IMPERIAL RIVALS

China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier



S.C.M. Paine

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S.C.M. Paine

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In memory of John Bryant Paine, Jr.

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I would like to emphasize that I alone am responsible for all shortcomings of the present work and for the interpretations contained herein. Some errors in interpretation are undoubtedly due to my own stubborn resistance to following some of the suggestions offered by the persons thanked above.

Notes

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2. The Hoover Institution administered funds from the United States Department of State's discretionary grant for Studies of Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the former Soviet Union based on the "Soviet-Eastern European Research & Training Act of 1983, Public Law 98-164, Title VIII, 97 Stat. 1047-50."

Technical Note

Dates have been given in the Gregorian calendar generally used in the West. All Russian dates according to the Julian calendar used until February 14, 1918 (February 1, Old Style), and Chinese dates according to the lunar calendar used until 1912 have been converted. The Julian calendar lagged twelve days in the nineteenth century and thirteen in the twentieth.

The transliteration system used for Russian is the Library of Congress system minus the diacritical marks. For Chinese, the Wade-Giles system has been used, except for those names which have entered into common usage by another romanization, for example: Sun Yat-sen, Sinkiang. In the case where multiple names exist for a single place, the usage follows that of the country currently with sovereignty over the area. Words in Cyrillic have been spelled according to the rules of the new orthography, while Chinese characters appear in both their simplified and complicated forms, depending on the source material. (Simplified characters tend to appear largely in materials published in mainland China after 1949.) All Chinese characters have been reproduced as in the original sources except for the name of Prince Ch'un, or I-huan (醇親王奕澴). The character for ***huan*** is very rare and, for technical reasons, I have rendered it with a water radical instead of with a 言.

The terms Chinese, Han, Great Russian, Russian, Soviet, and tsarist have been used as follows: Chinese refers to any citizen of the Chinese mainland, while Han refers to the Han Chinese ethnic group, which makes up the vast majority of China's population. Similarly, Russian refers to any citizen of either tsarist Russia (Russia before 1917) or of the Soviet Union (1917-1991), while Great Russian refers to the ethnic group making up the majority of the population of the Russian Republic and a minority in the other former Soviet republics. tsarist, therefore, is used in contrast to Soviet, the former referring to people and the polity before 1917, and the latter, after 1917. Russia is the generic term referring to the general geographic area held by tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Imperial Russian and tsarist are used synonymously: Imperial Russia and tsarist Russia both refer to the polity before the fall of the Romanov Dynasty in 1917.

Chinese and Japanese personal names are written with surname first, then given name.

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Abbreviations

ARFP	Archive for Russian Foreign Policy (Архив Внешней Политики России), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow. The citations included the title of the document, the Old Style date on the document followed by the equivalent Gregorian date in parentheses, the collection number, the file number, and the page number, if applicable.
BA	Bakhmeteff Archives, Columbia University, New York. The citations consist of the name of the collection (the Witte collection), the box number, file number, part number, document number, and page. Not all documents necessarily have all of these components.
CABM	籌辦夷務始末 (Complete account of barbarian management). The citations list a volume and page number.
CABM, Archives	籌辦夷務始末 (Complete account of barbarian management). The volumes for the reign of Kuang-hsü were never published but exist only in manuscript form at the Palace Museum Archives, Taipei, Taiwan. The volumes for 1878 to 1880 are missing. The last volume is for 1898. Of the reigns which were published (see CABM above) all volumes for Hsien-feng (1851-1862) are missing.
CDDMQ	Ministerstvo inostrannykh del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *Сборник дипломатических документов по Монгольскому вопросу (23 Августа 1912 г.-2 Ноября 1913 г.)* (Collection of diplomatic documents on the Mongolian question [23 August 1912-2 November 1913]).
CTGSMA	Главный штаб, Военно-ученый комитет (General Staff, Military Scientific Committee), *Сборник географических, топографических и статистических материалов по Азии* (Collection of topographical, geographical, and statistical materials on Asia). Each issue was marked "Top Secret." The bibliography lists the author and title for each report as well as the volume number.

FRA	外交檔案 (Foreign relations archives), 中央研究院 (Academia Sinica), 近史所 (Institute of Modern History), Taipei. The citations include the title, date, collection number, file number, and page number, if applicable.
HMIRCP	Wang Yen-wei (王彥威) and Wang Liang (王亮), eds., 清季外交史料 (Historical materials on international relations from the Ch'ing period). The citation provides a volume and page number.
JFM	外交部外交史料館 (Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives). The citations specify the collection number (separated by a period), the box number (separated by a hyphen), sometimes a volume number, and page numbers, if marked in the original.
MCA	第一历史档案馆 (Number one historical archives), (Ming-Ch'ing Archives). (1) "FM" refers to documents from the Foreign Ministry collection. The number refers to a file number. These documents have not been individually numbered, therefore particularly documents within a given file must be located by date and author. (2) "GC" indicates reference copies of palace memorials maintained by the Grand Council (录副奏折). (3) "GCRM" refers to rescripted memorials kept by the Grand Council (蛛批奏折). These two categories of memorials from the Grand Council are cited as follows: the name of the memorialist, lunar date by reign title, Gregorian date in parentheses, collection number (全宗号), catalogue number (目录号) if applicable, folder number (券), and document number (号). There are no catalogue numbers for the rescripted memorials. The abbreviations for the reign titles used in the traditional Chinese dating system are: HF for Hsien-feng, TC for T'ung-chih, KH for Kuang-hsü, and HT for Hsüan-t'ung.
RAD	*Отчет по Азиатскому Департаменту* (Report by the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) [RAD]. These citations consist of a year, ARFP [see above], *f. otchet MID* [the name of the collection] *op.* [inventory number], page number. After 1897, these reports were entitled *Отчет по Первому Департаменту* (Report by the First Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

RFD

Отчет по Первому Департаменту (Report by the First Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) [RFD]. Before 1898, these reports were entitled *Отчет по Азиатскому Департаменту* (Report by the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). See RAD above for a description of the citation format.

RIEIW

Wang Yen-wei (王彦威) and Wang Liang (王亮), eds., 西巡大事記 (Record of important events regarding the inspection of the West). Entries include a volume and page number.

Russia and China *c.* 1855



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

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

Sources: Donald W. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 265.

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Introduction

> As far as we were concerned, we weren't responsible for what our tsars had done, but the lands gained from those tsarist treaties were now Soviet territory. We weren't the only socialist country which had to administer and defend the territory inherited from a pre-Revolutionary regime.
>
> We were afraid that if we started remapping our frontiers according to historical considerations, the situation would get out of hand and lead to conflict. Besides, a true Communist and internationalist wouldn't assign any particular importance to the question of borders, especially borders between fellow socialist states.[1]
>
> Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev

> There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. . . . The Russians took everything they could. Some people have declared that the Sinkiang area and the territories north of the Amur River must be included in the Soviet Union. . . .
>
> The Soviet Union has an area of 22 million square kilometers and its population is only 220 million. It is about time to put an end to this allotment. . . . About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of [Lake] Baikal became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for this list.[2]
>
> Mao Tse-tung

At the end of the twentieth century, the Sino-Soviet boundary was the longest militarized border in the world and territorial disputes had dominated the last century and a half of Russo-Chinese relations. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Russo-Chinese frontier was a backwater for both empires. At that time neither country had more than a very vague idea about the basic geography of these areas. How the Russo-Chinese frontier evolved from being a remote periphery to a central concern for both countries is the subject of this work.

The importance of the boundary issue transcends territorial matters. Internationally, the evolving boundary line was the East Asian reflection of the new European balance of power caused by the Industrial Revolution. Regionally, the disposition of the border determined the geopolitical configuration in the Far East. Bilaterally, it constituted the overriding issue forever plaguing Russo-Chinese relations. Domestically, the maintenance of empire—the factor which first pitted Russia against China—conferred the status of a great power so crucial to the continuing legitimacy of the ruling houses of both Russia and China.

Each of these facets of Russo-Chinese relations will be discussed at length in this chapter and throughout this work. Simultaneously, there will be a careful

examination of the myths[3] which soon became intertwined with Russo-Chinese relations. Originally they ranged from slight exaggerations to deliberate falsifications, which, through repetition, grew and became accepted truths despite the evidence to the contrary. These false beliefs became the prism through which Russians and Chinese viewed each other; they underlay assumptions concerning the nature of Russo-Chinese relations; they became justifications for policy choices; and they even affected how other countries perceived Russia and China.

What follows is a diplomatic history; it is not a geographic survey of border markers.[4] It focuses on what factors precipitated changes of the border line, the nature of these changes, and their consequences. In the process, it attempts to put bilateral Russo-Chinese relations in the international context of the changing European and East Asian balance of power. In addition, it attempts to examine Russo-Chinese relations in the context of each country's strategy for security. This entails tracing both the evolution of Russian imperialism and Chinese hegemony in the Far East.

The period under consideration starts with the signing of the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and continues through the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924.[5] The boundary treaties negotiated in this period delimit the Sino-Soviet border in existence at the fall of the Soviet Union.[6] The previous set of treaties—the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, the 1727 Treaty of Bura, and the 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta—had remained in force for over a century, but in the mid-nineteenth century, new boundary and commercial treaties suddenly ruptured this stability: Russia took the Maritime Province, the northern bank of the Amur (Hei-lung-chiang), parts of the Pamirs and Sinkiang, and ultimately helped to detach Outer Mongolia from the Chinese sphere of influence.[7]

The 1858-1924 period is crucial for understanding contemporary Russo-Chinese relations for several reasons. First, it constitutes the formative period in modern Russo-Chinese relations: the issues that still bedevil contemporary relations came into being at this time. Second, these years encompass the evolution of the modern boundary which, due to its length and due to the size of the two countries involved, forms the keystone of the current balance of power in the Far East. Third, the tensions that arose from this repartition of the Far East set the tone for future Russo-Chinese relations; indeed, they go far in explaining such critical events as the 1960 Sino-Soviet split. Finally, these years provide the unique opportunity to examine the consequences of a major realignment of the balance of power in the Far East. This historical information is the only data available from which to extrapolate the possible consequences of the recent reversal in the balance of power between Russia and China.

This work is divided into four sections which correspond to the four time periods and the respective geographic areas in which activities along the border were concentrated: (1) the Amur Basin, 1858-1864: Russian expansion to the Amur and Ussuri rivers; (2) Sinkiang, 1871-1881: the struggle for the Ili Valley;

(3) Manchuria, 1896-1905: Japanese containment of Russian railroad imperialism; and (4) Outer Mongolia, 1911-1924: Soviet absorption of the Chinese sphere of influence.

In the first period, the tsarist government took advantage of China's defeats in the Opium Wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860) and of its paralysis during the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) in order to negotiate two highly advantageous border treaties. The 1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Treaty of Peking moved the border far to the south and set the present Manchurian boundary along the Amur and Ussuri (Wu-su-li-chiang) rivers.

During the second period, the Russians deployed troops in 1871 on Chinese territory in the Ili Valley to prevent the Muslim Uprising (1862-1878) in Sinkiang from spreading across the border to Russian co-religionists. Only after the Chinese granted considerable trade concessions and an indemnity under the 1881 Treaty of St. Petersburg did Russian troops finally withdraw from most of the occupied territory.

In the period between the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the Japanese successfully not only prevented further tsarist expansion in Manchuria, but even forced Russia to give up the southern portion of its costly far-flung railway concessions in China. This put an end to Russia's attempt to absorb Manchuria surreptitiously under the cover of extending its railway system.

The fourth and final section examines the expansion of Russian influence in Outer Mongolia from the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911 to the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924. The Red Army, which entered Outer Mongolia during the Russian Civil War, stayed on to ensure the transformation of the region from a Chinese to a Soviet protectorate.

The conclusion then summarizes the trends in the conduct of Russian and Chinese diplomacy; examines the paradoxical nature of Russian and Chinese imperialism; and discusses the possible ramifications of the recent shift in China's favor of the balance of power.

International Issues:
The Russian and Chinese Empires in the Industrial Age

The Industrial Revolution caused a change in the balance of power not only between Russia and the more-industrialized West European countries but also between Russia and China. During the period under consideration, territory exceeding the size of India became Russian outright or, in the case of Outer Mongolia, a Russian protectorate. These enormous territorial changes were the Far Eastern echo of a major realignment of the balance of power in Europe caused by the Industrial Revolution.[8] The Industrial Revolution heralded a new age of commercial maritime empires in which control over geographically contiguous territory had become far less important than in the past. Yet, in the

mid-nineteenth century, China, Russia, and the decaying Ottoman Empire remained traditional continental empires, struggling to survive in the new age.

China and Russia were both empires of vast territorial extent whose original imperial designs had stemmed largely from the requirements of border defense. In both countries, expansion into Central Asia and Siberia had largely been a frustrating quest for defensible borders, under the constant threat of invasion or harassment by neighboring nationalities. In the case of Russia, it was a huge country with few clear natural boundaries, but with vast plains to defend, so historically there had been a tendency to expand outwards to protect a geographically vulnerable center. This led to the gradual expansion of what was considered Russia proper, which in turn required ever more far-flung buffer areas for protection.

China, on the other hand, was surrounded by natural boundaries in three directions: mountains in the northwest, west, southwest, and south, and oceans in the east. At the height of Ch'ing expansion, the only area lacking such formidable natural boundaries was in the north, where China first came into contact with Russia.[9] Although the decline of the Ch'ing Dynasty neutralized Russia's main potential rival in the Far East, marauding nationalities presented a constant irritation, if not an overwhelming threat, to Russians living on the frontiers. Predations by the native inhabitants on Russian property gave local Russian commanders both a motive and a pretext to expand their jurisdictions outward in order to end such lawlessness.

Even though Russia continued to expand geographically throughout the nineteenth century, its relative economic base, technological level, and standard of living fell ever further behind those in Western Europe. From the Industrial Revolution onward, Russia was never able to match the economic achievements of Western Europe, the United States, or, later, of Japan. Therefore, it became increasingly strained in its efforts to keep up with the scale of foreign policy commitments required of a great power. For Russia, Chinese weakness presented all too tempting an opportunity, particularly when combined with traditional Russian insecurity about border areas.

By the second half of the nineteenth century, despite the many limitations of Russian industrialization *vis-à-vis* the West, Russia had become far more technologically advanced than China, causing a dramatic shift in Russia's favor of the relative balance of power with China. This put China in a position of double-jeopardy in its struggle not only to keep the Western capitalists at bay along the coast but also to obstruct Russian territorial ambitions along their mutual border. In the end, because Russia was stronger than China and because their mutual frontier was remote from the territorial interests of the Western powers, Russia was able vastly to expand its Asian domains at Chinese expense. Yet Russia expanded in Asia due not to national strength but to Chinese weakness.

Despite the epochal change in the international balance of power caused by the Industrial Revolution, China continued to rely on its traditional formulas for

power, which, over the millennia, had proved to be so successful at keeping pre-industrial border peoples in check. These successes had created an arrogance among the Chinese which greatly inhibited their ability to comprehend the magnitude of the changes before them.[10] By trying to maintain a hermetically sealed cultural world, the Chinese shut out the new intellectual currents developing in Europe necessary for an industrial revolution. Adapting to such a drastically changed international balance of power proved highly disruptive for China, a country preoccupied with upholding venerable traditions—not with sponsoring innovation—and one long accustomed to holding sway over all its neighbors, not to learning from them.

It is hardly surprising that China could not change overnight; for a country of its size and regional diversity to have done so would have been little short of miraculous. Even Russia, which had long had intimate political, economic, and cultural contacts with Western Europe, had extreme difficulties in meeting the new challenges presented by the Industrial Revolution. Given that China lacked such long-standing and intimate contacts with Europe, the obstacles to industrialization were that much more formidable.

Further undermining China's ability to adapt quickly was the fact that the ruling dynasty was not Han Chinese but Manchu and, therefore, was inherently vulnerable to charges of illegitimacy.[11] Indeed, the Manchus emphasized their role as upholders of Chinese traditions precisely to cement their mandate to rule.[12] Yet the new world order brought on by the Industrial Revolution required the very break with Chinese traditions which the Ch'ing Dynasty—unlike the ethnically homogeneous Japanese ruling house and its breathtakingly successful reforms during the Meiji period (1868-1912)—was so ill-equipped to make.

Even worse for China, the rising tensions with foreigners coincided with massive internal rebellions and accelerating dynastic decline. As the Ch'ing Dynasty began to lose control over its own house, with the Taiping and Muslim rebellions, the Russians jumped to fill the vacuum and force a massive redistribution of territory. Thus, between 1858 and 1924, due to a reconfiguration of international balance of power caused by the Industrial Revolution and magnified by Chinese dynastic decline, Russo-Chinese relations changed radically and, as a result, reshaped the face of central and northeastern Asia.

Yet neither country could fully come to terms with this formal territorial division of the Far East. While Russia could not justify its gains, China could not accept its losses. Instead, each fostered its own variant of the myth of original sovereignty. Both the Russians and the Chinese[13] claim that the borderlands historically constituted an integral part of their empire. There is ample evidence that this was not the case, certainly in the time of the Romanov and Ch'ing dynasties.[14] Russians were not even in the vicinity until the seventeenth century and did not arrive in significant numbers before the completion in 1905 of the railway connecting European Russia to Tashkent and the linking of Russia's two coasts, between 1891 and 1916, by the Trans-Siberian Railway.[15]

Even today Siberia remains under-populated and cut off from the rest of Russia. Indeed, a case can be made that, despite Siberia's administrative incorporation into Russia on paper, in practice, its remoteness prevented it from becoming completely integrated into the Russian empire until the Soviet period and therefore it cannot be said to have been historically an integral part of Russian territory. Tsarist tariff policy lends credence to this argument; tariff breaks at Cheliabinsk and Irkutsk treated Siberian grain like a foreign product.[16] The case for Russia's historical links to Central Asia is even more tenuous. The native populations of the Soviet Central Asian republics bordering China bear no cultural or linguistic ties to Great Russians. It can be argued that the Central Asian republics never were completely integrated into the Soviet Union, but remain culturally and linguistically distinct.

While China does possess the more ancient historical claim[17] to ties with Central Asia and southern Siberia, the Han are as culturally and linguistically distinct from the native peoples inhabiting these regions as are the Great Russians. Moreover, Ch'ing sources are unclear regarding the extent of Chinese territories; they discuss a plethora of changing place names referring to areas of unknown extent and vague location. Since the Chinese did not master Western cartography until the twentieth century, earlier Chinese maps have more artistic than practical value. Ch'ing boundary negotiators before 1880 often did not have more than a very general idea about where allegedly integral territories were actually located. Court officials in Peking in the mid-nineteenth century displayed an astounding ignorance of the actual extent of Manchuria, the homeland of the Manchu or Ch'ing Dynasty: they knew virtually nothing about the lands north of the Amur and little about the Ussuri River coastal region.

Nevertheless, some Chinese have gone so far as to equate tributary relations with sovereignty. Yet, on the eve of the foundation of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Manchu sources refer to China, Korea, Mongolia, and Manchuria as *gurun* (Manchu for country—or *kuo* [國] in Chinese) and essentially accorded each and its respective rulers equal status.[18] In fact, the existence of tributary relations with the Russo-Chinese borderlands makes them no more nor less a part of China than were Russia, Burma, Korea and Vietnam, which all had sent tribute missions to Peking at one time or another.[19]

On the one hand, the denial by the Russians that a boundary issue existed (since they had taken allegedly empty lands) permitted them to delude themselves that the Chinese could not harbor any serious grievances against them. On the other hand, the exaggerated notions by the Chinese of their original patrimony fueled their hostilities toward the Russians. For these reasons, Russo-Chinese relations were much more acrimonious than the Russians imagined. As long as China remained weak, however, it was not in a position to reveal the depths of its anger. For Russia, the rude awakening came after the consolidation of communist power in China in the 1950s and became public knowledge with the Sino-Soviet split and the ensuing skirmishes on the border.

Regional Issues: The Militarization of the Russo-Chinese Frontier

Russia's expansion eastward transformed it into a Pacific power. In doing so, it posed a permanent security threat to China, Korea, and Japan, and, thereby, transformed the geopolitical alignment in the Far East. Before the mid-nineteenth century, China had held sway in the Far East, militarily, economically, and culturally. The arrival of Russia on China's periphery, however, created a new and formidable rival, more dangerous than the other European powers, for Russia alone was primarily interested not in commerce but in the permanent acquisition of territory. The central issue in Russo-Chinese relations was strategic. While Russia directed its energy toward territorial expansion, China used all available means, however limited, in an attempt to forestall this eventuality.

Despite Russian protestations to the contrary, Russia did not have significant commercial interests in China; its trade was minuscule compared to that of other European powers, Japan, or the United States. In fact, Russian commerce in China was not conducted primarily at the instigation of private entrepreneurs but rather was heavily promoted and subsidized by the government. Moreover, for Russia the costs of taking and then administering its Far Eastern possessions far exceeded any economic benefits derived from them. Profits were not the objective; rather, the Russian government hoped to promote its notion of national security and its vision of national prestige. To do so, it used commercial penetration as a precursor to territorial expansion.

The Russian decision to build the Trans-Siberian Railway and, later, the Chinese Eastern Railway immeasurably heightened China's security concerns. The completion of these railways led to the militarization of the border and the beginning of an arms race in the Far East since, for the first time, Russia could relatively efficiently deploy troops along its Far Eastern frontiers. Because China lacked this capacity, its primary defense became encouraging internal colonization of its frontier areas with Han Chinese to make the lands less attractive targets for Russian annexation. Before long, the Russians began to raise the alarm about an impending "yellow peril"—their nightmare of China's teeming population overflowing across the border to overwhelm the sparse Russian frontier settlements.

Japanese colonial ambitions in Manchuria further complicated the strategic equation. The success of the Meiji Period reforms made possible Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War and its consequent international recognition as a regional power. Thereafter until its defeat in World War II, it competed with Russia for control of China's northern frontiers. Russian unwillingness to moderate its territorial ambitions in the Far East or to reach a compromise with Japan fueled a Japanese arms race with Russia. Only after defeat in the Russo-Japanese War did Russia agree to Japan's long-standing request to delineate spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia. But this humiliation at the hands of an Asian nation brought Russian visions of a "yellow peril" to a new pitch of paranoia.

Empire in Asia greatly complicated Russia's own defensive requirements because massive geographic extent entailed commensurate military expenditures. In the end, these burgeoning Far Eastern commitments, which had been undertaken to maintain the foreign policy of a great power, worked to undermine the foundations of the Romanov Dynasty. They did so in two ways. First, these Far Eastern policies and particularly the attendant costs—such as building the Chinese Eastern Railway; occupying Manchuria during the Boxer Uprising; and the resultant war with Japan—jointly absorbed too many of Russia's scarce financial resources and demanded burdensome military commitments. This meant that retention of the new territories actually deprived European Russia of funds and thereby played a role in retarding its economic development.[20]

Second, the loss of the Russo-Japanese War led to the Revolution of 1905; took away funds from the defense of European Russia; and left the Russian government with little latitude for policy choices on the eve of World War I. Indeed, from the Russo-Japanese War onward, the fear of a two-front war, one in Europe and the other in Asia, required an enormous diversion of funds to the Russian Far East.[21] For Russia, therefore, its turn to the East had unanticipated strategic, military, and economic consequences.

For China, the physical territorial losses were enormous: an area exceeding that of the United States east of the Mississippi River changed hands. In Chinese eyes, this represented a gross dereliction of the filial duty to retain all of the lands so carefully accumulated by previous generations and still considered to be part of China's rightful patrimony.[22] Today, the world's most populace nation must live with the knowledge that just north across the border lies a vast and comparatively vacant land full of resources still waiting to be exploited—for although Russia had a seemingly insatiable appetite for land, it did not have a corresponding ability to develop all of what it had, much less of what it took.

These territorial losses, coupled with their many defeats by the other powers, have prompted the Chinese to see their modern history in terms of their own victimization. The Chinese are wont to claim that China has always been the innocent victim of the predations of rapacious foreigners and never an aggressor itself. This is the myth of Chinese moderation. Non-Han peoples, populating the regions bordering China proper, however, have a very different opinion. In fact, when the Chinese government had the power to do so, it was merciless in putting down insurrections by recalcitrant border peoples. The continuing unrest—some would argue genocide—in Tibet[23] is but the latest chapter in a very long history of power politics over weak border peoples. Coercive Chinese policies in Sinkiang and Mongolia fed the ethnic unrest, which in turn contributed to the territorial losses there.

In fact, Chinese casualties at the hands of European forces during the Opium Wars do not compare to the wholesale slaughter during China's campaigns against its ethnic minorities. While China was certainly a victim of imperialism, when it occupied a position of power relative to its weak minorities, its own

policies were often less benevolent than those of the West, which it has so thoroughly criticized. Moreover, its mismanagement of its own border peoples played into the Russians' hands when abused minorities appealed to Russia for protection from China. China has used the myth of Chinese moderation to avoid facing up to the dark side of its domination of non-Han peoples and to avoid re-examining its harsh policies regarding minorities. Instead, it has assumed the role of the forever-righteous victim. Scholars in the West have unwittingly helped prolong the life of this Chinese myth by publishing voluminously on European imperialism in China, on the Opium Wars, and so on, while writing very little about the fate of China's many ethnic minorities. Before the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, broadcast throughout the world, many Westerners also viewed China with an equally uncritical eye. They did not dwell on the harsh side of communist rule.

Bilateral Issues: The Nature of Russo-Chinese Relations

The Russo-Chinese border gradually assumed a symbolic importance beyond its obvious strategic significance as a line of dispute between two often antagonistic empires. For the Chinese, the boundary became the physical incarnation of China's failure to fend off the predations of European civilization, while for the Russians, their expanded boundary enshrined their country's great power status. Thus, the border became a potent, but antipodal, symbol for both countries—for the one it represented failure, for the other, success.

In the case of China, many of its history books present the modern period as beginning with the defeats in the Opium Wars, followed by a century of uninterrupted concessions and humiliations before foreigners. The psychological devastation of these unmitigated defeats of a civilization which many Chinese continue to believe is superior to all others[24] is evidenced in a variety of expressions such as "the humiliations caused by foreign powers" (外侮), "to wipe out the national shame and recover the fatherland" (雪恥復國), "the loss of economic rights to foreigners" (利權外溢), and "to guard against the insults of foreign powers" (禦侮).

According to conventional Chinese and Western historiography, modern history marks the first time that China had ever been completely unable to sinicize the outsiders, but had instead been forced, however reluctantly and painfully, to adapt to the world beyond China. The boundary symbolizes this defeat and explains the later resolve never again to relinquish even the smallest part of Chinese territory. This development was brought home to the Soviets in the pitched battles in 1969 over islands in the Amur River.

The border assumed a very different symbolic importance for the Tsarists and later the Soviets. For them, China served as a parade ground to demonstrate Russia's great power status. Although Russia and later the Soviet Union could not keep up with the great powers economically or, in the end, militarily, the

country would prove itself to be a great power in the Far East.[25] For both tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, therefore, the period of Russian territorial, and later Soviet ideological, expansion in the Far East became a great source of national pride. These periods were considered heroic eras in the quest by the Russian people to secure its neighbors in the embrace originally of civilization and then of communism.

These perceptions fostered the development of two myths. Russians have consistently misinterpreted Chinese outward expressions of friendship and hospitality, which are actually reflections of Chinese norms for etiquette and treatment of guests. In reality, these expressions did not emanate from any abiding sentiments or from genuine friendship. Out of this developed the myth of Russo-Chinese friendship. Based on platitudes exchanged in formal settings, the Russians—both tsarist and Soviet—have consistently argued that their country's relations with China, in contrast to those enjoyed by the other powers, have always been genuinely friendly and that the Chinese have long held them in warm regard. For example, Russian diplomats in the nineteenth century consistently speak of two hundred years of uninterrupted friendship between the two countries.[26]

Russian delusions of Chinese goodwill allowed them to claim that their relations with China had a moral character absent from those of the Western powers.[27] Because of their supposedly uniquely cordial relations, the Russians insisted that they had a special civilizing mission there, which the Chinese recognized and for which the latter were grateful. This moral high ground then became a justification for further Russian involvement in China. The myth of Russo-Chinese friendship also gained currency in third countries,[28] most recently during the 1950s at the height of the Cold War, but the myth has its origin in the nineteenth century.

The Chinese documentary evidence, however, is overwhelming on this score. Ch'ing officials were clearly aware that the Sung (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties had fallen when they could no longer defend the northern frontiers from invading barbarians, namely, the Mongols in the case of the Sung and the Manchus in the case of the Ming. After the Opium Wars, many Chinese gradually came to consider Russia the most dangerous European power because Russia came to China not simply for trade, as in the case of the others, but to absorb territory permanently. Only after defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) did the Chinese begin to look upon the Japanese with equal hostility.

China's preoccupation with Russian foreign policy is indicated by the distribution of the archival materials concerning Ch'ing foreign policy: nearly half of all these materials relate to Russia, while less than a third deal with Great Britain, and less than a tenth concern Japan or the United States.[29] In these archival documents, Chinese officials, over and over again, describe Russian designs on Chinese territory, using such terms as: "gnawing away like a silkworm" (蠶食),[30] "gobbling up" (併呑),[31] "eyeing predatorily like a tiger" (虎視),[32]

"drooling at the mouth" (垂涎),[33] "insatiable" (得寸進尺),[34] having "evil intentions" (禍心),[35] "desiring that which belongs to others" (覬覦),[36] and "unfathomable" (叵測)[37] behavior. Such documents show clearly that Russo-Chinese relations were deeply troubled from the start. The extent of the divergence between Russian and Chinese perceptions of their relations also reflects the depth of their misunderstandings.[38]

A parallel myth, to that of Russo-Chinese friendship, is one of more recent origin; it proposes that the Soviet foreign policy in the Far East was a radical departure from the imperialistic policies of the tsars. This myth of the discontinuity between tsarist and Soviet foreign policy is actually the Soviet variant of the preceding myth: since the Soviets considered the tsarist era to be the incarnation of evil, naturally they claimed that their policies were very different.[39] In fact, the Soviet achievement of detaching Outer Mongolia from the Chinese sphere of influence, thereby creating a pliable buffer state of its own, was a direct continuation of the emerging tsarist policy for Mongolia; the tsars simply had not dared go through with it for fear of creating an international uproar.

Only while the Russian Civil War raged in Siberia did the Bolsheviks make conciliatory overtures to China: during a few uncertain years, the Soviet government offered to annul all unequal treaties and immediately to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to China. Once the Bolsheviks took Siberia, however, Soviet diplomats denied ever having made the original offer.[40] Soviet resistance to returning the railway, which cut through the heart of Manchuria, or the naval base at Lü-shun (Port Arthur) and the harbor city of Ta-lien (Dairen or Dalny)—all of which the Soviet Union had regained after Japan's defeat in World War II—continued for a quarter of a century until 1953-55, despite heated Chinese demands for their immediate restitution.

In the end, the Soviet Union did not return its railway concession to China until several years after the Chinese communists had come to power and long after the other European nations had relinquished control over their concessions.[41] Such treatment of a fellow communist state helps undermine the Soviet fabrication that it honored its communist allies and never engaged in imperialistic policies. In fact, its allies were its primary victims. Even so, the myth of the discontinuity between tsarist and Soviet foreign policy had many adherents in the West.[42]

The fact that Soviet foreign policy in the Far East was a direct continuation of tsarist policies also exposes the chimera of a Sino-Soviet monolith. During the height of the Cold War, one of the factors making the Soviet Union so threatening to the West was the supposed existence of this monolith. But the Soviets, by recreating the Russian empire in the 1920s, also reproduced the same tensions with China that had existed under the tsars. Thus, from the very beginning, there was an absence of the long-term harmony of interests necessary for the existence, let alone the survival, of a Sino-Soviet monolith. This fact, however, was disguised by the myths of Russo-Chinese friendship and of the discontinuity between imperial Russian and Soviet foreign policy.

Domestic Issues: Political Legitimacy and Economic Backwardness

Before the arrival of the Russians, Chinese expansion differed fundamentally from that of Russia in that the absorption adjacent territories occurred largely due to spontaneous demographic pressures from below,[43] whereas Russian expansion was a policy consciously promoted by its leaders at the highest levels. Also unlike China, Russia had great difficulty populating, never mind developing, the lands it took. In the case of China's northern frontiers, the Ch'ing government actually had tried to limit any Han infiltration until Russian expansion compelled it to reverse this policy.

Although similar in geographical extent, the Russian and Chinese empires were fundamentally different in how they were administered. Russia was an imperialist empire, meaning that it maintained an empire wherein it controlled both the foreign and domestic policies of all its constituent parts. Russia was the sum of its territories and its history was the process of gradually incorporating adjoining territories into the Russian provincial system.[44] By contrast, China in the mid-nineteenth century was a hegemonic empire; that is, it controlled the foreign, but not necessarily the domestic, policies of its various parts.[45] Relations with its periphery were maintained through the tributary system. Unabated Russian expansion, however, forced the Ch'ing Dynasty to integrate its periphery into the Chinese provincial system, thereby transforming China into an imperialist power. Thus, boundary relations led to important administrative changes in China.

With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, the Romanov and Ch'ing dynasties became caught in the glare of economic inferiority in a world setting no longer hospitable to continental empires lacking a modern economic base. Thereafter, they both struggled to maintain the legitimacy of their continued rule. They did so even as their countries' statuses in the world were severely eroded by their more industrialized rivals, whose economic and military successes they could not match. This struggle made them cling to past images of their international status. Since both had historically considered themselves to be great powers, neither could easily abandon these pretensions without undercutting its mandate to rule. For a government to acknowledge that its country had fallen from the ranks of the great powers would have been an admission of a gross dereliction of duties, making it vulnerable to charges of having failed to carry out its principal responsibility, namely, the preservation of national security.

Neither China nor Russia could effectively use economic or military justifications for greatness. China could and did claim a greatness based on cultural achievements which had made it the most influential civilization in the Far East. Russia, however, could not successfully make such a claim, since its strong historical connections to Europe had rarely provided a correspondingly strong cultural influence: traditionally it had absorbed West European ideas, not the other way around.[46] In fact, both countries made a central claim to greatness

based on geographic extent.[47] This meant that the maintenance of empire was inextricably linked to the perpetuation of the legitimacy of the ruling dynasty in both countries.

Therefore, when faced with growing domestic criticism, the Russian autocracy sought to secure its mandate to rule by pursuing the foreign policy of a great power—as proof that Russia remained one—despite the mounting economic evidence to the contrary. Because Russia was unable to pursue such a policy in Europe and in much of the Near East due to the resistance of the industrialized countries, it had only two possible arenas left to act out its role of great power: Persia[48] and China.

China was in the even more unenviable position of having foreign powers swamping its government with unprecedented demands for what it perceived to be intrusive trading relations. The inability to ward off these intrusions severely eroded the mandate of the Manchus to rule in Han China. This, coupled with a rapidly unraveling domestic situation, put the Manchus in a precarious situation. Therefore, like the Russian government, the Chinese clung to the pretensions, in their case, of an enduring superiority despite the accumulating conflicting evidence. For all of these reasons, the boundary was not an issue on which either government would willingly compromise. This meant that when the Russian government directed its attention to the Far East in the mid-nineteenth century, conflicts immediately arose with China and have been with us ever since.

The fragility of rule in both Russia and China made pretenses of governmental prestige all the more important for sustaining governmental legitimacy. Conversely, damage to prestige could threaten that legitimacy. When Russian membership in the league of great powers was threatened by defeats in the Crimean War in 1856, at the 1878 Congress of Berlin after the war with Turkey, and, most seriously of all, by the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the autocracy scrambled to repair the damage. In the case of China, this happened when Western trade and diplomatic demands undermined its tributary system for managing relations with foreigners. The very act of so publicly and so radically changing the supposedly immutable[49] tributary system undercut the Chinese myth of enduring cultural superiority, which in turn undermined Manchu credibility as effective guardians of Han China.

The fragility of rule also made national dignity, in the case of Russia, and "face," in the case of China, assume a disproportionate importance. Since weak governments cannot afford many embarrassments casting doubts on their policies, a facade of imperviousness was required, especially in cases of poor judgment. This led to a rigidity in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in the mid-nineteenth century, which wore off to a degree as the Chinese learned how to use to their advantage international law and European-style balance-of-power politics. Russia, however, became ever more mired down in its Far Eastern commitments, which, once made, it felt unable to renounce for reasons of national dignity. Thus, for both governments, domestic weakness limited flexibility on foreign policy.

To "save face" while explaining away these foreign policy failures, the Chinese have conjured up another myth. This myth has been shared equally among Chinese historical figures and among the historians describing their activities. Although many Chinese scholars blame foreign imperialism for initiating conflicts, they have frequently attributed China's failure to cope with these foreign threats to domestic mismanagement by a few individuals. In the case of the Ch'ing government, acceptance of the responsibility for failure would have meant a "loss of face" for the emperor and, by extension, for the whole Manchu ruling house. In the case of Chinese historians, blaming a limited number of individuals removed the need for a far deeper and more critical examination of their cultural heritage. Therefore, Chinese historiography has mirrored the tendency to make individual unsuccessful Chinese diplomats scapegoats for what were, in fact, pervasive and fundamental institutional failings. With the passing of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and with China's continuing integration into the global economy, the importance of "face" has eased somewhat. Nevertheless, the penchant by the Chinese government to blame individuals as a way to deflect attention from systemic failures has not altogether disappeared. One of the more notable examples of this occurred in 1976 with the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four who were made personally responsible for the devastation of the Cultural Revolution.

This tendency to blame individuals has given rise to the myth of the diplomatic incompetence of Ch'ing Dynasty and early Republican period (1912-1949) diplomats.[50] Certainly one can make the argument that mid-nineteenth century Chinese officials involved in negotiating with Russia were ignorant of their northern neighbor, but within several decades this situation had changed. Yet, almost without exception, Chinese diplomats lost every set of negotiations with Russia. While Russia did not usually get everything that it wanted, it made consistent inroads, which the Chinese, try as they might, seemed incapable of stopping.

Before the late nineteenth century, a crucial factor helping to explain this was China's enduring reluctance to reveal its negotiations with Russia to other countries, such as Britain. If it had overcome this reluctance, it could have formed mutually beneficial alliances to put pressure on Russia. Ultimately, however, as long as China remained unindustrialized, no amount of diplomatic virtuosity on its part could have made up for the fundamental change in the balance of power caused by the industrialization of its rivals. In the meantime, the progressive deterioration of China's own internal situation greatly impeded and finally precluded the implementation of a successful foreign policy. For these reasons, the problem resided not in the individual diplomats but in a plethora of problems riddling China's entire international and domestic situation. Not surprisingly, the Chinese still have mixed emotions about this unsettling chapter of their history. But these mixed, and generally negative, feelings have created a tendency among historians to dismiss the achievements of the diplomats of the late Ch'ing dynasty and the early Republican period.

* * *

A key factor in explaining the endurance of these five myths—original sovereignty, Chinese moderation, Russo-Chinese friendship, Soviet diplomatic discontinuity, and Chinese diplomatic incompetence—relates to the focus of available histories and the source materials on which they have been based. Despite the obvious international importance of Russo-Chinese relations, Russian and Chinese history have primarily been studied either in isolation or in relation to the West. Modern China has also been compared to Japan, but the role played by Russia in Chinese history has generally been minimized.[51] The converse is even more pervasive: Russian histories usually treat China superficially or dismiss it altogether. In fact, relations with Russia proved critical for China from the mid-nineteenth century onward, while those with China have become a steadily growing concern for Russia. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine the twentieth-century history of either country without the other, so intertwined have their fates become. Yet only a handful of books rely on both Russian and Chinese sources. The consequence has been not simply to limit but—as indicated by the prevalence of so many myths—to distort our understanding of Russo-Chinese relations.

The Russo-Chinese border remains the main strategic fault line in the Far East and essential linchpin of the contemporary international balance of power. In the mid-nineteenth century, the balance of power suddenly shifted in favor of Russia and did not begin to reverse itself until after the reunification of China under the communists in 1949. Due to the implosion of the Soviet empire in 1991 juxtaposed against the successful economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), this shift in China's favor has recently greatly accelerated. As of April 1991, 10 percent of the 4,600-mile-long border remained in dispute after decades of negotiations.[52] Within the next few years, Russia and China signed a series of border agreements delineating disputed segments of their boundary, yet apparently small but key parts were left to "future generations" to resolve.[53]

As will be shown, the disposition of the Russo-Chinese frontier mirrored the changing relative balance of power between the Russian and Chinese empires. But this balance did not reflect a resurgence of Russia, for relative to the powers of its day, Russia continued to lose ground; rather, the changing balance reflected the collapse of Chinese power caused by the confluence of dynastic decline from within and the challenge of a technologically superior civilization from without. Therefore, Russia expanded in the Far East not because of strength but because of domestic and international weakness, which impelled it to play the role of a great power where it could, and because of Chinese weakness, which made China available as a stage for Russia's great-power ambitions.

Today the situation has reversed. Russian power has imploded both at home and abroad. But unlike the nineteenth century, today China is resurgent and beginning to close the gap between standards of living. With the growing

with the rising tide of Muslim fundamentalism in the Middle East, and with the approaching potentially destabilizing leadership changes in China, ongoing border tensions seem likely. They will become particularly dangerous if the politically ambitious in either country attempt to raise the specter of national security to use continuing territorial disagreements as a vehicle to power. These tensions threaten to become particularly pronounced after the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 and of Macao shortly thereafter. At that time, Russia's territorial gains will be the only remaining territorial legacy of the age of imperialism in China. That is, the frontier will constitute the only area where Europeans still occupy formerly Chinese territory or spheres of influence. Therefore, on a whole range of issues—international, regional, bilateral and domestic—the Russo-Chinese border issue promises to cast a long shadow well into the next century. How this all began is the subject of the next chapter.

Notes

1. Khrushchev is discussing the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, 284.

2. In this 1964 statement, Mao's list of victims of Soviet territorial annexations included Mongolia, Rumania, Germany, Poland, and Finland. Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis*, 43-4.

3. For more on the political uses of myths, see Henry Tudor, *Political Myth*, 124-7, 132-3, 138-9.

4. For an excellent geographic analysis of all the Russo-Chinese border treaties complete with English translations of the treaty texts and maps, see J. R. V. Prescott, *Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty*, xv-xvi, 5-97. See also Ch'eng Fa-jen (程發軔), 中俄國界圖考 (A geographic study of the Sino-Russian border). For good collections of maps detailing the evolution of the Russo-Chinese border see: H. C. Darby and Harold Fullard, eds., *The New Cambridge Modern History Atlas*, 184-6, 274; Albert Herrmann, *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China;* P. J. M. Geelan and D. C. Twitchett, *The Times Atlas of China.*

5. The year 1924 is a watershed for both Mongolian and Sino-Soviet history. That year the Mongolian People's Republic promulgated its constitution. In addition, Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations were restored after the break following the Bolshevik Revolution.

6. Although there have been certain territorial changes since 1924, most notably the secret incorporation in 1944 of Tannu Uriankhai (Tannu Tuva or Wu-liang-hai), Mongolia into the Soviet Union, Russia acquired *de facto* if not *de jure* sovereignty over this area during the period under discussion. During World War II, Joseph Stalin simply made official what had long been the case. Similarly, although Chiang Kai-shek only gave Nationalist recognition to Outer Mongolian independence on January 5, 1946, and Mao Tse-tung, in 1950, China had lost all influence over Outer Mongolia in the early 1920s. The Chinese, therefore, were belatedly recognizing a change that had taken place decades before. In the case of Soviet involvement in warlord politics in Sinkiang during the two decades before World War II, this did not result in territorial changes. Nor did the border war in 1969 over various river islands along the Manchurian border lead to any major

boundary adjustments—certainly not on the scale of those from the period between 1858 and 1924. Similarly, to date the ongoing border negotiations of the 1990s do not seem to have led to a major reallocation of territory. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, a history of the Russo-Chinese border from 1858 to 1924 constitutes the history of the modern border. Luke T. Chang, *China's Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes,* 26.

7. The only part of the border set by the Treaty of Nerchinsk to remain in force thereafter was the section along the Argun River downstream from Abagaytuy. In the case of the 1727 boundary documents, only the western section between the first eighteen beacons out of sixty-five remained in force through 1991. This treaty set the boundary between Outer Mongolia and Russia up to Tannu Uriankhai. Prescott, 12, 24.

8. For a discussion of the structural impact of the Industrial Revolution, see Douglass C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History,* 158-9, *passim.*

9. Ernest Batson Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia,* 3-4.

10. According to an 1856 entry in the diary of the Russian subject Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, "The self-confidence of the Chinese is incomprehensible to the mind. He never praises anything that is not Chinese." Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, "Западный край Китайской империи и город Кульджа (Дневник поездки в Кульджу 1856 г.)" (The western part of the Chinese empire and the city of Kuldja [Diary of a trip to Kuldja in 1856]), in *Собрание сочинений в пяти томах* (Collected works in five volumes), vol. 2, 36.

11. Kauko Laitinen, *Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty: Zhang Binglin as an Anti-Manchu Propagandist,* 15-30, 145; Ting-i Li, *A History of Modern China,* 253; Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., "The Canton Trade and the Opium War," 203; James M. Polachek, *The Inner Opium War,* 18, 247, 275, *passim.*

12. Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century,* 5-8.

13. For example, the eight-volume series of historical maps published by the Cartographic Publishing House in the People's Republic of China maintains very similar external boundaries for China even though the land area controlled by the various Chinese dynasties varied dramatically. The huge loss of territory under the Ming Dynasty, which came between the territorially two largest dynasties, the Yüan or Mongol Dynasty and the Ch'ing or Manchu Dynasty (neither Han Chinese), is concealed by including the Ming with the Yüan Dynasty. In earlier dynasties, the lands of independent border peoples are included as parts of China as if they were provinces. Tan Ch'i-hsiang (譚其驤), ed., 中國歷史地圖集 (Collection of historical maps of China), 8 vols. For other Chinese sources see: Wu Hsiang-hsiang (吳相湘), 俄帝侵略中國史, (History of the Imperial Russian invasion of China); *Sha-o ch'in-lüeh Chung-kuo hsi-pei pien-chieh shih* (沙俄侵略中国西北边界史) (History of the tsarist Russian invasion of northwest China); Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中国社会科学院), Institute of Modern History (近代史研究所), 沙俄侵华史 (The history of the tsarist Russian invasion of China); Ch'en Teng-yüan (陳登元), 中俄關係述略 (Outline of Russo-Chinese relations); T'ung Tung (佟冬), ed., 沙俄与东北 (Tsarist Russia and Manchuria), 1-2; Ho Han-wen (何漢文), 中俄外交史 (The history of Sino-Russian diplomacy), 21, 24, 37, 64. See also John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History,* 18-19.

In Russian and Soviet historiography, the Russians assume that, in expanding eastward, Russia simply moved into a territorial and political vacuum, and fulfilled its destiny to

become a Pacific Ocean power; only the expansionist tendencies of the Ch'ing Dynasty caused conflict. Russian and Soviet literature ignores the element of coercion in the nineteenth-century boundary and commercial treaties. It emphasizes the strong-armed tactics employed by the other great powers while it downplays similar tsarist policies. For the Soviet rebuttal of the Chinese position, see S. L. Tikhvinsky, "For a Scientific Approach to the History of Russo-Chinese Relations (17th-19th Centuries)," 10-11; S. I. Povalnikov, "The Second Opium War and Russia," 182; Victor Louis, *The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire,* 5. For more information, see the Bibliographic Essay

14. Fred W. Bergholz, *The Partition of the Steppe: The Struggle of the Russians, Manchus and the Zunghar Mongols for Empire in Central Asia, 1619-1758, A Study in Power Politics,* 419.

15. G. V. Glinka, ed., *Азиатская Россия* (Asiatic Russia), vol. 2, 539, 549.

16. J. N. Westwood, *A History of Russian Railways,* 117.

17. James Forsyth, *A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony 1581-1990,* 103-8, 213-4, 217.

18. David M. Farquhar, "The Origins of the Manchus' Mongolian Policy," 199-200.

19. In Chinese historiography, many authors take for granted that much of Siberia and Central Asia had long been Chinese. For each border area, these authors point to the dynasty which extended farthest to justify their territorial claims. These views are fraught with contradictions and greatly exaggerated the integration of the borderlands into Chinese territory. On the one hand the Mongol or Yüan Dynasty is considered an alien dynasty which subjugated China before being quite properly overthrown by a Han Chinese dynasty, the Ming. On the other hand, some Chinese imply that the lands constituting the territories of the Yüan Dynasty, most of which had never before been even remotely connected with China, are part of the lost patrimony. By such an accounting, Moscow itself would be part of Chinese territory. Bitterness over the loss of this territory colors Chinese work—Republican (1912-49), mainland Chinese, and Taiwanese.

According to Quested, "Chinese historians for their part have certainly given their signs of disapproval of Russian policy towards their country before 1917, and especially of the annexation of the Amur." She provides a detailed discussion of the pre-1949 literature, concluding, "All these were writers of the pre-Communist period, but even the attitude of Chinese Communist historians does not seem to have altered substantially." She then details the literature through the 1950s. R. K. I. Quested, The *Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857-1860,* xviii-xxi. See also: Sun Fu-k'un (孫福坤), 俄帝侵華史 (The history of Russian aggression in China), 1-6; Alastair Lamb, *Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem,* 29-30; T'ung Tung, 1-2. For more information, see the Bibliographic Essay.

20. This argument is discussing in detail in part III.

21. William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914,* 394-451.

22. Immanuel Chung-yüeh Hsü, "The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense vs. Frontier Defense," 221-2.

23. Although Amnesty International does not go so far as to accuse China of committing genocide in Tibet, it reports a variety of "gross human rights violations" perpetrated against those advocating Tibetan independence. Amnesty International, "People's Republic of China: Repression in Tibet, 1987-1992," title page, *passim.*

24. Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development,* 50-4.

25. As one scholar has written, "The birth, life and death of the Russian Empire were all linked closely to its struggle to acquire and retain the status of a European Great Power." D. C. B. Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War,* 5. See also the superb work by Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914,* 19, 86-7, 95, 99, 205, 345-6.

26. Instructions to Lev Fedorovich Baliuzek, 3/8/1861 (3/20/1861), ARFP, *f.* 161, St. Petersburg, *Glavnyi arkhiv*, IV-2, *op.* 119, 1861, *d.* 12, *l.* 43; N. Obruchev, 1895, "Соображения Ген. Обручева высказанные в начале Японо-Китайской войны 1895 года" (Views of Gen. Obruchev expressed at the beginning of the Russo-Chinese War in 1895), Central State Military History Archive of the USSR, Moscow, *f.* 447, *ed. khr.* no. 69, *l.* 5; Col. Putiat, 1902, "Секретная записка бывшего воен. агента в Китае Ген. Шт. Полк. Путят о шпрах по обеспечению нашего полож. на крайн. Востоке" (Secret memorandum by the former military agent in China for the General Staff Colonel Putiat and discussion on the security of our position in the Far East), Central State Military History Archive of the USSR, Moscow, *f.* 447, *ed. khr.* no. 69, *l.* 28; "Записка Министра Финансов о заседании по поводу записки Министра Иностранных Дел, о занятии Таляньваня" (Note by the minister of finance based on notes by the foreign minister on the meeting about the occupation of Ta-lien [Dairen]), 11/15/1897 (11/27/1897), BA, Witte, box 11, file 22, part 3, no. 8, p. 6; "Всеподданнейший доклад Военного Министра в 1900 году" (Most humble report of the Minister of War [Kuropatkin] for 1900), 3/14/1900 (3/26/1900), BA, Witte, box 11, file 27, part 1, pp. 114, 127; A. L. Popov, "Царская дипломатия в эпоху Тайпинского восстания с предисловием А. Л. Попова" (Tsarist diplomacy in the epoch of the Taiping Rebellion with a foreword by A. L. Popov), 191, *passim*; "Всеподданнейшая записка министра ин. дел" (Most humble memorandum by the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Murav'ev]), 6/4/1900 (6/17/1900), in "Боксерское восстание" (The Boxer Uprising), ed. A. Popov, 15; Oleg Igorevich Sergeev, *Казачество на русском Дальнем Востоке в XVII-XIX вв.* (The Cossacks in the Russian Far East in the eighteenth through nineteenth centuries), 42-3, 57-8; N. S. Kiniapina, *Внешняя политика России первой половины XIX в.* (The foreign policy of Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century), 275; Raisa Vsevolodovna Makarova, *Внешняя политика России на Дальнем Востоке, вторая половина XVIIIв.-60-е годы XIX в.* (The foreign policy of Russia in the Far East, second half of the eighteenth century to the 1860s), 4; Iu. Kushelev, *Монголия и Монгольский вопрос* (Mongolia and the Mongolian question), 54; Fedor Fedorovich Martens, *Россия и Китай. Историко-политическое исследование* (Russia and China. Historical and political research), 2, 7; A. M. Pozdneev, "Об отношениях европейцев к Китаю. Речь произнесенная на акте С.-Петербургского Университета 8-го февраля 1887 года" (Regarding the relations of the Europeans with China. Speech delivered at the commencement of the University of St. Petersburg on 8 February 1887 [20 February 1887]), 260-3; Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, *Русско-Китайский вопрос* (The Russo-Chinese question), 3-4; Il'ia Semenovich Levitov, *Желтороссия, как буферная колония* (Yellow Russia as a buffer colony), 113.

27. For a survey of the Soviet literature expressing this view, see Alfred J. Rieber, "The Historiography of Imperial Russian Foreign Policy: A Critical Survey," 389-95. See also: Milan Hauner, *What Is Asia to Us? Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today,* 4; Robert Wesson, *The Russian Dilemma,* 35, 48; Tikhvinsky, "For a Scientific Approach," 7-12; Povalnikov, "The Second Opium War and Russia," 181, 212-3; Galina

Nikolaevna Romanova, *Економические отношения России и Китая на Дальнем Востоке, XIX-началю XX в.* (Economic relations of Russia and China in the Far East, 19th-beginning of the 20th century), 47.

28. According to George Alexander Lensen, the much-published expert on Russo-Japanese relations: "But for decades relations between Russia and China had been good, friendlier than between China and the other foreign powers, foreign diplomats complaining that pro-Russians dominated the court, and their enormous common frontier had remained unguarded" (*The Russo-Chinese War*, 70). For other examples, see: George Alexander Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea and Manchuria, 1884-1899*, vol. 2, 477; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801-1917*, 440; Ian Nish, *The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War*, 8; Louis E. Frechtling, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkestan, 1863-1881," 487; A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Asia*, 144, 187; Steven G. Marks, *Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization of Asian Russia 1850-1917*, 39; Anatole G. Mazour, *Russia: Tsarist and Communist*, 296, 335-6; Stephan, 48; R. K. I. Quested, *"Matey" Imperialists? The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria 1895-1917*, 15, 45, 115, 125-6, *passim*. Quested's thesis is manifest in her book's title: Russian imperialism in China was "matey," a Britishism meaning companionable.

Some of the scholars listed above are among the most distinguished experts on the diplomatic relations of the Far East or on Russian history. Lensen was the most well-known American specialist on Russo-Japanese relations, while Nish taught diplomatic history for many years at the London School of Economics and was well-acquainted with Russian and Japanese sources. Quested wrote several detailed works on Russo-Chinese relations; Seton-Watson is known for his work on Imperial Russia; Stephan has written extensively on Asiatic Russia; and Mazour taught history at Stanford. Both Seton-Watson and Stephan underestimated the level of coercion involved in concluding the mid-nineteenth-century border treaties.

29. See the Bibliographic Essay's section on archives for more information. Interestingly, during the reign of the K'ang-hsi Emperor (1662-1723) "[t]he dossiers of transactions with Russia (E-lo-ssu tang and variant titles) appear to be one of the few specialized archival records maintained in the K'ang-hsi inner court." Beatrice S. Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723-1820*, 369.

30. This and the following seven footnotes list only a few representative examples of the epithets regularly used by Chinese memorialists and emperors to describe Russian activities. 花翎薩, KH 28/9/25 (10/26/1902), MCA, FM, 0245-743; 錫恒, HT 1/6/21 (8/6/1909), MCA, GCRM, 4-163-34; 瑞詢, KH 25-30 (1899-1904), MCA, GCRM, 4-171-2; 長庚, KH 29/10/4 (11/22/1903), MCA, GCRM, 4-171-3; 崇文, KH 6/1/22 (3/2/1880), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-8; 許應騤, KH 6/7/10 (8/15/1880), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-22; 高萬鵬, KH 4/3/20 (4/22/1878), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-40; 陳熾, KH 11/6/10 (7/21/1885), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-44; 奎潤 et al., KH 12/5/22 (6/23/1886), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-46; 奕譞, KH 6/8/24 (9/28/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-30; 洪良品, KH 6/10/15 (11/17/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-45; 郭嵩燾, KH 6/2/13 (3/23/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7708-11; 左宗棠, KH 5/10/21 (11/4/1879), MCA, GC, 3-161-7708-22; 趙林, KH 5/12/15 (1/28/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-23; 奕譞, KH 6/5/16 (6/23/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7710-6; 籌辦夷務始末, CABM (The complete account of barbarian management), vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 22 *ts'e*, 9a *yeh;* 清季外交史料, HMIRCP (Historical materials on international relations from the Ch'ing period), 18 *chüan*, 21b *yeh;* 20 *chüan*, 20a *yeh;* 22 *chüan*, 33b *yeh;* 16

chüan, 9b *yeh;* 18 *chüan*, 5a *yeh;* 124 *chüan*, 14b *yeh*.

31. 高萬鵬, KH 4/3/20 (4/22/1878), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-40; 秀昌, KH 29/10/14 (12/2/1903), MCA, GC, 3-160-7679-20; 廖廉能, KH 29/1/28 (2/25/1903), MCA, GC, 3-160-7679-23; 文悌, KH 24/3/5 (3/26/1896), MCA, GC, 3-161-7694-2; 榮全, TC 12/4/25 (5/21/1873), MCA, GC, 3-161-7703-21; 徐桐 et al., KH 6/8/24 (9/28/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-31; 李鴻章 and 183 others, KH 5/12/10 (1/21/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7708-25; 張仲良, KH 6/1/6 (2/15/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-27; HMIRCP, 18 *chüan*, 21b, 24a *yeh*.

32. 錫恒, HT 1/6/21 (8/6/1909), MCA, GCRM, 4-163-34; 劉坤一, KH 6/8/2 (9/6/1880), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-43; 陳熾, KH 11/6/10 (7/21/1885), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-44; 李有棻, KH 29/10/4 (11/22/1903), MCA, GC, 3-160-7679-17; Academia Sinica (中央研究院), Institute for Modern History (近代史研究所), 東北砭邊防外蒙古 (Manchurian border defense, Outer Mongolia), 1921, 85.

33. 瑞洵, KH 25-30 (1899-1904), MCA, GCRM, 4-171-2; 錫綸春滿, KH 13/閏4/4 (5/26/1887), MCA, GCRM, 4-185-6; 劉坤一, KH 6/11/20 (12/21/1880), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-20; 劉坤一, KH 6/8/2 (9/26/1880), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-43; 奎潤 et al., KH 12/5/22 (6/23/1886), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-46; 金順, KH, MCA, GC, 3-160-7681-37; 增祺, KH 29/5/17 (6/12/1903), MCA, GC, 3-161-7698-31; 趙林, KH 5/12/15 (1/26/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-23; 寶廷, KH 5/12/7 (1/18/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7708-29; HMIRCP, T'ung-chih, 87 *ts'e*, 6b *yeh;* 西巡大事記 , RIEIW (Record of important events regarding the inspection of the West), 6 *chüan*, 32b *yeh*.

34. 明慶, KH 6/1/18 (2/27/1880), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-42; 奎潤 et al., KH 12/5/22 (6/23/1886), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-46; 洪鈞, KH 4-12 (1878-1886), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-48; 夏敦復, KH 29/8/12 (10/2/1903), MCA, GC, 3-160-7679-16; 長順, KH 27/3/4 (4/22/1901), MCA, GC, 3-161-7695-40; 左宗棠, KH 5/8/11 (9/26/1879), MCA, GC, 3-161-7705-52; 左宗棠, KH 5/7/10 (8/27/1879), MCA, GC, 3-161-7707-25; 吳鎮, KH 5/12/10 (1/21/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-18; 隆懃, KH 5/12/12 (1/23/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-20; 張仲良, KH 6/1/6 (2/15/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-27; 沈葆楨 KH 5/9/5 (10/19/ 1879), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-40; CABM, vol. 16, Hsien-feng, 43 *ts'e*, 10b *yeh*; 44 *ts'e*, 19b *yeh;* vol. 19, 66 *ts'e*, 12a *yeh;* 69 *ts'e*, 21b *yeh;* HMIRCP, 17 *chüan*, 16a *yeh;* 21 *chüan*, 23a *yeh;* 1 *chüan*, 4b *yeh;* 15 *chüan*, 35a, 36b *yeh;* 16 *chüan*, 3a, 4a *yeh;* 171 *chüan*, 2b *yeh*.

35. 榮全, TC 12/4/25 (5/21/1873), MCA, GC, 3-161-7703-21; 榮全, TC 11/12/6 (1/4/1873), MCA, GC, 3-161-7704-38; 烏拉布, KH 5/12/9 (1/20/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-3; 洪良品, KH 6/10/15 (11/17/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-45; 左宗棠, KH 5/10/21 (12/4/1879), MCA, GC, 3-161-7708-22; HMIRCP, 126 *chüan*, 8b *yeh*.

36. 明緒, TC, 4/8/1 (9/20/1865), MCA, GC, 3-161-7704-10; 榮全, TC, 10/8/5 (9/19/1871), MCA, GC, 3-161-7704-24; 蔣鎮嵩, KH 5/12/15 (1/26/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-13; 劉錫鴻, KH 5/12/16 (1/27/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-16; 夏震川, KH 6?/9/17 (10/20/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-41; 孔憲瑴, KH 5/12/10 (1/21/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-12; 張仲良, KH 6/1/6 (2/15/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-27; CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 *ts'e*, 5a *yeh;* vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 19 *ts'e*, 4a *yeh;* vol. 16, Hsien-feng, 47 *ts'e*, 9a *yeh;* HMIRCP, 21 *chüan*, 23b *yeh;* 118 *chüan*, 22a *yeh*.

37. 奕山 et al., HF 7/閏5/10 (1/1/1857), MCA, GC, 3-159-7667-61; 吳大澂, KH 6/7/27 (9/1/1880), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-16; 奎潤 et al., KH 12/5/22 (7/4/1885), MCA, GC, 3-160-7678-46; 文謙 et al., HF 7/6/29 (8/18/1857), MCA, GC, 3-161-7702-13; 明緒, TC 4/9/23 (11/11/1865), MCA, GC, 3-161-7704-13; 榮全, TC 10/9/29 (11/11/1871), MCA,

GC, 3-161-7704-26; 王先謙, KH 5/12/9 (1/20/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-2; 李璠 et al., KH 5/12/14 (1/15/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-12; 廖壽豐, KH 6/1/28 (3/8/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-21; 史履晉, KH 33/6/15 (1/24/1907), MCA, GC, 3-164-7806-27; 孔憲殼, KH 5/12/10 (1/21/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-12; 張仲良, KH 6/1/6 (2/15/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7709-27; CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 *ts'e,* 4b, 13b *yeh;* 13 *ts'e,* 10a *yeh;* 15 *ts'e* , 26b *yeh;* vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 20 *ts'e*, 25b *yeh;* T'ung-chih, 86 *ts'e,* 38a *yeh;* HMIRCP, 17 *chüan,* 17a *yeh;* 19 *chüan,* 10b *yeh;* 20 *chüan,* 23a *yeh;* 21 *chüan,* 30a *yeh;* 22 *chüan,* 21b *yeh;* 24 *chüan,* 8a *yeh;* 118 *chüan,* 22a *yeh;* 146 *chüan,* 33a *yeh;* RIEIW, 6 *chüan,* 26b *yeh.*

38. The persistence of such a myth, given the existence of common published documentary collections (such as CABM and HMIRCP, both published in the 1930s) containing ample references to such opinions, casts doubt on whether many Soviet scholars are well acquainted with key published materials in classical Chinese. Similarly, the view is amply represented in secondary works published during the Republican Period (1912-49). See, for instance, Ch'en Po-wen (陳博文), 中俄外交史 (The history of Sino-Russian diplomatic relations), 7, 20; Ch'en Teng-yüan, 14, 30; C. T. Wang (王正廷), 籌辦中俄交涉事宜公署意見書 (Memorandum of the Sino-Soviet Negotiations Commission), 7-11.

39. See for instance, G. V. Efimov and A. M. Dubinskii, *Международные отношения на Дальнем Востоке* (International relations in the Far East), vol. 2, 61-4; E. M. Zhukov, ed., *Международные отношения на Дальном Востоке (1870-1945 гг.)* (International relations in the Far East [1870-1945]), 365.

40. Bruce A. Elleman, "The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1924-1925," 459-86. For more information, see chapter 12.

41. China began to redeem various railway concessions in the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty. England then relinquished various urban concessions in the late 1920s and was joined by other European countries in the early 1930s. In 1943 the United States and Britain voluntarily abolished all unequal treaties with China. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China,* 466-8, 567.

42. See, for instance, Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia: From 1360 to the Present Day,* 253-4; O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: The "Great Game,"* 210; Hsu, *Rise of Modern China,* 515; Jean Chesneaux, Françoise Le Barbier, and Marie-Claire Bergère, *China from the 1911 Revolution to Liberation,* 124; Mazour, *Russia,* 651; John W. Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism,* 8.

43. "The phenomenon of Chinese cultural expansion and migratory settlement in new lands is not to be associated with particular policies or with contemporary régimes. It has proved to be one of the most enduring features of all Chinese history, beginning long before unity had been achieved within the future Chinese empire, independent of the nature of the government in power, and very often indifferent to the disapproval of that government." C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People,* xv.

44. Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii, *Курс Русской Истории* (The course of Russian history), part 1, vol. 1, 50.

45. I am relying on Michael W. Doyle's definitions for empire, imperialism and hegemony. According to Doyle, "Empires are relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies. They include more than just formally annexed territories, but they encompass less than