THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE

WRITINGS OF JULIUS CAESAR

Edited by Luca Grillo and Christopher B. Krebs

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Well-known as a brilliant general and politician, Julius Caesar also played a fundamental role in the formation of the Latin literary language and remains a central figure in the history of Latin literature. With twenty-three chapters written by renowned scholars, this *Companion* provides an accessible introduction to Caesar as an intellectual along with a scholarly assessment of his multiple literary accomplishments and new insights into their literary value. The *Commentarii* and Caesar's lost works are presented in their historical and literary context. The various chapters explore their main features, the connection between literature, state religion and politics, Caesar's debt to previous Greek and Latin authors, and his legacy within and outside of Latin literature. The innovative volume will be of great value to all students and scholars of Latin literature and to those seeking a more rounded portrait of the achievements of Julius Caesar.

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A complete list of books in the series is at the back of this book.

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Journal Abbreviations

ACD	Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis
AH	Ancient History: Resources for Teachers
AIGC	Annuario dell'Istituto Giapponese di Cultura in Roma
AJA	American Journal of Archaeology
AJAH	American Journal of Ancient History
AJP	American Journal of Philology
ANRW	Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt
AU	Der Altsprachliche Unterricht: Latein, Griechisch.
BICS	Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies
BStudLat	Bolletino di studi latini
CA	Classical Antiquity
CB	The Classical Bulletin
CCG	Cahiers du Centre Gustave-Glotz
CCJ	The Cambridge Classical Journal
CJ	The Classical Journal
CP	Classical Philology
CQ	Classical Quarterly
CR	Classical Review
CW	Classical World
DAGR	Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines
DNP	Der Neue Pauly
ESHG	Études Suisses d'Histoire Générale
G&R	Greece and Rome
HSCP	Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
HZ	Historische Zeitschrift
ICS	Illinois Classical Studies
JHS	The Journal of Hellenic Studies
JRS	The Journal of Roman Studies
LEC	Les études classiques
MD	Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici

MDAI(R)	Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Römische Abteilung = Bullettino dell'Istituto Archeologico Germanico, Sezione romana.
NJbb	Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung
NJW	Neue Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft
PBSR	Papers of the British School at Rome
PCPhS	Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society
PLLS	Papers of the Leeds Latin Seminar
QUCC	Quaderni urbinati di cultura classica
QS	Quaderni di Storia
RE	Real-Encyclopädie d. klassischen Altertumswissenschaft
REL	Revue des études latines
RFIC	Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica
RhM	Rheinisches Museum für Philologie
RIL	Rendiconti / Istituto Lombardo, Accademia di Scienze e Lettere
RPh	Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes
RSI	Rivista Storica Italiana
SCI	Scripta Classica Israelica
SIFC	Studi italiani di filologia classica
SRIC	Studi e ricerche dell'Istituto di Civilità Classica, Cristiana, Medievale
StudClas	Studii clasice. Bucharest.
TAPA	Transactions of the American Philological Association
TLS	The Times Literary Supplement
WZRostock	Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Wilhelm-Pieck-Universität Rostock
ZPE	Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

Introduction
Caesarian Questions: Then, Now, Hence

Luca Grillo and Christopher B. Krebs

When, in Shakespeare, Julius Caesar reflects on Cassius' mean menace, he concludes that, fear-inspiring though Cassius may be, he fears him not: "For always I am Caesar" (1.2.213). Four hundred and some years after the influential tragedy premiered, and some two thousand years after Caesar and Cassius faced one another in Rome, Caesar is still with us: first and foremost, in the living memory of posterity, as the tyrannical undertaker of the Roman Republic – *sic semper tyrannis*! – and, secondly, as conqueror of Gaul, land of Asterix.[1] In this latter capacity, he has marched across the pages of his *Gallic Wars*, his account of his conquest in seven books, leading countless students in classrooms near and far through the Latin syntax ever since the Renaissance. Matthias Gelzer, the eminent ancient historian and author of a magisterial biography of Caesar, in the 1960s remarked how the Latin teachers of his school days knew the *Gallic Wars* by heart.[2] While the degree of familiarity may have changed more recently, Caesar's standing as *the* primer in Latin grammars, prose composition volumes, and in the classroom remains unchallenged.

This standing is largely owed to Caesar's limpid style, which contemporaries recognized as exceptional (e.g. Cic. *Brut.* 262). It results from careful and consistent choice and represents his effort at regulation as advanced, theoretically, in his linguistic treatise *De Analogia*, "On analogous word formation."[3] As a linguist, Caesar enjoyed great authority (cf. Gell. 1.10.4 and 19.8.1–8); his various other contributions to the Roman Republic of letters were no less admired. To contemporaries and following generations he was, in fact, known not only as a political and military

[1] On the alleged origin and afterlife of the declaration, see Wyke (2012, 1–4); on Caesar and the comic series *Asterix*, see Wyke (2008, 61–5). Tatum (2008) uses part of the Shakespearean line for a title.

[2] "Die Lateinlehrer meiner Schulzeit kannten die 7 Bücher auswendig . . ." (Gelzer, 1960, reprinted 1977, 444).

[3] Cf. Pezzini 173–92 in this volume. The extent to which Caesar's practice conforms to his theory is debated.

leader but also as an eminent man of letters, who enjoyed the company of the bright and talented (*favet ingeniis*, Cic. *Fam.* 4.8.2).[4] The list of his accomplishments is long: as orator he ranked second only to Cicero (Quint. 10.1.114; cf. Cic. *Brut.* 252), while, as ethnographer, he produced an account of the Gallic and Germanic tribes so compelling that Tacitus thought it necessary to take him on one hundred and fifty years later.[5] Caesar's letter-writing inspired awe (Plut. *Caes.* 17.7) and impressed for novelty (Suet. *Iul.* 56.6).[6] But he also penned a political pamphlet (*Anticato*) and poems, whereof we have fragments (or secure knowledge) of an epigram on Terence, for example, and what may have been a verse travelogue (*Iter*).[7] He was fluent in Greek and admired (and feared) for his wit.[8] Caesar's intellectual talents and contributions impress, even through their mostly fragmentary state. But his fate as man of letters was to disappear in the shadow of his own accomplishments as military and political leader.[9] One aim of this *Companion* is to provide discussion of all his works across the literary genres.

The predominant view of Caesar as a historical figure (on which Miriam Griffin's *A Companion to Julius Caesar* focuses) and as a man of power rather than letters is not only discernible in scholarship on him;[10] it has influenced modern readings of his only extant works, the "commentaries" on the Gallic and civil wars, as well. These seemingly straightforward, seemingly unadorned narratives, rendered in a seemingly unassuming style, befitted the military man, an impression that Cicero's famous praise of them as *nudi . . . recti et venusti*, "naked, upright, and charming" (*Brut.* 262), only seemed to confirm. In addition, with their lapidary Latin elevated to classical status – the *BG* especially came to enjoy the status of a "citadel of classical Latinity"[11] – they fell victim to their own success, as, for centuries, they were studied primarily with historical, linguistic, and, above all, didactic interest rather than a literary-aesthetic sensibility.

Carl Nipperdey's monumental 1847 edition of Caesar's *Commentarii* along with the *Corpus Caesarianum* (comprising Hirtius' eighth book of the *Gallic Wars* as well as the *Alexandrian*, *African*, and *Hispanic Wars*) is

[4] On Caesar as an intellectual, see Fantham (2009) and Schiesaro (2010). Krebs is currently preparing a fuller treatment: Krebs (forthcoming b).
[5] On Caesar and Tacitus: Krebs (2011); for Caesar the orator and ethnographer, cf. van der Blom 193–205 and Riggsby 68–74 in this volume.
[6] Cf. Morello 223–33 in this volume. [7] Cf. Corbeill 215–22 and Casali 206–14 in this volume.
[8] Cf. Corbeill 145–56 in this volume.
[9] Cf. Raaflaub and Rüpke 13–28 and 58–67 in this volume. [10] Griffin (2009).
[11] Frese (1900, 3, our translation). On Caesar's style, cf. Krebs 110–30 in this volume.

widely considered a landmark in Caesarian studies. Since it is also in many ways paradigmatic, it offers an excellent starting point for a survey of modern scholarship. Its introduction, two hundred and fifty pages addressing *Quaestiones Caesarianae*, "Caesarian Questions," dedicated two hundred pages to text-critical discussions of individual passages. Nipperdey approached his author as if he were infallible, unfailingly logical, and intolerant of any stylistic irregularity: Caesar *could* not have written that the tide came in twice within twelve hours, for surely he *must* have known better (*BG* 3.12.1, Nipperdey 67 *neque Caesarem in hac re errasse credibile*); nor should his pen be credited with a redundant expression such as *intermisso loci spatio* (literally, "with a spatial distance left in-between," *BG* 5.15.4), as *spatium* alone in its literal meaning applies to *locus* already (*propria uis est, ut de loco intelligatur*, Nipperdey 80). In consequence, Nipperdey frequently altered the (often unanimous) manuscript readings and produced a somewhat idiosyncratic text. Both Nipperdey's notion of his author, Caesar, as infallible and his approach to his texts, the *Commentarii*, as monoliths of classical Latinity set the style: the "critical appendix" (*kritischer Anhang*) of the standard edition cum commentary by Kraner, Dittenberger, and Meusel (1961) provides ample documentation thereof, as does the list of conjectures Meusel assembled for his lexicon, which totals ninety-three double-columned pages.[12] In more recent years, however, scholars and editors such as Wolfgang Hering have deemed many of these "emendations" unconvincing (1987) (in fact, Rice Holmes condemned this custom already in 1899, xviii (see Rice Holmes (1911)); Michael Winterbottom remarked that most editions of Caesar are "marked by remarkable indifference to what the manuscripts actually read" (1983, 35); and others, such as P. T. Eden, Lindsay Hall, and, most recently, Cynthia Damon, have emphasized the irregularities in Caesar, thus breathing Roman life back into the marble bust.[13] But the (in retrospect) misconceived effort to cleanse and regularize Caesar loudly bespeaks the interest in securing him as the logical school author of classical Latinity.

Ahead of his extensive text-critical discussion, Nipperdey surveyed the evidence as well as arguments pertaining to a number of issues he deemed central, starting with the possible dates and forms of composition and publication of the *Commentarii* (3–8).[14] The evidence is scant: praise for

[12] Meusel (1844–1916, vol. 2, part 2, 1–93) *Tabula Coniecturarum* (*BG*, 1–36; *BC,* 37–93).
[13] Eden (1962), Hall (1998), and Damon, who has a whole section dedicated to "novel and unusual expressions in Caesar's *Bellum Civile*" (2015, 97–126).
[14] Cf. Raaflaub 18–22, Krebs 41–2 and Nousek 107–8 in this volume.

the style of the *BG* in Cicero's *Brutus* (46 BCE) provides a *terminus ante quem* for its appearance; and a statement by Pollio (reported by Suetonius, *Iul.* 56) suggests that the *BC* was published only after Caesar's death in 44. This leaves ample space for ingenuity and disagreements. Nipperdey himself believed that Caesar had composed the *BG* all at once around 50 BCE (as opposed to year by year), to then be published more or less immediately around 49 at the beginning of the civil war. But the arguments he and others advanced in support failed to prove conclusive. When F. E. Adcock reviewed the arguments in 1956, he concluded that it seemed "more probable than not that, while Caesar *wrote* his seven commentaries on the War in Gaul in stages, he *published* them all at once."[15] But this opinion has not carried the day either. Remarkably, some of the arguments have been used *in utramque partem*: the stylistic evolution, for instance, as expressed in the increase of direct speeches and changes of preferred syntactical structures and vocabulary, has often been advanced as evidence of the seriatim publication (Schlicher, 1936); others, meanwhile, interpreted the very same development as a literary device Caesar created in the *BG* and then reproduced in the *BC*.[16] Similarly, while no one denies that books three and five contrast Sabinus' first praiseworthy (3.17–19) and then blameworthy conduct (5.26–38), some have seen the former episode as a set-up for the latter, implying that Caesar wrote book three in foreknowledge of book five (Collins 1952, 88–96), while others have read this very contrast as evidence that Caesar was ignorant of the events to be narrated in book five when he wrote book three (Seel, 1961, iii).[17] The debate continues: more recently T. P. Wiseman has re-emphasized how Caesar would have benefitted from the circulation and public reading of a year-by-year account, while C. B. Krebs pointed to the sudden appearance of Lucretian echoes in the later books of the *BG* as an argument in favor of serial composition.[18] As for the *BC*, while most scholars believe that it was published posthumously, there seems to be even less agreement on the date(s) of composition and the question whether Caesar left it unfinished.[19]

Closely entwined with the question of composition and publication is that of the possible form and circulation of "notes" that various ancient sources attribute to Caesar (Plut. *Caes.* 22.2, App. *Celt.* fr. 18.3). This

[15] Adcock (1956, 89).
[16] Von Albrecht (1997, 414). For helpful summaries of the scholarly debate in English, see Adcock (1956, 77–89), Collins (1963, 49–51), and Riggsby (2006, 9–15).
[17] Grillo (2016, 259–62); cf. further Grillo 160–3 in this volume.
[18] Wiseman (1998), Krebs (2013a).
[19] For a summary of the various positions, see Grillo (2012, 178–80).

second question is further complicated by the fact that we know of the customary reports Caesar sent to the senate at the end of each campaign year (*BG* 2.35.4, 4.38.5, 7.90.7), not to mention possible interim reports or letters to friends and acquaintances (Suet. *Iul.* 56.6 and Gell. *NA* 17.9.1). To what, if any, extent are the *Commentarii* indebted to any of these sources (the military reports in particular), whether for content or for style? Michel Rambaud devoted considerable attention to this issue and elucidated numerous features that the *Commentarii* and these reports seem to share (1953, reprinted 1966, 19–43, 77–96); and Eva Odelman, in an equally ground-breaking but less noticed work, brought to light the various debts Caesar's style owes to the language of Roman administration.[20]

Stylistic concerns also bulk large in Nipperdey's discussion of the *corpus Caesarianum*, those four texts written by mostly unidentifiable staff-members of Caesar's (wider) circle. Their genesis, for both of the individual *bella* and the entire *corpus*, their differences in style, and their authorship, all of which he discussed, have continued to pique scholars and have recently received renewed attention, not least for what they can tell us about the state of Latin prose at the time.[21] The same critical acumen was directed to the transmission and manuscripts of the Caesarian *Commentarii* – the reliability of the various manuscripts and their groupings – and, more particularly, to the question of possible interpolations into Caesar's own texts. The ethnographic and geographic digressions in particular were much doubted in their authenticity, both on linguistic and structural grounds, until Franz Beckmann demonstrated in 1930 that no activity by an interpolator was demonstrable. Since then, skeptics have been few and far between, and most accept the passages in question as genuine. "Nonetheless, the idea of interpolation in *De Bello Gallico* [and *De Bello Civili*, *our addition*] may not be quite dead yet."[22]

The questions Nipperdey highlighted have shaped the debate, as Hans Oppermann acknowledged when, in 1974, he reviewed the "problems and status quo in Caesarian scholarship" (*Probleme und heutiger Stand der Caesarforschung*).[23] But among those problems, which he himself proposed to reevaluate with the help of a "comprehensive profile of Caesar's *personality* . . . [as] yardstick,"[24] there are two issues that had hardly figured

[20] Her work, *Études sur quelques reflets du style administratif chez César*, was published in 1972.
[21] See Gaertner and Hausburg (2013, 22–30, with n. 51) and Gaertner 263–76 in this volume.
[22] Riggsby (2006, 12), with further discussion and references.
[23] Oppermann (1974, 485).
[24] "Gesamtbild der Persönlichkeit Caesars . . . [als] allgemeinen Maßstab," Oppermann (1974, 487, the emphasis in the English translation above is ours). Thus Oppermann succumbed, in his own way, to the cult of Caesar's personality that had enthralled German scholars in particular for many decades.

in the *Quaestiones*. First, Caesar's "reliability" (511). Caesar's union of agent and author had always raised skepticism, even among his contemporaries (Suet. *Iul.* 56.4); and while it had been discussed variously in the second half of the nineteenth century, the "propagandistic" aspects of the *Commentarii* came under closest scrutiny after World War Two. Michel Rambaud, mentioned above, in 1953 offered a detailed and comprehensive rhetorical analysis of Caesar's *déformation historique*. He conceded that Caesar narrated real events, "*mais du côté qui convient à ses intérêts, et les formes de son récit suscitent chez le lecteur une impression fausse*."[25] The bulk of the book is devoted to the rhetorical techniques of "demonstration" and "persuasion" by which historical reality is warped. Coinciding with three other studies to the same effect, *La déformation historique* caused a lively controversy;[26] and while the controversy has calmed down over the last two decades and propaganda is no longer so pressing a question, the influence of Rambaud's study can still be felt, and its sophistication makes it mandatory reading for anyone interested in Caesar.

The second issue that occupied considerable space in the 1974 review concerned the *literary* characteristics of the *Commentarii* and their literary genre. Oppermann himself had made substantial contributions to both questions. He (and others) confidently reconstructed the history of the *commentarius* genre and declared the *Gallic* and *Civil War* its "classical works."[27] But even if the *commentarius* continued to receive acute attention, today very few would share this confidence: so scant is the evidence of other *commentarii*, so vague the term itself, that the generic approach to Caesar's *Commentarii* seems to have reached its impasse. Our appreciation of their literary qualities, on the other hand, has only grown since Oppermann's study. The third-person narrative – intended, he argued, to preserve the impression of "a simple reconstruction of what had really happened"[28] – continues to be the subject of subtle analyses. And his observations on "the functions of space and time," and, more particularly, on how episodes were connected and

[25] Rambaud (1966, 364).

[26] This controversy, which predates Rambaud (cf. e.g. Stevens (1952) for the *BG* and Barwick (1951) and Treu (1948) for the *BC*), is helpfully summarized by Collins (1952 and 1972). On propaganda, see Krebs 29–42 in this volume.

[27] Oppermann (1933, 6). Cf. also Klotz (1910, 1–25) on the *literarische Charakter des* Bellum Gallicum *und* Bellum Civile. On the *commentarius*, cf. Nousek 97–109 in this volume.

[28] "*[A]ls einfache Nachbildung dessen, was wirklich geschehen ist*," Oppermann (1933, 105). For more recent discussions: Pelling (2009a and 2013), Grillo (2011) and Batstone 48–9, Pitcher 238–40, and Chassignet, 261–2 in this volume.

vivid effects were brought about, would later in the century be differentiated further with the help of the tools supplied by narratology.[29]

Just a few years after Oppermann's survey, in the late 1970s, a major shift occurred in the study of ancient historiography. In *Clio's Cosmetics* T. P. Wiseman argued that the Roman historians were much closer to the poets and orators than to their modern counterparts, similar, as they were, in regards to aims, methods, and subject matter: "persuasion is his [the Roman historian's] business no less than the orator's."[30] Focusing in particular on the historians of the late Roman Republic, Wiseman detailed how they resorted to the treasury of rhetoric to compose content and weave a plausible rather than factual text; he also emphasized that their audience would have rather expected them to do just that. The muse of history, he concluded, liked make-up just as much as her sisters. About a decade later, in 1988, A. J. Woodman pursued this line of inquiry further. In *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* he revealed through careful readings of Thucydides (the alleged paragon of facticity), Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus that the writing of ancient history was first and foremost a literary endeavor, with the historian conceiving of himself primarily as a literary artist, or, in the words of T. J. Luce, "the heir of Homer."[31] Woodman explored the central role that *inventio*, the "discovery" of suitable materials, played in the historian's crafting of his verisimilar historical narrative. His conclusion was that, aside from a few incontestable historical hard facts, historical narratives were built from the storehouse of literature and with the techniques of rhetoric.

Reviewers of both books were quick to predict that they would cause a lively controversy; they were right.[32] But irrespective of how "truthful" the ancient historians *actually* were, it is now standard practice to regard their texts as literature engaged with the Greek and Roman literary traditions, participatory in contemporary discourses, and inevitably shaped by the all-pervasive influence of rhetoric. Indeed, this *historiographical turn* has, for most of the extant classical historians, resulted in unprecedented sophisticated readings of their narratives.

[29] Another important contribution at the time, Barwick's study of *Caesar's Commentarii und das Corpus Caesarianum* (1938) also helped to advance our appreciation of Caesar's style and narrative, even though his remarks are embedded in a highly debatable argument about the composition of the *corpus Caesarianum* (a question that occupied this generation of scholars). For examples of literary approaches to Caesar, cf. Grillo 157–69 in this volume.

[30] Wiseman (1979, 39). [31] Luce (1989, 174).

[32] Cornell (1982, 203), Luce (1989, 174). For a recent contribution to the debate cf. Lendon (2009); cf. also Thorne 304–17 in this volume.

Caesar's *Commentarii* have been somewhat slow to attract that new attention, even if, as some recent works have demonstrated, they are ultimately no exception. Whatever the degree to which they fell under Clio's province, Caesar certainly knew how to use rhetorical and literary devices; and the celebrated "nudity" of their style is a studied pose, as C. S. Kraus, among others, has noted (2009, 159–65). Accordingly, Batstone and Damon's literary approach to the *Civil War* (2006), Riggsby's discourse analyses of the *Gallic War* (2006) and Grillo's study of *The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile* (2012) have put to good account narratological, intertextual, and semantic tools and demonstrated that, thanks to their literary complexity, both the *BG* and the *BC* fully repay the same scrutiny that Latin poets and other historians enjoyed long before Caesar. Much work remains to be done in these areas and while this *Companion* provides an overview of the approaches that have been taken to Caesar's works, it also aims to encourage further exploration.

Other, partly related areas provide perhaps even more fertile fields for future research. As a man of letters, Caesar certainly not only knew but actively engaged with his Greek and Roman predecessors. Yet the generic difference of the *Commentarii* from *historia* and, more generally, their alleged overall sparseness, not to mention the scant and controversial evidence of other *Commentarii* have discouraged inquiries into the literary sources and models of both the *BG* and the *BC*.[33] Similarly, while his contribution may reasonably be assumed to have left a mark on Latin literature, what evidence is there of his influence on later Latin prose and poetry?[34] And what of later imitators outside Latin literature?[35] The final section of this *Companion* turns to these and related questions, though, by necessity, selectively and *exempli causa*; several of them surely await a monograph treatment.

To return to our starting point, then, Caesar is still with us – but, as the new approaches to the *Commentarii* indicate, wearing a new suit of clothes. Cicero in his *Pro Marcello* effusively predicted that Caesar's military and political actions would ensure that his "life [would] flourish in the memory of all times" (*quae* [sc. vita] *vigebit memoria saeculorum omnium, Marcell.* 28); but he knew why he withheld judgment on them.

[33] Cf. Pitcher 237–8 and Chassignet 249–62 in this volume. On Caesar's Sisenna and Caesar and Thucydides, see Krebs (2014 and 2016); on Caesar and Polybius, see Grillo (2016).

[34] Cf. Kraus 277–88 and Joseph 289–303 in this volume. [35] Cf. Schadee 318–31 in this volume.

Caesar's literary accomplishments have also earned him immortality, and of a less controversial quality to boot.

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PART I

Literature and Politics

CHAPTER 1

Caesar, Literature, and Politics at the End of the Republic

Kurt A. Raaflaub

Caesar's Literary Achievement and its Place in Roman Literature

Caesar was one of the greatest literary talents Rome ever produced (Cic. *Brut.* 251), prolific and path-breaking in several genres. Cicero thought he at least equaled the greatest orators (*Brut.* 252; cf. Quint. 10.114, Suet. *Iul.* 55),[1] among whom he stood out as "the purest user of the Latin tongue"; he also admired Caesar for his deep and thorough studies of language and saluted his *De Analogia* as "the most careful and precise treatise on the principles of correct Latinity" (253).[2] This excitement confirms Caesar's literary reputation (cf. 255). In short, without choosing to dedicate his career to such pursuits, Caesar rose to the highest ranks among brilliant orators and experts on style – and he might have done so also among historians.

According to Cicero, Caesar had acknowledged that his pioneering efforts in mastering the art of rhetoric had "achieved great merits for the prestige and standing of the Roman people" (*bene de nomine ac dignitate populi Romani meritum esse*) (*Brut.* 253). This formula, more typical of generals and statesmen, is remarkable. To have his literary accomplishments acknowledged like others' military and political successes must have been a dream come true to Cicero, whose political self-assessment was frequently challenged and whose shortcomings in the military sphere were obvious.[3] This raises questions. To what extent was literary fame in the late Republic capable of matching military or political glory? And if

I thank the participants in a conference organized for discussion of draft chapters, for valuable suggestions and the volume editors for incisive comments that helped me improve the chapter.

[1] See Butler and Cary (1927, 115).

[2] Although Caesar's ideals differed from Cicero's: on this and *De Analogia,* see most recently Garcea (2012). This work addressed Cicero, its dedicatee, as "almost the pioneer and inventor of eloquence" (Cic. *Brut*. 253).

[3] In Cic. *De Or.* 1.2.7, 8.34 Cicero says that the general's prestige is greater but the orator's art both more difficult and more beneficial to the state; see further just below.

Caesar believed that thanks to rhetoric Cicero had "achieved great merits," what does this mean for his own career choice and the way he thought about his literary pursuits?

One needs to distinguish between genres. Rhetoric was indispensable for success in politics. Brilliant oratory could secure victories and advance careers – as Cicero's case illustrates. Hence Roman *nobiles*, including Caesar, studied rhetoric with the best masters. But it was a means to an end, and applying it to political success was sharply distinguished from teaching it or writing about it: Cicero wrote his rhetorical works when politics enforced leisure.[4]

Legal expertise was valued and respected but, traditionally, cultivated in certain senatorial families and practiced on the side to advise clients, friends, and even the general public – a means to perform leadership and care for the people (*Digest* 1.2.2, esp. 35–8). It was gradually professionalized but, Cicero insists, dedication to legal science was not to prevail over public engagement in the Forum; at most, it was a compliment to do both (*De Or.* 3.33.133–4).[5] Nor could such expertise balance lack of achievement in the field – as Cicero's devastating (though tendentious) attack on Servius Sulpicius Rufus demonstrates: "How could it be doubted that the glory of skills in military matters rather than civil law supports a higher claim to reach the consulship?" (*Mur.* 22–3).

The same is true for history, long a "hobby" of elder statesmen who wrote Rome's history from the senate's perspective, intending to highlight their class' collective achievement. Here too, non-elite "professionals" had begun to intrude, new genres complemented the traditional *annales*, and historical works now often presented a partisan view-point.[6] The prefaces of Sallust, a senator with an overall unsuccessful career, illuminate his efforts to claim for his art a level of respectability that would give him the desired prestige (*Cat.* 3.1–2; cf. 8; *Iug.* 3–4).

In vain. Not intellectuals or artists but a long line of military and political leaders had built the magnificent edifice of the Roman State and Empire; they get credit in Cicero's *Republic*, populated Livy's "exemplary" history and, as *summi viri*, adorned the niches in the porticoes of Augustus' new Forum, models of "citizens who had raised

[4] See the praise of rhetoric's power in Cic. *De Or.* 8.29–34 and the ensuing discussion; also *Leg.* 1.3.10; *Off.* 2.19.65. Rhetoric in Rome: Kennedy (1972); Rawson (1985, 143–55). Cicero: Conte (1994b, 175–208). Caesar's training: Gelzer (1968, 23).

[5] Rawson (1985, 201–14).

[6] Rawson (1985, 215–32); Oakley (1997, 3–108); Mehl (2011, chs. 2–3).

the Roman people from small beginnings to their present glory," to be imitated by future generations.[7]

Because of its political value, serious study of rhetoric or law was acceptable but otherwise sons of senators wasted little time in formal education and only dabbled in intellectual pursuits such as philosophy. They learned leadership skills by observing their relatives in action and were stimulated by Rome's memorial landscape.[8] Typically, like Sallust, Varro (the polymath) turned to intellectual pursuits only after his political career foundered. Hence the doer of deeds continued to prevail over the writer and scholar. The path to highest standing in Rome led only through the battlefield and Forum – in this sequence. Caesar might compliment Cicero extravagantly for enhancing the Roman *nomen* and *dignitas* through intellectual achievements – especially in competition with the Greeks – but he himself would never have considered anything but a military and political career in competition with the greatest Roman achievers: the Scipios, Marius, and Pompey.

Still, he dictated *De Analogia* "while coming back over the Alps" from Cisalpine Gaul, and a poem, *The Journey* (*Iter*), "on the road between Rome and Western Spain" (Suet. *Iul.* 56.5.).[9] He wrote pamphlets, other pieces of poetry (now lost), and ten books of *commentarii*; he read and commented on others' poetry while maintaining an astonishingly intense correspondence in the midst of long and difficult wars.[10] We understand the importance of the correspondence. But what is the significance of all the other literary activities? Does it mean that thinking and writing about Latin style or composing poetry were merely useful to exercise his mind or pleasant distractions? Hardly, though we can only speculate. I would think that in this respect Caesar, despite his family connections and ideological leanings, identified more with the Scipios and Sulla than with Marius and Pompey: with old, highly educated and sophisticated nobility, conversant in languages, literature, and the arts rather than with military men who excelled in the field but were lost when dealing with the intricate norms of the elegant salons of high society and the senate's antechambers. Nobody doubted Caesar's abundant social skills. Intellectually, he had proved his

[7] Cic. *Rep.* 2.2, with a historical sketch; Chaplin (2000) (exemplary history); van der Blom (2010) (on Cicero's *exempla*); Sall. *Iug.* 4.5–6 (on ancestors' *exempla*); Suet. *Aug.* 31.5; Luce 1991; Zanker (1988, 210–15) (on the *summi viri*). See also next note.

[8] Hölkeskamp (2001); Scholz (2011).

[9] On *De Analogia* and the *Iter*, see Pezzini 173–92 and Casali 206–14 in this volume.

[10] On Caesar's ability to focus and dictate several letters simultaneously, see Pliny, *NH* 7.91; Plut. *Caes.* 17.3–4; Suet. *Iul.* 56.5. Caesar's comments on Cicero's poetry: Cic. *QFr.* 2.16.5.

excellence in rhetoric and the courts; he continued to display flashes of his brilliance in other intellectual fields by producing exquisite tidbits of poetry or brilliant examples of stylistic theory and historical narrative (*De Analogia*, the *Commentarii*) – to make himself present in Rome while he was far away, and to demonstrate that he had it all, being a serious literary contender while competing with the best generals Rome ever had![11]

In a personality as complex as that of Caesar's, it is no contradiction that such intent to align himself with the highest and oldest nobility goes together with what some scholars have identified as a populist effort to "democratize" language in *De Analogia*: this treaty clearly reflects contemporary debates and contrasts with Cicero's much more exclusive understanding of language. In particular, through linguistic analysis and theory Caesar attempted to make Latin accessible and manageable to those Romans, Italians, or even provincials, who did not have the proper Roman elite background and were looked down upon because they had "insufficient" control of this language.[12] This effort of "popularization" in the sense of reaching, including, and empowering wider audiences far beyond the Roman elite applies not only to *De Analogia* but also, as we shall see, to the *Commentarii*.

Finally, perhaps Caesar's thinking about style corresponded to a deep-seated need. Matthias Gelzer writes about *De Analogia*:

> [O]ne suspects that the principle of style which he there champions was derived from his own method of aiming at perfect clarity of expression. Thus . . . the characteristic warning: "As the sailor avoids the rock, so should you the obsolete and rare word" . . . could . . . be applied to his policies, which shunned all display of "clever" originality, but appeared in their monumental simplicity as the fulfilment of the duties of a true Roman statesman.[13]

Even so, the military and political spheres claimed absolute priority, and overall Caesar had more important things to do. The poem and *De Analogia* were among rare exceptions. Why, then, did he invest so much continuous effort into writing his *Commentarii* on top of the usual general's reports to the senate? What, then, was a *commentarius* in Roman tradition and perception? How do Caesar's *Commentarii* relate to such perceptions? When and how were they published? And what was their purpose and intended readership?

[11] See recently Osgood (2009).
[12] Dugan (2005, 179–80); Garcea (2012, ch. 1, esp. 3-10) and Pezzini 177–92 in this volume.
[13] Gelzer (1968, 139); see Garcea (2012, 5–7) about the relationship between this literary work and some of Caesar's political and administrative measures. See also below at n. 27.

Caesar's *Commentarii* in their Literary and Political Context

Briefly, a *commentarius* (often used in the plural, *commentarii*), variously interchangeable with *acta*, *tabulae*, or *res gestae*) could be a "handbook" (such as the guide to senate procedures Varro wrote for Pompey), a record (or set of records) of activities and transactions (what Caesar gave to Antonius before his planned departure for the Parthian campaign), kept by a head of household, priestly college, or magistrate, or a memoir or autobiography written to describe, glorify, justify, and defend a person's achievements from his own perspective (such as Sulla's memoirs or Augustus' *Res Gestae*).[14] Some were published, most were not.

Nothing suggests that such *commentarii* were commonly intended to be elaborated by historians – which is what Hirtius and Cicero claim of Caesar's *Commentarii*, while also making it clear that these works were literary masterpieces no historian would want to improve upon.

> [A]ll the most strenuous literary efforts of others are surpassed by the elegance of these commentaries. They were published to provide writers with information about such important events, but they have received such general approbation that future writers appear to have been forestalled rather than provided with an opportunity. Yet we may feel greater admiration than all others, for they know how well and faultlessly he wrote, while we also know with what ease and speed he completed the work. (Hirtius, *BG* 8 *praef.* 4–7; cf. Cic. *Brut.* 262)

The speed of completion Hirtius mentions perhaps explains the more critical assessment of another of Caesar's close associates, Asinius Pollio, who apparently believed "that the memoirs show signs of carelessness and inaccuracy" and that "Caesar would have been intending to rewrite and correct" them (Suet. *Iul.* 56.4).[15]

Clearly, then, Caesar had in his own simple but refined style created successful works of elegant literary art. Why Cicero and Hirtius still thought that they were written "to furnish others with material for writing history" is perhaps elucidated by Cicero's own case.[16] Hoping that someone would write a history of his great achievements in his consulship but rebuffed by several historians, he eventually approached Lucceius and

[14] Varro: Gell. *NA* 14.7.1–2; Caesar's records: e.g., Cic. *Phil.* 2.95; 5.10–11; Vell. Pat. 2.60.4. See most recently Rüpke (1992); Riggsby (2006, 133–55); Batstone and Damon (2006, 8–11); Nousek 97–109 in this volume; Krebs (2017).

[15] Lossmann (1957, 55–8); Grillo (2011, 245). Pollio, author of a history of the civil wars, probably had his own agenda.

[16] So too Krebs (2017).

promised to supply him with *commentarii* "on the whole affair," that is, with notes or a narrative upon which Lucceius could elaborate artistically and dramatically (*Fam.* 5.12). Disappointed again, Cicero wrote a *commentarius* on his consulship himself, but in Greek (a *hypomnēma*), and later reported that he had sent it to Posidonius "with the idea that he might compose something more elaborate on the same theme," but "so far from being stimulated to composition he was effectively frightened away" (*Att.* 2.1.1–2; 1.19).

This obviously was an elaborated and polished historical work, ready for publication – and still Cicero expected a professional historian to take it to yet higher levels. Apparently he applied the same standards to Caesar's work: excellent in its own way (he said) but still improvable (he thought). Whatever Caesar's own opinion about this, his *Commentarii* must have been intended to present his own interpretation of his accomplishments in an elegant and readable style to a public that was supposed to be persuaded and impressed. These books were based in turn on a collection of materials (notes and records), including his dispatches (*litterae*) to the senate and those of his officers to himself, that formed his personal archive (*commentarii*) on the events he was involved in.[17]

The questions of purpose, publication, and readership are crucial. They require a brief review of Caesar's situation when he began his Gallic campaigns. Cicero and Sallust present Caesar as a *popularis* already in 63 (Cic. *Cat.* 4.9–10; Sall. *Cat.* 51). He had fought for the restoration of people's rights eliminated by Sulla against Sulla's successors, who clung to power and prevented the realization of long overdue reforms.[18] His demonstratively anti-optimate actions in 63 further established his reputation as an ambitious and unusual risk-taker who courted popularity among all who were not *optimates.* But these actions caused conflicts with leading *optimates* and their chief-ideologue, Cato, about matters of policy and principle that forced Caesar to seek support elsewhere: through his alliance with Pompey and Crassus, he reached the consulship of 59 and a plum provincial command that was likely to offer opportunities for impressive military feats, perhaps even matching those of Pompey[19] – but at the price of disastrous fights with his opponents and repeated disregard for constitutional rules that marred his entire consulship and made him vulnerable

[17] On Caesar's use of the reports of his legates, see Rambaud (1966, ch. 2).
[18] Strasburger (1938, 2nd edn 1968); also Wiseman (1998, 3–4). Gruen (2009), among others, disagrees. For a more detailed discussion with sources, see Raaflaub (2010a).
[19] Caesar's goals in Gaul: Meier (1995, 235–7, 254–64); Walser (1998); Botermann (2002).

to later court action.[20] As governor of Transalpine Gaul, Caesar eagerly seized the first opportunity to launch a war, without hesitation crossing the border of his province into independent Gaul, and went on to conquer it – for Rome but without senate authorization, thus again violating legal restrictions.

From the moment Caesar left Rome, he was thus forced to organize his defenses. He needed to justify his actions in Gaul to forestall any legal action upon his return: this he *de facto* accomplished thanks to his success, recognized by the senate in 57 when it decreed an exceptionally long thanksgiving period for his victories (*BG* 2.35) and in 56 when it authorized public funding for the legions Caesar had raised on his own (Cic. *Fam.* 1.7.10) – thus giving "full legal validity" to "all Caesar's actions in Gaul since 58."[21] Moreover, he had to protect himself against his enemies' threats to prosecute him for legal offenses during his consulship, and to prepare his return to Roman politics against their foreseeable opposition. This he achieved in a first step by renewing his alliance with Pompey and Crassus in 56, who as consuls passed a bill in 55 to extend his proconsulship by another five years for a total of ten (the interval required between consulships).[22] In a second step, he planned to run for a second consulship *in absentia* and thus to maintain immunity through his year of office, which would allow him to take care of all remaining problems. This effort started well when in 52 with Pompey's support all ten tribunes passed a bill allowing Caesar to run *in absentia*, but it failed when his enemies succeeded in pulling Pompey to their side.[23]

Caesar must thus have launched a propaganda campaign from the very beginning of his operations in Gaul: through individual letters to leading personalities and by exerting pressure on some of them (such as Cicero), seconded by letters of his associates (as attested in Cicero's correspondence), through building projects and other acts of generosity benefitting the urban population in Rome, through financial "support" of important politicians "in need," through dispatches to the senate – and through his *Commentarii.*[24]

Whether these were published annually or in one set late in Caesar's proconsulship is debated. Each essentially covered one campaigning season

[20] For details, Gelzer (1968, ch. 3); Meier (1995, ch. 10); Jehne (2017).
[21] Gelzer (1968, 123–4). Thanksgiving: repeated in 55 (4.38) and 52 (7.90). Caesar's levies: 1.10.2; 2.2.1.
[22] Gelzer (1968, 127–8 with sources).
[23] For detailed discussion, see Raaflaub (1974, pt. I and 125–36).
[24] For details and references, see Krebs 31–5 in this volume.

(except for the eighth, for which Hirtius, completing the series, apologizes explicitly: *BG* 8.48.10–11).[25] Although some scholars believe that these books, "however they were written, were ... finished off as a unitary narrative," numerous reasons speak for annual publication: indeed, given his situation, Caesar had compelling reasons not to wait till the end.[26]

Furthermore, pursuing the connection between Caesar's literary and political projects suggested above concerning *De Analogia*, it seems highly plausible to see these *Commentarii* also as an expression of Caesar's own need: to understand, structure, conceptualize, and contextualize his war efforts and to create an increasingly clear and compelling vision that turned multiple stories of scattered campaigns into a coherent narrative of transforming a vast conquered barbarian territory into a civilized province of the Roman empire.[27]

The civil war allowed no winter breaks and no leisure time. Caesar had made intense and good-faith efforts to avoid this war and, when these failed, tried everything he could to end it as quickly as possible – to no avail.[28] In this case, efforts at damage control and winning the public relations battle were even more urgent and began immediately. Almost daily comments in Cicero's correspondence illuminate these activities that comprised letter campaigns, reliance on personal contacts, diplomatic efforts to restart peace negotiations, and a refined political strategy appealing to those who wanted to remain neutral. These policies had a sensational impact when Caesar demonstrated unexpected generosity toward those opponents who fell into his hands at Corfinium, and made leniency his principle.[29]

In this political battle too, Caesar's *Commentarii* were intended to play a crucial role. Their composition, completeness, and publication are also intensely debated.[30] Hirtius indicates that the *Civil War* was incomplete. Who completed it and how the extant work can be reconciled with Hirtius' words remains a puzzle.[31] Most likely, though, Caesar wrote his

[25] *BG* 3 (events of 56) contains another anomaly: its beginning (3.1–6) covers the unsuccessful campaign of Servius Galba in the Rhone Valley, dating to late 57. This may be owed to artistic and political reasons, which, as Klotz (1910, 20) points out, demanded that book 2 end with the glorious *Gallia pacata* and thanksgiving celebration (2.35), not with a setback. On the other hand, the setback occurred after Caesar's campaigns of that year and his departure to northern Italy (3.1.1), and thus possibly after the dispatch of his annual report (2.35.4).

[26] Kraus (2009, 159–65 (quote: 160 and the bibliography in n. 13)); recently: Wiseman (1998); Welch (1998). Krebs (2013a) provides additional arguments for serial composition.

[27] See recently Osgood (2009) and this chapter's last section.

[28] Raaflaub (1974, pts. 1, 3).

[29] *BC* 1.22–3; Cic. *Att.* 7.22 vs. 8.16.2; 9.7C; Raaflaub (1974, pt. 3); Grillo (2012, ch. 4).

[30] Summarized in Raaflaub (2009, 180–2).

[31] See Gaertner 273–6 in this volume.

three books soon after the events, two covering the year 49 (the first his own actions, the second essentially those of his legates), the third the events of 48, culminating in (but not ending with) the victory at Pharsalus and Pompey's death in Egypt. Segments of the *Alexandrian War* seem close to Caesar's narrative style, suggesting that the author knew Caesar's drafts and, therefore, that Caesar intended to write a *commentarius* on this war too. His obvious effort to enhance his public image and emphasize his Republican convictions, the justice of his cause, and his care for the Roman state and citizens make it likely that he intended to publish the work, perhaps upon his return to Rome from the East.[32] Although some scholars still think it was indeed published at that time, enough reasons, including Cicero's failure to acknowledge it, argue against it. Probably Caesar ultimately decided against publication because political conditions – and perhaps his thinking – had changed, and conditions in Rome and the prospect of a new civil war may have discouraged him from continuing his Republican goodwill campaign.

The circumstances in which Caesar wrote all his *commentarii* must thus have urged him to address a broad public that comprised all those whose opinion mattered and who were not *a priori* against him. He had always sought support outside the senate, and his policies had long envisaged what we might call "a grand coalition of true Romans" that encompassed the majority of senators (beyond the dominant faction of his enemies), the equestrians, the elites in the townships of Italy and Roman provincial municipalities, and the middle and upper officer corps in the armies.[33] Other large audiences included the urban populations of Rome and Italy – who heard about Caesar's deeds and arguments by word of mouth, in *contiones*, and through soldiers' letters to their families – and the soldiers who had witnessed or heard about them. In both cases, knowledge may also have been disseminated through public readings of the *Commentarii*.[34] I suggest it is this coalition – partly real and visible in the *Civil War*'s narrative, partly ideal, to be confirmed or won over – that Caesar addressed in his *Commentarii.* For this broad and diverse audience it was crucial that Caesar had the gift to write with simple but "consummate elegance" and that he "also knew to convey his intentions most exactly" (Hirt. *BG* 8 *praef.* 7).

[32] Hirtius, *BG* 8 praef. 2. Boatwright (1988); Jehne (2000); Batstone and Damon (2006, 29–32, 171); Grillo (2012, 178–80). *Alexandrian War*: Gaertner and Hausburg (2013). On the question of the numbers of books initially intended, see Grillo (2012, 181–4).

[33] Not to speak of posterity: Cic. *Marc.* 29. "Grand coalition:" below nn. 51–2.

[34] As argued by Wiseman (1998). See also Rüpke (1992).

To this audience Caesar needed to portray himself not only as a great general and achiever but also, in contrast to his irreconcilable opponents, as a supreme statesman and leader who was capable of rising above the parties, who endorsed principles needed to overcome the crisis of polarization, who was able to achieve what needed to be done, and whose actions were always determined by the interests of the *res publica*, its citizens, and all those affiliated with it. Caesar's self-portrait needed not only to be compelling but also appealing to his readers as a means to identify with him. Roman history was "exemplary," offering models to imitate and to avoid.[35] It was thus not far-fetched, even for an author of *commentarii*, to transcend justification and glorification by emphasizing in his self-portrait generally valid traits that inspired identification and imitation. What, then, does Caesar's self-portrait reveal about his views of what a Roman ideally was and what a Roman leader should strive to be?

Caesar's Self-portrait as a Perfect Roman

Two episodes take us to the heart of the issue. In one, Vercingetorix and his army in Alesia are starving and desperate. In the war council, Critognatus blasts the Romans: "What do they want, except to settle in the fields and cities of the Gauls and bind the people in slavery forever? ... They have never waged war for any other reasons than these ... [L]ook at our neighbor 'Gaul,' which has been reduced to a province, had its rights and laws transformed, been made subject to their government, and is oppressed by perpetual slavery" (*BG* 7.77.14–16). Although elsewhere, too, Caesar mentions the Gauls' intense desire to preserve their ancestral freedom,[36] this speech goes farther: it reminds us of that of Calgacus, leader of the last free Britons, who in Tacitus' *Agricola* describes the Romans as robbers of freedom and "pillagers of the world" (30). Tacitus likes to use hostile but virtuous "others" to criticize the Romans. This is hardly Caesar's intention. Unlike Tacitus' Calgacus, Caesar's Critognatus is ruthlessly brutal, and his Gauls are no shining paragons of virtue.[37] Hence Caesar' purpose must be different. It is, I suggest, to endorse the Roman imperial mission we know best from Vergil's famous lines:

[35] Livy pref. 9–11. Exemplary history: above n.7; Mehl (2013). Lausberg (1980) shows how Tacitus in turn uses Caesar as an *exemplum* to shape his biography of Agricola.
[36] *BG* 5.7.8; 7.1.5; 7.89; 8.1.3; 8.4.4; see Seager (2003, 22–6).
[37] See Barlow 1998 for how Caesar undercuts the credibility of Gallic proclamations of liberty.

> You, Roman, remember to rule the peoples with your command (*imperium*) –
> these will be your skills – to impose civilization (*morem*) on peace,
> to spare the subjected and to fight down the arrogant. (*Aen.* 6.851–3)

In contrast to the motto, *si vis pacem para bellum*, "if you want peace prepare for war,"[38] the Roman principle was first to subject the enemy and then to enjoy peace. Caesar presents himself as doing just that: although Roman imperial control requires the suppression of other peoples' liberty, this is amply justified by the resulting peace, stability, and order.[39] Most Romans would have agreed. Cicero, hardly a warmonger, emphasizes the parallel between Caesar's achievement in the North and that of Pompey in the East where all peoples have been weakened so gravely that they hardly exist anymore, and pacified so completely that they rejoice about Roman rule (*Prov. Cons.* 19, 31).

In the other episode, Caesar faced an enemy army that held a much superior position. His soldiers still wanted to fight. But Caesar refused, explaining to them the heavy losses the victory would cost: "he would be judged guilty of the most terrible injustice if he did not place a higher value on their lives than on doing well for himself" (*BG* 7.19.4–6). Similarly, in Spain in 49 Caesar had cornered and demoralized the enemy troops and cut them off from supplies and water. "This offered an opportunity to do things well!"[40] Although urged by his army to attack, he refused: "Why should he consent to lose any of his men, even in a successful battle? . . . He was also moved by pity for his fellow citizens on the other side, for he knew that . . . they would be slaughtered. He preferred to achieve his objective while leaving them safe and unhurt" (*BC* 1.71.1, 72.2–3). Against the soldiers' frustrated threats, Caesar persisted – and was soon vindicated, when the enemy capitulated and his clemency earned the approval of both sides (1.74.7).

Here, in a civil war, Caesar tries to save citizen lives on both sides – a recurring motif. True, clemency is part of his carefully calculated political strategy, but in the *Gallic War* too he usually applies the principle of pardon after the first submission – so that the Gauls themselves count on his clemency.[41] For violations of sworn agreements, however, punishment

[38] This motto originated in political debates of late nineteenth-century Germany: see Wölfflin (1888) and, for further discussion, Linderski (1984b); Welwei (1989).

[39] For Tacitus' further development of this argument (and for differences), see Lausberg (1980).

[40] Although the formula *rem bene gerere* usually simply means "to be successful, gain victory," a literal translation better brings out what Caesar means here.

[41] Usual clemency: e.g., *BG* 2.14, 31. Caesar's political strategy in the civil war: Raaflaub (1974, pt. 3); clemency: Raaflaub (1974, 293–307). Caesar's *clementia:* Dahlmann (1967); Weinstock (1971, 233–43); Alföldi (1985: ch. 5); Griffin (2003); Grillo (2012, 78–105).

is brutal, not least for the sake of deterrence.[42] Remarkable here is not the cruelty – common in the history of Roman warfare – but the frequent effort to avoid it. By contrast, leniency and moderation are unknown to barbarians and to Caesar's opponents in the civil war, who mercilessly execute Caesar's soldiers they capture, often breaking earlier assurances.[43]

Caesar's self-portrait as a general is well-known:[44] his determined pursuit of victory and his ability, with few exceptions, to avoid major disasters and turn even great challenges into triumphs; the speed (*celeritas*) of his movements and decisions and his unrelenting persistence that baffled his opponents' best efforts; his iron will and focus; his personal courage and willingness to incur risks if it was needed to achieve success; his circumspection, inventiveness, and ability to "think outside the box"; his comprehensive understanding of the conditions in which he fought; his versatility and mastery of all aspects of military science; his ability to lead and inspire, his care for his soldiers and officers, while demanding highest levels of performance; his magnanimity in acknowledging their efforts and achievements, and his generosity in rewarding them; and the natural authority with which he quelled rare instances of dissatisfaction or panic.[45]

Caesar's self-portrait as a statesman is equally impressive. Justifying his involvement in Gaul, outside his province – politically and legally not without problems – Caesar emphasizes that he was motivated entirely by his responsibility as a provincial governor to protect his province and Roman "friends" and allies – particularly upon the latter's request – and by his desire to avenge past injury and restore Roman (and personal) honor.[46] More broadly, Caesar's actions in free Gaul stabilize a troublesome border area and thus serve Roman security needs. Hostilities among Gallic tribes that subsequently threaten such stability are interpreted as rebellions against an order established in Rome's and its allies' interest (e.g., *BG* 2.1). Their repression – and Caesar's involvement in an ever larger area outside of his province – are thus necessary to protect this order. Caesar and his subcommanders always do what is needed "in the interest of the *res publica.*"

[42] Punishment of treacherous Gauls: e.g., *BG* 2.31–3; 8.44. On the impact of Caesar's conquest in human and economic terms: Will (1992, esp. 96–104).
[43] E.g. *BG* 5.26–7; cruelty of Caesar's opponents: e.g., *BC* 3.14, 28, with Grillo (2012, 136–40).
[44] Goldsworthy (1998); de Blois (2007); Rosenstein (2009).
[45] The *Bellum Africum,* probably written by an officer, offers most valuable insights about the psychology of Caesar's leadership and how he was seen by his troops.
[46] *BG* 1.7, 10–14, 28, 30–3, 37, 43, 45; Seager (2003, 19–22).

Caesar constantly thinks and acts as a representative of the Roman state and people. As such one does and does not do certain things. As Quintus Cicero says to rebel leaders, "it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept terms from an armed enemy." If they disarmed and sent envoys to Caesar to submit, he, Cicero, would support their petition and Caesar hopefully would grant it (*BG* 5.41.7–8; cf. 3.28). While Titurius Sabinus follows treacherous enemy advice and is massacred with all his troops, Cicero and his men fight heroically and are saved by Caesar's determined intervention (5.24–52).

Romans display courage, discipline, and constancy; they never give up and always abide by agreements and oaths – traits the barbarians lack: they are treacherous, making and breaking agreements at will, bold and courageous but foolhardy, fickle without discipline and persistence, arrogant and boastful but easily discouraged. These patterns, based on prejudice and experience, have an ulterior purpose – to show Caesar systematically replacing a world of barbarian chaos with Roman order, until we see him holding court in Bibracte, as if Gallia Comata were already a Roman province (*BG* 8.4). Conversely, praise of Gallic bravery serves to enhance Caesar's and his army's achievement: easy victories offer little cause for glory.[47]

As governor, Caesar is especially obliged to protect Roman citizens. Hence violence done to his emissaries or the murder of Italian merchants suffice as causes for war and brutal punishment, and the safety of his soldiers is a constant concern (*BG* 3.7–8; 7.3). In the *BC* all this receives additional clarification. Caesar insists that he is fighting not against state, senate, or Roman people but only against a small faction of personal enemies who want to destroy him. He thus speaks of "disagreement among citizens" rather than "civil war," continuously seeks compromise and peace, explicitly excludes from the conflict those in the middle who wish to remain neutral, and treats opponents he captures with clemency,[48] thus consistently demonstrating his statesman-like qualities.

His opponents use an opposite strategy and often behave like barbarians, not Romans.[49] In forcing the war, they use oppressive and despicable political methods, allowing Caesar to present himself as advocate of the senate's and people's liberty and thus to refute long-standing

[47] On Caesar's portrait of the Gauls as warriors: Rawlings (1998). The *Alexandrian War* offers further rich evidence on the common negative portrait of non-Roman enemies.

[48] On political strategies in the civil war: Raaflaub (1974: pt. 3), summarized briefly in Raaflaub (2003, 59–61).

[49] *Ibid.*; Grillo (2012, 106–30).

denunciations of himself as a threat to the state's liberty.[50] An exclusive minority, his opponents pursue divisive policies and fight for the state in word, but in fact for personal enmities, privileges, and power, demonstrating blatantly un-Roman attitudes (e.g., *BC* 2.44; 3.82–3, 96). In contrast, Caesar claims the support of the majority of the senate and Roman people (*BC* 1.2.6, 1.3.5, 1.9.5; cf. Hirtius, *BG* 8.52.3) as well as the Italian municipalities – a vote of Italy in Caesar's favor that prompts provincial towns too to join his side (*BC* 1.12–13, 15, 35.1; 2.19–20; 3.9, 11–12, 34–6). This majority also includes the citizens in Rome's armies: those of his opponents who owe their lives to his clemency and, unlike their stubborn leaders, happily leave the war behind (e.g., *BC* 1.74, 86), and Caesar's own, condemned as outcasts, who need to fight with him to regain their citizenship (3.91).[51] They all do their duty (*officium*) in saving citizens' lives; only the enemy generals brutally suppress peace (*BC* 1.85.1–3; 3.19). Caesar addresses them as citizens in explaining the justice of his cause and his efforts to preserve and restore peace (1.7, 85; 3.90). He is thus a leader who unites citizens of all classes and represents their true interests.[52]

Certainly, all this is tainted by Caesar's partisan interests. A corresponding report from the opposite side would have sounded very different. It is easy to be charmed by Caesar – a trap to be avoided – but just as easy to discard as mere propaganda what we just extracted from Caesar's works. His vision of a grand coalition of true Romans recalls the comprehensive reform programs of Gaius Gracchus and Livius Drusus, involving all classes of Roman citizens. In 59, Caesar used inclusive procedures to make an urgent agrarian law acceptable, and resorted to radical methods only when his opponents categorically refused even to consider it. In the spring of 49, Caesar urged the senators to join him in taking responsibility for the state's government and to resume peace negotiations. His aim, he says, was to outdo others in justice and equity, just as he previously surpassed them in achievement. This effort failed because the senators feared Pompey's threats – and presumably disliked Caesar's announcement that, if necessary, he would do alone what needed to be done.[53]

Caesar's plans, like those of all other leaders, always served his own interests, but they also contained the potential to overcome the stalemate that paralyzed the state. Unfortunately, in 46 and 45, when he had a

[50] Liberty: Raaflaub (2003). [51] See also Cic. *Lig.* 6.18; Lucan 1.278–9; Raaflaub (2003, 57 n.72).
[52] Raaflaub (2010a), (2010b); Grillo (2012, 131–6). [53] 59: Dio Cass. 38.1.6–7. 49: *BC* 1.32–3.