered a 'defective' democracy (Merkel 2004 and Puhle 2005) that produced important restrictions in the sphere of rights. This defective democracy combined elements of 'tutelary democracy,' in which non-elected actors (the military establishment in Turkey's case) maintain reserved domains and act as veto players, and those of 'illiberal democracy', in which there are severe limitations in the exercise of public freedoms and fundamental rights and the effective rule of law. Although the political parties banned in 1981 were slowly rebuilt over the course of a decade, institutional weakness and/or a lack of will and conviction hindered any substantial reform of the political system. Though the democratization of the political system will continue to advance, any resulting reforms could be of limited scope and the fruit of difficult transactions between parties.

The Helsinki European Council's decision to recognise Turkey as an EU candidate country in 1999 served as a catalyst for the political parties to undertake a comprehensive process of political and economic reforms. Between 1999 and 2002, they were promoted by a difficult coalition of three parties and, after the AKP won an absolute majority in the 2002 general elections, this party determined to follow the path the previous coalition had already initiated with even greater intensity. As a result of all these changes, for the first time in Turkey, the political debate opened up significantly to issues that had been heretofore taboo (like the Kurdish question) and both the political elite and society in general seemed to come together in a synergy in favour of deep democratising changes.

Without a doubt, the Turkish regime that emerged after the 1980 coup d'état has evolved considerably since that year. Both internal democratic demands, such as those made by women's associations, which had a significant impact on the civil (2001) and penal (2005) code reforms, and the external influence of Turkey's candidacy to join the EU, have played a role. And although the Turkish constitution has been transformed in important

ways, it is now commonly believed that more than a mere transformation is needed; the adoption of a new constitution that would leave authoritarian and repressive habits in the past is essential.

However, after negotiations began with the EU in 2005, the drive for democratization was slowed down, doubtless due to different factors, including most notably: messages from some EU governments ruling out the possibility of Turkey's candidacy that instead supported a different type of privileged relationship; the biased policies of the governing AKP, which, for example, while fighting to limit military power, have not been successful in establishing a legal and social framework that encourages the expansion of freedom of expression in the country (indeed, Keyman (2010: 325) believes that the AKP failed in its second term in that it did not establish the right equilibrium between its commitment to democratic consolidation and its conservative nature, thus intensifying scepticism about the objectives of its programme for democratising the regime); also during its second term in office, the AKP's erratic policies co-existed with those of an opposition that supported the status quo while wrapping itself in the discourse of national security.

The response in some sectors critical of the AKP at that time, whether political, military or judicial, was characterised by their defence of a discourse that emphasised security (as opposed to the AKP's policies, which were seen as detrimental to the country's territorial and secular integrity) at the expense of greater democratic reforms, which would reinforce Turkish pluralism. The polarisation resulting from this process can be regarded as the inevitable consequence of a process of democratization that has opened a Pandora's box in Turkish society. Curtailed since the 1980 coup, these different groups have been forced to openly confront their unresolved internal conflicts. Although this tension may be the natural consequence of a process in which different voices – which are not used to engaging in dialogue – must come to new agreements if they are to live together, the way in which this tension is resolved will determine the success of Turkish democratization.

Structure of the book

The analysis of the process of Turkish democratization presented in this book is designed, on the one hand, to study the recent democratic evolution not only in the Turkish political institutional arena, but also in other spheres, as defined in Linz and Stepan's classic work *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (1996a: 7–15).[5] Using Schedler's (1998) concept, Turkey would be deep in a process that could be called 'completing democracy' and the theoretical framework advanced by Linz and Stepan makes it possible to analyse the complexity of this process in all its dimensions. This chapter is intended to provide a more detailed account of the work of these and other well known academics in the field of democratization.

If Linz and Stepan (1996a:7) consider that democratic consolidation requires much more than 'elections and markets', it is essential to begin with

a sovereign state. For this reason, the following chapter of the book is dedicated to the historical context of the formation of the Turkish nation-state. Linz and Stepan distinguish state-building from nation-building and discuss the conflicts that may arise during the evolution of these two differentiated concepts and the impact that they can have on processes of democratization: 'Whereas a state can exist on the basis of external conformity with its rules, a nation requires some internal identification' (Linz and Stepan 1996a:22). Democratic policies that emerge in the context of state-making tend to emphasise an inclusive and extensive citizenry that guarantees the equality of individual rights to citizens. On the contrary, a nation-state policy may be in serious opposition to this process of democratization if it pursues greater cultural homogeneity using repressive measures (Linz and Stepan 1996a: 25).

These questions are discussed in Chapter 2 by Ibrahim Saylan, 'The formation of citizenship in Turkey'. Following this, İlter Turan in 'Two steps forward one step back: Turkey's democratic transformation' reviews the development of both authoritarian and democratic trends in the Turkish regime since the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, thus positioning the reader in the present day. An analysis of the international context rounds out these pieces. The outbreak of the Arab revolts has created a new situation in the region. Much speculation has been made as well about the possible influence that Turkey might have on the new regimes that are emerging, as a possible political and social model to follow. Conversely, it is essential to consider the effect that the revolts may have on Turkish internal politics, either by encouraging the democratization process with the push that may come from their spread or the so-called spirit of the times, as suggested by Linz and Stepan (1996a: 75–76), or by contributing negatively to it. This negative contribution could be due to the fact that the political instability occurring in the countries sharing borders with Turkey could intensify concerns for national security that go against democratization trends and the promotion of fundamental rights and freedoms. More time will have to pass before these recent influences can be evaluated, while other longer-term ones can be given a more unhurried and profound analysis. In Chapter 4, 'The international context of democratic reform in Turkey', William Hale takes a close look at the effect that interaction with European and transatlantic organisations and countries has had on the process of Turkish democratization.

These three chapters, then, introduce and provide context for the five relevant interconnected arenas defined by Linz and Stepan (which in this case are equally useful for the analysis of democratization processes in defective democracies). The first section includes articles relating to political society. Political parties are key actors since they carry out essential work when it comes to agreeing on the rules of the democratic game and their implementation. Chapter 5 by Sabri Sayarı, 'Party system and democratic consolidation in Turkey: problems and prospects', analyses the development of the Turkish party system. More specifically, Işık Gürleyen's Chapter 6, 'What did they promise for democracy and what did they deliver?: the AKP

and the CHP 2002–11' aims to analyse the specific proposals made by the political parties to promote democratic reforms and the expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms.

The section dedicated to civil society features articles by Fuat Keyman and Tuba Kancı, Pinar İlkkaracan and Marcus Graf. Chapter 7 by Fuat Keyman and Tuba Kancı, 'Democratic consolidation and civil society in Turkey' analyses Turkish civil society's organisational capacity and the way in which civil society organisations approach democracy. Pınar İlkkaracan takes up the role of Turkish women's movements in the democratization process of Turkish society in Chapter 8, 'Democratization in Turkey from a gender perspective'. Finally, Chapter 9 by Marcus Graf, 'The Istanbul Art Scene – A Social System?', reflects on art's various functions for the palace, the state and the public and pays special attention to the interconnection between artistic and social developments in Turkey. The third major arena analysed focuses on the intersection between citizens and the idea of social justice as explained by Mine Eder in Chapter 10, 'Deepening neo-liberalisation and the changing welfare regime in Turkey: mutations of a populist, "sub-optimal" democracy'.

The fourth arena examined in the book includes an analysis of the functioning of the state apparatus. This segment includes the new public administration, the military, the judiciary and the perceptions that citizens have about corruption and the tax system in the country. Süleyman Sözen in his Chapter 11 'New public administration in Turkey' explains the substantial legal and structural changes that the Turkish public administration has undergone in the last few years in line with the democratization process in the country. Chapter 12 by Ali Çarkoğlu and Fikret Adaman: 'Determinants of tax evasion by households: evidence from Turkey' however, offers a different point of view, drawing on political culture. As a study of administrative efficiency, this piece analyses the perception that Turkish citizens have of tax evasion. Yaprak Gürsoy, in turn, in Chapter 13, 'From tutelary powers and interventions to civilian control: An overview of Turkish civil-military relations since the 1920s', provides an overview of Turkish civil-military relations primarily focusing on the post-1980 era, looking at whether or not military power is being superseded by civil power. Finally in this section, Ergun Özbudun in Chapter 14, 'The judiciary', reviews the current situation of this state power in Turkey, taking into account the developments fostered by the reforms requested by the EU.

The last arena analysed corresponds to the rule of law about which Linz and Stepan have stated:

> a rule of law embodied in a spirit of constitutionalism is an indispensable condition. A spirit of constitutionalism requires more than rule by majoritarianism. It entails a relatively strong consensus over the constitution and especially a commitment to 'self-binding' procedures of governance that require exceptional majorities to change.
>
> (Linz and Stepan 1996a: 10)

The rule of law must guarantee and promote the development of a democratic regime and the defence of fundamental rights and liberties.

In this respect, Chapter 15, by Ergun Özbudun, 'Democracy, tutelarism, and the search for a new constitution' is essential to understand the importance of the new Turkish constitutional process and the difficulties it faces. Senem Aydın in Chapter 16, 'Human rights in Turkey', provides an overview of the state of human rights in Turkey in the 1990s, followed by an account of the EU-induced reform process that accelerated in the 1999–2005 period. Ayşen Candaş Bilgen and Hakan Yılmaz in Chapter 17, 'The paradox of equality: subjective attitudes towards basic rights in Turkey' evaluate and contextualise the attitudes of Turkey's constituency with regard to basic rights from the perspective of political culture. Dilek Kurban focuses on the Kurdish issue, one of the most relevant topics influencing the democratization process in Turkey. Chapter 18 'The Kurdish question: law, politics and the limits of recognition', presents a systematic overview of the legal framework affecting the rights and freedoms of the Kurdish population in the Turkish political system and pays special attention to the current claims of the Kurdish population and whether or not the legal changes are reflecting them.

On the current situation of the minorities recognised by the Lausanne Treaty, Samim Akgönül, in Chapter 19, 'Non-Muslim minorities in the Turkish democratization process', has written about the main constraints these groups face, their demands and aspirations and the political response up to now. Elise Massicard, on the other hand, aims to analyse the question of democratization from the Alevi perspective in Chapter 20, 'Democratization in Turkey? Insights from the Alevi issue'. This piece pays special attention to the evolution not only of the legal framework affecting their rights, but also to the integration of Alevis in the political process, in particular to the Alevist movement that appeared in the late 1980s.

Ceren Sözeri in Chapter 21, 'The political economy of the media and its impact on freedom of expression in Turkey', looks at the situation of freedom of expression, a key issue concerning all democratization processes. Organisations such as Reporters Without Borders have noted a negative evolution in this area, since Turkey, which ranked 123 on the world ranking of freedom of expression in 2009, fell to 138 in 2010. Indeed, the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg also expressed his concern in this respect in a report published in April 2011.

Finally, the book ends with Chapter 22 'Some observations on Turkey's democratization process' in order to bring together the main ideas from the different chapters and propose some lines of analysis that can contribute to the study of the democratization processes in countries with defective democracies.

Notes

1 On the different paths to democratization, see: Stepan, A. (1986) 'Paths toward redemocratization: theoretical and comparative considerations', in G. O'Donnell,

P. Schmitter, L. Whitehead (eds) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Comparative perspectives,* London: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Linz, J. J., and Stepan A. (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

2 Colomer, J. M. (1994) 'Teorías de la transición', *Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época)*, 86: 243–53 and Martí i Puig, S. (2001) 'Y después de las transiciones qué? Un balance y análisis de las teorías del cambio político', *Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época)* 13: 101–24.

3 As Szmolka (2010:105–06, 117–18) notes:

> The processes of political change initiated in authoritarian countries during the latest upheavals in the third wave of democratization have not always resulted in forms of democratic government. In many cases, they have produced new types of authoritarianism or near-democratic regimes that may experience significant problems in the way in which their government functions. It is difficult to classify these countries using the classic categories of political regimes established by political science, which has traditionally differentiated between democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. These new regimes have been conceptualised in different ways.

As the author explains, some scholars use terms that emphasise the democratic element: 'façade democracie', "pseudo-democracies" (Finer, 1970), "semi-democracies" (Diamond, Linz, Lipset, 1995; Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez Liñán, 2000), among others. Other academics have stressed the adjective "authoritarian". Examples of this include the terms "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way, 2002) and "electoral authoritarianism" (Schedler, 2002 and 2006). Finally, Szmolka mentions authors who have used the category of "hybrid political regimes". Szmolka herself differentiates between "defective democracies" and "pluralist authoritarianism" within hybrid political regimes.

For a compilation of the different definitions of hybrid regimes, see Diamond, L. (2002) 'Thinking About Hybrid Regimes', *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2): 21–35; Bogaards, M. (2009) 'How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism', *Democratization,* 16(2): 399–423; Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2002) 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2): 51–65.

4 Dimensions, partial regimes and criteria of embedded democracy as defined in Merkel (2004):

I. Dimension of vertical legitimacy
- A) Electoral regime
  1. Elected officials
  2. Inclusive suffrage
  3. Right to candidacy
  4. Correctly organized, free and fair elections
- B) Political rights
  5. Press freedom
  6. Freedom of association

II. Dimension of liberal constitutionalism and rule of law
- C) Civil Rights
  7. Individual liberties from violations of own rights by state/private agents
  8. Equality before the law

D) Horizontal accountability
9. Horizontal separation of powers
III. Dimension of effective agenda control
E) Effective power to rule
10. Effective officials with effective right to rule

5 Ergun Özbudun has already applied Linz and Stepan's concept of democratic consolidation to the Turkish case in his book, Özbudun, E. (2000) *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, London: Lynne Rienner.

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2 The formation of citizenship in Turkey

İbrahim Saylan

Introduction

Citizenship denotes a politico-legal link between state and people. In other words, it refers to membership of a political community, which provides members with a set of rights and obligations. In principle, membership to polity is universal, that is, open to everybody living within the territorial boundaries of the state. Nevertheless, the connection between people as nation and the state makes membership criteria highly contentious. Modern citizenship expresses membership to the nation-state. Although rights and duties associated with citizenship have changed in the course of history, nation-state has thus far remained the fundamental political unit defining borders and content of citizenship.

On the other hand, a number of factors have brought about questioning, or even crisis of modernist convictions, including the assumption of an indissoluble link between nation and state, which substantiated nation-state-based modern political structure. This questioning has naturally drawn attention to the institution of citizenship that has been closely bound with the state and nation in the age of nation-states.

As a part of modernity, nationalism claimed congruence of nation and state. In reality, nation was a goal to be achieved (Alter 1989). For this purpose, cultural, ethnic, religious identities were disregarded in the name of progress, prosperity, and democracy, which were defined within the context of national identity and interests. Hence, the nation-building process relegated some groups in society to minority positions in terms of religion, ethnicity, culture, and political ideology. And, unsurprisingly homogenizing attempts by the nation-states have met immediate reactions by especially autochthonous ethnic, cultural groups. Until the end of the Cold War, discontent could be hardly expressed or heard. However, for about two decades, ethnic, religious, and cultural identity claims have challenged nation-states in remarkable ways. All these demands have unavoidably related to the existing formation of citizenship, and the need to reconstruct it so to meet these diverse demands under new circumstances. Its repercussions have been more critical for the states in which the connection between nationhood and citizenship was stronger.

This chapter aims to analyze the construction of Turkish citizenship as a politico-legal institution and the discourse that links Turkish state and people in a specific way in the age of nation-states and within the context of contemporary challenges to its extant formation on various grounds. In doing this, it first gives a theoretical perspective about the relationship between nationalism and citizenship within the broader context of modernity in order to lay the ground for an analysis of the particular Turkish case. The second part focuses on the formation of citizenship in Turkey in the early republican period. In doing this, it deals with the nature and content of Turkish citizenship in relation to Turkish nationalism. Thus, while it sheds light on the tense relationship between political and cultural definitions of Turk, or state's double discourse on Turkishness, the effects of citizenship policies on various ethnic, religious minorities are examined. The third part is centered upon current debates and political struggles that relate to the reconstruction of Turkish citizenship with the effects of internal and external dynamics within the context of systemic gripes caused by increasing demands from ethnic, religious, and linguistic identities inside, and globalization processes, particularly European integration, that require the institutionalization and internalization of liberal-democratic normative\institutional framework. Thus, it is expected to denote the crucial interconnection between a democratic re-formation of Turkish citizenship and consolidation of democracy in the country.

Modernity, nationalism, citizenship

Citizenship in the modern age cannot be comprehended separately from nationalism and nation-state since they have all become entwined notwithstanding that they are conceptually differentiated. Nationalism has not only enabled establishment, and thus far reproduction, of nation-state in highly varied contexts, it has also articulated the institution of citizenship with a universalist redefinition of this new type of state since the French Revolution. Therefore, in order to have a better understanding of the notion of citizenship and related policies, one needs to scrutinize the nature, content, and mechanisms of nationalism, and then focus on the formation of nationality both at cultural and politico-legal levels within the framework of nation-state.

Nationalism

Nationalism has been one of the ideologies that put its imprint on the modern age. However, it is still a puzzling phenomenon basically since particularity, ambiguity, and resilience are features of it. Even so, one can contend that nationalism as a multifaceted phenomenon consists of mainly three aspects: sentiment, ideology, and politics. Its psychological\emotional aspect is much more related to human condition: the need for belongingness, the meaning attributed by people to their culture, language, and territory. The peculiarity of nationalism is that it exploits the emotional investment of

individuals in the elements of their culture. Although there is nothing inevitable about creating national identity out of perennial cultural diversity and fluid ethno-cultural traits, nationalism reifies culture and makes a political principle out of it. This is the point where the ideological characteristic of nationalism becomes conspicuous.

Nationalist ideology basically prioritizes the nation and legitimates political authority on the basis of the will of nation. Associated with a clearly demarcated territory, nation is mobilized for self-determination. So, the idea that 'like should rule the like' (Wimmer 2002: 58) constitutes the main political objective. To put it differently, nationalism refers to a political principle ('nationality principle') which seeks to achieve congruence between cultural and political units (Gellner 1983: 1). It denotes a new mode of boundary-making according to which the legitimate unit was to be one composed of persons of the same culture. Thus, it does not only define the limits of the unit but it assumes that the unit has an institutional leadership (the state), and its main concern is that foreigners should not rule it (self-government) (Gellner 1997).

Nevertheless, despite all these naturalizing tendencies of nationalist ideology, nations are actually historical constructions. Like nation-states, nations are basically products of nationalism that emerged in the modern age through transformations in the nature of power, which led to the production and reception of nationalist politics. In this sense, nationalism is principally about politics and politics is about power (Breuilly 1993). Hence, in the struggle for power that is concentrated in the state in the modern age, there is no inevitability of the emergence of particular nations. Particular nations are the result of the defeat of alternative nationalisms (Billig 1995: 28). The establishment of the nation-state merely indicates political and/or military triumph of nationalist elites or just a specific part of them, but it does not mean that social and political integration is completed. In accordance with the ideal of congruence between political and cultural units, the process of nation-building which already started with nationalist political movement now sets about integrating and harmonizing socially, regionally, or even politically and institutionally divided sections of the people (Alter 1989: 21). Hence, nationalism as a form of identity politics by its nature politicizes cultural identity.[1] And, since homogeneity of the nation is largely fictitious, it needs to create a common culture in order to tie the inhabitants together in a national fellowship. Therefore, national identity as a construction is above all a political identity whose construction is a part of the broader process of nation-building.

The mechanisms underlying nation-building are various, and the efforts needed for this purpose vary since each case is shaped by different historical trajectories and political circumstances, and culminated in the formation of nation-states. Historically, this notion of particularity subsequently affected both the way that nation-states were established, and the conceptualization of the nation they adopted in the institutionalization of the link between the

state and people through citizenship. Nation-states, as consequences of successful political movements, rose in two stages. First, they appeared as the nationalization of absolutist states of Western Europe that were relatively more homogeneous. Then, the model of nation-state was globalized through the break-up of empires that were more heterogeneous. In other words, nation-states were established in two ways: either modern state was captured by the nationalist project, or they were built on its premises by ideological and institutional copying (Wimmer 2002: 65). Actually, before nationalist ideas reached empires that led to their break-up in Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian cases, nationalism had been ramified with the emergence of the Herderian interpretation of nationalism in Germany (Greenfeld 1992).

These two historical patterns have been generally expressed on the basis of civic/ethnic dichotomy which is used to define two different conceptions of the nation, and thus citizenship regimes. This conceptualization was first used as Western and Eastern nationalisms by Kohn according to whom, while the former sees nations as associations of territorial populations governed by a single set of laws and institutions, the latter considers nations as organic wholes (Kohn 1967). Civic model is generally referred to as a standard Western model. Indeed, civicness and ethnicness have for decades been used as opposites. Recently, one can observe a relative convergence around the idea that national identity includes both civic and ethnic elements. Given that the definition of what holds the nation together varies not only from country to country, but also over time (Wimmer 2002: 56), and national identity has a culturally substantiated political character, it would be more meaningful to assert that every national identity consists of both civic and ethnic characteristics. Indeed, experiences of nation-building show that elements of both models may (and do) exist at the same time in varying degrees and differing forms. That is to say, the nation is defined not in terms of rival models but collectively signifying a cultural and a political bond (Özdoğan 2000).

Such a perspective does not totally ignore analytical usefulness of this distinction. It is apparent that the so-called civic type sees the nation as a political association based on consent and will; on the contrary, the ethnic model takes culture as its starting point, not the state.[2] Nonetheless, since the difference between ethnic and civic variants has generally been overrated, it becomes difficult to see that the civic type has also an ethnic dimension. In this sense, although only the ethnic type is labeled as exclusive, the inclusiveness of the civic type has limits. This mainly results from the fact that national 'us' vis-à-vis 'others' is constructed by particular cultural values, symbols, language, and common history.

Thus, despite the significance of the different historical trajectories followed by each case, there is always a general principle regarding nation-building that it strives to institutionalize national boundaries drawn according to the nationally defined processes of inclusion and exclusion. In Wimmer's words,

> national boundary-making aims at surrounding different dimensions of human life-economy, polity and society-as expression of a single entity, and in this process different forms of closure (legal, political, military, and social) are organized along the same set of nationalist principles.
> (Wimmer 2002: 57)

This new type of boundary-making is so extensive and comprehensive that the nation-state model represents a unique type in history thus far in which the state, nation, and society converge, and politics becomes nation-wide politics. Furthermore, within 'the universal code of particularity' (Billig 1995), nation-states reinforce each other, making the nationalist representation of the world more and more plausible, as if this were the natural way to think and speak about society, politics, law, and so forth. Hence, the nation has gained two meanings in nationalist ideology: nation as the people living within a state, and nation as the nation-state (Billig 1995). Consequently, national 'us' is formed within a two-tiered process consisting of the construction of the nation as a cultural collective and a polity so as to complement each other and serve the same goal in the boundary-making process between 'us' and 'them'.

Nation as a cultural collectivite

The core nationalist assumption that nations are pre-existing cultural collectives contradicts with social reality, since claimed cultural homogeneity, belief in common past and future all need to be constructed and institutionalized as prevalent through a hard ideological and political struggle. Although historical evidence shows that most successful nationalisms presume some prior community of territory, language, or culture, objective elements *per se* do not lead to a distinct national identity. Nations come into existence as an amalgamation of objective and subjective elements through

> cultural innovation, involving hard ideological labor, careful propaganda, and a creative imagination. (In other words), if politics is the ground upon which the category of the nation was first proposed, culture was the terrain where it was elaborated, and in this sense nationality is best conceived as a complex, uneven, and unpredictable process, forged from an interaction of cultural coalescence and specific political intervention, which cannot be reduced to static criteria of language, territory, ethnicity or culture.
> (Eley and Suny 1996: 7–8)

Therefore, national identity construction is a multifaceted process resulting from a constant struggle between competing elites and aiming at obtaining the loyalty of the masses through a specific interpretation of so-called objective elements to yield a national consciousness. In this complex process

of national identity construction, territory, language, and culture gain a moral meaning through manufacturing and manipulation of a particular view of the past. While ethnicity provides nationalism with an historical pedigree that it lacks (Hobsbawm 1992), nationalist construction converts the cultural traditions of everyday life into more specific claims. Historical, political, cultural, geographical, and socio-economic symbols or boundary-markers (heroes, habits, institutions, values, traditions, glories, and traumata) are used selectively for the present-day construction of the past (Calhoun 1993). Thus, ethno-history is of a crucial role in the making and maintenance of the 'us' and 'them' distinction by providing the nation with a primordial aura through which the claim of historical continuity, and certain rights specific to nations, are legitimated.

The nation as polity: Nationalization of citizenship

Besides its cultural dimension, nationality is constructed at a political level, which has much more immediate and concrete consequences. This dimension is directly related to the domain of nation-states where the state and the nation are linked to each other through the institution of citizenship. With the French Revolution, citizenship, which was the symbol of freedom since the ancient Greeks, became associated with nationality (Gross 1999: 91).[3] The link established was so critical that to be a citizen of a state now meant belonging to its nation. Thus, equality derived from belonging to the same community which was culturally defined and complemented by membership to the political community.

The conflation of the state and nation in the modern (nationalist) interpretation of citizenship[4] was a reflection of the nationalist ideal of achieving congruence between cultural and political units. In this sense, the institution of citizenship complements nationalist ideology. While the idea of nation as a cultural collective entails a great deal of cultural innovation, premises of citizenship are highly tangible. Through citizenship that enables institutional closure in legal, political, economic, and social domains (Wimmer 2002), national boundaries at an imaginary level become quite palpable. Thus, nationalism did not only imagine the nation as a horizontal comradeship (community), but also as a polity whose members are tied to each other through specific rights and duties. In this sense, we enjoy citizenship not as members of humanity, but rather as the members of particular nation-states. Therefore, modern citizenship is nationalized citizenship that includes a number of characteristics. First of all, it refers to membership of a political community. Second, this characteristically entails certain rights or privileges and an attendant set of duties and obligations such as social security, political representation through elections, taxation, military service, and so on.[5] Third, citizenship is usually an ascribed status given us at birth. In this sense, it is an important component of individual identity ('who I am'). (Pierson 2004).

On the grounds of these shared characteristics, one can mention at least two models of citizenship which directly relates to the conception of the nation. Therefore, historical trajectories of nationalist movements condition the conception of the nation on the civic-ethnic continuum, as a corollary, the conception of the nation shapes citizenship regimes to a great extent. Although citizenship models are conventionally analyzed in two models as civic and ethnic, the civic model also consists of two different interpretations. Therefore, we can argue that there are three models of citizenship. The first model is the French type ('republican model') that territorially defines citizenship. Rejecting ethno-cultural diversity, it is based on cultural homogeneity. Since it establishes an obligatory relationship between political authority and culture, it is culturally repressive and assimilationist. It is not exclusive but its criteria of inclusiveness may be problematic. The second type of civic model is the Anglo-Saxon type that is also based on territoriality. However, it differs from the French type, since it rests upon voluntary assimilation. It conceptualizes the nation as the unity of diversity rather than as a monolithic unity. As long as different ethnic groups are loyal to legal-political supra-identity, they are free to live their cultures (sub-identities) that are legally recognized. The ethnic model is different from the civic model in the sense that it defines the nation as a genealogical, organic entity, membership to which is not voluntary but by birth (Kurubaş 2008: 27–28).

Within this context, one can maintain that the model of citizenship in a country is connected to the prevailing characteristics of nationalism according to which both criteria for, and expectations from, membership change. In a general sense, modern citizenship has had two conflicting characteristics since its inception in the wake of the French Revolution. On the one hand, it is a reflection of a revolutionary idea, a democratizing force promoted by nationalist ideology. Despite being limited to nationally defined borders, its universalist interpretation has provided modern citizenship with a rights-based, egalitarian positive image. This implied both the democratization of the political sphere by allowing participation for each member of polity and an increasingly active role for the nation-state. Notwithstanding these positive connotations, citizenship has been actually exclusive in at least two senses. First, universalism and participation associated with citizenship have been highly ambivalent. Citizenship applies only to those who can generally be redeemed only by the particular state to which such citizenship applies. Second, citizenship has been formally or substantively exclusive. Formally, various categories of persons, such as immigrants and political refugees have been excluded from the status of citizen. On the other hand, citizens who had formally the same rights and duties have not been substantively equal to each other. Certain groups, even if they are fortunate enough to enjoy the status of citizen, on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation have been often subject to systematic discrimination (Pierson 2004).

Equally important, citizenship policies and practices have served to complement nationalist ideologies in drawing and maintaining national

boundaries. Citizenship has provided a politico-legal framework for nation-building policies oriented toward the congruence between cultural and political units. In conjunction with the prevalent conception of the nation produced and reproduced by nationalist ideology in a country, universal membership to political community has in many cases led to voluntary or forceful assimilation to the cultural unit. While the ethnic citizenship model from the very beginning closes its doors to ethnically external members, the French civic model rejects ethno-cultural diversity and demands assimilation into a politico-territorially defined French nation. Even the civic Anglo-Saxon model expects assimilation, though being voluntary in principle.

In this sense, modern citizenship that is associated with a nationality model has been exclusionary, particularistic, and/or assimilationist despite the fact that it claims to be inclusionary and universal. Citizenship, like nationalism, has also been an open-ended political practice connected to power relations. In this sense, cultural and political conceptions of nationality are contestable, subject to constant reconstruction through political struggle. Any challenges to the prevalent form of citizenship might turn into challenges to the existing form of national identity, especially in contexts where the link between ethno-cultural identity and citizenship is so strong.

The Turkish experience

Turkish nationalism

The Turkish experience constitutes a quite interesting case in order to shed light on ramifications of the close relationship between citizenship and nationalism within the broader context of modernity. Accordingly, any attempt to understand what makes up 'Turkishness', and its limits on both cultural and politico-legal grounds, requires an analysis of Turkish nationalism within the framework of Turkish modernization.

By taking modernization as almost synonymous with westernization, Turkish modernization, envisioned and led by the official ideology of Kemalism, with the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, aimed at reaching the contemporary level of (Western) civilization. This meant that the making of modern Turkey was based on the creation of an independent nation-state, the promotion of industrialization, and the construction of a secular and modern national identity as an expression of 'the will to (Western) civilization' (Keyman 2005: 271). Thus, Turkish modernization emerged as a project that would be applied 'from above' by Kemalist elites to transform the Anatolian population into secular members of the emerging Turkish nation. In line with it, nationalism and secularism have constituted the core of Kemalist ideology, among its six fundamental principles symbolized by 'six arrows' (Zürcher 2004).

As one of the central tenets of Kemalism, Turkish nationalism[6] was mainly shaped by two factors which to a great extent highlight the path

followed by Turkish modernization, conceptualization of national identity, citizenship practices, and particularly the Turkish official view of Muslim or non-Muslim minorities since the inception of the republican era. Modern Turkey was founded after a deep crisis during which its very existence was endangered. The gradual demise of the Ottoman Empire, and the Sevres Treaty (1920) that formally dissolved the Empire by leading to the partition of Anatolian territory by European powers, brought about a nation-state tradition that has had strong survival and threat perception. However, this perception did not turn into anti-Westernism. By contrast, while the West was the 'Other' having had designs upon the Turkish homeland, it simultaneously represented the model that should be adopted to attain contemporary civilization.[7] This ambivalent stance towards the West has been one the major factors that gives Turkish nationalism its color. On the one hand, the ultimate objective of Turkish modernization was the Kemalist will to civilize through the establishment of a nation-state. Hence, Kemalism has had a teleological character defined with the Turkish march towards the West. On the other hand, nationalism as a crucial component of Turkish modernization has consisted of anti-Western (or at least Euro-sceptic) elements,[8] which have been conspicuous but eventually overshadowed by the ultimate objective of the Kemalist project. It is not surprising that this synthesis has given rise to a self-perception and a perception of the West full of contradictions and tension. Consequently, while these perceptions embodied a particular mindset shaping the way in which Turkish nationalism and Turkish national identity were molded, they also substantiated a specific structure of power relations dominated by the Kemalist elite.[9]

The nature and ultimate objective of Turkish modernization thus imply at least two facts about Turkish nationalism. As an historical fact, the state preceded the nation in the Turkish context (Kadıoğlu 1995: 92). Therefore, national identity did not appear as an outcome of long historical processes. Instead, it was forged by the state as a prerequisite of modernization. While Turkish nationalism, on the one hand, set about reinvigorating the 'essence' through 'invention of the tradition' attuned with the 'general code of particularity' of nationalist ideology, it was first and foremost employed as an "instrument for purposes of social control and mobilization towards modernization" (Keyman and İçduygu 2005: 12). As a second fact that is interrelated to the first one, Turkish nationalism has had a state-centric character. By underlying the importance of Heper's statement that the Kemalist elite conceived the state as an active agent that shapes and reshapes the nation to the level of contemporary civilization, Keyman rightly maintains that "the Kemalist idea of the state was embedded in the question of how to activate the people toward the goal of civilization, that is, how to construct a national identity compatible with the will to civilization" (Keyman 2005: 275). Thus, state-centrism could not only be explained with the notion of survival and threat. The Kemalist attempt to forge a national identity was also attuned with the 'from-above' character of Turkish modernization.

Having an organic vision of society which was seen as essential for survival and modernization, Turkish nationalism saw the 'duties and services' to the state of different occupation groups, as the basis of the society (Kazancıgil and Özbudun 1981). More crucially, this view has underlain the official doctrine of the 'indivisible unity of the state with its territory and its nation' since the founding of the republic. According to this doctrine, there is only one people in Turkey, and it comprises the totality of the country's citizens, who enjoy the same rights and have the same obligations (Kramer 2000: 40).[10]

Nonetheless, despite official rhetoric of civic nationalism, the state-centered Turkish nationalism has had a hybrid character, combining a French-style civic nationalism based on the principle of citizenship and territoriality with ethnic nationalism of the German type. (Kadıoğlu 1993; Bora 2003). While its civilizationist dimension suggested Turkish nationality was an expression of politico-territorially defined common will, its culturalist aspect has aimed to achieve a centralist, absolutist and monist national identity.[11] This hybrid nationalist discourse underpinned formation and practices of citizenship in Turkey.

Republican understanding of citizenship

Within the framework of the aimed congruence between cultural and political units, the Turkish state's attempt to create a homogenous national identity was not very different from what happened in many other European countries.[12] Among others, Turkey was inspired especially by France in many ways. In accordance with the adopted understanding of national sovereignty in the form of supremacy of general will over particular identities and interests, the idea of 'unity-over-diversity' prevailed in the formation of nation. Nevertheless, Turkish experience developed from the above unlike the contractual French case. Strong state tradition and insufficient socio-economic development historically prevented flourishing of civil society, which implied that the invention of a Turkish nation would require much more toilsome and imaginative ideological efforts by republican elites. In the creation of a general will as an integrative force, Turkish republican elites sought to create a sense of public consciousness as the basis of common civic culture. Thus, nation-formation and citizenship formation went hand in hand in a way inspired by the assimilationist and territorial French model with quite significant particularities.

As the Turkish nation is imagined as a classless, coherent, corporate body without any privileges, Turkish citizenship was based on a non-individualized conception. Members of a Turkish nation were deemed to be organically tied to each other and were considered to be passive and obedient citizens. The masses were given civil and political rights, but the state saw citizenship primarily as an ideological device through which it attempted to transform society in line with its will to civilize (Keyman and İçduygu 2005). Primacy of state interests over individual ones reflected Gökalpian's idea