Classic Adelphi Papers

# The Evolution of Strategic Thought

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

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Alastair Buchan, the first director (1958–69) of the
Institute for Strategic Studies

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# The Evolution of Strategic Thought

## Classic Adelphi Papers

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# Introduction

For half a century, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has helped to define the field of global security and strategic studies through a series of influential monographs called the Adelphi Papers, which have appeared on an average of eight times per year since the early 1960s. The IISS – or the ISS, as it was known during its first decade, before it added another 'I' to reflect its international nature – inaugurated what would become a staple of strategic studies: carefully researched, scholarly studies which today fill the pigeonholes, inboxes and bookshelves of professors, journalists, *éminences grises* and policymakers around the world.

The meaning behind the name of the series remains something of a mystery. The Institute's original quarters at 18 Adam Street were located in an area of central London known as Adelphi (from *adelphoi*, Greek for 'brothers'), so named because buildings in the area had been developed by four brothers – James, John, Robert and William Adam. But the series title may also have been chosen for a less immediately obvious reason. In contrast to the obscurity of 'Adelphi', the title of the Institute's journal, *Survival*, was an overt – and apocalyptic – reference to the issue that had catalysed the organisation into existence: the fear that mounting Soviet military power might provoke nuclear war. Both publications were intended to widen the circle of well-informed men and women who might be in a position to make intelligent policy in the parlous Cold War era. Thus it might be supposed that the name 'Adelphi' was chosen to suggest the need to create a transatlantic, and eventually a global, fraternity or network of knowledgeable and influential thinkers to help preserve peace and security.

A single volume – even one as generously thick as the present one – cannot possibly do justice to the depth of insight contained in and breadth of issues covered by nearly 400 monographs published over five decades. In selecting chapters for this book, I have been forced to thrust aside papers that were hugely influential at the time of writing, produced by scholars who achieved (and, in many cases, are still achieving) well-deserved accolades for their research. All the same, this necessarily subjective, even idiosyncratic, selection offers a splendid promenade down 50 years of strategic thought from the middle of the twentieth century to the present. While some of the chapters in

this volume illustrate the limits of what can be understood and foreseen at any given time (it is worth bearing in mind that the typical Adelphi Paper is written to remain current for about five years), others show impressive prescience, and all shed some kind of light on contemporary security challenges.

The book is partly inspired by the example of an edited volume that stimulated a generation of strategists, compiled during the Second World War by Edward Mead Earle, Princeton professor and pioneer of the American school of strategic studies, with the intention of providing Americans with an introduction to *The Makers of Modern Strategy*. Professor Sir Michael Howard, a founder and president emeritus of the IISS, upon becoming a professor at King's College, London in the 1950s, reflected on the importance and the uniqueness of that volume: 'Gradually it became clear what a huge and fertile field I had been set to cultivate and how very little had as yet been tilled.'[1]

The field of strategic studies was flourishing in the United States at this time; indeed the 1950s would be remembered as 'the golden age of strategy'.[2] Michael Howard recalls the challenge of establishing the ISS in the United Kingdom in this period:

> A flood of literature had been pouring out of the USA . . . by writers such as [Bernard] Brodie . . . Herman Kahn, William Kaufmann, Henry Kissinger, Klaus Knorr, Oskar Morgenstern, Paul Nitze, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, Jacob Viner and Albert Wohlstetter. We saw one of our first tasks at the ISS as being to familiarise ourselves and our members with what these pundits were thinking.[3]

The Institute's first director, Alastair Buchan, persuaded leading thinkers to participate in a conference at Oxford in the summer of 1959 to aid this process.

Buchan was a shrewd choice to head the new European-based think tank. Born in 1918, he was no stranger to the tragedy of war, which no doubt influenced his thinking on matters of militaries and defence. Alastair Francis Buchan was the son of John Buchan, first Baron Tweedsmuir of Elsfield, Scottish historian, governor general of Canada, commander-in-chief of the Dominion of Canada, from 1915 a war correspondent for *The Times*, and author of *The Thirty-Nine Steps*, among over a hundred books. Alastair's paternal uncle and namesake was killed in action in the First World War in 1917 leading the Royal Scots Fusiliers.

Buchan, a lifelong committed Atlanticist,[4] soon built a reputation of his own as a gifted journalist. From 1948 to 1951 he was assistant editor of the *Economist*,[5] then from 1951 to 1955 the Washington correspondent of the *Observer*. After returning to London, he served as the *Observer's* diplomatic and defence correspondent until 1958. In that year, Buchan won the first Atlantic Community Award for the best journalistic appraisal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). He went on to serve as director of the ISS for nearly 12 years, leaving to become commandant of the Royal College of

Defence Studies, London, and then Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford, a post he held until his death in February 1976. Long after he had left the Institute, Professor Buchan would relish inviting his best students to join the IISS.

This accomplished man from a remarkable family restricted himself to the humble role of rapporteur at the Institute's first conference in 1959. But his notes and musings on the event were to be thoroughly ventilated: his report of the conference was to be the Institute's first publication, a book entitled *NATO in the 1960s*, and many of its ideas were echoed in the Institute's 1961 inaugural Adelphi Paper, *The Evolution of NATO*, incorporated in this anthology.

The original monograph was as modest as the musty, Dickensian Adam Street office itself, typed in plain text on plain parchment with numbered, rather than titled sections. Members of the Institute received the paper for free, with additional copies made available at a cost of five shillings, or 80 cents, per copy. The content, equally unadorned, set a standard for coherent strategic analysis at a time when there was a growing need for informed assessments that reached beyond the daily headlines. Although the author claimed Adelphi Paper 1 was 'concerned primarily with the central machinery and institutions of NATO', it in fact captured far more important verities about alliances and transatlantic relations. Above all else, Buchan grasped the overriding necessity of East–West strategic nuclear parity. His insights were no doubt aided by the illustrious cast of scholars and practitioners who reviewed the paper, including Albert Wohlstetter, Michael Howard, Sir John Slessor, Sir Anthony Buzzard, Raymond Aron and Helmut Schmidt.

Alastair Buchan's Atlanticism earned him trust on both sides of the ocean. He was appreciated in the United States because he articulated a rationale for NATO and called on Europeans to shoulder greater burdens and responsibilities, both individually and collectively. He underlined the need for a recovering Europe to spend more on conventional arms and to establish a European nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Buchan represented British and European interests. He recognised that only properly informed and engaged European elites could steer an abruptly ascendant American superpower away from the precipice of nuclear war. Alastair Buchan was, like his father, a fine writer, but his scholarly task was a difficult one, and it had the urgency of being undertaken against the backdrop of the Berlin Crisis – not the easiest climate in which to convince a broad network of people to be reflective and take a strategic and long-term view. But despite these difficulties, Buchan managed nevertheless to communicate a persuasive vision.

Adelphi Paper 1 picked up where *NATO in the 1960s* left off, with an appreciation of the fact that any large multilateral institution, and especially an alliance of democracies, was bound to face difficulties 'for the simple reason that it is much harder to initiate and pursue a constructive debate between sovereign nations than within them'.[6] NATO has always had its critics and those who question its relevance. Though Buchan genuinely believed in the

value of the Alliance, he never flinched from airing opposing points of view. He realised that, to some, 'the organisation creates a distasteful image of a largely military organisation of severely limited usefulness, membership of which tends to embarrass the more liberal Atlantic powers in their relations with the uncommitted world'.[7] But Buchan was convinced that the world, lacking a supranational enforcement agency, needed the Atlantic alliance to build durable and practical institutions to withstand muscular Soviet coercion in Europe and the centrifugal forces of decolonisation, or what he called 'disimperialism'.[8]

As with so many Adelphi Papers that would follow, the Institute's first paper seemed to anticipate the future, arguably even presaging the Cuban missile crisis the following year: 'the alliance is going to have to withstand severe pressures in the years immediately ahead, even if it does not actually have to fight a war'.[9] If NATO were to withstand future crises, it was vital that the machinery of the Alliance be built on shared aims and common liberal Western values. Buchan observed that the Kennedy administration wanted Allies to contribute more to 'upholding the free world'. This contribution, Buchan noted, would have material, military and human aspects. In addition, it also had:

> a moral aspect, the development of a sense of common identity between American policy and [that] of her leading European allies, so that the diplomatic and political onus of confronting the Soviet bloc or representing the interests of the free world is not born solely by the United States.[10]

Contemporary arguments that America concentrates too much on hard power, and leaves Europe to be a normative superpower focused on the rule of law, illustrate the enduring relevance of Buchan's concerns about the common values and objectives of the transatlantic alliance.

For Buchan, the fact that US–Soviet nuclear parity made nuclear war unwinnable meant that changes needed to be made to the Alliance's strategic calculus. He found particularly myopic the mid 1950s US policy of placing a decisive emphasis on firepower over manpower, and persuading NATO Allies to rely on low-yield nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles to defend Europe. He argued that to prevent fatal mistakes, and to reverse the trend towards the proliferation of battlefield and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance would need to be buttressed. It was necessary not only for Europe to counter Soviet power, but also to create a counterweight to American power. For if the United States exercised all of the power at its disposal, 'she [ran] two grave risks. The first [was] incurring the concealed resentment of European governments and public opinion . . . Second, [the US exercising all of its power] multiplies the effect of mistakes in American policy and increases the difficulty of correcting them.'[11] Something like the first problem can be seen coming to pass in recent

episodes such as the divisions over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The second is a succinct explanation of why a powerful Cold War America was such a double-edged sword for its European allies: American military might, which could deter conflict, was also capable of precipitating it.

In this first paper, Buchan also lays out a *raison d'être* for the Institute and the Adelphi Papers, making the case that Europe can and should use the 'force of ideas', not only 'the idea of forces' – although he thought more forces could be useful, too. Europeans, he wrote, 'could make a vital contribution in the realm of ideas, but only if they were adequately informed'. Buchan worried that Washington had been 'largely tone deaf to the views of its allies during the mid-fifties' and he wondered whether 'the fact that the worst mistakes in American strategic policy – the decision to over-emphasise nuclear firepower, to distribute low-yield weapons to the allies, to continue primary reliance on the manned bomber – were made during that period, was not perhaps mere chance'.[12]

Buchan's legacy endures in his contribution to effective institutions aimed at keeping the peace. After his death, the IISS established a lecture in his name, to be given annually by a distinguished statesman or intellectual. In the 2005 lecture, given by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, Buchan was praised for using such institutions to educate and engage the public and civil society in the critical issues of security, including proliferation.

Buchan's contributions to NATO itself were also noteworthy. He hewed to the conviction that alliances were means to larger ends; helping to define NATO's common ends so that the Atlantic community might cohere for the purpose of providing 'a better system of security and stability' he viewed as his lifelong challenge. As Henry Kissinger observed in the first Alastair Buchan Lecture in 1976, Buchan was a champion of the importance of what he saw as the inevitable bond between North America and Europe. 'Beneath the sceptical air', said the US secretary of state, 'was a passionate commitment to the values and traditions we cherish as Western civilisation.' Buchan's focus, added Kissinger, 'was not simply the structure of global politics and the roots of war; it was the central role of the West in preserving peace and giving it moral purpose. This Institute is a monument to his quest.'[13]

In June 1965, the Institute published, at nine pages, the shortest paper in the Adelphi series. Future Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling produced the pithy essay, entitled *Controlled Response and Strategic Warfare*, having spent the first half of 1965 in residence at the Institute as a visiting research associate. The then professor of economics at Harvard University had already published a widely acclaimed volume, *The Strategy of Conflict*, as well as another valuable study, *Strategy and Arms Control*, which he co-authored with fellow Adelphi Paper author[14] and future US government official, Morton Halperin.

In the late 1950s, Schelling had worked on game theory, particularly in relation to nuclear weapons and deterrence. In 1958, he came with his family

to London, where he met influential scholars and former military officers interested in theories of deterrence and limited war. One of those influential men was Alastair Buchan, who was in the early years of establishing the Institute and who invited Schelling to spend time there to think and write.

Schelling's Adelphi Paper reflected on the cardinal security issue occupying Washington at the time. American presidents, first John F. Kennedy and then Lyndon Johnson, favoured responding to a number of military contingencies with flexible or 'controlled' options over employing an 'all-or-none' approach. Schelling observed that this was nothing new – in 1957, British politician and IISS founding council member Denis Healey had been among those advocating 'graduated deterrence', a sequence of threatened responses to aggression that was 'everything that "massive retaliation" was not'. The rationale of a flexible response policy was that it avoided reliance on military responses 'too big to be credible or too big to be wise'. In the context of 'general war', a showdown between the US and the Soviet Union, however, Schelling observed, the notion of graduated deterrence raised profound questions about 'the character of war itself':[15] *Could* escalation in fact be limited in conflicts between nuclear powers? Was war in the nuclear age even winnable?

US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had introduced the idea of a 'controlled nuclear war' doctrine in a speech in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in June 1962. He had proposed that, even in 'general war', destruction should not be unconfined, but instead deterrence should continue, discrimination should be attempted and options should be kept open. 'We usually think of deterrence as having failed if a major war ever occurs. And so it has', Schelling wrote, 'but it could fail worse if no effort were made to extend deterrence into war itself.'[16]

For an economist, Schelling had a keen appreciation for history. The son of a naval officer, he referred the new thinking on controlled responses and nuclear 'hostage-taking' back to Thucydides's account of the tactics of King Archidamus of Sparta. In his paper, he quotes the king speaking in Thucydides:

> When they see our actual strength . . . they will be more inclined to give way, since their land will still be untouched and, in making up their minds, they will be thinking of advantages which they still possess and which have not yet been destroyed. For you must think of their land as though it was a hostage in your possession.[17]

While acknowledging that the issue warranted further study, Schelling underscored the problematic nature of 'counter-value' or 'counter-city' strategic targeting, as opposed to counterforce targeting of military installations:

> One might pretend, in order to make war as fearsome as possible, that the obvious way to fight a war if we cannot successfully destroy military

> forces is to destroy the enemy's cities, while he does the same to us with the weapons that we are powerless to stop. But, once the war started, that would be a witless way to behave, about as astute as head-on collision to preserve the right of way.[18]

Always one to use evocative analogies to elucidate complex strategic concepts, Schelling explains the concept of nuclear escalation in terms of kidnapping:

> If I [waylay] your children after school, and you kidnap mine, and each of us intends to use his hostages to guarantee the safety of his own children and possibly to settle some other disputes as well, there is no straightforward analysis that tells us what form the bargaining takes, which children in our respective possessions get hurt, who expects the other to yield – and how it all comes out.[19]

After spending a year at RAND in California, Schelling settled at Harvard, dividing his time between the economics department and the Center for International Affairs. One of the ideas he formulated while at Harvard, the notion that, in the absence of communication with others, a person will tend to make a choice on the basis of their idea of what is obvious or natural, was so influential that it crept into mainstream nuclear policy and doctrine as what is sometimes referred to as the 'Schelling Point'. Schelling was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 for enhancing 'our understanding of conflict and co-operation through game-theory analysis'.

If the first five years of the Institute was focused on coming to terms with strategic nuclear parity, the mid 1960s saw attention turn to the dangers of onward nuclear proliferation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would be signed in 1968, and in the run-up to that cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, the Institute co-sponsored a conference on the issue at the Guild Inn hotel near Toronto from 23–26 June 1966.[20] Three of the most noteworthy speeches – by Sir Solly Zuckerman, Swedish Ambassador Alva Myrdal and Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson – were subsequently published as Adelphi Paper 29, *The Control of Proliferation: Three Views*.

Though he would later become famous for his work on non-proliferation and his contributions as a public servant, Sir Solly Zuckerman began his career as a zoologist at the London Zoological Society in 1928. He had, unusually, distinguished himself as a zoological researcher and professor of anatomy before he entered the debate on nuclear proliferation. During the Second World War, Zuckerman spent time looking at the impact of strategic bombing; it is likely that this work shaped his beliefs on proliferation and the exploitation of peaceful nuclear energy. His experience in the field undoubtedly informed his opposition to the nuclear-arms race, and added authority to his argument that it is important not to deny a peaceful world the benefits of nuclear energy. In 1960, Zuckerman was made chief scientific adviser to the

UK Ministry of Defence, and he subsequently became chief scientific adviser to the British government, a post he held from 1964 to 1971.

As a scientist, Zuckerman focused on the impact of the NPT on the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy – a timely subject in 2008, given the renaissance of interest in nuclear power as a 'green', or at least non-hydrocarbon, source of fuel. He judged that 'the growth of world population means that conventional sources of energy will ultimately become scarce, and correspondingly more expensive than nuclear power'. Furthermore, he believed that it was a lesson of the history of the industrial age 'that no technological "benefit" can ever be stifled'. Developing societies had every right to 'harness technology as the basis of their new industries'. Ensuring security and survival must be coupled with promoting industry and prosperity: 'Whatever steps are taken – in the interests of survival – to inhibit the first [nuclear technology for military purposes] should clearly not shut the door to the second [nuclear technology in a world at peace].'[21]

At the same time, Zuckerman drew attention to 'the risk of opening the door to military exploitation'. Since 1945, a new nuclear power had emerged on average every five years, and proliferation, however gradual, would increasingly necessitate a variety of flexible safeguards; both passive and active restraints. Nuclear weapons were 'a hideous danger for mankind, at the same time as there are endless useful potentialities for nuclear energy in the civil field'.[22] The tensions between the dual uses of nuclear energy meant that trade-offs would be needed. While his colleagues on the dais at the Guild Inn stressed urgency, Zuckerman counselled balance: 'In our efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons, we should not . . . drive ourselves into the paradoxical situation that we deny a peaceful world the benefits of nuclear energy.' Though difficult, taking steps towards both disarmament and the effective monitoring of fissile material was important: 'The smallest steps forward in either field mean progress',[23] he concluded. Zuckerman formally retired as a governmental adviser in 1969, but he remained influential until his death in 1993.

Ambassador Alva Myrdal began her career promoting social welfare in Sweden during the Great Depression. Like Solly Zuckerman, she appears to have moved into the field of security studies in response to the horrendous experience of the Second World War. One of the first women to distinguish herself in international security in the twentieth century, she also helped to establish one of Europe's leading think tanks, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Her Adelphi Paper contribution begins by noting the paradox that, in the mid 1960s, both arms racing and arms control were thriving activities. This, she observed, illustrated the profound challenge of achieving nuclear disarmament. Her realism was passionate: 'The salvation of the world is not anticipated as coming about by some sudden stroke of redemption. It must be achieved, if achieved it can be, by laborious construction, using as foundations the hard facts of the military and political realities as they exist.'[24]

Myrdal sought to look beyond simple treaty-based approaches to arms control. Her thinking had something in common with that of the George W. Bush administration when it created the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the ad hoc global coalition to check proliferation on the high seas. Like the devisers of the PSI, Myrdal favoured an instrumental over a classic approach to arms control: rather than waiting for a non-proliferation regime to work, she championed the wider adoption of the Swedish practice of 'verification by challenge', and was very much taken with the concept of creating regional nuclear-free zones, beginning in Europe.

While optimistic about non-proliferation in the short term, she warned that with China gaining in confidence and strength, and potentially unstable developing countries aligned against the West beginning to acquire nuclear weapons, the long-term challenges to non-proliferation were substantial. Ambassador Myrdal concluded by saying that 'Disarmament is no subject for small-scale accommodation, still less for technical or legalistic gimmicks. Disarmament measures must be as real as are arms and missiles.' In her view, there were two paths humanity could take, and only that of disarmament offered 'the chance to open up a widening path away from the horror world that man is conjuring up for himself'.[25]

Alva Myrdal went on to play a key role in the disarmament debate, winning the Nobel Peace Prize with Alfonso García Robles in 1982, and writing and speaking frequently until her death in 1986.

Lester Pearson, prime minister of Canada from 1963 until 1968, enjoyed a distinguished career in politics and international security that culminated in his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts in defusing the Suez crisis through the United Nations. Widely considered in his home country to be the 'father of the concept of peacekeeping', Pearson played a pivotal role in strengthening both NATO and the United Nations, and in so doing carved out a distinctive niche for Canada in international negotiations as an honest broker adept at finding common ground. His work had a profound impact on Canada's approach to international security. Pearson's own ability to disarm opposing viewpoints could be seen in his Guild Inn speech when he quipped, 'the offensiveness or defensiveness of a weapon depended on whether you were in front of it or behind it'.[26]

His capstone address completes Adelphi Paper 29. His speech, entitled 'The Broader View', is redolent of the contemporary concepts of globalisation and interdependence. In it, Pearson states that nuclear weapons have created a convergence between national and international interests because 'the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons' means that 'it is the common *national* objective of all peoples and governments to remove the possibility that these weapons will ever be used'.[27] He warns that 'a further spread of these weapons . . . left unchecked . . . will one day destroy our civilization'.[28] Like Myrdal, Pearson felt that immediate action was needed.

The field of strategic studies underwent a growth spurt in the 1960s. The rise of the security think tank came about in no small part thanks to

American charitable foundations, the Ford Foundation in particular, which provided generous financial support to several research organisations, including the IISS. New security research institutions that were founded and expanded in this period include the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Institut International d'Etudes Stratégiques in France, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Germany, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Switzerland and the Atlantic Institute in the United States, to name just a few among a burgeoning wave.

If a West–East axis served as the principal analytic model for the IISS in its early years, the Institute also always showed a dedication to understanding military affairs in the round. This was a particular aim of historian Michael Howard, who was instrumental in establishing strategic studies in Britain; helping to create not only the IISS, but also a War Studies Department at King's College, London. Four months after the Third Arab–Israeli War of June 1967, Howard (then working at King's) and Dr Robert Hunter (then lecturer at the London School of Economics and later US Ambassador to NATO) wrote a penetrating analysis that placed that conflict in context.

In Adelphi Paper 41, *Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967*, both authors were at pains to apologise for the paper's alleged shortcomings, in particular regarding documentation and available sources. But they made 'no apology . . . for attempting an interpretive history rather than – if such a thing is ever possible – a dispassionate chronicle'.

They began by observing that there had from the start been indicators that war could break out in Israel–Palestine, but that for some time, the situation had remained uncertain. 'This conflict between Jews – a nation without a State – and Arabs – a nation divided into too many States – was evident to some experts from the beginning', Howard and Hunter wrote. 'But it was slow to acquire international significance.'[29] By the mid 1930s, some two decades after Britain had assured its support for a 'National Home for the Jewish People' in the Balfour Declaration, 'the British had realised the full difficulty of the task they had taken on. Unless there was to be continual warfare in Palestine, the Arabs had somehow to be reconciled to the new arrivals.'[30] Thirty years later, 'the whole Arab world exploded into wrathful activity and the Great Powers suddenly realised that they had on their hands a crisis of major proportions; an imminent conflict between client states to whose survival their own prestige and power were deeply committed.'[31]

The 'central mystery' of the crisis, according to the authors, was what had driven Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to cross obvious red lines by sending forces into the Sinai Peninsula to occupy Sharm el-Sheikh and close the Straits of Tiran in May 1967 as, in his words, an 'affirmation of our rights and our sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba'.[32] Clearly, Israel would react with overwhelming force. 'The knowledge that Israel was likely to take action on

her own unless something was done for her was certainly a major factor in the calculations of Washington and London.' Engulfed in Vietnam, the Pentagon could only look upon another war with 'undiluted dismay'.[33] But the United States felt obligated to defend Israel and thus, on 23 May, President Johnson announced that the straits were international waters and the blockade was illegal.

When Israel mobilised in spite of the intervention, regional opprobrium was unleashed. Many years before the era of Arab satellite television and al-Jazeera, Arab radio stations broadcast 'a stream of hatred, threats, and vilification. One after another the States of the Arab League fell into line and mobilized forces for the explicit purpose of [Israeli troops'] destruction.'[34] An issue of straits became an issue of survival.

If few foresaw the timing of the war, fewer still predicted its rapidity. It began at 7:45 am on Monday 5 June, when the Israeli air force struck Egyptian airfields. Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank in less than a week. The Six-Day War ended on 10 June, but not before killing some 18,000 combatants.

The authors of Adelphi Paper 41 correctly predicted that, for military reasons alone, the Six-Day War would be found worthy of study by military staff colleges. 'Like the campaigns of the younger Napoleon, the performance of the Israeli Defence Force provided a text-book illustration for all the classical Principles of War: speed, surprise, concentration, security, information, the offensive, above all training and morale.'[35]

But beyond military effectiveness, the authors stressed that what was most impressive about the Israeli campaign was the acute political awareness it showed. Israel had 'observed a principle which appears in few military textbooks but which armed forces neglect at their peril: the Clausewitzian principle of Political Context, which the British ignored so disastrously in 1956'. Israeli officials knew that their political environment meant that fighting prolonged beyond a few days would not be tolerated: 'The Israeli High Command . . . worked on the assumption that it would have three days to complete its task before outside pressures compelled a cease-fire.'[36] In the end, it got away with six, but Europeans and Americans had been unhappy when Israel disregarded a UN demand for a ceasefire and launched its offensive against Syria. In the face of international condemnation, Israel knew time was not on its side, and it needed to wrap things up fast.

In the Cold War context, in which every regional war had the potential to escalate into an East–West struggle, Howard and Hunter believed that 'tacit agreement between the super-powers to co-operate in preventing overt conflicts which threaten international peace and security' would be the principal check on unbridled regional wars, keeping conflicts contained and brief as in the case of the Six-Day War. However, neither power would be particularly eager to risk a second conflict to undo the results of any initial war, even in the event that one side had succeeded in its immediate aims. 'The lesson is a

sombre one', they wrote, because, in this situation, 'a premium [is placed] on adventurism and pre-emption.'[37]

Sir Michael Howard has retired from the University of Oxford, where he taught from 1968 to 1987, but he continues to write and lecture. Robert Hunter, who would test his Middle East experience in a variety of future roles, including as special adviser on Lebanon to the Speaker of the US House of Representatives and as a member of the US negotiating team for talks on the West Bank and Gaza, is now a senior adviser at RAND and vice-president of the Atlantic Treaty Association.

In writing on the Six-Day War when they did, Howard and Hunter were providing almost instant analysis. From their vantage point, the impressive speed of the Israeli military victory was one of the war's most striking features. Perhaps this rapid victory, rather than the prospect of enduring Arab–Israeli tensions, was at the forefront of their minds when they concluded:

> Wars, it used to be said, settle nothing. Unfortunately the statement was untrue: they can settle many problems, and are sometimes, regrettably, the only way of settling them. But they also create new ones, sometimes so grave that one may look back to the old almost with nostalgia.[38]

In hindsight, these lessons could be open to challenge: this editor will allow readers to make their own analysis. But it is surely difficult not to see parallels between the Six-Day War and more recent conflicts, including both Gulf Wars and the current tensions amongst Palestinians (Hamas and Fatah) and Israel, in which military actions and the failure to achieve reconciliation have bred yet further grievances and problems.

The Howard and Hunter paper was focused on a particular region and a particular war, albeit a region and a war especially critical to international security. Many Adelphi Papers over the past five decades have offered similarly trenchant regional analyses. The constraints on a single volume preclude publishing across the breadth of this detailed national and regional expertise, but the following Adelphi Paper authors and contributors warrant a mention for their outstanding regional analyses. On Europe, the work of Philip Windsor, Curt Gasteyger, Christoph Bertram, Hans-Joachim Spanger, Edward Mortimer, Philip Gordon, Ivo Daalder, Uwe Nerlich, David Yost, Stephen Larrabee and John Chipman, who today is director-general and chief executive of the IISS, has been particularly illuminating. On Russia and the Soviet Union, Malcolm Mackintosh, Marshall Shulman, David Holloway, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Roy Allison, Harry Gelman, Hannes Adomeit, Kurt Campbell and Eugene Rumer have all offered special insights; likewise on the greater Middle East, Geoffrey Kemp, Shahram Chubin, Claire Spencer, Efraim Karsh, Mark Heller, Adeed Dawisha, Yair Evron, Ali Ansari and Olivier Roy have made valuable contributions. Gerald Segal, Paul Dibb, Carlyle Thayer, Michael Leifer, Yukio Satoh, Rosemary Foot, Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh have written insightfully on East Asia; as have Raju Thomas,

Sir Hilary Synnott and Shekhar Gupta on South Asia; Ali Mazrui, Jeffrey Herbst, Ken Menkhaus and Robert Jaster on Africa; and Jack Davis and Gregory Treverton on Latin America.

A good example of an Adelphi Paper that combines an understanding of a particular region with broader strategic analysis is Australian scholar Coral Bell's *The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents*, a cogent analysis of shifting power arrangements that retains relevance today.

Bell, who began her career in the Australian diplomatic service before distinguishing herself as an academic at the London School of Economics and elsewhere, boldly attempts in Adelphi Paper 44 the 'dangerous and delicate task' of applying balance-of-power concepts to a dynamic Asia.[39] Writing in the middle of the Vietnam War, Coral Bell was concerned about America's future ability and will to play a major role in regional order. Both the war and the wider project of trying to contain rising Chinese power carried, she observed, a 'very high cost'. Referring to the hotly disputed justifications for the Vietnam War, she added that 'the objectives of policy will have to remain swaddled in a certain amount of protective verbal flannel'.[40]

Today it might be argued that, while China's People's Liberation Army is enamoured of high technology, and no longer favours strategies designed to drag its opponents down in a struggle against long-haul insurgencies, as it did when sponsoring the 'people's wars' of the 1960s, the US by contrast is now keen to rediscover classic concepts of counter-insurgency of the kind that it employed in the 1960s against just those 'people's wars', albeit for use in different theatres. In 1968, Bell was worrying that America, crucial to South-east Asia's balance of power, was at risk of becoming increasingly embroiled in a revolutionary war, as it succumbed to the attrition tactics of its insurgent opponents. 'The theory of people's war is for Chinese decision-makers essentially a theory about the *absorption of the adversary's resources*.' Insurgency offered 'a blueprint for Chinese victory by military proxy' by ' "destroying the enemy by drawing him in deeper to drown in the sea of people's war" '.[41] Reading Bell's paper 40 years on, one might have the sense that, if history is not quite repeating itself, there is nevertheless a certain symmetry between the events of the two eras.

Bell was also thinking about the challenge posed by a rising China long before that concern became fashionable. She pointed out that the integration of China into the emerging regional order would require Chinese acquiescence. She was not pessimistic about China's ability to evolve into a responsible global power, and saw as an encouraging sign the fact that the United States had, in her view, adapted remarkably quickly to its newfound post-war responsibilities for maintaining global order: 'one is struck by the transformation which a few years' experience of the burdens of the dominant power can produce.'[42] Alongside this optimism, however, was concern about the damaging divisions over Asia in Washington's policy circles: 'The reason why America's Asian policy has presented a rather dishevelled and disoriented image, like the feathers of a bird caught in passing in a brisk game of

shuttlecock, is that the forces between whom the Asian policy options are batted about in Washington have been unfortunately well matched in skill and moral zeal.'[43]

Moving our focus westward, Adelphi Papers 45 and 49 on *Change and Security in Europe* were written by Pierre Hassner, who was at the time of writing a research associate at the Centre d'Etudes des Relations Internationales (CERI) in Paris. It is perhaps unsurprising that Hassner, who received his education in France, should have developed an interest in issues of European security, an interest that he pursued through his time as a research associate at the IISS in the summer of 1966 and which eventually led to his appointment as emeritus research director at CERI. Part I of *Change and Security in Europe*, Adelphi Paper 45, gives the background to issues of European security, while Part II, published in July 1968 and reprinted in this volume, examines the problems presented by various possible European security systems.

Hassner began by asking whether the future security system for Europe would be designed *for* or *by* Europeans. He went on to consider the boundaries of Europe, the definition of 'security' and the structure of an integrated European system – issues he viewed as vital, and which had been hotly debated in Europe ever since the time of the founding of the ISS.

Two points in particular strike a reader of these papers: how clearly Hassner writes about strategic choices, and how uncertain the future direction of Europe appeared just four decades ago. For Hassner, settling the 'German question' had been the decisive factor shaping Europe in the first half of the twentieth century; in the latter half the key issue was the outcome of the East–West contest. Thus, the future might variously hold a continuation of a bipolar Europe, the disengagement of the outside powers, a Europe of loosely united states, or a truly integrated Europe.[44]

If Europeanisation through integration were to prevail, Hassner added, it would need to happen in two stages: first within the Eastern and Western blocs, and then between them. He counselled a sober approach to the process of integration:

> The two basic principles, as enunciated by Stanley Hoffmann, would be to act neither as if tomorrow was already here, nor as if it would never come. A third principle is to be prepared to be surprised and disappointed by the actual settlement, if and when our efforts succeed.[45]

Hassner is an important representative of the erudite French school of security. Over the decades, a remarkable contribution to the IISS has been made by such intellectuals as François de Rose, Raymond Aron, André Beaufre, Pierre Lellouche, Thierry de Montbrial, Jean-Louis Gergorin, Thérèse Delpech, Olivier Debouzy and former IISS director and current council chairman François Heisbourg. Collectively, they constitute a vital element in a re-emergent, recovered European security voice; independent while caring deeply about preserving transatlantic bonds.

Whether one is thinking about al-Qaeda or the insurgency in Iraq today, Adelphi Paper 79 by Robert Moss on *Urban Guerrilla Warfare* has many insights relevant to the contemporary security world. In contrast to Hassner's intellectually wide-ranging, but necessarily Cold War-era-tinted paper, Moss, who had taught history at the Australian National University and written on Latin America and Asia for the *Economist*, produced in 1971 an Adelphi Paper that speaks truths about terrorism and political violence that are echoed by the front pages of today's newspapers. Its relevance survives the contrast between the political movements and goals of its period with the transcendental and millenarian aura of the al-Qaeda movement.

At the time of Moss's writing, insurgency, in the form of the Maoist people's wars taking place in the countryside of many developing countries, was bleeding into revolutionary violence and terrorism, and migrating from the countryside to the city. Moss pointed to a recent upsurge in revolutionary violence, much of it concentrated on the urban environment: 'In Latin America, the heirs of Che Guevara have made the city their target; and Maoist groups in India have launched a terrorist campaign in New Delhi and Calcutta.' This urban political violence would continue, Moss predicted glumly: 'The kidnapping of ambassadors, the hijacking of aircraft and the bombing of company offices are likely to continue to be familiar hazards of life in the 1970s.'[46] Urban terrorists did not seek

> control of territory, but control of men's minds. They are essentially political partisans, for whom success or failure will hinge less on what happens on the battleground than on their capacity to get their message across, to erode the morale of the forces of order, and to induce a general 'climate of collapse'.[47]

Moss identifies urban terrorism as a subset of a wider phenomenon of urban militancy: 'The terrorist has a political tool; the urban guerrilla has a strategy for revolution (however utopian it may seem).' He includes as a long appendix to his paper a 'minimanual' for the urban guerrilla written by Brazilian rebel leader Carlos Marighella, who was shot dead in a police ambush in São Paulo at the end of 1969. Moss quotes Marighella on this guerrilla strategy:

> It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. That will alienate the masses who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and thus blame them for this state of things.[48]

Moss detected three main contemporary forms of urban guerrilla warfare: '(i) "Technological terrorism" in the industrial cities; (ii) Ghetto revolts and separatist uprisings; and (iii) Urban violence in the pre-industrial cities

(notably Latin America).'[49] He makes three general observations in the paper about the patterns of political violence in both developed and underdeveloped cities. Firstly, he notes the importance of the disruptive effects of population movements and internal migration: 'The cities of the third world are like sponges, sucking in the surplus rural populations faster than they can absorb them.' Secondly, he discusses the sense of relative deprivation – what today is often classified as a 'root cause': 'Men do not rebel because they are deprived, but because they are conscious that they are deprived.' But, thirdly, Moss also notes that there are limits at least to terroristic urban violence, given the character of its perpetrators. Terrorism, he says, is the work of 'a tiny self-styled revolutionary elite', who suffer from 'the corrupting effect of the systematic use of political violence, and its reinforcement of the totalitarian impulse'.[50] It is difficult for a popular movement to survive as such if its leaders' arrogance leads them to disregard the demands of the people they purport to represent.

Although Moss never attempted to forecast the future, he certainly made observations about political violence and terrorism that are highly germane to today. For instance, among the terrorist methods he identified were the use of propaganda and the subversion of security forces – both tactics witnessed in insurgencies today. He also underscored the vulnerability of modern democracies to terrorism:

> Terrorism may prove to have the most dangerous effects in Western industrial societies . . . ghetto revolts in the United States could disrupt the most powerful economy in the world and impose severe constraint on America's capacity to act as a great power. A sustained campaign of urban terrorism in Europe might undermine popular faith in the democratic system and raise the prospect of a more repressive form of government.[51]

Here a moral element to strategy is suggested, as Moss highlights a key vulnerability: the temptation to stray from their own liberal Western values that modern states can experience when subjected to campaigns of political violence.

In the 1970s, the focus of strategic thought was migrating from the threat of nuclear war, through 'hot' conventional war in the Middle East, to revolutionary political violence and terrorism. But another new theme also entered the arena of international security following the 1973 Middle East war: what German international relations scholar Hanns Maull in his 1975 Adelphi Paper entitled *Oil and Influence* dubbed 'the oil weapon'.

Maull, who was born in 1947 and studied in Munich and London, was a researcher at the IISS from 1973–74, and later served as European director of the Trilateral Commission. Since 1991, he has held the Chair of Foreign Policy and International Relations at the University of Trier.

In Adelphi Paper 117, Maull defines the 'oil weapon' as 'any manipulation of the price and/or supply of oil by exporting nations with the intention of

changing the political behaviour of the consumer nations'. Such a weapon of course remains available today, not only to Middle Eastern oil producers, but also to countries as diverse as Russia and Venezuela. In the final analysis, wrote Maull, 'oil power is the power which stems from the dependence of the consumer nations on oil'.[52] He observed that, despite the risks associated with a high degree of dependence on oil imports, especially imports from the Middle East, as the immediate oil shock of 1973 was short lived, Western complacency about energy dependence soon returned and expanded.

The successful wielding of the oil weapon in 1973–74 was not the first time petroleum had been used to attempt to force policy changes from other states. Previous Middle Eastern conflicts had also triggered the weapon: in the 1956 Suez crisis, the Canal and the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline from the Iraqi oilfields to the Mediterranean were closed and about two-thirds of Middle Eastern exports to Europe had to be re-routed or were cut off. During the Six-Day War in 1967, the Suez Canal was again closed, this time for a much longer period, and Kuwait, Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia stopped production following the outbreak of war.[53] Yet in neither of these instances did an oil crisis result. Maull's Adelphi Paper systematically addresses why the oil weapon scored such a remarkable success in 1973, when only six years earlier it had failed, and he contemplates what role it might play in future international relations.

While producer nations would always have to grapple with the problem of finding a common political objective that would enable them to act together, they had in their favour the rising dependence of Europe, Japan and the United States on Middle Eastern oil. Between 1956 and 1973, US oil imports had increased from around 57 million tons to around 300 million tons annually, with the percentage of the country's annual energy supply that was imported rising from around 6% in 1956 to around 17% in 1973. Dependence on Arab oil imports expressed as a percentage of total energy supply in 1973, while far greater in Western Europe (45%) and Japan (33%), had also increased quickly in the United States, to 5% from 1.3% in 1956.[54]

Despite this growing dependence, Maull drew a relatively optimistic, if very tentative conclusion about the future of the oil weapon. Oil power would continue because of the imbalanced trade relationship between producer and consumer nations. However, 'it may well have reached its peak and could lessen in the medium term. The only real qualitative increase which might come about in the future would be the possibility of being able to use the oil weapon selectively.' The 1973 shock notwithstanding, 'oil power is not unlimited except in the sense that it could trigger a vicious circle of growing and uncontrollable damage'.[55] Precisely because the consequences of using the oil weapon were potentially so great, and universal, while a future Arab–Israeli war remained the most likely context in which oil would again be used in this way, Maull reasoned that the rationality brought about by interdependence ought to help deter any such usage. A 'cataclysmic oil war cannot totally be

ruled out', Maull wrote, but 'so long as the oil producers continue to supply the world with a vital share of its energy supply, the result would be a suicidal spiral of escalation and destruction on a world-wide scale'.[56]

Maull highlighted a fundamental paradox: namely, that the use of oil as a weapon was severely circumscribed and could well become more so, yet, at the same time, it was also likely to become increasingly powerful and important:

> This paradox is explained by the fact that the oil weapon, which is simply the ultimate sanction of oil power, is a sanction that will not be lightly resorted to but will nevertheless, by its very existence, constitute an omnipresent factor in international relations. Oil diplomacy will replace the actual use of the oil weapon because, while the latter is a relatively awkward and costly political instrument of last resort, oil diplomacy can make full use of all dimensions of oil power and the forms of power derived from it: threats, symbolic sanctions (embargoes without cut-backs, stoppages), wealth, military power and, finally, economic power.[57]

Maull also identified the trend of emerging economic powers in the developing world exerting greater influence in the international system. 'The net result of the oil crisis in 1973–74 was a fundamental change in the international political system. A new group of actors has achieved prominence and begun to exert its influence in world politics.' Although the rise of producer-country power would not be fast or apply to all oil-rich nations, Maull did nevertheless correctly observe the emergence of a new pole, if that was what it was, in world politics. 'These powers will assume a mediating position between the highly developed countries and the majority of the Third World', he wrote:

> They will in many aspects still be dependent on their great-power ally and their economic partners among developed countries, but their economic leverage will allow them to build a considerable and diversified power base, attracting surrounding states and areas which will then serve as raw material suppliers, markets and receivers of capital investment.[58]

Some 15 years after the signing of the NPT, nuclear weapons continued to proliferate, albeit gradually, more or less as predicted by Sir Solly Zuckerman. In this context, a leading realist theorist, Kenneth N. Waltz, offered up one of the more provocative theses published in the Adelphi Paper series. Adelphi Paper 171, published in 1981, was called *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, and it challenged the conventional wisdom about the inherent security benefits of non-proliferation:

> Someday the world will be populated by ten or twelve or eighteen nuclear-weapon states. . . . What the further spread of nuclear weapons will do to the world is therefore a compelling question.

> Most people believe that the world will become a more dangerous one as nuclear weapons spread. The chances that nuclear weapons will be fired in anger or accidentally exploded in a way that prompts a nuclear exchange are finite, though unknown. Those chances increase as the number of nuclear states increase. More is therefore worse. Most people also believe that the chances that nuclear weapons will be used vary with the character of the new nuclear states – their sense of responsibility, inclination toward peace, devotion to the status quo, political stability, and administrative competence . . . If nuclear weapons are acquired by countries whose governments totter and frequently fall, should we not worry more about the world's destruction than we do now? And if nuclear weapons are acquired by two states that are traditional and bitter rivals, should that not also foster our concern?[59]

Waltz challenged such beliefs because they dealt with imagined dangers rather than with carefully calculated likelihoods. 'We want to know both the likelihood that new dangers will manifest themselves and what the possibilities of their mitigation may be. We want to be able to see the future world, so to speak, rather than merely imagining ways in which it may be a better or a worse one.'[60] To this end, he proposed making deductions about this future world from the structure of the international political system, and inferences from the historical record.

The system and the historical record both suggested to Waltz that nuclear weapons could actually slow down rather than speed up arms races, that nuclear arms have in the past and would in the future be likely only to spread gradually, and that even a weak state with a nuclear weapon would be unlikely to launch such a weapon in anger. The dangers from further proliferation were nevertheless real and they included the risk – of which Israel's 1981 raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak was a reminder – 'that each new nuclear state may tempt an old one to strike preventively in order to destroy an embryonic nuclear capability before it can become militarily effective'.[61]

Waltz was critical of applying different standards to different powers. Furthermore, he believed that the United States and others should provide security assurances to those countries developing nuclear weapons. He concluded that:

> The gradual spread of nuclear weapons is better than no spread and better than rapid spread. We do not face a set of happy choices. We may prefer that countries have conventional weapons only, do not run arms races, and do not fight. Yet the alternative to nuclear weapons for some countries may be ruinous arms races with high risk of their becoming engaged in debilitating conventional wars.[62]

In short, Waltz wrote, 'the spread of nuclear weapons is something that we have worried too much about and tried too hard to stop'.[63]

As we move into the 1980s, a concern with great-power military interventions in the developing world gains in prominence. Dr Neil Macfarlane, author of Adelphi Paper 196, *Intervention and Regional Security*, is a Canadian scholar who wrote his doctoral dissertation under the tutelage of Hedley Bull, the brilliant Australian thinker who took up the Montague Burton International Relations Professorship after the death of Alastair Buchan. On completing his dissertation, which focused on Soviet-supported wars of national liberation and Soviet interventions in the developing world, Macfarlane took up a research associate posting to the IISS, which he held from 1981–82. A manuscript begun during this tenure was subsequently finished while Macfarlane was teaching at the University of Virginia, and *Intervention and Regional Security* was eventually published in the spring of 1985.

The paper examines cases of intervention in developing-world conflicts and seeks to determine their causes and consequences, and the patterns they display. This was a timely issue when the paper was published because of three developments on the international stage: the increased capacity of the USSR to project force throughout the developing world; the diffusion of power, especially in the form of arms, throughout the world; and a growing dependence in the Western world on resources from Asia, Africa and Latin America – precisely those regions where today China is noted for its investment activity. The paper's case studies are Angola 1975–76, the Horn of Africa 1977–78, Chad 1980–82 and Afghanistan 1979 to the time of writing.

Macfarlane, like many Adelphi Paper authors, was apt to interrogate and clarify complex terminology; challenging ambiguous and subjective meanings for the benefit of his readers. He observed for instance that a definition of intervention, as a coercive military intrusion into the internal affairs of another state' failed to distinguish between action on behalf of governments, action against governments, and action taken in instances where no governmental authority exists.[64]

There were, in Macfarlane's view, several factors that seemed to make intervention more rather than less likely. In particular, he argued that countries fragmented along ethnic, religious, class and ideological lines tended to be the most susceptible to intervention. Not all weak states mirrored Angola's division among three major ethnic groups (the Ovimbundu, the Mbundu and the Bakongo), but 'societies which ultimately experience military intervention are generally lacking in political integration and chronically unstable, and their populations have little if any commitment to central political authority'.[65] The paper examines the ways in which the absence of legitimacy and popular consent makes weak states prone to outside intervention.

Macfarlane was ahead of the curve in thinking about the problem of weak and failed states. The IISS Armed Conflict Database tracks some 70 conflicts that are ongoing or simmering, and there appeared in 2007 to be at least two dozen or more very weak states in the developing world. Although some analysts have noted a decline in developing-world conflicts – following a

sharp rise immediately after the Cold War – the fact remains that there are plenty of weak states that are riven with sectarianism. Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan are perhaps the three most discussed today.

According to Macfarlane, the motivations of external actors for intervening vary. He identifies several not mutually exclusive motivators, including ideological commitment, the quest for influence, considerations of status and prestige, strategic and security concerns, and economic gain. Although the Cold War may have supplied more ideological justifications for interventions than does the current world order, even then the defence of national or regional security was a primary motive. For instance, Macfarlane concludes that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was probably mainly propelled by concerns about basic security:

> Growing instability along the USSR's southern fringe, and the Islamic fundamentalism which was in part its cause, provoked concern in Moscow. This was aggravated by the ethnic and religious affinities between the population in Afghanistan and the inhabitants of Soviet Central Asia, and by longer-term demographic shifts in the USSR itself. These factors encouraged a demonstration of resolve to defend Soviet interests in the region.[66]

Factors constraining intervention include the demands of alliances, domestic considerations and international opinion.

Whatever the catalyst for an intervention, there tends to be a divergence between short-term effects (interventions are often successful on the terms of discrete original goals) and long-term effects (it is far less clear as to whether the broader aims of interventions hold up over time). As Macfarlane writes, 'It is difficult to find . . . an unambiguously successful intervention.'[67]

Macfarlane's basic scepticism about the long-term value of intervention provokes him to an analogy about the right to bear arms in the United States: 'although possessing and using a gun may in specific circumstances protect one from harm as well as contributing to the social good, that does not mean that widespread personal ownership of lethal weapons is constructive or contributes to social order'.[68]

He goes on to ponder the possible future international regulation of military intervention, and in doing so anticipates elements of the vigorous debates over the 'responsibility to protect' and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. He reasons that 'in the longer term, the record would suggest that intervention is likely to be unrewarding. The military instrument may perhaps buy time, but it is too blunt to resolve the political and social conflicts which provoked the intrusion.'[69] Macfarlane, who today holds the Lester B. Pearson Chair of International Relations at the University of Oxford, updated these ideas in a subsequent Adelphi Paper.[70]

By the mid 1990s, it was clear that the end of the Cold War had ushered in what some were calling not 'the end of history', but 'a new world disorder'.

Reading Professor Sir Adam Roberts' Adelphi Paper 305 from December 1996, *Humanitarian Action in War*, can give one a sense – widely felt at the time – that somehow the Cold War had been far simpler.

Civil wars, bad governance, massive economic disruption and natural disasters were of course not new, but the responses to them were. 'War, civil war, dictatorship, earthquake, famine and refugee flows have been familiar phenomena throughout recorded history. In the past, they rarely led to large-scale international effort such as in the early 1990s. Clearly there were some new factors at work.'[71] 'Humanitarian action as a response to war, and to violent crises within states', Roberts wrote, 'has been tried in the 1990s as never before.'[72]

Writing with characteristic clarity, always mindful of precision, and with what one reviewer dubbed 'the sturdy Englishman's distaste for grand prescriptions', Adam Roberts surveyed the contemporary security scene. The US involvement in Somalia had begun as a humanitarian exercise, but ended in the disaster memorialised in the book – and subsequent film – *Black Hawk Down*. The UN response to Bosnia was 'mired in controversy and largely discredited by the fall of Srebrenica in 1995'.[73] And then there were the actions in Liberia, Northern Iraq, Rwanda and Zaire. Roberts notes that 'the pendulum that swung so far towards humanitarian action in the first half of the 1990s has since then been moving in the opposite direction . . . Many countries are showing signs of reluctance to become deeply involved in war-torn countries and regions, even in a humanitarian role.' But for Roberts, 'the key issue is not whether there is a place for humanitarian action in international politics, but what that place is, and what forms such action can usefully take'.[74]

For him, the problem was not the idea of humanitarian intervention in itself but its execution:

> The central argument of this paper is that a failure to develop serious policies regarding the security of humanitarian action, and of affected peoples and areas, has been the principal cause of the setbacks of humanitarian action in the 1990s. Such security issues, the inherent difficulties of which are undeniable, have been handled repeatedly in a short-term and half-hearted manner, often with elements of dishonesty and buck-passing.[75]

One of the thorniest questions in these complex emergencies concerned the role of the military. Roberts writes that:

> The question of defining exactly what the military role should be and how great a commitment it required proved to be difficult and controversial . . . the record of outside military involvement supporting humanitarian action is full of instances of vacillation and retreat, poor coordination,

> a reluctance to make serious commitments and take serious risks, and achieving at best only temporary results.[76]

In his systematic dissection of the issues, Roberts asked many salient questions, including which humanitarian actions actually saved lives and which simply prolonged conflict. Can humanitarian intervention, Roberts insists on asking, 'stop the killing as well as the dying?' His paper challenges the notion of a 'right' to engage in 'humanitarian intervention' as presumptuous, if not a slippery slope towards justifying any nation's whim to intervene anywhere. It also challenges policymakers to think more carefully about their ends and means, asking 'Has the increased emphasis of governments on humanitarian action been an abdication from serious policy-making?'[77] Roberts detects excessive short-termism and vagueness of aims:

> In many instances of 'humanitarian intervention' since 1990, the repeated emphasis on the word 'humanitarian' has gone hand-in-hand with the absence of a serious long-term policy with respect to the target country, except in the limited matters of providing food and medical aid, and trying to get rival factions to reach a peace accord.[78]

While Roberts does not object to the new term 'complex emergencies', and accepts both the definition of humanitarian intervention as 'military intervention in a state without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death', and the fact that, as such, it represents an important exceptional violation of the principle of non-intervention, he does worry that analysts are concealing old problems by using new terms; the new label may have made it easier to intervene, but no easier to actually solve deep-seated problems. He also reflects that the term 'complex emergencies' 'fits, perhaps too easily, the ambition of some within the UN system to tackle simultaneously' a host of problems that are unlikely to be soluble.

For all the problems of humanitarian intervention, and Roberts identifies many in his paper, the demand for 'international humanitarian action in wars and other crises' was unlikely to abate. 'Even if humanitarian action goes through cycles of decline', Roberts concluded, 'it will not disappear; it reflects interests as well as altruism. Decision-makers need to plan for such action, offer assistance, and be aware of its merits and weaknesses.'[79]

Complex humanitarian emergencies proliferated with the end of the Cold War, but by the beginning of the twenty-first century, intervening in them tended to be seen in Washington as largely being a job for America's allies. The higher strategic calling of the world's preponderant military power, particularly after 11 September 2001, was to lead a global fight against terrorism. But if the United States was to be successful in this fight, Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman wrote in 2006, it would have to understand the differences between the period of the 1991 Gulf War, when a 'revolution in

military affairs', or RMA, seemed to be having its effect, and those of the interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The 'contemporary era', as Freedman calls it in Adelphi Paper 379, might be understood as the time of *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*. Some eight years earlier, Freedman had written an Adelphi Paper on the RMA, putting the so-called 'revolution in information and technical areas' into a wider context. But during the administration of President George W. Bush, revolution had given way to transformation, although the impact of information technology remained crucial. Now the strategic environment was shaping military technology, rather than the other way around.

Despite the relative ease with which superior US-led military power was able to remove first the Taliban and then Saddam Hussein from power, there followed a longer insurgency in which US military dominance appeared less effective, given the need to control populations on the ground. As Freedman wrote:

> The US would not be the first apparently unbeatable military power to find itself undone by an inability to take seriously or even to comprehend enemies that rely on their ability to emerge out of the shadows of civil society, preferring minor skirmish to major battle, accepting no possibility for decisive victory but instead aiming to unsettle, harass, demoralise, humiliate and eventually to wear down their opponents.[80]

Freedman argued not that 'major regular wars will not occur in the future or that it is pointless to prepare for them', rather that, 'for the moment, the most perplexing problems of security policy surround irregular rather than regular war'.[81]

Adelphi Paper 379 addresses the difficulty that the US armed forces face in shifting their focus from preparing for regular wars, in which combat is separate from civil society, to irregular wars, in which combat is integrated with civil society. It contends that the political context of contemporary irregular wars means that the purpose and practice of Western democratic forces must be governed by liberal values if they are to be sustainable. Freedman also argues that the challenge of irregular warfare becomes easier to meet when military operations are understood to contribute to the development of a compelling narrative about the likely course and consequence of a conflict. Finally, he says that while it is vital that those employed by armed forces remain sensitive at all times to political context and to the role of narratives in shaping this context, a key test of success will always be the defeat of the opposing forces. 'Strategy is about choice', Freedman writes:

> It depends on the ability to understand situations and to appreciate the dangers and opportunities they contain. The most talented strategists are able to look forward, to imagine quite different and more benign situations from those that currently obtain and what must be done to reach

> them, as well as more malign situations and how they might best be prevented.[82]

Whereas Alastair Buchan talked about a bipolar arms race and the state fragility brought about by 'disimperialism', Freedman writing 45 years later describes a contemporary system characterised by a much larger and more diffuse state system, and a trend toward the demilitarisation of inter-state relations, particularly among the great powers. The significant trends today are the creation of transnational networks, the supreme influence of culture and the importance of narratives.

The 1991 Gulf War saw the success, Freedman observed, of the kind of manoeuvre warfare in which the enemy was disoriented by means of highly mobile firepower, made possible by technical superiority and the skilful orchestration of professional forces. But if the successful execution of the doctrine of 'AirLand Battle' renewed trust in US military power, the United States was about to find far fewer foes willing to fight superior American military might on its own terms. Freedman cited a school of thought that spoke of 'fourth-generation warfare' (4GW) that, unlike previous generations of warfare (line-and-column, massed firepower and blitzkrieg), occurred on a dispersed battlefield, reducing the importance of centralised logistics and mass, and creating a tendency for victory to come through the implosion of the enemy rather than through physical destruction. 'The essence of 4GW lies in the blurring of boundaries – between war and peace, between civilian and military, between tactics and strategy, between order and chaos. Such war cannot be contained in either time or space.' Instead it spans the spectrum of human activity: 'Unfortunately, whereas the RMA points to a singular form of regular warfare, which because it so suits the US is unlikely to be fought, 4GW points to almost everything else.' 'The methods that are classified as 4GW are those used by the weak against the strong. Those fighting a conventionally superior capability wish to avoid direct battle in order to survive over the long term.'[83]

This new warfare has elevated the importance of what is sometimes called 'hearts-and-minds' strategy, which uses compelling narratives, or storylines, to explain complex events in a way that ensures that networks cohere and stay intact. In the new environment, Freedman writes, 'instead of being geared to eliminating the assets of the enemy, [military operations] might need to be focused on undermining those narratives on which that enemy bases its appeal and which animates and guides its activists'.[84]

Recognition of this new environment means in addition avoiding the temptation of succumbing to a reliance on air power, or believing in the idea that 'air power might work on its own, at least as a coercive instrument'.[85] It also calls for better strategic communications, and necessitates the careful and considered application of hearts-and-minds strategies. It is inadvisable, for instance, to strive to address local security and local grievances while simultaneously attempting state-building.

Of course, what the paper called a 'transformation' was simply the newfound prominence of elements of warfare that had been around for a very long time, and the shift to irregular war was:

> hardly novel. Those who served in the anti-colonial wars of the twentieth century would recognise many of the dilemmas faced by their contemporary counterparts as they try to think of ways to win over sullen populations by offering current security and hope for the future, acquiring reliable intelligence, setting traps while avoiding obvious ambushes, flushing out militants and turning some into informers.[86]

But in fighting on this well-trodden terrain, Western allies needed to follow a narrative based on liberal values:

> President Bush framed the response to 9/11 in terms of national security and it was on this basis that Afghanistan and Iraq were occupied. Within this framework it was accepted that the insidious nature of the threat required measures that could not be guaranteed to accord at all times with liberal values. In light of its experience since 2003 the Bush administration might wish it had handled matters differently. In particular, this experience has pointed to the perils of ignoring questions of legitimacy in the conduct of military operations.[87]

With 400 Adelphi Papers published over the first half-century of the IISS, the field of strategic studies could be forgiven for seeming somewhat well worn. But as we can see from the papers selected for this volume, the constant shifts in the strategic terrain, the breadth of the challenges and the rise of new actors at both state and non-state levels have ensured a consistently high demand for a deeper understanding of international security. As future scholars and policymakers confront the challenges of tomorrow, a good starting point would be to mine the research and analysis represented in these impressive monographs.

As the compiler of this volume on the occasion of the Institute's jubilee anniversary, I feel a privilege akin to that which I enjoyed in my first job after leaving the University of Oxford in 1984, at the Congressional Research Service. There I was granted unfettered access to the stacks at the Library of Congress, which in theory held every book ever published in the English language, or at least since the founding of the Library in 1800. A similar sense of awed discovery has accompanied the process of compiling this volume. I only wish the reader as much pleasure in reading these papers as I have had in selecting them.

**Patrick M. Cronin,** Editor of the Adelphi Papers, 2007,
IISS Director of Studies, 2005–7

## Notes

1 Michael Howard, *Captain Professor: The Memoirs of Sir Michael Howard* (London: Continuum, 2006), p. 145.
2 See Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).
3 Howard, *Captain Professor: The Memoirs of Sir Michael Howard*, p. 163.
4 The last article written by Buchan before his death, which was written on the occasion of America's bicentennial in July 1976 and published in *Foreign Affairs*, was an essay about the deep interpenetration between Britain and America. Alastair Buchan, 'Two Hundred Years of American Policy: Mothers and Daughters (or Greeks and Romans)', *Foreign Affairs*, July 1976.
5 The Institute has always enjoyed an association with the *Economist*. The magazine's diplomatic editor, Edwina Moreton, sits on the IISS Advisory Council, and her late husband, Gerald Segal, served with great distinction as the Research Director of the IISS until his untimely death at the age of 46. Their remarkable daughter, Rachel Segal, assisted with this introduction before returning to Cambridge University.
6 Alastair Buchan, *The Evolution of NATO*, Adelphi Paper 1 (London: ISS, 1961), p. 1, p. 31 in this volume.
7 *Ibid.*, p. 3, p. 33 in this volume.
8 *Ibid.*, p. 5, p. 35 in this volume.
9 *Ibid.*, p. 2, p. 32 in this volume.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 8, p. 38 in this volume.
11 *Ibid.*, p. 27, p. 54 in this volume.
12 *Ibid.*, p. 31, p. 57 in this volume.
13 Henry A. Kissinger, 'The Inaugural Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture', Institution of Electrical Engineers, Savoy Place, London, 25 June 1976. The lecture is available on the IISS website at http://www.iiss.org/conferences/alastair-buchan/alastair-buchan-lecture-transcripts.
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15 T.C. Schelling, *Controlled Response and Strategic Warfare*, Adelphi Paper 19 (London: ISS, 1965), pp. 3–4, pp. 73–4 in this volume.
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19 *Ibid.*, p. 9, p. 81 in this volume.
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22 *Ibid.*, p. 7, p. 95 in this volume.
23 *Ibid.*, p. 8, p. 96 in this volume.
24 *Ibid.*, p. 9, p. 97 in this volume.
25 *Ibid.*, p. 20, p. 112 in this volume.
26 *Ibid.*, p. 21, p. 113 in this volume.
27 *Ibid.*
28 *Ibid.*, p. 26, p. 120 in this volume.
29 Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, *Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967*, Adelphi Paper 41 (London: ISS, 1967), p. 1, p. 124 in this volume.
30 *Ibid.*, p. 2, p. 125 in this volume.
31 *Ibid.*, p. 15, p. 143 in this volume.

32 *Ibid.*, p. 20, p. 151 in this volume.
33 *Ibid.*, p. 21, p. 152 in this volume.
34 *Ibid.*, p. 25, p. 158 in this volume.
35 *Ibid.*, p. 39, p. 178 in this volume.
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37 *Ibid.*, p. 41, p. 178 in this volume.
38 *Ibid.*, p. 43, p. 181 in this volume.
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41 *Ibid.*, p. 8, pp. 204–5 in this volume.
42 *Ibid.*, p. 4, p. 199 in this volume.
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49 *Ibid.*, p. 4, p. 269 in this volume.
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72 *Ibid.*, p. 7, p. 520 in this volume.
73 *Ibid.*
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75 *Ibid.*, p. 9, p. 522 in this volume.
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78 *Ibid.*, p. 26, p. 537 in this volume.
79 *Ibid.*, p. 79, pp. 579–80 in this volume.
80 Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Paper 379, (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2006), pp. 5–6, p. 595 in this volume.
81 *Ibid.*, pp. 6 and 7, pp. 595 and 597 in this volume.
82 *Ibid.*, p. 9, p. 598 in this volume.
83 *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21, pp. 608–9 in this volume.
84 *Ibid.*, p. 26, p. 613 in this volume.
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# 1 The Evolution of NATO

## Adelphi Paper 1, 1961

*Alastair Buchan*

### Introduction

I have taken the liberty of introducing our new Adelphi Papers with a paper of my own. It represents purely my own views, but is the fruit of observations and conversations with officials and private citizens on both sides of the Channel and the Atlantic over a number of months. It is offered as a contribution to the forthcoming international debate about the future course and structure of NATO which cannot, despite Berlin, be delayed very much longer.

This paper is concerned primarily with the central machinery and institutions of NATO and only secondarily with the military and political plans that should emerge from them. I have, however, dwelt at some length on the problem of European defence in order to illustrate and emphasise the deficiencies of the existing system of intergovernmental planning and consultation. Readers must therefore excuse me if the paper seems in places somewhat negative in tone, and refers only to certain matters of high policy and controversy rather than exploring them.

A few members of the Institute have been kind enough to read and comment on this paper, and I am particularly grateful for the comments of Albert Wohlstetter, Michael Howard, Sir John Slessor and Sir Anthony Buzzard, as well as for the endorsement of the central ideas which it contains by Raymond Aron, Helmut Schmidt and others.

Alastair Buchan, November 1961

### I

It is difficult for a large alliance of democratic countries to alter its objectives, its policy or its *modus operandi*, for the simple reason that it is much harder to initiate and pursue a constructive debate between sovereign nations than within them. The nature of the external challenge is seen from many different perspectives: new ideas are communicated only slowly, are easily misunderstood, and even when accepted must be translated in terms of different national traditions and preoccupations. It is like changing the course of a sailing fleet, beating up against wind and tide in the days before wireless – in this case a fleet in which the leaders of the vanguard can no longer be sure that

the adventurous or reluctant captains sailing in company with them will necessarily respond in time to the movements of their helms if they suddenly adopt a new tack to avoid the rocks they see ahead, more especially if they tack in different directions.

The first purpose of this paper is to examine the pressures both external and internal, that appear to necessitate changes in the military and political stance of the North Atlantic Treaty powers, and an extension of the responsibilities of their central organisation, NATO. Its second is to consider pragmatic means by which the co-ordination of national policies could be improved. It is prompted in part by the need to reconsider several of the assumptions and suggestions contained in the first of the Institute's "Studies in International Security"[1], written in 1959, in the light of developments during the last two years. It has been written under the shadow of the Berlin crisis, and of the other dramatic events of 1961, but I have tried to look beyond them to the world of the mid and later sixties, using the clarification of official policies which these events have elicited as one among a number of guideposts.

The alliance is a more healthy and vital system than the number of doctors who are continuously taking its pulse might suggest. Certainly NATO is in no need of any synthetic injection, such as extending the responsibilities of its central institutions to cultural or economic affairs, in order to increase its vitality or its importance. But there can be little disagreement that, in this autumn of 1961, a number of developments have become apparent which makes it urgent to explore the maladies or maladjustments from which it is generally thought to be suffering. The Vienna meeting, the collapse of the nuclear test negotiations, and Mr Khrushchev's subsequent statements and actions on Berlin, suggest that the alliance is going to have to withstand severe pressures in the years immediately ahead, even if it does not actually have to fight a war. Though neither side has yet made an incautious physical move, or closed the door on further negotiations, the atmosphere of East–West relations is clearly deteriorating. At the same time there is a new Administration in Washington which has already signified by its actions that it is prepared to consider important modifications in the relationship of the United States to its European partners. With developments in missiles and satellites the strategic context is altering. Any doubts that still lingered two years ago that France might become at least a nominal nuclear power have now been dispelled. Britain is on the point of recasting her relationship with continental Europe. And a period of unrelenting change has produced many less dramatic developments.

Indeed, the pressures of change, not only in the extent of the political and military challenge to the Atlantic powers, but in the economic sphere as well – the need, for instance, to organise economic aid or to stabilise raw material prices upon the widest possible basis – has led to a revival of interest in the idea of Atlantic Union or federation.

It may well be that at some point in the indeterminate future it will be necessary to think in very wide and radical terms about the creation of an

indissoluble political federation among the Atlantic powers. All that one can say for certain is that at this moment neither public opinions nor political leaders in the Atlantic countries are conditioned to think in such terms, or to accept such a proposal if they were in fact confronted with it. NATO is an alliance of sovereign powers, it has no supranational authority like the institutions of EEC and it is extremely doubtful if the Treaty could be amended to provide this without months and probably years of debate, except in the wake of some great disaster. The only responsible course at present, therefore, is to work for the improvement of those central Atlantic institutions that do exist, regarding the creation of truly effective means of intergovernmental planning and co-ordination both as urgent in their own right and as the essential preliminary to a more formal and far reaching pooling of sovereignty at some future date. An alliance has disadvantages as well as advantages for the nations who compose it: it limits their freedom of action, complicates their diplomacy, and exposes them to fresh dangers as well as guarding them from the old ones. If its protective and centralising functions appear to be ineffective or inadequate, the constituent nations could come to feel that they are getting the worst of both worlds.

## II

Reconsideration of the functions and functioning of NATO is impeded both by its most ardent supporters and its most active critics. To some people in the West, the strengthening of NATO is synonymous with the cohesion and unity of the democratic world itself, forgetting that NATO cannot and should not attempt to comprise all aspects of the policy of the Atlantic powers towards the rest of the world. To others, the organisation creates a distasteful image of a largely military organisation of severely limited usefulness, membership of which tends to embarrass the more liberal Atlantic powers in their relations with the uncommitted world.

It is perfectly true that NATO has a limited function, and the creation of OECD to handle a different range of aims and interests has fortunately made this quite clear. NATO is concerned with the confrontation of the Soviet challenge to the Atlantic powers, with the "Cold War" and the deterrence of hotter war. Though this comprehends a large and growing area of policy it is not all embracing. But the point that concerns us is that the nature of this function is changing and that it may need a certain reorganisation of priorities and ideas to discharge even this limited responsibility. My preliminary purpose, therefore, is briefly to examine the external changes which require a redefinition of the scope of its responsibilities, and the developments within the Atlantic powers themselves which may call for a reorganisation of its structure and an increase in its authority.

There seem to me to be three developments in the non-Atlantic world which are gradually but profoundly modifying the whole context in which the original purpose of creating NATO, to assure the stability and security

of the North Atlantic area, must be considered. The first is the mounting evidence, not of any dramatic change in the objectives of Soviet policy, but of the steady widening of the range of challenges which Moscow now feels able to offer to the West. This challenge was, of course, never a purely military one or confined to Europe alone. But what has become particularly marked in the last two years is the confidence which Mr. Khrushchev now feels that Soviet military policy has given the Soviet Union a new freedom of action, by multiplying the difficulties and dangers of exerting any direct pressure upon Russia itself, to challenge Western interests throughout the world by less dangerous and less obvious means than war.

To a considerable extent this confidence is justified. It is true that American strategic strength still poses a very formidable threat to the Soviet Union. It is also true that the United States has not yet lost the will to implement that threat, and, though there is no more talk of "massive retaliation" for acts of local aggression, the clear intent of American policy is to make the Russians very circumspect for fear of sliding into a nuclear war with the United States. But though the Soviet long range strategic threat to the United States itself is not as large in number of bombs or bombers as the American threat to Russia, her threat to the allies of the United States is very considerable. This fact alone is an asset to Soviet diplomacy for one of the unvarying aims of Soviet policy is the disintegration of NATO itself.

Moreover, with the steady transference of the strategic strength of both sides into increasingly invulnerable forms of retaliatory power, smaller ICBMs in hard or mobile bases, Polaris type submarines and stand off bombs, the ability of each side to maintain a counter force capability – to threaten the destruction of a high proportion of the other's strategic striking power in the event of war – must become a matter of great uncertainty. If, as the sixties progress the prospect of strategic war seems likely to involve, sooner or later, a mutual exchange of blows on great cities and industrial centres, the credibility of the American resort to it, even under extreme provocation, must become very speculative unless all the NATO countries were prepared to undertake programmes of civil defence so vast as to strain the resources of many of them and to create severe tensions between allies of unequal geographic and economic resources. Despite the continuing strategic superiority of the West in its diversity of long range weapons, the ability of the United States to exert direct pressure on the Soviet Union by a credible threat of strategic action, with or even without the consent of its allies, which has been declining steadily throughout the fifties, is now likely to decline still further, and very probably cannot be recovered except by crash programmes so menacing – space weapons for instance – as to be in themselves a likely cause of war.

What this uncertainty does is to dispose of any lingering Western hope of being able to meet Soviet challenges at a quite different level from that at which they are offered, to offset the tactical move by the strategic threat. To some extent this is already apparent. In so far as any move in Soviet policy implies a direct military threat against the NATO area, this can only be offset

by the same kind of military forces which it is prepared to use. President Kennedy's statements and actions on Berlin make it very clear that he understands this. Tempting as it may have been for him to accept the view of some of his advisers, that the Berlin situation called for an overwhelming threat of American force, the plain fact is that the state of European and American opinion, plus the real strategic facts of life, would have made such a course irresponsible and disastrous. But Berlin apart, Mr. Khrushchev knows that his freedom to support "movements of colonial liberation" or to exploit the forces of unrest in Asia, Africa or Latin America is in fact increasing unless his agents can be thwarted, not centrally but at the seat of trouble, and generally by non-military means, a policy which he rightly believes it is difficult for the West to pursue. No better illustration of the diminishing cover of the American strategic umbrella could have been provided than the Laos crisis of 1961. Thus, Soviet policy is not only creating a necessity for a much wider range of Western military responses, but imposing the need to co-ordinate non-military policy in a way never envisaged in the earlier years of NATO.

The second external factor, closely allied to the first, of which any reconsideration of NATO's responsibilities must take account, is that the process of disimperialism, which has been set in motion by her own members, is inevitably creating a precarious world order that may take a generation or more to find firmer foundations. With the number of sovereign states increasing almost monthly, so the likelihood of situations if internal chaos or local aggression, a Congo, a Laos, a Kuwait, increase also. This danger has arisen at a time when the peace keeping machinery of the United Nations is still very immature and also is being actively undermined by the Soviet Union. It is one to which none of the NATO powers can be indifferent, since many of them have close ties with the new countries, some of them such as Norway, Denmark and Canada are actively concerned in the existing peace keeping efforts of the United Nations, and all of them would be immediately involved if intervention by other NATO allies were to bring them face to face with the forces of the Soviet Union or its allies. At the same time modern communications are shrinking the world so as to increase the speed and scope of action and reaction however remote the original seat of trouble may be from the Atlantic area.

The third inter-related development concerns the delicacy of the overall strategic balance of power between NATO and the Soviet Union which has been created by the combination of cataclysmic explosive power with very rapid means of delivering it. This has three effects. First, it means that all the military preparations of NATO powers must be considered with an eye to advancing the prospects of reaching at least limited agreements with the Soviet Union to mitigate the worst dangers of the delicate balance:– surprise attack, accidental war, miscalculation: and this in turn requires effective political co-operation in all military *planning*, especially of NATO dispositions in Germany. Second, it increases the importance of civil control over military *action*, and, in a world increasingly dependent on computer-fed intelligence, of interposing political judgement at all levels of military decision

and reducing to a minimum the dangers of automatic reaction. This is a problem that affects the Soviet Union just as much as NATO, but is easier for her to solve. Because of the delicacy of the balance and the complexity of the technological environment the alliance can no longer hope to behave as an alliance in times of stress unless it can master the problem of central civil control over the central military command systems it has created, at all times and all levels of response. Finally, it makes urgent the development of a means of providing a unified political responses in swiftly moving diplomatic exchanges such as we have seen over Berlin. The speed of international action and reaction, the increasingly important factors of popular opinion and morale, the significance of the views of the uncommitted spectators of the East and West conflict mean that inter-allied disagreements over diplomatic strategy can undermine the political strength of NATO, in a tense situation, every bit as much as disparities of military power.

## III

One reason why NATO has often seemed slow to adjust itself to changes in the external world is that the member governments are naturally averse (except in the wake of a grave crisis such as Suez) to acknowledging and adjusting themselves to changes in the balance of power within the alliances. Yet if the outside world has changed beyond recognition in the twelve years since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, so also has relationship between the NATO powers themselves. It seems to me that there are three trends which have been discernible for the last year or two which must be taken as fully into account as external developments if the alliance is to develop greater cohesion and strength and its central institution to acquire greater authority.

The first and most important is the gradual change in the politico-strategic relationship of the United States to its European NATO allies and vice versa. Here there seem to be two contrary forces at work on both sides. On the one hand, as the problem of maintaining a credible system of strategic deterrence in the open West becomes more and more complex, the disparity between the strategic resources of the United States and the European allies becomes more marked. As the deterrent forces come to centre increasingly round the nuclear submarine, the mobile or hard based missile, and elaborate satellite or other early warning systems, the dependence of the allies on the United States becomes greater for these are programmes which not only require resources which no single European country, or perhaps all of them collectively could command, but are the product of continuous American programmes of research and development in which European countries have been only partially or fitfully engaged. Even if the European allies as a whole were to decide to compete in this sphere, they could not match the geographic advantages that are becoming of increasing importance in the missile era, which a large and relatively sparsely populated land area and proximity of the two great

oceans give to the United States. One cannot avoid the conclusion that the strategic pre-eminence of the United States which was decisive even during the hegemony of the medium bomber is likely to increase whatever the strategic policy of Britain, France or the other European NATO allies, and whatever their leaders may feel or say about the impossibility of being dependent on another country for their ultimate survival.

In the short run this is also true of tactical forces. Because France is still heavily committed in Algeria, because British defence policy has not been readjusted from the disastrous misreading of the future which led her in 1957 to decide to return to a small volunteer army while increasing her nuclear forces, and because the dramatic economic growth of the rest of Europe has led to an acute manpower shortage in many countries, the main burden of increasing the flexibility of Western strategy and diplomacy is likely, for the next year or two, to fall principally on the United States which, for a number of reasons, can expand the size of her conventional forces more easily than her allies. Unless and until European defence policies are adjusted, the dominance of the United States in NATO will continue to extend to every aspect of defence planning. In terms of the kinds of military strength which will be most valuable in the years ahead, Britain, France and even Germany are relatively weak powers. Moreover, American strategic forces (other than her ground forces based in Europe) will become less and less dependent on European bases (except for valuable but not vital facilities such as air refuelling and submarine replenishment) as the main weight of American deterrence becomes concentrated in the Polaris submarines, and the *Minuteman* and the B52 based in the United States. This in turn will attenuate the already tenuous physical control over American strategic policy or decisions which some European governments have considered that they exercise by reason of having American strategic weapons based on their soil.

But in the larger political context, I think most thoughtful Americans would acknowledge that the United States, largely as a result of the external pressures we have examined, is now becoming more dependent on, and more directly affected by, the policies of her European NATO allies. For one thing, as international relations become more complex with the steady increase in the number of sovereign states, as action in one area tends to react more rapidly and forcibly on others, as Soviet and Chinese policy becomes increasingly concerned with discrediting the Atlantic Allies as a whole in the eyes of the uncommitted world, so the United States becomes increasingly affected by the colonial policies of her European allies or their continuing relations with their former colonies. This is particularly true of developments in Africa, the dark continent on which so much light is now focussed. The American attempt, in the earlier days of NATO, to stand as the champion of anti-colonialism while maintaining an intimate political relationship in NATO with Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Portugal has not only proved unconvincing to the world at large, but has less and less relevance now that the three most important colonial powers are committed to policies of

disimperialism which help solve the American dilemma but also create new problems for the United States just as much as her European allies.

For another, the Kennedy Administration has expressed a very understandable desire to shift more of the burden of upholding the free world, on to the shoulders of her increasingly prosperous and dynamic allies. This has a material aspect: it means greater European participation in foreign aid and technical assistance programmes. It has a military aspect: it means greater European participation in the defence of the NATO area, and assistance in the building up of the contingency reserves for possible use outside it. It has a human aspect: it means giving greater weight to European experience and knowledge, particularly of former colonial areas. And it has a moral aspect, the development of a sense of common identity between American policy and those of her leading European allies so that the diplomatic and political onus of confronting the Soviet bloc or representing the interests of the free world is not born solely by the United States.

In the relationship of European allies to the United States it seems to me that these two trends, the increasing military dominance of the United States and her increasing political, economic and tactical dependence on Europe, can be seen in reverse. The European NATO powers, whether they are prepared to acknowledge it or not, become strategically more dependent on American technological prowess all the time. Even Britain, which aspired to a measure of strategic independence must seek at best a wholly interdependent relationship with the United States if her strategic deterrent system is to retain any credibility through the middle and later sixties.[2] By the same token, the attempt to construct a French system of strategic deterrence around a small force of manned bombers by 1965 and around an IRBM by 1968, without American assistance, is now widely questioned, even in French government circles. So fair and well informed an assessor of his country's interests as M. Raymond Aron has recently recorded his own conviction that this objective is impossible of achievement in this decade.[3] In other words the United States is in an even stronger position than in the past to direct, or, if she insists, to dictate, the military policy of the alliance. Most European governments know this, and are beginning to realise that the only way they can ensure a continuing and steadfast American commitment to the security of Europe in the era of nuclear parity is by assisting the United States to develop more flexible forms of military response and defence.

But the group of allies with whom the United States must maintain close political relations are very different societies from those whose governments signed the North Atlantic Treaty twelve years ago. Most of them have recovered, and surpassed, their old economic and social dynamism: and they have restored and extended their own interests and contacts throughout the world. At the same time their confidence in American political leadership which was very high in the early days of NATO, is nowadays qualified; partly because of the mistakes of the Eisenhower years; partly because of the failure of the American policy-making process in Washington to mature and develop at

the same pace as the development of American physical powers and responsibilities; partly, in the NATO and cold war context, by reason of a less ideological and more empiric assessment of Soviet political aims and the requirements of co-existence. Indeed, the American school of thought which has in the past been nervous of strengthening or extending the functions of NATO for fear of associating the United States too closely with the old colonial powers, has its counterpart, especially after Cuba, in the fears of many Europeans at being too closely associated with the United States in NATO lest they damage their own relations with the new or uncommitted countries.

It is obviously unwise to attempt any generalisations about an area of such diverse national psychologies and traditions of thought as Europe. What is beyond dispute, in my view, is that the restored pride and dynamism of Europe makes it likely that these countries will tend to play a critical or even obstructive role in the formulation of allied policy, unless a means can be found which gives them full responsibility of playing a constructive role. Moreover there can be no reason to assume that this is not a permanent development or is likely to be less marked when certain grand old men of a passing generation have quit the European scene, for the new Europe is not the creation merely of de Gaulle, Adenauer and Macmillan. Similarly there is no inherent reason why the new Europe should not accept the equity and logic of the Kennedy Administration's desire to share more of the present American burden with Europe, but only if Europe is given a larger voice in determining the policies which it necessitates. The change in the nature of the external challenge makes it as impossible for the United States to use her increasing strategic dominance in the alliance in order to lay down general policies for the West, as in effect she tried to do through a large part of the 1950s, as it is for the European NATO allies to develop or maintain independent systems of strategic deterrence or national defence. This increasing dependence of the two halves of the alliance on each other could be the source of enormous friction or of a better working relationship and more powerful central institutions, depending on the intelligence and candour with which it is confronted.

The second important internal development springs also from the recovery of Europe. The implicit assumptions on which the institutions of NATO, certainly the military machinery, were founded was that the alliance consisted of three powers with worldwide interests and responsibilities, the United States, Britain and France, and nine (later increased to twelve) countries whose primary interest was in their security in their own particular area. This view corresponded closely with reality in the early 1950s when Britain and France were still imperial powers in the old sense, and when the other European countries were still preoccupied with the reconstruction of their domestic economies. But the distinction is now becoming increasingly blurred. The worldwide responsibilities of Britain and France have diminished, though they are still of considerable importance, and Britain is becoming

increasingly reluctant to use military means for the defence of her own without the support of allies. Moreover, the interests and influence of the other NATO countries have increased. Italy, for instance, has developed important economic, and to some extent political, relationships of her own with the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Canada is expanding her relationships not only throughout the Commonwealth but in the Far East. Germany not only plays an increasingly important part in the defence of Europe, but is spreading her interests throughout the world. Turkey is vitally involved in the affairs of the Middle East. Norway and Greece are now worldwide shipping powers. The Netherlands has an unfinished chapter in her relations with South East Asia. Belgium and Portugal still have a vital role to play, for good or ill, in Africa, (here it is not so much that their interests have expanded, as that the area in which they are involved is now of greater political importance to the alliance than ten years ago).

No doubt it is possible, on a narrow definition of overseas interests and responsibilities, to make out a case for regarding Britain and France as still "world powers" in a sense that the others are not. The essential point, however, is that the distinction is now too tenuous to be made the basis of an effective formula for allied co-operation and co-ordination of policy in the years ahead. The old one will die hard in France, for the notion of a tripartite directorate of NATO is dear to the heart of President de Gaulle, though many other thoughtful Frenchmen are aware how much the world is changing. But any attempt to implement it would create unceasing friction between the "great", the "middle" and the "small" powers in NATO, and markedly weaken their willingness to accept the risks and strains which membership of NATO involves.

Though President Kennedy appears to have made certain undefined concessions to President de Gaulle's view during his visit to Paris in May, 1961, it is clear that the only long-term solution is to find a way of drawing all thirteen countries (for Iceland does not claim to have more than local interests, though these she claims tenaciously) into closer association with the United States. For between them her thirteen allies have a range of world–wide interests, information, opportunities and commitments equal to her own, whereas no smaller group of NATO powers has. There would be a curious irony in erecting a Troika in Paris at the moment when we are resisting it in Geneva and New York.

The third development within the relationships of the Atlantic powers themselves may provide the incentive to develop such means of strengthening the political authority of NATO. This is the need to develop stronger regional associations on both sides of the Atlantic. The British government has now announced its intention of negotiating membership of the European Economic Community and it seems probably that within the next two years she (together with Denmark and possibly Greece and Portgual) will have become a full member of it. This change in British policy is likely to have certain very important effects within NATO. Quite apart from the recasting of her

relationships with the Commonwealth on which so much attention has been focussed, it means that she is tacitly abandoning the attempt, which has dominated her post-war policy, to maintain a special relationship, in political and military matters, with the United States, and has accepted the force of the Kennedy Administration's contention that her influence in Washington will henceforward be commensurate with her influence, in Paris, Bonn and other capitals of continental Europe. This altered perspective in London is likely to have a double effect. In the first place, Britain's decision to give a high priority to her political and economic relations with her European neighbours and to enter an association with them (if she can negotiate the terms of entry) which is not merely consultative but involves a certain cession of sovereignty and a highly co-ordinated system of planning, should do much to allay fears that have long been expressed in France, and to a lesser extent in other European countries, of Anglo-American domination of the alliance, it should thus weaken the demand for tripartism. Secondly, since Britain, of all European NATO countries, is the one least likely to be attracted to the idea of a European "Third Force", the fact that she is quietly having to relinquish her special bilateral relationship with the United States is likely to make her all the more anxious to develop and strengthen the only existing forum of multilateral trans-Atlantic political consultation, the NATO Council. The same is also likely to be true of the smaller recruits to EEC who will be equally loth to sacrific the trans-Atlantic links. EEC may in time acquire some limited responsibility in defence matters, even perhaps come to discharge some of the functions of the abortive EDC, but not if it means precluding European governments from contact with the source of virtually all Western strategic power, the United States. The political and military development of EEC is therefore dependent upon the strengthening of NATO.

By the same token, Canada will almost certainly feel impelled to accept membership of the Organisation of American States. This is a move that is clearly desirable in its own right. But Canada will be loth to become more deeply involved in the affairs of her own hemisphere unless her lines of political communication, not just with Britain but with Europe as a whole, can be kept open and improved.

## IV

If one is right in thinking that these six developments – the widening of the Soviet challenge to the West as a consequence of nuclear parity; the growing difficulty of maintaining a stable system of international relations in the age of disimperialism; the importance of civil control over military decision and of unified diplomatic action; the increasing military dependence of Europe on the United States and the growing political dependence of the United States on Europe; the blurring of the old distinction in NATO between powers of greater and lesser interests; and the needs and desire to offset the trend toward regionalism within the alliance – are those which are likely to be most

important for, and to have the most far reaching effect upon security and cohesion, then certain conclusions seem to me to follow. The first is that the significance and authority of the political institutions of the alliance must be enhanced. The importance of a resolution of conflicting interests outside the NATO area is now as great as making common cause over those that directly affect the Atlantic area itself. Allied with this is the need to develop entirely new means of interposing political judgement between every step of military planning, long term or emergency. And both problems require an allied solution since a closer working arrangement on political questions merely between the larger powers in NATO no longer meets the needs of the case.

The second is that the defence of Europe, which will remain the central responsibility of NATO, needs reconsideration, not merely in the light of the Berlin crisis, but of changes in the strategic and technological environment, and the altering European-American relationship.

The third derives, perhaps, from the other two, the need to maintain a high degree of internal confidence and external caution and resolution by developing a new relationship between the political institutions of NATO on the one hand, and strategic weapons and the planning that surrounds them on the other.

## V

In the early days of NATO the principal emphasis of the allied governments was on the speediest possible development of central military commands. The central political institutions, the NATO Council with its fifteen permanent representatives and the office of the Secretary General and his staff were developed more slowly, and until 1956 or 1957 were considered by the member governments to be less important. The shock of the Suez debacle gave rise to the Committee of Three, Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada, Signor Martino of Italy, and Mr. Halvard Lange of Norway, and on their recommendation the powers of the Secretary-General were enhanced and the Council's terms of reference were widened to include discussion of questions outside the NATO area. But despite these reforms of five years ago neither the Council nor the NATO secretariat wield the authority or are equipped for the responsibilities which the need for a high degree of political co-ordination imposes.

What are these responsibilities? They seem to divide into two categories, those concerned with the direct confrontation of the Soviet Union in Europe, and those deriving from the need to maintain a stable pattern of international relationships in the rest of the world. The third responsibility, of possible control over military decisions, I shall leave for later consideration.

Now it would be absurd to suggest that the NATO Council does not spend a great deal of its time in considering questions of European security and the fact that it does, that the representatives of the smaller or more exposed European powers are in constant touch with American, British or French

views and support, partly accounts for the fact that Soviet attempts to apply pressure and blackmail on them in turn has met with only marginal success.

But regular consultation on problems or threats as they arise is one thing, joint planning is quite another. Two points cannot fail to impress the outside observer of the operations of NATO. The first is that the NATO Council in Paris has little authority over the military planning either of the Standing Group and the Military Committee in Washington or of their most dynamic subordinate command, Supreme Headquarters Europe. It is consulted, it is informed, it is advised by the military authorities as occasion serves, but it does not wield any real authority over the work of the international military institutions of the alliance, in any way comparable to that which national cabinets wield over national military planning. The Council thus has little power to determine the military environment in which it may be asked to reach political judgements. As such it can, for the most part, only function as a clearing house of individual national aspirations and anxieties.

In the second place, the permanent NATO Secretariat is not a strong enough body to undertake effective long range planning on behalf of the alliance. Except in certain specialised and technical financial fields, governments have not encouraged the formation of a civil staff of high enough calibre to act as an international policy co-ordination centre, which will earn the respect of governments in the way that the staff of OEEC has done or as the new "Eurocrats" in the central institutions of EEC are earning it.

It may be argued that this is a false analogy, that it is impossible to attempt long range or detailed political planning in the same way in which it has proved both necessary and possible for international staffs to make long range economic forecasts or military plans. (The relative unimportance of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department can be cited as evidence.) This is true of many aspects of politics and diplomacy but not all. In Europe especially there are certain intractable or endemic problems (made intractable as much by differences between allies as between the alliance and Russia) which call for the kind of continuing concentration which only a high class staff can bring to bear. It was, for instance, a rude shock to discover that virtually no international staff work had been done on the Berlin problem between the ending of the 1958/9 crisis and the recrudescense of the Soviet threat to Berlin in the spring of 1961. We may pay very dearly for this.

A crucial area of policy to which NATO, as an institution, has made virtually no contribution is arms control and those aspects of disarmament policy that would affect Europe. Yet this is as central to the aims and responsibilities of the alliance as military planning, and in many ways much more difficult; because there is no central staff in the NATO secretariat permanently at work on those problems, the plans formulated by national governments, often hastily, have more than once foundered on the hostility of other member governments to them (perhaps because their officials have not devoted consistent attention to the problem) or else on the natural caution of the

international military staffs.[4] A great deal of consistent attention is now being devoted to arms control and disarmament policy by the United States government and American universities. But little of this is communicated to other governments in NATO, without whose support the United States is unlikely to make much headway with the Soviet Union or in the United Nations. Certainly as far as the application of American ideas is concerned, one can be quite certain that a common policy cannot be evolved, without the creation of a joint staff to work on it, and NATO is clearly the right place to create such a team.

Yet another field in which the views of NATO, the civil institution, as distinct from SHAPE, the military headquarters, carry little weight is the evaluation of trends in the policy of the Soviet Union or other countries potentially hostile to the alliance. By this I do not mean either purely military intelligence or intelligence gathering which is so delicate a task that it can probably only be conducted by national governments. What I do mean is the evaluation of intentions and broad trends of Soviet and Communist policy by competent experts. So often one hears an official of one NATO government bevailing the fact that another government places quite a different interpretation on Soviet policy and ascribing difficulties in achieving joint action or a common outlook to this cause. Insofar as this can be corrected, NATO is clearly the place in which to make the attempt, not by occasional conferences, but by having an influential international staff continuously considering the evidence. Here the blurring of the old distinction between the "great" and the lesser powers is relevant; the smaller NATO powers with their widening interests now often have important insights to contribute to the views of the larger powers.

On questions of European and Atlantic security, it seems to me that events have demonstrated clearly that intergovernmental consultation alone is no longer adequate to the demands of the Sixties, and that nothing less than the evolution of a system of joint political planning by a strong international staff will give governments the necessary foundation on which to develop a more unified policy. But the problem of dealing with situations outside the NATO area is more complex.

The need is obvious, for, as the world shrinks, the extent to which the unilateral action of one NATO power directly affects the interests and security of the others increases sharply. The events of the post-war years provide direct evidence of this. The failure of Belgium to launch the Congo as a viable sovereign state and the consequent chaos which ensued, not only complicated the task and jeopardised the authority of the UN on whose effective functioning all the members of NATO are dependent (though President de Gaulle may at present think otherwise), but also jeopardised British and French relationships with their Commonwealth and Community associates in Africa. Conversely, the pace of British and French policy in Africa has had a profound effect on the position of Belgium and Portugal. American policy in Latin America – and not just the Cuban debacle – now increasingly affects the

interests of her NATO allies there, just as her Asian and African policies interact upon theirs. At one of the focal points of the cold war the failure of France and the United States to co-ordinate their local policies in the successor states of Indo-China during the past seven years has not only harmed those two countries, but the West as a whole.

There is no simple answer here. To suggest, even if it were acceptable to the NATO governments concerned, that the same kind of joint planning should be developed as for questions of European policy would be a mistake. The new countries – most particularly in Africa – are intensely suspicious of any effort to devise a monolithic Western policy towards them. An overt attempt to create "a political general staff", as some American and some Europeans (notably Sir Anthony Eden) have suggested, would do considerably more harm than good. At the same time the hopes that are still nourished in many NATO countries that somehow or other it can be made clear to the uncommitted world that NATO is concerned purely with the confrontation of Russia and that membership of it implies no support for the policies of other allies in other parts of the world, are proving a delusion.

This does not mean that NATO should try and plan a collective policy for action in the non-NATO world. But it does mean that its member governments now have an absolute duty to inform their allies, and to submit, through the NATO Council, their policies and plans for action in other parts of the world to the collective judgement of a group of allies whose interests are more and more closely inter-related. It could be argued that this can be done through the ordinary process of diplomacy. But collective judgements are sometimes more valuable that individual ones. The new Belgian government now wisely takes the line that it would prefer to have its African policy actively criticised in the NATO Council than be heard in polite silence by its allies and then to see them vote against it at the UN. The United States might have been deterred from its Cuban folly if it had over asked its NATO allies to help it assess the balance of risks in the Caribbean (just as the British and French decision to make war on Egypt would never have survived discussion in the NATO Council).

It can also be argued that to accept such a commitment to consult one's allies would lead to inaction and paralysis on the part of the major powers. I find this argument unconvincing. For one thing, there is no virtue in action for its own sake and there is a high premium on avoiding rash action outside the NATO area. For another, in the delicate balance of contemporary international affairs it is unlikely that the acts of the leading NATO powers in Africa, the Middle East or Asia will achieve their purpose unless they have the support of their Atlantic allies.

At this moment Angola presents, in many ways, as difficult a problem for the alliance as Berlin. There may be a justification for Dr Salazar's colonial policy, but it is hard to discern it, and the basic assumptions of Portuguese policy, and the methods used to enforce them, are in flat contradiction with those which govern the aims and actions of the other colonial powers

in NATO, and the non-colonial allies who are almost as closely affected. Portugal may have to be persuaded to change the whole foundation of her colonial policy if the word NATO is not to stink in African nostrils, and all the member countries to suffer in greater or lesser degree. Yet where can such a resolution of conflicting views and interests be reached if not in the NATO Council. Unlike the UN its deliberations are private and discreet: it comprises those countries on whose goodwill the security and prosperity of Portugal are wholly dependent: and they can, if they must, wield the ultimate sanction of expulsion, for the military contribution to NATO of Portugal is negligible and her strategic value is now greatly diminished. If the allies cannot persuade Portugal to modify her colonial policy, then world opinion, Communist, non-aligned or even in the NATO countries themselves, can only conclude that the political institutions of the alliance are mere facades.

I do not mean to suggest that consultation on wider problems, or those outside the NATO area, should in any way be given priority over the evolution of a common policy on European questions or those concerned with the military confrontation of the Soviet Union. Any such idea would be absurd. But the one is essential to the other in the sense that the smaller countries in the alliance can only be expected to have a degree of confidence in NATO, to give its interests a high priority in their planning, to accept the risks as well as benefits which membership confers, if it gives them access to the American, British and French policy-making process and an opportunity to exert an influence upon it over a wide range of questions, in a way which the conventional diplomatic intercourse of friendly countries would not. Since their interests are becoming increasingly extended, intimate knowledge of the factors which may decide American policy toward, say, South East Asia or British policy in the Persian Gulf, has a distinct bearing on their readiness to face the strains of a Berlin crisis. Moreover, there are broad questions of national policy to which a proper answer can only be givern after candid discussion in NATO. The most obvious one at present is whether Britain should try to help keep the peace in the Middle East and Far East by maintaining nearly half her forces there at great cost or whether she should concentrate her strength more in Europe. The argument is a finely balanced one in terms of the interests of the allies as much as Britain, but I doubt if it can be satisfactorily solved by national discussion alone.

The third reform of the political machinery of NATO concerns the status of the members of the Council. For the past ten years the NATO countries have for the most part, appointed professional diplomats as their permanent representatives on the Council. The value of the NATO Council is enormous, for it is the only body of Western political representatives which meets regularly every week or more often (in addition to the Spring and December meetings of Foreign Ministers). Important subjects can thus be discussed by men who have a thorough knowledge of oach others' minds and without creating the sense of crisis which special gatherings of Ministers or officials from different capitals tend to cause. But it is doubtful whether, if the

Secretariat is to be strengthened, if the terms of reference of the Council are to be widened, and if it is to acquire certain operational responsibilities which we will discuss later, professional diplomats can carry enough weight with their own governments and public opinions to make the Council the really influential centre of discussion and decision that the course of events now demands. Skilful and experienced as professionals may be in dealing with the agenda of the Council, there seems to me a strong case for appointing men with political standing in their own country, who can speak directly to the heads of governments and, where constitutionally possible, to parliaments. There is no question of abandoning the extremely useful rules of privacy which govern discussion in the Council: the point is to have a man who can convince his own public opinion by direct means that the interests of his country have not been overlooked in reaching a decision which may not be wholly palatable, after full and candid discussion with his peers.

The arrangement would differ according to the constitutional practice of different countries. In those with a parliamentary and cabinet government such as Britain, Canada, or Belgium, Norway and Denmark, it would presumably involve the appointment of a Minister of State or a Minister for North Atlantic Affairs, as the permanent representative on the NATO Council, perhaps with a seat in the Cabinet. In the United States it would mean the appointment of a special representative of the President who would either be a member of the National Security Council in absentia or would report direct to it in the same way the Mr. Adlai Stevenson and his predecessors have reported direct from the United Nations (the appointment of the present American representative to NATO, Mr. Thomas Finletter, who has been an influential political figure at home, goes half way to meet this requirement). In the Fifth Republic and those countries which are governed by one man, it would involve the appointment of someone high in his confidence. This is not a reform that is likely to take place overnight: the point is that if several of the leading NATO countries appoint men of this calibre the others would feel bound to follow suit.

Since the countries of the alliance are not yet prepared to take a step towards creating a federation, there would be no question of giving a revised Council any supranational powers. The point is to enhance its status in the eyes of governments, electorates and adversaries so that its declarations and recommendations have the maximum impact on the course of events. The professional diplomat should remain on the national delegation for his advice will be invaluable if the Council's terms of reference are enlarged, but the chief representative should be a figure of political weight. It is only by this means that NATO can respond swiftly to diplomatic probes, and avert, for instance, the tardy and ragged response which was all the Western powers could make to the closing of the East Berlin frontier on 13th August. In times of high tension it is probably necessary to establish a political operations centre, akin to a military command post, if the inherent disadvantage of a large alliance when facing a single adversary is to be overcome; and, in a democratic alliance,

this can only be manned by figures who command political support in their own countries.

## VI

A future historian may find it strange that, since the Soviet Union became a nuclear power in the same year that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was launched, and has been continuously augmenting this form of military strength throughout the whole lifetime of the alliance, it should have taken the NATO powers so long to accept the implications of nuclear parity. He will probably find the explanation to this puzzle in the intense reluctance of Western leaders and their publics to believe that their centuries-old leadership in technology was drawing to an abrupt close – a revolution in accepted ideas, compounded in the last few years by the very real difficulty in assessing the effect on the strategic balance of power of a revolutionary form of striking power, the ballistic missile.

Whatever the cause, I think it is fair to say that only in the last year or so have Western governments really begun to adjust their whole military planning and their conception of the requirements of security and stability in the Atlantic area to the fact that Russia is a strong nuclear, air and missile power, and even so the process of adjustment is proceeding at an uneven pace in different countries. Throughout much of the previous three years, the process of clarification has been muddied by anxious speculation as to whether the nuclear stalemate itself could be maintained or whether the difficulties and confusions which surrounded the early years of the American missile programme, and the problems of offsetting – by technical means in the open West – the relative invulnerability of Soviet striking power which is achieved by political means, might not undermine the strategic balance of power itself.

That anxiety persists but it began to slacken some eighteen months ago when it became clear that the United States was making effective progress towards the re-establishment of a secure and stable system of strategic deterrence, founded on the solid fuelled missile in hard, mobile or underwater bases and in the intercontinental bomber. As this programme advances towards completion, in two to three years time, so the chances of any general attack on the Atlantic area, whether based on calculation or miscalculation, diminishes. The closing of the "missile gap" (if it was ever of real strategic significance), and of the "intelligence" or vulnerability gap, (which is) will have given the United States during the middle and later 1960s the same ability to provide for the overall protection of the area from large scale attack that its hegemony in nuclear striking power afforded in the early days of the alliance. (To look further ahead is unwise at this moment. No-one can claim to assess with any assurance the effects of space weapons or even dependable reconnaissance satellites upon the strategic balance.)

But the new situation is creating a different relationship between the United States and her allies and already imposes a different set of military

requirements on the alliance as a whole than those which obtained during the supremacy of the medium bomber and before the Soviet nuclear stockpile attained its present size. It does not mean that the integrity or the effectiveness of the American commitment to the defence of Europe in the event of major attack is weakening, for reasons that have been fully set out in an authoritative article by Albert Wohlstetter "Nuclear sharing : NATO and the Nth country" in the April, 1961 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. It must not be forgotten that the American signature to the North Atlantic Treaty was not an act of disinterested generosity but derived from a well thought decision that the survival of Western Europe was essential to the survival of the United States itself. Nothing has happened to alter that judgement, and now that the protagonists of "agonising reappraisal" have had their day and a clearer vision of the American national interest has been restored in Washington, it is apparent that any talk of American withdrawal from Europe to a Fortress America position was always a hollow bluff. If there were any doubt about it President Kennedy's decision not only to maintain the present level of American forces in Europe, despite the drain on the foreign exchange resources of the United States, and even to reinforce them in a crisis, should finally dispose of any such questionings in the United States, in Europe and in Moscow.

Nevertheless, the advent of nuclear parity has profoundly altered the nature of the American guarantee to Europe. The existence even of an effective, well protected strategic retaliatory force can no longer deter all forms of threat to Europe. As the relative counterforce capability of the United States diminishes with the growth and diversification of Soviet long range striking power, so the deterrent value of the threat of massive nuclear retaliation against anything short of a massive attack on Europe and the United States must diminish with it; in other words, strategic nuclear weapons must become increasingly a deterrent only to the use of their Soviet counterparts. Now that both sides have a continuous spectrum of weapons of mass destruction in their armouries, the kind of limited challenge presented by a crisis over Berlin, or on the line of the Iron Curtain, by a threat to Northern Norway, to the Baltic Straits or to Greece (let alone in South East Asia or the Middle East), can be met only at the level at which it is offered. To rest the defence of Europe on a force which could withstand a military challenge only for a few hours without resorting to nuclear weapons must lead to insecurity and diplomatic paralysis.

One reason it has taken so long for governments and military leaders to accept the logic of events has been the attempt to build around the tactical atomic weapon a doctrine of limited atomic war. NATO governments were all the more ready to engage in such an exercise, partly because of the historic dislike of large standing armies in some countries, partly because of the widely held belief that the disbursement of tactical atomic weapons to the European allies gave them a measure of control over American policy. Moreover, army staffs have seen in this development an opportunity, hitherto reserved for air forces and navies, to graft their tactics on to the most advanced and

spectacular developments in military science. The consequence has been that the NATO "shield" forces in the Central Area have been increasingly trained and organised for atomic warfare only, a military posture which is at the worst highly dangerous in terms of miscalculation, and at best irrelevant to the kinds of challenge to Western nerve, morale and clear judgement that are likely to arise.

At the same time, the belief that it would be possible to fight a war in Europe in which nuclear weapons were confined to battlefield targets, without incurring an impossibly high risk of escalation into thermo-nuclear strategic war, even if its aims were limited, is dying a slow but sure death for two reasons which Henry Kissinger, originally one of the chief architects of the theory of limited nuclear war, has candidly and courageously pointed out in his recent book, *The Necessity for Choice*. It has proved impossible to develop an agreed inter-service doctrine on what limitations could be accepted and observed once nuclear weapons had been introduced into the battle. And the development of the medium range missile and the nuclear armed fighter bomber increases the potential depth of the battlefield to a point where both adversaries would find it very difficult to determine whether they were being subjected in, say, Poland or the Low Countries, to interdiction attack or to the first wave of strategic bombing aimed at their heartlands.

The Kennedy Administration deserves great credit for grappling with this problem of the overdependence of NATO's European defences on nuclear weapons so soon after taking office. The President's action in making clear that there would be no reduction in American forces in Europe, and possibly even an increase in times of emergency, should remove any fear that in the American desire to see stronger indigenous conventional forces there is the first step in some American policy of withdrawal within its shell. But it is essential to keep the problem of strengthening the NATO shield in proper perspective. In the first place, no one has suggested, and there seems no valid military requirement for, a dramatic increase in the size of the NATO shield force in the central area. If one accepts the current NATO doctrine, which seems to me sound in this respect, that it is not the role of the NATO ground forces to fight a prolonged battle for the defence of Europe,[5] so much as to hold conflict at the lowest possible level for the longest possible time in order to win a breathing space for a considered political decision by both sides on the implications of mounting to a higher level of warfare, then the figure of thirty divisions stationed in the Central Area in normal times is adequate. By this I mean full strength divisions and not the shadowy skeletons that too often pass muster in the NATO order of battle. If that figure can be reached as it could be with the completion of the German programme and the honouring by Britain and France of their original commitments of four divisions, it represents a numerical superiority of three to two over the Soviet divisions normally stationed in the German Democratic Republic. It is quite true that Mr. Khrushchev has, during the summer of 1961, taken a number of actions designed to convince public opinion in the NATO countries that attempts to

improve their conventional strength are worthless since he has only to snap his fingers to summon up much greater reserves. He has arrested the run down of the Soviet ground forces announced in January 1960 (this policy was probably suspended late in 1960 or early in 1961, and possibly for reasons unconnected with the Berlin crisis): and he has suspended demobilisation of the present class of conscripts, thus augmenting the Soviet forces above their 1959 level. But the economic and social pressures which originally made him anxious to reduce Soviet mobilised manpower are as strong as ever, and it is reasonable to assume that his actions are designed to have a short term effect and do not represent a permanent change of Soviet policy.

But, by the same token it is essential in terms of a strong Western diplomacy and morale that the NATO forces in Central Europe can be augmented above the level of thirty divisions and four thousand aircraft, for limited periods of high tension in order to register determination by non-provocative means. And this requires on increase in the strategic reserves of the leading NATO powers, for it is only they who can put a significant number of efficient reserve forces into Europe at relatively short notice. Since in the present state of British and French commitments elsewhere, it is really only the United States who can provide a strategic reserve large enough to have a real diplomatic significance, how does this affect the need, which has been noted earlier, to redistribute the European and American shares of the common burden? The answer, to my mind, lies not so much in terms of quantity as of quality.

The quality of the non-American units in Germany is uneven in terms of equipment, training, mobility and efficiency – discrepancies of which the Russians are keenly aware. The United States would find a readier response if she asked her allies to improve the training, manning and equipment of their conventional forces up to the high standard of her own forces in Europe, using economic resources with which they are now for the most part liberally endowed, rather than markedly to increase their size, at a time when manpower suitable and available for military service is scarcer in Europe than in the United States. (Even so it may require significant changes in the manpower policy of several NATO allies since high quality units inevitably create a demand for technicians and highly qualified men who are now scarce all over Europe.) For it is an irony of the present situation that the United States, with a high wartime birthrate, increasing automation in industry, endemic unemployment and a selective service system, is politically readier to augment her conventional forces than most European countries. However, to ask the United States to station permanently still larger conventional forces in Europe would be disastrous in terms of mutual confidence and respect within the alliance. To ask her to maintain her present commitment and increase her reserve commitment in return for a rapid improvement of the efficiency of the European NATO forces is the more reasonable equation. It would be a double irony if the European partners were unable to meet their half of the equation when one considers that the German, British and French armies were the most efficient in the world at a time when the American army was an ill-paid,

socially despised and miniscule force. Moreover, the European countries are also making important advances in conventional weapons such as anti-tank missiles. If the European allies cannot match American forces in terms of quality, then the equitable and psychologically unifying course would be to contribute a greater proportion of the cost of maintaining them in Europe.

In the second place, few responsible people have suggested that NATO can wholly dispense with shorter range nuclear weapons nor contemplate resting the security of Europe on conventional forces alone. Their continued presence in Europe is necessary, first, to deter their use by the Soviet forces in any minor war situation occurring in Europe. And, second, to remove any temptation to the Soviet Union to take a leaf from the pages of German history and present the United States and Britain with the *fait accompli* of a conquered Western Europe by a swift offensive in the manner of May 1940, using her strong tactical air power to reinforce her limited strength on the ground. The essential point is that such weapons as *Honest John*, *Sergeant*, *Pershing*, and the nuclear armed fighter-bombers should be regarded as a form of penultimate reserve firepower to be employed only – but only – when it is clear that massive aggression, conventional or nuclear, is under way, and not as part of the resources which divisional or subordinate commanders would expect to have made available to them in the early stages of combat. Since they are purely American weapons, launcher as well as warhead, they should always have been concentrated in special American units[6] under the direct command of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Central and Southern areas (they are not deployed in the Northern area), to be used only on the highest political authority. But the policy of devolving them has gone so far that it will be difficult enough to reverse it, and correct the false premises on which the training of national forces, most particularly the British and German armies, have been proceeding, without immediately carrying the opposite policy to its logical conclusion. One should therefore be content for the present to see Army nuclear support weapons held under the authority of Army commanders but no lower down the chain of command, while insisting that present and future generations of tactical aircraft have a conventional as well as, if need be, a nuclear capability. This is a policy which is now being publicly resisted by the German Defence Minister, Herr Strauss, who said in a recent interview in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that nuclear weapons should remain integrated in the division in order to increase the effectiveness of the deterrent.[7] The form of political control over the use of these shorter range nuclear weapons will be discussed in the last section.

The tactics of the nuclear and the conventional battlefield are very different and it will not be easy for commanders to re-adapt their training to techniques which give first priority to the latter. It is hard not to feel considerable sympathy with politicians and military commanders – in Germany and elsewhere – who, having originally accepted the necessity of tactical atomic weapons with reluctance, are now being asked to reverse the premises on which their planning and training for the last six or seven years has been

based. It might be easier to accept the necessity for such an alteration if greater emphasis were also laid on another major priority of Alliance planning – progress on arms control. Too much of NATO's military planning has proceeded in a political vacuum without reference to the broader requirements of international stability. The need to find ways of checking the upward spiral of arms and forces and eliminating the most likely cause of war, is now very much in the minds of all the political leaders of the NATO powers. At the same time it is becoming evident that the requirements of stability dictate that such restraints should not depend only on the successful outcome of complex or protracted multilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, but that they may have to be initiated by unilateral action on both sides. It is belatedly coming to be recognised that arms control and military planning are not antithetical, but two facets of the same policy.

In the context of NATO this has two special implications. The first is that as more radical approaches to the problem of arms control run into technical or political objections, so it may prove necessary to make a start with some form of agreed limitation of armaments, particularly of nuclear weapons in Europe, the area which both sides rightly regard as the one where war could most easily erupt. If this is the case, NATO must work towards a military posture which makes it possible to contemplate such a proposal. (This was one of the weaknesses of General Norstad's proposal of last year for an IRBM force in Europe.) The second requirement of arms control is to evolve the clearest and most watertight system of command over nuclear weapons to convince the adversary that we are doing everything that human ingenuity can devise to mitigate the dangers of war through accident, irresponsibility or miscalculation. A declared policy of concentrating the physical control of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe at the highest efficient level of responsibility (as the Russians themselves claim to do) might have a valuable effect in adjusting the distorted Soviet perspective on NATO military planning.[8] Moreover, a greater concern for the place of arms control in military planning would give a constructive, rather than a purely defensive complexion, to the central institutions of the alliance.

## VII

The controversy which was in full swing during the spring and early summer (until overtaken by the Berlin crisis) over the proper role of tactical atomic weapons in Europe, clearly illustrates how faulty the system of policy coordination in NATO has become. The statements on the subject made by President Kennedy, the Secretary of Defence and other American officials on this subject, though in my view quite correct, have clearly implied that when the United States changes its policy so does the Alliance. But this is the language of an earlier epoch in NATO, before the European countries had regained strong governments and strong views of their own. The upshot has been dignified but fully public argument between the German and American

governments, with the British government, which now privately accepts the validity of the American view but is acutely embarrassed on the question of conventional manpower, trying to keep a foot in both camps. And this on a subject which is at the very heart of NATO's own responsibilities.

Now, as I have suggested earlier, the United States possesses, to an even greater extent than in the early days of NATO, the power to dictate the military policy of the alliance, even in the non-nuclear field. But if she exercises this power to the full she runs two grave risks. The first is that of incurring the concealed resentment of European governments and public opinion. Europeans cannot but admit the prowess of the United States in military technology, but they are not prepared to accord her any hegemony in the realm of ideas, even if their own views are less well informed. And to create such tensions could militate against the true interests of the United States since she is increasingly dependent on the political support of her European partners.

In the second place, it multiplies the effect of mistakes in American policy and increases the difficulty of correcting them. This will, I think, emerge clearly when it is possible to write the inner history of military policy in the alliance during the last five or six years. American policy between 1954 and 1959 placed a decisive emphasis on firepower as compared with manpower, and persuaded its NATO allies of the importance of low yield nuclear weapons and medium range missiles to the defence of Europe. This policy was accepted at first with misgivings by the European allies, but later with enthusiasm as they became aware that this would largely relieve them of the need to increase their mobilised manpower. Then American views began to change, but since the allies had only a very fragmentary picture through occasional briefings of the NATO Council, or the ineffective Military Representatives' Committee in Washington, of the considerations which were causing American policymakers to revise their view, they continued to apply the lesson they had learnt so well. The consequence is that the British, German, Canadian and French staffs are still much more enthusiastic about the use of low yield nuclear weapons as part of their normal fire power than the American army, which is abandoning the pentomic division – and with it the cliché that soldiers cannot be expected to fight with anything but the best weapons, – and is trying to evolve a tactical doctrine that places less emphasis on nuclear weapons.

It seems to me that it is in the interests of the United States to avert this kind of cleavage between herself and her NATO allies (which has been muted but not healed by the Berlin crisis), and to shorten the time lag in conforming to modifications in military concepts, of which she must clearly be the fountain head since technology has so profound an effect upon them. The best way to do this would be to ensure that her allies had continuous access to the inner debate from which American policy emerges, and that they were treated with greater candour concerning American weapon developments. In other words, that all her NATO allies should now be on the same

footing, as far as exchange of confidential information and views are concerned, as Britain and Canada have been since before NATO was founded. If the military policy of all the allies for the defence of Europe is to respond to and keep pace with technological development and events in the outside world, there is no alternative to a system of joint international planning in which the United States has a powerful but not overweening influence.

The obvious response is that such a system exists already. All NATO commands, including the two Supreme Commands which play an important part in the planning process, are international though their commanders are American. They report to the Standing Group, that is to the representatives of the United States, British and French Chiefs of Staff in Washington, who in turn report to the Military Committee which consists of the Chiefs of Staffs of the alliance. Their recommendations and modifications to each five year plan then go before the NATO Council for approval. In theory all military planning in NATO is internationally formulated and does not go into effect until it receives the unanimous assent of the highest civil authority in the alliance and the member government which it represents.

But significant differences have developed between theory and practice. For one thing the Standing Group in Washington has become a somewhat shadowy organisation with little influence either in the Pentagon or in the alliance as a whole. SHAPE has become the dynamic centre of military planning and since it is only twelve miles from NATO, while the Standing Group and the representatives of the Military Committee are three thousand, the Supreme Commander Europe has in reality become the Chief of Staff of the alliance. With a man of such remarkable qualities as General Norstad this situation has been, on the whole, acceptable. But even during his five years at SHAPE certain weaknesses have been apparent which are likely to become glaring if a less gifted soldier-diplomat succeeds him.

One is that it imposes a great strain on one man to function as a planner, as a military advisor to an international organisation, and as a potential commander of so vast an area as NATO Europe. Another is that SHAPE as a planning headquarters tends to fall between two stools. It is directed by an American, but as an international commander his views do not necessarily represent those of the US government. When General Norstad made public his views in November, 1960, on the desirability of stationing MRBMs in Europe, he was widely thought, throughout Europe and the rest of the world, to be voicing a new American policy when in fact he was attempting to speak only in his international role. Thus there is a danger that new ideas emanating from the NATO military staffs may be suspect in Europe as looking like American dictation, and equally suspect in Washington because they have not been through the American policy making process.

But there are two more serious defects in the NATO planning process. One is that the formulation of military policy takes place entirely within military channels, and the military and civil channels meet only at the highest level, where it is hard to effect alteration or modification. This is not to cast any

doubt upon the ability and integrity of NATO military staffs or military planning as such. But as weapons become more lethal and more costly, as manpower and military budgets rise, and as research and development becomes more complex, so the area of purely military consideration diminishes, while the diplomatic, arms control, or economic aspects of military choices become more important. It is for this reason that foreign offices and treasuries have become so deeply involved in problems which even a decade ago would have been considered within the exclusive competence of Chiefs of Staff. It is also one reason why Ministers of Defence, who are a constitutional innovation of the last twenty years in all the NATO countries, have become such important political figures. To continue to plan through purely military staffs on the international level now contradicts national practice. Since it is far easier to reconcile the sometimes conflicting requirements of political stability and military defence when planning is in its formative stages, the case for a joint civil-military staff or a welding of the stronger secretariat we have envisaged for NATO with the existing military machine, is a strong one.[9]

The other weakness is that American legislation and practice preclude American officials from discussing with their fellow members of international staffs (except the British) any planning considerations that involve the use of nuclear weapons. Every NATO staff has, in effect, an American wing in which a number of highly important papers circulate which may be seen only by American eyes. No one wishes to prejudice security, but the upshot of this has been that other governments have had only a very cloudy impression of American dispositions in Europe in so far as nuclear weapons are concerned, of the purpose they are designed to serve, or the action the United States would take in an emergency. In so far as the British are (by reason of the 1958 amendment to the MacMahon Act) more closely in the American confidence than other countries, this serves to accentuate the sense of division between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental halves of the alliance, and in any case can hardly survive Britain's entry into a closer political relationship with Europe. Bi-lateral agreements, such as have been made between the United States and certain countries to inform them about certain aspects of nuclear technology or tactics with which they may be especially concerned, are not adequate to give this sense of participation in the evolution of NATO policy as a whole which is so clearly needed to increase trans-Atlantic confidence. It is true that security is an important consideration, but in view of the publicity that inevitably attends so much of Western planning and development, it is only one consideration among several to be weighed. The fact that American senior officers in NATO have of late felt it necessary to stretch their instructions to the limit, in order to give their colleagues and associates in NATO a clearer picture of American dispositions and policy, is a recognition of this. The time, however, has come to change the instructions.

To summarise this aspect of the problem: with the demise of the strategy of "massive retaliation" the American conception of the requirements of the defence of Europe has markedly altered. Since American military power, both

strategic and tactical, is decisive for the security of Europe, the NATO allies must pay close attention to these changes. But it is politically most unwise for the United States either to assume that when she changes her policies her allies will respond except after long delay and much public friction, or that she can dictate military policy to them, even if the new policy offers them much greater security (as I believe in this case it does). But without better access to the American policy making process, now can the allies keep in close touch with the factors which make it necessary to modify American policy, or justify their own consequential actions to their own publics. The European allies are neither cowardly nor stupid, even if they may be somewhat self-centred, but lacking the grist for the kind of continuous debate in policy which centres on Washington, without large staffs or continuous technological progress of their own, they need a clearer insight than they now get into the considerations which affect American decisions, especially if they must justify costly and unpopular decisions to their own parliaments and publics.

At the same time the existing machinery for the joint planning of European defence has developed certain weaknesses. SHAPE has acquired too important a place in it, which has forced the Supreme Commander into an equivocal role as an international officer and a representative of the US government. The allied military channels of planning and consultation have too little connection with political planning. And the inability of American officials to discuss the considerations that affect nuclear weapons gives European staffs and governments only a hazy conception of American overall policy, which leads to unrealism or archaism in the policies and attitudes of the latter.[10] The Kennedy Administration is reported to be disappointed with the response of its allies to its proposals for strengthening the conventional defences of Europe. But American practice over recent years must bear a large share of the blame.

Nor is this by any means a one way exchange. Not only have the European allies important contributions to make in the field of military technology, as the extent to which British, French and Italian designs and inventions have been accepted by the US forces indicates. They could make a vital contribution in the realm of ideas, but only if they were adequately informed. American policy was largely tone deaf to the views of its allies during the mid-fifties when Mr. Dulles was at the State Department and Admiral Radford was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also when European opinion was extremely ill-informed about the trends of strategy and weapons development. The fact that the worst mistakes in American strategic policy – the decision to over-emphasise nuclear firepower, to distribute low yield weapons to the allies, to continue primary reliance on the manned bomber – were made during that period, was not perhaps mere chance.

## VIII

If the considerations which I have outlined are correct, they point in one direction. If the NATO Council is to become a more effective and authoritative

centre for the coordinating of national policies, the standing of its individual members should be enhanced and its secretariat must be considerably strengthened. At the same time internal developments within the alliance make it impossible to create any executive committee or political directorate of the nominally or traditionally most influential member governments. If the military policy of the alliance is to be the servant rather than the master of political aims, and a unifying rather than divisive process, there should be closer liaison between political and military planning, and continuous and intimate access on the part of the European allies to the American policy making process.

The time has, therefore, come in my view, to consider a radical overhaul of the institutions and machinery of the alliance broadly along the following lines.

(1) The NATO Council should be retained in its present form with two changes. (a) Its members should be elevated in status from professional diplomats to those with political standing in their own countries. (b) The offices of Secretary-General and Chairman of the Council which have been combined since 1957 should be separated. Chairmanship of a body which operates by the unanimity rule is a full time job, analogous to that of Prime Minister in a Cabinet government. In the case of NATO the task requires a great deal of discreet contact with governments at the highest level and carefully formulated public statements. It must be held by a figure who commands a special degree of public and political confidence throughout the alliance. It is the Chairman of the Council who should be the principal public spokesman of the Alliance.

(2) The post of Secretary-General should be retained but its functions should be transformed. The Secretary-General should be what his name implies, the senior official in the alliance. The best national analogy is that of a Permanent Under-Secretary of a Department in the British civil service system (though he should not, I think, be British). He should be a man of powerful intellect and considerable experience, with a strong control over the official machinery. His task would not be to evolve policy so much as to draw together the threads of official planning and controversy so that his political masters can be presented with clear and intelligible choices. He would be a powerful but not a public figure.

(3) Under the Secretary-General there should be a single unified Secretariat responsible for both political and military planning. Under him should come four Deputy Secretary-Generals: (a) for military planning and arms control, (b) for European affairs, (c) for extra European affairs, including liaison with the other alliances, SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS (which means in effect keeping in close touch with the development of American, British and French policy in the Middle and Far East), (d) for economic affairs, dealing with the industrial and financial problems of infrastructure, burden sharing and support costs, rationalization of national

armaments programmes and related questions. (This department would be concerned with the economics and finance of NATO itself and should not overlap with the functions of OECD.) Each would have an international staff under them.

(4) The Deputy Secretary-General for Military Planning would be a civilian but under him would come a new appointment, the Chief of Staff of NATO, a senior military officer (preferably one who has held the highest military office, Chief of Staff or Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, in his own country) who would be the apex of the military planning machine. He would have the same privileges as a Chief of Staff in the British or American systems, that is to say, right of access not only to his immediate superior but to the Chairman and the individual members of the Council. He would have a strong international military staff, including three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one from each service. But, it would be the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary to present the military requirements of the alliance for reconciliation with the political and economic requirements of his fellow Deputy Secretary-Generals.

The Standing Group in Washington could then be disbanded and the Military Representative Committee there would be broken up so that its members became part of national delegations and the military advisers to their representative on the Council. At the same time SHAPE would become an operational rather than a planning headquarters. This would imply no demotion for SACEUR, for in the era of missiles and sensitive early warning systems, operational responsibility for an area stretching from the North Cape to Tabriz and involving the forces of thirteen different countries, is quite enough load for one man to handle, if indeed it is not already too much.

(5) Such a reorganisation would be designed to improve the efficiency of an alliance of governments and the new Secretariat would not have supranational powers. It is therefore necessary to devise means for regular and effective national control of and agreement to, the proposals of this powerful new staff. Otherwise its work and authority will be undermined by national doubts and jealousies. To a large extent this will be met by creating a more authoritative NATO Council but there are still thorny problems of an expert kind which need continuous review and resolution. It has long seemed to me that two short meetings a year of NATO Foreign Ministers (one of which includes Finance and Defence Ministers) is inadequate for this purpose, since there is time only for the most general *tour d'horizon* at each meeting. What seems to be required is (a) A quarterly or half yearly meeting of Defence Ministers, whose increasing importance we have noted, plus their Chiefs of Staff, to review the work of the Military Planning department of the Secretariat. (b) A half yearly meeting of Foreign Ministers to review the work of the two political sections. (c) A yearly or half yearly meeting of Ministers of Finance and Trade (or Industry) to review the work of the economic section. Clearly

these meetings could be made to overlap to give at least one general plenary session.

It is always a rash step for a layman to attempt to draw up even the most general and outline sketch for an official organisation and I can imagine a number of objections to this proposal for a single secretariat under a strengthened Council.

The first is that to obliterate any formal distinction between the various NATO powers, for instance by abolishing the Standing Group, by lessening the importance of SACEUR and by making the NATO Council the effective governing instrument of the Alliance is to obsure the very different size, strength and resources of the various allies. But in fact the shadow would be discarded for the substance, and the differing importance of the allies could be more usefully registered by the distribution of senior appointments in a more powerful working team. The following suggests one reasonable distribution of power and responsibilities.

| | |
|---|---|
| Chairman of the Council | A smaller European power. |
| Secretary-General | United States. |
| Deputy Secretaries General | (a) Military: United Kingdom or France.<br>(b) For European Affairs: Canada or Italy.<br>(c) For extra European Affairs: France or United Kingdom.<br>(d) For Economic Affairs: Germany. |

Clearly, the attempt to create a more effective and unified machinery for the coordination of policy would fail if any of these different offices were regarded as the perogative of a particular government, and personalities, personal gifts and personal experience, were to play no part in the choice of the senior officials. However, it would be wise to establish certain fixed principles at the outset if this reorganisation is to fulfil its aim. One is that the Secretary-General, with his revised responsibilities, should be an American (and of course a civilian). It is only by placing an American at a key point in the structure that the alliance can rely upon continuous contact with the working bureaucracy in Washington, a function complementary to that of the American representative on the Council whose job is to act as an interpreter of American policy at the highest level. It is true that the American civil service and administrative system does not breed many men of the type required, but in other international organisations Americans have fulfilled a post of this kind with great success. A second principle is that the Deputy Secretary-General for Military Planning should not be an American. This is not suggested in order to satisfy British or French *amour propre*, but because of the importance in terms of inter-allied confidence of interposing an influential non-American voice in the military planning process of the alliance. The Chief of Staff,

however, probably should be an American; with a British, French and German Deputy Chief of Staff under him.

Finally, the question of whether the Supreme Commander Europe should continue to be an American should be determined by the policy of Britain and France. The decision should not be determined by the fact that at present only an American can control the use of nuclear weapons, since as we shall discuss in the last section, this may need modification. But at the moment the United States is making the greatest single contribution, direct and indirect, to the security of Europe. If this should change, if France were to assume a larger share of the burden and the position of French senior officers to become less controversial than at present, the case for a French SACEUR would be a strong one, for the restoration of the conventional defences of Europe is one which France is historically and geographically best suited to undertake.

The second objection to the idea of a combined civil-military secretariat in NATO is that men of the required calibre to make it a really effective centre of international planning would not be forthcoming, would not be made available by national governments. Certainly, if this were true, it would be a grave objection, for nothing would be gained by creating a large second-rate bureaucracy at the heart of the alliance. But this is a problem by no means confined to NATO for it affects the relations of governments in the UN, its specialised agencies and other international organisations. The crucial point (which has been recognised in other spheres) is that the interests of a government may now be much better served by seconding one of its best men to NATO than by retaining him within its own Foreign Office or Ministry of Defence. In considering men for the NATO secretariat, which should be strong rather than large, governments should ask themselves if they can spare X; if the answer is Yes, he should not be appointed: if the answer is No, then he is the right man. There is no doubt that if certain governments took the lead in seconding men of high quality, the others would, in self protection, have to follow suit.

The third objection is that of the military, namely that in a combined organisation of this kind military considerations may tend to get obscured or that military advice may not be presented to the Council and to member governments with the clarity and detachment that is needed. This objection can be met in two ways. One is to acknowledge that it has some force by giving to the Chief of Staff the right of access to the Council. The other is to remind military staffs that the field of pure military planning or considerations is diminishing all the time and cannot be considered, even if it ever could, in a political and economic vacuum without doing grave damage to the general objectives of the alliance. In this sense the reorganisation would merely have the effect of bringing the practice within NATO into line with that of most of its member governments. With the development of Ministries of Defence over the last two decades, the purely military element in the machinery of defence planning has tended to diminish in importance. The evolution of national security policy, which in earlier periods of non-war was

largely a matter of trilateral bargaining between the Chief or Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury and the head of the government, to-day involves continuous consultation between civilian and military planners at all levels and embracing many departments. The time is overdue to make the evolution of international security policy follow the same pattern.

Then it can be asked whether a mere reorganisation of the machinery of the alliance would have a significant effect upon the problems which have been discussed earlier. Is not the spirit of the alliance, and the attitude of member governments towards their obligations of much greater importance? Until these change, would not a reorganisation of the central institutions be an attempt to cure the symptoms rather than the causes of division and malaise?

In the case of national governments this is very often the case: the setting up of the Ministry of X or the disbandment of Ministry Y, rarely, though not always, provides a solution to the real problem. But in the case of international organisations this is not true. Structure may have a considerable bearing upon the policy which it adopts, as Mr. Khrushchev clearly acknowledges when he demands a reorganisation of the machinery of the United Nations. Moreover, in an alliance, rather than a world organisation, the adjustment of the central machinery can have a distinct bearing upon the readiness of the member governments to accept and support the decisions and plans of the alliance as a whole, because they are better able to convince their own publics that they themselves have played an important part in the shaping of these decisions. In the case of NATO it is no accident that the governments of some of the smaller countries are unwilling to defend or implement NATO policy, because it is only hazily understood by officials and regarded by public opinion as dictated by the United States. In the same way the uncooperative role of France in NATO in the last few years is connected with the fact that the only senior appointment held by a Frenchman in the central machinery, membership of the Standing Group in Washington, has lost all real power or significance.

Finally, the most cogent objections to the strengthening of the central institution of NATO is that it might tend to bureaucratise the already difficult process of arriving at national or international decisions on policy, slow down the reactions of the leading powers to developments in the external world, and reduce policy decisions merely to inarticulate compromises between different national positions. To a certain extent, this problem is inherent in the existence of the alliance itself, but I would argue that such a reorganisation would minimise it for two reasons. The first is that by giving the smaller allies a more intimate working knowledge of the trends of British and American policy and contingency planning, it would, in fact, give the larger countries a freer hand to take swift action, political or military, in a crisis. The second is that by enhancing the status of the Council *and* creating a strong civil-military secretariat, it would be possible to work at international decisions at the proper level. A more authoritative Council by itself would be insufficient since busy political figures cannot be expected to spend the hours

and weeks of discussion which are generally necessary to evolve constructive policies, whereas junior teams of officials can. Without a stronger secretariat, the members of the Council would be apt merely to parrot standard national policies and attitudes instead of having the fruits of intelligent official debate within the Secretariat as the starting point of discussion. Without a stronger Council much of the work of the Secretariat would go to waste, gathering dust in the archives of national government.

This reorganisation, in my view, would have a significant effect upon the cohesion and effectiveness of the Alliance. But most important of all, no solution to the problem of a better relationship between NATO and strategic weapons and planning, which has been exercising governments and thoughtful people throughout the alliance for the last few years, is conceivable without a reshaping of the central institutions. It is for this reason that I have left the consideration of this particular problem until the last.

## IX

At the present time, there is less discussion than in recent years in all the countries of the Alliance about the credibility of the American strategic deterrent in the event of war in Europe. The proposition, so keenly debated by American as well as European experts, that, with the advent of full nuclear parity the ability of the United States to take strategic action in face of a threat to her European allies is declining, has for the moment lost some of its force for three reasons. The first is a better and less formalistic appreciation of the realities of the situation of which Albert Wohlstetter's "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country"[11] is the outstanding example. This demonstrates, among other things, that in the present technological context it would be virtually impossible for the President of the United States to distinguish between a large-scale attack on Europe and the first wave of an attack likely to engulf his own country immediately, even if the former did not also involve the mass slaughter of Americans. The second is the fact that the United States is now well on the way to developing a more effective and secure retaliatory capability than seemed the case even eighteen months ago. The third is the clear statements of President Kennedy that the United States government intends to honour its commitments and is not – for the foreseeable future – making any move towards that "nuclear isolationism" which some pessimists had deduced from earlier political and technological trends.

Nevertheless, American strategic nuclear weapons remain a potential source of tension and division between the European allies and the United States. This is not surprising: not only are strategic nuclear weapons terrifying things to contemplate but no system of collective security has been constructed hitherto in which the vast preponderance of strategic power would remain under the unilateral control of one ally while all were equally exposed to the strategic attack by the adversary. It is easy to make two mistakes about the state of European opinion in this context. One is to underrate the degree of

European confidence in the integrity of the American intentions towards Europe – mistaking the clever rationalizations of a small number of military intellectuals for the views of serious and informed Europeans as a whole.[12] The other is to point to the basic ambivalence of the general European attitude, on the one hand fear that the United States will not come to the aid of Europe, and on the other alarm that she may take precipitate action in an emergency – the desire for a finger on the safety catch and on the trigger – as a reason for ignoring it.

The contradiction probably arises from the superimposing of one era of American strategic policy upon the other: alarm at the danger of precipitate American action stems from the earlier years of the Eisenhower regime when the doctrine of "massive retaliation" was official American policy; fear that the United States might not be able to come to Europe's aid grew up during the later Eisenhower years, especially the period of the missile muddle when it appeared that the strategic balance of power might be tilting seriously against the United States. Both fears are largely out of date, but the fact that they exist shows the weakness of the central institution. To eradicate this ambiguous thinking among America's allies requires action on two phases: first, a firm and agreed American strategic policy to meet the needs of the present day: this I think the new Administration, aided by the technical achievements of its predecessor, is now moving towards. The second is to devise means whereby the European allies can acquire some control over their own destiny in return for a greater contribution to the general strength of the Alliance.

Moreover, a new development is making the devising of such means more urgent. The American strategic deterrent is becoming increasingly centred in the Polaris submarine and in missiles and aircraft based on North America itself, and as a result American bases in Europe will become progressively less important. As this happens, the admittedly tenuous control over, or association with, American strategic policy and decisions which some European governments have felt they exercised, by virtue of having these overseas bases on their soil, will also evaporate. And unless some new form of political association takes its place, the sense of frustration, the sense of being powerless over the issue of peace and war which so quickly breeds a sense of defeatism, may increase (as appears to be the case in Italy).[13] In some sections of European public opinion there may be relief that the bases are gone, since the country in question will present a less important target in the event of war: governments, however, are more likely to feel uneasy at losing an important *raison d'entree* in Washington (as well as dollars).

The other source of tension is the existence of the British "independent contribution to the deterrent" in national hands, and France's potential *force de frappe*. The two can not be equated, for the British V-bomber force exists in considerable numbers while the French force is still several years from completion: the operational life of the one is to be continued by means of American assistance which is not likely to be forthcoming for the other. But