

Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China

Edited by
**Leong H. Liew and
Shaoguang Wang**



Routledge Contemporary China Series

Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China

This book examines the changing role of nationalism in China in the light of the immense political and economic changes there during the 1990s. It analyses recent debates between the nationalists (and New Left) and liberals in China, examining the roles played by state-sponsored and populist nationalism in China's foreign relations with the West in general and the US in particular. The issues of Taiwanese nationalism and Tibet and Xinjiang separatism are discussed, with a focus on the questions surrounding the impact of globalization on national integration, and the relationship between democracy and national integration. Should democracy precede national democracy and national integration, could democracy be realized only after national integration, or are democracy and national integration mutually exclusive objectives? This book also examines the roles played by the People's Liberation Army and fiscal system in China in promoting Chinese nationalism and national integration.

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Preface

The centrifugal forces of economic and social liberalization in the People's Republic of China have projected democracy, nationalism and national integration as pivotal issues for the Chinese people and their leaders. These issues are also portentous for many outside China who seek to understand how to engage most effectively with this seemingly ever more powerful nation undergoing political and social as well as economic transformation.

Recognizing this, a regional workshop on nationalism, democracy and national integration in China was held in Brisbane, Australia, in January 2001, to examine the importance of these issues and the complex relationships between them. The 2001 workshop was the genesis of this book. Scholars from Australia, Hong Kong, Mainland China, Singapore and Taiwan took part in the workshop over two days. Authors have revised their workshop papers in the light of workshop discussion, additional research, and further time (which included the 11 September terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC in 2001).

The book has 12 chapters in six parts. Chapter 1 is more than an introduction to the book; it introduces some key concepts and identifies linkages and disjunctures in the literature on Chinese nationalism, democracy and national integration. It also identifies key issues on the topics highlighted directly and indirectly by other authors in the book.

The remaining chapters are presented in five parts. Part II examines views held by PRC intellectuals about democracy and nationalism. In particular, it analyses debates between the liberals and 'New Left'. Part III considers Chinese nationalism in Sino-US relations and Part IV examines Taiwanese nationalism in the light of PRC efforts at reunification. Chapters in Part V explore issues of market and democracy in relation to national identity and national integration, and Part VI examines two key institutions – China's system of fiscal transfers and the People's Liberation Army – that impact on national integration.

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Leong H. Liew and Shaoguang Wang
April 2003

Part I

Introduction

1 The nexus between nationalism, democracy and national integration

Leong H. Liew and Doug Smith

There is little doubt that nationalism played a central role in China's struggle for modernity and international respect throughout the twentieth century. Early debates about Chinese nationalism sought to identify its origins in a China that had previously found unity through the strength of its own culture, rather than through politics. For millennia, the power of Chinese culture served, sometimes more and sometimes less, to assimilate external threats. But the strength of Chinese culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries proved insufficient to meet the military technology and destabilizing economic power of the modern state, and the once great regional power was humbled at the hands of a few Western nations and Japan.

Much has been made of the absence of nationalism in Asia. It was the American and French revolutions in the eighteenth century that saw the rise of modern nationalism, with 'the first ideological conception of the nation' (Anderson 2002: 7). Early modern nationalism was Euro-centric, linked intimately to the rationalism of the Enlightenment, and it was European intrusion into Asia and the realization by Asian proto-nationalists of the currency of the concept that provoked the development of nationalism in Asia. The universalism implied in the maxim 'all under the Chinese emperor' now had no place within the world of nations. For China to secure a place, Chinese leaders clearly had to draw together the population to build what many saw as China's only defence against imperialism – a modern nation-state.

Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen's passionate call for that 'loose sheet of sand' (founded for millennia on the particularistic ties of family, clan and village) to come together into a modern nation-state is well known. Numerous modern Chinese leaders from both the right and left have echoed the call for cohesion throughout the struggles that followed Sun's incomplete nationalist revolution. The leaders of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, for example, attacked Confucianism, arguing it should no longer be the national essence (*guocui*). The people of China were to become patriots, upholding Mr Science and Mr Democracy to build a modern nation capable of resisting imperialism and standing proud among the nations of the world.

Many Chinese traditions were now seen as obstacles to China's advance into this modern world. Importantly, the May Fourth Movement saw the need to shift the rationale of the state towards the Chinese people themselves. While this national project was never completed under the auspices of the Movement, the attempts in the wake of the Movement provided useful groundwork for the efforts that followed.

Nationalism found unique – and ironic¹ – expression in the unity secured by Mao Zedong through Marxist ideology in establishing the People's Republic in 1949. Mao saw the organizational power of nationalism and used it judiciously to draw a fractured society into the semblance of a modern nation in response to external threats, especially from Japan and the US. Mao used the time-honoured approach of establishing a national myth upon which to establish the nation of the People's Republic of China, when he claimed:

[t]he Chinese nation is known throughout the world not only for its industriousness and stamina, but also for its ardent love of freedom and its rich revolutionary traditions. The history of the Han people . . . demonstrates that the Chinese never submit to tyrannical rule but invariably use revolutionary means to overthrow or change it. . . . Thus the Chinese nation has a glorious revolutionary tradition and a splendid historical heritage.

(Mao 1965: 314)

Mao identified nationalism as one of the most powerful exports from the West, and strongly embraced it in his task of nation-building. Mao's nationalism stressed patriotism through loyalty to the nation and to the state. It anticipated a world in which a fraternity of socialist nations predominated over the capitalist West. Mao's nationalism was therefore qualified by a commitment to the internationalist imperatives of Marxism and Leninism. Both Mao and Stalin used nationalism to serve the cause of national economic development and modernization. But nationalism and the left do not always sit together comfortably. As Moby Gao points out in Chapter 3 in this volume, in contrast to the situation in contemporary China, in Europe it is often the right that raises the banner of nationalism in politics. Epitomizing the position of the left in Europe, Hardt and Negri (2000), the authors of *Empire* – a neo-Marxist critique of globalization – are critical of nationalism and the forging of national identities. They write approvingly of Rosa Luxemburg, a revolutionary figure of the early twentieth century who was much admired by Trotsky and a vehement critic of nationalism. They point out that her most powerful argument against nationalism was not that it divides the working class – an issue of extreme concern to her and presumably to the authors – but that it 'means dictatorship and is thus profoundly incompatible with any attempt at democratic organization' (Hardt and Negri 2000: 97).

Views repudiating nationalism gained resonance among many Western scholars of China after 1978. These scholars have argued that in the dramatic shift after 1978 away from utopian ideology to commerce and patriotism, nationalism functioned or was manipulated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to foster the legitimacy of the Party in the eyes of the Chinese masses (Nelson 2000: 262; Unger 1996: xi). Even the strong defence of Chinese nationalism and call for a more balanced understanding of a rising China, as put by scholar Zheng Yongnian, assumes that nationalism fills the ideological vacuum left by the decline in Marxism. Zheng claimed:

A strong sense of national pride comes to average Chinese citizens, a sense probably as strong as they felt when Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. The Chinese leadership certainly welcomes this resurgence of nationalism because a new ideology is necessary as faith in Marxism or Maoism declines, and nationalism, if handled properly, can justify the political legitimacy of the leadership. In other words, nationalism can become the ideological basis of a transitional regime that turns away from totalitarianism but is not yet democratized. The leadership, aware of the danger of an ideological vacuum, often consciously appeals to nationalism to legitimate its political governance.

(Zheng 1999: 2)

Chinese nationalism in the new millennium

By the 1990s, most urban Chinese had accepted the limitations of Marxism-Leninism in the newly emerging global economy, and had accepted the need to develop new identities with which to manage their working lives. Conceptually, economic life should not be thought 'exogenous' to national life. As Crane (1999: 217) identified, economic life works in a number of ways to incorporate the population into the national narrative: 'economic historical experiences of suffering that are made into powerful signs of collective identity; economic accomplishments that can serve as emblems of shared glory; and assertions of societal unity rooted in a common economic life'. These new identities have been sustained by China's very strong economic growth since 1978. According to the World Bank (1997: ix), China's GDP per capita grew an average of 8.2 per cent annually between 1978 and the mid-1990s, and in the process lifted 200 million people out of poverty. Between 1995 and 2000 China received 40 per cent of the foreign direct investment flows into Asia and in the 1990s had outperformed most of its Asian neighbours in export growth (CSRC 2002: Ch. 5). Depending on whether purchasing power calculations are used, China is now the second or third largest economy in the world after the US and perhaps Japan.

The collapse of the Soviet Empire was a shock to the leaders of China and heralded the end of any pretence of utopian ideology in China. The CCP's subsequent inquest into the Soviet collapse led the Party leadership to conclude that the Party's continued relevance, even survival, depends on how well it can meet the material expectations of the Chinese people. The CCP leadership came to recognize the potential of nationalism as more than an instrument for achieving political and social stability and reinforcing its own legitimacy. Party leaders now also recognize nationalism as a powerful source of motivation that will propel the Chinese people to compete successfully in the global league of economic and other competitions. Greenfeld's impressive study, *The Spirit of Capitalism* (Greenfeld 2001), documents how nationalism has served as a strong motivator for national economic achievement in many countries:

[N]ationalism implies international competition. This makes competitiveness a measure of success in every sphere [that] a nation defines as significant for its self-image, and commits societies [that] define themselves as nations to a race with a relative and therefore forever receding finish line. When the economy is included among the areas of competition, this presupposes a commitment to constant growth. In other words, the sustained growth characteristic of modern economy is not self-sustained; it is stimulated and sustained by nationalism.

(Greenfeld 2001: 23)

Unlike Greenfeld, who sees the role of nationalism primarily to motivate people towards national economic competitiveness and has nothing to say about its possible role in developing a nation's capabilities for economic growth, in China we see nationalism contributing to national capability as well as arousing desire for economic growth. Of course, China's impressive economic performance since 1978 cannot be attributed solely to nationalism; gradual radical reform of institutions or 'rules of the game' has obviously played a major role. However, as Liew (1997: 149) has argued, the need 'to encourage and develop productive [rather than unproductive] entrepreneurial behaviour and the imperative to retain modes of cooperative behaviour during the transition to a market economy . . . is the most difficult task facing [Chinese] reformers'. We believe that the CCP's adroit use of nationalism has made this task easier. We contend that the gap filled by nationalism in place of communist ideology, to moderate otherwise unrestrained maximizing behaviour among economic actors, cannot be underestimated. Nationalism is providing the motivation for the modicum of cooperative behaviour among economic actors in China's economy while it is in transition from central planning to market. It has thus contributed significantly to minimizing the free-rider problem, and has facilitated economic reform.

Here we see the reciprocity between nationalism and marketization. For, while nationalism has contributed to China's successes in economic reform, these successes in turn have lubricated the emergence of a type of nationalism that has promoted China's international status. China is recognized today as a 'rising economic and military power' with, importantly, a set of historically accumulated grievances against the West. Xiao Gongqin's widely held view casts these grievances as a 'profound sense of humiliation' caused by the setbacks and frustrations that the Chinese people have experienced historically. This has 'planted in the Chinese people a certain complex that is accumulated and settled in the deepest recesses of the Chinese mentality'. This complex can be called 'the dream of becoming a strong nation' (cited in Zheng 1999: 74).

This humiliation and the 'dream' were other important aspects of twentieth-century Chinese identity. Some Chinese intellectuals perceived China had fallen from greatness to backwardness at least partially because of weaknesses in the national character. The broad popularity of Lu Hsun's *The True Story of Ah Q* (1955) and Bo Yang's *The Ugly Chinaman and the Crisis of Chinese Culture* (1991) resonates clearly with the pessimism and anxiety² among many learned Chinese about the state of their nation.

However, recent triumphs in a number of areas complement China's growing significance in the global economy, and have helped to reverse attitudes to the 'backwardness of Chinese culture'. Beijing's success in winning the bid to stage the 2008 Olympic Games highlights China's propensity as an emerging and confident international player. Gone now is the earlier anxiety about Chinese 'ways' among many Chinese cultural leaders, as evidenced by the wave of Chinese literary and cinematic products capturing both art-house and mainstream audiences around the world. Ben Hillman's Chapter 4 in this volume describes this phenomenon as 'a renewed celebration of Chineseness'. For Hillman, cultural forms of nationalism are benign. They create a sense of community and link the past to the future, providing a sense of direction for the nation as a whole. According to Hillman, the goals of Chinese nationalism now depend increasingly on this direction, as the dream of a socialist utopia has been ended by market reforms. Most Chinese liberals, however, are not so welcoming of cultural nationalism, seeing it as a major obstacle to democracy in China.

Andrew Nathan suggests that the 'generally accepted sense' of a democracy requires the existence of a system for open competitive elections under universal franchise, together with 'the freedoms of organization and speech needed to enable self-generated political groups to compete effectively in these elections' (Nathan 2000: 22). Using this definition, he argues that democracy has never really been tried in China. Pre-1949 attempts at democratization generally lacked universal franchise and effective institutions, and were sabotaged by political instability and corruption. Post-1949 communist governments have also incorporated democratic ideals within

their ideology, but failed to deliver democracy in a practical sense. Mao himself clearly highlighted democratic ideals as the *raison d'être* of the government, which – in theory if not in practice – was to be ‘one that genuinely represents the people’s interests; it is a government that serves the people’ (cited in Hsu 1971: 587). Yet these democratic aspirations devolved into dictatorship over the proletariat under the Leninist leadership of the party. One of Mao’s designated successors, Liu Shaoqi, explained of this political arrangement:

[p]ersonal interests must be subordinated to the Party’s interests, the interests of the local Party organization to those of the entire Party, the interests of the part to those of the whole, and temporary to long-term interests. This is a Marxist-Leninist principle which must be followed by every communist . . . When a Party member’s personal interests are subordinated to those of the Party, they are subordinated to the interests of the emancipation of the class and the nation, and those of communism and social progress . . .

(cited in Hsu 1971: 581–2, 584)

One could argue credibly that tension between democratic ideals and authoritarian party leadership was at the heart of the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). The need to relieve this tension became an important priority for the government of Deng Xiaoping, who liberalized much of the economy and certain aspects of social life. Baogang He has underlined the significance of the Cultural Revolution as a prelude to the democratic movements in contemporary China by comparing this revolution to the religious wars of Europe, which gave birth to increased tolerance in those states after the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 (Baogang He 1996: 1).

The reforms that Deng introduced from 1978 sought to counter the social aberrations of the Cultural Revolution. However, reforms can be a double-edged sword. Political and economic liberalization gained for the CCP government the needed legitimacy that drained severely during the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution. Yet this liberalization has also unleashed powerful forces that many argue will in the end pull the Chinese Communist Party from government. The Party leadership has treated democratic movements in 1978, 1987 and 1989 with varying degrees of severity, and all three incidences indicate that the Party is not as ripe for democratic change from below as it is for redevelopment of nationalist sentiments from above.

A trend towards democratic development appears to parallel the rise of nationalism. This has led to considerable tension, articulated in the late 1980s through debate between liberal Chinese intellectuals and neo-authoritarian factions within the government. Neo-authoritarians claimed that, rather than democratization, China needed recentralization to promote economic reform and build a strong nation. Liberals, on the other hand,

argued that statism and recentralization weakens state power – China needed democratization through political reform. The liberal arguments did not discount the need for a strong state, but argued against nationalism and for democracy as the foundation of the state. Wang Deshang and Li Zehou, two leading liberals, argued that they stood for:

... centralization. The central government must be strong and have great authority. If power is too decentralized and local governments do not follow the mandate from the centre, then a civil war will be inevitable. Without a strong central government to coordinate, regulate, and control diverse local interests, there will be disaster ... Neo-authoritarianism aims to institutionalize centralized power. But China needs to transit to democracy and the rule of law.

(translated and cited in Zheng 1999: 151)

After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, where the authorities cracked down heavily on civilian demonstrators, participants in the debates on democracy tended to divide between liberals and nationalists instead of liberals and neo-authoritarians. As Guo Yingjie points out in Chapter 2, what is so striking about their views is that ‘they regard liberalism or nationalism, rather than authoritarianism, as the main obstacle to democratization’. Guo’s chapter and Chapter 3 by Mobo Gao explore the current debate between the liberals/New Right and nationalists/New Left in the print media and Internet over democracy and other socio-political and cultural issues. Guo, focusing on debate in print media, argues that the positions of both camps on democracy and national identity are closer to each other than they seem. The disputes over nationalism versus democracy and national identity versus freedom ‘are probably easier to reconcile than the more emotional disputes over attitudes towards the Chinese Party-State and the US’. Guo holds that these concepts are not mutually exclusive and believes that it is unfortunate that most liberals and nationalists are ‘still guided by the age-old Chinese adage “no deconstruction, no construction”’, which makes reconciliation between them difficult. For Guo, liberals and nationalists should recognize ‘that the construction of a democratic future for China does not require deconstruction of all that is now seen to be undemocratic in China’s past or present’.

Gao, on the other hand, sees irreconcilable differences between the two camps in his analysis of debates through the Internet. Gao sees that the future modernization of China is at stake here, with attitudes of the liberals and nationalists towards the US closely aligned with their preferred models of modernization. That China should modernize is not in dispute; the problem is rather which modernization path China should take, given rapid changes from globalization. While Guo is ambivalent about where his sympathies lie, Gao clearly sympathizes with the New Left. Gao notes the liberals’ preference for transforming China with Western Enlightenment

and humanist rationality, but he questions how the liberals can rightly ignore or reject the New Left argument that the very structure of Western rationality has racist and imperialist implications.

Nationalism and international relations

Whether and how to engage or contain China has become one of the key foreign policy issues for many nations in the West. Many in the US have embraced the 'China threat' thesis, adopting a seemingly anti-China attitude that often finds expression in reports such as that to the US Congress, produced by the China Security Review Commission (CSRC 2002), and articles in the print media. Charles Krauthammer's declaration in *Time* magazine (well circulated in Chinese intellectual circles) of the need for 'us' to 'contain' China is a prime example. China, he argues, is:

an expanding power that will ruthlessly act to preserve its dictatorship. The US needs to apply pressure now that will contain China and promote democracy there. Though diplomats cannot come out and say it, this means undermining the authoritarian regime.

(Krauthammer 1995: 72)

Similarly, David Shambaugh (1999) highlighted the dangers of Chinese nationalism in his article, 'Insecure China is stoking xenophobic nationalism', in the *International Herald Tribune*. Shambaugh claimed 'A succession of Chinese Governments has periodically stoked [xenophobia] for their own purposes – from the boxer rebellion at the turn of the century to Chiang Kai-shek's neofascist manifesto in the 1930s, to Mao's Cultural Revolution'.

'Containing China' and Chinese nationalism are hot topics not only in academic and political print media but also in such popular media as the Internet. We want to be careful here not to reduce these sorts of critical comments simply to anti-China stances; one must always take care not to accept statements in international politics at their face value. Yet we must point out here that many nationalist writers in China have construed these comments as anti-China. Many Chinese elites and intellectuals have interpreted these discussions as 'the West' denying 'China' fair treatment. Much of the new nationalism may well be a direct result of these seemingly anti-China attitudes and many Chinese themselves have developed strong feelings about American attitudes to China. While the 1980s saw growing Chinese respect for the West and things Western, since 1989 there have been signs of growing disenchantment with the West, particularly the US. Significantly, Chinese have noticed that the post-1989 transformation of Russia and its previous satellite states of Eastern Europe to liberal/capitalist states has not lived up to the expectations of many, if

not most, of their peoples, despite promises of better living standards and democracy.

Wang Hui from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences claims that Samuel Huntington's polemical work on the clash of civilizations has led Chinese intellectuals to believe that they are alien to Western cultures (cited in Zheng 1999: 19). In the light of human-rights demands and calls for liberalization inside China, the clash of civilizations thesis has inspired some Chinese intellectuals to take on defence of Confucian civilization as their mission. There is now, as Gao has argued forcefully in his chapter in this book, a general uneasiness in China about some beliefs and value systems that are dominant in the West, and their suitability for post-communist states, particularly China. This uneasiness forms an influential component of contemporary Chinese nationalism.

Three issues in particular have sharpened and refocused these aspects of Chinese nationalism, not only for the elites but also the masses. The first was the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 8 May 1999, which aroused a huge wave of anti-American sentiment nationwide in China. Ironically, Chinese are likely to regale Westerners with this information in a McDonalds, sipping a Coke or over a Budweiser, while wearing jeans designed in the US or Europe. Perhaps more ironically, this anti-American sentiment at the heart of the new nationalism is much stronger among the young, who are more likely to frequent McDonalds or Pizza Hut. The US still remains the number one destination for Chinese students studying overseas. Holland (1999) tries to explain this as the individual American remaining popular in China, despite a strong distrust of the invisible American. Holland cites a 30-year-old insurance salesman sitting in McDonalds during the demonstrations following the Belgrade embassy bombing, who claimed, 'I cannot accept the US attack on China's sovereignty and we must stand up to that, but this is lunch' (Holland 1999: 13). There are of course more radical emotions and actions, such as parading placards in the Guangzhou demonstrations in May 1999 stating: 'I'd rather die of thirst than drink Coca-Cola; I'd rather starve to death than eat McDonalds' (cited in Hooper 2000: 439).

The second key event was the collision between a Chinese fighter plane and a US spy plane on 1 April 2001, forcing the spy plane to land on Hainan Island and killing the Chinese pilot. While it seems the US plane was in international airspace, the incident brought home to the Chinese people that the US views China as a sufficient threat to warrant close surveillance. As with the Belgrade embassy bombing, Internet chat rooms reflected considerable indignation over the issue. It is likely that the sardonic letter below, which was circulated widely on the Internet, reflects the feelings of many ordinary Chinese who, after the embassy incident, were extremely sensitive about China's treatment in the international arena.

Dear American:

My name is U. Sam. Here was what happened last weekend. I drove a van circling around your house, took pictures of your backyard, recorded your bedroom conversation with your wife with high-tech devices. I admit I did that routinely. But, I drove on a PUBLIC road. When your kid came out biking, I hit and killed him. I swear, it was an accident. Then, my van was landed on your backyard. So, you should send my van, my equipment and my friends on board back to me immediately, otherwise, the relationship between your family and my family could be damaged. By the way, I have no intention to apologize because I did nothing wrong. It happened on a PUBLIC road.

Uncle Sam (personal communication)

The third and most important issue is Taiwan. Anxiety over the growing push for independence in Taiwan is building not only among Mainland leaders; a considerable number of Mainland citizens themselves feel passionately that Taiwan is part of the Chinese nation. Yet support for independence inside Taiwan is also strong. Lee Teng-hui was the first Taiwanese president to openly canvass the idea of a fully independent and sovereign Taiwan. He found considerable support among the youth of Taiwan who had never known a home on the Mainland. Nothing has inflamed the situation in Mainland eyes more than Lee's 1995 visit to his Alma Mater, Cornell University, in the US. Taiwan's various attempts to gain a seat in the United Nations, and other attempts to gain recognition as an independent state, have continued to aggravate the Chinese government.

Just before the Taiwanese elections in 1996, cross-Strait tension had escalated such that the Chinese government felt the need to hold aggressive naval manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait to show its intransigence. Clearly the growing movement for independence in Taiwan is a crucial issue for Chinese nationalists on the Mainland. For Mainland nationalists, it is imperative that Taiwan be included in a truly integrated Chinese nation. Internet chat rooms in China have revealed quite hardline attitudes to the Taiwan issue. Wang Jisi, Director of the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Science, suggests that generally Internet users believe that the Mainland government has been too soft on Taiwan (Wang 2001: 24).

Ben Hillman's Chapter 4 in this book examines articles in *Renmin ribao* (RMRB), the Mainland's official party newspaper, to analyse how nationalism was conveyed in that paper in response to the US bombing of China's Belgrade embassy. Hillman found that China's official media displayed a calculated degree of restraint in its coverage of this incident, proving that China's leaders were in 'supreme command over the nationalist rhetoric'. Here was a calculated show of anger against the bombing that recognized and used the opportunity to advocate what Hillman considers to be

the positive aspects of Chinese nationalism – nation-building and cultural pride. Hillman cautions, however, that the negative aspect of Chinese nationalism – the idea of China as a victim of past injustices inflicted by the West – is always lurking beside the positive aspects of Chinese nationalism, and China's leaders have to continually manage prudently its popular expression.

Joseph Cheng and Kinglun Ngok argue in Chapter 5 on Chinese nationalism and Sino-US relations that China's leaders are rational actors. The way in which these leaders responded to the embassy bombing and spy-plane incidents shows that they are aware of China's weaknesses and recognize the limitations of using nationalism to manage foreign affairs. Cheng and Ngok see that China's leaders use nationalism mainly for domestic purposes – to preserve political stability and achieve national unity. However, Cheng and Ngok recognize that the leaders' goal of national integration inevitably will involve disagreements with the US over Taiwan, an exception in foreign affairs where nationalism will feature powerfully. Nevertheless, the CCP recognizes that the legitimacy of its rule depends ultimately on its ability to improve the living standards of China's people and the Party will evaluate China's relations with the US in this light (Lampton 2001: 299). Cheng and Ngok claim that this will ensure that the CCP exercises extreme caution in exploiting nationalism, even for the very worthy goal of national unity.

An important aspect of Chinese nationalism that foreign observers have emphasized is contemporary Chinese governments' use of nationalism to gain legitimacy in the face of the decline of ideology. Yet this move is only part of a larger story. An understanding of Chinese nationalism that focuses totally on state-led nationalism ignores the new nationalism, which is often expressed spontaneously and is now seen in extra-bureaucratic and private sectors. The narrower perspective reduces nationalism to a mere instrument of government propaganda, which is simply not the case.

In a discussion in 2000 on Chinese nationalism, Michael Yahuda compares *minzu zhuyi* (nationalism) with *aiguozhuyi* that translates as 'love-state-ism'. Yahuda argues that the CCP leadership encourages *aiguo zhuyi*, which highlights the role of the state – meaning the national leadership and the CCP – not only because the leadership 'can use it to demand loyalty to the person, but also because the leaders themselves determine [the state's] whole character' (Yahuda 2000: 33–4). Yahuda's claim may have some explanatory power. Yet it is surely the case that many Chinese can differentiate between their love of country and their feeling towards the state. The many spontaneous expressions of indignation at the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the US spy-plane incidents from ordinary Chinese people are clear examples of non-state-sponsored nationalism. Within hours of the Chinese people learning of the two incidents, fervently nationalist discussions, many patently anti-American, raged through the Internet inside China. People outside China received emails from China

reflecting a strong nationalist and even vitriolic response, and there was simply no way that the government could have mobilized such feeling in such a short time.

Taiwanese nationalism

Gellner's definition of nationalism as the desire to make the state, the nation and patriotism congruent has serious implications for the issues and relationships examined in this volume (Gellner 1983: 43). In the Taiwan case we need to question which state, which nation and whose patriotism. Mainland Chinese patriots vehemently support the inclusion of Taiwan in the People's Republic of China (PRC), while Taiwanese patriots want an independent Taiwan.

C.L. Chiou and Chia-lung Lin in Chapters 6 and 7 in this book put the case strongly for an independent Taiwan. Chiou points out that before the 28 February 1947 uprising against Nationalist rule on Taiwan, there was no Taiwanese nationalist consciousness. Taiwanese nationalism is based neither on ethnicity nor culture since most Taiwanese are Han. Chiou argues that Taiwanese nationalism arose from the movement of the then Taiwanese political opposition against the Nationalist government for democratic rights, which later developed into a political struggle by the Nationalist's opponents to gain self-determination and independence from their ancestral home country. Chiou argues that this nationalism is neither anti-Confucian nor anti-Han, but anti-authoritarian, anti-communist and anti-Chinese-irredentist. For Chiou, this nationalism is the result of nation-building and political modernization. As Ernest Gellner claimed, it is 'not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist'; it 'engenders nations, and not the other way around'.

In Chapter 7 Lin uses surveys carried out by himself and others in Taiwan, to examine Taiwanese identity. Lin believes that national identity is a social and political construct and like Chiou believes that Taiwanese nationalism grew out of the then Taiwanese opposition struggle against the Nationalists for democratic rights. In Lin's view, the emerging Taiwanese national identity is the result of pull and push factors. Democratization in Taiwan pulled people together, creating a collective loyalty to the political system through their political participation. The push factor is the CCP's opposition to Taiwan's transition to a democracy.

Chiou's and Lin's description of Taiwanese nationalism thus fits with what Ben Anderson categorizes as creole nationalism, a nationalism that 'was pioneered by settler populations from the Old Country, who shared religion, language and customs with the metropole but increasingly felt oppressed by and alienated from it' (Anderson 2001: 33). Therefore while Chiou and Lin may accept the view that it is difficult to conceive of nationalism without some reference to a 'shared culture and ethnic

community' (Smith 2000: 17), they believe it is an insufficient condition for nationalism.

Democracy and national integration

'The Taiwan issue' is highly complex, with arguments on both sides of the Strait that require serious examination. The questions of which state, which nation, and whose patriotism have serious implications for multi-ethnic nations like China. Consequently, nation building has been an important aspect of Chinese governance throughout the twentieth century. Chinese minority groups are very diverse and the levels to which these groups have been integrated into the Chinese nation have varied considerably. A number of groups are ethnically quite distinct from the Han, while others are quite similar. A number of these groups occupy strategically important regions that are close to the nation's borders, often with considerable relations with their brethren across that border (Mackerras 1994: 4). The PRC has made considerable concessions to its national minorities through social and economic policy, but there are still acute tensions between the central government and a number of groups. Separatist sentiments are held by a number of ethnic minorities in Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia, where local customs and religions bear a heavy and direct influence on the political cultures of these regions. This situation has led Allan Liu to argue that the minorities 'will remain the most alienated political culture(s) in China' (Liu 2001: 265).

The difficulty of integrating the various nationalities in China is examined by Colin Mackerras in Chapter 8, 'China's minorities and national integration'. Mackerras concludes that 'China has "integrated" its minority nationalities well enough to function as an effective nation-state', and he does not believe that any attempt through the use of force by Tibet and Xinjiang to secede from the PRC will be likely to succeed within the next five to ten years. He gives this assessment cognizant that since 1987, opposition to the state in places like Xinjiang has increased. His assessment is that outside factors may be more decisive than domestic factors in influencing China's national integration, and military conflict over Taiwan is far more likely than conflict over nationality issues on the Mainland.

Separatist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet, and the independence movement in Taiwan, highlight the tenuous nature of the Chinese nation. This tenuous nature has led a number of scholars to suggest that China is 'a state looking for a nation'. Underlining this state action is an anxiety inspired by the rather tragic dismantling of the Soviet Union. The crucial issue here is how best to 'control diverse local interests' – with a more authoritarian government, or a more democratic one? It is particularly compelling to answer accurately when we recognize that the centrifugal forces that increased liberalization inside China, particularly in the border regions, may ignite into fully blown separatism.

This acute tension is a crucial issue for Chinese democracy and Chinese nationalism to face. Ethnic separatism has been a significant and tragic force in Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans and Chechnya. The Chinese government is extremely anxious about the dangers of disintegration of the PRC. Yet there seems to be silence on this in the English language literature on democracy in China. Andrew Nathan's otherwise excellent and seminal book on Chinese democracy (Nathan 1985) does not mention nationalism in the index and really does not engage democracy with the question of national integration, despite some inextricable linkages. Ding Yijing's *Chinese Democracy after Tiananmen* (2001) also fails to engage explicitly with this issue.

The relationship between democratization and national integration is complex. In an early but important article, Dankwart Rustow argued that, for democracy to emerge there must already be a strong sense of community that is preferably 'taken for granted . . . [and] is above mere opinion and mere agreement' (Rustow 1970: 363). His model of the transition to democracy presents three broad assertions. First, it argues that elements such as national unity, entrenched competition and the acceptance of democratic rules are 'indispensable to the genesis of democracy'. Second, and particularly important for our argument here, he asserts strongly that these elements must be assembled one by one because they have their own logic and their own protagonists and as such may be incompatible with each other. And finally, a 'small circle of political leaders skilled at negotiation and compromise' is needed to formulate democratic rules. The crucial issue is the prerequisite sense of 'national unity', which acts to ensure that competition between groups will not be divisive for the entire nation. Citizens in a 'democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong' (Rustow 1970: 363). Primarily, this is because democracy needs conflict, especially in the modern liberal sense, where democracy is seen as a system of rule by temporary majorities that have to compete for popular mandate at regular intervals. So that those who are ruled can change their rulers and policies, the nation's sovereign boundaries must endure and the composition of the citizenry must remain consistent.

In Chapter 9, Baogang He's argument that democratization threatens the existence of the Chinese nation state finds resonance with Dankwart's axiom 'unity before democracy'. China as a multi-ethnic country with a history of empire poses an extraordinary challenge to China's leaders who attempt to keep the country together. He explains that this is why China's leaders, post-Deng Xiaoping, have continued to stress national integration and strengthening national identity to maintain national unity while delaying full-scale democratization.

In Chapter 10 on 'reaching out' to Taiwan and 'keeping in' Xinjiang, Leong Liew introduces marketization and globalization into Rustow's conceptualization of the relationship between national integration and

democracy. Liew argues that marketization and globalization serve to integrate the economies of the PRC and Taiwan. This integration does not guarantee reunification of the two political entities, but at least advances the cause of reunification. Here marketization and globalization serve as a means by which the Mainland ‘reaches out’. For Xinjiang, however, marketization is a means by which the state helps to ‘keep in’ this province with separatist leanings, and here the PRC is not as successful. Marketization has improved living standards in Xinjiang, but it has also exacerbated economic differences between this poor northwestern province and the rich coastal and southern provinces. Xinjiang’s poor factor endowments and remote location help to prevent it flourishing in a market economy without state intervention. The central government has made massive investments in this province in response to growing regional income inequality in the wake of marketization and Muslim separatism in Xinjiang. Yet these investments are exacerbating ethnic–Han tensions in the province. Moreover, while marketization is integrating Xinjiang’s economy more closely with other provinces in China, globalization is nudging Xinjiang’s economy and society closer to Central Asia. This latter development advances the cause of ethnic rather than national identification. Hence, applying Rustow’s logic of a sense of community as prerequisite for democracy, marketization and globalization have mixed consequences for national integration and national identity, and thus for the prospects of democratization. By more closely integrating Taiwan with China, these forces promote democratization, but by encouraging ethnic identification in Xinjiang, these forces weaken democratization.

Institutions promoting national integration

In recent years, the Chinese government has made enormous efforts through economic and social policies to integrate minority areas into China. In 2000 the central government unveiled an ambitious plan to develop the poorer western part of the country, where many ethnic minorities reside. In Chapter 11, Shaoguang Wang explores the price of attempts at national integration through the fiscal system. In theory, central transfers should be designed primarily to equalize the distribution of fiscal resources and/or outcomes among administrative units. But in practice, many other factors, including political interests, also shape the allocation process. Wang concludes that the driving force behind intergovernmental fiscal transfers in China is the overriding concern of Chinese political elites at the centre to maintain national unity. Wang found that provinces with predominantly non-Han populations have been given the highest levels of subsidies, even though their income levels often exceed those of poorer provinces.

The fiscal health of the state has a direct bearing on national unity and therefore on potential prospects for democracy. A fiscally strong state that can afford to effectively use ‘the carrot’ to ameliorate poor living standards

in minority and other areas will see less of a need to use ‘the stick’ punitively to maintain unity and social stability. However, as Liew highlighted in his discussion of the situation in Xinjiang, fiscal transfers and investment flows from the centre to minority areas may prove counterproductive in promoting national unity if they are used in ways that do not improve the living standards of national minorities and/or if they encourage national minorities to interact economically more with their ethnic brethren outside China than with their fellow PRC citizens.

Finally, an important institution that promotes national integration in China is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In this book’s final chapter, Ji You discusses the influence of nationalism on China’s defence culture and the role of the PLA in promoting nationalism. He argues that the PLA, following the CCP, has been de-ideologized. The PLA has been made the guardian of national interest rather than a revolutionary tool that serves the interest of the working class. Its current generation of officer corps is better educated and ‘more and more professionalized’ compared to the previous generation. PLA officers are nationalists who favour China’s modernization, but they reject its wholesale Westernization. They regard themselves as guardians of China’s sovereignty. They protect China’s territorial integrity and are highly committed to reunification with Taiwan.

Concluding remarks

The essays in this volume reveal in different ways how complex and intertwined are the issues of nationalism, democracy and national integration. These essays will no doubt provoke several major questions in the minds of readers. They serve to suggest ‘a chicken/egg’ type of questioning about the symbiosis between democracy and national unity. A central question for Chinese democrats is: has China really achieved the degree of national unity that Rustrow argues is required before democratization? To Chinese nationalists, the key question is almost the reverse: whether the current lack of democracy in China is stifling efforts at promoting national unity? On the issue of the nexus between globalization and nationalism, the central question for Chinese leaders is: will nationalism help the Chinese to globalize successfully and promote national integration, or will globalization divide China? The role of culture in national integration is similarly an intriguing question. Are Ben Anderson, and in this volume Chiou and Lin, right to assert that sharing a common culture is an insufficient condition for Taiwan to embrace Chinese national identity? And if Anthony Smith is right that a common culture is most likely to be a necessary condition for nationalism, does this mean that the goal of integrating minority areas like Tibet and Xinjiang into the PRC is incompatible with democratization? Finally, and of particular interest to the international community, is the issue of how Chinese nationalism is expressed to the