


THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN CONVOYS

A Naval Staff History



With a Preface by Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones

The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys

Naval Staff Histories

Series Editor: Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones

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Foreword

*Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, KCB, ADC, First Sea Lord and
Chief of Naval Staff*

Convoys in the Second World War have been largely associated with attacks by U-boats but, as this Naval Staff History of the Mediterranean Convoys to Malta shows, these sailed in the face of multiple threats from the air and surface, as well as from underwater enemies. By and large, these attacks were mastered by the determination and tactical expertise of the Royal Navy and the steadfast courage of the Allied merchant marine, even when the odds were heavily stacked against them. The account presented here deals with the naval side of these Mediterranean convoys. As the History and the new Preface make clear, the convoys were critical to the ultimate survival of that island and, though our hold on the island was at times fragile, its defence and re-supply were major factors in the defeat of Axis forces in the Mediterranean. This is disputed by some historians, but was readily acknowledged by the enemy at the time. The provision of the necessary aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers to escort these small but vital convoys placed a heavy strain on British resources. It was, however, a commitment that – albeit, sometimes, by a narrow margin – the Royal Navy was able to meet, because of the inherent flexibility of seapower, which allowed the necessary ships to be concentrated from other stations, often hundreds of miles away, and then readily re-deployed. Thus many ships were sequentially used in Mediterranean and then Arctic convoys.

The Western Alliance has, for many years now, enjoyed almost complete control over the World's oceans. It is easy to forget how fragile this command can be, even when threatened by weak asymmetric threats. Who can predict whether another maritime power might possess, in the not too far future, the global reach to threaten this hegemony? It is therefore easy to take for granted that the oceans can be used for our own purposes: to transport armies and supplies at will. British military campaigns ashore are supplied overwhelmingly by sea. When this Staff History was written, these lessons were in the forefront of most naval officers' minds. Sixty years on, it is perhaps time for a gentle reminder that our hegemony may not automatically remain intact and that we may, once more, have to fight supplies through to a future battlezone. The History shows how the Royal Navy was able to plan and execute the complex tactical operations required to see the Mediterranean convoys through to their destination, without (for the most part) unacceptable losses – at least by the standards of their day. These operations also demonstrated that, against a multitude of threats, the age-old strategy of 'convoy and escort' succeeded in simultaneously protecting trade and inflicting heavy loss on the enemy. Even taking into account the great changes in naval technology, convoys remained vital for the survival of the United Kingdom – a lesson we forget at our peril! The security of the High Seas and maritime trade remain as important as ever. As for this Staff History, it is now fifty years old, but the account, written with the echoes of the events still ringing in the author's ears, retains an immediacy and candour that the casual reader and academic researcher alike will not find in other secondary accounts.

Preface to the Published Edition¹

Battle Summary 18, *Mediterranean Convoys, 1941*, and Battle Summary No. 32, *Malta Convoys, 1942*, were both completed by Commander J. Owen of the Historical Section and issued in 1944 and 1945.² These Battle Summaries were revised and combined after the war by Pitcairn-Jones and issued in 1957 as *Selected Convoys (Mediterranean), 1941–1942*. By this time, Pitcairn-Jones had access to the full records (some of them highly classified), including those captured from German and Italian forces. The Staff History was thus produced as a Confidential study for use within the Royal Navy.³ Although long since declassified, it is published for the first time here in this volume, where it is deliberately reproduced in facsimile and with no attempt at revision. It will be seen that this Staff History, in common with the whole series, was narrowly focussed on the naval aspects of the Mediterranean Convoys to Malta. This Preface, however, is new and is intended to provide additional context for the operations described in the Staff History and, in particular, to emphasise the value of the continuing resistance of Malta to the Mediterranean theatre generally.

What did The Mediterranean Convoys Achieve?

The Admiralty's Historical Section were under no illusion as to the importance of Malta to British strategy in the Mediterranean. In a lecture they prepared the Historical Section concluded that:

When the history of the war comes to be written, it will be generally recognised that the maintenance of Malta, as a base for offensive operations, was the 'Corner Stone' on which the whole strategy of the war in the Mediterranean has been built. The success of its air and submarine offensive in the last months of 1941, and from July onwards of 1942, played a decisive part in those Military successes in Libya and North Africa which have culminated in the tremendous victory in Tunisia. Malta's contribution to the destruction of the Axis air strength alone is impressive: 1,000 enemy aircraft have been shot down by the fighters and A/A gunfire of the Island. . . .⁴

During the war, however, it had not always seemed so certain. After Italy entered the war and with France defeated, it was realised that Mediterranean through-convoys would have to be abandoned and that Malta would be too vulnerable to act as a Fleet main base. However, there was no plan to abandon Malta entirely, for its strategic position athwart Italian (and later German) lines of communication to North Africa meant that it could be used as a base for sea and air offensive operations.⁵ This was realised by the enemy too, and the neutralisation

[x] *Preface to the published edition*

of the island was one of *Luftwaffe's* objectives when Fliegerkorps X was despatched to Sicily in January 1941. Thereafter the whole Mediterranean situation, of which Malta was frequently the focus, caused the Germans to constantly reinforce the theatre at the end of 1941, even at the expense of air support on the Russian front.⁶

However, the struggle was not as one-sided as this might suggest, for the ability of Malta to play a significant part in the interdiction of the enemy's supply routes, and even to guarantee its own survival were, for a long time, in the balance during 1941–42. The decision in April 1942, for example, to abandon the sailing of a planned re-supply convoy prompted the Governor of Malta to signal London that:

... our situation is so grave that it is my duty to restate [it] in the clearest possible terms. The decision materially reduces our chances of survival not because of any failure of morale or fighting efficiency but because it is impossible to carry on without food and ammunition. ... The position with regard to these is as follows:—
(A) Flour. We have enough to last until the later half of May. ...
(B) A/A Ammunition...we have slightly over a month's supply. ...⁷

Even in the following September, after the arrival of the 'Pedestal' convoy (the last dealt with in the Staff History) the position had imperceptibly improved. After listing the items of essential stores to be carried in a single ship totalling 8,000 tons (of which just over 40% was to be flour), the Governor again signalled in the starkest of terms that:

Only absolutely essential articles of food and fuel are included with small allocation of civil and service stores. Object would be to put off target date until early January.⁸

The Governor's 'target date' was the date by which Malta would be forced to surrender unless the essential supplies were received.⁹ Malta's ability to act as an offensive base remained on a knife-edge and, in the circumstances, it is remarkable that her strike forces achieved so much.

During 1942 the Royal Navy was heavily committed in the Atlantic combating the U-boats. Resources were also consumed in vain attempts to stem the Japanese advance in the Far East and, of course, in supporting the Russians via the Arctic Convoys. The desperate shortage of heavy ships (particularly aircraft carriers) made the adequate protection for Mediterranean convoys problematic. As a result, Malta's critical situation often had to be allayed by the use of submarines to ferry stores and fuel to the island. Thus three trips were made in 1940, 39 in 1941, and at least 50 during 1942.¹⁰ The carriage of stores by air was a by-product of the transfer of aircraft to Malta for reconnaissance and strike operations, though in early 1942 the Air Ministry agreed to 24 Squadron, equipped with long-range Hudsons, to be used for regular flights to Malta carrying passengers and small quantities of high value cargo, such as medical and electronic supplies. When aircraft carriers were available, fighter aircraft could be ferried to Malta and, by this means, about 700 Hurricanes and Spitfires were delivered.¹¹ The security these aircraft gave Malta allowed the island to become a progressively more effective base for strikes against enemy shipping. Their convoys were trying to supply the Axis armies in North Africa, whose ultimate objective was the capture of the Middle East oil fields.

During 1942 the *Luftwaffe* increased its commitment to the Mediterranean theatre by some 50%, until they were maintaining over 1,000 aircraft. This contrasted markedly with the steady decline in the *Luftwaffe* on the Russian front, where their strength fell from

4,800 to 3,950 aircraft during 1942, and thereafter to less than 1,800 aircraft.¹² In both theatres the Germans were at last meeting numerically superior opponents, with the consequent increase in aircraft wastage, and never enough aircraft to undertake all the operations needed to support German positions. In mid June 1942, for example, the Eighth Army began a well-ordered retreat from Gazala. This could have been turned into a rout if the *Luftwaffe* had been able to attack the exposed columns, but the enemy's air forces were instead concentrated against the 'Harpoon' and 'Vigorous' convoys making their way to Malta. The Panzer Army was thus forced to advance into Egypt without adequate air support, while the enemy aircraft lost in the convoys battles reduced their strength for future operations. The switch of bomber force bases caused considerable disorganisation, and the intensity of the anti-convoy operations also markedly effected subsequent aircraft serviceability. The cycle was repeated in August against the 'Pedestal' convoy.¹³ On the Allied side, the arrival of two ships in the 'Harpoon' convoy allowed Malta to resume offensive operations, which prompted urgent discussions between senior Axis Commanders. The German General Staff were informed:

The situation of the British Army demands that successes gained so far be exploited as far as possible. In spite of this, it must be taken into consideration that the supply problem offers difficulties. The air base of Malta has resumed offensive operations. The Tripoli route must be temporarily abandoned and the route to harbours in Cyrenaica is also endangered. It is planned to neutralise Malta again, employing formations to be transferred from Germany. This, however, requires time, during which a critical period cannot be avoided.¹⁴

The third Axis air 'blitz' was launched against Malta in July, but by then Malta's fighter defences had been augmented to such a degree that the enemy's assault was defeated. The enemy were also in no doubt over the effects the Malta garrison was having on their naval operations. Admiral Weichold, for example, revealed the inter-relationship between the Allied convoy operations and the enemy's ability to transport and protect supplies to the Panzer Army in North Africa. During the June convoys operations the Italian Fleet had expended 15,000 tons of fuel and this left them with insufficient reserves to maintain their extensive convoy protection commitments. This in turn caused a further drop in the rate of delivery of supplies to North Africa. Although some of the shortfalls were:

... made good by the windfall obtained with the capture of Tobruk, this was no substitute for a controlled and successful supply programme, and in fact it merely helped to conceal the real extent of the supply crisis of the Panzer Army. Later, when fully revealed by the pressure of events, the shortage of supplies became one of the most important factors in the failure of the Panzer Army, at El Alamein.¹⁵

Perhaps no better appreciation of the value of Malta, bought at such high cost, can be found than in this unwitting testimony from the enemy.

A contemporary assessment was made by the Director of Naval Operational Research of the effect of the Malta striking forces. The study reviewed the period from the 'Torch' landings in November 1942 to May 1943, when the campaign ended and the Mediterranean was reopened for through convoys. It was based, in part, on '... captured enemy documents and other sources ...' and concluded that:

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... 26% of the [enemy's] supplies sailing have been sunk or turned back through damage. During November [1942] there were no sinkings, in December 31% was sunk and in January and February 23% and 21%, after that sinkings rose to 37% in March, 45% in April and 78% in May.¹⁶

The principal means of sinking Axis shipping were aircraft and submarines operating from several bases in the Mediterranean, although roughly half of the air strikes and half of the enemy shipping sunk were by aircraft flying from Malta.¹⁷ This was as a direct outcome of a gradual accrual of strength by the Malta garrison, especially after the arrival of the 'Harpoon' convoy in June 1942.¹⁸ Thus, the Axis forces were constantly beset by their lack of an assured supply route across the short stretch of the Mediterranean that lay between Italy and North Africa. In addition to their attempts to send supplies by sea '... about 40,000 tons arrived by air. Nearly all of this was transported in Ju 52's carrying 2 tons each, or Me 323's carrying 10 tons.'¹⁹ Smaller proportions were carried by other Italian aircraft, but the whole enterprise was hugely inefficient. But even with all these exertions, the Axis army in North Africa was deprived of half of their supplies and, more significantly, two-thirds of their oil.²⁰ Meanwhile, the British managed, by and large, to maintain and even expand their army in North Africa via the long sea routes round the Cape.

Continuing Relevance of the Naval Staff Histories

In parallel with the *Mediterranean Convoys* study Admiralty issued *The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping* which focussed mainly (but not exclusively) on the Atlantic U-boat campaign.²¹ The volume covering the *Arctic Convoys, 1941-1945* had been issued three years earlier, and together with the other two volumes, provided detailed analyses of all the main convoy operations during the war. Of course, much has changed since the Second World War: the technological promises of that earlier era have become realities and the politico-strategic environment has altered out of all recognition. In the late 1980s, some professional experts thought that convoys were much less valuable as a means of protecting shipping, because the improvements in ocean surveillance systems meant that more 'offensive' anti-submarine operations could be contemplated. Moreover, dispersion and deception were seen as the principal counters to both the submarine and aircraft capable of firing long-range missiles, for the enemy would be less sure of identifying their principal target. In any case, if they were to fire, it would be from well outside any convoy's traditional defensive perimeter.²² This is, surely, a misreading of the *Mediterranean Convoys* and the other Staff Histories, for the shape of multi-threat future operations as conceived at the beginning of the Cold War, bore a great resemblance to the convoy and fleet actions in the Mediterranean, the Arctic and the Pacific. The histories of these campaigns showed how attack-at-source and other offensive operations had directly effected the defence of shipping. Indeed, for those contemplating a nuclear attack-at-source strategy launched from the Mediterranean, and later the Arctic, these histories provided direct information of these operational areas.²³

The *Mediterranean Convoys* volume confirmed the value of convoy in the defence of shipping against air and submarine attack, and demonstrated the necessity of aircraft carriers '... for fighter protection and fighter direction ... against shore-based air attack.'²⁴ This was a lesson reinforced during the 1982 Falklands War. Aircraft carriers and other fleet units also played an indirect part in the success of the convoys, by neutralising the enemy's surface fleet in actions such as the Fleet Air Arm attack at Taranto and the Battle of Matapan.²⁵ The *Mediterranean Convoys* volume also confirmed another lesson: that complex operations

could be mounted by ships drawn from widely separated theatres at short notice. An example was HMS *Ashanti*, a Home Fleet ship, who took part in the Arctic PQ17 convoy, followed by the Mediterranean 'Pedestal' operations and then went back to the Arctic for convoy PQ18. One of *Ashanti*'s officers was the future Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin.²⁶ These operations made a distinct impression on Lewin which stayed with him for many years. When he was asked, just after *Sheffield* was sunk at the beginning of the 1982 Falklands campaign, whether further heavy losses of ships would result in the abandonment of the operation, he reminded '... the War Cabinet that in 1942 Operation 'Pedestal' had lost two-thirds of the merchant ships involved. ...' He might have added that an aircraft carrier, a cruiser, an anti-aircraft ship and a destroyer were also lost, with others damaged, but, Lewin emphatically assured the War Cabinet, the Royal Navy '... had still saved Malta.'²⁷

As an example of pure history, this Staff History provides a fascinating and detailed account of important events during the Second World War with an authority which is seldom possible elsewhere. Their value is enhanced when it is realised that these histories were written by a professional historian, Pitcairn-Jones, a man of considerable naval experience and technical knowledge, who had access to an impressive range of primary sources, including Ultra intelligence material and the personal testimony of many individuals involved in the events depicted. Given that the history was written 'in-house', it is surprisingly balanced in its treatment of, what were sometimes, controversial events and this, surely, is an example to be followed. Furthermore, this Staff History takes a positive view of the Malta convoys. Many subsequent histories have dwelt on the cost of these operations and concluded that they were therefore wasteful of effort. The Staff History, on the other hand, while not belittling the setbacks and losses, emphasises the achievements, as well as the detrimental effect on Axis operations, by the continued British possession of Malta. While the strategic and operational environment in which the Royal Navy now operates is vastly different to that depicted in *Mediterranean Convoys*, the History restates the vital necessity for detailed operational planning if success is to be assured. Also that the courage and determination of both the military and merchant sailors, and the airmen was essential to fight through their convoys, more often than not against heavy odds. The history shows that aggressive action could reap benefits – in the psychological as well as the material arenas – and that high technology was not the only determinate of success. The Naval Staff in the 1950s read and commented on the drafts and found that the narrative chimed well with their experiences of the Mediterranean Convoys.

Dr. Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones
Naval Historical Branch
1 December 2004

- 1 The author would like to thank those who helped variously with encouragement, criticism and unearthing records during the preparation of this Preface, especially Michael Whitby (Department of History and Heritage, Ottawa), Peter Nash (King's College, London), Kate Tildesley and Mac McAloon (both of the Naval Historical Branch).
- 2 'Historical Section of TSD – Review of Narrator Posts,' Roger M. Bellairs, 11 November 1949, T.27309, NHB. Owen does not appear in the list of narrators in 1949. 'Extra Pay Allowance,' Rear Admiral Roger M. Bellairs, HSL.261 29 December 1949, in, 'Personnel and Administration, 1 June 1948 to 31 December 1949,' TSD/HS, NHB.
- 3 The original can be found in the National Archive at the Public Record Office (hereafter PRO): 'Selected Convoys (Mediterranean), 1941–42, Battle Summary Nos. 18 and 32,' 1957, PRO ADM 234/336, and in both the Naval Historical Branch and Admiralty Library.

[xiv] *Preface to the published edition*

- 4 'Malta, Lecture,' n.d., in, 'Lectures,' Folder No. 7, NHB.
- 5 *ibid.*
- 6 Air Ministry, Pamphlet No. 248: *The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1933 to 1945)* (Issued by the Air Ministry (A.C.A.S.[I]), 1948), pp. 129 and 133.
- 7 Governor and C-in-C, Malta, to Admiralty for Chiefs of Staff, Hush Message, 1320/20 April 1942, 'Hush Signals, April to June 1942,' Microfilm, NHB, p. 289.
- 8 Governor Malta to Admiralty, Hush Message 1430B/27 September 1942, 'Hush Signals, August to October 1942,' Microfilm, NHB, p. 162.
- 9 The author is especially indebted to Arnold Hague for drawing his attention to this aspect of the campaign and the Hush Signals series.
- 10 Arnold Hague, *The Supply of Malta, 1940–1942* (unpublished paper, May 1995), pp. 73–80.
- 11 *ibid.*, p. 64.
- 12 Much of the drain of aircraft from the Russian front was, of course, due to the increasing effectiveness of the direct attack on Germany first by RAF Bomber Command and later by the USAAF Air Forces based in Britain and the Mediterranean. Air Ministry, Pamphlet No. 248: *The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1933 to 1945)* (Issued by the Air Ministry (A.C.A.S.[I]), 1948), pp. 219–221.
- 13 'Operation "Pedestal": Enquiry from Commander L.J. Pitcairn-Jones,' Mervyn Mills, Air Historical Branch, 10 December 1955, in, 'Selected Convoys: Mediterranean, 1941–42, Revised Battle Summaries, Nos. 18, 32,' Folder, NHB.
- 14 Quoted in, 'The June Convoys to Malta (Operations "Harpoon" and "Vigorous"): Enquiry from Commander L.J. Pitcairn-Jones, RN,' [Squadron Leader Mervyn Mills, 24 January 1956], in, 'Selected Convoys: Mediterranean, 1941–42, Revised Battle Summaries, Nos. 18, 32,' Folder, NHB.
- 15 *ibid.*
- 16 'Enemy Supplies to Tunisia,' [E.C. Bullard], CAOR, May 1943, 'Lectures,' Folder No. 7, NHB.
- 17 *ibid.*
- 18 'The June Convoys to Malta (Operations "Harpoon" and "Vigorous"): Enquiry from Commander L.J. Pitcairn-Jones, RN,' [Squadron Leader Mervyn Mills, 24 January 1956], in, 'Selected Convoys: Mediterranean, 1941–42, Revised Battle Summaries, Nos. 18, 32,' Folder, NHB.
- 19 'Enemy Supplies to Tunisia,' *op cit.*
- 20 Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, paperback edn. (London: Pimlico, 1996), p. 52.
- 21 'Naval Staff History: Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939–1945: A Study of Policy and Operations: Volume 1A, Text and Appendices,' CB 3304(1A), 1957, PRO ADM 239/415 and 'Naval Staff History: Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939–1945: A Study of Policy and Operations: Volume 1B, Plans and Tables,' CB 3304(1A), 1957, PRO ADM 239/416. (See also PRO ADM 234/578 and PRO ADM 234/579.) These books have been published in a single volume: Eric J. Grove (ed.), *The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939–1945*, revised edn. (Aldershot: Ashgate for The Navy Records Society, 1997).
- 22 Geoffrey Till, *Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914–1945. A Historical Survey* (London: Jane's, 1979), pp. 143–145.
- 23 For more detail see Michael A. Palmer, *Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945–55* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990); Eric J. Grove, *Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II* (London: The Bodley Head, 1987).
- 24 'Selected Convoys (Mediterranean), 1941–42, Battle Summary Nos. 18 and 32,' 1957, PRO ADM 234/336, Section 74.
- 25 'Selected Operations (Mediterranean), 1940, (Battle Summaries Nos. 2, 8, 9 & 10),' Historical Section, BR 1736(6), 1957, and 'The Battle of Cape Matapan,' Historical Section, BR 1736(35), 1950, NHB.
- 26 Ashanti was part of the escort for the Home Fleet. Richard Hill, *Lewin of Greenwich: The Authorised Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin* (London: Cassell, 2000), pp. 39–50.
- 27 Richard Hill, *Lewin of Greenwich: The Authorised Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin* (London: Cassell, 2000), p. 370; 'Selected Convoys (Mediterranean), 1941–42, Battle Summary Nos. 18 and 32,' 1957, PRO ADM 234/336, Appendix N.

Appendix to the preface

Abbreviations used in the preface

CB	Confidential Book(s)
C-in-C or CinC	Commander-in-Chief
HMS	Her Majesty's Ship
PRO	Public Record Office (now the National Archive)
RAF	Royal Air Force
TSD	Tactical and Staff Duties (Division) (Admiralty)

A Note on Sources

The documentary sources used in *Mediterranean Convoys* are referenced by the original file structure used within the Admiralty. For researchers who wish to explore these further a translation of these references into the Public Record Office (now the National Archive) numbering has been provided below.

Sources for Mediterranean Convoys

In the listings below, 'N/T' stands for 'No Trace'. This does not necessarily indicate that the document concerned has been destroyed but that it has proved impossible to identify the current National Archive designation of the record.

Original Ref

Admiralty Historical Section War Diary
CinC Mediterranean: War Diary

Vice Admiral, Malta: War Diary
Reports of Proceedings, etc., contained in
the following Record Office cases and
dockets:—

Operation 'Excess'

WH 7603, 7363: FO, Force 'H'
WH 7721, 8122: CinC Mediterranean
WH 8088, 8091: Submarines
A. 0655/41: HMS *Illustrious*

Current National Archive Ref

ADM 199/2195–2326
ADM 199/414–415 (1941),
ADM 199/650–651 (1942)
ADM 199/413 (1941), ADM 199/424 (1942)

ADM 199/656
ADM 199/797
ADM 199/1150, ADM 199/1153
N/T

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Operation 'Substance'

WH 7604, 7745, Force 'H'	ADM 199/657, ADM 704 & 705
WH 7745, CinC Mediterranean	ADM 199/830
WH 8027, 8028, 8030, 8092, 8093: Submarines	ADM 199/1119, N/T, ADM 199/1154, ADM 199/1155

Operation 'Halberd'

WH 7746: FO, Force 'H'; Home Fleet	ADM 199/831
WH 8020, 8027, 8089, 8091, 8092: Submarines	ADM 199/1116, ADM 199/1119, ADM 199/1151, ADM 199/1153, ADM 199/1154

Operation MG I

WH 8287: CinC Mediterranean	N/T
WH 8202, 8212: Submarines	ADM 199/1218 & 1219, ADM 199/1224
WH 7758: Naval Air Squadrons	ADM 199/844

Operation 'Harpoon'

WH 8285; SO Force 'T'; VA Malta; various ship's reports	N/T
M.10/27/55: Loss of HMS <i>Bedouin</i>	N/T
WH 8373: HMS <i>Welshman</i>	N/Y
WH 8281: Submarines	N/T
WH 7758: Naval Air Squadrons	ADM 199/844

Operation 'Vigorous'

WH 8286: CinC, Mediterranean	ADM 199/1244
WH 8202, 8213: Submarines	ADM 199/1219, 199/1225

Operation 'Pedestal'

WH 8267, 8268, 8269: SO Force 'F'; VA Malta; various ship's reports	199/1240 & 1241, 199/1242, 199/
WH 8210, 8213: Submarines	ADM 199/1222 & 1225
M.014103/42: HMS <i>Pathfinder</i>	N/T

Various ships' logs (as necessary)	ADM 53
Italian Official Naval History, Second World War	
Naval Staff History, <i>Mediterranean, Vol. II</i>	ADM 186/801
Naval Staff History, <i>Submarines, Vol. II</i>	ADM 234/381
Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 22, <i>Arctic Convoys</i>	ADM 234/340
Naval Staff History, <i>Development of British Naval Aviation, Vols. I and II</i>	ADM 383 & 384

Air Ministry Pamphlet No. 248, *The Rise
and Fall of the German Air Force*
*War Vessels and Aircraft, British and
Foreign*

ADM 239/70 & 72

Navy Lists

Pink Lists

ADM 187

The Second world War, The Right Hon.

W.S. Churchill, OM, PC, CH, MP

A Sailor's Odyssey, Admiral of the Fleet
viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope,
KT, GCB, OM, DSO

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NAVAL STAFF HISTORY

SECOND WORLD WAR

SELECTED CONVOYS

(MEDITERRANEAN), 1941-1942

BATTLE SUMMARIES Nos. 18 and 32

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HISTORICAL SECTION
ADMIRALTY

Admiralty, S.W.1
31st December, 1957

H.S. 4/56

B.R. 1736(11), Naval Staff History, Second World War, *Selected Convoys (Mediterranean)*, 1957, having been approved by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, is hereby promulgated.

B.R. 1736(11), dated 1944, and B.R. 1736(25), dated 1945, are hereby superseded and should be destroyed in accordance with the instructions contained in B.R.1.

By Command of Their Lordships,

J. S. Lang

