

ROUTLEDGE



Nietzsche

Feminism
& Political
Theory



Edited by Paul Patton

Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory

Nietzsche's views on women and politics have long been the most problematic aspects of his thought. Why then has the work of Nietzsche aroused so much interest in recent years from feminist theorists and political philosophers?

In answer, this collection comprises twelve outstanding essays on Nietzsche's philosophy. Each essay applies Nietzsche's work to current debates in feminist and political theory. It is the first to focus on the way in which Nietzsche has become an essential point of reference for postmodern ethical and political thought.

The editor **Paul Patton** is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sydney, Australia. In addition to his numerous articles on contemporary European philosophy, he has recently translated Gilles Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*.

The contributors: Keith Ansell-Pearson, Howard Caygill, Daniel W.Conway, Penelope Deutscher, Rosalyn Diprose, Elizabeth Grosz, Frances Oppel, Paul Patton, Paul Redding, Ted Sadler, Marion Tapper, Cathryn Vasseleu.

Page Intentionally Left Blank

Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory

Edited by Paul Patton

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1993 by Routledge

Published 2015 by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge Inc.

711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002.

Selection and editorial matter © 1993 Paul Patton
Individual contributions © 1993 Individual contributors

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory

I. Patton, Paul

193

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Nietzsche, feminism, and political theory/edited by Paul Patton.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844–1900—Contributions in political science. 2. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844–1900—Contributions in feminism. I. Patton, Paul.

JC233.N52N55 1993 92–33978

320'.01–dc20

ISBN 978-0-203-00233-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 978-0-203-16145-6 (Adobe eReader Format)

ISBN 978-0-415-08255-6 (Print Edition)

ISBN 978-0-415-08256-3 (Print Edition)

Contents

<i>Notes on contributors</i>	vii
<i>Introduction</i>	ix
1 Nietzsche and the pathos of distance <i>Rosalyn Diprose</i>	1
2 Nietzsche, woman and political theory <i>Keith Ansell-Pearson</i>	27
3 Nietzsche and the stomach for knowledge <i>Elizabeth Grosz</i>	49
4 Not drowning, sailing Women and the artist's craft in Nietzsche <i>Cathryn Vasseleu</i>	71
5 'Speaking of Immemorial Waters' Irigaray with Nietzsche <i>Frances Opper</i>	88
6 <i>Das Weib an sich</i> The slave revolt in epistemology <i>Daniel W. Conway</i>	110
7 <i>Ressentiment</i> and power Some reflections on feminist practices <i>Marion Tapper</i>	130
8 Politics and the concept of power in Hobbes and Nietzsche <i>Paul Patton</i>	144

9	'Is it not remarkable that Nietzsche...should have hated Rousseau?' Woman, femininity: distancing Nietzsche from Rousseau <i>Penelope Deutscher</i>	162
10	The return of Nietzsche and Marx <i>Howard Caygill</i>	189
11	Child of the English Genealogists Nietzsche's affiliation with the critical historical mode of the Enlightenment <i>Paul Redding</i>	204
12	The postmodern politicization of Nietzsche <i>Ted Sadler</i>	225
	<i>Index</i>	244

Notes on contributors

Keith Ansell-Pearson is currently Lecturer in Political Theory in the Department of Political Studies at Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, and from September 1993 will be Lecturer in Modern European Philosophy at the University of Warwick.

Howard Caygill is Lecturer in the School of Economic and Social Studies at the University of East Anglia, and is the author of *Art of Judgement* (1989).

Daniel W. Conway is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University.

Penelope Deutscher is a Lecturer in Philosophy at The Australian National University, Canberra, where she teaches feminist theory and contemporary French philosophy. She has published in the *Newsletter of the Freudian Field* and *Australian Feminist Studies*.

Rosalyn Diprose is a Lecturer in Philosophy at The Flinders University of South Australia. She co-edited, with Robert Ferrell, *Cartographies: Poststructuralism and the Mapping of Bodies and Spaces* (Allen & Unwin, 1991), and is the author of *The Body of Woman: Ethics and Sexual Difference* (Routledge, forthcoming).

Elizabeth Grosz is Associate Professor in the Institute for Critical and Cultural Studies at Monash University. She has published *Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists* (Allen & Unwin, 1989), *Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction* (Routledge, 1990) and is currently completing a book on the body and sexual difference.

Frances Oppel lectures in literary and cultural studies at Griffith University, Queensland. She is writing a book on 'woman' in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

Paul Patton lectures in philosophy at the University of Sydney. He has published numerous articles on contemporary European

philosophy, and recently translated Gilles Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* (1993).

Paul Redding is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He teaches and writes in the areas of hermeneutic theory, epistemology and metaphysics and Hegelian philosophy. He is currently completing a book entitled *Hegel, Copernican Philosophy and Hermeneutics*.

Ted Sadler lectures on modern German philosophy at the University of Sydney. He is presently completing a book on Heidegger.

Marion Tapper lectures in philosophy at the University of Melbourne. She teaches and writes on modern European philosophy and feminism.

Cathryn Vasseleu is completing doctoral work in philosophy at the University of Sydney. She has published articles on animation, imaging technology and sexual difference.

Introduction

Nietzsche's views on women and politics have long been among the most problematic aspects of his thought. Philosophers prepared to find merit in his reflections on art, morals and truth have passed over his political doctrines in silence. In the aftermath of the Nazi appropriation of his texts, this silence has weighed heavily upon the political interpretation of Nietzsche. Until recently, it has prevented any serious consideration of his contribution to political theory. Nietzsche's relation to feminist theory has been no less troubled. His name is invariably linked with the infamous line from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*—'Are you visiting women? Do not forget your whip!'—while the other remarks on women scattered throughout his writings are often read as the more or less subtle expressions of an incurable personal misogyny. Even those concerned to defend his writings against the charge of anti-Semitism readily abandon his remarks on 'woman' as indefensible.

Against this background, it is perhaps one of the surprising effects of the explosion of interest in Nietzsche since the early 1970s that he has begun to be taken seriously by political theorists, including some whose primary orientation is feminist. The writings of Tracy B. Strong, Ofelia Schutte, Mark Warren, William Connolly and others have established Nietzsche as a thinker with much to offer those thinking through the dilemmas of political theory in the late twentieth century. The work of Sarah Kofman, Luce Irigaray and others has ensured that Nietzsche is now recognized as a valued interlocutor and resource for contemporary feminist theory. The present collection of essays displays some of the achievements and suggests some possible future gains, as well as risks, of this turn towards Nietzsche

within social and political thought. While several of the essays interrogate Nietzsche's texts and thereby seek to advance the scholarly appreciation of their complexity, the principal focus of the collection lies somewhere between Nietzsche's texts and the questions thrown up by contemporary philosophical and political debates. Overall, these essays address the utility and effects of Nietzsche's philosophy not at their source but further downstream, with respect to present philosophical, moral and political concerns. They do not seek to present Nietzsche's philosophy as a new panacea for feminism or political theory, but neither do they rehearse the well-known difficulties posed by Nietzsche's remarks on women and politics.

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze suggested that it was the aphoristic form of Nietzsche's writing which enabled it to establish immediate relations with the outside, in other words with forces and processes external to the text. However, Deleuze cites as an example a passage not from one of Nietzsche's early books of aphorisms but from *On the Genealogy of Morals*, a work usually regarded as approaching the style of a philosophical prose-essay. In effect, he is proposing a conception of the aphorism or of aphoristic writing which has less to do with the length of the paragraphs than with the discontinuous or pluralistic character of the thought expressed. Aphoristic writing deals with a multiplicity of objects without attempting to force these into the unity of a single object or totality. Similarly, the aphorism has no implicit subject, no authorial voice attached: it is an anonymous form of expression. Aphoristic writing therefore conveys a thought which is not tied to any field of interiority, whether defined in terms of the consciousness of its author or a supposed unitary object with which it deals. Such a thought entertains immediate relations with the outside, not mediated through any such interiority. Deleuze defines the aphorism as an amalgam or 'play of forces, the most recent of which—the latest, the newest and provisionally the final force—is always the most exterior' (Deleuze 1977:145). On this basis, he suggests, the question of the politics of Nietzsche's writing is misconceived if it is posed in terms of interpretation. The point is not to try to show that fascist or misogynist readings are false, or distortions of the 'meaning' of Nietzsche's text, for the distinctive feature of aphoristic writing is precisely that it lays no claim to any such definitive meaning: an aphorism 'means nothing, signifies nothing, and is no more a signifier than a signified'. Rather, the point is to discover the new forces that come from without, to find the revolutionary or nomadic

forces that are currently capable of occupying or making use of Nietzsche's text.

The essays collected here bear witness to a range of such intellectual and political forces which are 'active' in the present: these include the widespread desire of men and women to find ways of understanding and affirming sexual difference that do not imply social relations of domination and subordination; the interest of critical theorists in conceptions of power and practices of criticism which are not confined to the reactive perspective of slave morality; the interest of feminist and political theorists in ways of understanding self-hood that take adequate account of the embodied and historical nature of human existence; and the desire of many to find possible forms of relations to others, to knowledge and to self which might provide bases for less oppressive social relations. In order that such ethical and political forces be able to lay hold of Nietzsche's thought, a further condition is indispensable, namely the presence of those more sophisticated and *slow* readers who have learnt to read him well. Recent Nietzsche scholarship has made it possible to see through the masks of coarseness and apparent brutality which complicate his texts, and to discover within them more subtle features of his thought capable of making positive contributions to both feminist and political theory. In particular, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* has begun to be taken seriously as a dramatic text in which it is not Nietzsche himself who speaks directly to readers but a variety of characters, and in which the principal character, Zarathustra, undergoes significant development in the course of the narrative. Any attempt to interpret the whip remark cited above must take account of the fact that it was uttered not by Zarathustra but by the Old Woman to whom he has spoken 'about woman'. She offers him in reply this 'little truth' which Zarathustra has earlier described as being 'unruly as a little child' (Nietzsche 1969:91). Is it too much, one recent reader asks, 'to suggest that what is at issue here is the absence or presence of women, of genuine relations with "the other", which the whip serves to repress?' (Armstrong 1992:5).

The whip is a complex symbol in Nietzsche's text, and its relationship to Zarathustra's masculinity is open to many interpretations besides those which see only a crude misogyny. Nowhere is this more apparent than in The Second Dance Song when the whip reappears at the end of Zarathustra's passionate but initially fruitless pursuit of his 'wanton companion', Life. In frustration or play, he reaches for his whip only to be admonished by the object of his desire, 'O Zarathustra! Do not crack your whip

so terribly! You surely know: noise kills thought—and now such tender thoughts are coming to me' (Nietzsche 1969:242). In this context, Aurelia Armstrong comments,

neither consummation nor subordination, take place. The whip is ineffectual and clearly inappropriate in the context of a genuine meeting between two parties. Certainly there are power relations here, but they are not the fixed relations of domination instituted by violence, rather, they are relations of power at play: transformative relations which leave neither of the participants unmarked. At the end of the dance we find Zarathustra and Life together weeping and contemplating the dusk; changed in or between themselves and, thus, associating differently with the outside.

(Armstrong 1992:5)

Nietzsche's writings have always been a battlefield for conflicting interpretations. The present collection is no exception. Although several of the essays address Nietzsche's thought as this is refracted by 'post-structuralist' readings of his work, this approach itself does not go unchallenged. The current interest in Nietzsche among feminist and postmodern political theorists, as well as among theorists of the postmodern condition, is perhaps no more than a new campaign in an already old war of conflicting interpretations. After all, Nietzsche was admired by anarchists, socialists and feminists during the 1890s, long before he was championed by the Nazis (Hinton Thomas 1983). A century later, however, we find ourselves in a vastly different historical situation, one much closer to the epoch for which Nietzsche considered he wrote. He regarded the collapse of faith in the Christian God as an event of such magnitude that it would take centuries for the consequences to become apparent. Few can yet fathom, he wrote in *The Gay Science* 343, 'how much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined because it was built on this faith, propped up by it, grown into it, for example, the whole of European morality' (Nietzsche 1974:279). The concerns of the present collection of essays illustrate Nietzsche's prescience with regard to the long-term effects of the crisis of modern cultural identity that he diagnosed under the name of nihilism. Traditional notions of self-hood, sexual difference, rationality and agency are among the presuppositions of modern social and political theory which have only recently been thrown into question. Renewed concern for the specific forms of social and corporeal existence has

led some to question the modern ideals of justice and political equality. If we are able to confront these challenges as if before an open sea upon which ‘at long last our ships may venture out again’ (Nietzsche 1974:280), it is in part because Nietzsche had already begun the exploration of these sea routes beyond modernity. To the extent that it charts directions which postmodern ethical and political thought might follow, Nietzsche’s philosophy has perhaps at last become timely.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Several of the contributors to this volume have assisted with the conception and execution of the project at various stages. I am particularly grateful for the assistance of Cathryn Vasseleu, Rosalyn Diprose, Keith Ansell-Pearson and Paul Redding. I am also thankful to Lisa Trahair for her assistance with editing, and to Moira Gatens for her astute reader’s comments and advice.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Armstrong, A. (1992) ‘“Woman” and the Whip’, *Silenus Laughed* (4).
- Connolly, W.E. (1988) *Political Theory and Modernity*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Deleuze, G. (1977) ‘Nomad thought’, in D.B.Allison (ed.) *The New Nietzsche*, New York: Delta.
- Hinton Thomas, R. (1983) *Nietzsche in German Politics and Society*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Nietzsche, F. (1969) *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R.J.Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- (1974) *The Gay Science*, trans. W.Kaufmann, New York: Vintage.

Page Intentionally Left Blank

1 Nietzsche and the pathos of distance

Rosalyn Diprose

Jeanette Winterson, in her novel *Sexing the Cherry*, describes the city of Jordan's dreams. A city

whose inhabitants are so cunning that to escape the insistence of creditors they knock down their houses in a single night and rebuild them elsewhere. So the number of buildings in the city is always constant but they are never in the same place from one day to the next.

For close families, and most people in the city are close families, this presents no problem, and it is more usual than not for the escapees to find their pursuers waiting for them on the new site of their choice.

As a subterfuge, then, it has little to recommend it, but as a game it is a most fulfilling pastime and accounts for the extraordinary longevity of the men and women who live there. We were all nomads once, and crossed the deserts and the seas on tracks that could not be detected, but were clear to those who knew the way. Since settling down and rooting like trees, but without the ability to make use of the wind to scatter our seed, we have found only infection and discontent.

In the city the inhabitants have reconciled two discordant desires: to remain in one place and to leave it behind forever.

(Winterson 1989:42–3)

This is a postmodern city. It is built on the recognition that one's place within a political and social space rests on unstable foundations. Places can change. This instability arises from the complex creditor-debtor relations which characterize subjectivity: the self gains a place in the world only by incurring a debt to the other, making self-present autonomy, freedom from this debt, impossible.

2 *Rosalyn Diprose*

The best one can hope for is a reconciliation of the desire for stability, for proximity to oneself (and hence to one's creditor) and the desire for change, for distance, for difference.

Winterson's city encapsulates Nietzsche's philosophy of self—a philosophy which sits uneasily between two streams of thought in Anglophone philosophy. On the one side there is mainstream social and political theory which, in the name of stability and sameness, assumes that society consists of relations of contract and exchange between free and equal, autonomous, self-present individuals. On the other side is the declaration that self-mastery and self-identity are dead along with the ideal of uniform social relations these notions of self-support. Rather than a society consisting of unified individuals governed by universal values, this alternative position variously posits a self dispersed into another, a multiplicity of differences, and finds universal values both invalid and oppressive.

This 'postmodernism' is often evoked in the name of feminism and sometimes in the name of Nietzsche. Craig Owens (1985), for example, defines postmodernism as the death of self-mastery, of the representation of woman as Other and of the repression of femininity that self-mastery entails. In the interests of opening up a multiplicity of sexual differences, he argues against the representation of 'positive' images of a revised femininity which may shore up a monolithic culture of centred masculinity (Owens 1985:71). Similarly, Jean Graybeal (1990), in a sympathetic reading of Nietzsche and following Kristeva, concludes that rather than repressing the 'dividedness' within ourselves and projecting this 'otherness' on to women, we should take a leaf out of Nietzsche's book and 'delight' in our dispersed condition (Graybeal 1990:160).

Nietzsche's aesthetics of self has more in common with these than it does with the self-presence underscoring conventional assessments of social relations. However, the reading of his philosophy which I offer below cautions against simple declarations of the death of self-presence which assume the ability to promote change and difference by distancing oneself from others. My aim is to explore Nietzsche's contributions to an understanding of both individual and sexual difference as the 'problematic of the constitution of place' in relation to others (Irigaray 1984:13–14).

While he may delight in self-division, there are at least two aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy that I shall highlight which warn against the forms of postmodernism mentioned. The first is his analysis of the self as an embodied cultural artifact which suggests that any change in self involves a material production rather than a

change of mind (or a simple declaration that the self is divided). Second, while Nietzsche's project for self-creation reads at times like an escape from others, there is much to suggest that even creative self-formation incurs a debt to the other. Both his philosophy of the body and his understanding of the self-other relation as a debtor-creditor relation rest on a certain concept of distance: distance as a division within the self and distance as difference between the self and others. And Nietzsche's understanding of the operation of distance has important consequences for re-thinking sexual difference within the context of a postmodern aesthetics of self.

THE BODY AND ONE'S PLACE

Central to Nietzsche's concept of self, and a point often overlooked by hyperreal postmodernism, is his recognition that the problematic of the constitution of place is a question of the social constitution of embodiment. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* he claims that 'body I am entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body' (Nietzsche 1966:34). In contrast to the assumptions that the self's identity can be reduced to consciousness and that the mind directs the body, Nietzsche claims that the body is what compares and creates and that thought and the ego are its instruments.

He is not suggesting that the body is an a-social fact in charge of operations. While 'in man *creature* and *creator*', matter and sculptor, are united (Nietzsche 1972:136), it is not consciousness (transcendental or individual) which makes a man out of matter. Rather, the body like any 'thing' is the sum of its effects in so far as those effects are united by a concept (1967:296). The 'body is only a social structure composed of many souls' (1972:31) where 'soul' refers to a corporeal multiplicity or a 'social structure of the drives and emotions' (1972:25). So, for Nietzsche, one's place in the world is determined by the concepts which govern the structure of the social world and which sculpture the body accordingly—a body which is a 'unity as an organisation' and is therefore a 'work of art' (1967:419).

How the self is made as a social structure is first a question of how the body is unified through social concepts. Second, and related to this process of unification, is the question of how thought and the ego are instruments of the body. The body is the locus of pleasure and pain (which are already interpretations) and thought is a reflection on pleasure and pain. To quote Nietzsche:

4 Rosalyn Diprose

The self says to the ego, 'Feel pain here!' Then the ego suffers and thinks how it might suffer no more—and that is why it is *made* to think.

The self says to the ego, 'Feel pleasure here!' Then the ego is pleased and thinks how it might often be pleased again—and that is why it is made to think.

(Nietzsche 1966:35)

Thought then is about the projection of bodily experience into the future: the conscious subject is an effect of temporalizing the body.

The target for much of Nietzsche's critical attention is the manner in which experience is unified and the body temporalized in the social relations of modernity. Here, the embodied self is constituted by social concepts which discourage difference, creativity and change. His account in the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals* begins with the idea that the unification of any body relies on the operation of memory and forgetting. 'Forgetting' is the incorporation of bodily affects before they become conscious and a making way for new sensations by allowing one to 'have done' with the old (1969:58). But, while this not-remembering is necessary for the constitution of any self as present, the making of the modern moral subject, the individual who is responsible for his or her acts, requires a faculty which opposes forgetting—memory.

Nietzsche describes how the social and moral discourses of modernity constitute a particular kind of memory: a memory which unifies a selection of activities, events, experiences and effects such that they belong to one person (1969:58). This memory makes the self constant and apparently unchanging through time by projecting the same body into the future. The operation of memory and forgetting unifies experience in another sense—it makes different experiences the same. What is remembered is not just an experience but a socially prescribed mode of interpreting that experience. As Nietzsche explains in *Twilight of the Idols* (1968:50–3), effects and events are incorporated by interpretation using prevailing moral norms and the concept of cause. Unpleasant feelings are said to be caused by actions considered undesirable. Pleasant feelings are said to arise from good or successful actions (1968:52). Hence, 'everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through—...pleasure and displeasure are subsequent and derivative phenomena' (1967:263–4).¹ So even forgetting as having done with an event involves first, dividing effects into those which are written into the body and

those which are not. Second, events which are incorporated and upon which we reflect are divided into a cause and an effect where the effect is pleasure or displeasure and the cause is interpreted according to social moral norms. Then, when encountering a new event or effect, the memory 'calls up earlier states of a similar kind and the causal interpretations which had grown out of them' (1968:51). New experiences are subsumed under habitual interpretations making every experience a fabrication (1972:97).

The individual is not the author of this dutiful memory: it is created through what Nietzsche calls the 'mnemotechnics of pain' (1969:61), techniques of punishment which carry social norms and moral values. 'Body I am entirely' in so far as my conscience, sense of responsibility and uniformity are created by an ordering of sensations, and projection of the body into the future through a social disciplinary system. This ensures not only that an individual's experiences are consistent over time but, as we are subjected to the same moral values, we shall have 'our experience in common' (1972:186). Forgetting in conjunction with a selective memory becomes a social instrument of repression against the dangers of inconsistency and variation. A society which favours consistency and conformity discourages us to leave our place behind.

Contrary to mainstream social and political theory, Nietzsche proposes that the individual is a cultural artifact whose existence is a product of the exclusion of other possibilities for one's embodied place in the world. But this account leaves Nietzsche with a problem shared also by those who find self-mastery and universal values oppressive: how can change be effected given that the self is the result of a socially informed material process of production? How can different possibilities for one's embodiment be opened, how can one leave one's place behind, without assuming the possibility of stepping outside either one's present body or one's social context? It is Nietzsche's concept of a distance within the self which addresses this apparent impasse.

DISTANCE AND LEAVING ONE'S PLACE BEHIND

The body which conforms to a uniform mode of subjection is one which acts out a social role imposed upon it.² In contrast to this actor, Nietzsche, in *The Gay Science*, privileges a process of self-fabrication with the artistic ability to stage, watch and overcome the self according to a self-given plan (1974:132–3). He draws on two

features of art and the artist to characterize creative self-fabrication (1974:163–4). The first is the suggestion that the self, like any artifact, is an interpretation, perspective or mask. Second, the relation between artists and their art illustrates the point that creating beyond the present self requires that we view ourselves from a distance in an image outside ourselves. Leaving behind the influence of social concepts which restrict our place in the world requires treating one's corporeality as a work of art.

The distinction that Nietzsche makes between the self as artist and the image or spectacle staged beyond the present body could imply a unique, extra-social invention. But, at a less ambitious and more realistic level, it suggests that you are never identical with yourself. Nietzsche sometimes refers to this difference within the self as the 'pathos of distance':

that longing for an ever increasing widening of distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, more remote, tenser, more comprehensive states, in short precisely the elevation of the type 'man', the continual 'self-overcoming of man', to take a moral formula in a supra-moral sense.

(Nietzsche 1972:173)

What Nietzsche is suggesting here is that the ability to move beyond oneself hinges on a relation within the soul (where the soul is something about the body). A distance or difference within the self, between the present self and an image of self towards which I aspire, is necessary for change to be incorporated in the constitution and enhancement of the bodily self. We should not confuse the artist and his work, says Nietzsche, 'as if [the artist] were what he is able to represent, conceive and express. The fact is that *if* he were it, he would not represent, conceive, and express it' (1969:101). The self as a work of art is never the same as the self that creates it, not because the self as artist is the true or essential self in contrast to a false, unique, extra-social image projected. Rather, the image which the artistic self creates is a moment beyond the present self which creates it. The difference, or distance, between the two is a precondition to representation which for Nietzsche is always self-representation.

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche accounts for this distance within the self in terms of a process of self-temporalization of the body which subverts the notion of linear time assumed in normalizing social structures. Unlike the 'last man', who views himself as the essential and unchangeable end point of his history

(Nietzsche 1966:202), the overman views himself as a moment. He risks his present self or, as Nietzsche puts it, 'goes under' (1966:14–15). But, unlike the 'higher man', who, in a manner not unlike Owen's 'postmodern' self, affirms the future by negating the past and skipping over existence, thereby changing nothing (1966:286–95), the overman risks himself by 'willing backwards': 'To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all "it was" into "thus I willed it"—that alone I should call redemption' (1966:139). Creativity is not a matter of declaring oneself born again by simply reaching for a new part to play: it requires working on oneself. The overman then is the self that is a moment which temporalizes itself by recreating its past as a way of projecting itself into the future. This self-temporalization produces a distance or difference within the self.

The idea that the bodily self is reproduced differently as it is temporalized through the production of a distance within the self would seem to be at odds with Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence. Problems arise if we accept eternal recurrence as either a cosmological hypothesis, where the world repeats itself infinitely (1967:521), or a psychological doctrine, where self-affirmation involves the desire for the self to recur eternally the same (1966:322). However, as David Wood (1988) has demonstrated, interpreting the doctrine of eternal recurrence exclusively in either of these ways is ultimately untenable.³

Nietzsche's presentation of the doctrine in 'The vision and the riddle' (1966:85–7) consists in a further revaluation of linear time which suggests that there is always difference in repetition. Here Zarathustra, on a 'bridge across becoming', recounts his vision of climbing a mountain while carrying on his back his 'archenemy, the spirit of gravity'. Zarathustra is attempting to climb toward the future, but the spirit of gravity, of which man suffers if he cannot go beyond himself, threatens to drag him back towards himself. 'You threw yourself up high', says gravity to Zarathustra, 'but every stone must fall...the stone will fall back on yourself' (Nietzsche 1966:156). The spirit of gravity is suggesting a notion of return which is cyclic: you cannot escape what you are, you will always return to yourself the same.

While Zarathustra affirms this notion of repetition of self ('was that life? well then! once more'), he goes on to reinterpret it. He points to a gateway called 'the moment' claiming that from this moment a path leads backwards to eternity and another contradictory path leads forwards to eternity: the future contradicts the past and both the future and the past lead out from the present moment.

Zarathustra then goes on to suggest that all that leads backwards from the moment, all that has been, has been before, as has this moment. And, because all things are knotted together then this moment draws after it all that is to come. Therefore, he asks, must not all of us have been at this moment before and must we not eternally return?

What Nietzsche seems to be suggesting is a return of self involving a relation to time where the self does not seek to escape the past (linear time) nor simply to repeat it (cyclic). By defining time as something which comes out of the moment, Nietzsche is suggesting, in keeping with his notion of self-overcoming, that one temporalizes oneself. The self *re-creates* the past (or what one has been) at every moment as it projects itself towards a future. The future is also created out of the present. The contingent future, governed by others, is made one's own through the present where the present is a re-constitution of the past. And, by making the present moment its own, the self also distances itself from a necessary past and future.

At the same time, according to Nietzsche, each moment eternally recurs and contains every other moment which constitutes the temporalized self. As Zarathustra suggests, there is no outside the moment that is the present self: 'how should there be an outside-myself? There is no outside' (Nietzsche 1966:217). This is not to say that the self is transcendental or unchanging. On the contrary, to re-create the past, or one's 'it was', by making it 'thus I willed it' is to give birth to the self anew. But, while the self is different at every moment, these different moments are not self-contained. There is no outside the self in the sense that the moment, which is the present self, contains traces of its relation to a past and a future which are different. The structure of the moment is one where the self exceeds its present self rather than one where the self is self-present and self-identical. Man is 'an imperfect tense' (Nietzsche 1983:61): his past is never complete in relation to his present.

The distancing effected by making the moment one's own is not a state of mind: it 'creates a higher body' (1966:70)—the bodily self is reproduced differently. Reproduction as difference is also apparent in Nietzsche's use of the metaphor of pregnancy to characterize the artistic self.⁴ The overman 'begets and bears' (1972:113) a future self which is beyond and different from himself. The pathos of distance within the self, generated by making the moment one's own, allows one to remain in one place while leaving it behind forever. But this is not a simple rejection of one's embodied place. Nietzsche's

formulation of a distance within the self re-opens what is denied by social discourses which, in assuming an unchanging subject over time, assume that 'what is does not *become*' (1968:35). This assumption of sameness is an 'escape from sense-deception, from becoming, from history' (1968:35). The history which conformity disavows is the process of incorporating new experiences and shedding the old, reconciling conflicting impulses, the ongoing process of corporeal self-fabrication according to concepts one had inherited and cultivated (1972:96–104; 1974:269–71).

DISTANCE AND THE CREDITOR-DEBTOR RELATION

While Nietzsche's understanding of creative self-fabrication allows a reconciliation of the discordant desires in Winterson's dream, it remains an uneasy formulation. Nietzsche often speaks as if the distance within the self effected by making the moment one's own is generated by the self alone: creative self-fabrication is often presented as an autonomous, self-contained project. Yet, in 'Schopenhauer as Educator', for example, Nietzsche suggests that, rather than finding ourselves within ourselves, we are more likely to find ourselves outside ourselves, that is in our effects, in 'everything [which] bears witness to what we are, our friendships and our enmities, our glance and the clasp of our hand, our memory and that which we do not remember, our books and our handwriting', in the objects we love (1983:129). In other words, the self is not just divided between the remembered and the forgotten, the future and the past, but between the self and the other. There is something about our relation to others which determines the place we occupy within social relations. Hence, contrary to some postmodern formulations of a dispersed self who does not 'other' others, creative self-fabrication, changing places, must implicate others in some sense.

Nietzsche's genealogies of justice and punishment typically reveal the ways in which others are involved in the constitution of one's place in the world. The most fundamental social relation is, he claims, the creditor-debtor relation where 'one person first *measured himself* against another' (1969:70). Inflicting pain on another was 'originally' a way of recovering a debt rather than creating the memory necessary for conformity. And this involved evaluating different parts of the body to ensure that the pain inflicted was equivalent to the debt owed (1969:62–5). Under such a system, evaluation is of the body and operates by mutual agreement. Debts

can be repaid through the body via a contractual arrangement between creditor and debtor.

But what is the nature of this debt which is supposedly repaid through corporeal measurement? As determining values, establishing and exchanging equivalences is the most fundamental social arrangement, it is not just a question of commerce in a literal sense. Evaluation of one's own body in relation to another is constitutive of one's place in the world. While Nietzsche sometimes speaks as if there is an original difference between debtor and creditor, the self becomes different, a distinct entity, only by distancing itself from others. And this distancing itself is a mode of production involving measurement.

The relation between self and other is governed by will to power: by language as an expression of power, by the use of concepts to measure, interpret, draw distinctions. According to Nietzsche, if we eliminate concepts which we impose, such as number, thing, activity and motion, then

no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their 'effect' upon the same. The will to power not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos*—the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge.

(Nietzsche 1967:339)

To say that will to power is pathos refers us to the distinction between ethos and pathos which Nietzsche evokes elsewhere (1974:252). Ethos is usually understood as a way of life, one's habits and character, whereas pathos is how one is passively effected. While we think of our way of life as a given and an enduring ethos, our life, Nietzsche argues, is really pathos, a dynamic process of changing experience. The will to power is pathos: it is the movement by which experience is constituted and entities come into being such that they are in relation and can be affected and can effect.⁵

Will to power as interpretation operates within intersubjective relations where, as Nietzsche claims in reference to love, 'our pleasure in ourselves tries to maintain itself by again and again changing something new *into ourselves*' (1974:88). Measuring the other is a way of enhancing our own form, capacities and effects. But again, neither the self nor the other (whether the other is another person or a 'thing') exists in essence apart from this relation, that is, apart from 'the effect it produces and that which it resists' (1967:337). In other words, individuals, and the differences between them, are not given. They are an effect of

creation and imposition of forms...[within] a ruling structure which *lives*, in which parts and functions are delimited and coordinated, in which nothing whatever finds a place that has not been first assigned a 'meaning' in relation to a whole.

(Nietzsche 1969:86–7)

Will to power is this process of the constitution of place, of delimiting one from another, through the assignment of 'meaning' to effects and their interrelations. So any difference between parties to a contract is an effect of will to power as productive interpretation by which entities are constituted in relation. The distance/ difference between self and other is predicated upon the proximity of measurement: the credit of difference incurs a debt to the other.

If the relation of measurement between creditor and debtor is one of mutual exchange, which Nietzsche suggests in his genealogy and which liberal political theory assumes, then it is a relation which already implies sameness. Nietzsche often notes that justice, as the fair settling of disputes (the possibility of mutual exchange without any loss of self), assumes the parties involved are already of 'approximately equal power' (1969:70; 1984:64). At one level 'equal power' means that both parties have the power to enforce their own evaluations. At a more fundamental level 'equal power' means a balance in the distribution of productive power. The possibility of justice, as mutual understanding, assumes that the selves involved are already constituted by the same mode of evaluation. That is justice assumes that will to power as interpretation operates uniformly to produce all bodies as the same. As Nietzsche puts it in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

To refrain from mutual injury, mutual violence, mutual exploitation, to equate one's own will with that of another: this may in a certain rough sense become good manners between individuals if the conditions for it are present (namely if their strength and value standards are in fact similar and they both belong to *one* body).

(Nietzsche 1972:174)

Belonging to one social body within which it is possible to settle one's debt to the other assumes a shared mode of evaluation by which the bodily self is constituted.

But the possibility of mutual understanding is at best limited on Nietzsche's model of self-fabrication. A social body may share a language, a mode of interpretation and evaluation, a mode of self-

creation. But self-evaluation occurs in relation to another and there is always a disjunction between how one evaluates oneself and how one is evaluated by another. Interpretation of the other is a translation which is a 'form of conquest' (Nietzsche 1974:137) and reduces the tempo of the other's style (1972:41). The style projected becomes overlaid by other masks constituted through misunderstanding. The constitution of identity is dissimulation where one's absolute identity is deferred:

Every profound spirit needs a mask: more, around every profound spirit a mask is continually growing thanks to the constantly false, that is to say *shallow* interpretation of every word he speaks, every step he takes, every sign of life he gives.

(Nietzsche 1972:51)⁶

Further, while one's identity is a self-fabrication of the body using concepts one inherits, there is always a disjunction between the social concepts we share and how each person applies them:

Ultimately, the individual derives the value of his acts from himself; because he has to interpret in a quite individual way even the words he has inherited. His interpretation of a formula at least is personal, even if he does not create a formula: as an interpreter he is still creative.

(Nietzsche 1967:403)

What Nietzsche exposes in his genealogy of justice and the creditor - debtor relation is that the exchange of equivalences already assumes sameness. And second, in so far as the parties involved are only at best *approximately* the same then evaluation involves some subtraction from the other to the benefit of the self. Social exchange does not begin with a contract between independent individuals (1969:86). It is always a matter of will to power as self-constitution and in so far as this exchange is 'successful' it assumes and promotes sameness. Yet, in assuming that the other is the same, one reduces the other to the self and 'deliberately and recklessly brush[es] the dust of the wings of the butterfly that is called moment' (1974:137), that contradictory moment which is the site of self-creativity.

Despite indications that one's place can never be reduced to another's, the discourses of modernity assume sameness and encourage the desire to stay in one place. Law (which embodies notions of just and unjust) reflects a community's customs in the sense of a mode of evaluation and interpretation (Nietzsche 1969:71–