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Elliptic Curves in Cryptography

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To

Elizabeth, Lauren and Michael,

Lidia, Ariel and Dahlia,

Maggie, Ellie and Oliver.

Contents

Preface

Much attention has recently been focused on the use of elliptic curves in public key cryptography, first proposed in the work of Koblitz [**62**] and Miller [**103**]. The motivation for this is the fact that there is no known sub-exponential algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem on a general elliptic curve. In addition, as will be discussed in Chapter I, the standard protocols in cryptography which make use of the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields, such as Diffie–Hellman key exchange, ElGamal encryption and digital signature, Massey–Omura encryption and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), all have analogues in the elliptic curve case.

Cryptosystems based on elliptic curves are an exciting technology because for the same level of security as systems such as RSA [**134**], using the current knowledge of algorithms in the two cases, they offer the benefits of smaller key sizes and hence of smaller memory and processor requirements. This makes them ideal for use in smart cards and other environments where resources such as storage, time, or power are at a premium.

Some researchers have expressed concern that the basic problem on which elliptic curve systems are based has not been looked at in as much detail as, say, the factoring problem, on which systems such as RSA are based. However, all such systems based on the perceived difficulty of a mathematical problem live in fear of a dramatic breakthrough to some extent, and this issue is not addressed further in this work.

This book discusses various issues surrounding the use of elliptic curves in cryptography, including:

- The basic arithmetic operations, not only on the curves but also over finite fields.
- Ways of efficiently implementing the basic operation of adding a point to itself a large number of times (point multiplication).
- Known attacks on systems based on elliptic curves.
- A large section devoted to computing the number of rational points on elliptic curves over finite fields.
- A discussion on the generalization of elliptic curve systems to hyperelliptic systems.

The book is written for a wide audience ranging from the mathematician who knows about elliptic curves (or has been acquainted with them) and who wants a quick survey of the main results pertaining to cryptography, to an

implementer who requires some knowledge of elliptic curve mathematics for use in a practical cryptosystem. Clearly, aiming for such diverse audiences is hard, and not all parts of the book will be of the same level of interest to all readers. However, most of the important points such as implementation issues, security issues and point counting issues can be acquired with only a moderate understanding of the underlying mathematics.

We try and give a flavour of the mathematics involved for those who are interested. We decided however not to include most proofs since that not only would dramatically increase the size of the book but also would not serve its main purpose. It is hoped that the numerous references cited and the extensive bibliography provided will direct the interested reader to appropriate sources for all the missing details. In fact, much of the necessary mathematical background can be found in the books by Silverman, [**147**] and [**148**].

Some of the topics covered in the book by Menezes [**97**] are expanded upon. In particular the improvements made to the algorithm of Schoof [**141**] for determining the number of rational points on an elliptic curve are explained, and the method of finding curves using the theory of complex multiplication is discussed. This latter method has other applications when one uses elliptic curves to construct proofs of primality. We also give the first treatment in book form of such methods as point compression (including x-coordinate compression), the attack on anomalous curves and the generalization of the MOV attack to curves such as those with the trace of Frobenius equal to two. Two chapters are devoted to implementation issues. One covers finite fields while the second covers the various techniques available for point multiplication. In addition, the chapter on Schoof's algorithm and its improvements provides algorithmic summaries intended to facilitate the implementation of these point counting techniques.

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Abbreviations and Standard Notation

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations of standard phrases are used throughout the book:

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
BSGS	baby step/giant step method
CM	Complex multiplication
CRT	Chinese Remainder Theorem
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DHP	Diffie–Hellman problem
DLP	Discrete logarithm problem
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDLP	Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
ECM	Elliptic curve factoring method
ECPP	Elliptic curve primality proving method
GCD	Greatest common divisor
LCM	Least common multiple
MOV	Menezes–Okamoto–Vanstone attack
NAF	Non-adjacent form
NFS	Number field sieve
ONB	Optimal normal basis
RNS	Residue number system
RSA	Rivest–Shamir–Adleman encryption scheme
SD	Signed digit
SEA	Schoof–Elkies–Atkin algorithm

Standard notation

The following standard notation is used throughout the book, often without further definition. Other notation is defined locally near its first use.

K^*, K^+, $\overline{K}$	for a field K, the multiplicative group, additive group, and algebraic closure, respectively
$\mathrm{Gal}(K/F)$	Galois group of K over F
$\mathrm{Aut}(G)$	Automorphism group of G
$\mathrm{char}(K)$	characteristic of K
$\gcd(f,g), \mathrm{lcm}(f,g)$	GCD, LCM of f and g
$\deg(f)$	degree of a polynomial f
$\mathrm{ord}(g)$	order of an element g in a group
$\mathbb{Z}$, $\mathbb{Q}$, $\mathbb{R}$, $\mathbb{C}$	integers, rationals, reals and complex numbers
$\mathbb{Z}_{>k}$	integers greater than k; similarly for $\geq, <, \leq$
$\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$	integers modulo n
$\mathbb{Z}_p$, $\mathbb{Q}_p$	p-adic integers and numbers, respectively
$\mathbb{F}_q$	finite field with q elements
$\mathrm{Tr}_{q\|p}(x)$	trace of $x \in \mathbb{F}_q$ over $\mathbb{F}_p$, $q = p^n$
$\langle g \rangle$	cyclic group generated by g
$\#S$	cardinality of the set S
E	elliptic curve (equation)
$E(K)$	group of K-rational points on E
$[m]P$	multiplication-by-m map applied to the point P
$E[m]$	group of m-torsion points on the elliptic curve E
$\mathrm{End}(E)$	Endormorphism ring of E
$\mathcal{O}$	point at infinity (on an elliptic curve)
$\wp$	Weierstrass 'pay' function
φ	Frobenius map
ϕ_{Eul}	Euler totient function
$GL_2(R)$	general linear group over the ring R: 2×2 matrices over R with determinant a unit in R
$PGL_2(K)$	projective general linear group over the field K, with scalar multiples identified
$SL_2(\mathbb{Z})$	special linear group of 2×2 matrices over $\mathbb{Z}$ with determinant one
$\left(\frac{\cdot}{p}\right)$	Legendre symbol
$\mathrm{Re}(z), \mathrm{Im}(z)$	real and imaginary parts of $z \in \mathbb{C}$, respectively
$\mathcal{H}$	Poincaré half-plane $\mathrm{Im}(z) > 0$
$O(f(n))$	function $g(n)$ such that $\|g(n)\| \leq c\|f(n)\|$ for some constant $c > 0$ and all sufficiently large n
$o(f(n))$	function $g(n)$ such that $\lim_{n\to\infty}(g(n)/f(n)) = 0$
$\log_b x$	logarithm to base b of x; natural log if b omitted

Often we will need to present binary, hexadecimal or decimal numbers which are too long to fit on one line. We shall use the standard convention of breaking the number into multiple lines, with a backslash at the end of a line indicating that the number is continued in the next line. For example

$$\begin{aligned} p &= 2^{230} + 67 \\ &= 1725436586697640946858688965569256363112777243042 5\backslash \\ &\quad 96638790631055949891. \end{aligned}$$

CHAPTER I

Introduction

We introduce the three main characters in public key cryptography. As in many books on the subject, it is assumed that Alice and Bob wish to perform some form of communication whilst Eve is an eavesdropper who wishes to spy on (or tamper with) the communications between Alice and Bob. Of course there is no assumption that Alice and Bob (or Eve) are actually human. They may (and probably will) be computers on some network such as the Internet.

Modern cryptography, as applied in the commercial world, is concerned with a number of problems. The most important of these are:

1. **Confidentiality:** A message sent from Alice to Bob cannot be read by anyone else.
2. **Authenticity:** Bob knows that only Alice could have sent the message he has just received.
3. **Integrity:** Bob knows that the message from Alice has not been tampered with in transit.
4. **Non-repudiation:** It is impossible for Alice to turn around later and say she did not send the message.

To see why all four properties are important consider the following scenario. Alice wishes to buy some item over the Internet from Bob. She sends her instruction to Bob which contains her credit card number and payment details. She requires that this communication be confidential, since she wants other people to know neither her credit card details nor what she is buying. Bob needs to know that the message is authentic in that it came from Alice and not some impostor. Both Alice and Bob need to be certain that the message's integrity is preserved, for example the amount cannot be altered by some third party whilst it is in transit. Finally Bob requires the non-repudiation property, meaning that Alice should not be able to say she did not send the instruction.

In other words, we require transactions to take place between two mutually distrusting parties over a public network. This is different from conventional private networks, such as those used in banking, where there are key hierarchies and tamper proof hardware which can store symmetric keys.

It is common in the literature to introduce public key techniques in the area of confidentiality protection. Public key techniques are, however, usually infeasible to use directly in this context, being orders of magnitude slower than symmetric techniques. Their use in confidentiality is often limited to

the transmission of symmetric cipher keys. On the other hand *digital signatures*, which give the user the authentication, integrity and non-repudiation properties required in electronic commerce, seem to require the use of public key cryptography.

A computer which is processing payments for a bank or a business may need to verify or create thousands of digital signatures every second. This has led to the demand for public key digital signature schemes which are very efficient. Whilst many schemes are based on the discrete logarithm problem in a finite abelian group, there is some debate as to what type of groups to use. One choice is the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field. This choice is becoming increasingly popular, precisely because of efficiency considerations. In this book, we attempt to summarize the latest knowledge available on both theoretical and practical issues related to elliptic curve cryptosystems.

I.1. Cryptography Based on Groups

In this section, some of the standard protocols of public key cryptography are surveyed. A more detailed discussion of all of these protocols and other related areas of cryptography can be found in the books by Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [**99**] and Schneier [**139**], although neither of these books covers the use of elliptic curves in cryptography. The protocols discussed here only require the use of a finite abelian group G, of order $\#G$, which is assumed to be cyclic. The group of interest in this work is the *additive* group of points on an elliptic curve. However, it is convenient for the remainder of this chapter to assume the group is *multiplicative*, with generator g, and that the order, $\#G$, is a prime. If this is not the case, we can always take a prime order subgroup of G as our group, with no loss of security. The additive vs. multiplicative issue is, of course, just one of notation. We will revert to additive notation later on, when the discussion focuses on the elliptic curve groups.

The group G should be presented in such a way as to make multiplication and exponentiation easy, whilst computing discrete logarithms is hard. The reason for this will become clearer below. It should also be possible to generate random elements from the group with an almost uniform distribution.

By the *discrete logarithm problem* (DLP) we mean the problem of determining the least positive integer, x, if it exists, which satisfies the equation

$$h = g^x$$

for two, given, elements h and g in the group G. Note that a common feature of all of the following schemes is that if there is a fast way to solve the DLP in G, then they are all insecure for the group G. Since we have assumed that G is of prime order such a discrete logarithm always exists.

I.1.1. Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Alice and Bob wish to agree on a secret random element in the group, which could be of use as a key for a

higher speed symmetric algorithm like the *Data Encryption Standard* (DES). They wish to make this agreement over an insecure channel, without having exchanged any information previously. The only public items, which can be shared amongst a group of users, are the group G and an element $g \in G$ of large known order.

1. Alice generates a random integer $x_A \in \{1, \ldots, \#G - 1\}$. She sends to Bob the element
$$g^{x_A}.$$
2. Bob generates a random integer $x_B \in \{1, \ldots, \#G - 1\}$. He sends to Alice the element
$$g^{x_B}.$$
3. Alice can then compute
$$g^{x_A x_B} = (g^{x_B})^{x_A}.$$
4. Likewise, Bob can compute
$$g^{x_A x_B} = (g^{x_A})^{x_B}.$$

The only information that Eve knows is G, g, g^{x_A} and g^{x_B}. If Eve can recover $g^{x_A x_B}$ from this data then Eve is said to have solved a *Diffie–Hellman problem* (DHP). It is easy to see that if Eve can find discrete logarithms in G then she can solve the DHP. It is believed for most groups in use in cryptography that the DHP and the DLP are equivalent [**94**], in a complexity-theoretic sense (there is a polynomial time reduction of one problem to the other, and vice versa).

I.1.2. ElGamal encryption [39]. Alice wishes to send a message to Bob. Her message, m, is assumed to be encoded as an element in the group. Bob has a public key consisting of g and $h = g^x$, where x is the private key.

1. Alice generates a random integer $k \in \{1, \ldots, \#G - 1\}$ and computes
$$a = g^k, \ b = h^k m.$$
2. Alice sends the cipher text (a, b) to Bob.
3. Bob can recover the message from the equation
$$ba^{-x} = h^k m g^{-kx} = g^{xk - xk} m = m.$$

I.1.3. ElGamal digital signature [39]. Here, Bob wants to sign a message $m \in (\mathbb{Z}/(\#G)\mathbb{Z})$. He can use the same public and private key pair, h and x, as he used for the encryption scheme. We will need a bijection f from G to $\mathbb{Z}/(\#G)\mathbb{Z}$.

1. Bob generates a random integer $k \in \{1, \ldots, \#G - 1\}$, and computes
$$a = g^k.$$
2. Bob computes a solution, $b \in \mathbb{Z}/(\#G)\mathbb{Z}$, to the congruence
$$m \equiv x f(a) + bk \pmod{\#G}.$$

3. Bob sends the signature, (a, b), and the message, m, to Alice.
4. Alice verifies the signature by checking that the following equation holds:
$$h^{f(a)}a^b = g^{xf(a)+kb} = g^m.$$

I.1.4. Digital Signature Algorithm. A version of ElGamal signatures, called the *Digital Signature Algorithm* (DSA), is the basis of the Digital Signature Standard [**FIPS186**]. An elliptic curve version of DSA (ECDSA) is described in the IEEE P1363 standard draft [**P1363**]. The signature procedure is almost identical to the ElGamal scheme above. It is described here for the sake of completeness, as well as to introduce a slightly different signature verification procedure with some computational advantages.

Bob wants to sign a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}/(\#G)\mathbb{Z}$. He uses the same public and private key pair h and x as before, and both he and Alice use a common bijective mapping, f, from G to $\mathbb{Z}/(\#G)\mathbb{Z}$.

1. Bob generates a random integer $k \in \{1, \ldots, \#G - 1\}$, and computes
$$a = g^k.$$
2. He computes the solution, b, to the congruence
$$m \equiv -xf(a) + kb \pmod{\#G}.$$
3. He sends the signature, (a, b), and the message, m, to Alice.
4. Alice computes
$$u = mb^{-1} \pmod{\#G}\ ,\ v = f(a)b^{-1} \pmod{\#G}.$$
5. She then computes
$$w = g^u h^v$$
and verifies that
$$\begin{aligned} w &= g^u h^v = g^{mb^{-1}} g^{vx} = g^{mb^{-1}+xf(a)b^{-1}} \\ &= g^{(m+xf(a))b^{-1}} = g^{kbb^{-1}} = g^k \\ &= a. \end{aligned}$$

Although the signature verification procedure implemented by Alice appears, at first glance, more complicated than the one described for the ElGamal scheme, it is in fact computationally simpler. Upon closer scrutiny, one notes that the verification procedure described for DSA requires two group exponentiations, while the one described for the ElGamal scheme requires three. The two procedures are, of course, mathematically equivalent.

In its standardized versions, the DSA requires also a secure *hashing function*. This is a many-to-one function that maps the original message to a shorter *digest*, in a way that is infeasible to invert in practice. The message digest is the quantity actually operated on, in lieu of m. See, e.g., [**99**] or [**P1363**] for the details.

I.1.5. Massey–Omura encryption. Here Alice wishes to send a message to Bob. They do not need to have a private or public key. The message is encoded as an element $m \in G$. This protocol is sometimes described as the 'you-to-me, me-to-you' method. It requires Alice and Bob to carry out a conversation rather than just a single transmission of encrypted text.

1. Alice computes a random integer, x_A, coprime to $\#G$, and sends Bob the element
$$a = m^{x_A}.$$
2. Bob computes a random integer, x_B, coprime to $\#G$, and sends back to Alice the element
$$b = a^{x_B} = m^{x_A x_B}.$$
3. Alice can compute $x_A^{-1} \pmod{\#G}$ and so sends back to Bob the element
$$a' = b^{x_A^{-1}} = m^{x_A x_B x_A^{-1}} = m^{x_B}.$$
4. Finally Bob computes $x_B^{-1} \pmod{\#G}$ and can decrypt the message as
$$(a')^{x_B^{-1}} = m^{x_B x_B^{-1}} = m.$$

This algorithm, also referred to as the 'double lock' algorithm, is seldom used in practice but is of historical interest.

I.1.6. Nyberg–Rueppel digital signature [113]. Nyberg and Rueppel present a series of digital signature schemes which allow message recovery. Below we give a variant of one of these schemes, based on a system of Piveteau [**122**]. However, here it is given as a standard signature scheme without any message recovery. For details on how to add message recovery, to this and to other schemes, we refer the reader to [**113**].

Our reason for including the following scheme is that the message to be signed, m, is a member of the group G and not $\mathbb{Z}/(\#G)\mathbb{Z}$. This makes it slightly different from the ElGamal and DSA schemes above.

Once again we assume f is a bijection from G to $\mathbb{Z}/(\#G)\mathbb{Z}$. Alice wishes to sign a message, $m \in G$. She has a private key $x \in \mathbb{Z}$, coprime to $\#G$, and a public key $y = g^x$.

1. She computes a random integer, k, coprime to $\#G$, and computes $r = g^{-k}m$.
2. Alice then computes a solution, s, to the congruence
$$1 \equiv f(r)x + sk \pmod{\#G}.$$
3. She sends the message, m, and the digital signature, (r, s), to Bob.
4. Bob can verify that the message came from Alice by verifying the equation
$$y^{-f(r)}r^s = g^{sk-1-sk}m^s = m^s g^{-1}.$$