

POLITICAL REPRESSION IN 19TH CENTURY EUROPE

Robert J. Goldstein

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By

ROBERT J. GOLDSTEIN

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Political Repression in 19th Century Europe

ROBERT J. GOLDSTEIN

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
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
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Introduction

The primary purpose of this book is to bring together in one convenient volume material related to the subject of political repression in nineteenth-century Europe. Although reference to this topic is made in many general and specialized studies of the period, there currently exists no single source that covers the entire Continent over the time span included herein. Many studies exist that focus on other subjects that affected all of Europe during the nineteenth century--for example, urbanization, industrialization and nationalism--yet the topic of restrictions on political liberty and popular struggles against such restrictions has been curiously neglected, save for specialized treatment of individual countries and/or relatively short time periods. Thus, the reader interested in obtaining an overview of this subject has been forced to consult literally hundreds of books and articles.

This book seeks to be of use to both the specialist in European social and political history and the interested layperson. A considerable amount of general background information is included. Most specialists will be familiar with it, but the average lay reader should find it useful in putting material on political repression into a broader context. Of course, in any study dealing with approximately twenty countries over a one-hundred-year period, it is frequently necessary to reduce, in the words of the great British historian E. J. Hobsbawm, extremely important information "to a paragraph or two, a line, a passing mention or a mere nuance of treatment" where it is not omitted altogether (1979: xiv).

Some Definitions

I have defined "Europe" to encompass all of the countries of that continent, including the sometimes neglected smaller nations. Far too often, studies of "Europe" turn out to be at most about Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Russia and the Habsburg Empire, even though in 1900 75 million Europeans lived in Scandinavia, Ireland, Switzerland, the Low Countries, the Balkans and Iberia.

I have defined the nineteenth century as the period between the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo (1815) and the outbreak of World War I

(1914). Obviously this period, technically, does not include all of the nineteenth century and includes part of the twentieth century. However, it has become a historical convention to refer to these one hundred years as the nineteenth century; and since the approach of this book is to treat political repression and the struggles against it as a part of the general process of European modernization, this periodization is an appropriate one. These one hundred years marked a crucial transition period between Europe of the "old order" preceding the French Revolution and modern European society. This periodization also seemed particularly appropriate because the 1815-1914 era in Europe is in many ways quite analogous to the contemporary era in the "developing" world. Most of the current problems faced by the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa today are the same problems that Europe encountered in the nineteenth century: the adjustment of societies to the impact of such developments as massive population growth, rapid industrialization and urbanization, revolutions in transportation and communication, and especially the emergence of formerly "invisible," poverty-stricken masses, who are increasingly aware, educated and politicized and demand improvements in their political and social rights. Although it is not a pleasant fact to recall, most nineteenth-century European regimes responded to rising lower-class demands for reforms and political power in the same repressive manner which many present-day Third World regimes do.

Except in a few isolated instances--for example, the suppressions of the 1871 Paris Commune and of the 1907 Rumanian peasant rebellion--nineteenth-century European political repression did not involve mass executions or killings, and nineteenth-century European regimes rarely if ever engaged in random killings simply to create a climate of terror. Therefore, the analogy that is suggested between nineteenth-century Europe and current events in the developing world should not be interpreted to suggest that such recent experiences as the mass slaughters and "disappearances" in Cambodia, Uganda, Argentina, Guatamala and elsewhere are typical of nineteenth-century Europe. On the other hand, nineteenth-century European political repression was often sufficiently intense to destroy opposition groups or drive them underground for years or decades, and certainly there is nothing inherent in "western civilization" that grants immunity from mass slaughter, as the twentieth century in Europe conclusively demonstrates.

In my book Political Repression in Modern America I devoted several pages to a discussion of a definition of political repression: "Political repression consists of government action which grossly discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key governmental policies, because of their perceived political beliefs" (1978: xvi). Admittedly, this definition is not entirely adequate, since it is not specific enough to allow an absolute determination as to whether or not all possibly politically repressive acts fall within its confines. However, after having studied the subject of political repression for about ten years, I have concluded that this definition is

about as specific as it can be, because the variety of ways in which political repression can be implemented defy even the most expert lexicographer. From a practical standpoint, the types of political repression especially focussed on in this book are relatively straightforward, involving the denial of liberties, such as freedom of the press, speech, assembly and association, and the right to vote, either generally or for certain segments of populations whose particular beliefs are undesirable according to the perception of the political authorities. Political repression, in this perspective, can be peaceful and "legal" as well as violent and "illegal." An example of perfectly peaceful and legal repression that was of incalculable import in nineteenth-century Europe was the enfranchisement for most or all of the period in almost every country of only the wealthiest segments of the population, for fear that, if the poor were allowed to vote, there might be a "legal" social and political revolution.

The Methodology and Plan of the Book

Because of the enormous amount of material available that in some way touches on the subject of nineteenth-century European political repression, it was necessary to limit the scope of my research. To quote Hobsbawm again, "An enormous amount has already been written about the nineteenth century, and every year adds to the height and bulk of the mountain ranges which darken the historical sky ... the quantity of information which must be absorbed is far too great for even the most erudite and encyclopedic scholar" (1979: xiii-xiv). In order to cope with this historical mass, I generally restricted my reading to secondary sources published in English since about 1940, although even so this left thousands of sources to consult, not all of which could be read. In order to avoid flooding the book with footnotes, I have used citations only when material is directly quoted or statistical material is used in tables. However, following the selected list of sources at the end of the book is an analytical guide that indicates which sources were relied upon most heavily for various subjects.

The book is divided into three major parts. In the first part, there is a summary, with numerous examples taken from all of the European countries, of the major techniques used to repress political dissent throughout the nineteenth century and also of means by which dissidents attempted to evade such repression. The following techniques are discussed in this part of the book, roughly in order of their overall importance in affecting nineteenth-century European history and as contemporary political issues: suffrage restrictions, limitations on freedom of the press, assembly, and association, restrictions on trade unions and strikes, the use of violence and secret police techniques against dissidents, and restrictions on academic freedom. I have also included in this part of the book a discussion of the victims of political repression: political prisoners and exiles.

In the second part of the book, I have attempted to construct a chronological history of political repression in nineteenth-century

Europe, set in a general context of social and political history. Within this part of the book, I refer frequently to specific techniques of political repression, usually without detailed elaboration, on the assumption that the reader has already perused the first part of the book. However, some readers may find it more congenial to read the second part of the book first, and they can probably do so without serious difficulty. The chronological history is divided into three major time periods: 1815-50, 1850-70, 1870-1914. The major dividing lines within the 1815-1914 period are the suppression of the European revolutions of 1848-49 and the Franco-Prussian War (1870) and its side-effect, the Paris Commune of 1871. These divisions are fairly standard in European historiography because they coincide with more general benchmarks in European social and political history. They suit my purposes also. In a rough sense, during the 1815-50 period, the "old order" remained relatively intact, and in most countries almost all political opposition and groups outside the traditional ruling clerical-aristocratic-monarchical coalition were met with repression. The 1850-70 period in many European countries marked a general industrialization "takeoff" period, and one in which the upper middle class was accepted into the governing coalition, although lower-class attempts to influence politics still met mostly with repression. During the 1870-1914 period, in most countries repression became less intense and the lower classes were finally able to organize and obtain varying degrees of political influence.

Within these three major time divisions, I have organized the material somewhat differently, depending upon what seemed the most effective and efficient way to present it. For the period between 1815 and 1870 I have made chronological subdivisions (1815-30, 1830-39, 1840-49, 1850-58, 1859-1870), and in most cases within these sub-divisions European countries are grouped together to the extent they experienced similar developments. I have subdivided the 1870-1914 period by regions of Europe (northwestern, central, and eastern and southern) that experienced similar developments, and within those divisions each country is discussed over the entire 45-year period. In short, the primary subdivision between 1815 and 1870 is by time, and the primary subdivision between 1870 and 1914 is by region.

The reason for this difference in approach within the chronology is quite simple. Most European countries were affected to some degree during the 1815-70 period by certain events relevant to political repression, such as the 1819-21, 1830-2 and 1848-9 periods of widespread unrest, which tended to create similar patterns of response across the Continent. In particular, the major continental European regions--France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and the Habsburg Empire--all exhibited roughly similar trends in terms of heightened or decreased repression on a cyclical basis within the 1815-70 period. In the other European countries, a similar, although generally less intense pattern was exhibited. Therefore, a subdivision by time, and within that by region--usually between the major continental territories and the other European countries--seemed to be the most sensible approach to the 1815-70 period. After 1870, with the major exception of the 1871 Paris Commune, there were relatively few events that triggered

similar responses relevant to political repression across the Continent. Instead, the response of European countries to political dissent after 1870 became increasingly differentiated by region. In general, the northwestern countries, which were the most economically advanced regions, became increasingly democratic after 1870, the eastern and southern countries--which were also the most backwards economically--tended to respond to dissent almost exclusively with repression, while the central European countries were "in between" both in economic development and in responses to dissent. Since the differentiated response to protest after 1870 appears to have been closely related to general differences in economic and social development, it seemed to make sense to discard the all-European time subdivision used previously as an organizing approach and shift to a regional analysis. Skillful use of the index will allow the reader to construct a coherent chronological account of any particular country during the entire period covered in the book. For a quick refresher in nineteenth-century European political geography the maps on pages viii and ix should prove helpful.

In the final part of the book, I have briefly summarized the most important information contained in the preceding sections and have tried to analyze the long- and short-term importance of political repression in the nineteenth century for European historical development during that century and afterwards. In short, my argument is that political repression and the struggle against it was one of the great themes of nineteenth-century Europe, helping to shape fundamental aspects of European political development and in some cases leaving historical legacies that continue to effect European society and politics even today. I also suggest that, unfortunately, political repression seems to be a "normal" part of the process of political modernization, and that, particularly given the advanced military technologies supplied so readily to the developing countries by today's "advanced" nations, it is likely to be a major theme in the news for a long time to come.

Part One

Techniques of Political Repression
in Nineteenth-Century Europe

Chapter I

Suffrage Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century Europe

Universal suffrage, according to Danish Prime Minister Jacob Estrup (1875-94), a conservative landowner, was the "greatest folly in this otherwise so abundantly foolish age." It would add, he stated, to "liberalism, radicalism, socialism and anarchism" and ultimately to the "collapse of everything we have learned to respect and love" (Woodhouse 1974: 203). Similarly, François Guizot, the conservative premier of France (1847-8) termed universal suffrage "absurd." Under such a system, he said, "Every living creature would be granted political rights" (Fejto 1973: 77). Conservative legislator Robert Lowe, in opposing a proposed expansion of the suffrage in the United Kingdom in 1866, declared, "It is the order of Providence that men should be unequal, and it is . . . the wisdom of the State to make its institutions conform to that order" (Smith 1966: 81).

Such sentiments were by no means confined to European conservatives during the nineteenth century. Until late in the century, most European "liberals," who demanded extension of the suffrage to encompass the middle and professional classes, were among the most ardent foes of enfranchising the poor. Thus, the Whig (liberal) historian and parliamentarian Thomas Macaulay declared in 1842 that universal suffrage would be "fatal to the purposes for which government exists" and was "utterly incompatible with the existence of civilization" (Arnstein 1971: 32). The writer and social critic Thomas Carlyle termed universal suffrage the "Devil-appointed way" to count heads, one that would equate "Judas Iscariot to Jesus Christ" (Smith 1966: 242). Odilon Barrot, a leader of the liberal opposition to the Guizot regime in France, declared:

"Vox populi, vox Dei," which gives to a majority the infallibility of God is the most dangerous and the most despotic absurdity that has ever emerged from a human brain. If you want to ruin a state, give it universal suffrage (Fasel 1970: 21).

In fact, as Table 1.1 indicates, the great majority of European countries adopted highly discriminatory suffrage systems for lower

Table 1.1: Percentage of Total Population Enfranchised
for Lower Legislative Chambers in Europe, 1815-1915

	Austria	Belgium	Bulgaria	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy
1815	0	1.4	-	0	(7)	0.3		-	1	-
1820	0	1.4	-	0	(7)	0.3		-	1	-
1825	0	1.4	-	0	(7)	0.3		-	1	-
1830	0	1.1	-	0	(7)	0.5		0	1	-
1835	0	1.1	-	0	(7)	0.5		0	1	-
1840	0	1.1	-	0	(7)	0.6		0	1	-
1845	0	1.1	-	0	(6)	0.7		23	1	-
1850	0	1.8	-	15	(6)	20		23	0	-
1855	0	1.8	-	15	(6)	25		23	0	-
1860	0	2.0	-	15	(6)	25		23	0	1.7
1865	5.9	2.2	-	15	(6)	25		23	6.1	2.0
1870	5.9	2.2	-	15	(6)	26		23	6.5	2.0
1875	6	2.2	-	15	(6)	27	19	23	5.1	2.1
1880	5.9	2.2	(22)	16	(6)	27	20	23	5.2	2.2
1885	7.2	2.2	(22)	16	(6)	28	20	23	5.4	8
1890	7.2	2.2	(22)	16	(5)	29	21	23	6.3	9.1
1895	7.2	22	(22)	16	(5)	29	21	23	5.6	6.7
1900	19	22	(22)	17	(5)	29	21	23	6.1	6.9
1905	20	22	22	17	4.5	29	21	23	6	7.5
1910	21	23	23	17	45	29	22	23	6.2	8.3
1915	21	23	25	18	45	29	22	23	7.7	23.2

Explanations for Table 1.1: A dash (-) indicates this country did not exist as a geopolitical entity at the time. A zero (0) indicates the lack of a popularly elected national legislative assembly. Data enclosed in parentheses are estimated based on the provisions of electoral laws and/or known data for other dates. All other data are precise calculations or interpolations within known data. Had universal manhood suffrage been in effect, 20-25 per cent of the total population of each country would have been enfranchised; universal adult suffrage would have enfranchised 40-50 per cent of each country's population. The figures for Denmark after 1910, Finland after 1905 and Norway after 1905 reflect total or partial enfranchisement of women. In Germany before 1870 and in Switzerland before 1850 the confederation legislatures were elected by state or cantonal governments, which themselves were elected on widely varying franchises. The data for Belgium before 1830 and for

	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Rumania	Russia	Serbia	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	United Kingdom
1815	3.9	10	0	0	0	0	0	(10)		2.5
1820	3.9	10	0	0	0	0	(20)	(10)		2.5
1825	3.7	9.1	0	0	0	0	0	(9)		2.5
1830	3.5	8.5	0	(2)	0	0	0	9		2.1
1835	3.4	8.3	(15)	(2)	0	0	0.1	8		3.2
1840	3.3	8.1	(10)	(2)	0	0	3.4	7		3.4
1845	3.1	8	.7	(2)	0	0	0.8	7		3.6
1850	2.5	8	.7	0	0	0	1.1	6	22	4
1855	2.7	7.8	9	0	0	0	4.6	5	22	4.3
1860	2.7	7.8	9	0.1	0	0	1.0	6	22	4.5
1865	2.7	7.5	9	(15)	0	0	2.7	5.9	22	4.4
1870	2.9	7.5	9	(15)	0	(20)	24	5.6	22	8
1875	2.9	7.5	9	(15)	0	(20)	24	5.8	22	8.7
1880	3.0	7.6	14	(15)	0	(20)	5.1	6	23	8.7
1885	3.0	9.4	18	(15)	0	(20)	4.7	6	23	8.7
1890	6.5	9.8	18	(15)	0	(20)	24	6	22	16
1895	6.2	11	10	(15)	0	(20)	24	6.2	22	16
1900	11	20	10	(15)	0	(20)	24	7	22	16
1905	14	20	10	16	(20)	23	24	8.1	22	18
1910	14	33	12	16	(15)	23	24	19	22	18
1915	16	45	8	16	(15)	23	24	20	23	18

Hungary before 1870 are for provincial legislatures; until 1830 Belgium was part of the United Netherlands along with the Dutch Netherlands, and before 1867 Hungary was an integral part of Austria. Finland was under Russian sovereignty but had its own legislature throughout the 1815-1914 period. Norway was united with Sweden through allegiance to the Swedish king, although autonomous in domestic affairs, until 1905. Belgium (1893-1919), Austria (1861-1907), Rumania (1866-1917), and Russia (1905-1917) all used class-weighted voting systems (see text for explanation).

Major sources: Mackie and Rose 1974; Rokkan and Meyriat 1969; Anderson and Anderson 1967: 320; Garver 1978: 349; Rokkan 1967; Wandwycz 1974: 318; Rothschild 1959: 44; Dedijer 1974: 379; Payne 1973: 474, 543; Seton-Watson 1934: 357; Seton-Watson 1972: 467; Kent 1937: 26; Neufeld 1961: 524; Walker 1973.

SUFFRAGE DISCRIMINATION

legislative chambers for most or all of the 1815-1915 period. Universal male suffrage (which is what was meant when universal suffrage was discussed) at age 21 would have enfranchised about 25 per cent of the European population during the nineteenth century, while universal adult (including female) suffrage would have given the vote to about 50 per cent of the population. Female suffrage at the national level was not granted by any European country before 1915 save Finland (after 1906) and Norway (after 1907). While disenfranchisement of women reflected a general discrimination against rich and poor females alike, disenfranchisement of men was based clearly on class. As late as 1880, as a result of class-biased suffrage systems, less than 10 per cent of the total population was enfranchised in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The clear purpose of the class-biased suffrage systems that prevailed in most European countries for all or part of the nineteenth century was to protect the wealth and power of the dominant elements of European society. This purpose was rarely articulated as directly as Macaulay's warning that the "populace" would use political power to "plunder every man in the kingdom who had a good coat on his back and a good roof over his head" (Langer 1969: 55). Instead, disenfranchisement of the poor, or the extra-weighting of the votes of the wealthy if the poor were enfranchised, was usually justified by more lofty and less obviously self-interested principles. The primary justification, repeated over and over again by both conservatives and liberals, was that wealth and property were signs of intelligence and ability, and that it was only reasonable to entrust the control of state policies to those who had demonstrated their qualifications by material well-being. Since, according to this argument, any talented person was capable of acquiring wealth, the denial of universal suffrage did not discriminate against poverty, but against ignorance, sloth and general incapacity. Thus, "enrichissez-vous" (get rich) was the solution made famous by Guizot for those who complained they could not vote under the French laws that disenfranchised over 99 per cent of the population before 1848.

The thesis that wealth and property were the best indicators of electoral ability was so frequently espoused that Spanish liberals noted in the prologue to their 1837 electoral law--which disenfranchised 98 per cent of the population--that "in all the nations of Europe which have proceeded us in the ways of representative government, private property has been considered the only proper indication of electoral capacity" (Marichal 1977: 105). In blunter terms, a member of the Spanish legislature told that body in 1845 that poverty was a "sign of stupidity" (Carr 1966: 237), and Italian Prime Minister Francesco Crispi (1887-91, 1893-6) told his parliament that the common people were "corrupted by ignorance, gnawed by envy and ingratitude, and should not be allowed any say in politics" (Smith 1959: 175). Francisco Romero Robledo, who became notorious for his election rigging as minister of the interior in late nineteenth-century Spain, told the Spanish legislature in 1876:

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I have fought universal suffrage all my life because I consider it to be an instrument of tyranny and an enemy of liberty. Suffrage is not an independent right but a political function that demands conditions of capacity and most Spaniards do not have sufficient culture or intelligence to understand the public interest when they deposit their slip of paper in the electoral urn (Kern 1974: 38).

Supplementing the argument that wealth per se was a sign of electoral capacity was a related and sometimes intertwined argument that the wealthy had more of a stake in and made more of a contribution to society, and therefore were more deserving of a say in determining governmental policy. Thus, the Prussian aristocrat Baron Adolf Senfft von Pilsach declared:

I cannot consider it just and reasonable that a simple working man has as much voice as his employer who hires hundreds or thousands like him, gives them bread and feeds their families (Hamerow 1974: 211-12).

When a class-weighted voting system was introduced in Prussia in 1849, the Prussian ministry defended it as allowing the "several classes of the people that proportional influence corresponding to their actual importance in the life of the state" (Anderson and Anderson 1967: 307). When a similar system was introduced for local elections in Russia in 1864, the government noted that voting was based on the principle that "participation in the conduct of local affairs should be proportionate to everyone's economic interest" (Mosse 1962: 79).

Another argument used to justify restricting or biasing the suffrage in favor of the wealthy was that those with money were most qualified to determine public policy because only they had enough leisure to carefully consider affairs of state. Thus, the leading French Restoration liberal-radical Benjamin Constant declared:

Those whom poverty keeps in eternal dependence and who are condemned to daily work are no more enlightened on public affairs than children. . . . Property alone, by giving sufficient leisure, renders a man capable of exercising his political rights (Artz 1929: 206).

A final argument used by those opposing a broad suffrage was that the wealthy would pursue a "disinterested" approach to politics since their affluence allowed them to ignore their own interests, while the poor would always be influenced by their need to obtain more money and would always pursue selfish policies. This argument sounds ludicrous today, since the basic purpose of class-biased suffrage systems was precisely to preserve the existing structure of power and wealth, an aim hardly disinterested from the standpoint of those who benefitted from that structure. Nevertheless, it was made frequently

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and perhaps even innocently by those whose vision was so clouded by upper-class bias that to them such a system was normal and anything else was clouded by selfish interests. Thus, one of the great British aristocrats, Lord Robert Cecil, who as the Marquis of Salisbury served three times as prime minister (1885-6, 1886-92, 1895-1902), argued that only by preserving political power for the wealthy would politics "not be defiled by the taint of sordid greed." Under a democratic suffrage, he maintained, "passion is not the exception but the rule," with power entrusted to those whose minds "are unused to thought and undisciplined to study." Under such a system, he argued, "the rich would pay all the taxes and the poor make all the laws" (Tuchman 1967: 11).

Suffrage Discrimination for Lower Legislative Chambers

The most common device for excluding the poor from voting for lower legislative chambers was to make the franchise dependent upon a minimum amount of income, a minimum amount of property, and/or the payment of a minimum amount of direct tax based on property or income. Thus, under the French constitution of 1814-30, to vote one had to pay 300 francs (\$60) per year in direct taxes, a requirement that reduced the electorate to less than 100,000 (about 0.3 per cent) in a population of about 30 million. Following the July 1830 revolution in France--partly sparked by the attempt of King Charles X (1824-30) to reduce the suffrage to about 25,000--the franchise was slightly liberalized. Under the 1830 constitution, which remained in effect until universal male suffrage was introduced in 1848, the direct tax requirement was reduced to 200 francs per year, thus enfranchising in 1842 about 220,000 people in a population of 34 million.

More or less similar systems were the norm for most European countries during all or most of the nineteenth century. Thus, in Belgium, the suffrage under the electoral law of March 1831 depended upon a direct tax payment requirement that enfranchised fewer than 50,000 Belgians (about 1 per cent) in a population of 4 million in 1831. In 1848, the tax requirement was liberalized, increasing the eligible Belgian electorate to about 80,000 in a population of 4.5 million. The 1848 law remained in effect until 1893, when Belgium adopted a system of universal male suffrage with extra votes for the wealthy and highly educated.

Uniquely among European countries, Italy from 1860 to 1912 required adult males to be literate and to pay a minimum direct tax in order to vote. The Italian system was somewhat mitigated by waiver of the tax payment requirement for those demonstrating a certain level of education, which in 1882 was lowered to four years of primary schooling. Before that year, only about 2 per cent of the Italian population could vote, and even afterwards the suffrage was restricted to less than 10 per cent of the citizenry (see Table 1.2). The literacy/education/tax-payment barrier proved especially pernicious in

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its discrimination against southern Italy, the poorest area of the country, which received little attention from the Italian government partly because so few of its inhabitants could cast ballots. Thus, in 1871, 46 per cent of all adults in northern Italy were literate, compared with only 16 per cent of adult southern Italians. Universal male suffrage was finally introduced in Italy in 1912.

Table 1.2 Suffrage Statistics for the Italian Lower
Legislative Chamber, 1861-1913

Date	Italian Population	Enfranchised Voters	% of Total Population Eligible to Vote
1861	25,017,000	418,696	1.7
1865		504,263	2.0
1867		498,208	1.9
1870		530,018	2.0
1871	26,801,000		
1874		571,939	2.1
1876		605,007	2.2
1880		621,896	2.2
1881	28,450,000		
1882		2,017,829	6.9
1886		2,420,327	8.1
1890		2,752,658	9.1
1892	30,300,000	2,934,445	9.4
1895		2,120,185	6.7
1897		2,120,909	6.6
1900		2,248,509	6.9
1901	32,475,000		
1904		2,541,327	7.5
1909		2,930,473	8.3
1911		34,671,000	
1913		8,443,205	23.2

Sources: Neufeld 1961: 524; Mitchell 1978: 5.

In addition to Italy, several other countries waived normal tax, income, or property requirements for those holding certain educational degrees or, in some cases, holding certain official positions and middle-class occupations. Norway was especially liberal in this regard, enfranchising after 1814 all government officials as well as citizens licensed as merchants and artisans. Spain after 1836 and Hungary after 1865 enfranchised a wide variety of persons following middle-class and professional occupations (known as capacidades in Spain and honoratiores in Hungary). Among those thus enfranchised in

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Hungary regardless of wealth were scholars, surgeons, artists, lawyers, engineers, teachers, and ministers. The attempt by these and several other countries to give extra weight to or at least to enfranchise all "responsible" citizens regardless of wealth--with the hope of thus eliminating from the ranks of the disaffected the most educated and articulate segments of the population, while still short-weighting or disenfranchising the rabble--gave rise to some electoral laws of staggering complexity. Thus, the Dutch electoral reform of 1896, which doubled the electorate by enfranchising 12 per cent of the population, provided that adult Dutch males could obtain the suffrage by: 1) paying one or more direct taxes at specified levels; 2) demonstrating they were householders or lodgers paying a minimum rent; 3) demonstrating they owned or rented boats of over 24 tons capacity; 4) demonstrating they earned an annual wage of about \$115; 5) possessing a savings account of about \$20 or owning about \$40 in government bonds; or 6) passing a recognized examination qualifying for certain offices or employment or giving the right to work in specified professions. That even these seemingly liberal qualifications excluded about half of all Dutch male adults clearly demonstrated the poverty of the population.

A similarly convoluted franchise law introduced in Russia in 1907 led one American academic to conclude, "Even the educated man could not find his place in this complicated system; the uneducated man was quite lost" (Anderson and Anderson 1967: 336). The official Hungarian government organ conceded that Hungary's 1874 electoral law--which reduced the suffrage from 900,000 to 700,000--was so complex that "the confusion of Babel has really been erected into law" (Seton-Watson 1934: 402). In 1912, there existed in the United Kingdom, according to electoral expert J. A. Pease, 11 distinct ways of qualifying for the franchise, with a total of 19 different variations altogether. Pease told the House of Commons in June 1912, "The intricacy of our franchise law is without parallel in the history of the civilized world" (Blewitt 1965: 30).

The most extraordinary class-biased suffrage systems in nineteenth-century Europe were those that gave extra votes to the wealthy and/or well educated (plural voting systems) or that separated citizens into voting categories by class criteria and extra-weighted upper-class votes (variously known as class, curial or estate voting systems). The Belgian plural voting system of 1893, in effect until equal and universal male suffrage was adopted in 1919 (along with limited female suffrage), enfranchised 1,354,891 Belgians (21 per cent of the population) compared with the previous tax-based system that gave the suffrage to 136,775. However, while all 25-year-old males were enfranchised in 1893, wealthy Belgians received a second vote. Those with a higher education, regardless of wealth, received two extra votes. No one could cast more than three votes. In 1893 under this system 850,000 Belgians had one vote; 290,000 voted twice; and 220,000 cast three votes. Thus, the 510,000 Belgians with plural votes, with a total of 1.24 million votes, could outpoll the remaining 850,000 Belgians. Plural voting was also allowed in the United Kingdom

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throughout the 1815-1914 period, in France between 1820 and 1830, in the lower two houses of the Swedish and Finnish diets (until 1866 and 1906, respectively), and in Russia between 1905 and 1907. Plural voting was also allowed on a trivial scale in Austria between 1861 and 1896, and on a wide scale there between 1896 and 1907.

About 7 per cent of the electorate in the United Kingdom--those meeting more than one franchise requirement or meeting property requirements in more than one constituency--cast plural votes in 1911, and in some cases individuals cast dozens of votes. Thus, the London Daily News of December 20, 1910, noted that a man "may own 20 small stables in 20 constituencies and he exercises 20 votes" (Blewitt 1965: 45). About 40 per cent of Austrian males cast two votes under the electoral system of 1896-1907. Under the French system of 1820-30, 90,000 Frenchmen elected 258 parliamentary deputies, while the richest 25 per cent of these electors cast a second vote and elected an additional 172 deputies.

Plural voting was defended by the same arguments used to justify other forms of class-based suffrage discrimination. Thus, Sir William Anson, a leading conservative constitutional lawyer, asked the British House of Commons in 1912, "Is the man who is too illiterate to read his ballot paper, who is too imprudent to support his children, to be placed on the same footing as the man who by industry and capacity has acquired a substantial interest in more than one constituency?" (Blewitt 1965: 45).

While plural voting systems explicitly and directly placed extra weight on the votes of the well-to-do and/or well educated, class, curial or estate voting systems did so indirectly by separating voters by class criteria into categories and assigning disproportionate numbers of legislative deputies to the upper-class voters. Under these systems, all voters cast only one ballot, but some ballots counted much more than others. Such systems were used in Prussia (1849-1918), Rumania (1866-1917), Austria (1861-1907), Russia (1905-17), Finland (from medieval times until 1906) and Sweden (from medieval times until 1866).

Perhaps the simplest of these systems was the three-class voting scheme imposed by royal decree of Prussian King Frederick William IV (1840-1858) in 1849, after the legislative body elected under his previously decreed universal, equal manhood suffrage of 1848 displeased him. Under the provisions of the May 30, 1849 decree-law, about 80 per cent of all adult males qualified to vote. However, the wealthiest voters, those who collectively paid one-third of direct taxes, were entitled to elect one-third of the electors, who then elected deputies to the lower legislative chamber. Middle income voters, those who collectively paid another third of direct taxes, also elected one-third of the electors, while those too poor to pay taxes and those who collectively paid the final third of taxes elected another one-third of the electors. This system, which stayed in effect for Prussian state elections after Prussia became part of the German Empire in 1871, allowed the approximately 85 per cent of the electorate in the third class to be out-voted two to one by the 15 per

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cent who comprised the upper two classes. Thus, in 1908, of every 10,000 people eligible to vote in Prussia, 382 voted in the first class, 1,386 in the second, and 8,232 in the third. In 2,200 of the 29,000 Prussian electoral districts, a single voter constituted the entire first class in 1908, as in the case of the arms magnate Krupp in Essen! Since the electors chosen by the three classes in each district met together collectively to choose legislators, the lower-class electors could be completely shut out in the final election process. Thus, the three-class system produced ludicrous results, such as in the 1903 state elections, when the Social Democratic and conservative parties each gained 19 per cent of the popular vote, but the conservatives obtained 143 legislative seats and the socialists none.

This system drastically decreased voter interest among the Prussian lower classes, who knew their ballots counted very little. Voter turnouts in the Prussian state elections were twice as high in the first as in the third class. While only about 30-35 per cent of the eligible Prussian electorate voted in the state elections, with its indirect, unequal and public voting, 70 per cent of the same electorate voted in German national elections, which had direct, equal and secret balloting.

Under the Rumanian system of 1866, as slightly modified in 1884, all adult male taxpayers (about 16 per cent of the population in 1905) were enfranchised. However, the electorate was divided into three "colleges" or curia. The first college, including persons with income of 1,200 lei (\$500) or more, had 15,973 voters in 1905, or 1.5 per cent of the total electorate, but elected 41 per cent of the lower legislative chamber. The second college, including urban residents who paid 20 lei or more in direct taxes, as well as those with a primary education, following certain middle-class professions or having retired from military or civil service positions, comprised 34,742 persons in 1905. This group, constituting 3.5 per cent of the electorate, chose 38 per cent of the legislature. The other 95 per cent of the electorate, including all other taxpayers, constituted the third college and chose the remaining 21 per cent of the legislature. Thus, the votes cast in the first college counted more than twice as much as those in the second college and about 130 times as much as a third college vote.

Under the Russian electoral system of 1905 (similar to the Austrian system of 1861-1907), voters were divided into four categories or curia: landowners, urban residents, peasants, and industrial workers. Voters in each category voted for electors who then chose representatives to the lower legislative chamber (duma). By arbitrarily fixing the ratio of electors to voters in each curia, a system was devised in which 2,000 landowners chose one elector, as did 7,000 townsmen, 30,000 peasants, and 90,000 workers. Thus, one vote in the first curia was equal to 3.5 in the second, 15 in the third and 45 in the fourth. In 1907, this system was illegally changed by decree to create an even more reactionary system. Urban residents were divided into two sub-categories on the basis of wealth, with the result that one elector now was chosen by 230 landowners, 1,000 wealthy urban residents, 15,000 members of the urban lower middle

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class, 60,000 peasants or 125,000 industrial workers. Thus, one landowner's vote in the first curia now equalled over four votes in the wealthy half of the urban curia, 65 votes in the poorer half of the urban curia, 260 peasants' votes or 543 workers' votes. Under the 1907 system, 200,000 large landowners chose about 50 per cent of all electors, while the other 150 million Russians were represented by the other 50 per cent.

The four-estates system used in Finland until 1906 and Sweden until 1866 were identical, deriving from Sweden's rule over Finland until 1809. Finland was conquered by Russia in that year, but the Finnish diet was allowed to function along traditional lines under Russian rule (although it was never convened between 1809 and 1863). Both Finland and Sweden had a four-house parliament, with separate houses or estates for the nobility, clergy, burghers (wealthy townsmen) and independent peasantry. In both countries, adult male heads of each noble family were automatically represented in the estate of the nobility. The highest ranking clergy automatically sat in the second house, while the lower ranking clergy elected representatives to that estate. Urban residents following certain professions or meeting certain income requirements voted for the burghers' estate. Only independent farmers could vote for the peasants' estate, thus excluding the large and growing number of tenant farmers and agricultural laborers in both countries. In the last unreformed Swedish diet, in 1866, about 235,000 Swedes were enfranchised (about 6 per cent of the population), while in the last unreformed Finnish diet, that of 1906, only 127,000 (5 per cent) could vote. Since each of the four estates had equal power, the system gave the approximately 3 per cent of the population in each country that was represented in the upper three estates three times as much power as the 97 per cent of the population that was either completely unrepresented or voted in the fourth estate. Thus, in Finland around 1900 the 150 or so noble families had representation equivalent to the 1,083 enfranchised clericals, the 23,469 eligible burghers, and the 102,184 enfranchised peasants.

Although, as Table 1.1 clearly indicates, the general trend in nineteenth-century Europe was expansion of the suffrage, many countries actually reduced the percentage of the population enfranchised, or lessened the weight accorded to lower-class voters at one time or another during the 1815-1914 period. Such "negative reforms" occurred in the United Kingdom (1829), Belgium (1830), France (1850), the Netherlands (1850), Rumania (1866), Sweden (1866), Hungary (1874), Italy (1894), Russia (1907) and Portugal (1842, 1895, and 1913). The all-time champion in this area was undoubtedly Spain where the franchise was reduced in 1814, 1823, 1845, 1856, and 1876 (see Table 1.3).

Indirect Voting, Open Ballots, and High Minimum Age Requirements

Besides the exclusion or short-weighting of the votes of the poor, a number of other devices were used in nineteenth-century Europe to

Table 1.3: Suffrage Statistics for the
Spanish Lower Legislative Chamber,
1812-1910

Date	Spanish Population	Enfranchised Voters	% of Total Population Eligible to Vote
1812			c. 20
1814			0
1820			c. 20
1822	11,661,865		c. 20
1824			0
1834	12,162,172	18,000	0.15
1836		65,067	0.52
1837		257,984	1.7
1839		342,559	2.78
1840		423,787	3.44
1843		c. 600,000	c. 4
1846		97,100	0.79
1850		121,770	1.11
1854		694,110	4.6
1856		c.1,000,000	c. 6.5
1857	15,464,340	147,000	0.95
1858		157,931	1.02
1860	15,673,481		
1863		179,413	1.14
1864		144,291	1.06
1865		418,271	2.67
1867		396,863	2.38
1869		3,801,071	24.3
1871	16,794,970	4,030,792	24
1873		4,551,436	27.1
1876	16,623,384	3,989,612	24
1877	16,634,345		
1879		846,961	5.1
1881		846,961	5.1
1884	17,254,764	808,243	4.7
1887	17,549,600		
1897	18,108,610		
1900	18,594,000		
1907		4,479,114	23.7
1910	19,994,600	4,650,000	23.3

Sources: Harrison 1978: 23; Payne 1973: 474; Marichal 1977: 266; Kiernan 1966: 95, 192.

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limit lower-class influence in the election of lower legislative chambers. Indirect voting, in which ballots were cast not for legislative deputies, but for electors who in turn selected representatives to parliament, was used in many countries. Among them were the Netherlands and Switzerland from 1815 to 1848, Norway from 1815 to 1906, Prussia from 1849 to 1918, Russia from 1905 to 1917, France from 1815 to 1817, Austria from 1861 to 1873, Portugal for most of the period from 1834 to 1852, and, in the lower curial elections, Rumania (1866-1917), Austria (1873-1907), Sweden (until 1866) and Finland (until 1906). It was generally--and correctly--believed that imposing an intermediate stage in the electoral process would make it more likely that only well-known and "respectable" candidates would be ultimately selected. Thus, in the Russian district assemblies (uiezd zemtvos) elected in 1865-7, there were 42 per cent nobles, 38 per cent peasants, 11 per cent merchants and 7 per cent members of priestly families, while in the provincial assemblies (zemtvos), elected by the uiezd zemtvos, the corresponding percentages were 74, 11, 11 and 4. That indirect elections were especially designed to filter out potentially "dangerous" candidates from the lower classes is evident from the fact that only lower colleges or curiae voted indirectly in Rumania, Austria, Finland and Sweden. In the Russian electoral system, most voters went through only one indirect electoral stage, while the lower classes went through multiple indirect stages.

Another technique used in a number of European countries to discourage the election of "unreliable" candidates was the use of "open" balloting, usually by oral voting or a show of hands. Open balloting greatly facilitated the use of pressure and manipulation by governmental officials and local elites, especially in rural areas of Ireland, Hungary, Prussia and Austrian Galicia, where landlords continued to exercise a semi-feudal domination over the peasantry until well into the twentieth century. Open balloting was used in Hungary and Prussia as late as 1914, while the secret ballot was introduced quite late in the 1815-1914 period in the United Kingdom (1872), Belgium (1877), Serbia (1879), Norway (1885), Denmark (1901), and Austria (1906). In France, the ballot was theoretically secret but in practice privacy was not protected until after 1900. Particularly during the 1815-30 period, any French voter who insisted on concealing his ballot immediately branded himself an opponent of the government, and in any case the number of eligible voters was so small that handwriting could often be recognized. The crown-appointed head of one electoral college in France wrote to the Minister of the Interior in 1824: "All the voters cast open ballots in my presence . . . the most horrible liberals wrote their choice under my gaze in favor of the royalist candidates" (Sauvigny 1966: 297). In rural areas of Europe where the open ballot was used voters were often forced to state their preferences in front of their employers or local elites who served as election judges or observers. "By forcing him to repeat the name of his preference several times, members of the local elite . . . let the voter understand that his first choice met with disapproval and that

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insistence upon it would lead to reprisals" (Anderson and Anderson 1967: 342).

Open threats were sometimes made to influence voting in such situations. Thus, one landlord in Prussian Silesia announced during the critical 1863 election that those who voted against "the disposition and will of his Majesty and his ministers" would

if they are workers in the forest or on the estates be dismissed, and that the same procedure shall be followed in the brickworks, the peat banks, and the factory for ovenware and pottery; that the supervisory personnel of the forest, the estate, the garden, the mill, the bakery and the sawmill shall be given notice; that final accounts shall be settled with handicraftsmen, . . . as well as with the merchants who sell them anything; furthermore those who have rented a dwelling or leased farm or forest land shall be given notice as soon as the contractual obligation ends (Hamerow 1974: 299-300).

Those who defended the open ballot argued that voters should be willing to defend their choices publicly--ignoring the economic vulnerability of the lower classes--and that only the open ballot would insure that voters be exposed to "proper" influences. Thus, the preface to a ludicrous electoral "reform" bill proposed by the Hungarian government to parliament in 1908, which retained the open ballot, argued that secret voting "everywhere conflicts with the views, the customs and the moral feelings of society . . . it weakens the true moral principle that it is every man's duty to have the courage to express his opinion freely" (Seton-Watson 1911: 31). The Prussian political observer Theodor von Bernhardi argued:

The proper influence of social position, of education and of higher insight and intelligence ceases under secret voting and in its place comes the improper influence of the basest political agitation. . . . We will then not be the ones who will lead the great uneducated mass. It will be the worst individuals, the most dangerous elements of civil society who will then gain an entirely incalculable influence (Hamerow 1974: 294).

Another device used to keep down the number of "undesirable" votes and voters was the specification of artificially high minimum age requirements for the suffrage in many nineteenth-century European countries. The most common minimum voting age was 25 (in effect during most or all of the century in Norway, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Rumania, Germany and Russia), although most males began working full-time in their early teens and average life expectancy was less than 40 in 1850 and only 45 as late as 1900. Maintaining such high voting ages tended to increase conservative chances during elections because voters generally became more conservative with age and

because the lower classes died much younger than the upper classes, with the result that the higher the age requirement for voting, the lower the percentage of the poor still alive and able to cast ballots (assuming they were not otherwise disenfranchised). Because conditions were generally much healthier in non-urban than in urban areas, high age requirements also tended to benefit rural areas, which were generally more conservative than the cities.

The impact of high minimum age requirements in disenfranchising the poor can be clearly seen in age data for nineteenth-century urban workers. In 1841, 82 per cent of 2,017 tobacco workers in Bremen, Germany were 25 years old or younger, and 61 per cent were 20 or younger. Among 108,000 Moscow factory workers in 1902, only 43 per cent were 30 or more, while about 40 per cent were below the age of 25. When the Spanish voting age was lowered from 25 to 21 in 1873, the number of eligible voters increased by over 500,000 (13 per cent).

Legislators in nineteenth-century Europe seem to have recognized that raising the voting age disproportionately decreased the percentage of the poor enfranchised to vote. Thus, in Sweden, wealth-based suffrage requirements for voting for the lower chamber were relaxed in 1909, but the age requirement was raised from 21 to 24 as a clear compensating measure. Similar events occurred in the Netherlands (1897) and Hungary (1913), and, for upper legislative houses, in Belgium (1893) and Denmark (1915).

Restrictions on Eligibility for Service in Lower Legislative Chambers

Aside from restrictions and repressive techniques designed to discourage "unreliable" voting, many European countries also attempted to discourage "unreliable" candidates for legislative office during the nineteenth century. Techniques to this end were the failure to pay legislative deputies in several major European countries, and the imposition of age and wealth requirements on legislative candidates above those required to vote. While most of the minor European countries early provided pay for lower legislative deputies (for example the Netherlands in 1815, Norway in 1814, Belgium in 1831 and Denmark in 1849), the record of the major countries in this area was extremely poor. Deputies were not paid in France until 1852, in Germany until 1906, in Italy until 1911 and in the United Kingdom until 1912. Spanish deputies remained unpaid throughout the period. This lack of payment was deliberate and perceived as a form of discrimination by the lower classes since it made independent wealth a requirement to serve in legislative office. Thus, one of the six demands of the Chartist movement that flourished in the United Kingdom between 1835 and 1848 was for payment of deputies. When the British House of Lords, in the Osborne Judgment of 1909, disallowed the trade union practice of contributing funds to members of parliament as a substitute for legislative pay, the resultant uproar not only led to provision of such pay in 1911, but also to greatly strengthening the newly born Labour party. Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck (1862-90, and German chancellor, 1871-90) bitterly

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and successfully opposed legislative pay when the constitution of the North German Confederation, the precursor of the German Empire, was drawn up in 1867. He declared, "Per diem allowances for legislators are a remuneration to the educated proletariat for the purpose of the vocational practice of demagogy" (Hamerow 1972: 332).

Age and wealth requirements to serve in lower legislative chambers higher than those required to obtain the suffrage was another widely used technique designed to encourage conservative tendencies among legislators. Higher age requirements were imposed in many countries, including, at various times, France, Hungary, Italy, Greece, Serbia, Sweden and the Netherlands. Higher wealth requirements were imposed for part or all of the nineteenth century in France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Spain, Rumania, Serbia, and many of the German states. In some cases, the wealth requirements were devastatingly high and eliminated huge percentages of the population. Eligibility requirements of the 1817 French electoral law were so high that only 16,000 Frenchmen (less than 0.1 per cent) out of 30 million qualified. After the requirement was "liberalized" in 1830, fewer than 50,000 were eligible. In Portugal, under the 1842 constitution, only 4,500 (0.1 per cent) of the population of 3.4 million qualified. The tiny German state of Nassau, with a population of about 100,000 in 1815, "had such high property requirements that in one election no eligible candidates could be found in 12 of the 20 electoral districts, while in the entire state there were only 70 men qualified to be candidates" (Sheehan 1978: 10).

Gerrymandering and Electoral Corruption

Gross gerrymandering was another technique designed to hold down the impact of "undesirable" voters. Gerrymandering took different forms, reflecting the particular constellation of elite interests in different countries. In the Scandinavian countries, urban areas were generally overrepresented in the legislatures, reflecting the influence of bureaucratic-mercantile interests. Thus, in Sweden, under the 1866 electoral reform, one member of the lower chamber represented 40,000 rural inhabitants, but only 6,000 citizens of small towns and 10,000 inhabitants of large cities. Overrepresentation of urban areas was especially notorious in Norway, where the so-called bondeparagrafen of the 1814 constitution guaranteed urban areas one-third representation in the Storting, although 90 per cent of the population was rural. The bondeparagrafen, along with the system of indirect voting used in Norway until 1906, reflected the general disdain and fear held by the dominant bureaucratic-official class for the peasantry.

In Austria, "electoral geometry" also grossly overrepresented urban areas and interests, in this case to assure that political dominance would remain in the hands of the disproportionately urbanized German elements rather than the overwhelmingly rural Slavic areas. Under the 1907 Austrian electoral reform, which specifically allocated legislative seats by nationality, Germans, with

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36 per cent of the population, received 45 per cent of the mandates, while the Slavic groups, constituting 60 per cent of the population, obtained only 50 per cent of the legislative seats. In the United Kingdom, failure to reapportion the House of Commons significantly until 1885 left rapidly growing and reformist-oriented industrialized areas grossly underrepresented, while scores of "rotten boroughs" (depopulated constituencies) were controlled by large landowners who were able to manipulate the votes of their personal or economic dependents in a reliably conservative direction.

Failure to reapportion the German Reichstag between 1871 and 1914 also resulted in severe discrimination against the rapidly growing industrial areas, which tended to support socialist and liberal parties, and vast overrepresentation of the stagnant or declining small towns and rural areas that supported conservatives. Around 1900, constituency sizes ranged from 9,500 for a Reichstag seat from Schaumburg-Lippe to 247,000 for Berlin-Treptow. In the 1907 election, the Social Democratic party won only 43 Reichstag seats with 3.25 million votes, while two conservative parties gained 85 seats with 1.56 million votes.

Gerrymandering had perhaps the greatest significance in Hungary, where skillful drawing of electoral boundaries together with gross corruption and fraud maintained governments in power for decades after 1865 that were probably opposed by a majority of the enfranchised population. Although a basic element of government policy in Hungary was discrimination against non-Magyar nationalities, such as Slovaks and Rumanians, most Magyar elements in the country viewed the regime as insufficiently militant in demanding greater freedom from Austria under the 1867 settlement that gave Hungary domestic autonomy, but placed foreign policy, defense and some financial matters under joint Austro-Hungarian control. Since most of the Magyar population opposed the government, the only way in which ruling elites in Hungary could maintain power was to cluster huge numbers of Magyar votes in a small number of constituencies, thus limiting the impact of their vote, while vastly overrepresenting non-Magyar areas. While these areas also tended towards opposition to the government, the small number of voters per constituency and the open ballot used in Hungary lent itself to easy intimidation of non-Magyars, directed by Magyar officials who owed their jobs to the government. This system was consecrated in the 1877 electoral reapportionment act, which redistributed districts so that "opposition regions" often represented seventy-five times as many voters as "government regions." Nine representatives, for example, were allocated to the 80,000 voters of Budapest, while in heavily non-Magyar Transylvania 9,000 voters were allocated 74 seats. Bizarrely shaped electoral districts reminded one scholar of the "most difficult Chinese puzzles of our childhood" (Seton-Watson 1911: 8).

Many nineteenth-century European governments relied upon techniques far more corrupt than gerrymandering to insure that electoral results turned out "correctly." Elections were massively fixed by methods ranging from bribery, threats, and falsification to

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outright terrorism on a systematic and institutionalized basis in Bulgaria, Greece (until about 1875), Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Rumania, Serbia (until 1903) and Spain. In reading scholarly histories of all of these countries, one encounters time and again phrases such as "it was the government which made the election, not the election the government" (Smith 1959: 200), and elections "always returned an overwhelming majority for the government in power" (Eidelberg 1974: 18). Electoral manipulation was so extensive in these countries that voting results often showed ludicrous shifts from election to election if a new government conducted the balloting. Thus, the Bulgarian parliament (Sobranie) dissolved in 1908 contained 150 liberals and 6 members of Alexander Malinov's Democratic party. When Malinov was called to power by Bulgarian Czar Ferdinand in that year, elections controlled by his party produced a Sobranie with 166 Democrats and no liberals. In 1911, Ferdinand called to power a coalition of Nationalists and Progressive Liberals, who managed elections in which the Democrats fell to four seats while the ruling coalition returned 159 deputies. Severe electoral corruption, although usually considerably less blatant than it was in Iberia, the Balkans, Hungary and Italy, was also common in France, Prussia, Austria and the United Kingdom until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and in Russia after the inauguration of elections there in 1906. Switzerland also saw a considerable amount of electoral chicanery, especially before 1848, although it was not in the same league with any of the aforementioned countries. Elections in Scandinavia and the Low Countries were generally free from corrupt practices.

Governmental manipulation of elections was made easier by the high degree of bureaucratic centralization that prevailed in the countries of Latin and eastern Europe, including Spain, France, Italy, Russia and the Balkans. Centralization greatly facilitated coordinated governmental electoral corruption, particularly when severe suffrage restrictions created small electorates that were highly visible and vulnerable, especially since many voters depended upon governmental patronage or favors of some sort. In France, 85 per cent of the deputies were elected by fewer than 400 votes in 1846. Under the 1845 Spanish constitution, there was an average of less than 300 voters per constituency, and in some cases half or more of the electorate "was composed of government and municipal employees or those on government pensions" (Carr 1966: 213). In Italy until 1882 the average number of votes needed to elect a deputy was 500, while in Hungary in 1901 about two-thirds of all deputies were elected by less than 1,000 votes. In the United Kingdom (where power was relatively decentralized) before 1832 about half of the House of Commons was elected from constituencies with fewer than 250 voters, who were often highly vulnerable to pressure from local elites. Many of these "rotten borough" constituencies were literally bought and sold by rich landowners. Sir Robert Peel (prime minister 1834-35, 1841-46) was given his seat in the House of Commons at Cashel in County Tipperary, Ireland, as a present from his father on his twenty-first birthday, while the famous constituency of the elder William Pitt at Old Sarum did not contain a single inhabitant!

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In some countries, the science of election fraud was so advanced that a special vocabulary developed to describe various corrupt techniques. Thus, in 1891, the great Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto noted in his nation's elections:

It is called the blocco when the whole contents of the voting urns are changed, or the pastetta when one changes only a part of them. There is still no word for when absent people and even the dead are made to vote, though one will soon appear when this usage becomes general (Smith 1959: 220).

The Spanish had a name for it--the lazaros technique, named after the man whom Jesus brought back to life. "On one occasion, a whole cemetery, 700 strong, gave their vote, and it was edifying to see that though they had been illiterate in their lifetime, they had all learned to write in the grave" (Brenan 1964: 5-6). Another technique used in Spain was known as actas en blanco, when members of the election committee would certify that they had counted the votes but "left the column of results blank for the Civil Governor to fill in as he pleased later" (Brenan 1964: 6).

Spain seems to have developed the most pervasive and systematic use of electoral fraud, although Hungary provided close competition. Spain "was not a parliamentary system with abuses; the abuses were the system" (Carr 1966: 367). One Spanish precinct that had 124 voters in 1918 returned 9,015 votes for the official candidate! After 1875, the two major Spanish parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, agreed to take turns governing and fixing elections, thus giving each a chance at the governmental gravy while avoiding the need for the violent revolts that had plagued Spanish politics before 1875. Since both parties represented the same upper middle-upper class constituencies, the so-called turno pacifico ("peaceful rotation") spared each the need even to pretend to concern themselves with the problems of the masses of the population. It was normal under the turno pacifico for the party that "made" the election to allow leaders of the other party to be returned to parliament along with a reasonable contingent of their followers to maintain good feelings.

The key mechanism of the Spanish system was the cacique, or local political boss, who was guaranteed control of patronage and power in his locality by the central government in exchange for the proper electoral returns. The cacique obtained votes for the government by such techniques as parcelling out jobs, adjusting taxes, exempting men from the draft, and settling various local disputes on behalf of those who pledged their votes. Since for the cacique to operate effectively he had to control the local governments and courts, "every electoral contest was preceded by a massive change of mayors and local judges" (Carr 1980: 11). If the usual means of pressure or bribery failed, opposition voters could be excluded from the electoral rolls and government backers would cast ballots several times. The lazaros or actas en blanco techniques might also be used. Although before 1900 the Spanish system was so iron-clad that election results were sometimes published in the press before ballots were cast,