THE GEOPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPORT

This is the first book to define and explore the geopolitical economy of sport—the intersection of power, politics, money, and state interests that both exploit and shape elite sport around the world.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global response, and the consequent ramifications for sport have put the geopolitical economy of sport front and centre in both public debate and academic thinking. Similarly, the Winter Olympics in Beijing and the FIFA World Cup in Qatar illustrate the political, economic, and geographic imperatives that shape modern sport. This book brings together studies from around the world to describe this new geopolitical economy of sport, from the way in which countries use natural resource revenues, accusations of sport washing, and the deployment of sport for soft power purposes, to the way in which sport has become a focus for industrial development. This book looks at the geopolitical economy of sport across the globe, from the Gulf States’ interests in European soccer to Israel seeking to build a national competitive advantage by positioning itself as a global sports tech start-up hub, and the United States continuing to extend its economic and cultural influence through geopolitical sport activities in Africa, Latin America, and the Indian subcontinent. This book captures a pivotal moment in the history of sport and sport business.

This is essential reading for any student, researcher, practitioner, or policymaker with an interest in sport business, the politics of sport, geopolitics, soft power, diplomacy, international relations, or international political economy.

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THE GEOPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPORT

Power, Politics, Money, and the State

Edited by Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop, and Michael M. Goldman
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INTRODUCTION
Towards a Geopolitical Economy of Sport

Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop, and Michael M. Goldman

In late 2021, reports emerged that a Chinese female professional tennis player – Peng Shuai – had posted a message on social media claiming that she had been coerced into a sexual relationship with one of her country’s senior government officials. The post was rapidly deleted, and stories then began to circulate that the athlete had disappeared. Many people, including fellow professional tennis players, began demanding to know what had happened to Peng. Shortly afterwards, the International Olympic Committee president – Thomas Bach – appeared in photographs, apparently in a video call with the missing athlete. This was immediately questioned by observers and critics, though Bach was presumably mindful of the potential for a large-scale boycott of the impending 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. Calls for a boycott of the event had been a predominant feature of the run-up to the event, notably in response to China’s treatment of its Uyghur community. Whatever the IOC president’s motives or intentions, the Women’s Tennis Association, an organization founded and based in the United States, subsequently announced that it would be suspending its tournaments in China following the Peng episode. In due course, Peng re-appeared in public, though many remained unconvinced that she was in control of her own liberty and free to speak openly. Nevertheless, the tennis player was eventually seen in the front row at an Olympic freestyle skiing event in Beijing, at which Eileen Gu won the gold medal. Gu herself comes with an interesting story: born and raised in the United States to a Chinese mother and estranged American father; a rising star in possession of naming rights deals with the likes of Red Bull, at the same time competing for China and being seen as an instrument of propaganda for the Chinese state.

Once the Beijing Winter Olympics had ended, though even before the Winter Paralympics had started, Russia invaded Ukraine. Within days, the global sport community had responded, with Russian athletes, teams, and governing bodies
being suspended from participation and membership. The response of European football’s governing body – UEFA – was especially notable. Its men’s Champions League competition had been sponsored for nearly a decade by Russian state-owned Gazprom, which had been using its sponsorship portfolio for political purposes. At the same time, its chairman had been sitting on the board of UEFA’s executive committee as a result of his position as president of the Russian Football Union. He had also been president of the Russian football club Zenit Saint Petersburg, itself owned by Gazprom, playing in a stadium owned by the gas corporation, located in a city in which Gazprom has its headquarters. Furthermore, with little more than four months to go, the men’s Champions League Final was scheduled to take place at the Gazprom-owned venue. In response to Russia’s military action, UEFA unilaterally terminated its Gazprom sponsorship, switched the upcoming match to Paris, and suspended Russia and its teams from all UEFA competitions.

At the end of 2022, Qatar stages the FIFA men’s football World Cup – a tournament that has been hugely controversial in its organization. Less than 5 percent the size of Britain, Qatar has been linked to corruption scandals within FIFA, with critics claiming that it is an undeserving host of football’s biggest national team competition. Yet Qatar is a gas- and oil-rich state that is going through a period of economic, political, and social transformation, driven by its long-planned staging of the World Cup. What some have seen as nation building on an epic scale, others have dismissed as ostentation driven by vanity. As the government in Doha has sought to project soft power through football, a popular discourse has arisen that frames Qatar as a sport washer. Though the country has worked hard to position itself as a more progressive Gulf nation (albeit underpinned by traditional Islamic values), critics highlight what they see as an archaic labour market system that has resulted in the exploitation and death of countless migrant workers. Yet Qatar is now a prominent and legitimate member of the global sport community, having staged many of sport’s biggest international events and gained decision making influence within sport’s governing institutions. At the same time, the likes of its state-owned airline – Qatar Airways – have established an impressive array of sport sponsorship properties. Yet at the same time, other sponsors will have stayed away from any association with the World Cup, fearing adverse consequences of being associated with the country in any way.

Adding to this chronology, there are numerous other examples of where sport, economics, politics, and geography interconnect and influence one another. In early 2022, Houthi drones attacked an industrial facility close to the Jeddah Formula 1 circuit in Saudi Arabia. A retaliatory strike against the country, the Houthis were responding to the kingdom’s military actions in Yemen. F1 drivers were so concerned that they considered boycotting the race, which would have had significant economic, political, and legal consequences for a multitude of the sport’s stakeholders. In both 2020 and 2021, the British government’s attempts to facilitate the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund’s acquisition of
Premier League club Newcastle United whilst establishing a fan-led review of club ownership were as confused as they were striking. Nonetheless, the British government illustrated the economic and political significance of English football, something that has been accumulated over decades and confers a global competitive advantage in football upon Great Britain. Or one can refer to the case of Colin Kaepernick and his taking the knee, which simultaneously became a socio-political matter as well as a business and commercial one. Upon the death of George Floyd, taking the knee became an important symbol of solidarity and demand for change across the world. All of which has thrust the issue of race into the spotlight of global sport ever since.

In these examples drawn from little more than a period of a few years, several things immediately become clear. Firstly, that the world (and, indeed, the world of sport) is densely interconnected, meaning that it is often impossible to create a demarcation between matters of geography, politics, and economics. At one level sport has become an important focal node of networks underpinned by a quest for power and control over important resources. At another level, sport has become the means to an end for countries, businesses, and others that are seeking to achieve goals that extend way beyond it. Sport is undoubtedly shaped by and is therefore an outcome of geography, both physical and human. One need only think of nations that perform well in alpine sports to understand such a statement. That Qatar and Saudi Arabia are spending lavishly on sport is fuelled by the oil and gas deposits that sit beneath their countries. Though people rail against sport and politics mixing, during the first quarter of the 21st century the two appear to be synonymous or in symbiosis rather than being remote from one another. Different ideologies increasingly underpin the organization and governance of sport, whilst countries compete with each other to successfully formulate strategy and policy in sport. For instance, South Korea was the first country in the world to adopt an esports strategy intended to position it as one of the world’s leading industrial hubs. Such policy and strategy typically have an economic dimension, whereby contribution to national income, job creation, the generation of tax revenues, and the promotion of exports in sport becomes as important as sports themselves. One need only consider that the US NBA basketball competition is thought to have generated upwards of $500 billion in China alone is a testament to the economic significance of sport.

For the purposes of this book, we define the geopolitical economy of sport as being:

The way in which nations, states, and other entities engage in, with or through sport for geographic, political and/or economic reasons in order to build and exert power, and secure strategic advantages through the control of resources within and via networks of which sport is a constituent part.

(Chadwick, 2022a)
The editors recommend that readers who may wish to familiarize themselves with the origins and features of geopolitical economy read the above article, though one may also find other articles by Chadwick (2022b) and Chadwick and Widdop (2021) to be helpful. The purpose of this book is, nevertheless, not to address issues in its conceptualization. Rather, it is intended to highlight instances and issues that we believe should be classified as being geopolitically economic in nature. In conjunction with formative commentaries about it, this text is implicitly an assertion that this new way of conceiving sport is of paramount importance at this stage’s history. Though we acknowledge the 19th-century utilitarian traditions of sport research and appreciate the contribution of neoclassical economics to understanding sport management in the 20th century, this book is intended as a bold assertion that a new conceptualization of sport—a new discipline in which people can engage in scholarly activity—needs to be adopted. It is anticipated that this book will make an important contribution in this regard. It is important that the reader notes both the multidisciplinary nature of sport’s geopolitical economy and the diversity of its constituent members.

It is important for the reader to note that although this book does contain a plethora of chapters focusing on countries and states, they are not the extent of its geographic constituency. Cities, communities, and even individual athletes are amongst the other constituents we assert are part of sport’s geopolitical economy. Likewise, governments, sovereign wealth funds, and sport governing bodies are amongst the political constituents. While sponsors, broadcasters, and apparel providers are just a small selection of the economic constituents. It is important to note too that, in spite of the mention above of the likes of China and Qatar, the geopolitical economy of sport is not exclusively an Asian phenomenon—it encapsulates the world. Ideology, diplomacy, and soft power are as much characteristics of Brazilian, Canadian, or Nigerian sport as they are of sport in China, India, or Japan. Equally, sport and the countries of Europe, and those in Oceania and elsewhere, are shaped by and are an influence upon the geopolitical economy.

The reader may wish to note that this book has adopted the following themes, into which chapters have been placed:

- Russia and Ukraine;
- China;
- The Gulf and South Asia
- Africa;
- Football;
- Motorsport;
- Peace, diplomacy, and society;
- Implications.

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PART I
Russia and Ukraine
“No War in Ukraine”: so read the sign held up by Ukrainian skeleton racer Vladyslav Heraskevych after he finished one of his runs at the Beijing Winter Olympics on 11 February 2022, amidst warnings that a Russian attack against Kyiv was imminent.1 Less than a month later, on 5 March, while war was raging across Ukraine, Russian gymnast Ivan Kuliak took the podium at an Artistic Gymnastics World Cup event in Doha wearing the infamous “Z” symbol, associated with support for the Russian military.2 Through their gestures, Heraskevych and Kuliak used international sports events to deliver opposing political messages – one for peace, the other for war – that were widely reported in the media and reached beyond their respective sports’ audiences. Heraskevych’s and Kuliak’s actions were sensational but far from isolated: within a few weeks of the invasion, a significant number of elite athletes – not only Ukrainian and Russian, but also third-country nationals – took a public stand on the war, in most cases against it.

Athletes’ public responses to the war on Ukraine are the latest chapter in the long history of athletes’ agency – defined as the “capacity to act” for social and political purposes.3 They highlight the role and limits of athletes’ agency in an era marked by greater attention to humanitarian and human rights considerations on the one hand, and rising international tensions and fragmentation of global governance on the other.4

A New Era of Athletes’ Agency?

Due to their public relevance and global media attention, major sports events such as the Olympics can offer a uniquely spectacular platform for athletes to make statements about wider sociopolitical issues.5 This is especially the case for highly emotional events such as medal ceremonies, which have provided the stage for some of the most iconic examples of athletes’ agency: first and foremost, Tommie...
Smith and John Carlos’s black-glove salute at the 1968 Mexico Olympics. These on-field enactments of agency openly defy the self-professed “apolitical” and “neutral” nature of sport that has been part and parcel of the Olympic movement since its inception. Indeed, they bring to light political and social cleavages, undermining the belief that sport is pure recreation; furthermore, at the international level, they may highlight geopolitical tensions, thereby threatening the unity and the status quo of international sport. Not surprisingly, international sports organizations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have long been at pains to prevent and sanction on-field exercise of agency, leading to a number of successive regulations, the most recent being Rule 50.2 of the Olympic Charter, mandating that “No kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas.”

Historically, elite athletes taking a public stand have constituted a minority, even more so on-field. In recent years, however, an increasing number of sportspeople have publicly supported anti-racism, anti-discrimination, gender equality, and social justice initiatives. Especially after the wave of protests in response to the murder of George Floyd in late spring–summer 2020, the gesture of taking a knee before the start of matches, following the example of NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick, has become fairly widespread among elite athletes, especially from North America.

Hence, pressing questions about athletes’ freedom of expression have emerged, leading the IOC to ask its Athletes’ Commission “to explore whether a greater appetite exists among athletes worldwide to express themselves […] during the Olympic Games.” A comprehensive survey administered to over 3,500 elite athletes from 185 different National Olympic Committees highlighted that 42 per cent of respondents deem it appropriate to have an opportunity to “express their individual views on political issues and other topics” in the media during the Games, while only 16 per cent find it appropriate to do so on the medal podium and 14 per cent on the field of play. Nonetheless, having an opportunity for “unified messaging around inclusion and solidarity on the field of play” is welcomed by 46 per cent of respondents. Notably, athletes’ responses vary significantly according to nationality: while 40 per cent of US athletes support “Allowing physical gestures in an Olympic venue, as a way to demonstrate or express a view”, barely 10 per cent of Russian and 4 per cent of Chinese respondents find it important. Furthermore, the Team USA Council on Racial and Social Justice provided detailed recommendations to the IOC Athletes’ Commission, asking, among other things, to “Establish a no-punishment-policy for protests and demonstrations that are aimed at promoting human rights/social justice initiatives and advancing the human rights mission of the Olympic and Paralympic movements”.

The IOC consultation did not lead to a change in Rule 50.2; however, on the occasion of both the Tokyo 2020 and the Beijing 2022 Olympic Games, the Athletes’ Commission published dedicated “Rule 50 Guidelines”. The Guidelines
clarified that athletes “have the opportunity to express their views” in a number of instances during the Games, not only when speaking to the media, but also “on the field of play prior to the start of the competition”, provided that the gesture is “consistent with the Fundamental Principles of Olympism”, not aimed at any specific target and not disruptive to the Games.13

Overall, already before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the number of elite athletes publicly expressing their views or taking a stand on sociopolitical issues – that is, exercising their agency – seemed to be on the rise.14 This prompted a response by international sports organizations that, while reasserting the principle of sport’s neutrality, partly relaxed their rules regarding athletes’ activism. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which was launched during the “Olympic Truce”15 only a week before the Beijing Winter Paralympics were due to commence, triggered a new wave of statements and gestures by elite athletes. In contrast to anti-racist and anti-discrimination stances, which usually focused on domestic (especially US) matters, pro-peace (or pro-war) demonstrations directly involved issues of international politics. As such, they injected geopolitical tensions into international sports, piercing the veil of its alleged neutrality and universalism.

Elite Athletes and the War on Ukraine

In the early days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a substantial number of elite sportspeople expressed themselves against the war through interviews, public statements, and/or social media. Several of them went beyond generic declarations of solidarity and came out in support of a ban on teams and individuals officially representing Russia in international sports, even threatening to walk out of matches and competitions had international sports organizations failed to do so. This attitude was not limited to Ukrainians – many of whom quickly left the sports grounds to join the fight against the invaders16 – but was shared by other (overwhelmingly Western) athletes: among the most prominent examples was the Polish men’s football team, which on 26 February released a statement via social media in agreement with the Polish Football Association, expressing their intention not to compete against Russia in the upcoming World Cup qualifiers. The Polish were soon joined by the Swedish and Czech teams, leading FIFA to eventually ban Russia from all its competitions, including the World Cup.17

In the first week of the war, the primary focus of athletes’ initiatives was on the upcoming Paralympic Games. On 27 February, a joint statement by several Ukrainian elite athletes – the first signatory being Vladyslav Heraskevych – and Global Athlete – an “athlete start-up movement aiming to inspire and drive change across the world of sport”18 – was released, calling for the immediate suspension of the Russian and Belarusian National Olympic and Paralympic Committees, as well as a blanket ban on all Russian and Belarusian athletes from international sport, due to the violation of international law and the Olympic
and Paralympic Charters by the two countries. A video message making similar demands and featuring Ukrainian Olympians was also released via social media. In the next days, the joint statement was signed by dozens of other sportspeople, both active and retired, in a personal or collective capacity, reaching a total of over 160 signatories on 2 March: among them, athletes from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and another 13 (overwhelmingly Western) countries.

For its part, under joint pressure from Western affiliates, national governments, and public opinions, the IOC took action on 24 February ("strongly condemnn[ing] the breach of the Olympic Truce by the Russian government"), on 25 February (urging the relocation of all events due to be held in Russia and Belarus), and on 28 February (recommending to all sports federations the outright exclusion of Russian and Belarusian athletes “[i]n order to protect the integrity of global sports competitions and for the safety of all the participants”).

As an alternative to the ban, international sports federations were advised to allow the participation of Russian nationals “only as neutral athletes or neutral teams”. This approach was adopted in many events where athletes compete in personal capacity rather than as national representatives (such as the ATP and WTA tennis circuits) and was also the initial decision of the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) towards the Beijing Games. The IPC, however, was soon forced to backtrack and exclude Russian and Belarusian players amidst growing tensions in the Paralympic village and signals that entire teams would walk out of competitions and matches featuring Russian athletes. While parallel pressure from national committees and governments was certainly key, there is little doubt that the firm stance taken by several elite athletes contributed significantly to the introduction of the bans.

Notably, the IOC’s recommendation to ban Russian athletes was framed by IOC President Thomas Bach not as a sanctioning measure, but rather as a “protective” one, which was also supposedly aimed at preventing the potential “politicisation of sports competitions by athletes or teams, some of them being encouraged by third parties”.

According to this narrative, allowing the participation of Russian representatives would imply the risk of turning athletes and teams into geopolitical players, bringing conflict and tensions into the sporting fields; an outright exclusion of Russian sportspeople would therefore be less of a violation of sport’s neutrality than allowing them to play against Ukrainian and Western athletes.

One may argue that this approach discounted the agency of Russian sportspeople in using international events to express dissenting views on the war. To be sure, in the early days of the war, several Russian athletes (especially tennis players) made pro-peace declarations and gestures, on-field, during press conferences, or via social media: the best-known example was perhaps Andrey Rublev, writing, “No War Please” on the TV camera during the Dubai Tennis Championships on 25 February 2022, while the 2021 French Open finalist Anastasia Pavlyuchenkova tweeted that she was “not afraid to clearly state [her] position […] against war and violence. Personal ambitions or political motives
cannot justify violence”. Unlike Pavlyuchenkova’s, however, most of these statements remained fairly generic and came short of criticizing their country’s government: this was the case, for example, of ice hockey superstar Alexander Ovechkin, who called for “no more war” during a press conference but, when asked whether he still supported Vladimir Putin, simply replied that “he is my President”. As the war progressed, the tightening authoritarian grip of Putin’s regime substantially limited the space for dissent in Russian sport, although with notable exceptions. In contrast, a number of Russian athletes toed the official line and publicly supported the war: from the aforementioned episode involving Ivan Kuliak to the attendance of numerous high-profile Russian sportsmen and sportswomen – some of them donning jackets with the Z symbol – at the rally celebrating the eighth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea on 18 March.

The issue of athletes’ agency, and its limits, resurfaced with the blanket ban on Russian and Belarusian athletes announced by the organizers of the Wimbledon Championships in April. The ban was not compliant with the ATP’s policy of allowing participation of Russian players under neutral flag and was immediately criticized as a potential form of “discrimination based on nationality” by the Association. Wimbledon’s organizers justified their decision by pointing to “the importance of not allowing sport to be used to promote the Russian regime and […] broader concerns for public and player (including family) safety”. The latter remark hinted at possible retaliation by the Kremlin against dissenting athletes and their families, which, in the organizers’ view, made it impossible to ask for assurances about Russian players’ opposition to Vladimir Putin’s regime, as had initially been suggested by the UK sports minister. Unlike the earlier bans, Wimbledon’s decision was not supported by international sports organizations and seemed to drive a wedge between Ukrainian and other Western players. Ukraine’s Marta Kostyuk, for example, repeatedly lamented the silence of Russian players about their country’s war of aggression and welcomed the ban. Instead, top Western athletes, such as Rafael Nadal and Andy Murray, opposed the ban initially, although they did not ultimately boycott the event.

One of the reasons for the strong controversy behind the Wimbledon ban is its direct impact on a number of Russian players (like Andrey Rublev and Anastasia Pavlyuchenkova) who had previously taken a stand against the war. As tennis legend Martina Navratilova – who escaped from Communist Czechoslovakia to the United States in 1975 – noted, penalizing players who had “actually spoken out against the war at some potential personal cost” looked “hypocritical”, especially considering that countries with a “questionable human rights record” had been systematically “validated” by being granted the organization of mega sports events in the recent past. In her view, the Wimbledon ban highlights once more how deeply “politics and sport are intertwined”.
Conclusion: Potential and Limits of Athletes’ Agency in a Fragmented World

Much to the chagrin of those who would like them to simply ‘shut up and dribble’, elite athletes can leverage their fame and media attention to make powerful statements about social and political issues at both the domestic and international levels. When athletes take a stand on issues pertaining to the sphere of international politics, such as an armed conflict or the violation of human rights in another country, however, this implies the risk of heightened confrontation and fragmentation in international sport, undermining its self-professed neutrality and unity. Therefore, international sports organizations have historically tried to minimize the potential disruption of athletes’ agency, as evidenced by their firm handling of anti-Israel boycotts at the Olympics and other international events.36

In the case of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, however, this was not the case. Not only were athletes’ public stances against the war not sanctioned,37 they effectively played a role in the decision of international sports organizations to introduce sanctioning measures against Russia and Belarus. To be sure, this was only possible due to the concurrent pressure from Western federations, governments, and public opinions denouncing a major violation of international law and of Olympic values (first and foremost, the Olympic truce). In effect, the public stance taken by Western federations and governments on the matter arguably facilitated and enhanced Western athletes’ agency, and vice versa.

Significantly, the eventual ban on Russian athletes and teams from most international sports competitions was explicitly motivated by an attempt to prevent further politicization of international sport. Ivan Kuliak’s infamous behaviour in Doha somehow hints at the level of tension that the presence of individuals and teams officially representing Russia (and its pro-war propaganda machine) may cause; at the same time, the exclusion of tennis players who had previously opposed the war from Wimbledon 2022 highlights how such bans may also suppress potential opportunities for dissenting Russian athletes to express agency. This is not to overlook, however, that the primary factor constraining the latter has undoubtedly been increased domestic authoritarianism in Russia.

Indeed, to properly understand its potential and limits, athletes’ agency must be situated within structural boundaries set at both the domestic (regime type, foreign policy, sports policy) and international levels (international environment, rules, and politics of international sports organizations). These boundaries can facilitate, enhance, constrain, or even suppress athletes’ agency altogether. Overall, greater attention to human rights among sportspeople and the general public, as well as rising international tensions and ongoing fragmentation of global governance,38 suggests that athletes’ agency in international sports may be destined to become more and more salient in the coming years.
Notes

1 CNN (2022).
2 Pavitt (2022); BBC (2022).
3 Braun et al. (2019), 788. Relatedly, and with specific reference to athletes’ activism, see Totten (2016); Magrath (2022).
4 Chadwick and Widdop (2021).
6 Boykoff (2017), 8–9.
8 Ghani (2022); Haislop (2022); The Guardian (2020).
9 International Olympic Committee (2021a), 2.
10 Publicis Sport & Entertainment (2021), 10, 18.
11 Ibid., 41, 51, 53.
13 International Olympic Committee (2021c), 3; International Olympic Committee (2022e), 3.
15 The Olympic Truce, supported by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, is a period running from the seventh day before the start of the Olympic Games until the seventh day following the end of the Paralympic Games, during which states are invited “to promote and strengthen a culture of peace and harmony” and, if involved in armed conflicts, “to boldly agree to true mutual ceasefires” (United Nations 2022).
16 Jack (2022).
17 McLaughlin (2022); Czech Football National Team (@ceskarepre_eng) (2022); FIFA (2022).
18 Global Athlete (2022b).
19 Global Athlete (2022a); Global Athlete (@GlobalAthleteHQ) (2022). The author is grateful to Jasmine Wu for her support in collecting these data.
20 International Olympic Committee (2022d).
21 International Olympic Committee (2022c).
22 International Olympic Committee (2022b).
23 International Tennis Federation (2022); International Paralympic Committee (2022).
24 Pells (2022); Heroux (@Devin_Heroux) (2022).
25 International Olympic Committee (2022a).
26 Holmes (2022); Newman (2022).
28 Reuters (2022b).
29 The Insider (2022); Badshah (2022).
30 AP News (2022).
31 Association of Tennis Professionals (2022a); Association of Tennis Professionals (2022b).
32 Wimbledon (2022); Reuters (2022a).
33 Kostyuk (@Marta_Kostyuk) (2022); Sessions (2022).
34 Boren (2022).
35 Schmitz et al. (2022).
36 Close et al. (2021); Reiche (2018), 35–39.
37 The sign flashed by Vladyslav Heraskevych during the men’s skeleton final, for example, was defined by IOC sources as “a general call for peace” and thus was not sanctioned (Reynolds 2022).