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THE  
PSYCHOANALYTIC  
THEORY OF  
NEUROSIS



*Founded by C. K. Ogden*

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# THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS



*Founded by C.K.Ogden*

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# THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS

*OTTO FENICHEL*

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## PREFACE

NEARLY twenty years of teaching at different psychoanalytic institutes and training centers both in Europe and in America—as staff member in five cities and as occasional guest lecturer in ten others—have convinced me of the need to summarize the psychoanalytic doctrines in a systematic and comprehensive manner, and thus to provide teaching aids for psychoanalytic training.

Among the different disciplines a textbook of psychoanalysis should embrace, the theory of neurosis interested me in particular. At European psychoanalytic institutes the custom was to subdivide this field into a general part, treating the mechanisms common to all neuroses, and a special part, treating the characteristic features of the individual neuroses. Because chance first brought me to the special part, I published in 1932 *Spezielle Psychoanalytische Neurosenlehre* at the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag in Vienna, Austria. This book was translated by Dr. Bertram D. Lewin and Dr. Gregory Zilboorg, and published in 1934 in the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* and, as a book, by W. W. Norton and Company, New York, under the title *Outline of Clinical Psychoanalysis* (424).

The lack of a “General Part” was the main drawback of this book. Therefore, when I was asked to prepare a second edition, I preferred to write a new book, which would not only treat the subject matter of the *Outline* in a more systematized and up-to-date form, but the questions of “general” theory as well.

Among the many acknowledgments I wish to make, I want to express my gratitude first of all to the listeners of the various courses from which the following pages have been derived. Their suggestions and remarks during the discussion proved to be very helpful. For advice concerning the final English formulation, I am especially obliged to Drs. David Brunswick, Ralph Greenson, and Norman Reider, and to Mmes. Dorothy Deinum and Ruth Lachenbruch.

OTTO FENICHEL

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PART I  
PRELIMINARY  
CONSIDERATIONS

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A.  
Introduction

CHAPTERS I–III

*Chapter I*  
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON  
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE THEORY  
OF NEUROSIS

CONCERNING the origin of the young science of psychoanalysis one often hears two diametrically opposed opinions. Some people say that Freud transferred the principles of the materialistic biology of his time to the field of mental phenomena, and sometimes they even add that Freud therefore, through being limited to biology, failed to see the cultural and social determinants of mental phenomena. Others state that at a period when the natural sciences were at their height, Freud's contribution consisted in turning against the spirit of the times and forcing the recognition of the irrational and the psychogenic in defiance of the prevalent overestimation of rationalism.

What should we think of this contradiction? Through gradual development, scientific thinking is winning out over magical thinking. The natural sciences, originating and evolving at definite periods in the development of human society (when they had become a technical necessity), have had to overcome the most violent and stubborn resistances in their attempt to describe and explain actual phenomena. This resistance affected different fields to a different degree. It increased in proportion to the approach of the subject matter of the science to the personal concern of man: physics and chemistry freed themselves earlier than biology, biology earlier than anatomy and physiology (not so long ago, the pathologist was forbidden to dissect the human body), anatomy and physiology earlier than psychology. The influence of magic is greater in medicine than in pure natural science, due to the tradition of medicine, which stems from the activities of the medicine men and priests. Within medicine, psychiatry is not only the youngest branch of this magic-imbued science but it is also the one most tainted with magic.

For centuries psychology was considered a special field of speculative philosophy, far removed from sober empiricism. If one considers the more or less metaphysical questions that used to be of paramount importance, it is easily recognized that the problems discussed continued to reflect the antithesis of "body and soul," "human and divine," "natural and supernatural." Everywhere valuations influenced, unfortunately, the examination of facts.

A glance at the history of science teaches that the process of overcoming magic has not been a continuous one. There have been advances and retreats which certainly cannot be explained merely in terms of a history of ideas. The fluctuations in this struggle are dependent on complicated historical conditions. They can be understood only through the study of the society in which the struggle takes place and of the conflicting interests of its various groups. That the history of medical psychology is no exception to this rule can be seen from the interesting book by Zilboorg and Henry (1936).

Psychoanalysis represents in this struggle a definite step toward the aim of scientific thinking in psychology—away from the magical. Recently Bernfeld again stressed the completely materialistic orientation of Freud's teachers and of Freud's own prepsychoanalytic thinking (140).

Certainly it must be admitted that Freud was not the first to consider the field of mental manifestations from a natural-scientific point of view. There were natural-scientific psychologies before him. But compared to the "philosophical" psychologies, these natural-scientific psychologies have always been in the minority, and they have only been able to treat disparate mental functions. An understanding of the multiplicity of everyday human mental life, based on natural science, really began only with psychoanalysis.

Now the question can be answered concerning the contradictory statements of Freud's place in the history of science. The golden days of materialistic biology and medicine simply did not regard the whole field of humanity as their universe of discourse. The neglect of the mental field indicates that the progress of scientific thinking was purchased at the price of allowing one entire realm of nature, the human mind, to remain a residue of religious and magical thinking; and the contradiction in the historic evaluation of Freud's work is solved by recognizing that actually he did both: by opposing the idea that "mind is brain" and by emphasizing strongly the existence of the mental sphere and the inadequacy of physical-scientific methods to deal with it, he won this terrain for science. In spite of assertions that Freud, by giving the "subjective factor," the "irrational," its just due has turned against rationalism, his procedure clearly reveals the spirit of that broad cultural trend which proclaimed as its ideal the primacy of reason over magic and the unbiased investigation of reality. What had previously been considered sacred and untouchable, now had to be touched, because the validity of the taboos was denied. Freud investigated the mental world in the same scientific spirit as his teachers had investigated the physical world, which implied the same rebellion against the prejudices that had been taught up to that time. The subject matter, not the method of psychoanalysis, is irrational.

The objection may be raised that such a statement is a one-sided presentation of psychoanalysis. Does not this science include quite a lot of mystic tradition? Did it not develop out of hypnotism and the latter from "mesmerism"? Is it not a "mental healing," which means a sort of magic? Certainly psychoanalysis has developed directly out of magical therapeutic methods. But it has eliminated the magical background of its forerunners. Of course, in every mental development rudiments of earlier phases persist. Actually, it is not difficult to find many magical features in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. (Probably this would not be difficult in other branches of medicine either.) Psychoanalysis as it is now constituted undoubtedly contains mystic elements, the rudiments of its past, as well as natural-scientific elements toward which it is striving. It cannot help retaining some mystic elements, at least in the same sense in which the activity of a police dog in police investigations is—as Reik has recognized (1295)—a survival of the animal oracle. However, the police dog has the ability to scent out the criminal. It is the aim of psychoanalysis to reduce its magical elements at least to the same level of insignificance as that to which modern criminal investigation tries to reduce the magical elements in its detective methods.

Scientific psychology explains mental phenomena as a result of the interplay of primitive physical needs—rooted in the biological structure of man and developed in the

course of biological history (and therefore changeable in the course of further biological history)—and the influences of the environment on these needs. There is no place for any third factor.

That the mind is to be explained in terms of constitution and milieu is a very old conception. What is characteristic for psychoanalysis is *what* it regards as biological structure, *which* environmental influences it recognizes as formative, and *how* it relates structural and environmental influences to each other.

As to the biological structure, a scientific psychology first of all must posit itself within biology. Mental phenomena occur only in living organisms; mental phenomena are a special instance of life phenomena. The general laws that are valid for life phenomena are also valid for mental phenomena; special laws that are valid only for the level of mental phenomena must be added.

Thus a scientific psychology investigates, as does any science, general *laws*. It is not satisfied with a mere description of individual psychic processes. An exact description of historical processes is its means, not its goal. Its subject is not the individual X but the comprehension of general laws governing mental functions.

Besides, a scientific psychology is absolutely free of moral valuation. For it, there is no good or evil, no moral or immoral, and no what ought to be at all; for a scientific psychology, good and evil, moral and immoral, and what ought to be are products of human minds and have to be investigated as such.

As to the influences of the surroundings, these must be studied in detail in their practical reality. There is no “psychology of man” in a general sense, in a vacuum, as it were, but only a psychology of man in a certain concrete society and in a certain social place within this concrete society.

Concerning the relation between biological needs and the formative environmental influences, this book will demonstrate adequately how psychoanalysis approaches the problem. At this point, only the following needs to be said. In the endeavor to investigate the relationship between biological needs and external influences, one or the other of these two forces may be overestimated. The history of psychoanalysis has seen both types of deviation. Certain authors, in their biologicistic thinking have entirely overlooked the role of outwardly determined frustrations in the genesis of neuroses and character traits, and are of the opinion that neuroses and character traits might be rooted in conflicts between contradictory biological needs in an entirely endogenous manner. Such a point of view is dangerous even in therapeutic analysis; but it becomes entirely fatal if it is assumed in applications of psychoanalysis to sociological questions. Attempts of this kind have sought to understand social institutions as the outcome of conflicts between contradictory instinctual impulses within the same individuals, instead of seeking to understand the instinctual structure of empirical human beings through the social institutions in which they grew up.

But there are also certain authors at the other extreme who reproach psychoanalysis as being too biologically oriented, and who are of the opinion that the high evaluation of the instinctual impulses means that cultural influences are denied or neglected. They are even of the erroneous opinion that the demonstration of the importance of cultural influences contradicts any instinct theory. Freud’s own writings contain, essentially, descriptions of how instinctual attitudes, objects, and aims are changed under the influence of

experiences. Thus it is absurd to be of the opinion that the proof of the existence of this influence contradicts Freud.

We agree with Zilboorg that it is not difficult to find in all such “culturistic” deviations a distorted return to magical thinking and to the contrast of body and soul (1637). At first glance it looks as if the stressing of cultural factors, because of their significance for mental development, expressly brought about an emphasis on reality; but actually this viewpoint denies reality by denying man’s biological basis.

Certainly not only frustrations and reactions to frustrations are socially determined; what a human being desires is also determined by his cultural environment. However, the culturally determined desires are merely variations of a few biological basic needs; changing the primitive biological values of “gratifying” and “frustrating” into the highly complicated systems of values of modern man is just the thing that can be explained by psychoanalytic study of the history of the particular man and the influences of social forces to which he has been subjected. It is the task of sociology to study these social forces, their genesis, and their function.

The application of the general principles of natural science to the special field of psychology naturally presupposes the development of new *methods* of research that are adequate to its subject matter. Attempts to keep the mental realm outside of causal and quantitative thinking (“theory grays the many-colored pattern of life”) thwart real insight, as does also a pseudo exactness which believes it necessary to transfer the biological methods of experiment and scientific protocol to a field where these methods are not suitable. (Astronomy also is unable to resort to experiments and nevertheless is a natural science.)

Against the statement that psychoanalysis aims at the full scientific research into mental phenomena, it might be objected that this formulation is either too narrow or too broad. Psychoanalysis-maintains that there is an unconscious mental life, and that it studies this unconscious. Since under the term “the human mind” the conscious phenomena are usually understood, it would seem that psychoanalysis is concerned with more than just human mental life. On the other hand it may be asked: is not psychoanalysis above all a psychology of neuroses, or a psychology of instincts, or a psychology “of the emotional components in mental life—whereas the more intellectual components and the individual functions, such as perception, the formation of conceptions, judgment, would have to be investigated by other psychologies?

These objections are not valid. The thesis that in investigating the unconscious, psychoanalysis is undertaking something that lies beyond psychic phenomena may be compared to an assertion that optics is investigating something other than the phenomena of light when it occupies itself with the wave lengths of light waves. The existence of the unconscious is an assumption that forced itself upon psychoanalytic research when it sought a scientific explanation and a comprehension of conscious phenomena. Without such an assumption the data of the conscious in their interrelationships remain incomprehensible; with such an assumption, that which characterizes the success of every science becomes possible: to predict the future and to exert systematic influence.

As to the argument that psychoanalysis is concerned with neuroses or with instinctual and emotional phenomena only, it must be admitted that these subjects are predominant in psychoanalytic research. This can be explained historically and practically. Psychoanalysis began as a therapeutic method and even today secures its research

material principally because of the happy circumstance that its psychological research method and the medical therapeutic method coincide. What Freud observed during the treatment of his patients, however, he could apply later to an understanding of the mental phenomena of healthy persons. When psychoanalysis then went on to study the conscious phenomena and the various mental functions, it could do this in a way different from that of other psychologies, for it had previously studied the unconscious and the instincts. It conceives of all these "surface manifestations" as structures that have been formed out of deeper instinctual and emotional sources through the influence of the environment. Of course it should not be claimed that except for the Freudian findings there is no scientific psychological knowledge; but it should be asserted that all psychological knowledge gains new light when considered from the psychoanalytic point of view.

However, this book is *not* a textbook of psychoanalytic psychology; it limits itself to the theory of neurosis. It is true that neuroses, for the analyst, provide the most fruitful study in the realm of mental phenomena; after having studied the neuroses, it will be easier to study other mental phenomena. In this sense, this is perhaps a first volume of a textbook on psychoanalytic psychology.

The theory of neurosis has the same relation to psychoanalytic therapeutic practice as pathology has to internal medicine: inductively arrived at through practical experience, it furnishes the foundation for further practical work. It represents an attempt to ascertain that which is regular in the etiology, the manifestations, and the clinical course of neuroses, in order to furnish us with a causally directed method of therapy and prophylaxis.

Nothing should be demanded of such a theory that a medical man would not demand of pathology. The search for "regularity" permits a formulation only of that which is of general significance and so, in a sense, does violence to the uniqueness of the individual case. In compensation, however, it gives the practitioner a better orientation, even though it must be remembered that this orientation alone is not sufficient for the actual treatment of individual cases.

We shall endeavor to clarify the theory by clinical examples. But it will remain "theory," that is, abstraction. All the examples tend only to illustrate mechanisms; thus they are illustrations but not case histories. What may be reported in a few lines as a result of psychoanalytic research, sometimes required months of work.

Thus only the typical will be presented here. Actually the psychological facts represented by the terms Oedipus complex or castration complex are infinitely varied. This book presents the framework which, in clinical reality, is filled with thousands of specific facts. Clinical experience with practical cases (supervised work with patients and case-history seminars) cannot be supplanted by a book like this; neither can it substitute for training in psychoanalytic technique. It can, however, give an impression as to why special training in technique is necessary, and why a personal analysis is an irreplaceable part of this training.

Those who have not undergone a personal analysis will probably be able to understand intellectually what is presented in this book; but probably many things will seem to them even more incredible and "far-fetched" than psychoanalytic case reports. Persons who "do not believe in psychoanalysis" will not be convinced by reading this book. They can only inform themselves about what the teachings of psychoanalysis actually are.

But even this seems very necessary. Many critics who “do not believe in psychoanalysis” do not know what psychoanalysis is about, and are in the habit of ascribing to Freud a great many things he never said or wrote.

However, the reading of case histories offers the best method for remedying deficiencies in personal experience, and is therefore the most important supplement to the reading of this book, just as attendance at clinical lectures or the reading of clinical case reports is the best supplement to the study of pathology.

It is in no way true that in discussing events of human life one has to choose between the vivid, intuitive description of an artist and the detached abstractness of a scientist thinking only quantitatively. It is not necessary and not permissible to lose feeling when feeling is investigated scientifically. Freud once stated that it was not his fault that his case histories gave the impression of a novel. To understand neuroses one would have to read such novel-like case histories as well as books like this; but it can also be promised that such case histories will be understood in quite another way after this book has been studied.

The admission that the practical art of analyzing cannot be acquired through reading this book is no cause to underestimate its value for the student of psychoanalysis. When objections, such as the claim that the essential therapeutic intuition and sensitivity cannot be taught, are hurled at a scientific pathology, it is a sign of magical thinking. Just as scientific pathology is no barrier to the intuitive medical art but an indispensable prerequisite for it, so it is with the theory of neurosis and the practice of psychoanalysis. It is true that not everything can be taught; but first one has to learn what *is* teachable.

We shall try to engage as little as possible in polemics, but concentrate, rather, on explaining that which already seems established. It is unavoidable that, in the choice of the material to be presented, in the decision as to which problems should be given more space and which less, and in the arrangement of the book, the personal beliefs of the author are reflected. However, since he hopes that his scientific convictions are well founded, he is of the opinion that this will not be a disadvantage.

In one respect, a theory of neurosis differs from a somatic pathology. A pathologist is in a position to assume that his audience knows physiology; he does not have to explain the “biological basic principles” before he demonstrates his real subject matter. Because of the newness of psychoanalytic psychology, we have to clarify first, at least in a sketchy way, the general system by which we shall orient ourselves.

These basic principles were uncovered by the laborious empirical method. It is important to emphasize this, because in what follows it cannot be shown how these insights were gradually built up from experience; they will be presented rather, in a definite, somewhat dogmatic fashion, which might lead to a misunderstanding of their nature and appear to be purely speculative. Their form of presentation will be a deductive one; actually, knowledge of these principles has been gained inductively, and further inductive scientific research can and may change them.

## *Chapter II*

# THE DYNAMIC, THE ECONOMIC, AND THE STRUCTURAL POINTS OF VIEW

### MENTAL DYNAMICS

MENTAL functions should be approached from the same angle as the functions of the nervous system in general. They are manifestations of the same basic function of the living organism—irritability. The basic pattern which is useful for the understanding of mental phenomena is the reflex arc. Stimuli from the outside world or from the body initiate a state of tension that seeks for motor or secretory discharge, bringing about relaxation. However, between stimulus and discharge, forces are at work opposing the discharge tendency. The study of these inhibiting forces, their origin and their effect on the discharge tendency, is the immediate subject of psychology. Without these counterforces there would be no psyche, only reflexes (495).

With such a starting point, it is apparent that psychoanalytic psychology attempts more than mere description. It explains mental phenomena as the result of the interaction and counteraction of forces, that is, in a *dynamic* way. A dynamic explanation is also a *genetic* one, since it examines not only a phenomenon as such but the forces that brought it about as well. It does not examine single acts; it examines the phenomena in terms of processes, of development, of progression or regression.

The idea of looking at mental phenomena as a result of interacting forces certainly was not derived merely by transferring the concept of energy from the other natural sciences to psychology. Originally it happened the other way around: the everyday assumption that one understands mental reactions when one understands their motives has been transferred to physics.

One special kind of mental phenomena, instinctual drives, is directly experienced as an “urging energy.” Certain perceptions have a provocative character: they press for immediate action; one feels oneself impelled by forces of various intensities. In connecting this experience with the reflex pattern, it may be assumed that the instinctual impulses have the general tendency to lower the excitation level by the discharge of tensions that have been brought about by exciting stimuli. Counterforces, to be investigated later, oppose this, and the struggle so created constitutes the basis of the realm of mental phenomena.

This certainly does not mean that psychoanalytic psychology assumes all mental phenomena to be instinctual in nature. It only means that noninstinctual phenomena have to be explained as the effects of external stimuli on biological needs. The noninstinctual part of the human mind becomes understandable as a derivative of the struggle for and against discharge, created by the influence of the external world. Nor does the cell theory maintain that all living substance is made up only of cells; its position remains justified as long as it succeeds in proving that the noncellular components of living substance, like tendons, hair, or intercellular material, are parts or products of cells. The same holds true for psychoanalytic psychology as long as it can prove that the noninstinctual mental phenomena are derivatives of more primitive instinctual ones. Therefore Freud’s short

paper, "On Negation" (616), is of principal importance, for therein he shows how the seemingly very remote function of judgment is derived from instincts.

However, the expression *Trieb* which Freud uses does not signify exactly the same thing as the English expression *instinct*, as it is customarily translated. Inherent in the concept of instinct is the idea that it represents an inherited and unchangeable pattern; in the German concept of *Trieb* this unchangeability is by no means implied. On the contrary, the *Triebe* obviously are changed in aim and object under influences stemming from the environment, and Freud was even of the opinion that they originated under the same influence (588). This incorrect equating of *instinct* and *Trieb* has created serious misunderstandings (1105).

The assumption has been made in various forms by many biologists that there is a basic vital tendency to abolish tensions that have been brought about by external stimulation and to return to the energy state that was effective before the stimulation. The most fruitful conception in this respect is Cannon's formulation of the principle of "homeostatis" (241). "Organisms, composed of material which is characterized by the utmost inconstancy and unsteadiness, have somehow learned the methods of maintaining constancy and keeping steady in the presence of conditions which might reasonably be expected to prove profoundly disturbing." The word homeostasis "does not imply something set and immobile, a stagnation"; on the contrary, the living functions are extremely flexible and mobile, their equilibrium being disturbed uninterruptedly, but being re-established by the organism equally uninterruptedly.

It was the same basic principle Fechner had in mind when he spoke about the "principle of constancy" (605), and for which Freud, following Barbara Low, often used the expression "Nirvana principle" (613). It seems more appropriate to see the ultimate goal for all these equalization tendencies as the aim of maintaining a certain level of tension characteristic for the organism, of "preserving the level of excitation," as Freud put it very early (188), rather than the aim of the total abolition of all tension (517).

It can be seen everywhere that this principle of homeostasis does not remain unopposed. Some behavior seems to be directed not toward getting rid of tensions but rather toward creating new tensions, and the main task of psychology is to study and understand counterforces that tend to block or to postpone immediate discharge.

However, this understanding will never be arrived at if an attempt is made to differentiate a "homeostatic instinct" from other "nonhomeostatic instincts" (1211). Homeostasis is, as a principle, at the root of all instinctual behavior; the frequent "counterhomeostatic" behavior must be explained as a secondary complication, imposed upon the organism by external forces.

Just as there is no homeostatic instinct but only a homeostatic principle at the basis of all instinctual behavior, there is likewise no "instinct to master," as distinguished from other instincts (766, 767, 768). Mastery means the ability to handle outer demands and inner drives, to postpone gratification when necessary, to assure satisfaction even against hindrances; it is a general aim of every organism but not of a specific instinct. However, there is no doubt that there is a "pleasure of enjoying one's abilities," that is, of enjoying the cessation of the tension of "not

being able yet," the cessation of anxiety connected with insufficiency of motor control.

Thus the forces whose interaction is supposed to explain the actual mental phenomena have definite *directions*—toward motility or away from motility. The impulses toward discharge are representative of a primary biological tendency; the opposite impulses are brought into the organism by influences from the outside.

Slips of the tongue, errors, symptomatic acts are the best examples of conflicts between strivings for discharge and opposing forces; some tendency that has been warded off, either definitely by "repression" or by a wish not to express it here and now, finds a distorted expression counter to the opposing conscious will (553).

When tendencies to discharge and tendencies to inhibit are equally strong, there is externally no evidence of activity; but energy is consumed in an internal hidden struggle. Clinically this is manifested by the fact that individuals subject to such conflicts show fatigue and exhaustion without doing perceptible work.

### MENTAL ECONOMICS

With this example we find ourselves in the field that Freud has called psychoeconomics (588). The above-mentioned persons were tired because they were consuming energy in a struggle between inner forces. When a person suppresses an irritation and subsequently in another situation reacts violently to an insignificant provocation, it must be assumed that the first quantity of irritation, which was suppressed, was still at work in him as a readiness to discharge, later seizing the first possible opportunity. The energy of the forces behind the mental phenomena is displaceable. Strong impulses demanding discharge are more difficult to restrain than weak ones; however, they can be restrained if the counterforces are equally strong. What quantity of excitation can be borne without discharge is an economic problem. There is a "mental energy exchange," an economic distribution of the energy at hand between intake, consumption, and output. Another example of the usefulness of the economic concept is seen in the fact that neuroses frequently break out at puberty and at the climacterium. The person affected was able to withstand a certain amount of undischarged instinctual excitation; however, when physical changes increased the absolute quantity of this excitation, the countermeasures no longer sufficed. Countless other examples exist which bring home the importance of the economic point of view for the understanding of factually observed phenomena. The person who was tired after having done nothing represents but a special type of general inhibitions due to silent internal tasks. Those who have inner problems to solve must apply a great deal of their energy to them, and there remains little for other functions.

The concept of a "quantity" of mental energy is exactly as justifiable or unjustifiable as the introduction of other scientific working concepts that have proved practical. It is regrettable that this quantity cannot be measured directly; it may be measured indirectly by its physiological manifestations.

## CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS

In the exposition of the dynamics and economics of the mental organization, nothing has been stated as yet about the significance of whether a given phenomenon is conscious or unconscious. This is due to the fact that the differentiation is initially purely descriptive, not quantitative. Posthypnotic suggestion demonstrates the existence of a psychic unconscious before our very eyes. The forgetting of a name makes us feel it subjectively. One knows that one knows the name and still one does not know it.

When the dynamic and the economic points of view are applied, the problem of conscious or unconscious should be put in the following way: Under what circumstances and through what energies does the condition of consciousness arise? It is in these terms that all mental qualities should be examined. Too, the feelings of pleasure and pain as qualities are describable only; to "explain" them means to determine under what dynamic and economic conditions they are experienced.

This way of putting the problem would find a simple justification if a direct correlation could be found between fundamental quantities and the definite qualities that appeared only with them: for example, if Fechner's hypothesis—that every increase in mental tension is felt as displeasure and every decrease as pleasure—could be confirmed. Many facts are in accordance with such a view-point, but unfortunately there are contradictory facts, too (555, 613). There are pleasurable tensions, like sexual excitement, and painful lacks of tension, like boredom or feelings of emptiness. Nevertheless, Fechner's rule is valid in general. That sexual excitement and boredom are secondary complications can be demonstrated. The pleasure of sexual excitement, called forepleasure, turns immediately into displeasure if the hope of bringing about a discharge in subsequent end pleasure disappears; the pleasure-character of the forepleasure is tied up with a mental anticipation of the end pleasure. The displeasure of boredom turns out, on closer inspection, not to correspond to a lack of tension but rather to an excitement whose aim is unconscious (422). A further discussion of the problem at this point would lead us too far astray (*cf.* 613). It was brought up in order to demonstrate that attempts to co-ordinate quantitative factors and qualitative phenomena are warranted.

Returning to the quality "conscious," the fact whether or not an impulse is conscious reveals nothing of its dynamic value. Conscious phenomena are not simply stronger than unconscious ones; nor is it true that everything unconscious is the "real motor" of the mind, and everything conscious merely a relatively unimportant side issue. The many memory traces that can be made conscious by a simple act of attention are "unimportant" though unconscious (they are called preconscious). Other unconscious phenomena, however, must be imagined as intense forces striving for discharge but kept in check by an equally strong force, which manifests itself as "resistance." Unconscious material under such high pressure has only one aim: discharge. Its freely floating energy is directed according to the "primary process"; that is, it is unburdened by the demands of reality, time, order, or logical considerations; it becomes condensed and displaced, following only the interests of increased possibilities of discharge. This mode of functioning of the archaic mind remains effective in the realm of the unconscious; in the more differentiated parts of the mind it gradually becomes supplanted by the organized "secondary process" (590).

## THE MENTAL STRUCTURE

Mental phenomena are to be regarded as the result of the interplay of forces pressing respectively toward and away from motility. The organism is in contact with the outside world at the beginning and at the end of its reaction processes, which start with the perception of stimuli and end with motor or glandular discharge. Freud looks at the mental apparatus as modeled after an organism floating in water (608). Its surface takes up stimuli, conducts them to the interior, whence reactive impulses surge to the surface. The surface is differentiated gradually with respect to its functions of stimulus perception and discharge. The product of this differentiation becomes the "ego." The ego proceeds selectively in its reception of perceptions as well as in its allowing impulses to gain motility. It operates as an inhibiting apparatus which controls, by this inhibiting function, the position of the organism in the outside world. Alexander in his "vector analysis" regards all mental tendencies as combinations of intake, retention, and elimination (44). We add: living begins with intake; but with the initial intake the first urge to eliminate appears; retention, however, arises later under complicating influences.

The ego develops abilities with which it can observe, select, and organize stimuli and impulses: the functions of judgment and intelligence. It also develops methods of keeping the rejected impulses from motility by the use of energy quantities kept ready for this purpose; that is, it blocks the tendency toward discharge and changes the primary process into the secondary process (552, 590). All this takes place by means of a special organization which aims to fulfill its different tasks with a minimum of effort (principle of multiple function) (1551).

Underneath the organized periphery of the ego lies the core of a dynamic, driving chaos of forces, which strive for discharge and nothing else, but which constantly receive new stimulations from external as well as internal perceptions, influenced by somatic factors that determine how the perceptions are experienced (590, 608). The organization proceeds from the surface to the depth. The ego is to the id as the ectoderm is to the endoderm. The ego becomes the mediator between the organism and the outer world. As such it has to provide protection against hostile influences from the environment as well as enforcement of gratification even against a restricting outside world. There is no reason to assume that the ego, created for the purpose of ensuring the gratification of the organism's impulses, is in any way primarily hostile to the instincts.

What does the differentiation of ego and id have to do with the qualities of conscious and unconscious? It would be simple if ego and conscious, id and unconscious could be co-ordinated. But unfortunately things are more complicated. That which takes place in consciousness consists of (corresponding to "intake" and "discharge") perceptions and impulses. We may regard imagery as consisting of impulses with a weaker cathexis (774). However, not all impulses and perceptions are conscious. There are "below threshold" stimuli which can be proved to have been perceived without ever having been conscious (1228). Further, there are repressed perceptions, in hysterical blindness, for example, where the effectiveness of unconscious perceptions can be observed. There is also unconscious motility, as in somnambulism. Unconscious perceptions and movements have specific peculiarities which differentiate them from the conscious ones. All living organisms must maintain exchanges with the outside world through the basic functions of perception and motility—this is true even before there is any differentiation

of an ego, and in the same way that nourishment and breathing must be performed by each living cell even before there is a differential development of a multicellular respiratory and metabolic apparatus. Before a systematic conception of reality can be developed there must of necessity exist a certain unsystematic perception.

Consciousness comes into being at some point in the process of systematization (*see p. 34*). This process depends on the ability to utilize memories. Memory traces are remnants of perceptions; they apparently arise on a second level below that of the perceptions themselves (522, 615). The ego broadens out from the layer of these memory traces, called the preconscious. The differentiation of the ego is a gradual process. There are deeper layers of the ego which are unconscious. The transition from ego to id is a gradual one and is only sharp at those points where a conflict exists. However, where such conflict does arise, even highly differentiated forces of the ego become unconscious again.

The portion of the conscious that is best known is the "repressed"—that which is unconscious because strong, dynamic forces hinder its becoming conscious. The repressed pushes toward consciousness and motility; it consists of impulses seeking outlets. In this seeking activity it tends to produce "derivatives," that is, to displace its cathexes onto associatively connected ideas that are less objectionable to the conscious ego. In psychoanalysis, preconscious derivatives are encouraged and caught by the patient's attention; this is the way repressed content gradually becomes known. The repressed consists, first of all, of the ideas and conceptions connected with the aim of the warded-off impulses which, by being warded off, have lost their connection with verbal expression; by regaining verbalization, unconscious ideas become preconscious (590). But it is also meaningful to talk about unconscious sensations, feelings, or emotions. Certainly the qualities of feelings come into being only by being felt. But there are tensions in the organism which, were they not hindered in their discharge and development by blocking counter-cathexes, would result in specific sensations, feelings, or emotions. They are unconscious "dispositions" toward these qualities, unconscious "longings for affects," strivings toward development of affects that are held in check by opposing forces, while the individual does not know that he has such readiness toward rage or sexual excitement or anxiety or guilt feeling or whatever it may be (608). Of course, such "unconscious dispositions toward affects" are not theoretical constructions but may be observed clinically in the same way that unconscious ideas may be observed: they, too, develop derivatives, betray themselves in dreams, in symptoms, and in other substitute formations, or through the rigidity of the opposing behavior, or, finally, merely in general weariness.

The mental apparatus, however, does not consist only of an ego and an id. Its further development brings a further complication.

Previously it was stated that the question as to the nature of the forces blocking discharge was the basic one of all psychology. In the main, these forces were thrust upon the mind by the environment. It is the consideration of reality that keeps the ego from immediately complying with the discharge drive of the impulses. However, such inhibiting tendencies, which according to the definition are derived from the ego, are not in all respects the opposite of "instinctual drives." Often, for example in ascetics or moral masochists, the anti-instinctual behavior betrays all the characteristics of an instinct. This contradiction can be explained genetically. The energy with which the ego carries out its

instinctinhibiting activities is drawn from the instinctual reservoir of the id. A portion of the instinctual energy is changed into counterinstinctual energy. A certain part of the ego which inhibits instinctual activity develops on the one hand closer to the instincts and on the other hand is in conflict with other parts of the ego that are hungry for pleasure. This part, which has the function (among others) of deciding which impulses are acceptable and which are not, is called the superego. While the ego is also a representative of the outside world, here again we have a special representative of the outside world within the first representative (608).

#### INITIAL ESSAY AT A DEFINITION OF NEUROSIS

After bringing forth the dynamic, economic, and structural points of view, an initial attempt will be made to clarify what takes place in a neurosis. Is there any common denominator in the manifold neurotic phenomena that may be utilized for comprehending the essential nature of neuroses?

In all neurotic symptoms something happens which the patient experiences as strange and unintelligible. This something may be involuntary movements, other changes of bodily functions and various sensations, as in hysteria; or an overwhelming and unjustified emotion or mood, as in anxiety spells or depressions; or queer impulses or thoughts, as in compulsions and obsessions. All symptoms give the impression of a something that seems to break in upon the personality from an unknown source—a something that disturbs the continuity of the personality and that is outside the realm of the conscious will. But there are also neurotic phenomena of another kind. In “neurotic characters” the personality does not appear to be uniform or disturbed only by one or the other interrupting event, but openly so torn or deformed and often so involved in the illness that one cannot say at what point the “personality” ends and the “symptom” begins. But different as “symptom neuroses” and “character neuroses” seem to be, both have this in common: the normal and rational way of handling the demands of the external world as well as the impulses from within is substituted by some irrational phenomenon which seems strange and cannot be voluntarily controlled. Since the normal functioning of the mind is governed by a control apparatus that organizes, leads, and inhibits deeper archaic and more instinctual forces—in the same way that the cortex organizes, leads, and inhibits impulses of the deeper and more archaic levels of the brain—it can be stated that the common denominator of all neurotic phenomena is an insufficiency of the normal control apparatus.

The simplest way to “control” stimuli is to discharge by motor reactions the excitation they arouse. Later the immediate discharge is replaced by more complicated control mechanisms of counterforces. This control consists in a distribution of counterenergies in an adequate economic stability between incoming stimuli and outgoing discharges.

All neurotic phenomena are based on insufficiencies of the normal control apparatus. They can be understood as involuntary emergency discharges that supplant the normal ones. The insufficiency can be brought about in two ways. One way is through an increase in the influx of stimuli: too much excitation enters the mental apparatus in a given unit of time and cannot be mastered; such experiences are called traumatic. The other way is through a previous blocking or decrease of discharge which has produced a

damming up of tensions within the organism so that normal excitations now operate relatively like traumatic ones. These two possible ways are not mutually exclusive. A trauma may initiate an ensuing blocking of discharge; and a primary blocking, by creating a state of being dammed up, may cause subsequent average stimuli to have a traumatic effect.

A model of the first type can be seen in irritations that everyone experiences after little traumata, like a sudden fright or some smaller accident. The person feels irritated for a certain time, cannot concentrate because inwardly he is still concerned about the event and has no energy free for attention in other directions. He repeats the event in his thoughts and feelings a few times—and after a short while his mental stability is re-established. Such a little traumatic neurosis can be explained as flooding of the organism by amounts of unmastered excitation and as attempts at a belated mastery. The severe traumatic neuroses must be looked at from the same angle (*see pp. 117ff.*).

A model of the second type of neurosis, characterized by a previous blocking of discharge and called psychoneurosis, is represented by the artificial neuroses that have been inflicted upon animals by experimental psychologists (65, 286, 923, 1109). Some stimulus which had represented pleasant instinctual experiences or which had served as a signal that some action would now procure gratification is suddenly connected by the experimenter with frustrating or threatening experiences, or the experimenter decreases the difference between stimuli which the animal had been trained to associate with instinct gratification and threat respectively; the animal then gets into a state of irritation which is very similar to that of a traumatic neurosis. He feels contradictory impulses; the conflict makes it impossible for him to give in to the impulses in the accustomed way; the discharge is blocked, and this decrease in discharge works in the same way as an increase in influx: it brings the organism into a state of tension and calls for emergency discharges.

In psychoneuroses some impulses have been blocked; the consequence is a state of tension and eventually some “emergency discharges.” These consist partly in unspecific restlessness and its elaborations and partly in much more specific phenomena which represent the distorted involuntary discharges of those very instinctual drives for which a normal discharge has been interdicted. Thus we have in psychoneuroses, first a defense of the ego against an instinct, then a conflict between the instinct striving for discharge and the defensive forces of the ego, then a state of damming up, and finally the neurotic symptoms which are distorted discharges as a consequence of the state of damming up—a compromise between the opposing forces. The symptom is the only step in this development that becomes manifest; the conflict, its history, and the significance of the symptoms are unconscious.

## NEUROTIC SYMPTOMS AND AFFECTS

These considerations of the essence of the neuroses call forth an objection that should not be overlooked. Much of the given characterization of neurotic phenomena seems valid also for a category of very normal mental phenomena, namely, of affective or emotional spells.

Actually a search for a common denominator for all sudden outbursts of affect reveals a close relationship between outbursts of this kind and neurotic phenomena.

Affective spells consist of (*a*) movements and other physiological discharges, especially changes in the muscular and glandular functions, and (*b*) emotional feelings. Both the physical and the mental phenomena are specific for any given affect—and in particular the correlation of both phenomena is specific. Emotional spells occur without the consent or even against the will of the individual; persons who undergo emotional spells have “lost control.” Apparently something of a more archaic nature is substituted for the normal ego—there is no doubt that children and infantile personalities are more unstable emotionally.

Such spells occur as a response to (*a*) extraordinarily intense stimuli, the quantity of which explains the temporary insufficiency of the normal control apparatus of the ego; in this case the emotional spells seem to be a kind of emergency control supplanting the normal ego control; or (*b*) to ordinary stimuli when certain conditions obtain in the organism. The simplest example is displaced rage. A slight precipitating factor evokes a fit of anger if there was a readiness for it in the organism rooted in a previous experience that afforded this tendency no means of expression. In general the organism tends toward emotional regressions if it is in a state of tension. This is why an unduly intense emotional reaction generally can be regarded as a “derivative” of something that was previously suppressed. In summary, emotional spells occur when the normal ego control has been rendered relatively insufficient by (*a*) too much influx of excitation, or (*b*) a previous blocking of the efflux (191, 440, 697, 1013, 1021).

This definition is identical with that given for neurotic symptoms. The neurotic symptoms, too, are discharge phenomena that occur without the consent of the ego; and if their precipitating factors, too, are analyzed, either an increased influx of excitation (traumatic neuroses) is found or defense activities of the ego that had previously blocked discharges and thus brought the organism into a state of tension (psychoneuroses). Thus the causation of emotional spells and of neurotic symptoms is essentially the same: a relative insufficiency of ego control because of either increased influx or blocking of discharge. Both emotional spells and neurotic symptoms are partial substitutes, of a more archaic nature, for the normal ego motility. Neurotic symptoms could be called a kind of “personally structured” affective spells. The difference lies in the nature of what is substituted. In neurosis the substitute is subjectively determined in the history of the individual. In affect the substitute is objectively determined; the syndrome is more or less the same in different individuals and is caused by chemically induced nervous reactions—just where it comes from, we do not know. The impression that there is a general similarity between neurotic and emotional spells impelled Freud, after having discovered the historical determination of the hysterical fit, to look for a historical determination of the anxiety syndrome also (618).

The similarity between neurotic symptoms and emotional spells seems less striking in the case of compulsive symptoms. However, the compulsive symptom is less primitive than other neurotic symptoms; it is not a simple breaking through of the repressed forces. Similarly, not all affects have the character of sudden spells; the compulsive symptoms may be compared to tension affects like grief. If a conversion symptom corresponds to an outburst of intractable sexual excitement or of rage, then the compulsive symptom is

paralleled by the more gradual work of mourning. Both compulsion and mourning represent a secondary elaboration of the original tendency toward stormy discharge.

The psychoneuroses are essentially the result of a conflict between instinctual demands and defensive forces of the ego. This knowledge shows how best to organize a theory of neurosis. To be studied are (*a*) the defending ego and its development, (*b*) the instincts and their development, (*c*) the types of conflicts between the two, their motives, methods and manifestations, and (*d*) the consequences of the conflicts, the neuroses proper.

However, these four points cannot be strictly separated from each other; they are too closely interwoven. We shall have to deal with the same facts repeatedly, looking at them from different angles. The interrelationship between ego and id makes it necessary to subdivide the ego chapter; first the early stages of development of the ego will be taken up, next the development of the instincts, and only then the later development of the ego. A brief chapter about the psychoanalytic method of research precedes the discussion of mental development.

## *Chapter III*

# THE METHOD OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

WHAT follows is neither a presentation of the technique of psychoanalysis nor an explanation of the therapeutic procedure; The former is beyond the scope of this book and the latter will be discussed later ([Chapter Twenty-three](#)). Only a few basic facts will be presented concerning the scientific method used in gathering the psychological and psychopathological findings that are to be discussed (*cf.* 748, 779).

Today the presentation of the principles of the psychoanalytic method is easy. Historically they were gradually developed out of the needs of psychotherapeutic practice (188). Every bit of newly acquired method brought forth new findings which again could be used in improving the method. Today it is possible to justify the method by explaining its theoretical background. Actually the theory did not precede the method; rather, it was established with the help of the method.

### THE BASIC RULE

Dynamic psychology has the task of reconstructing, from certain given manifestations, the constellation of forces that produced the manifestations. Behind the changing manifest picture are its dynamic foundations, impulses striving for discharge and inhibiting counterforces. The initial efforts of the analyst are devoted to eliminating obstacles that prevent a more direct expression of these forces. He undertakes to achieve this by the so-called basic rule. The patient is requested to say everything that enters his mind, without selection.

To understand the meaning of this rule, we should recall how a person acts in everyday life who does not follow the rule. His impulses toward actions or words are determined by (*a*) external stimuli of any kind to which he reacts, (*b*) his physical state which gives him internal stimuli and determines the intensity and mode of the impressions by external stimuli, (*c*) certain conceptual goals, the thought of what he wants to do or say, which makes him suppress that which does not belong to the subject, and (*d*) the derivatives of all the warded-off impulses that try to find discharge.

The psychoanalyst wants to understand the last group of determinants and for this purpose tries to exclude the first three as much as possible, with the aim of making this last more recognizable. The external stimuli during the psychoanalytic hour are reduced to a minimum and remain relatively constant.

In his earlier days Freud even asked patients to close their eyes for the purpose of excluding distracting visual perceptions (543, 544). Later,

however, it turned out that the danger of inducing the patient to isolate the analytic procedure from “open-eye reality” is usually greater than the possible gain.

An acute extraordinary physical state, such as pain, hunger, or an impending real danger, actually is a hindrance to the production of fruitful associations because it overshadows the production of derivatives.

A patient used to dream exclusively about food, and the analysis apparently made no progress. It turned out that he actually did not have enough to eat. After he succeeded in getting a job, the “oral” dreams disappeared and the analysis went on normally.

The elimination of the third disturbing factor, the conscious conceptual goals of the ego, is the main object of the basic rule. When the selective conceptual goals of the ego are excluded, what is expressed is determined rather by tensions and impulses within the individual awaiting the opportunity to gain expression. The analyst tries to make the patient learn to eliminate the conceptual goals and not to select the things he tells. In fact, the patient is not to be active at all; his one task is *not* to prevent the expression of impulses that rise within him.

“To tell everything” is much more difficult than one imagines. Even the individual who conscientiously tries to adhere to the basic rule fails to tell many things because he considers them too unimportant, too stupid, too indiscreet, and so on. There are many who never learn to apply the basic rule because their fear of losing control is too great, and before they can give expression to anything, they must examine it to see exactly what it is.

It is, therefore, not so simple for the unconscious to find expression simply by attempting to obey the basic rule. It is true that the regulation eliminates thousands of conceptual goals of everyday life, but it cannot eliminate all the counterforces of the ego. Even if it were possible to cut off all purposeful thinking and to concentrate only on what comes up spontaneously, still the pure drives striving for discharge would not be encountered. The very strongest and deepest resistances—that is, those that originated in childhood and that are directed against unconscious instinctual outbursts—cannot be swept out of existence by a stipulation to tell everything. Thus the utterances of a patient obeying the rule are not simply a reflection of the unconscious that now becomes conscious. The picture presented is, rather, one of a struggle between certain unconscious impulses (which reveal themselves relatively more clearly in analysis than in ordinary conversation) and certain resistances of the ego, which likewise are unconscious to the subject or become apparent to him in distorted form only. In the patient’s expressions, minima and maxima of an approach to something “really meant” can be recognized.

## INTERPRETATION

Now, what does the analyst do? (1) He helps the patient eliminate his resistances as far as possible. Though he may apply various means, fundamentally the analyst calls the

attention of the patient, who is either completely unaware or insufficiently aware of his resistances, to the effects of his resistances. (2) Knowing that the utterances of the patient are really allusions to other things, the psychoanalyst tries to deduce what lies behind the allusions and to impart this information to the patient. When there is a minimum of distance between allusion and what is alluded to, the analyst gives the patient words to express feelings just rising to the surface and thereby facilitates their becoming conscious.

This procedure of deducing what the patient actually means and telling it to him is called interpretation. Since interpretation means helping something unconscious to become conscious by naming it at the moment it is striving to break through, effective interpretations can be given only at one specific point, namely, where the patient's immediate interest is momentarily centered. The actual shocking infantile instinctual impulses are so far removed from the possibility of being felt that, in the beginning, interpretation is of course not concerned with them but rather with their derivatives. Defensive attitudes are closer to the patient's capacity to understand and so are interpreted first.

It has been asked why the theoretical knowledge about content and mechanisms of neuroses cannot be applied toward shortening the regrettably long time required by psychoanalysis. If it is known that the basis of a neurosis is the so-called Oedipus complex, why not tell the patient immediately that he loves his mother and wants to kill his father, and cure him by this information? There was once a comparatively large school of pseudo analysis which held that the patient should be "bombarded" with "deep interpretations" (1479); and even psychoanalytic literature contains statements to the effect that a speedy, "deep interpretation" can overcome the patient's anxiety (958). Efforts of this kind remain necessarily unsuccessful. The unprepared patient can in no way connect the words he hears from the analyst with his emotional experiences. Such an "interpretation" does not interpret at all.

Even the mere information that something within him is fighting his adherence to the basic rule tends to make the patient discover something in himself of which he was previously unaware. An interpretation that directs the patient's attention to something hitherto unnoticed serves the same purpose as does the histology teacher who tells his pupils what to look for in the microscope. Of course it is not mere lack of experience that prevents the analysand from noting his attitude. There are powerful motives that make him unwilling to know.

Actually resistances are attacked not only by interpretation; other means of influencing people to do something unpleasant are used as well. The analyst tries to convince the patient that the unpleasant task is necessary; his friendly feelings toward the analyst are utilized. However, wherever possible, interpretation is used. The concurrence of perceiving the interpreter's words and the preconscious presence of the derivative in statu nascendi changes the dynamic conflict between defense and warded-off impulses in favor of the latter and new, less distorted derivatives can be tolerated. The interpretation splits the ego into an observing and an experiencing part so that the former can judge the irrational character of the latter.

How can the analyst know what the words of the patient actually allude to? Resistances have twisted his utterances beyond recognition. It is the task of the analyst's interpretative work to undo and make retroactive the distortion caused by resistances.

This work of reconstruction has often rightly been compared to the interpretation of archaeological findings. It can be more readily demonstrated with examples of errors, slips of the tongue, and dreams than with neuroses in toto (553).

### DEVICES OF DISTORTION

There are many ways in which distortion is brought about. A few examples of the devices employed in distortion may be enumerated:

1. Links may be missing in the associations of the patient which, when examined, reveal themselves as being connected with affects, specific recollections, or, generally, specific attitudes that may be expected in certain situations. When the analyst observes such hiatuses, he knows that the censoring forces of the ego have been busy with their scissors.

2. Affects that have once been suppressed express themselves in some other connection. If a man must swallow his anger at his boss, he may easily become enraged at his wife. Therefore, when the analyst observes that an affect is incommensurate with a given situation—whether it be too strong or whether it be different in quality—he knows that he is dealing with a derivative of something else.

3. Not only affects may reveal themselves as “substitutes”; the distortion may also consist in replacing any idea with another one which is associatively connected. Whatever the patient expresses, not only in words but also in movements, attitudes, errors, may be allusions to something else. The associative connections are of various kinds. Allusions and what is alluded to may have common or similar characteristics. What is said and what is meant may represent different parts of one and the same whole. So long as the analyst does not know the whole, he cannot surmise what is meant. The more the analyst knows about the history of his patient, the better he can understand. Neurotic symptoms, especially, often become understandable only through their historical connections.

Since the unconscious continually strives for expression, the best way for the analyst to find out what is actually meant is to look for a common factor in the various utterances of the patient. Frequently it is the interplay or the contradiction between the patient’s various statements or between his words and his gestures or between his words and his feelings that puts the analyst on the right trail. At times the very manner in which the patient relates something or experiences something must itself be interpreted as the expression of a specific unconscious thought. Also to be noted is the fact that everyone shares a common reservoir of expressions that serve to distort meaning—symbolism.

The interpretative work of the analyst does not, of course, consist in stopping to examine every utterance of the patient by saying to himself: “Did he omit something here? Is the patient’s remark only a fragment of some complete train of thought? Perhaps I must find some historical connection in it. What is the connection between the patient’s utterance and what he said five minutes ago, or yesterday? Is the patient’s facial expression in harmony with or in contradiction to what he is saying? Is that which he just mentioned to be found in Freud’s table of symbols? Is his affect commensurate with his utterance?” and so on. By the time the analyst considers all these points the patient will have gone on to something else. No, discovering what the patient really means does not

involve the conscious analysis of all possible distortions but rather an intense empathy with the personality of the patient. In performing this part of his task the tool of the analyst is his own unconscious.

Does this admission deny the scientific character of the psychoanalytic method? How can the analyst, working with his intuition, actually know if that which he has surmised is really correct? The answer to this question may be postponed for the time being.

An interpretation, it has been stated, can only be effective if it is given at the moment when the distance between what is said and what is meant is at a minimum. How can the analyst know *when* to interpret? He must constantly have an awareness of the strength of the resistances operative at any given moment.

### TYPES OF RESISTANCES

Resistances find expression in manifold ways. Everything that prevents the patient from producing material derived from the unconscious is resistance. It is impossible to tabulate the various ways in which resistance can be expressed. The patient may stop talking, or he may talk so much that a common factor cannot be deduced from his utterances. What he says appears to deviate further and further from what he actually means; it seems to be extensive rather than deep.

If we call the patient's attention to this, he may reply: "You asked me to say *everything* that comes to my mind. If my associations tend to spread out in all directions, should I therefore abandon the basic rule of analysis?" The answer is simple: The patient must follow the basic rule as closely as he can. If, however, no common factor develops, the analysis is confronted with an antecedent problem, which must be recognized before what is actually meant can be surmised: *Why* do the patient's associations extend in all directions? Both the analyst and the patient must co-operate to find out why the patient expresses his resistance in this specific form.

The patient may forget certain things, important events of the day before, or something that has already been discussed in the analysis. He may criticize every comment of the analyst; he may feel antagonistic or ill at ease.

It is the aim of analysis to demonstrate to the patient the disturbing residues of the past in his present feelings and reactions—to connect the present with the past. Thus a certain form of resistance consists in the patient's talking only about the present and refusing to see the past; in the converse form of resistance the patient talks only about childhood memories and refuses to see their representations in present reality.

It is the aim of analysis to confront the patient's reasonable ego with the irrational emotions effective within him. Thus a certain form of resistance consists in the patient's always being reasonable and refusing to have any understanding for the logic of emotions; in the opposite type of resistance the patient floats continuously in unclear emotional experiences without getting the necessary distance and freedom which would permit him to look at them reasonably.

All these are forms of resistance that are easily recognizable as such. Some resistances, however, operate far more secretly. A patient may, for example, appear to be doing good analytic work; he may make progress in understanding the forces working within him, sense connections, and dig up new childhood recollections—and yet there is no change in his neurosis. This may be due to the operation of various hidden resistances. A certain attitude of the patient, which itself has not been analyzed, may nullify the effect of the analysis. For instance, he may have a feeling of doubt: “That would all be very fine if it were true, but I don’t know if it is true.” Or the patient may have understood what his associations and the analyst’s interpretations showed him and yet the knowledge remains entirely separated from his real life. It is as if he said to himself: “This is all valid only as long as I lie on the couch.” Or a patient may accept everything the analyst tells him merely as a matter of courtesy; but it is just this courteous attitude which protects him from reliving to the full his instinctual conflicts, and which therefore must first be analyzed. There are intellectual resistances in which patients try to refute the theoretical validity of psychoanalysis instead of seeking to clarify their own mental life. But there are also intellectual resistances of the reverse type: some patients become enthusiastic supporters of psychoanalysis in order to avoid applying it to themselves.

An acute resistance, one that is directed against the discussion of some particular topic, is far easier to handle than “character resistances.” These are attitudes which the patient had previously developed in order to maintain his repressions, and which he now exhibits toward the analyst. These attitudes must first be broken down before the repressions can be resolved.

## TRANSFERENCE

The repetition of previously acquired attitudes toward the analyst is but one example of the most significant category of resistance, the handling of which is the core of analysis: the transference resistance. Understanding the contents of the patient’s unconscious from his utterances is, relatively, the simplest part of the analyst’s task. Handling the transference is the most difficult.

It seems very natural that in the course of an analytic treatment the patient should produce powerful affects. They may appear as anxiety or joy, as an increase in inner tension beyond the point of endurance, or as a happy feeling of complete relaxation. They may also take the form of specific feelings toward the analyst: an intense love, because the analyst is helping him, or bitter hatred, because the analyst forces him to undergo unpleasant experiences. But the problem becomes more complicated when a patient’s affect is in contradiction to what is happening in the analysis, as, for example, when a patient hates the analyst for helping him, or loves him for imposing an unpleasant restriction. The problem is even more complicated when the patient obviously misconstrues the real situation and loves or hates the analyst for ‘something which, in the judgment of the analyst, is nonexistent. Such misconstruing of the actual psychoanalytic situation is a regular occurrence in almost every analysis. Freud was at first surprised when he met with this phenomenon (577); today Freud’s discoveries make it easy to understand it theoretically. The analytic situation induces the development of derivatives of the repressed, and at the same time a resistance is operative against it. The derivatives

may make their appearance as highly concrete emotional needs directed toward the person who happens to be present. Resistance distorts the true connections. The patient misunderstands the present in terms of the past; and then instead of remembering the past, he strives, without recognizing the nature of his action, to relive the past and to live it more satisfactorily than he did in childhood. He “transfers” past attitudes to the present.

In analysis, transference has a twofold aspect. Fundamentally it must be considered as a form of resistance. The patient defends himself against remembering and discussing his infantile conflicts by reliving them. Transference actions (since the object is not the right one and the situation is not fitting) serve the purpose of distorting the original connections, and the discharge thus attained is necessarily insufficient. The analysand, seeking immediate satisfaction of derivatives instead of facing his original impulses, attempts to use a short-circuit substitute for his repressed drives. On the other hand, the transference offers the analyst a unique opportunity to observe directly the past of his patient and thereby to understand the development of his conflicts.

In everyday life, too, there are transference situations. It is a general human trait to interpret one's experiences in the light of the past. The more that repressed impulses seek expression in derivatives, the more hampered is the correct evaluation of the differences between the present and the past, and the greater is the transference component of a person's behavior. However, the psychoanalytic situation in particular promotes the production of transference in two ways: (1) The environment which is reacted to has a relatively uniform and constant character and therefore the transference component in the reactions becomes much more pronounced. (2) Whereas in other situations people react to a person's actions and words—thus provoking new reactions and creating new realities all of which obscures the transference character of the original action—the analyst, in contrast to this, provides no actual provocation to the patient and responds to his affective outbursts only by making the patient aware of his behavior. Thus the transference character of the patient's feelings becomes clearer. The analyst's reaction to transference is the same as to any other attitude of the patient: he interprets. He sees in the patient's attitude a derivative of unconscious impulses and tries to show this to the patient.

Practically, this task is far more difficult than any other type of interpretation. Were the analyst to behave as the patient's parents had previously done, he could not help him, for then what had occurred in the patient's childhood would merely be repeated. And were the analyst to behave in a contrary way, he would not be able to cure the patient either, for then he would only be fulfilling the patient's resistance wishes. The analyst, therefore, must do neither the one nor the other. If he were to feel flattered by the love of the patient and responded in kind, or if he were hurt by the patient's feeling of hate, in short, if he were to react to the affects of his patient with counter-affects, he could not successfully interpret; for the patient could respond to interpretations' in some such way as: “No, I love you or hate you not because of unresolved love or hate tendencies of my past but because you have actually behaved in a lovable or hateful way.”

There are several reasons why analytic institutes require that all analysts themselves first be analyzed. One of the reasons is that in psychoanalytic courses it is not possible to give clinical demonstrations, and consequently the future analyst can learn analytic technique only by personal experience. A second reason is that the analyst's own repressions would make him overlook certain things in his patient, or see others in an exaggerated way and therefore falsify their significance. Much more fundamental is a

third reason. It is not easy to face the innumerable and various affects with which patients bombard the analyst without reacting with counteraffects, whether conscious or unconscious. The unconscious tendencies of the analyst to express his own unresolved love and hate tendencies by reacting to transference with countertransference must therefore be eliminated through a training analysis.

Systematic and consistent interpretative work, both within and without the framework of the transference, can be described as educating the patient to produce continually less distorted derivatives until his fundamental instinctual conflicts are recognizable. Of course, this is not a single operation resulting in a single act of abreaction; it is, rather, a chronic process of working through, which shows the patient again and again the same conflicts and his usual way of reacting to them, but from new angles and in new connections.

### CRITERIA FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF INTERPRETATIONS

The problem of how the analyst knows his interpretations are correct has been postponed until now. A familiar objection made to psychoanalysis is that interpretations are arbitrary, that the analyst more or less projects his own fantasies onto the patient. He is said to make things easy for himself: if the patient says "yes" to an interpretation, that is taken as a proof of its validity; if he says "no," he thereby shows a resistance to the interpretation, proof positive of its validity. As for scientific certainty, there simply is no evidence of it.

What is the real situation? As a matter of fact, it is correct that a patient's yes usually is accepted as a confirmation and that, under certain circumstances, a no is not regarded as a refutation. Freud very rightly called attention to an analogous situation, that of the judge (596). The confession of an accused person is generally valid as proof of guilt, although in exceptional cases the confession may be false; but a denial on the part of the accused is by no means proof of innocence. The difference between the accused and a psychoanalytic patient is merely that the former consciously conceals the truth, the latter unconsciously.

Hence neither a yes nor a no in reply to an interpretation is a final criterion as to its validity. It is rather the manner in which the yes or no is expressed. Certainly there is a kind of no that merely represents a final attempt to maintain an attitude that has become insupportable. There are various signs by which such a patient betrays, immediately after uttering his no, that he has been inwardly affected by the interpretation and feels that what the analyst has called to his attention really exists within himself. But in general one can say that an interpretation to which the patient objects is wrong. That does not necessarily mean that it is wrong in content, that, for instance, the impulse which the analyst surmised and imparted to the patient had never been operative. The interpretation may be correct in content but incorrect dynamically or economically, that is, given at a moment when the patient could not grasp its validity or get any farther with it. Sometimes a yes may be simulated by the patient out of politeness or negligence or fear of the consequences of a contradiction or for some other reason, whereas his behavior may show that inwardly he is saying no.

To put it differently, it is not a matter of the words used by the patient in responding to an interpretation. In giving an interpretation, the analyst seeks to intervene in the dynamic interplay of forces, to change the balance in favor of the repressed in its striving for discharge. The degree to which this change actually occurs is the criterion for the validity of an interpretation. It is the patient's reactions in their *entirety* that give the answer, not his first yes or no. A valid interpretation brings about a dynamic change, manifested in the subsequent associations of the patient and in his entire behavior.

Freud once compared psychoanalysis to a jigsaw puzzle, in which the aim is to construct a complete picture out of its fragments (550). There is but one correct solution. So long as this is not discovered, one can perhaps recognize isolated bits, but there is no coherent whole. If the correct solution is found, there can be no doubt as to its validity, for each fragment fits into the general whole. A final solution reveals a unified coherence in which every hitherto incomprehensible detail has found its place. And, also before this happy point is reached, dynamic-economic changes in the state of the patient are decisive for determining whether or not the procedure of the analyst is adequate.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Many problems merely touched upon in this chapter are discussed at some length in (438).

B.  
The Mental Development

CHAPTERS IV–VI

*Chapter IV*  
EARLY MENTAL DEVELOPMENT: THE  
ARCHAIC EGO

METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE INVESTIGATION OF  
THE EARLY PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT

IN CONTRAST to the affect storm or emotional spell, where the phenomena are determined by biological and phylogenetic factors, in the neuroses the phenomena are conditioned by the individual history. Since earlier levels of development are retained or returned to in neuroses, they cannot be understood without a thorough knowledge of these early stages. The following chapters, therefore, present a brief and schematic outline of mental development.

Conclusions concerning early mental life have been very slowly worked out from the material gained in the analysis of adult neurotics. Later these findings were confirmed through direct observation of children. The earliest years have necessarily remained most obscure. First, it is not always imperative to go back to the earliest period in order to analyze and cure a neurosis; second, it becomes increasingly difficult to grasp mental reactions the further one delves into periods in which there is as yet no language and in which many later separate functions are still undifferentiated from each other. Attempts to overcome these obstacles by the direct observation of infants are difficult before the development of speech; data gained in this way allow a variety of psychological interpretations. The temptation is great to apply concepts and ideas valid for higher stages of maturation to the behavior of young children. In fact it seems that this criticism applies to various psychoanalytic studies about the early phases of the ego. Few systematic observations of infants have as yet been undertaken from the standpoint of psychoanalysis (645, 671, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1596). Observations made by experimental psychologists have contributed much (134, 714); however, such research approaches the material chiefly in a way very different from that of psychoanalysis.

The analysis of psychotics with their regression to primitive ego phases greatly increases the knowledge of these earliest stages. Analysis of psychotics does for the understanding of early mental development what analysis of neurotics with their return to infantile sexuality did for the understanding of the infantile stages of sexuality. The psychoses are, of course, not the only states where regressions of the ego are observable. In the healthy person, too, archaic ego functions return under conditions of intoxication, exhaustion, and especially in the states of falling asleep and awakening (726, 837, 1546).

### THE EARLIEST STAGES

The mental functions represent a progressively more complicated apparatus for the mastery of stimuli. Thus the earliest phases must be comprehended by means of the expressions "excitation" and "relaxation," and only the later phases can be characterized in more definite and differentiated terms.

The ego becomes differentiated under the influence of the external world. Correspondingly, it can be said that the newborn infant has no ego. The human infant is born more helpless than other mammals. He cannot live if he is not cared for. Innumerable stimuli pour out upon him which he cannot master. He is not in a position to move voluntarily and is not able to differentiate the encroaching stimuli. He knows no object world and has no ability yet to "bind" tension. One can guess that he has no clear consciousness but has at most an undifferentiated sensitivity to pain and pleasure, to increase and decrease of tension. Precisely the functions that later constitute the ego and consciousness are not yet developed: the taking in of the external world (perception), the mastery of the motor apparatus (motility), and the ability to bind tension by counteracthexis.

Of course, even prior to the development of the ego there are reactions to stimuli; the subsequent functions of the ego are carried out in an undifferentiated manner by the organism as a whole.

The origin of the ego is not a homogeneous process. It begins with (or perhaps even before) birth and is in a strict sense never completed. At birth, the organism emerges out of a relatively quiet environment and enters an overwhelming state of stimulation with a minimum of protection from stimuli. This flooding with excitation without an adequate defense apparatus is, according to Freud, the model for all later anxiety (618).

Probably this being flooded by excitation is highly unpleasant and evokes the first mental tendency, namely, the tendency to get rid of the state of tension. When the outside world succeeds in helping the infant cope with these stimuli satisfactorily, he falls asleep. New stimuli, such as hunger, thirst, cold, awaken him. The first traces of consciousness do not differentiate between ego and nonego but rather between greater and lesser tension; at this time relaxation is concomitant with loss of consciousness. If every need could be immediately taken care of, a conception of reality would probably never develop.

### THE FINDING OF OBJECTS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EGO

The life of the infant alternates between hunger (cold and other disturbing stimuli) and sleep. Hunger (and disturbing stimuli) leads to a state of tension and thus to a tendency to get rid of the tension. It disappears with satiation, and sleep, a relative freedom from stimuli, sets in. The first signs of object representation must originate in the state of hunger. When more distinct beginnings of the later ego functions appear, the infant's grasping of the fact that something has to be done by the outside world in order to

alleviate stimuli leads to the first longing toward objects. An object relationship of this primitive kind exists only as long as the object is absent. With its appearance, the longing disappears and sleep follows (425).

Before the establishment of this “first object” the infant is physically dependent on persons whose ministrations keep him alive. These persons, however, are not the infant’s objects in a psychological sense, since he is not aware of the outside world but only of his own tension or relaxation. The first awareness of an object must come from a longing for something already familiar to the infant—something that has the ability to gratify needs but that is not present at the moment (507).

The first acceptance of reality is only an intermediary step on the road to getting rid of it. This is the point at which a contradiction of basic importance in human life arises, the contradiction between longing for complete relaxation and longing for objects (stimulus hunger). The striving for discharge and relaxation, the direct expression of the constancy principle, is necessarily the older mechanism. The fact that external objects brought about the desired state of relaxed satisfaction introduced the complication that objects became longed for; in the beginning, it is true, they were sought only as instruments which made themselves disappear again. The longing for objects thus began as a detour on the way to the goal of being rid of objects (of stimuli). This is probably meant when it is sometimes stated that hate is older than love. The truth is, however, that the first object relations are neither hate nor love but the still undifferentiated forerunner of both (79).

The origin of the ego and the origin of the sense of reality are but two aspects of one developmental step. This is inherent in the definition of the ego as that part of the mind which handles reality (295, 700). The concept of reality also creates the concept of ego. We are individuals inasmuch as we feel ourselves separate and distinct from others.

In the development of reality the conception of one’s own body plays a very special role (608). At first there is only the perception of tension, that is, of an “inside something.” Later, with the awareness that an object exists to quiet this tension, we have an “outside something.” One’s own body is both at the same time. Due to the simultaneous occurrence of both outer tactile and inner sensory data, one’s own body becomes something apart from the rest of the world and thus the discerning of self from nonself is made possible. The sum of the mental representations of the body and its organs, the so-called body image, constitutes the idea of I and is of basic importance for the further formation of the ego (1372). The body image does not coincide with the objective body; for example, clothing or phantom extremities may be included within it (521, 1612).

A compulsion neurotic patient was obsessively worried about his clothes which had to fit perfectly because otherwise he felt extremely distressed. He had a kind of hypochondriasis about clothes. It turned out that actually it was his physical well-being about which he was concerned. Something wrong with his clothes meant something wrong in his body. The clothes were included in his body image.

## EARLY PERCEPTION AND PRIMARY IDENTIFICATION

The first state without any object representation is called primary narcissism (585). The first reactions to objects recognized as such contain much, integrated as a unit, which will later be further differentiated. These reactions are like reflexes; that is, every stimulus demands an immediate reaction, in accordance with the constancy principle. Stimulus intake and stimulus discharge, perception and motor reaction stand extraordinarily close together; they are inseparably interwoven. Primitive perception is precisely characterized by its closeness to motor reaction. One perceives by first changing one's body through the influence of the perceived object—and then taking cognizance of this bodily change. Many perceptions usually considered optic are really kinesthetic (379, 1456). Similarly, eidetic research has shown that primitive optic perceptions are bound up with motor reactions ready for discharge (83); the same is shown by the findings of the motor attitudes in hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations (837).

The original connection between perception and motor action is also demonstrated by Freud in his paper, "A Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad" (615). He makes clear the activity in the function of perception. As long as intensive stimuli from the outside world flood the organism, the organism experiences this passively. The construction of a perception apparatus, coinciding with an apparatus protecting against too intense stimuli, brings about a change from passivity to activity. The perceptions take place rhythmically, obviously under the influence of centrifugal (motor) throbs of cathexes, which may be regarded as a first attempt at mastering the outside world. This is the basis for the differentiation of systems of perception and systems of memory (552), and the origin of a more differentiated consciousness. After the completion of this differentiation, the organism is in a position to protect itself against too much influx of stimuli by shutting off the function of perception (917). The newly formed ego can again sink back into the id. This ability can be observed in fainting and in the symptoms of traumatic neuroses. It is clearly the model for all later defense mechanisms and can be applied against internal pains as well as against displeasure of an external origin. Repression, too, may be looked upon as a specific blocking of the perception of particular instinctual demands. Another kind of return of the ego into the id takes place in sleep.

An important function of the ego is the phenomenon of fascination which Bernfeld described (130). A primitive attempt at the mastery of intense stimuli consists in the primitive ego's imitating that which is perceived. Apparently, perceiving and changing one's own body according to what is perceived were originally one and the same thing. Goldstein's patients with brain injury could compensate for their alexia by outlining the letters they saw with head movements, and then they could read by becoming aware of their kinesthetic sensations (704, 1476). This primitive imitation of that which is perceived is a kind of identification, the awareness of which brings perception.

Another primitive reaction to the first objects appears simpler and more comprehensible: the infant wants to put them into its mouth. It was hunger, repeatedly disturbing the peacefulness of sleep, which compelled the recognition of the outside world. The experience of satiation, which first banished this tension, then became the model for the mastery of external stimuli in general. The first reality is what one can

swallow. Recognizing reality originally means to judge whether something helps to gain satisfaction or whether it raises tensions, whether one should swallow it or spit it out (616). Taking-into-the-mouth or spitting-out “is the basis for all perception, and in conditions of regression one can observe that in the unconscious all sense organs are conceived as mouthlike (420, 430).

The primitive reactions of imitating what is perceived and the oral introjection of what is perceived belong close together. “Identification” in normal psychology and in psychopathology gives the impression, as Freud always emphasized (606, 608), of being a regression, a “secondary” identification, repeating an archaic “primary” one. The concept of a primary identification denotes that actually “putting into the mouth” and “imitation for perception’s sake” are one and the same and represent the very first relation to objects. In this primary identification, instinctual behavior and ego behavior are not differentiated from each other. It is all one: the first (oral) object love, the first motor reaction to external stimuli, and the first perception (408). Identifications play a great part in the process of building up the subsequent ego, whose nature therefore depends on the personalities of the persons around the infant (*cf.* 101). The imitation of the external world by oral incorporation is also the basis for the primitive mode of thinking, called magic, to be discussed later.

This incorporation, which is the first reaction to objects in general and the precursor of the later sexual and destructive attitudes, in a psychological sense destroys the existence of the object. The attitude that the object exists only for the ego’s satisfaction and may disappear once satisfaction is achieved can still be observed in some childish types of love. But the aim of the incorporation of objects does not necessarily reflect a subjective destructive tendency toward the object. This primary incorporation is the matrix of what later becomes love as well as destructive hate, but it is not yet either of these. An exaggerated desire to destroy, which actually appears in some children (and is not merely later projected back into childhood by manic-depressive patients), is not active in every infant sucking at the mother’s breast. Certainly the existence of early infantile oral-destructive drives can be proved in pathological cases. The oral strivings of the normal infant do not contain such highly destructive aims and such correspondingly great fears of retaliation. Too, it must not be forgotten that incorporation is only secondarily destructive, its objectively destructive nature being used for subjective purposes; the first hostile strivings toward objects, which bring pain or hinder pleasure, is not to swallow them but to spit them out. It is also questionable whether the same object which once brought satisfaction and later refuses satisfaction is recognized as one and the same by the primitive ego; it is more likely that first there are different conceptions of a “good” object, which one wants to possess by swallowing, and a “bad” object, which one wants to spit out and only later wants to destroy by swallowing. It is a matter of definition whether primitive incorporation is designated “ambivalent” and the ambivalence of emotions thus described as “congenital.” It is ambivalent in so far as elements of subsequent love and hate are contained in it; it is not ambivalent in so far as love and hate as opposites do not exist as yet (707). An urge to get satisfaction without consideration of the object (whereby the object may be destroyed) and an urge to destroy an object out of hate are not the same.

To return to the study of perception: The differences between the perceptions of infants and of adults have the consequence that they experience the world differently.

Observations made on psychotics, who have regressed to primitive modes of perception, confirm the fact that they experience the world in a more vague and less differentiated way. Objects are not necessarily sharply distinguished from one another or from the ego or from parts of it. The first images are large in extent, all enveloping and inexact. They do not consist of elements that are later put together, but rather of units, wholes, which only later are recognized as containing different elements. Not only are perception and motility inseparable, but also the perceptions of many sense organs overlap. The more primitive senses, especially the kinesthetic sensations and the data of depth sensibility (proprioception) prevail.

Besides the form of infantile perception, the contents that are perceived are also different. Hermann called perceptions “which the small child possesses, but which later disappear for inner or external reasons,” primal perceptions (778). The different nature of these primal perceptions is partly due to the biological characteristics of the child. The world appears to the child in quite another perspective due to his small size and to his different experience of space (134, 1147). To a greater part the characteristics of archaic perception result from its “unobjective” character, its emotional nature. The world is perceived according to the instincts as a possible source of satisfaction or as a possible threat; instinctual wishes and fears falsify reality. A more objective perception presupposes a certain psychological distance of the perceiving ego from the data of perception, a judgment about the sources of the experienced sensations and, more than that, a *correct* judgment, an ability for differential learning, whereas the primitive experiences are felt as still undifferentiated wholes which make their appearance repeatedly. The pleasure principle, that is, the need for immediate discharge, is incompatible with correct judgment, which is based on consideration and postponement of the reaction. The time and energy saved by this postponement are used in the function of judgment. In the early states the weak ego has not yet learned to postpone anything (575).

#### OMNIPOTENCE AND SELF-ESTEEM

The primitive ego, in contrast to the more differentiated ego, is considered weak, that is, powerless in relation to its own instincts as well as to the outside world. But since the psychological separation of the ego from the external world is still incomplete, through comprehending the outside world or parts of it within itself, the ego comes to feel itself omnipotent. Ferenczi spoke of a first unlimited omnipotence, which persists as long as no conception of objects exists. It becomes limited through the experiencing of excitation which cannot be mastered and which leads to un-co-ordinated discharge movements. When these are understood by the environment to be a signal calling for a change in the situation, the child may experience this train of events as an “omnipotence of movements” (457).

The separation of the ego from the external world is not a sudden but a gradual process.

It is, of course, also a heterogenous process, since ego-forming encounters with reality and with one’s own body occur in connection with manifold

needs. The subsequent ego, therefore, has manifold "nuclei" (694, 695). A final ego is formed by a synthetic integration of these nuclei, and in certain states of ego regression a split of the ego into its original nuclei becomes observable.

There always remain certain traces of the original objectless condition (878), or at least a longing for it ("oceanic feeling") (622). Introjection is an attempt to make parts of the external world flow into the ego. Projection, by putting unpleasant sensations into the external world, also attempts to reverse the separation of ego from nonego. There is a stage in development in which anything unpleasant is considered nonego, anything pleasant is considered ego, which Freud called the purified pleasure ego (588). The most primitive method of getting rid of pain was to "hallucinate it away," a method that quickly breaks down in the face of reality. Then the young organism tries to join pleasurable stimuli to the ego and unpleasurable ones to the nonego. In later life, traces of this phase are manifested in persons who without question acknowledge any pleasurable body sensations as "their own" but reproach aching organs as if they did not belong to them. Many other traces persist from the "transitivistic" world in general. An example of this is presented by the child who when playing hide-and-go-seek closes his eyes and believes he now cannot be seen. The archaic animistic conception of the world which is based on a confusion of ego and nonego is thus illustrated; it is a kind of reverse identification. The outside world is perceived as having the ego's characteristics, just as in primary identification the ego is perceived as having the object's characteristics (265, 712, 802).

When the child is forced through experiences to renounce his belief in his omnipotence, he considers the adults who have now become independent objects to be omnipotent, and tries by introjection to share their omnipotence again. Certain narcissistic feelings of well-being are characterized by the fact that they are felt as a reunion with an omnipotent force in the external world, brought about either by incorporating parts of this world or by the fantasy of being incorporated by it ("secondary narcissism") (608). Religious ecstasy, patriotism, and similar feelings are characterized by the ego's participation in something unattainably high. Many social phenomena are rooted in the "omnipotents'" promise to the powerless of the desired passive participation on condition of their fulfillment of certain rules.

The individual's experiences connected with omnipotence lead to a most significant need of the human mind. The longing for the oceanic feeling of primary narcissism can be called the "narcissistic need." "Self-esteem" is the awareness of how close the individual is to the original omnipotence (1238).

The primitive methods of the regulation of self-esteem arise from the fact that the first longing for objects has the character of a longing for the removal of disturbing displeasure, and that the satisfaction by the object removes the object itself and revives the narcissistic state. The longing for the return of omnipotence and the longing for the removal of instinctual tension are not yet differentiated from each other. If one succeeds in getting rid of an unpleasant stimulus, one's self-esteem is again restored. The first supply of satisfaction from the external world, the supply of nourishment, is simultaneously the first regulator of self-esteem.

The tendency to participate in the adult's omnipotence after the renunciation of one's own differentiates itself from the desire for the satisfaction of hunger. Every token of love from the more powerful adult, then, has the same effect as the supply of milk had on the infant. The small child loses self-esteem when he loses love and attains it when he regains love. That is what makes children *educable*. They need supplies of affection so badly that they are ready to renounce other satisfactions if rewards of affection are promised or if withdrawal of affection is threatened. The promise of necessary narcissistic supplies of affection under the condition of obedience and the threat of withdrawal of these supplies if the conditions are not fulfilled are the weapons of any authority (427, 436).

Subsequently narcissistic and sexual needs become differentiated; sexual needs develop in the relationship to objects, narcissistic ones more in the relationship between ego and superego. Every feeling of guilt lowers self-esteem; every fulfillment of ideals raises it. But since, as in all mental development, the old and primitive remain underneath the new, so a part of the relationship to objects remains governed by the needs of self-esteem. This is best studied in persons who are fixated at this level. They need a narcissistic supply from the outside in order to maintain their self-esteem. Among such persons there are innumerable subtypes. There are aggressive types who want to procure by force the essentials that the wicked outside world withholds, and there are types who try to avoid force and instead seek the essential supplies by submissiveness and demonstration of suffering. Many persons try both methods simultaneously.

The fact that erotic and narcissistic needs compel the child to ask for affection, and the imperative character of this longing, allows us to speak of a passive object love in small children. The child wants to get something from the object without returning anything. The object is as yet no personality but an instrument for providing satisfaction (73).

The stage of primary narcissism, in which omnipotence was felt and "mastery" was no problem yet, is thus followed by a period of passive-receptive mastery in which difficulties are overcome by influencing powerful external objects to give what is needed. Whenever the subsequent active types of mastery fail or do not offer any hope of success, a temptation is at hand to fall back to the state of passive-receptive mastery.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOTILITY AND ACTIVE MASTERY

The development of active mastery is a long and complicated process. The mastery of the motor apparatus, too, is a task that the human infant only gradually learns in constant connection with the maturation of the sensory apparatus. It is, from a psychological point of view, a gradual substituting of actions for mere discharge reactions. This is achieved through the interposing of a time period between stimulus and reaction, by the acquisition of a certain tension tolerance, that is, of an ability to bind primitive reaction impulses by counteratheses (575). The prerequisite for an action is, besides mastery of the bodily apparatus, the development of the function of judgment. This means the ability to anticipate the future in the imagination by "testing" reality, by trying in an active manner and in a small dosage what might happen to one passively and in an unknown dosage. This type of functioning is in general characteristic of the ego.

Learning to walk, to be clean, and to speak are the main steps in the development of the mastery of physical motor functions. Walking and control of the sphincters form the foundation of the child's independence; these abilities help to develop the reality principle (575) and to overcome receptive dependence and the necessity for immediate discharge. The faculty of speech changes the anticipating functions of the ego; the establishment of name symbols for things consolidates consciousness and gives the possibility of anticipating events in the model world of words. The ability to judge reality and the ability to tolerate tensions are two aspects of one and the same faculty. To direct one's actions according to external necessity means to be able to foresee dangers and to fight or avoid them.

### ANXIETY

The biological helplessness of the human infant brings him necessarily into states of painful high tension. States in which the organism is flooded by amounts of excitation beyond its capacity to master are called traumatic states (605). The pain of the unavoidable early traumatic states, still undifferentiated and therefore not yet identical with later definite affects, is the common root of different later affects, certainly also of anxiety. The sensations of this "primary anxiety" can be looked upon partly as the way in which the tension makes itself felt and partly as the perception of involuntary vegetative emergency discharges (690, 993). Freud suggested that the act of being born might be considered as an experience in which the syndrome of this primary anxiety is established. He had found that the apparently meaningless syndromes of hysterical attacks are historically determined—that is, that they had been purposeful in a certain situation in the past—and his hypothesis was based on the idea that normal affects might have a historical origin in an analogous way (596). Certainly this primary anxiety is in no way created actively by the ego; it is created by external and internal stimuli, still unmastered, and in so far as it is experienced as a conscious painful feeling, it is experienced passively, as something that occurs to the ego and has to be endured (431, 714).

In later life, experiences that are comparable to primary anxiety occur in persons who have to endure traumatic events. Uncontrollable spells of over-whelming anxiety, felt as something terrible that floods a helpless personality, form a typical symptom of traumatic neuroses. A similar type of anxiety is felt when sexual (and perhaps also aggressive) excitement is not permitted to take its normal course. Thus it becomes probable that traumatic anxiety or panic is dynamically the same thing as primary anxiety—the way in which an insufficiency of mastery, a state of being flooded with excitation, is passively and automatically felt.

When the child learns to control his motility, purposeful actions gradually take the place of mere discharge reactions; the child can now prolong the time between stimulus and reaction and achieve a certain tolerance of tension. The characteristic capacity for "trying out" that is thus acquired changes the ego's relation to its affects. Affects are originally archaic discharge syndromes that supplant voluntary actions under certain exciting conditions. Now the growing ego learns to "tame" affects and to use them for its own anticipating purposes (440). This holds true also for anxiety (618).

With anticipatory imagination and the resultant planning of suitable later actions, the idea of danger comes into being. The judging ego declares that a situation that is not yet traumatic might become so. This judgment obviously sets up conditions that are similar to those created by the traumatic situation itself, but much less intense. This, too, is experienced by the ego as anxiety. However, how different is this fear as compared with the original panic! Instead of an overwhelming spell of anxiety, a more or less moderate fear is experienced, which is utilized as a signal or protective measure. This anxiety is an anticipation of what might happen (618). The purposeful components which appear in anxiety in the face of danger are to be accredited to the judging ego; the unpurposeful components, like the possibility of paralysis, are due to the fact that the ego does not produce the anxiety but only uses it; it has no better means at its disposal (1485).

A complication that occurs in neurotic anxiety will be met with often in the following chapters. Sometimes the expectation of danger, instead of precipitating a purposeful fear that might be used to avoid a traumatic state, precipitates a traumatic state itself. The ego's judgment "danger ahead!" is followed by an overwhelming panic; the ego called forth something it cannot control. The attempt at taming anxiety has failed, and the original wild panic recurs and overwhelms the ego. This happens if the whole organism is in a state of tension which could be described as a latent readiness for the development of panic. The ego's judgment of danger then has the effect of a match in a powder barrel. The intention of lighting the match as a signal fails because it frees a vast power, incomparably mightier than the limited powers of the force that tried to use the match (*see p. 133*).

The content of the primitive ego's ideas of anxiety is determined in part directly by its biological nature and in part indirectly by its animistic ways of thinking, which make the ego believe that its environment has the same instinctual aims as it has itself (combined with much more power). In these animistic misunderstandings the primitive talion principle is at work, according to which any deed may be undone (or must be punished) by a similar deed inflicted on the original doer.

The most fundamental anxiety is apparently connected with the infant's physiological inability to satisfy his drives himself. The first fear is the (wordless) fear of the experience of further traumatic states. The idea that one's own instinctual demands might be dangerous (which is the ultimate basis of all psychoneuroses) is rooted in this fear.

However, this does not mean that the ego is hostile to instinctual impulses from the very beginning or always in fear of being overrun by too intense inner strivings. Since the ego learns to master and actively to satisfy its impulses, it would not need to produce an anxiety of this kind after having achieved this ability, and normal adults actually do not fear their impulses. Certain neurotics who are still afraid of the experience of their own excitement, at least beyond a certain intensity of this excitement, are so not because of a primary "anxiety of the intensity of their own excitement" (541) but because other types of anxiety have caused them to block the natural course of their excitements, turning pleasure secondarily into an intense displeasure (431, 1522) (*see pp. 543 f.*).

This leads sooner or later to the fear that external means of satisfaction might possibly fail to arrive. It is the "fear over loss of love" or rather loss of help and protection. This fear is more intense than it would be if it represented only a rational judgment about real danger because the early self-esteem is regulated by means of external supplies so that a loss of help and protection means also a loss of self-esteem. An ego that is loved feels strong, a deserted one weak and exposed to danger. An ego that is loved fears the possibility of being deserted.

The animistic way of thinking and feeling complicates matters. If a child fantasies devouring his environment and then meets a rebuff, he fantasies that he might be eaten by the parents. In this way do fantastic anxieties of physical destruction originate. The most important representative of this group is castration anxiety, which eventually becomes the main motive for the defense activities of the ego (1417).

The ways by which the normal ego learns to overcome its early and still untamed anxieties is very characteristic. Whenever the organism is flooded with a very large quantity of excitation it attempts to get rid of it by subsequent active repetitions of the situation that induced the excessive excitation. This takes place in the early games of little children (605, 1552) and in their dreams as well (722). Between the original flood of excitation and these repetitions there is one fundamental difference: in the original experience the organism was passive; in the case of the repetitions, the organism is active and determines the time and degree of excitation. At first the passive experiences that aroused anxiety are reproduced actively by the child in his play in order to achieve a belated mastery. Later on, the child in his play not only dramatizes the exciting experiences of the past but he also anticipates what he expects to happen in the future. The use of fear as a signal is but one example of the purposeful use of this anticipation.

When the child discovers that he is now able to overcome without fear a situation that formerly would have overwhelmed him with anxiety, he experiences a certain kind of pleasure. This pleasure has the character of "I need not feel anxiety any more." It makes the child's play evolve from mere attempts at discharge to mastery of the external world by means of repeated practice. "Functional pleasure" is pleasure in the fact that the exercise of a function is now possible without anxiety (984), rather than the gratification of one specific type of instinct (766, 767, 768). It is the same pleasure that makes children enjoy the endless repetitions of the same game or of the same story, which has to be told in exactly the same words (1457).

Economically, this pleasure can be explained in the following way. An expenditure of energy is associated with the anxiety or the fearful expectation felt by a person who is uncertain whether he will be able to master an expected excitation; The sudden cessation of this expenditure brings its relieving discharge which is experienced by the successful ego as a "triumph" (436) and enjoyed as functional pleasure. Usually the pleasure originating from this source is condensed with an erogenous pleasure which again has become possible due to the overcoming of anxiety. When a child is tossed in the air by an adult and caught, he feels undoubtedly on the one hand erogenous pleasure in equilibrium (and cutaneous) sensations, and on the other hand pleasure due to an overcoming of the fear of falling. If he is certain that he will not be dropped, he can take pleasure in having thought he might have been dropped; he may shudder a little, but then he realizes that this fear was unnecessary. To make this pleasure possible, conditions of reassurance must be fulfilled. The child must have confidence in the adult who is playing with him and the

height must not be too great. Thus in time real learning through practice occurs. When repeated experience has shown that the fear was groundless, the child becomes more courageous (423).

Both anxiety and functional pleasure disappear when the ego is sure of itself and no longer holds an anxious expectation in readiness. Adults no longer enjoy any special pleasure when they engage in long-familiar and automatic activities which made them very proud when first accomplished in their childhood (527, 530).

In neurotics, however, a pathogenic defense may perpetuate childhood fears. The anxieties remain effective, for the most part blocking the “dangerous” activities entirely; sometimes, however, the ways of fighting anxiety are repeated, too, and the ego may experience a “functional pleasure” of overcoming the fear by repetitions of the feared activity (435) (*see pp.* 480 ff.).

### THINKING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF REALITY

The ability to recognize, to love, and to fear reality is developed in general before the learning of speech. But it is the faculty of speech that initiates a further decisive step in the development of reality testing. Words allow for a more precise communication with objects, and also for making more precise the anticipation by trial actions. This anticipation of action now becomes thinking proper and consolidates consciousness finally (590). Of course there already had existed a consciousness without words, which can be observed later in regressive states as “preconscious fantasy thinking” (1426, 1545, 1546, 1547). But this is merely the undifferentiated predecessor of thinking, in which all characteristics of the primitive ego are still to be seen, such as wide scope of concepts, similarities taken as identities, parts as wholes, and in which the concepts are based on common motor reactions. Schilder has shown that every single thought before formulation, has gone through a prior wordless state (1363).

The acquisition of the faculty of speech, of the understanding that certain noises are used as symbols for things, and of the gradual capacity for rational use of this faculty and understanding (252, 1452, 1453; *cf. also* 1450) is a decisive step in the formation of the ego. The ways by which the ego proceeds from integrated to differentiated, from whole units to constituent elements, from large scope to narrow confines, can be investigated with the help of studies of the phenomena of aphasia.

Tying up words and ideas makes thinking proper possible. The ego has now a better weapon in handling the external world as well as its own excitations. This is the rational content of the ancient magical belief that one can master what one can name. The striving for mastery of instinctual drives in this way doubtless adds to intellectual development. A shift from emotional fantasy to sober reality takes place which serves the purpose of combating anxiety. A pathological distortion of this is the flight of the compulsive character from all emotion to the shadowy world of words and concepts (*see p.* 295). The lofty intellectual interests that make their appearance at puberty also serve to master the instinctual excitement of that period (541).

The achievement of the faculty of speech is experienced as the acquisition of a great power. It turns the “omnipotence of thought” into an “omnipotence of words” (457). The

child's earliest speech is a charm directed toward forcing the external world and fate to do those things that have been conjured up in words. Certain words retain their original magical power, for example obscene words (451), oaths, solemn formulae, or poetry.

Thinking itself is a further elaboration and differentiation of the more primitive types of judgment which distinguished between what can be swallowed and what is better spit out, and, subsequently, between harmless and dangerous things; reaction, again, is postponed, and this postponement occurs by means of trial acting; the movements necessary for the planned action are done on a small scale, by which what is planned and its consequences are "tasted." Muscular actions accompanying thinking have been demonstrated by experimental psychology (482, 776).

The working principle of the ego generally consists in a retardation of automatic id functions which provides the possibility of using these functions purposefully and in an organized way. In the same way that primary anxiety later is "tamed" and reduced to an "anxiety signal," so does the ego in the process of thinking tame two archaic automatic reactions: the drive to discharge tensions, which is slowed down, and the tendency to hallucinatory wish fulfillment, which is reduced to the imagination of the prospective events and subsequently of the abstract symbols of these events.

Just as the taming of anxiety may fail and the signal may start a recurrence of the primary panic, the tendencies to discharge at all costs and the hallucinatory wish fulfillment may come back in thinking. If persons are tired, asleep, intoxicated or psychotic, they think in another and more primitive way; and even in healthy, good thinkers who are wide-awake, every single thought runs through initial phases that have more similarity with dream thinking than with logic (1363). The characteristics of this prelogical emotional thinking have been investigated in detail by both analytic and nonanalytic psychologists (1545, 1546, 1547). It is less fitted for objective judgment as to what is going to happen because it is relatively unorganized, tolerates and condenses contradictions and is ruled by emotions and hence full of wishful or fearful misconceptions. This thinking according to the primary process seems to be directed only by the striving for discharge and is remote from any logic. But it is thinking nevertheless, because it consists of imaginations according to which later actions are performed, and it is done with reduced energy. It is carried out more through pictorial, concrete images, whereas the secondary process is based more on words. The retranslation of words into pictures in dreams and in fatigue is well known. Preconscious pictorial thinking is a magical type of thinking (916, 1047). The object and the idea of the object, the object and a picture or model of the object, the object and a part of the object are equated; similarities are not distinguished from identities; ego and nonego are not yet separated (1104). What happens to objects might (by identification) be experienced as happening to the ego, and what happens to the ego causes the same thing to happen to the object, a "transitivity" which makes the technique of "magical gestures" possible: by making a gesture someone forces another person to do the same thing.

If a person feels ashamed, he looks away or covers his eyes with his hand; this means: "Nobody is to look at me." Children believe that they cannot be seen if they cannot see. One child had the idea that when the conductor closes his eyes, the train passes through a tunnel.

Another strange characteristic of archaic thinking is represented by symbolism. In adults a conscious idea may be used as a symbol for the purpose of hiding an objectionable unconscious idea; the idea of a penis may be represented by a snake, an ape, a hat, an airplane, if the idea of penis is objectionable. The symbol is conscious, the symbolized idea is unconscious. The distinct idea of a penis had been grasped but rejected. However, symbolic thinking is vague, directed by the primary process. It is not only a method of distortion; it is also a part of the primal prelogical thinking. Again, the censoring ego uses regressive methods. Again, when distorting through symbolism, the ego in its defensive activities makes use of mechanisms that previously operated automatically without any intent. The use of symbols is a falling back into an earlier primary stage of thinking, by means of which intended distortions are brought about. In dreams, symbols appear in both aspects, as a tool of the dream censorship and also as a characteristic of archaic pictorial thinking, as a part of visualizing abstract thoughts (552, 596).

The regressive nature of symbolic distortions explains two facts: (a) that the symbols, being a residual of an archaic way of perceiving the world, are common to all human beings, like affective syndromes; (b) that symbolic thinking occurs not only where distortions have to be made but also in states of fatigue, sleep, psychosis, and generally in early childhood, that is, in all states where archaic ego characteristics are in the foreground.

Silberer explained symbolism as an “apperceptive insufficiency of the ego” (1427, 1428, 1429, 1430). He certainly was right, although his superficial classification of symbols according to the cause of this insufficiency cannot be accepted. Jones is not convincing in his statement that retracing symbolism to insufficient apperception is like retracing slips of the tongue to fatigue (882). Slips of the tongue are not an essential part of the state of fatigue (they are only precipitated by this state), whereas it is an essential part of archaic thinking with insufficient apperception to experience the world in symbols. However, archaic symbolism as a part of prelogical thinking and distortion by means of representing a repressed idea through a conscious symbol are not the same. Whereas in distortion the idea of penis is avoided through disguising it by the idea of snake, in prelogical thinking penis and snake are one and the same; that is, they are perceived by a common conception: the sight of the snake provokes penis emotions; and this fact is later utilized when the conscious idea of snake replaces the unconscious one of penis.

Primitive symbolism is a part of the way in which conceptions are formed in prelogical thinking: comprehension of the world radiates from instinctual demands and fears, so that the first objects are possible means of gratification or possible threats; stimuli that provoke the same reactions are looked upon as identical; and the first ideas are not sums built up out of distinct elements but wholes comprehended in a still undifferentiated way, united by the emotional responses they have provoked.

These characteristics suffice to explain some of the common symbols, namely, the symbols based on similarity, on *pars pro toto* or on identity of the provoked responses, such as tools=penis, shell=vagina, but also departure=death, riding=sexual intercourse, king=father. In other cases the similarity of the provoked reactions is not obvious, but it can be found by an exact analysis of the child’s emotional experiences (460). In this way the symbolic equation money= feces can be explained (*see* p. 281). However, in still other cases the connection between symbol and what is symbolized is not understood.

The children who dream about spiders and mean cruel mothers (23) do not know anything about the spider's sexual characteristics. Ferenczi believed that the disgust reaction toward reptiles contains a kind of phylogenetic memory (497) and Freud was inclined toward similar speculations in this respect (632). This question must remain open.

The fact that the earliest thinking is not in accordance with reality but has all the archaic and magical features that have been described might be used as an objection to the statement that it, too, is "preparation" and an attempt to master reality. But the inadequacy of this type of thinking does not contradict the fact that it is relatively more adequate than immediate discharge and wishfulfilling hallucinations.

However, this anticipation becomes incomparably more adequate through the development of words. The faculty of speech changes this prethinking into a logical, organized, and more adjusted thinking which follows the secondary process. Thus it is a decisive step toward the final differentiation of conscious and unconscious and toward the reality principle (575, 590).

Yet even after speech, logic, and the reality principle have been established we find that prelogical thinking is still in operation and even beyond the role it plays in states of ego regression or as a form of purposeful distortion. It no longer fulfills, it is true, the function of preparing for future actions but becomes, rather, a *substitute* for unpleasant reality.

The first ideas of objects came into being when a remembered gratification was missing. The first ideas about objects were both a substitute for the missing real object and attempts to master the real object magically. Primitive thinking attempted to control the object in a magical way (which, at that time, was believed to be real). The secondary type of thinking strives to control it in a real way. But when this real way fails, when reality is too unpleasant or one is unable to influence it, one regresses again to the magical method. In the older child and the adult, the two types of thinking have the two different functions of preparation for reality (anticipation of what is probable) and of substitution for reality (anticipation of what is desirable).

This co-ordination of types of thinking with different functions is valid in general only. Practically there are certain ways of returning from daydreaming to reality (art) as well as of using word thinking for withdrawal from reality (compulsive thinking).

As long as thinking is not followed by action it is called fantasy. There are two types of fantasy: creative fantasy, which prepares some later action, and daydreaming fantasy, the refuge for wishes that cannot be fulfilled. The former, rooted in the unconscious, certainly also starts in the primary process and imagination, but develops out of this sphere. The latter becomes a real substitute for action in the state of "introversion," when the "small" movements accompanying fantasy become intense enough to bring discharge. The problem has been discussed whether military games in boyhood increase or decrease belligerent tendencies. Does fantasy stimulate the wish so that the tendency to realize fantasied ideas increases, or does fantasy channelize the wish so that what has been satisfied in games no longer needs to be satisfied in earnest? The answer becomes obvious in the case of sexual fantasies. If a man merely anticipates in fantasy prospective sexual intercourse, his tension and his longing for fulfillment increase; but if his fantasies stimulate him to masturbation, the tension decreases or vanishes. A preparatory fantasy has regressed to the substitute type.

Neurotics are persons whose real actions are blocked. There are two ways of expressing this blocking which demonstrate very well the contrast between magical pictorial daydreaming and abstract preparatory thinking. The hysterical type regresses from action to unworded daydreaming; his conversion symptoms are substitutes for actions. The compulsive type regresses from action to the preparation for action through words; his thinking is a kind of eternal preparation for actions that never are performed.

It might perhaps be expected that one remains in direct contact with reality as long as one's thinking remains concrete, but that thinking ceases to serve as a preparation for real actions when it becomes too abstract, when it operates with sophistry and classification rather than with symbols for objects. This is true, but only to a certain degree. The pictorial nature of the elements of certain "concrete" thoughts may start daydreams instead of preparatory thinking.

Logical thinking presupposes a strong ego that is capable of postponements, tolerant of tensions, rich in counter-cathexes, and ready to judge reality according to its experience. If the ego is weak or tired or asleep or without confidence in its own ability and desirous of a receptive type of mastery, then the pictorial type of thinking becomes more attractive than objective intelligence. It is understandable that tired persons prefer the movies to Shakespeare and an illustrated magazine to difficult reading, that dissatisfied persons without any possibility of actively influencing their situation ask for more illustrations in newspapers or for comic strips rather than for difficult intellectual pursuits. Whenever reality becomes unpleasant, more pictorial daydream substitutes are sought.

## DEFENSES AGAINST IMPULSES

Up to now the reality principle appeared as the ability to postpone the final reaction. But certain reactions not only have to be postponed but even curtailed more or less permanently. Simultaneously with the increasing mastery of motility—that is, with the change of mere discharge movements into actions—a nondischarge apparatus, a defense apparatus, also is developed. The ego learns to ward off impulses that are either dangerous or inappropriate. Mechanisms that first were used against painful external stimuli now become turned against inner drives.

The ego wants to be satisfied. It seems paradoxical that it frequently turns against its own instinctual demands. Causes that bring about such a paradox have already been mentioned. They are:

1. The biological fact that the infant is not able to control his motor apparatus and that he therefore requires external help to satisfy his instinctual demands leads to the consequence that he slips into traumatic situations, since the outside world cannot always immediately be at hand. The temporary disappearance of primary objects has in itself a traumatic effect because the child's tender longings become deprived of their possibility of discharge. The memory of painful experiences of this kind leads to the first impression that instinctual excitations may be a source of danger.

2. Threats and prohibitions from the external world create fear of instinctual acts and their consequences. Such external influences may be of two somewhat different types: (*a*) objective and natural ones—the fire will burn the child who instinctively grasps at it—or

(b) the dangers may be artificially produced by educational measures. Voluntarily or involuntarily, adults give children the impression that instinctual behavior is to be decried and that abstinence is praiseworthy. The effectiveness of these impressions is due not only to the adult's real physical power but also to the dependency of the child's self-esteem upon getting affection.

3. The dangers feared may be entirely fantastic, in so far as the world is "projectively misunderstood" by the child. The violent force of his own repressed impulses is projected and makes him expect drastic punishments; the expected punishment is a retaliatory damage to the "sinful" parts of the body.

4. Later on a fourth factor comes into being through the ego's dependence on the superego, which is an intrapsychic representative of the objective, educational, and projectively misunderstood external world. This fourth factor turns anxiety into guilt feeling.

This systematic outline gives an answer to the problem of how forces that are hostile to the discharge of instinctual impulses originate.

#### FURTHER REMARKS ABOUT ADAPTATION AND REALITY SENSE

It is true that psychoanalysis has studied the defensive aspect of the ego more thoroughly than the development of its positive forces of adaptation (762). However, the ideas of defense and of adaptation are interwoven. Adaptation in a dynamic sense means finding common solutions for the tasks represented by inner impulses and outer (inhibiting and threatening) stimuli.

Hartmann, in a very interesting paper, tried to show that adaptation has been studied by psychoanalysts too much from the point of view of mental conflicts. He points out that there is also a "sphere without conflict," originating, it is true, in antitheses between organism and environment (750).

Because of the importance of these antitheses, the term sphere without conflict seems misleading, as tending toward an undynamic point of view. The ego's maturation is a result of the continuous interplay of the organism's needs and the environmental influences. Certainly the active types of mastery are rather complicated processes, many details of which still have to be investigated; but in the main it is understood how perception and motility are developed in connection with instinctual needs and with the functions of judgment and thinking (1176).

A field where the study of adaptation is especially fruitful is the psychology of will or desire. Biological needs are molded and modified through evaluations of the ego (or by influence of the superego); and just how these modifications occur, how subjective values are created by the influence of systems of values handed down by tradition, is one of the points clarified by individual psychoanalyses.

Constitutional factors as well as experience determine how far the development of the sense of reality succeeds, how far the primal, vague, magical, fear-ridden world based on projections and introjections becomes an objectively judged "real" world, responded to by the individual's alloplastic forces and uninfluenced by hopes and fears, and how far the old forms persist. It never succeeds entirely. Objective reality is differently

experienced by different individuals. Laforgue had this in mind when talking about the relativity of reality (1003, 1004). In neurotics all the misjudgings of reality and all the inability to differential learning (which cause outer events to be experienced as repetitions of a few patterns only and which are characteristic for the archaic ego) make their appearance again.

Behind all active types of mastery of external and internal tasks, a readiness remains to fall back to passive-receptive types of mastery; this readiness has a very different intensity in various individuals as well as under various cultural conditions.

The sociological significance of the types of mastery that are encouraged or discouraged by various historically determined institutions was stressed by Kardiner in his promising earlier writings (918, 919, 920). Later, however, he felt that the social determination of the predominance of certain ego types in given cultures was incompatible with Freud's ideas about instincts (921).

The development of the ego and of the id does not occur separately but is interwoven, the one influencing the other. But before describing the development of the id, two concepts of fundamental importance to the psychology of the neuroses must be discussed: fixation and regression.

In mental development, earlier levels still persist along with or underneath higher levels. Constitutional or experiential factors may cause this to become more transparent. In ego fixations or ego regressions an earlier level of ego development persists or returns, which may mean various things. It may refer to isolated ego functions which retain or again take on certain features of a more primitive phase. In this sense the eidetic types may be designated as perception fixations. Thinking may have retained a more magical character than in normal persons, as in compulsion neurotics, where early overdeveloped intellect is to be seen simultaneously with superstition and with unconscious belief in omnipotence and in the law of retaliation. The relationships to objects may show primitive features. There may be fixations at the earlier love levels, with aims of incorporation, or at the types of self-esteem regulation characteristic of small children. Finally the ego fixation may limit itself to a repetitious use of specific types of defense (429) (*see pp. 523 ff.*).

*Chapter V*  
EARLY MENTAL DEVELOPMENT  
(*CONTINUED*): DEVELOPMENT OF  
INSTINCTS, INFANTILE SEXUALITY

WHAT ARE INSTINCTS?

FREUD suggested that two kinds of excitation should be distinguished: one that is evoked by external, perceptual, discontinuous stimuli and another that arises from continuous instinctual stimuli within the organism (971).

This statement, however, deserves more detailed consideration. All perceptions, all sensory stimuli, whether they originate without or within the organism, have a "provocative character," provoke a certain urge to action. In the archaic types of perception this connection with motility, as has been pointed out, is more distinct than it is later. The intensity of the urge varies with the variable physical states of the body. Food has a variable meaning for the individual, depending on whether he is hungry or satiated; this also holds true for sexual stimuli. Only the physical conditions that determine the urge, the chemistry of the body, and not the sensory stimuli can rightly be called the sources of instincts. A certain impulse to action arises from every perception, whether it be internal or external. Under specific somatic conditions these impulses take on the character of urgent instinctual drives (1023, 1024).

At first glance one finds many contradictory presentations of the essence of the instincts both in Freud's writings and in psychoanalytic literature in general. First, instinct is explained as "the measure of the demand made upon the mind in consequence of its connection with the body" (588); an urgent state of tension, caused chemically and manifested through a sensory stimulus, is to be discharged. This concept is very illuminating since it is consonant with the reflex pattern as the basis for all mental functions, and it is clearly this concept of instincts that has enabled psychoanalysis to rest on a biological basis (555). In the same passage, Freud calls instinct "a borderline concept between the mental 'and the physical'" (588); phenomena of instincts can be considered from the physical aspect by examining the source of instinct, or they can be considered from the mental aspect by examining the drive and the resultant psychological phenomena. At another place, instincts are called "mystical forces" whose mode of operation we investigate without knowing anything about their existence (628). That sounds strange since psychoanalysis tries to eliminate everything mystical. What is meant is that we are aware of the experience of instinctual impulses and actions but never of "the Instinct." What constitutes the unity of "one instinct" is highly debatable. The definition will vary according to the classification applied, that is, according to whether aim, object, or source is made the main criterion. It is therefore necessary to define these concepts.

The *aim* of an instinct is its satisfaction or, more precisely, the very specific discharge action which dispels the physical condition of excitement and thus brings about satisfaction. The *object* of an instinct is that instrument by which or through which the instinct can attain its aim. The *source* of an instinct is the chemico-physical status which causes a sensory stimulus to bring about excitement (588). What instincts are to be distinguished and how many depends on whether the aim, the object, or the source is chosen as the basis of classification. In terms of aim or object an infinite number of instincts might be described. However, psychoanalysts know how readily interchangeable objects and aims can be. (This very fact makes it paradoxical to attribute to Freud the opinion that “instincts” represent entirely unchanging rigid patterns [1105].) Thus a classification according to source would be the preferable one. Unfortunately, physiology here disappoints us; the instinctual sources are a purely physiological problem, and in this field our knowledge is not yet sufficient. In spite of this deficiency two categories of instincts are definitely discernible.

The first category is represented by certain simple physical needs which, incidentally, present the best model for the course of an instinct: somatic changes cause certain urgent sensory experiences; the urge precipitates a specific action which eliminates the somatic change and relaxation is felt. The character of drive becomes especially apparent when the normal course is hindered. Examples are breathing, hunger, thirst, defecation, urination. Since the satisfaction of these urges is vital, the actions can be postponed for a short time only and their aims cannot be altered. Consequently there is hardly any variability in these needs and for psychology they are of relatively minor importance. The assumption that it is the lowering of the excitation level—relaxation—that is experienced by the ego as pleasure can be easily verified with these instincts.

Recognition of the second group as a cohesive unit was made possible only by psychoanalytic research (555). This is the group of the sexual instincts. In contradistinction to the imperative instincts discussed above, the sexual instincts, if they cannot find gratification in their original form, have the capacity to change, to alter their objects or aims, or to submit to repression by the ego and then to make themselves apparent again in various ways and in different disguises. The widely circulated reproach is still heard that Freud explains everything as sexual. This is far from correct, for Freud recognizes other instincts besides sexual ones. But it is true that Freud explains as sexual many phenomena which had previously not been recognized as having any connection with sexuality—in particular, the neuroses. He recognizes that human sexuality is by no means limited to the impulses and actions that lead more or less directly to sexual intercourse. He recognizes the field of *infantile sexuality* (550, 551, 552, 555).

It is generally known today that children exhibit numerous types of instinctual behavior which in content are identical with the drives which in perverse individuals replace normal sexuality. Indeed, it is difficult to observe children without seeing manifestations of this kind. Consequently, today it seems less appropriate to phrase the question: “Is there an infantile sexuality?” than to ask: “How was it possible that so obvious a phenomenon as infantile sexuality was not observed before Freud?” This striking oversight is one of the best examples of “repression.”

Why does Freud call these infantile phenomena sexual? First, because they constitute the native soil from which the sexuality of the adult subsequently develops; second, because every adult who is in any way blocked in his sexuality falls back to infantile

sexuality as a substitute; third, because the child experiences his sexuality with the same emotions the adult feels toward his; fourth, because the aims of these strivings are identical with the aims observable in adult perversions, and no one has ever doubted that the perversions are anything but sexual.

It is probable that the sexual instincts have a common chemistry as their basis. The study of the hormones has taught us some things about the sources of sexuality, but present knowledge is far from sufficient. Chemical changes in the body initiate sensory stimuli in the erogenous zones, bringing forth impulses of a particularly urgent character, demanding actions that lead to changes at the place of stimulation. The physiological basis of sexual impulses is comparable to the physiological occurrences that arouse sensations such as itching or tickling. Insect bites or internal physiological conditions produce chemical changes causing sensory stimuli in the skin which, in turn, create feelings of an especially urgent kind; the impulse to scratch is aroused and scratching finally leads to a change at the source.

However, although scratching may be effective through changing the blood supply to the itching area, one gets the impression that scratching represents a remainder of a much deeper biological reflex which is also of basic importance for sexual discharges: the reflex to get rid of organs that create disturbing sensations. The autotomy of lizards' tails shows this biological tendency to its full extent. Later this reflex may degenerate to the idea to "scratch away" an itching area of skin, and probably also to the idea of the "detumescing" discharge in sexual tension (1242). An evaluation of the concept of autotomy shows the relativity of the contrast between satisfaction of an instinct and defense against an instinct; the autotomic reflex may be a common root for both the instinctive act and the defense against the instinctive act.

Subsequently sexual phenomena become much more complicated, but in the last analysis they remain within the same frame of operational mechanisms. During puberty, the various impulses of infantile sexuality fuse into a harmonious whole—the sexuality of the adult. But this development may undergo a variety of disturbances. Anxieties and other experiences of the child may cause single components to resist the fusion. In particular, the repressed components of infantile sexuality continue to exist in the unconscious, unchanged. When the adult person later experiences a sexual disappointment, he tends to fall back to infantile sexuality. The result is that the conflicts that raged about his sexuality in childhood likewise become mobilized again.

### CLASSIFICATION OF INSTINCTS

The exceptional role that the displaceability of energy gives to the sexual instincts was the starting point for Freud's first classification of instincts. He found that neurotics fell ill because of their repression of certain experiences, and that these experiences were always representatives of sexual wishes. The forces fighting the sexual-wishes were anxieties, guilt feelings, or ethical and esthetic ideals of the personality; these

countersexual forces could be summarized as “ego instincts,” since they serve the purpose of self-preservation. Thus the first classification of instincts, distinguishing “sexual instincts” from “ego instincts” (542, 548, 555, 585, 596), was supposed to represent the neurotic conflict, that is, the fact of repression. When Jung denied this dualism of instincts and wanted to call all ego instincts libidinal (907), his unification at that time would have obscured the newly discovered fact of repression (364).

Today repression is not conceived of as a conflict between two groups of instincts; the conflict is rather a structural one. The ego wards off certain demands of the id. And from the concept that the ego is a differentiated surface layer of the id, it is no longer tenable to expect the ego to harbor innately other instincts than are present in the id. Even if the instinctual energies in the ego are treated otherwise than in the id, it must be assumed that the ego derives its energy from the id and contains primarily no other kinds of instincts.

The criticism of the first classification of instincts originated in the discovery of narcissism, that is, of the libidinal character of some instinctual wishes, which until then had been attributed to the ego instincts. Part of the “egoism,” of the high evaluation of one’s own ego, turned out to be of the same nature as the sexual instincts with which objects are loved; this becomes manifest in the displaceability of the energy of the ego to objects and vice versa. The sum of interest turned toward one’s ego and to outside objects is, for a given time, constant. He who loves himself more is less interested in outside objects and vice versa (585). Freud compared man in respect to libido with an amoeba that can stretch out pseudopodia, originally concentrated within its own body substance, toward the outside world, and then can draw them back again (585). Accordingly the designations ego libido and object libido are applied. However, there is no difference in quality between the two; by a mere displacement process, ego libido changes into object libido and vice versa. With these findings the former division of instincts into ego instincts and sexual instincts has become inadequate. The fact that this division reflected the facts of repression led at first to an attempt to preserve it. Freud undertook this on the assumption that the ego instincts were cathected with two different qualities of psychic energy: with “interest,” corresponding to the energy of the ego instincts, and with libidinal elements, which constitute narcissism (585). Such a conception could not be maintained. After the recognition of displaceable libidinal elements, the view could no longer be accepted that in the repressing and in the repressed (or, in today’s terminology, in the ego and in the id) there are two fundamentally different kinds of instincts at work. Both ego interests and libidinal drives, which later certainly are often in conflict with each other, have evolved from a common source.

Freud then proposed his new classification of instincts (605, 608). This new classification has two bases, one speculative and one clinical. The speculative basis is the conservative character of the instincts, as characterized by the constancy principle, namely, the fact that instincts tend toward getting rid of tensions. But there is also a phenomenon that seems to run contrary to the constancy principle, namely, a hunger for stimuli, seen most distinctly in the sexual instincts. Thus it seems as if the “Nirvana principle” characterizes some instincts and the hunger for stimuli others.

The clinical basis of the new Freudian theory is the existence of aggression. Aggressive tendencies of all kinds constitute a considerable proportion of all human drives. In part they manifest a reactive character; that is, they are the response to frustrations and have as their goal the overcoming of frustrations (335). In part they

appear closely connected with certain sexual drives, especially with sexual drives that are prominent in pregenital levels of libido organization. Other aggressions seem to arise quite apart from sexuality. Besides, there is the riddle of masochism, the fact that under certain circumstances our usual orientation in human behavior, the pleasure principle, seems to be put out of action, and self-destructive tendencies come to the fore. Further, clinically, masochism and sadism always are bound together: wherever masochism is found, analysis shows that a sadistic drive has undergone a “turning against the ego” (555, 601). The opposite also exists: an external sadistic type of behavior may veil an unconscious masochistic aim.

Freud combined the speculative and the clinical bases into a new instinct theory (605) which states that there are two qualities in the mind: a self-destructive one, the “death instinct” (which can be turned toward the outside world and thus become a “destructive instinct”), and an object-seeking quality, striving for higher units, the *eros*. The objection that in reality there is neither a pure self-destructive nor a pure object-seeking behavior is overcome by assuming that the real mental phenomena are composed of various “mixtures” of these qualities (138, 144, 890, 900, 1014).

#### CRITICISMS OF THE CONCEPT OF A DEATH INSTINCT

There are many possible objections to this new theory (425). Here the following may suffice. The instinctual aim of destruction is the opposite of the sexual search for an object to be loved; of this there is no doubt. Questionable, however, is the nature of this antithesis. Are we dealing with basically different instinctual qualities or is this contrast again a matter of differentiation of an originally common root? The latter seems more probable. One could group all the phenomena collected under the heading of death instinct not as a special type of instinct but as expressions of a *principle*, valid for all instincts; in the course of development this principle might have been modified for certain instincts by external influences. The concept of the constancy principle, as a starting point for all instincts, allows for a unified thesis not only for all mental processes but for all living processes in general as well. Just in that group of drives, the sexual instincts, where hunger for stimuli, search for objects, and striving for higher units becomes especially clear, it is most demonstrable that they strive for relaxation and for getting rid of tensions. Hence it is not possible that for one kind of instinct the constancy principle is valid and for another kind stimulus hunger is valid. On the contrary, stimulus hunger as a principle contradicting the constancy principle must be genetically a derivative of the constancy principle or a special elaboration of it. When the infant is awakened by somatically conditioned hunger, he follows his constancy principle and desires to quiet the hunger and to fall asleep again. When he later recognizes the external world as necessary for this achievement, he strives toward this necessity and asks for contact with this outside world. The goal of being stimulated by the external world is an intermediary one, a detour to the goal of not being stimulated (*see p. 35*).

Of course, the existence and importance of aggressive drives cannot be denied. However, there is no proof that they always and necessarily came into being by a turning outward of more primary self-destructive drives. It seems rather as if aggressiveness were originally no instinctual aim of its own, characterizing one category of instincts in

contradistinction to others, but rather a mode in which instinctual aims sometimes are striven for, in response to frustrations or even spontaneously.

Aims are sought more readily in a destructive way the more primitive the maturation level of the organism—perhaps in connection with the insufficiently developed tolerance toward tensions. The archaic instinctual aim toward objects is incorporation, which is as much an attempt to achieve closeness as an attempt to destroy the object. It is the matrix of both. Freud describes this proneness to destructiveness on the archaic levels by saying that death instinct and eros are still “defused,” while they fuse gradually during maturation, eros neutralizing death instinct (608). The facts are that in these early periods libidinal and aggressive tendencies are so interwoven that they never can be entirely separated from each other; it seems as if these stages represent an integrated state, from which, later, eros and aggression are differentiated; only later do love and hate develop as opposite qualities.

Likewise a death instinct would not be compatible with the approved biological concept of instinct as discussed above. The thesis of an instinct source that makes the organism react to stimuli with drives toward “instinct actions,” which then change the source in an appropriate manner, cannot be applied to a death instinct. The dissimulation in the cells, an objective destruction, cannot be a “source” of a destructive instinct in the same way that the chemical sensitizing of the central nervous system in regard to stimulation of the erogenous zones is the source of the sexual instinct. According to the definition, the instinct attempts to remove the somatic changes at the source of the instinct. The death instinct does not attempt to remove the dissimulation.

It seems, therefore, as if the facts on which Freud based his concept of a death instinct in no way necessitate the assumption of two basically opposite kinds of instincts, the aim of one being relaxation and death, the aim of the other being a binding to higher units. In the chapters on masochism and depression an attempt will be made to show that the clinical facts of self-destruction likewise do not necessitate the assumption of a genuine self-destructive instinct and that all occurrences beyond the pleasure principle can be looked upon as created by external forces that disturbed the principles innate to the organism (*see pp. 358 ff. and 387ff.*).

The idea that the concept of a death instinct is neither necessary nor useful does not refute possible speculations that life might be looked upon as a “process leading to death.” The young organism embodies an abundance of prospective potentialities. Every moment of life that is lived through produces “structure” which limits the prospective potentialities, makes the organism more rigid, and brings it nearer to the inorganic. Whoever accepts this point of view may see in the mental functions once again a special case of the process of life in general.

We may summarize. Unquestionably there are often conflicts between the ego’s interests and its sexual drives; there are quite as often conflicts between aggressiveness and sexual tendencies. However, both kinds of conflicts have a history; they came into being at a certain point of development and remain conflicts only as long as certain conditions prevail. There is no necessity to assume that either of these two pairs of opposites represents a genuine and un-conditioned dichotomy, operative from the very beginning. For a better classification of instincts, we shall have to wait until physiology develops more valuable theses about instinctual sources.

## INFANTILE SEXUALITY

If we turn now to the study of the development of sexuality we are able to leave speculation and return to an empirical basis.

The characteristics of the polymorphous perverse infantile sexuality are well known from Freud's *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* (555). Infantile sexuality differs from adult sexuality in several respects. The most impressive difference lies in the fact that the highest excitation is not necessarily located at the genitals, but that the genitals, rather, play "the part of *primus inter pares* among many erogenous zones. The aims, too, are different; they do not necessarily lead toward sexual intercourse but linger at activities that later play a role in forepleasure. Infantile sexuality may be *autoerotic*, that is, take the child's own body or parts of it as its object. The components, which are directed toward objects, bear archaic features (incorporation aims and ambivalence). When a partial instinct is blocked, "collateral" partial instincts become correspondingly strengthened.

The small child is an instinctual creature full of polymorphous perverse sexual drives or, to put it more correctly, full of a still undifferentiated total sexuality which contains all the later "partial instincts" in one. Reality seems to be judged at first only as to whether it is compatible with instinct satisfaction. Reality, as conceived of by the primitive ego, is colored by the status of its sexual aims. Every kind of excitation in the child can become a source of sexual excitement: mechanical and muscular stimuli, affects, intellectual activity, and even pain. In infantile sexuality excitement and satisfaction are not sharply differentiated although there are already orgasmlike phenomena, that is, pleasurable sensations that bring relaxation and the end of sexual excitation. In time, however, the genitals begin to function as a special discharge apparatus, which concentrates all excitation upon itself and discharges it no matter in which erogenous zone it originated.

It is called genital primacy when this function of the genitals has become dominant over the extragenital erogenous zones, and all sexual excitations become finally genitally oriented and climactically discharged. The antithesis to genital primacy is the earlier pregenital period, when the genital apparatus has not yet assumed dominance, and as a result the relaxation achieved is never complete. The road from the early pregenital strivings to genital primacy can be described from two different points of view: from that of the change of the leading erogenous zones, and from that of the types of object relationships.

First of all it must be emphasized that the concept of developmental phases is a relative one, serving as a better means of orientation only. Practically, all phases gradually pass into one another and overlap.

When one attempts to organize the abundance of phenomena in infantile sexuality, one is struck by a period in which these phenomena are relatively few and the number and intensity of direct sexual manifestations are diminished. This is the so-called period of latency, extending from the sixth or seventh year of life until puberty. It is true that sexual manifestations never completely disappear; cultures have been described in which a period of latency seems to be lacking, and even in our culture there are many children who do not renounce their masturbation during these years; but even in these cases, sex is less in the foreground than it is earlier and later. Freud was of the opinion that the

occurrence of the period of latency is a characteristic of the human species. The early blossoming of infantile sexuality is, as it were, “doomed to destruction” by nature, and this fact is a biological precondition for repression and thus for neuroses (618). Other authors have pointed out that since among some primitive tribes a latency period never appears, cultural restrictions must be responsible for the renunciation of sexual wishes (1102, 1278). However, there is no clear-cut contradiction between “biologically” and “socially” determined phenomena. Biological changes may be brought about by former external influences. It may be that the latency period is a result of external influences that have been in effect long enough to have left permanent traces; perhaps at this point we are watching external influences becoming biological. At any rate, during this period the forces operative against instinctive impulses, such as shame, disgust, and so forth, develop at the price of instinctual energies.

Thus preadult sexuality generally can be divided into three major periods: the infantile period, the latency period, and puberty. The beginning and the end of the infantile period are very well known today, whereas that which lies in between is still in need of much research. It is possible that in this in-between stage accidental variations are of greater import than they are in the beginning and end phases.

#### THE ORAL STAGE

The beginning is the oral (more correctly the intestinal) state of organization of the libido (13, 555). In discussing the development of the ego, factors were brought out as to how the knowledge of reality comes about in connection with experiences of hunger and satiation. Further, it was evident that the first perceptions were connected with a kind of oral incorporation, and that the first judging was the decision whether or not a substance was edible. These findings may now be supplemented by a discussion of the autoerotic phenomenon of thumb-sucking. Thumbsucking is already evident in the newborn child and can, of course, be considered an innate reflex. That does not prevent us from noting that this reflex is concerned with a type of stimulation that usually is tied up with the function of nourishment but has become independent of it. Thumbsucking shows that the pleasure gained from breast or bottle is based not alone on the gratification of hunger but on the stimulation of the erogenous oral mucous membrane as well; otherwise the infant would disappointedly remove his thumb, since it produces no milk. There, sexual excitement has originally leaned upon the need for nourishment; in a similar way early sexual excitement has also leaned upon other physiological functions, upon breathing and cutaneous sensations and upon the sensations of defecation and urination.

It is not necessary to go into detail here about the many phenomena in which oral eroticism is still retained in the adult: kissing, perverse practices, drinking and smoking customs and many eating habits. One must not forget, however, that in drinking and smoking we are not dealing only with oral eroticism. Alcohol and nicotine are also toxins, which by chemical means produce wishedfor changes in the balance of instinctual conflicts. These changes diminish inhibitions, heighten self-esteem, and ward off anxiety, at least for a short time and to a certain extent.

The aim of oral eroticism is first the pleasurable autoerotic stimulation of the erogenous zone and later the incorporation of objects. Animal crackers, loved by

children, are significant remnants of early cannibalistic fantasies (165). The appearance of an especially intense greed, either manifest or, after its repression, in the form of derivatives, is always traceable to oral eroticism. Many peculiarities of persons fixated at this level can be explained by realizing that in this period objects are not looked upon as individuals but only as food or providers of food. By incorporating objects one becomes united with them. The "oral introjection" is simultaneously the executive of the "primary identification." The ideas of eating an object or of being eaten by an object remain the ways in which any reunion with objects is thought of unconsciously. The magical communion of "becoming the same substance," either by eating the same food or by mixing the respective bloods, and the magical belief that a person becomes similar to the object he has eaten are based on this fact. Abundant evidence of this is to be found in experiences ranging from religious rites to everyday habits. Handshaking means that union is sealed by letting one's body substance flow into the other person's. And a companion is still a "com-panion," a person whose bread is identical with ours.

Corresponding to the specific aims of oral eroticism and in accordance with the principle of animistic misunderstanding, we find specific oral fears, especially the fear of being eaten (414, 618).

Analytic experience shows that the fear of being eaten often serves as a cover for a more deeply hidden castration anxiety (566, 599). This is not to be taken as an objection to the archaic nature of this fear. The distortion, which aids in the defense against castration anxiety, may operate through regression.

Of course, the idea of being eaten is not only a source of fear but under certain circumstances may also be a source of oral pleasure. There is not only a longing to incorporate objects but also a longing to be incorporated by a larger object. Very often, the seemingly contradictory aims of eating and of being eaten appear condensed with each other. In the chapter on the ego the longing to be rejoined with an object to which one had yielded one's omnipotence was described. This rejoining, too, is unconsciously thought of as a kind of being eaten by a larger, more powerful object; it depends on individual circumstances whether this idea is met with positive longing or with anxiety (712).

Clinical experience shows that aims of oral incorporation often assume a sadistic character. This probably occurs under the influence of unknown constitutional factors or as a reaction to frustrations. Psychoanalysis of persons suffering from depressions or addictions shows that actually the sadistic character of the incorporation fantasies did not become added on later but was actually operative at the time of the oral phase. However, that is certainly no reason for assuming that every infant sucking at his mother's breast has the desire to kill and destroy her in a sadistic manner. The clinical material of British analysts who hold this point of view (958, 959, 1309) certainly should not be doubted. What is doubtful, however, is that the cases described are typical; they represent, rather, pathological cases with special oral-sadistic fixations (99, 429).

However, incorporation destroys the object objectively. This fact gives all the aims of incorporation a more or less "ambivalent" character. It has already been stated that this ambivalence does not exist from the very beginning. As long as there is no conception of

objects, it is meaningless to talk about ambivalence. However, as soon as a conception of objects is developed, the objectively destructive character of the incorporation facilitates a connection of ideas of incorporation with sadism, especially if definite frustrations have been endured (26).

The oral-sadistic fantasies, reconstructed in the analysis of orally fixated patients (*cf.* 104) and sometimes manifest in orally oriented psychoses, are so fantastic that certain authors are even of the opinion that real experiences are not at all important for their formation (1312). Actually, however, these “fantasies” express the ways in which an undeveloped archaic ego perceives (and misunderstands) a frustrating reality.

Abraham differentiated two subphases of the oral stage: a preambivalent one in which subjectively no object exists and only pleasurable sucking is sought, and an ambivalent phase, appearing after the eruption of teeth, which has the aim of biting the object (26). Analysis of sadistic perverts often reveals that at the bottom of their symptoms there is a fixation on the oral sexual aim of biting (1205). This co-ordination of sucking and the phase before the establishment of objects, and of biting and oral-sadistic drives, does not entirely fit, however; often oral-sadistic sucking fantasies directed against objects can be observed (vampire).

Of the neuroses, the manic-depressive cycle and the addictions present manifestations of fixation on the oral level. However, since in mental development earlier developmental levels still persist behind the more mature ones, oral-erotic characteristics are also present in all other neuroses.

Because of their significance for the later development of neuroses, it is advisable to elaborate again upon the concepts of fixation and regression which were discussed in the chapter on the ego (*see* p. 53). It was stated that in mental development the progress to a higher level never takes place completely; instead characteristics of the earlier level persist alongside of or behind the new level to some extent. Disturbances of development may occur not only in the form of a total arresting of development but also in the form of retaining more characteristics of earlier stages than is normal. When a new development meets with difficulties, there may be backward movements in which the development recedes to earlier stages that were more successfully experienced. Fixation and regression are complementary to each other. Freud used the simile of an advancing army in enemy territory leaving occupation troops at all important points. The stronger the occupation troops left behind, the weaker is the army that marches on. If the latter meets a too powerful enemy force, it may retreat to those points where it had previously left the strongest occupation troops (596). The stronger a fixation, the more easily will a regression take place if difficulties arise.

What are the factors responsible for evoking fixations? Unquestionably there are hereditary tendencies that account for the various erogenous zones being charged with different amounts of cathexis or different degrees of ability for discharge. Little is known about such constitutional factors. Psychoanalysis did succeed, however, in studying the kinds of experience that favor the development of fixations.

1. The consequence of experiencing excessive satisfactions at a given level is that this level is renounced only with reluctance; if, later, misfortunes occur, there is always a yearning for the satisfaction formerly enjoyed.

2. A similar effect is wrought by excessive *frustrations* at a given level. One gets the impression that at developmental levels that do not afford enough satisfaction, the

organism refuses to go further, demanding the withheld satisfactions. If the frustration has led to repression, the drives in question are thus cut off from the rest of the personality; they do not participate in further maturation and send up their disturbing derivatives from the unconscious into the conscious. The result is that these drives remain in the unconscious unchanged, constantly demanding the same sort of satisfaction; thus they also constantly provoke the same defensive attitudes on the part of the defending ego. This is one source of neurotic "repetitions" (*see* p. 542).

3. One frequently finds that excessive satisfactions as well as excessive frustrations underlie a given fixation; previous overindulgence had made the person unable to bear later frustrations; little frustrations, which a less spoiled individual could tolerate, then have the same effect that a severe frustration ordinarily has.

4. It is understandable, therefore, that abrupt changes from excessive satisfactions to excessive frustrations have an especially fixating effect.

5. Most frequently, however, fixations are rooted in experiences of instinctual satisfaction which simultaneously gave reassurance in the face of some anxiety or aided in repressing some other feared impulse. Such simultaneous satisfaction of drive and of security is the most common cause of fixations.

#### THE ANAL-SADISTIC STAGE

The analysis of compulsion neuroses enabled Freud to insert between the oral and phallic periods another organizational level of the libido, namely, the anal-sadistic level (581). Anal pleasure certainly is present from the beginning of life. However, in the second year of life the anal-erogenous zone seems to become the chief executive of all excitation which now, no matter where it originates, tends to be discharged through defecation. The primary aim of anal eroticism is certainly the enjoyment of pleasurable sensations in excretion. Later experience teaches that stimulation of the rectal mucosa may be increased by holding back the fecal mass. Anal-retention tendencies are a good example of combinations of erogenous pleasure with security against anxiety. Fear of the originally pleasurable excretion may lead to retention and to the discovery of retention pleasure. The possibility of achieving a more intense stimulation of the mucous membrane, and with it a more intense sensation through the increased tension of retention, is responsible for the tension pleasure which is greater in anal eroticism than in any other eroticism. Persons who, in their pleasures, seek to prolong the forepleasure and to postpone the end pleasure are latently always anal erotics.

The origin and character of the connection between anal and sadistic drives, hinted at in the term for the organization level (anal sadism), is analogous to the discussed connection between orality and sadism. It is due partly to frustrating influences and partly to the character of the incorporation aims. However, two factors must be added. First, the fact that elimination objectively is as "destructive" as incorporation; the object of the first anal-sadistic action is the feces themselves, their "pinching off" being perceived as a kind of sadistic act; later on, persons are treated as the feces previously were treated. Second, the factor of "social power" involved in the mastery of the sphincters: in training for cleanliness, the child finds opportunity effectively to express opposition against grownups.

There are physiological reasons for the connection of anal eroticism to ambivalence and bisexuality. Anal eroticism makes the child treat an object, namely feces, in a contradictory manner: he expels the matter from the body and retains it as if it were a loved object; this is the physiological root of "anal ambivalence." On the other hand the rectum is an excretory hollow organ; as an excretory organ it can actively expel something; as a hollow organ it can be stimulated by an entering foreign body. Masculine tendencies are derived from the first faculty; feminine tendencies from the second; this is the physiological root of the connection between anal eroticism and bisexuality (846).

The first anal strivings are, of course, autoerotic. Pleasurable elimination as well as (later) pleasurable retention can be attained without any object. The fact that this pleasure is experienced at a time when the primary feelings of omnipotence are still operative can be seen in the magical narcissistic overvaluation of the power of the individual's bowel movements; this finds expression in many neurotic and superstitious remnants (19). Though the pleasure is attained by the stimulation of the rectal mucous membrane, the feces, as the instrument by which this pleasure is attained, also become a libidinal object. They represent a thing which first is one's own body but which is transformed into an external object, the model of anything that may be lost; and thus they especially represent "possession," that is, things that are external but nevertheless have ego quality. The impulse to coprophagia which certainly has an erogenous source (representing an attempt to stimulate the erogenous zone of the mouth with the same pleasurable substance that previously stimulated the erogenous zone of the rectum) simultaneously represents an attempt to re-establish the threatened narcissistic equilibrium; that which has been eliminated must be reintrojected. A similar attempt at cutaneous reintrojection is represented by the impulse to smear (1050). Thus the feces become an ambivalently loved object. They are loved and held back or reintrojected and played with, and they are hated and pinched off.

Certain anal pleasures are first perceived in the sensations accompanying the mother's care when diapers are changed. This care and, later on, conflicts aroused by the child's training toward cleanliness gradually turn the autoerotic anal strivings into object strivings. Then, objects may be treated exactly like feces. They may be retained or introjected (there are various types of anal incorporation) as well as eliminated and pinched off (21, 26). The training for cleanliness gives ample opportunity for sensual and hostile gratifications. The "narcissistic overvaluation" (19) expresses itself now in a feeling of power over the mother in giving or not giving the feces. Other anal tendencies directed at objects are the impulses to share anal activities with somebody else: to defecate together, to watch and exhibit anal activities, to smear together, to defecate on another person or to have another person defecate on oneself. All these anal object strivings are ambivalently oriented. They may express tenderness in an archaic way, as well as, after their condemnation, hostility and contempt ("to play a dirty trick on somebody") (463, 1074).

Abraham took this contradictory attitude of the anal erotic toward the object world as a starting point for his suggestion to subdivide the phase of anal organization of the libido into an earlier period having a sadistic aim in excretory pleasure without consideration for the object, and a later period characterized by a prevalent retention pleasure where the object is conserved (26). The consideration of the object's well-being, which constitutes

love, probably starts in this second anal phase; its first manifestation is the readiness to sacrifice the feces for the object's sake.

Just as frustrations in the oral period through animistic misunderstanding lead to the formation of specific oral anxieties, so do frustrations in the anal period form specific anal anxieties. As a retaliation for anal-sadistic tendencies, fears develop that what one wished to perpetrate anally on others will now happen to oneself. Fears of physical injury of an anal nature develop, like the fear of some violent ripping out of feces or of body contents.

The other erogenous zones and partial drives are somewhat neglected in analytic literature since they do not become leading executive zones. Nevertheless, conflicts around them often play as decisive a role in the genesis of neuroses and in character formation as oral and anal eroticisms do.

### URETHRAL EROTICISM

The appearance of infantile urethral eroticism is so closely interwoven with infantile genital eroticism that not much can be said about it before infantile genitality is discussed. Nevertheless, in later stages it often appears as a pregenital opponent to genuine genital sexuality. The urethral-erotic child necessarily becomes aware of the difference between the sexes with reference to urinating. Thus urethral eroticism often appears in combination with the castration complex.

Certainly the primary aim of urethral eroticism is pleasure in urination. However, there is also a secondary urethral-retention pleasure, analogous to the analretention pleasure, as well as conflicts revolving about it. This is more frequent in girls, probably for anatomical reasons. At any rate it does not seem justifiable to make retention pleasure synonymous with anal pleasure and excretory pleasure with urethral pleasure, as Ferenczi once tried to do (497).

The original aims of urethral eroticism certainly are autoerotic ones, just as are those of anal eroticism; later, urethral eroticism, too, may turn toward objects. The urethral apparatus then becomes the executive of sexually exciting fantasies about urinating at objects, being urinated on by objects, or of fantasies in which the connection with urination is more concealed (1337).

Children often actively wet their pants or bed for the sake of autoerotic pleasure. Later, enuresis may develop as an involuntary neurotic symptom having the nature of an unconscious equivalent of masturbation (*see* pp. 232 ff.). In general, the pleasure in urinating may have a double character: it may have, in both sexes, a phallic and even sadistic significance—urinating being the equivalent of active penetration with fantasies of damaging or destroying—or it may be felt as a “letting flow,” as a passive giving oneself up and foregoing control. The aim of letting passively flow may be condensed with other passive aims in boys, like being fondled on the penis or being stimulated at the root of the penis or at the perineum (at the prostate) (1071). Whereas the active phallic part of urethral eroticism in boys is soon replaced by normal genitality, passive urethral-erotic aims may come in conflict with genitality, frequently condensed with anal aims; passive male urethral eroticism may, it is true, sometimes be combined with rather sadistic fantasies, as the analysis of cases of severe *ejaculatio praecox* shows (14). The

idea of letting flow frequently is displaced from urine to tears. In women, later urethral-erotic difficulties most frequently express conflicts centered around penis envy.

Since the pleasure in the retention of urine is less outspoken than in the retention of feces, and in boys may even be entirely absent, the conflicts in the realm of urethral eroticism are less characterized by a struggle between drives to eliminate and drives to retain than by a temptation to enjoy primitive erogenous pleasure in excretion and narcissistic pride in controlling the sphincter of the bladder. This pride is due to the fact that failures in urethral cleanliness are usually punished by putting the child to shame—much more so than failures in rectal cleanliness. It is not easy to say whence the deep connection between urethral eroticism and shame comes; but it can be stated that just as the idea of being eaten is the specific oral fear and the idea of being robbed of the contents of the body the specific anal fear, so *shame* is the specific force directed against urethral-erotic temptations. *Ambition*, so often described as an outcome of urethral-erotic conflicts (794, 881), represents the fight against this shame (*see p.* 139).

### OTHER EROGENOUS ZONES

The entire surface of the skin as well as all mucous membranes function as an erogenous zone. All skin stimulation, touch, as well as temperature and pain sensations are potential sources of erogenous stimulation which, if it meets internal contradiction, may result in conflicts. Temperature eroticism in particular is often combined with early oral eroticism and forms an essential part of primitive receptive sexuality. To have cutaneous contact with the partner and to feel the warmth of his body remains an essential component of all love relationships. In archaic forms of love, where objects serve rather as mere instruments for gaining satisfaction, this is especially marked. Intense pleasure in warmth, frequently manifested in neurotic bathing habits, is usually encountered in persons who simultaneously show other signs of a passive-receptive orientation, particularly in regard to the regulation of their self-esteem. For such persons, “to get affection” means “to get warmth.” They are “frozen” personalities who “thaw” in a “warm” atmosphere, who can sit for hours in a warm bath or on a radiator.

Touch eroticism is comparable to scopophilia, both representing the excitement brought about by specific sensory stimuli. After the achievement of genital primacy these sensory stimulations function as instigators of excitement and play a corresponding part in forepleasure. If they have been warded off during childhood they remain isolated, demanding full gratification on their own account and thus disturbing sexual integration. Touch eroticism is not necessarily connected with scopophilia.

In the case of a sculptor with neurotic inhibitions, specific fears which had become connected with the goals of touch eroticism formed the basis of the neurosis.

It would be interesting to study the development of touch eroticism in blind persons (223). The sublimation of touch pleasure is of great importance to the ego in learning to master the external world (1405).

Pleasure aroused by painful stimuli of the skin is the erogenous basis of all types of masochism (*see p. 359*).

When the goals of skin eroticism are no longer autoerotic but have become directed toward objects, the archaic aim of incorporation is very distinct. "Introjection through the skin" plays a significant role in the magical thinking of all times as well as in the unconscious sexual fantasies of neurotics (1050).

Skin eroticism is not always to be distinguished from muscle eroticism or from the sexualization of the data of depth sensibility (1338). Muscle eroticism is manifested in many games, sports, and so on, and, pathologically, in many conversion symptoms or in inhibitions of certain (sexualized) muscle activities. Sexual pleasure gained from sensations of depth sensibility in neurotic phenomena is of far greater importance than is generally accepted (410, 444, 526, 837, 1384, 1386, 1391). The importance of pleasures and fears around kinesthetic sensations as well as around sensations of the senses of equilibrium and space have been mentioned in connection with the archaic levels of the ego. Since the excitement (and the conflicts) aroused by these sensations form an essential component of infantile sexuality, the sensations themselves may later become re-presentatives of infantile sexuality in general. Kinesthetic sensations of the early ego levels are experienced by adults and older children while falling asleep, which may contribute to disturbances of sleep if these sensations, because of their latent sexual significance, have a frightening effect. The return of old and unclear equilibrium and space sensations is often the external sign for a remobilization of unconscious infantile excitement. They seem to be of special importance wherever sensations of excitement turn into sensations of anxiety (*see p. 203*).

The connection between anxiety and equilibrium sensations may have a deep physiological origin. Various authors have stressed the point that in the infant the fear of losing stability may form the pattern according to which, later on, other anxieties are built (72, 780, 1391).

## PARTIAL INSTINCTS

Scotophilia, the sexualization of the sensations of looking, is analogous to touch eroticism. Sensory stimuli which are normally initiators of excitement and executors of forepleasure may, if too strong or repressed, later resist subordination under the genital primacy. Wherever sensations of sense organs are sexualized all the features described as characteristic for primitive perception can be observed again: activity of the perceptual organs, motility inseparably connected with perception, "incorporation" of the perceived with a resultant change of the ego along the lines of what has been perceived. Observation of a child who is looking for libidinous purposes readily shows what the accompanying features or prerequisites of pleasurable looking are: he wants to look at an object in order to "feel along with him."

This is especially clear in the analysis of perverse voyeurs. Those who want to observe couples always identify themselves in fantasy with one of the two partners or even with both (*see p. 348*).

Very often sadistic impulses are tied up with scopophilia: the individual wants to see something in order to destroy it (or to gain reassurance that the object is not yet destroyed). Often, looking itself is unconsciously thought of as a substitute for destroying (“I did not destroy it; I merely looked at it”).

The typical obsessive idea in women that they must compulsively look at men’s genitals often represents a distorted expression of the sadistic wish to destroy men’s genitals.

In many scopophilic fantasies, the fantasy of incorporating through the eye the object seen is particularly clear (430). Scopophilia is the main component in children’s sexual curiosity which often has the quality of an instinctual drive. “Knowing sexual facts” may substitute for the observation of sexual facts and become a sexual aim of its own (249, 461, 1059). It may become displaced and give rise to the well-known continual asking of questions which can be so annoying to grownups. It may also become sublimated into a real interest in research, or its repression may block any intellectual interest, depending upon what experiences have become associated with this instinctive sexual curiosity (251, 561). “Primal scenes” (e.g. observing adults during sexual activities) or the birth of a younger sibling are the most common experiences that may stimulate or block curiosity.

Like other sexual components, scopophilia may become the object of specific repressions (8). Freud once wrote a special paper about the various outcomes of these repressions (571). Extreme cases occasionally occur in shy, inhibited persons who actually do not dare to look at their environment. There are specific fears that are dreaded by inhibited voyeurs as a talion punishment. The “evil eye” and “being turned to stone” are examples (1430). Generally, shyness may be called the specific fear corresponding to the scopophilic impulse (*see pp. 177 f.*).

The counterpart to scopophilia is exhibitionism, which usually appears together with scopophilia. Freud pointed out that this may be due to the fact that both have a common precursor in the sexual aim of looking at oneself (588). Due to this origin, exhibitionism remains more narcissistic than any other partial instinct. Its erogenous pleasure is always connected with an increase in self-esteem, anticipated or actually gained through the fact that others look at the subject. In the *perversion* of exhibitionism this gain is used as a reassurance against castration fears (*see pp. 345 ff.*). In a magical way exhibitionism which gives erogenous pleasure may simultaneously be used to influence the onlookers in various ways, either for apotropaic purposes (483, 634, 1249) or for showing them by magical gestures what they are supposed to do (555, 1296).

The relationship to the castration complex causes exhibitionism to have a different development in each sex. Since the man may quiet castration anxieties by exhibiting his genitals, masculine exhibitionism remains fixed to the genitals where it plays a role in sexual forepleasure. In women, since the idea of being castrated inhibits genital exhibitionism, there is a displacement of exhibitionism to the body as a whole. There is no feminine perversion of genital exhibitionism, but nongenital feminine exhibitionism plays a large role both inside and outside the sexual sphere (736) (*see pp. 346 f.*).

Just as there is a sexual impulse of touching and looking, so there are also sexual impulses of hearing, tasting, and smelling. About the connections between the so-called lower senses and sexuality, the same statements can be made as about the sexual

connotations of kinesthetic sensations. The lower senses as well as the kinesthetic participate to a relatively great extent in the general orientation of the child; thus they are also highly cathected with infantile sex-uality. Emotions (excitement as well as anxiety) which originally were connected with infantile sexuality may later be remobilized in a conflict situation around sensations of smelling, tasting, or hearing; again, 'where these sensations represent sexual impulses toward objects, the ideas of incorporation are in the foreground (11, 420, 838). In states of regression, scopophilia often recedes into the background, whereas auditory and olfactory conflicts come to the fore again.

Actually phenomena of taste sexuality for the most part coincide with oral eroticism, and phenomena of smell sexuality with anal eroticism. Nevertheless their vicissitudes may be studied separately (838).

Sadism and masochism likewise certainly may be designated as normal partial instincts; they are present in all children. It may be that sadism initially develops from the instinctive greediness with which the incorporation aims of the pregenital impulses are prosecuted, representing a way of striving for instinctive aims rather than an original instinctual aim in itself. Another root of sadism is the negative instinctual aim of getting rid ("spitting away") of painful stimuli. Both greediness and hate become condensed when the destruction or the damage of an object turns into an instinctual aim of its own, the completion of which produces a kind of erogenous pleasure.

All pregenital impulses, in their aims of incorporation, seem to possess a certain destructive component. Unknown constitutional factors, and above all, experiences of frustration, greatly increase this destructive element. In addition to oral and anal sadism other erogenous zones may serve as sources of sadism. It is often the specific repression of this sadistic component of infantile sexuality that later leads to conflicts and thus to neuroses.

Masochism, the direction of the destructive component in sexuality against the individual's own ego, is the counterpart to sadism. It is of special theoretical importance since its manifest aim of self-destruction seems to contradict the pleasure principle. The problem is whether this is due to a genuine selfdestructive instinct operative "beyond the pleasure principle" (605) or whether this contradiction is only an apparent one, the masochistic phenomena being reducible to changes in the direction of sadistic drives, necessitated by the environment (601, 1277, 1299). This will be discussed in connection with the perversion of masochism (*see pp. 358 ff.*). Concerning the partial instinct of masochism, it may suffice to say that its erogenous basis is represented by the component of skin (and muscle) eroticism, which is aroused by (not too intense) painful stimuli. Freud called this erogenous masochism (613). All further phenomena of masochism may be regarded as elaborations of this type of eroticism, provoked by certain experiences (*see pp. 360 ff.*). In principle, these elaborations can be understood in the following ways:

1. They may represent a turning of sadistic impulses against the ego.
2. They may represent a necessary evil in so far as experience has brought the conviction that pleasure can only be attained by bearing a certain amount of pain; thus enduring this pain becomes an unfortunate but unavoidable intermediary aim. The masochistic act may represent a "lesser evil": by a selfdestructive act one unconsciously pays a small price to avert a greater dreaded evil (1240). This is the psychology of "sacrifice." A greater hurt is averted by voluntarily submitting the ego to an earlier and lesser one.

3. The mechanism generally used to master traumatic experiences may complicate a person's sexuality: when something unpleasant is expected, it may be anticipated actively to a controllable degree and at a known time.

4. Experiences may inhibit activity and provoke a regression toward receptive behavior. Many masochistic phenomena appear in analysis as a strengthening of a passive-receptive giving oneself up for the sake of the pleasure of regaining participation in omnipotence. One's own smallness can be enjoyed if it serves as a way of feeling that one participates in somebody else's greatness (817, 819).

### THE PHALLIC PHASE; CASTRATION ANXIETY IN BOYS

At the conclusion of infantile sexuality, the genital concentration of all sexual excitement is achieved. The interest in the genitals and in genital masturbation attains a dominant significance, and even a kind of genital orgasm makes its appearance. Freud called this phase the infantile genital organization or the phallic phase (609).

The fact that a general genital discharge of all kinds of sexual excitement comes into being around the fourth or fifth year of life certainly does not mean that the genitals did not previously function as an erogenous zone. As an organ of erogenous sensitivity the genitals are highly effective from birth on; genital masturbation can be observed in infants. Genital erogeneity is as primary as the anal- and urethral-erotic elements, and is not created by a displacement of these elements (497). However, the genital organs and the urinary organs coincide to a high degree. The first genital strivings are certainly closely interwoven with the urethral-erotic ones.

Displacements of pregenital cathexes onto genital impulses, however, do occur and increase the genital erogeneity. It is such displacement that is described in the formula: sexual excitement, wherever originated, becomes more and more concentrated at the genitals and eventually discharged in the genital way.

Whatever the physiology of erogeneity may be, from a psychological point of view it must be said: there is not a specific oral libido, anal libido, and genital libido; there is but one libido which may be displaced from one erogenous zone to another. But where certain fixations have developed, forces are at work that resist such a displacement, so that, for example, pregenital fixations in neurotics hinder the progressive genital concentration of excitement during the sexual act.

The displacements that govern the later vicissitudes of anal eroticism have been studied and described in detail by Freud and others (593, 832, 1634). Likewise a retrograde displacement of anal cathexes to oral functions may occur (1143, 1489) and does occur regularly in stammering (*see* pp. 311 ff.).

The infantile genital organization has common trends and differences as compared with adult sexuality. The similarities concern the genital concentration and the object relations. In general, the child at the phallic phase resembles the adult from a sexual standpoint more than is generally realized. Under our social conditions the main expression of the