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# **EARLY JESUITS AND THE RHETORICAL TRADITION, 1540–1650**

Jaska Kainulainen



# Early Jesuits and the Rhetorical Tradition, 1540–1650

This book explores sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuit contributions to the rhetorical tradition established by Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. It analyses the writings of those Jesuits who taught rhetoric at the College of Rome, including Pedro Juan Perpiña, (1530–66), Carlo Reggio (1539–1612), Francesco Benci (1542–94), Famiano Strada (1572–1649) and Tarquinio Galluzzi (1574–1649). Additionally, it discusses the rhetorical views of Jesuits who were not based in Rome, most notably Cypriano Soarez (1524–93), the author of the popular manual *De arte rhetorica*. Jesuit education, Ciceronianism and civic life feature as the key themes of the book.

*Early Jesuits and the Rhetorical Tradition, 1540–1650* argues that, in line with Cicero, early modern Jesuit teachers and humanists associated rhetoric with a civic function. Jesuit writings, not only on rhetoric, but also on moral, religious and political themes, testify to their thorough familiarity with Cicero's civic philosophy. Following Cicero, Isocrates and Renaissance humanists, early modern Jesuit teachers of the *studia humanitatis* coupled eloquence with wisdom and, in so doing, invested the rhetorician with such qualities and duties which many *quattrocento* humanists ascribed to an active citizen or statesman. These qualities centred on the duty to promote the common good by actively participating in civic life.

This book will appeal to scholars and students alike interested in the history of the Jesuits, history of ideas and early modern history in general.

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*Jaska Kainulainen*

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# Abbreviations

- APUG** Archivio storico della Pontificia Università Gregoriana.  
**APUG F.C** *Fondo curia* at Archivio storico della Pontificia Università Gregoriana.
- ConSJ** Loyola, Ignatius, S.J., *Monumenta Ignatiana, series tertiae, Constitutiones Societatis Jesu*, vol. III: *Textus Latinus*, Rome 1938.
- EpNad** Nadal, Jerome, S.J., *Epistolae P. Hieronumi Nadal Societatis Jesu*, vol. IV (1546–1577), Madrid 1905.
- MDI** *Monumenta Missionum Societatis Iesu: Documenta Indica*, vols. I, II, XIV, XVIII, edited by Josef Wicki S.J., Rome 1948–1988.
- MJ** *Monumenta Missionum Societatis Iesu: Monumenta Historica Japoniae*, vol. III: *Documentos del Japón (1558–1562)*, edited by Juan Ruiz-de-Medina S.J., Rome 1995.
- MMex** *Monumenta Missionum Societatis Iesu: Monumenta Mexicana*, vols. I, IV, edited by Felix Zubillaga, S.J., Rome 1956–1971.
- MonBob** Bobadilla, Nicholas, S.J., *Bobadillae Monumentae; Nicolai Alphonsi de Bobadilla, sacerdotis e Societatis Jesu, gesta et scripta ex autographis aut archetypis potissimum deprompta*, Madrid 1913.
- MonIgS1** Loyola, Ignatius, S.J., *Monumenta Ignatiana, series prima, Sancti Ignatii de Loyola Societatis Jesu Fundatoris Epistolae et Instructiones*, vols. I, III, IV, IX, X, Madrid 1903–1910.
- MonIgS3** Loyola, Ignatius, S.J., *Monumenta Ignatiana, series tertiae, Constitutiones Societatis Jesu*, vols. I, IV, Rome 1934–1948.
- MonL** Laynez, Diego, S.J., *Lainii Monumenta: epistolae et acta patris Jacobi Lainii*, vols. VI–VIII, Madrid 1915–1917.
- MonX** Xavier, Francis, S.J., *Monumenta Xaveriana ex autographis vel ex antiquioribus exemplis collecta, tomus primus*, Madrid 1899–1900.



- MPaed** *Monumenta Paedagogica Societatis Jesu*, vols. I-VII (1540–1616), edited by Ladislaus Lukács, S.J., Rome 1965–1992.
- MPer** *Monumenta Missionum Societatis Iesu: Monumenta Peruana*, vols. VI-VIII, edited by Antonio de Egaña S.J., Rome 1974–1986.
- PolC** Polanco, Juan de, S.J., *Polanci Complementa: Epistolae et commentaria P. Joannis Alphonsi d Polanco e Societatis Jesu*, vol. I, Madrid 1916.

# 1 Introduction

*The Pope was unimpressed at first; but Lainez, knowing his love of flattery, heaped upon him poetical compliments, and prose eulogiums, in sixteen different languages. The Pope could not resist such incense, and the Jesuits obtained the Seminary at Rome.*  
(John Poynder, *A History of the Jesuits*, London 1816)

This book explores sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuit contributions to the rhetorical tradition established by Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. The main argument of the book is that, in line with Cicero, early modern Jesuit teachers and humanists associated rhetoric with a civic function. As the book demonstrates, Jesuit writings not only on rhetoric, but also on moral, religious and political themes testify to their thorough familiarity with Cicero's civic philosophy. In addition to exploring Jesuit views on rhetoric and education, the book offers an interpretation of Jesuit *scientia civilis* and argues that its key characteristics resonated with those of the rhetorical tradition founded in ancient Greece and Rome. In line with Cicero, Isocrates and Renaissance humanists, early modern Jesuit teachers of the *studia humanitatis* coupled eloquence with wisdom and, in so doing, invested the rhetorician with such qualities and duties which many *quattrocento* humanists ascribed to an active citizen or statesman. These qualities centred on the duty to promote the common good by actively participating in civic life. Such participation relied on the rhetorical or persuasive skills of the citizens. Besides subscribing to the Ciceronian commitment to *commune bonum* in their writings—a commitment already expressed in the Constitutions of the fraternity—Jesuits contributed to the advancement of the common good in practice through their successful education system. Their position was in harmony with that of Isocrates, Cicero and humanists such as Erasmus (1466–1536) in that they associated rhetoric with civic, ethical and educational purposes.<sup>1</sup>

1 Jesuit participation in the rhetorical and humanistic traditions is also discussed in the following studies: Fumaroli 1980, 1999; O'Malley 1993; Maryks 2008; Kainulainen 2018a, 2018b. In contrast to the identification of early modern Jesuits with the rhetorical tradition, however, see Haar 2019, p. 1, who argues that 'Jesuit moral and political thought stood in the tradition of the medieval schoolmen in Europe' and, pp. 8–9, that 'the Jesuits belonged to the tradition of natural law theory'. Höpfl 2004 discusses Jesuit political thought from the point of view of theology and philosophy rather than rhetoric. On page 181 he asserts that 'the theological faculties alone provided an institutional locus for Jesuit political theory'. This

## 2 Introduction

The claim that there was a distinctive tradition from classical antiquity to the early modern period is, admittedly, bold and problematic. The Athens of Isocrates was a different political and cultural framework from Cicero's Rome while both of them differed drastically from the Christian world of early modern Jesuits. The latter difference is made clear by the Jesuit cardinal Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621) when he rejected Cicero's idea that 'there was formerly a time when men wandered about in the manner of beasts, then, through the eloquence of some wise orator, they were induced to assemble and to live together'. According to Bellarmine, there never was such state of nature because of the wisdom of Adam and Cain. And 'before Cain and Adam, man did not exist'.<sup>2</sup> This said, it is the aim of this book to demonstrate that the early Jesuits were steeped in what emerges as a distinctive tradition of rhetoric through their own education and through their subsequent careers as teachers of that tradition. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the impact of historical developments and changes to the tradition discussed here. It is equally important to notice that while the undertaking to sustain and teach a tradition is to a large extent achieved through imitation, by imitation Isocrates, Cicero, Renaissance humanists and the Jesuits understood emulation rather than slavish reproduction of a historical model. The tradition discussed in this book, therefore, was maintained by a conscious effort of its advocates both to learn the art as it was to be found in the early, pagan documents (manuals, orations, prose and poetry) and to improve on it by attuning its teachings to the contemporary culture and audience. In fact, it is worth stressing that the ambition to adapt and accommodate, to develop without breaking with the past, is a key characteristic of classical rhetoric itself. It is at least partly due to this characteristic of the tradition that it survived for so long as a recognisable art.

The Society of Jesus was founded by Ignatius Loyola (1491–1556), a Spanish nobleman and soldier who experienced a religious conversion after having been wounded in the battle of Pamplona in 1521. Loyola studied philosophy briefly at the universities of Alcalá and Salamanca before enrolling at the University of Paris in 1528. In Paris, he acquainted a group of young men—Francis Xavier (1506–52), Peter Faber (1506–46), Simão Rodrigues (1510–79), Nicholas Bobadilla (1511–90), Diego Laynez (1512–65) and Alfonso Salmerón (1515–85)—who would become his spiritual companions and the first members of the Society of Jesus. In the hope of finding a safe route to Jerusalem, Loyola left Paris in 1535 and arrived in Venice at the end of the year. His six companions and three new recruits, Claude Jay (1505–52),

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book does not question the merits of Höpfl's important study, but offers a complimentary, different approach to early modern Jesuits' civic concerns.

2 Bellarmine, *De laicis*, pp. 22–3. Cicero's famous idea is formulated in his *De inventione*, I.I.2 where he claims that 'through reason and eloquence' the wise man transformed men 'from wild savages into a kind and gentle folk' (*magnus videlicet vir et sapiens ... propter rationem atque orationem studiosius audientes ex feris et immanibus mites reddidit et mansuetos*).

Paschale Broët (1500–62) and Jean Codure (1508–41) joined him in Venice in January 1537.<sup>3</sup> However, the group failed to secure a passage to Jerusalem because of a war that broke out between Venice and the Ottoman Empire.<sup>4</sup> Instead of pursuing their pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Loyola and his companions travelled to Rome and, after having submitted their founding manifesto (*Formula Instituti*) to the pope, obtained his approval and recognition of the new religious order, the Society of Jesus, in the bull *Regimini Militantis Ecclesiae* (1540).<sup>5</sup> In the *Formula Instituti*, Loyola and his friends declared that it was their purpose to ‘strive’ for ‘the progress of souls in Christian life’ through ‘the ministry of the word’, ‘spiritual exercises’, ‘works of charity’ and the ‘education of children and unlettered persons in Christianity’.<sup>6</sup> The last point—education of children and the unlettered—did not refer to systematic, academic education that the Jesuits were to become famous for, but, instead, to elementary instruction in Christianity which was achieved through the teaching of catechism.<sup>7</sup>

Notwithstanding the religious character of the Society of Jesus, early modern Jesuits made important contributions outside their exclusively Christian activities and concerns. They excelled as mathematicians, geographers, linguists and, in line with the central theme of this book, as educators, humanists and rhetoricians whose work contributed to the maintenance of the civil society. While occasionally referring to Jesuits who were based in localities other than Rome, the book focuses on Jesuit rhetoricians who taught at the *Collegio Romano* and contributed to Roman humanism. It is the key ambition of the book to study the early Jesuits as humanists, teachers and rhetoricians. In so doing, the book emphasises the pedagogical nature of the rhetorical tradition and demonstrates how, from Isocrates to Renaissance schoolmasters, rhetoricians sought to improve society by providing what could be labelled as civic education. That Renaissance humanists and Jesuit educators placed rhetoric at the heart of such education bespeaks their belief not only in the civic, but also in the epistemological, pedagogical and cultural significance of rhetorical training. Jesuit humanists such as Pedro Juan Perpiña (1530–66) and Famiano Strada (1572–1649) defended the philosophical and epistemological aspects of rhetoric and rejected Petrus Ramus’s (1515–72) theory which removed invention and arrangement from the activities of rhetoric and placed them as parts of dialectic instead. In contrast to Ramus’s vision of rhetoric as something merely concerned with

3 O’Malley 1993, pp. 23–33; Maryks 2014, pp. 1–2.

4 Donnelly 2006, p. xiii.

5 Maryks 2008, pp. 14–5; O’Malley 1993, pp. 4–6, 35–7.

6 Maryks 2008, p. 16.

7 Maryks 2008, pp. 76–7. O’Malley 1993, p. 120, points out that Jesuits made use of existing catechisms, but also composed their own ones. Jesuit catechisms include, for example, Diego Laynez (1540), Jerónimo Doménech (1547), Adriaan Adriaenssens (1550), Giovanni Araldo (1552) and Juan de Polanco (1557).

#### 4 Introduction

eloquence and matters of style, Perpiña and Strada insisted on the epistemological power of rhetorical invention.<sup>8</sup> While Ramus's point of view marks an important break from the rhetorical tradition discussed in this book, Jesuits' rejection of his thinking further demonstrates their allegiance to Ciceronian rhetoric.

The book explores the writings of a number of early Jesuit rhetoricians many of whom taught rhetoric at the *Collegio Romano*. These include André des Freux (1515–56), Hannibal du Coudret (1524–99), Fulvio Cardulo (1529–91), Pedro Juan Perpiña, Carlo Reggio (1539–1612), Francesco Benci (1542–94), Orazio Torsellini (1544–99), Andreas Schott (1552–1629), Famiano Strada and Tarquinio Galluzzi (1574–1649).<sup>9</sup> The book also discusses the rhetorical views of Daniello Bartoli (1608–85) who taught rhetoric at the Jesuit college of Parma in the 1620s, but spent the last four decades of his life in Rome and acted as the rector of the *Collegio Romano* between 1671 and 1674. Outside the context of the Roman college, the book explores rhetorical writings of Cypriano Soarez (1524–93), Juan Bonifacio (1538–1606), Jean Voel (1541–1610), Pablo José Arriaga (1564–1622) and, briefly, Bartolomé Bravo (1554–1607), Nicolas Caussin (1583–1651) and Martin du Cygne (1619–69). In addition, the book discusses Jesuit writings on political, ethical and educational issues in order to illuminate the historical and intellectual context in which the early Jesuit rhetoricians operated. These writings range from Carlo Scribani's (1561–1629) *Philosophus Christianus* to Pedro de Ribadeneira's (1527–1611) *Tratado de la religion* and from Jesuit correspondence to the *Ratio Studiorum* (1599), the Jesuit manual which instructed teachers and rectors on how to organise syllabi, teaching and the daily routines of a college.

While the origins of classical rhetoric lay in ancient Greece, Jesuit participation in the rhetorical tradition is best understood if associated with the historical context of Renaissance humanism, the 'identifying characteristic' of which was, to quote Hannah Gray, 'the pursuit of eloquence'.<sup>10</sup> By Renaissance, I understand the period from early fourteenth to early seventeenth centuries, bearing in mind that Renaissance spread from Italy to the rest of Europe with a delay of several decades, if not a century. As far as the term 'humanism' is concerned, I follow Paul Oskar Kristeller's observation that 'Renaissance humanism is bound up with the professional tradition of one particular section, namely the *studia humanitatis*'. Furthermore, as Kristeller explains, 'ever since the early 15th century', *studia humanitatis* stood for 'a well defined cycle of teaching subjects listed as grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history and moral philosophy', all of which

8 Tutino 2014, pp. 115, 135.

9 Gwynne 2016, p. 4, gives these dates for Benci. According to Fumaroli 1980, p. 176, Benci was born in 1550.

10 Gray 1963, p. 498.

were based on ‘the reading of the classical Greek and Latin authors’.<sup>11</sup> What this book argues about the Jesuit participation in the rhetorical tradition owes much to Kristeller’s view that Renaissance humanism was a ‘cultural and educational program’ which ‘must be understood as a characteristic phase in what may be called the rhetorical tradition in Western culture’.<sup>12</sup> At the same time, this book treats Renaissance rhetoric and education—and the Jesuit contributions to them—as manifestations of civic concerns. Brendan Bradshaw has criticised Kristeller and scholars who follow him for defining humanism ‘in exclusively literary and educational terms’, denying it ‘any specific philosophical content’, including political theory or philosophy. Whether this criticism is entirely justified, this book pays heed to Bradshaw’s argument that Renaissance eloquence consisted of both rhetoric and philosophy and was ‘literary in its form and seriously philosophical in its substance’.<sup>13</sup> It nevertheless seems that we can subscribe philosophical substance to Renaissance eloquence and humanism only insofar that we limit our discussion to moral philosophy and exclude for example logic and metaphysics from the expertise of Renaissance humanists *qua* experts in the humanities. As Kristeller has pointed out, much of the confusion about the allegedly philosophical nature of Renaissance humanism has to do with erroneous interpretations of the profession of a Renaissance humanist. As teachers of the *studia humanitatis*, the humanists were experts in grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry and moral philosophy only, and, as Kristeller concludes, this ‘seems to me to provide irrefutable evidence against the repeated attempts to identify Renaissance humanism with the philosophy, the science, or the learning of the period as a whole’.<sup>14</sup>

Some scholars have nevertheless examined how humanist notions of rhetoric and language related to political theory, ethics and a new kind of historical awareness. In contrast to Kristeller’s position, Eugenio Garin argues that scholars such as Ernest Renan, George Sarton, Bruno Nardi and

11 Kristeller 1965, pp. 3–4.

12 Kristeller 1961, pp. 10–1. Grendler 2006b, p. 3, succinctly defines Kristeller’s point of view as: ‘humanism was not only classical revival, but a fundamental educational movement’. See also, Leff 2016, p. 476, for further remarks on ‘the civic humanistic conception of rhetoric as a teaching discipline’.

13 Bradshaw 1991, pp. 95, 97, 101–2. Kristeller 1961, p. 22, concludes that ‘I should like to understand Renaissance humanism ... as a broad cultural and literary movement, which in its substance was not philosophical, but had important philosophical implications and consequences’. *Ibid.*, p. 10, refers to Renaissance humanism as ‘a cultural and educational program’ and ‘not as such a philosophical tendency or system’. For scholars supporting Kristeller’s interpretation, see, for example, Gray 1963, p. 499 and Nauert 1995, p. 196: ‘Kristeller is right on this issue: there was no distinctive philosophy of humanism’. Discussing Kristeller’s point of view, Witt 1995, pp. 93–4, points out that humanists such as Coluccio Salutati and Lorenzo Valla ‘drew theological and philosophical consequences from their grammatical and rhetorical investigations’. At the same time, Witt admits that Kristeller’s work has proved ‘extremely valuable’.

14 Kristeller 1961, p. 10.

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Giuseppe Billanovich unjustly questioned the philosophical substance of Renaissance humanism. Instead, Garin asserts that the ‘philological attitude’ of the Renaissance humanists and grammarians constituted ‘the new philosophy’, one that wanted to dispense with the traditional philosophy’s habit of ‘constructing great cathedrals of ideas’ and to replace such ‘vain and useless’ undertaking with ‘concrete, definite and precise research’ which no longer regarded Aristotle’s logic as ‘the word of god’, but as ‘a historical product’.<sup>15</sup> However, Robert Black has reminded us about the fact that Garin’s interpretation of the Renaissance and humanism was conditioned by those of his teacher, Giovanni Gentile, who in turn had adopted Hegel’s idealism and—in line with Hegel’s notion of a spirit of the age—postulated a stark contrast between the Middle Ages (which in his view had devalued man) and the Italian humanism which restored the dignity of man. Furthermore, Black points out that both Gentile and Garin sympathised with Burckhardt’s interpretation of the Renaissance, while Kristeller—who ‘came from the stable of Martin Heidegger’—replaced Hegelian idealism and ‘metaphysical accounts’ with the study of ‘concrete manifestations’ and the aspiration to define ‘humanism in what the humanists actually said and did’.<sup>16</sup> According to Black, the key problem with Garin’s idealist interpretation of humanism is its central argument that humanists championed the dignity of man, when, in fact, ‘many medieval texts exalted man’s dignity, while numerous Italian humanists could be misanthropic’. Garin’s definition of humanism is ‘fallacious’, Black concludes, because it excludes ‘undoubted humanists’, scholars who studied grammar and philology but ‘were interested neither in man nor philosophy’ and includes thinkers such as Pico ‘who rejected humanist Latin and rhetoric in favour of scholastic philosophy’. In contrast to these problems in Garin’s interpretation, Black notes that Kristeller’s definition embraces a wider divergence of humanists, ‘including that supreme denigrator of man, Machiavelli’.<sup>17</sup>

Christopher Celenza points out the political dimensions of the humanist approach to Latin language, noting that according to Lorenzo Valla (1407–57), Latin should not be viewed just as ‘a means of communication’, but as ‘a vehicle of power’.<sup>18</sup> While Renaissance humanists did not write large philosophical syntheses, their philological accuracy, historical awareness and rhetorical ability contributed to scientific, philosophical and epistemological developments in the early modern world. In his *The*

15 Garin 1993, pp. 7–11: ‘è proprio quello che gli umanisti vollero distrutto, e cioè la costruzione delle grandi “cattedrali di idee” ... A quella Filosofia ... vana ed inutile, si sostituiscono indagini concrete, definite, precise ... la logica d’Aristototele non è parola di Dio, ma un prodotto storico ... quell’atteggiamento “filologico” ... costituisce appunto la nuova “filosofia”’.

16 Black 2019, pp. 156–7.

17 Black 2019, p. 159.

18 Celenza 2017, p. 185.

*Machiavellian moment*, J.G.A. Pocock emphasises the humanist focus on the particular and the resulting increase in historical awareness, pointing out, however, that both the ‘late medieval and Renaissance intellect found the particular less intelligible and less rational than the universal’. While the shift towards the appreciation of historicity and ‘the particular’ was not an easy task, Pocock states that the ‘humanist technique’ which exalted philology and grammar led to ‘drastic’ ‘epistemological’ and ‘philosophical consequences’ such as novel ways of understanding time and the contrast between the particular and the universal.<sup>19</sup> As this book seeks to demonstrate, the particular—the ability to perceive and appreciate the specificity of historical contexts—played a central role in the Jesuit *modus operandi*.

To better understand why the humanist educational movement took place in early fifteenth-century Italy and why that movement was marked by civic characteristics, it is worth considering certain political developments that preceded the birth of Renaissance *studia humanitatis*. Many Italian republics turned into principalities in the course of the thirteenth century. According to such forerunners of Renaissance humanism as Brunetto Latini (1220–94), Lovato Lovati (1241–1309) and Alberto Mussato (1261–1329), these republics had lost their freedom to despotism due to the corruptive forces of internal factions and avarice. According to Quentin Skinner, Renaissance political theorists conceived of two possible remedies to such corruption. Either the governing institutions needed to be sufficiently strong to curb corruption or the individuals in power needed to be virtuous to the extent that they could be trusted to prioritise the common good over personal gain. Preferring the latter option, Renaissance humanists focused on the idea of virtue. They produced a radically new definition of nobility, abandoning old notions which linked it to wealth or family lineage and, instead, argued that *vera nobilitas* was identifiable with virtue alone. Both *quattrocento* civic humanists and Northern humanists such as Erasmus of Rotterdam believed that ‘the surest way of inculcating the virtues must be to furnish the leaders of the society with an education in the *studia humanitatis*’.<sup>20</sup> The new idea of nobility posed a threat to the prevailing hierarchy as it implied access to positions of authority to people outside the traditional establishment while the concomitant promotion of humanistic education promised a concrete route to such emancipation. Among the teachers who laid down the foundations of Renaissance liberal arts education were, for example, Gasparino da Barzizza (1360–1431), Guarino Guarini (1374–1460) and Vittorino da Feltre (1378–1446).<sup>21</sup> Renaissance *studia humanitatis* transformed the medieval system of *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric and logic) into the quintet of grammar, poetry, history, moral philosophy and rhetoric. While logic had held the paramount place in

19 Pocock 1975, pp. 4, 60–1. See also, Skinner 1978, vol. I, p. 86.

20 Skinner 1978, vol. I., pp. 44–5; Kallendorf 2008, p. viii.

21 For these three teachers, see Grendler 1989, pp. 125–32, and Woodward 1996.



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the medieval *trivium*—and continued to do so in Renaissance scholasticism—the new liberal arts program devised by Renaissance humanists centred around rhetoric. More specifically, Renaissance schoolmasters taught rhetoric which was inspired by and based on Cicero’s writings and marked by ethical and civic concerns. The central place of rhetoric in the Renaissance *studia humanitatis* reflected the humanists’ interest in virtue which contributed to the welfare of the civil society.

The origins of both the Society of Jesus and the pedagogical ideas of the Jesuits lay at the University of Paris where Loyola enrolled in the college of Montaigu in 1528. On 1 October 1529, however, he moved from the more traditional Montaigu to the liberal college of Sainte-Barbe, from where he received his Master of Arts degree in 1534.<sup>22</sup> The college of Sainte-Barbe excelled in the humanities, especially after the Portuguese humanist Andrea de Gouveia (1497–1548) became its new director sometime between 1529 and 1531.<sup>23</sup> Among the students at the college of Sainte-Barbe were future Jesuits such as Peter Faber, Francis Xavier, Simão Rodrigues and Alfonso Salmerón. In 1534, Gouveia moved on to run the new college of Guyenne in Bordeaux which he ‘made into an exact replica of Sainte Barbe’ and which, according to one of its alumni, Michel de Montaigne, was ‘the best school in France’.<sup>24</sup> Their experiences as students in Paris led Loyola and other founding members of the Society to construct their own educational system in line with the ‘*ordo et modus Parisiensis*’, the pedagogical system of the University of Paris.<sup>25</sup>

In line with their goal to promote the Christian way of life, Jesuit education started as elementary instruction in catechism but quickly and drastically changed into fully fledged Renaissance *studia humanitatis*. After having founded their first proper college in Messina in 1548—only eight years after the founding of the Society—the Jesuits became sought-after teachers of Latin, rhetoric and other humanistic disciplines. In 1560, having witnessed the success of their educational system, the Jesuit superiors incorporated the teaching of the humanities into the key ministries of the Society. The decision to include *studia humanitatis* in their key ministries meant that humanistic education became one of the two principal ways in which the Jesuits contributed to the well-being of others. The other way of achieving this consisted of religious activities such as sermons and confessions. Since this book focuses on the first of these two ways, religion is discussed only tangentially and many aspects of the Jesuits as preachers, missionaries and ‘soldiers of Christ’ are left out. However, the book discusses ‘papal humanism’ and the close ties between the

22 Loyola, *Autobiography*, p. 78, note 9.

23 Grendler 2017, p. 25.

24 Codina Mir 2000, p. 45; Codina Mir 1968, p. 194.

25 Codina Mir 1968, pp. 15–8, points out that Loyola, Alonso de Salmerón, Diego Laynez, Nicholas Bobadilla, Martín de Olave, Diego de Ledesma and Jerome Nadal—all of whom belonged to the first generation of the Jesuits—encountered the *modus Parisiensis* already in the 1520s when they studied at the University Alcalá de Henares, a new Spanish university established in 1499 and modelled after the University of Paris.

Jesuits and the papacy and juxtaposes civic values with Christian ethics, emphasising the overlap between these two moral frameworks in early modern Jesuit thought.

Two aspects of the early Society of Jesus are highly relevant to this study and worth mentioning in the introduction. Firstly, early Jesuits had humanistic training and excellent linguistic skills, a fact, which should be borne in mind when exploring their writings, educational system and general attitude towards language and communication. Secondly, Jesuit humanists regarded rhetoric as an art of persuasion rather than an art of speaking well. In line with this preference, they invested rhetoric with such meaning and purpose which exceeded the merely ornamental aspects of speech and writing. For the early Jesuits, rhetoric was instrumental not only to human interaction and civic life but also to knowledge and learning. While much of Jesuit rhetoric issued from and was aimed at dealing with theological problems—whether relating to biblical exegesis or disputes with Protestant theologians—Jesuit humanists also explicitly acknowledged the interconnectedness between rhetoric and civic life, thus expressing their commitment to the Ciceronian tradition of rhetoric.

Modern scholars define rhetoric as the ‘art of persuasion, of the probable argument, of prose style and composition or of literary criticism’.<sup>26</sup> In a more generic manner, rhetoric is also described as ‘the attempt to explain the process of human communication’.<sup>27</sup> It has also been noted that since late antiquity, there have been ‘two conceptions of rhetoric’, one seeing rhetoric as the art of ‘embellishment and ornamentation’ and the other as the art of ‘communication and persuasion’.<sup>28</sup> In line with this observation, scholars have distinguished between rhetoric as the art of persuasion (the position of Aristotle and Cicero) and the art of speaking well (Quintilian).<sup>29</sup> More recently, it has been suggested that there might be only one type of rhetoric, something that could be called ‘problematology’.<sup>30</sup> As it often is with definitions of complicated phenomena, also the ones applied to rhetoric fall short in capturing its full potential and nature. The very idea that it is possible to make a historical reconstruction of a coherent rhetorical tradition has been challenged by Alan G. Gross, according to whom the correct understanding of the rhetorical

26 Kristeller 1983, p. 1.

27 Murphy 1983, p. 20.

28 Kennedy 1978, p. 1.

29 Monfasani 1992, p. 121, distinguishes between rhetoric as the political art of persuasion and the ‘belletristically’ understood rhetoric, ‘the art of fine speaking’. On page 130 Monfasani discusses the Italian humanist Matteo Collazio (1457–?) who advocated the Ciceronian point of view which classified rhetoric as part of political science. Furthermore, Collazio argued that rhetoric had ‘a social end’ which is why its practitioners aimed to ‘affect the minds of others’. While ‘all the Greek and almost all Latin rhetoricians made persuasion the goal of rhetoric’, Collazio asserts, ‘only Quintilian argued for *bene dicere*’.

30 Meyer 2017, p. 228, writes that his book outlines a rhetoric which ‘integrates the various rhetorics given so far since Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, into a single view which, relying on the constructive role of questioning, I have called *problematology*’.

tradition requires an ‘intellectual reconstruction’ which ‘views the tradition as united around the answers to a core of questions’ which ‘its conceptual system generates’.<sup>31</sup> Should we conclude that the distinction between two kinds of rhetoric—the distinction between ornamental and persuasive rhetoric—is incorrect? Is there really only one kind of rhetoric? If so, should it be understood as persuasion, ‘problematology’ or a continuous attempt to address a set of unchanging questions? Or are there more than two kinds of rhetoric? Is it meaningful to speak of Ciceronian rhetoric or Jesuit rhetoric? Also, while persuasion might be the purpose most commonly assigned to rhetoric, and while early Jesuits themselves identified the goal of rhetoric as persuasion, can we make the claim that Jesuit rhetoric was exclusively concerned about persuasion and disregarded all ornamental aspects of speech and writing? Is it viable to separate the ornamental from the persuasive? Does (only) unadorned speech persuade? In fact, as we will see, the most typical early modern Jesuit definition of rhetoric combined Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, arguing that rhetoric was the art of speaking well and its goal was to persuade.

In his attempt to circumvent the philosophical question ‘what is rhetoric?’ (which he sees as ‘the wrong question’), Michael C. Leff writes that we should rather ask ‘how might we define rhetoric?’ Or ‘what is your preferred conception of rhetoric?’.<sup>32</sup> This book is an interpretation of early modern Jesuit writings on rhetoric and it suggests that the Jesuits’ ‘preferred conception’ of rhetoric was broad and embraced both *bene dicere* and persuasion. The book argues that the Jesuits postulated a necessary, inescapable connection between rhetoric and civic life. While the complexities relating to early Jesuits’ relations with political power are not the key focus of this study, it should nevertheless be acknowledged that it is impossible to detach rhetoric from the interests of the powers to be. Being the art of persuasion, classical rhetoric has always been relevant to both civic life and the art of government. As observed by Hayden White, rhetoric ‘represents a kind of knowledge with distinct social values insofar as it yields insights into the relation between political power and the control of language, speech and discourse’ which is what ‘political elites always have recognised as a necessary basis for effective rule’.<sup>33</sup> The twofold role of Jesuit humanists as loyal advocates of papal authority and teachers of rhetoric came with the equally bipartite duty to supervise the catholicity and piety of language and to teach the fundamental principles of persuasive and skilled communication. This contradictory position involved both the controlling and facilitating of students’ use of language. Jesuit teachers exercised power as consummate

31 Gross 2005, pp. 34, 36. Gross attacks the historical reconstructions of the rhetorical tradition in Kennedy, George, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition*, The University of North Carolina Press 1980, Vickers 1988 and Conley 1990, and concludes that his own *epistemological* interpretation of the rhetorical tradition enables ‘common intellectual efforts’ and ‘steady intellectual progress’.

32 Leff 2016, p. 473.

33 White 1997, p. 27.

rhetoricians and arbiters of orthodoxy, but they also provided students with the foundational means to share in that power.

Rather than ‘a trite technique of manipulation’, the rhetoric of the Jesuits was, according to Marc Fumaroli, ‘the creative driving force of their ethics, spirituality’ and ‘theology’ and ‘a working hermeneutics’ between the ‘truth of the divine word and the relativity of human languages’, aimed at ‘deciphering’ the ‘dialogue’ between ‘personal salvation and the welfare of the political body’.<sup>34</sup> Fumaroli’s interpretation of Jesuit rhetoric has recently been endorsed by John O’Malley.<sup>35</sup> The definition of Jesuit rhetoric as a ‘creative driving force’ of ethics or spirituality does not mean that persuasion played no role in Jesuit acts of communication. In this book, I identify persuasion as a key characteristic of Jesuit rhetoric and suggest that for the early Jesuits, manipulation stood for a corrupted form of persuasion. Following Fumaroli, I associate rhetorical persuasion with creativity. It should be stressed, however, that early Jesuit pedagogues connected creativity to tradition and argued that imitation of past masters played a crucial role in the process of learning an art such as eloquence. Jesuit humanists insisted on the importance of following the original, Greco-Roman tradition of rhetoric and opposed themselves to Ramus’s novel interpretation which ascribed some of the key aspects of rhetoric to dialectic. While Ramus had a significant influence on the development of early modern rhetoric, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuit humanists stand out as important champions of classical, Ciceronian rhetoric. Jesuit contribution to the history of rhetoric has been overlooked by many scholars of the field, but for example, Thomas Conley argues that in the seventeenth century, ‘the most significant influence on the history of rhetoric’ was ‘that exercised by the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits’.<sup>36</sup>

Besides distinguishing between the persuasive and ornamental aspects of rhetoric, theorists and scholars of classical rhetoric speak of deliberative, judicial and epideictic rhetoric. Roughly speaking, these translate into political, legal and panegyric genres of speaking and writing. In their educational system and rhetorical writings, early Jesuits embraced all three types of rhetoric. Archival and published source material shows that—as rhetoricians and teachers of rhetoric—they frequently analysed texts which

34 Fumaroli 1999, pp. 91, 101.

35 O’Malley 2016a, p. xiii.

36 Conley 1990, p. 152. For scholarship which overlooks Jesuit contributions to the history of rhetoric, see, for example, Garin 1957. Garin champions Ramus as an important innovator of rhetoric and at the same time trivialises early modern Jesuit education. Howell 1951, p. 9, ignores the Jesuit tradition of rhetoric when he writes that François Fénelon (1651–1715) attacked Ramus’s rhetorical doctrine in his *Dialogues on eloquence* (published posthumously in 1717, but written already in 1679) and, by so doing, produced ‘a wholesome restoration of Ciceronian doctrine’. Howell’s disregard for Jesuit Ciceronianism is all the more striking if we remember that the young Fénelon studied under the guidance of the Jesuits at the University of Cahors.

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either discussed or employed deliberative, judicial and epideictic rhetoric. Students of the rhetoric class, for example, were guided through Isocrates's orations, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Cicero's *De oratore*, *De partitione oratoria*, *De officiis* and a number of orations and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*.<sup>37</sup> Starting in the humanities class (usually the fourth year), the students also studied Cypriano Soarez's *De arte rhetorica* (1562), a textbook of rhetoric specifically designed to be used at Jesuit schools. While familiar with all three genres of classical rhetoric, in their own writings, early Jesuits favoured the epideictic genre. Extolling virtues and condemning vices, epideictic rhetoric was compatible with the markedly ethical objectives of the Society. While the rhetoric of praise and blame characterised much of early modern Jesuit writing, it has been noted that Ignatius Loyola did not limit his use of epideictic rhetoric to writing but rather conceived of the very 'purpose of life as epideictic' in his insistence on doing everything in the praise of god.<sup>38</sup>

Plato famously defined rhetoric as corrupted 'art of flattery', something that the sophists deployed for their own interests and benefit. Plato's point of view dissociates rhetoric from the civic, ethical and epistemological qualities which, as this book seeks to demonstrate, early Jesuits regarded as key aspects of rhetoric. The Jesuits were not alone in taking this position. As discussed in the first chapter of this book, the Ciceronian and Isocratean tradition of rhetoric which the Jesuits were part of regarded rhetoric as an ethically and civically oriented art of persuasive communication. This objective is manifest in the writings of a number of rhetoricians, ranging from Isocrates and Cicero to Renaissance humanists and enlightenment figures such as Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444) and Giambattista Vico (1668–1744). In the light of this tradition, it would be misleading to think of Renaissance and early modern manifestations of classical rhetoric simply in terms of the survival of a sophistic art of flattery, an art entirely alien to civic and epistemological considerations. Even Plato and other writers who expressed dismissive views on rhetoric employed rhetorical skills not only when they communicated their ideas, but also when they developed their ideas and gave them the recognisable outlook of a theory. According to humanist proponents of the rhetorical tradition, rhetoric is embedded in the very process of creating, shaping and communicating thoughts and scientific theories. This point of view is evident for example in the humanist critique of scholastic 'barbarism', the faulty use of language which according to humanists such as Lorenzo Valla resulted in opaque, unintelligible arguments.<sup>39</sup>

37 Cicero's *De officiis* is not a book on rhetoric. While dealing with moral duties, it nevertheless contains several references to rhetoric and, more to the point, connects rhetoric to civic duties. The fact that *De officiis* was studied at Jesuit schools thus supports the central argument of this book.

38 O'Rourke Boyle 1997, p. 3.

39 Moss 2003, p. 41.

In Jesuit education—which was based on the humanist model—the five-year-long curriculum of pre-university studies was crowned by the class of rhetoric. Together with grammar, poetry, history and moral philosophy, rhetoric constituted the *studia humanitatis* which can be traced back to Isocrates’ school of rhetoric and which today survives in liberal arts colleges or, in a mutilated form, in the highly specialised university departments which focus on different humanistic disciplines (although presently university strategists and Maecenases of research promote the blurring of these disciplinary boundaries). In the current system of university education—in Europe, at least—it is possible for a student of history, for example, to graduate without having analysed a single poem, without having completed a single module on moral philosophy and without having heard of the distinction between deliberative, judicial and epideictic rhetoric. In the Renaissance period, it would have been impossible to imagine a humanist whose learning would have been as specialised and narrow as is the case with most contemporary humanists, whether undergraduate students, lecturers or professors. But this works both ways: we, the humanists of the twenty-first century, struggle with the notion of a Ciceronian orator both in its classical and Renaissance context. One token of such struggle is our tendency to classify Renaissance scholars either as natural philosophers—physicians, anatomists, medics and mathematicians—or as humanists which we further categorise as historians, poets or rhetoricians in a manner which reflects much more our own than the Renaissance reality. How, for example, should we label the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher (1602–80), ‘the man who knew everything’ and whose scholarly interests ranged from egyptology, sinology and oriental languages to mathematics, medicine, geology and theory of music?<sup>40</sup>

Another difficulty that a historian of the Renaissance faces time after time is the question of how religious or irreligious the Renaissance period was.<sup>41</sup> While Jacob Burckhardt associated the Renaissance with the emergence of ‘the self-reflexive modern secular individual’, recent scholarship has emphasised the impact of Lucretius and Epicureanism on the development of irreligious views in the early modern world.<sup>42</sup> The question of Renaissance unbelief—or atheism—is complicated and connected to the challenge posed to modern historians by the width of the intellectual interests of Renaissance scholars. The historical reconstruction of Petrarch ‘the poet as irreligious, even idolatrous’, results from the excessively secularising reading of the Renaissance embracement of the pagan antiquity and from a sharp dissociation of the Renaissance period from medieval

40 Gwynne 2016, p. 13, refers to Kircher as ‘the last man alive to know everything’. There are at least two books which grant Kircher the same accolade: Finden, Paula (ed.), *Athanasius Kircher: The Last Man Who Knew Everything*, Routledge 2004 and Peters, Marilee, *The Man Who Knew Everything: The Strange Life of Athanasius Kircher*, Annick Press 2017.

41 For useful discussions on this question, see Robichaud 2013 and Palmer 2014, pp. 21–5.

42 I quote from Robichaud 2013, p. 183. For Lucretius and Epicureanism in the Renaissance, see Palmer 2014.

traditions of Christianity and from ‘obsolete historiography that demarcated the Middle Ages and the Renaissance as sacred and secular cultures’.<sup>43</sup> The label ‘Christian humanism’—most famously used to describe Erasmus’ position—is a further example of the line of thinking which suggests that there was, in the Renaissance period, a type of humanism which was not Christian. At the same time, Craig Kallendorf’s observation about the gradual, secularising effects of humanist education cannot be ignored. While humanist education ‘generally remained compatible with the prevailing Christian values’, Kallendorf writes, it eventually ‘facilitated the separation of a classical vision of humanity from its medieval Christian coloring’ and led to ‘secular school curricula’ of the modern era.<sup>44</sup> In the historical context that is relevant to this study, it is worth stressing with Kallendorf that the *studia humanitatis* was to a large extent compatible with Christian values.<sup>45</sup> The humanist Leonardo Bruni, for example, perceived ‘the proximity of pagan moral doctrine to Christian teaching’.<sup>46</sup>

While the question of Renaissance unbelief is not directly relevant to a study on early Jesuits, it nevertheless looms large on the aim of this book to inquire into the connections between early Jesuits and Renaissance humanism and into the implications of Jesuit involvement in the rhetorical tradition. If, as I believe it was the case, Renaissance humanists were at once champions of pagan literature and pious Christians, then it is easier to see how the Jesuits too could be both Christian priests and passionate teachers of classical literature and languages. Furthermore, the general overlapping between the secular and the religious in the Renaissance makes it easier for us to appreciate the full extent of the civic engagement of the early Jesuits. The Society of Jesus was born out of and into a culture which was vibrant, heterogenous and laden with contradictions, and yet it seems fair to say that,

43 O’Rourke Boyle 1991, pp. 1–2. As an example of such ‘obsolete historiography’ (published a year after O’Rourke Boyle’s book), see Gauna 1992, who argues that Renaissance was an ‘essentially pagan and secular’ phenomenon ‘thus marking a definite break with the almost wholly Christian culture of the Middle Ages’ (p. 16). See also, Bradshaw 1991, p. 104: ‘the thrust’ of ‘political commentary’ of Renaissance humanists ‘was towards the affirmation of a Christian not a secular political order’. On page 103 (and footnote 5) Bradshaw ascribes the origins of the mistaken interpretation of the Renaissance as a secular reaction to Christian Middle Ages to Jacob Burckhardt, whose argument was then further developed by scholars such as Walter Ullman. Nauert 1995, p. 56, asserts that the ‘irreligiosity of Renaissance humanism is a creation of nineteenth-century historians’.

44 Kallendorf 2008, p. ix.

45 For a recent modification of this point, see Little 2021, p. 581, who argues that there was ‘incommensurability of the two traditions’ (meaning classical literature and the Christian values of the Renaissance). While acknowledging the humanists’ admiration for classical literature, Little stresses the ‘ambivalence’ they felt ‘about the value of the classical heritage for a Christian readership’ (pp. 580–1) and suggests that the ambivalence and the perceived incompatibility of classical and Christian cultures inspired Renaissance authors ‘to be innovative, disruptive, and modern’ while remaining conscious of ‘what would remain lost’ due to the gap between the two cultures (pp. 596–7).

46 Seigel 1968, p. 106.

despite the intellectual and religious controversies of the sixteenth century, it was a period firmly rooted in the two traditions of Christianity and classical literature. One of the underlying assumptions of this book is that—in the context of the Renaissance—these two traditions were anything but mutually exclusive.

The historiographical classification of past scholars into specialists of only one or two disciplines and the challenges relating to the question of secularisation make it difficult to do justice to the early Jesuits who, almost to a man, were knowledgeable in both natural sciences and the humanities and conflated religious practices and civic concerns to an extent which confused their contemporaries, let alone a modern scholar with a limited understanding of sixteenth-century subtleties. It is a fact that early Jesuits were at once proponents of the rhetorical tradition and advocates of the Catholic Church. They taught classical rhetoric and performed religious ministries and, in so doing, promoted civic values and Christian piety. That they were well versed in Greco-Roman literature does not compromise their Christian belief. This is hardly a revolutionary conclusion. What I would like to stress, however, is that the Jesuits were not an exception. They were typical Renaissance and early modern polymaths who combined classical studies with natural philosophy without concurrently compromising their religious convictions.

Despite the limitations posed on me by the fact that I have not received the same education as Pedro Juan Perpiña or Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), I am hoping to do justice to the early Jesuits, to the sixteenth-century *studia humanitatis* and to the richness of the culture of the Renaissance. I try to see the early Jesuits as people who contributed to both religious and civic life and who, even when they were famous theologians such as Luis de Molina (1535–1600), Francisco Suárez or Robert Bellarmine, or scientists like Christopher Clavius (1538–1612) or Athanasius Kircher, were also humanists who had received a thorough education in the rhetorical tradition. This book develops further the observations of those historians who have acknowledged the impact and importance of classical rhetoric to the early Society of Jesus. As one such historian once remarked, the Jesuit notion of ‘the Christian orator’ ‘stands together’ with the classical idea of an orator, namely, with the ‘ideals of excellence, training in the classical rhetorical tradition, mastery of all disciplines, and commitment to the *civitas*’.<sup>47</sup>

Focusing on rhetoric and the Jesuits, the book deals with two topics which have received criticism and derision since their birth. This being the case, surely there is nothing that could evoke more suspicion than the notion of Jesuit rhetoric. If the very word ‘Jesuit’ is evocative of treachery and deceit, among the general public and at least in certain niches of the academy, rhetoric is considered an equally suspicious and corruptive force. Blaise Pascal’s four centuries old judgement of the moral ‘laxness’ of the Jesuits still

47 McGinness 1995, p. 9.



seems to match the most stereotypical view of the Society of Jesus at least in Protestant and secular contexts. Correspondingly, what Plato wrote about rhetoricians' pursuit of flattery at the expense of moral and philosophical substance, let alone truth, resonates with modern views of rhetoric as vacuous and irresponsible practice characteristic of charlatans and shifty demagogues. The Italian satirist Ferrante Pallavicino (1615–44) attacked the Society of Jesus precisely from the viewpoint of rhetoric, comparing Jesuit rhetoric to that of prostitutes whose eloquence consists of 'traps, nets of tricks and frauds' which 'turn men into voluntary pray' and deprive them of the free will.<sup>48</sup>

In contrast to these views, this book treats Jesuit writings on rhetoric as contributions to Renaissance humanism and to the long-standing endeavour within rhetorical tradition to sustain the civil society. The champions of the rhetorical tradition sought to improve not only communication, but also the premises of communication, that is, the means to attain, process and distribute knowledge. It was often the case that the knowledge which informed a rhetorician's speech was harnessed to defend or implement justice. Classical and Renaissance orators delved into the foundations of an organised society on pragmatic terms and at times their concerns clashed with those of philosophers. One could say that at the heart of the rhetorical tradition lays an axiomatic belief in the power of speech and language and the appreciation of the fact that such power underpins every aspect of a society and determines the level and nature of freedom and justice, both of which were considered pinnacles of civic life by the rhetoricians discussed in this book. According to this line of thought, training in classical rhetoric equipped students with the means to establish and deliver freedom and justice. In the context of *vita civile*, citizens who had received such training were—ideally—able to participate in debates with an enhanced ability and willingness to ascertain compromises which did not breed injustice, oppression or violence.

While identifying the early Jesuits as important proponents of the rhetorical tradition, this book testifies to the long-lasting appeal of classical rhetoric and its central message on the importance of effective communication to civic life and civil society. To explore such a humanistic and pragmatic theme in association with a religious order whose primary interests were spiritual necessitates appreciation of the wider historical context and acknowledgement of various overlapping aspects between the spiritual and the temporal, or the church and the state. This aspect of the book—the

48 Pallavicino, *La retorica delle puttane*, p. 8: '*con artificiosa tessitura compongono solamente a tuoi danni lacci, e reti d'insidie, e d'inganni*'; pp. 50–1: '*farà gli buomini volontarie prede ... privati della libertà dell'arbitrio*'. That Pallavicino's book is an attack against Jesuit rhetoric is obvious from what we know of Pallavicino's views in general and from the preface, in which he states that the book follows the arrangement of Cypriano Soarez's *De arte rhetorica*. On page 120 Pallavicino remarks that 'those who know me, understand against which prostitutes I write' ('*Chi mi conosce sa contro di quali Puttane io scrivo*').

relations between ecclesiastical and civic spheres—serves the purpose of elucidating and, perhaps, explaining some aspects of the early Jesuits' role within the rhetorical tradition. The book argues that Renaissance humanists (including the Jesuits) considered classical rhetoric inseparable from ethical considerations such as the common good. Therefore, rather than implying moral laxity, Jesuit involvement in the rhetorical tradition reveals a desire to transpose their spiritual calling into a civic context. The Jesuit calling to 'save souls' had pragmatic and civic dimensions, in particular in the field of education. It is worth stressing that prior to becoming victims of their own success, early Jesuit colleges offered rhetorical training to everyone, free of charge.

In discussing the implications of the Jesuit involvement in the rhetorical tradition on the wider society and early modern culture, the book also reflects on certain complexities embedded in the Jesuit undertaking to teach the *studia humanitatis*. The most obvious problem arises from the fact that the Jesuits were a religious order while the scholarly disciplines which the humanities consisted of related to civic and worldly matters and were chiefly studied through classical, pagan literature. This dichotomy brought about tensions between the Jesuits and the non-religious representatives of city-states and universities and, as Paul F. Grendler has recently pointed out, encouraged Loyola and other leading Jesuits to insist on the Society's independence with regard to managing their schools and deciding over teachers, curricula and course contents.<sup>49</sup> Such demands proved challenging to civic officials, and, as Grendler's *The Jesuits and Italian universities, 1548–1773* demonstrates, the Jesuits' aspiration to become independent educators proved particularly problematic in the context of university education. The rivalry between Jesuit colleges and non-religious universities did not, however, stop the Jesuit educators from embracing a thoroughly humanistic and secular curriculum.

The chapter 'Jesuits, Rome and the pagan tradition' begins with a brief delineation of rhetoric in ancient Greece and Rome, focusing especially on Isocrates, Aristotle and Cicero who laid the foundations of the tradition that the early modern Jesuits were to take part in. After an equally prefatory depiction of Renaissance rhetoric, the chapter moves on to demonstrate how the Society of Jesus embarked on humanist education and became involved in the rhetorical tradition. In so doing, the chapter focuses on sixteenth-century Rome as the headquarters and the seedbed of Jesuit educational system and pays special attention to the role of the Jesuit college of Rome as an important centre of humanistic learning in the early modern world. Challenging the scholarly view according to which Roman humanism withered away during the first two or three decades of the sixteenth century, the chapter argues that Jesuits contributed to the survival of Roman humanism into seventeenth century and that the Jesuit *Collegio Romano*

49 Grendler 2017, pp. 53, 81–2, 169–70, 444.

(founded in 1551) was a thriving scholarly hub with close connections to humanists such as Marc Antoine Muret (1526–85) and Paolo Manuzio (1512–74). The chapter also explores the relations between the Jesuits and the papacy, demonstrating that humanistic learning was a central characteristic of Renaissance and early modern curia of Rome.

The next chapter explores language teaching in Jesuit schools and demonstrates that early modern Jesuits followed Renaissance humanists in their appreciation of linguistic and philological proficiency. In so doing, the chapter indicates how this line of thinking emphasised the importance of language skills to all learning. After having discussed the primacy of Latin language in Renaissance and Jesuit education, the chapter moves on to elucidate the pedagogical methods used in Jesuit schools and points out how, for example, Pedro Juan Perpiña advocated teaching methods which would not rely too heavily on grammar rules.

One of the key arguments of the book is that early modern Jesuits made an important contribution to the rhetorical tradition through their educational system. Expanding on this argument, the chapter ‘rhetoric in Jesuit education’ begins with a brief overview of Renaissance schooling and moves on to discuss some of the key elements in Jesuit education. This is followed by a discussion on the role of manners, politeness and *urbanitas* in the writings of Jesuit rhetoricians and educators. The following two sections of the chapter discuss, firstly, rhetorical education and the common good and, secondly, education and democratisation. The next section discusses Christian virtues and civic values, followed by a section which elucidates the humanistic association of education with virtue. The remaining parts of the chapter discuss rhetorical education at the colleges of Messina and Rome before exploring how Jesuit humanists thought eloquence was best acquired. The final section of the chapter focuses on the readings which were used at Jesuit schools.

The chapter on Jesuit Ciceronianism discusses the question of imitation in the Renaissance context, indicating that Jesuit rhetoricians unanimously chose Cicero as their most important model to imitate. This is followed by a section which explores Jesuit views on the aim of rhetoric, demonstrating that they followed Cicero’s claim according to which the aim of rhetoric is to persuade by teaching, pleasing and moving. After having indicated the prominence of epideictic rhetoric and Christian grand style in early modern Christian culture, the chapter moves on to discuss Cicero’s central role in the Jesuit school curriculum. This is followed by a section which deals with Cypriano Soarez’s manual *De arte rhetorica*, a key text in Jesuit schools. The chapter ends with a discussion on the differences between rhetoric and dialectic, concluding that—like Renaissance humanists—Jesuit educators preferred Ciceronian rhetoric over scholastic dialectic. The chapter argues that early modern Jesuit education was characterised by a civic ethos which was to a large extent gleaned from Cicero’s *De oratore* and *De officiis*.