


INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

THIRD EDITION



EDITED BY THOMAS G. WEISS
AND RORDEN WILKINSON

ROUTLEDGE 

Praise for the Third Edition

“The theories and perspectives discussed in *International Organization and Global Governance* provide students, policy makers, and activists with a historical lens to understand where we all come from, together with a large tapestry of inter-related analytical strands to build a vision and strategies for change towards a new global order based on equity, social justice, peace, security, and sustainability. This book should be on the essential reading list for all students studying IR, Politics, Global Governance, Development Studies, International Political Economy, and International Business.”

—**Faizel Ismail**, *University of Cape Town*

“In this volume Weiss and Wilkinson deliver a complete 3,000-piece puzzle of global governance. What is exceptionally valuable is that they offer both the 30,000-foot view of the complex and comprehensive landscape and the details behind each piece of international organization.”

—**Maria Ivanova**, *Northeastern University*

“In a world riven with war, reeling from a global pandemic, and facing a climate and ecological emergency, it is ever more important to understand the global institutions and actors seeking to respond. In trying to make sense of an ever more complex governance landscape, the latest edition of *International Organization and Global Governance* brings together top scholars on a bewildering array of key global challenges to provide a timely, authoritative, and accessible guide to the world we live in.”

—**Peter Newell**, *University of Sussex*

“The third edition of this important book is a tour de force. Responding effectively to a range of new governance challenges, the volume offers both accessible discussions of theoretical frameworks and rich empirical accounts of governance actors, mechanisms, and processes. The collection enriches our collective understanding of governance and is a must-read for scholars and students alike.”

—**Laura Shepherd**, *University of Sydney*

“Too often, the study of international organizations (IGOs) and global governance has been relegated to lower-class status in the discipline of International Relations (IR)—the terrain where idealists tinker while power politics dominate. Weiss and Wilkinson encourage our discipline to rethink and deepen its analysis of the relationship between international organizations (IGOs) and global governance. By transcending the separation and confusion between the way that IGOs and global governance have been conceptualized and studied, this fully updated volume provides scholars and students critical tools to navigate the contemporary global governance puzzle in a time of great turbulence and change.”

—**Jennifer Welsh**, *McGill University*

Praise for the Second Edition

“*International Organization and Global Governance* is remarkable not just for the breadth and depth of its coverage, but for its ability to stretch our understandings of both organization and governance. It covers classic theories and established institutions (such as the UN and regional organizations) while illuminating the sometimes obscure powers of nongovernmental and ‘private’ entities (ranging from human rights groups to bond rating agencies). This is an indispensable resource for the field.”

—**Michael Doyle**, *Columbia University*

“An indispensable resource for any student of contemporary global affairs. This latest edition of a now-classic volume balances breath of coverage with conceptual depth and sophisticated analysis. The editors here have assembled a top-notch team to write an outstanding collection of insightful, accessible essays that span the enormous range of challenges and changes in global governance today.”

—**Martha Finnemore**, *George Washington University*

“The first edition of this volume was a land-mark; this second, much-updated volume is most welcome. The editors and authors are all leading authorities on their topics. Highly recommended.”

—**David Malone**, *United Nations University*

“In a fracturing world, international cooperation is looking fragile. This book provides a useful overview of how international organizations can help, where they fail, and with what consequences.”

—**Ngairé Woods**, *University of Oxford*

Praise for the First Edition

“*International Organization and Global Governance* should have a place on any international relations scholar’s shelf. In addition to its sheer comprehensiveness as a reference work, it takes the crucial conceptual leap of focusing not on organizations, institutions, regimes, or any other piece of international order, but instead on the presence or absence of actual governance: the successful exercise of power to achieve outcomes. As one important chapter asks, who are the actual governors of the international system? The answers, with respect to many areas of international life, are surprising.”

—**Anne-Marie Slaughter**, *Princeton University*

“A comprehensive survey of the theory and practice of global governance in the modern world. Comprising outstanding essays by acknowledged experts and filled with important insights, *International Organization and Global Governance* is essential reading for scholars and students as well as practitioners.”

—**David A. Lake**, *University of California, San Diego*

“Kofi Annan was right: we are creating a global village. Hence, the need for stronger global village councils becomes more pressing day by day. Despite this, few understand how spectacularly global governance—in all its manifestations—has grown and why it needs to keep growing to keep the world safe. Weiss and Wilkinson have done us a remarkable service by producing this volume now: it provides an indispensable guide to the fastest growing global industry. And it will be read and studied for several decades as the world continues to converge.”

—**Kishore Mahbubani**, *National University of Singapore*

“The reach and scope of this collection renders it invaluable for situating the study of international organizations in the broader field of IR.”

—**Thomas Biersteker**, *The Graduate Institute, Geneva*



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Completely revised and updated, this textbook continues to offer the most comprehensive resource available. Concise chapters from a diverse mix of established and emerging global scholars offer accessible, in-depth coverage of the history and theories of international organization and global governance, and discussions of the full range of state, intergovernmental, and non-state actors.

All chapters have been revised and rewritten to reflect the rapid development of world events, with new chapters on:

- Chinese approaches to international organization and global governance
- The UN system
- The Global South
- Sustaining the peace
- Queer international organization and global governance
- Post-colonial global governance
- The Sustainable Development Goals
- The English School
- Inequality
- Migration

Divided into seven parts woven together by a comprehensive opening chapter, along with separate introductions to each part and helpful pointers to further reading, *International Organization and Global Governance* provides a balanced, critical perspective that enables readers to comprehend more fully the role of myriad actors in the governance of global life.

Thomas G. Weiss is Presidential Professor of Political Science at The CUNY Graduate Center, New York; he is also Distinguished Fellow, Global Governance, at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, Korea.

Rorden Wilkinson is Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Academic, and Professor of International Political Economy at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Third Edition

■ Edited by
Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson

Designed cover image: Getty Images

Third edition published 2023

by Routledge

4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge

605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2023 selection and editorial matter; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

First edition published by Routledge 2014

Second edition published by Routledge 2018

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Weiss, Thomas G. (Thomas George), 1946– editor. |

Wilkinson, Rorden, 1970– editor.

Title: International organization and global governance /

Edited by Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson.

Description: Third edition. | Abingdon, Oxon;

New York, NY: Routledge, 2023. |

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022042372 (print) | LCCN 2022042373 (ebook) |

ISBN 9781032210155 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032210124 (paperback) |

ISBN 9781003266365 (adobe pdf)

Subjects: LCSH: International organization. |

International agencies. | International relations. | Globalization.

Classification: LCC JZ5566 .159 2023 (print) |

LCC JZ5566 (ebook) | DDC 341.2—dc23/20220916

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2022042372>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2022042373>

ISBN: 9781032210155 (hbk)

ISBN: 9781032210124 (pbk)

ISBN: 9781003266365 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003266365

Typeset in Times New Roman

by codeMantra

Access the Support Material: www.routledge.com/9781032210124

This book is dedicated to the memory of the friends and collaborators from this current and earlier editions who are sadly no longer with us: Graciana del Castillo, Robert W. Cox, Leon Gordenker, David Held, L. H. M. Ling, James G. McGann, Timothy J. Sinclair, and Ian Taylor.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

CONTENTS

<i>List of illustrations</i>	xiv	8 LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM	120
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xv	Tana Johnson and Andrew Heiss	
<i>Contributors</i>	xvi	9 CONSTRUCTIVISM	133
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	xxii	Susan Park	
Part I Introduction	1	10 THE ENGLISH SCHOOL	144
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD	3	Tim Dunne and Ian Hall	
Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson		11 RATIONAL CHOICE AND INDIRECT GLOBAL GOVERNANCE	155
		Henning Tamm and Duncan Snidal	
PART II Contextualizing international organization and global governance	19	12 CRITICAL THEORY	168
1 THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE	23	Robert W. Cox	
Craig N. Murphy		13 MARXISM	181
2 THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW	35	Julian Germann	
Charlotte Ku		14 FEMINISM	192
3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DIFFUSION OF POWER	46	Susanne Zwingel, Elisabeth Prügl and Gülay Caglar	
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall		15 POST-STRUCTURALISM	205
4 THE DIFFUSION OF AUTHORITY	59	James Brassett	
David Held and Eva-Maria Nag		16 POST-COLONIAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE	216
5 WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE?	73	Adekeye Adebajo	
Susan K. Sell		17 CHINESE APPROACHES	230
		Yongjin Zhang	
		18 QUEER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE	243
		Ariel G. Mekler	
Part III Theories of international organization and global governance	87	Part IV States and international institutions in global governance	257
6 REALISM	95	19 THE UN SYSTEM	261
Jason Charrette and Jennifer Sterling-Folker		Natalie Samarasinghe and Giovanna Kuele	
7 CLASSICAL LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM	106	20 THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY	277
Christer Jönsson		M.J. Peterson	

21	THE EUROPEAN UNION Ben Rosamond	292	35	REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE S. Neil MacFarlane	508
22	THE STAYING POWER OF THE BRICS Andrew F. Cooper and Ramesh Thakur	307	36	WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu	522
23	THE GLOBAL SOUTH Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner	321	37	COUNTERING TERRORISM AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM Peter Romaniuk	535
24	US HEGEMONY W. Andy Knight	334	38	HUMAN RIGHTS Daniel Braaten and David P. Forsythe	547
25	CHINA AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE Shaun Breslin and Ren Xiao	350	39	THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE Richard J. Goldstone	561
Part V Non-state actors in global governance		363	40	HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND R2P Simon Chesterman	573
26	GLOBAL CORPORATIONS Christopher May	367	41	CRISIS AND HUMANITARIAN CONTAINMENT Fabrice Weissman	585
27	CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS Jan Aart Scholte	378	42	SUSTAINING THE PEACE Gert Rosenthal	600
28	LABOR Robert O'Brien	393	43	HUMAN SECURITY AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD Stefanie Neumeier and Mark Raymond	613
29	CREDIT RATING AGENCIES Timothy J. Sinclair	407	Part VII Governing the economic and social world		
30	THINK TANKS AND GLOBAL POLICY NETWORKS James G. McGann with Laura Messner	419	44	GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE Bessma Momani	631
31	GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY Michael Moran	440	45	GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE Bernard Hoekman	644
32	PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES Peter J. Hoffman	457	46	GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE Katherine Marshall	658
33	TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS Frank G. Madsen	471	47	GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE Elizabeth R. DeSombre and Andreea Sabau	673
Part VI Securing the world, governing humanity		485			
34	UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND PEACE OPERATIONS Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy	491			

48	REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE Jonathan R. Strand	685	52	FOOD AND HUNGER Jennifer Clapp	738
49	CLIMATE CHANGE Matthew J. Hoffmann	696	53	GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE Sophie Harman and Andreas Papamichail	750
50	SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGS) AND THE PROMISE OF A TRANSFORMATIVE AGENDA Sakiko Fukuda-Parr	708	54	REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS Nicholas R. Micinski	763
51	GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE Harald Heubaum	724	55	GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE Madeline Carr	776
				<i>Index</i>	787

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

11.1 Opportunities for agency slack	159
11.2 Four modes of indirect governance	163
19.1 The UN system	265
20.1 Flow chart of General Assembly discussions	281
30.1 Number of think tanks in the world	424
30.2 Development of global think tanks	426
30.3 Global think tanks	428
33.1 Networks. Olympic rings	475
34.1 Number of ongoing UN-led peacekeeping operations, 1948–2021	495
34.2 Number of uniformed personnel in UN-led peacekeeping operations, 1990–2021 (November annual)	498
34.3 Fatalities in UN-led peacekeeping operations, 1948–2021	505
54.1 Number of international migrants, refugees, and IDPs	764

Tables

21.1 Evolution of the treaties of the EU	294
21.2 European Union enlargements	298
29.1 Credit rating scales	409
30.1 Global think tanks	421
30.2 Functions of global think tanks	425
30.3 Categories of think tank affiliations	427
33.1 Human trafficking	477
34.1 Peace operations: a typology with examples	493
44.1 The ten policies of the Washington Consensus	634
45.1 International trade cooperation: some key events	646

Boxes

31.1 What are private foundations?	441
31.2 Foundations and international relations theory	444
31.3 The new global philanthropy	451
33.1 A darknet marketplace: UniCC	482
46.1 Global visions for development	660
49.1 Orienting terms and dynamics	697
50.1 Sustainable development goals	709
54.1 The global compact on refugees—Programme of Action (2019)	766
54.2 Global compact for migration—objectives (2018)	771

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is the product of a long, fruitful journey, with friends and colleagues from across the fields of international organization and global governance. It is also the capstone of our intellectual partnership. We began thinking about this book more than 20 years ago, as a prelude for what became the “Global Institutions” book series that we edited for Routledge, but we took our time bringing it to fruition. We eventually put together a proposal that contained what we thought a cutting-edge book on international organization and global governance should resemble. Our editor at the time, Craig Fowlie, was enthusiastic about the project and promptly sent the proposal to ten referees. We were pleasantly surprised when soon thereafter ten glowing endorsements came back. The feedback helped us refine aspects of the proposal for what became the first edition of this book in 2014. We were grateful to those reviewers for their support and constructive criticisms then, and to another team assembled by Craig in 2016 to provide feedback from users about the first edition as part of the planning for the second edition, published in 2018. Rob Sorsby did the same for this third edition. Their collective insights have certainly helped improve what we believe is a landmark account of the field of international organization and global governance.

Two decades of collaborating closely on the series and this volume, among many other projects, has been rewarding; they have provided us with raw material for our own thinking and rethinking, for additions and subtractions from our ideas. The pages assembled here represent the accumulation of a rich intellectual input from many sides.

The current edition would not have come together without the first-rate support provided by Giovanna Kuele, an advanced doctoral candidate in Political Science at the City University of New York’s Graduate Center. Earlier editions benefited similarly from the good humor and uncommon common sense of Nicholas Micinski and Martin J. Burke. Giovanna, Nick, and Martin also did the heavy lifting as managing editors of the book series, whose quality and productivity would not have been possible without the support given to them by the Graduate Center’s Provost and Ralph Bunche Institute. We are delighted that Giovanna and Nick have contributed chapters to this edition. Oliver Turner helped organize and oversee the delivery of the first edition’s draft chapters; he too contributed chapters to the first and second editions. The Brooks World Poverty Institute—now part of the Global Development Institute—at the University of Manchester was the foundry where we forged the first edition, spurred by the help and friendship of David Hulme.

That half of the 74 contributors to 55 chapters in this second edition also have books in our series is a source of immense pride. A sadder task is to salute the memory of the seven friends and collaborators who contributed to earlier editions and the current one but who have since passed away: Graciana del Castillo, Robert W. Cox, Leon Gordenker, David Held, L. H. M. Ling, James G. McGann, Timothy J. Sinclair, and Ian Taylor. The list is too long and our discipline weaker for their loss; they made original and essential contributions to the field and their specializations. They were also mentors and friends. We, their former students and colleagues miss them.

T. G. W. and R. W.
New York and Sydney, December 2022

CONTRIBUTORS

Adekeye Adebajo is Senior Research Fellow at the University of Pretoria's Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, South Africa.

Michael Barnett is University Professor of International Affairs and Political Science in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, USA.

Alex J. Bellamy is Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at The University of Queensland, Australia.

Daniel Braaten is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas Lutheran University, USA.

James Brassett is Reader in International Political Economy at the University of Warwick, UK.

Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner is Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and in the Colin Powell School of Civic and Global Leadership at the City College of New York, USA.

Shaun Breslin is Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, and Co-Editor of *The Pacific Review*.

Gülây Çağlar is Professor of Political Science with a focus on Gender and Diversity at Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.

Madeline Carr is Professor of Global Politics and Cybersecurity at University College London, UK.

Jason Charrette is Adjunct Professor at Front Range Community College, USA.

Simon Chesterman is Dean of the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law, Editor of the *Asian Journal of International Law*, and Secretary-General of the Asian Society of International Law.

Jennifer Clapp is Canada Research Chair and Professor in the School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability at the University of Waterloo, Canada.

Andrew F. Cooper is University Research Professor at the University of Waterloo, Canada, and Associate Research Fellow-UNU CRIS in Bruges, Belgium.

Robert W. Cox was Emeritus Professor of Political Science at York University, Canada.

Elizabeth R. DeSombre is the Camilla Chandler Frost Professor of Environmental Studies at Wellesley College, USA.

Tim Dunne is Professor of International Relations and Provost at the University of Surrey, UK.

Raymond Duvall is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, USA.

David P. Forsythe is University Professor and Charles J. Mach Distinguished Professor, Emeritus, at the University of Nebraska in Lincoln, USA.

Sakiko Fukuda-Parr is Professor of International Affairs at The New School, USA.

Julian Germann is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex, UK.

Richard J. Goldstone is Retired Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and Former Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Ian Hall is Professor of International Relations and the Deputy Director (Research) at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Australia.

Sophie Harman is Professor of International Politics at Queen Mary University of London, UK.

Andrew Heiss is Faculty Member in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University, USA.

David Held was Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations at Durham University, UK.

Harald Heubaum is Associate Professor of Global Energy and Climate Policy at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of London, UK.

Bernard Hoekman is Professor and Director of Global Economics, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

Peter J. Hoffman is Associate Professor and Director of The Graduate Programs in International Affairs at The New School, USA.

Matthew J. Hoffmann is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto Scarborough and Co-Director of the Environmental Governance Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, Canada.

Tana Johnson is Faculty Member in the La Follette School of Public Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA.

Christer Jönsson is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden, and Member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.

W. Andy Knight is Distinguished Professor, the University of Alberta, Canada, and Fulbright Distinguished Chair of International and Area Studies, Yale University, USA.

Charlotte Ku is Professor of Law and Director, Global Programs, Texas A&M University School of Law, USA.

Giovanna Kuele is PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, USA.

S. Neil MacFarlane is Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford, UK.

Frank G. Madsen is formerly Head, Criminal Intelligence, Interpol HQ, Director of Security in a multinational company, and Fellow Commoner of Queens' College, Cambridge University, UK.

Katherine Marshall is Professor of the Practice of Development, Religion, and Conflict Resolution at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, USA.

Christopher May is Emeritus Professor of Political Economy at Lancaster University and Chair of the Lancaster Canal Regeneration Partnership, UK.

James G. McGann was Senior Lecturer of International Studies at the Lauder Institute, Director of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, and Senior Fellow at Fels Institute of Government at the University of Pennsylvania, USA.

Ariel G. Mekler is PhD Candidate in International Relations and Women and Gender Studies at the Graduate Center, the City University of New York, USA.

Laura Messner is BA Candidate in Economics and Mathematics at Columbia College, Columbia University in the City of New York, USA, and serves as the Executive Board Co-Lead and Chief of Staff at the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program.

Nicholas R. Micinski is Libra Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the University of Maine, USA.

Bessma Momani is Professor and Associate Vice-President at the University of Waterloo and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance and Innovation, Canada.

Michael Moran is Senior Lecturer and National Education Director at the Centre for Social Impact at the Swinburne University of Technology.

Craig N. Murphy is Betty Freyhof Johnson '44 Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, USA.

Eva-Maria Nag is Executive Editor of *Global Policy* and Co-Director of the Global Policy Institute, School of Government and International Relations, Durham University, UK.

Stefanie Neumeier is PhD student in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California, USA.

Robert O'Brien is Professor of Political Science at McMaster University, Canada, and Fulbright Canada Research Chair in Public Diplomacy at the Center for Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, USA.

Andreas Papamichail is Lecturer in Global Health and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London, UK.

Susan Park is Professor of Global Governance at the University of Sydney, Australia.

M. J. Peterson is Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA.

Elisabeth Prügl is Professor of International Relations at the Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland.

Mark Raymond is the Wick Cary Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Oklahoma, USA.

Peter Romaniuk is Associate Professor of Political Science at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the CUNY Graduate Center, and Senior Fellow at the Global Center on Cooperative Security, USA.

Ben Rosamond is Professor of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

Gert Rosenthal is Guatemala's former UN Permanent Representative and foreign minister; earlier he was ECLAC's executive secretary.

Andreea Sabau is studying Environmental Studies and Political Science at Wellesley College, USA.

Natalie Samarasinghe is the Global Director for Advocacy at the Open Society Foundations.

Jan Aart Scholte is Professor of Global Transformations and Governance Challenges at Leiden University, Netherlands, and Co-Director of the Centre for Global Cooperation Research at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany.

Susan K. Sell is Professor at the School of Regulation and Global Governance, College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University, Australia, and Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University, USA.

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu is Clinical Professor at New York University's Center for Global Affairs and directs the United Nations Initiative, USA.

Timothy J. Sinclair was Associate Professor of International Political Economy in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK.

Duncan Snidal is Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford and a fellow of both Nuffield College and the British Academy, UK.

Jennifer Sterling-Folker is the Alan R. Bennett Honors Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut, USA.

Jonathan R. Strand is Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA.

Henning Tamm is Lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, UK.

Ramesh Thakur is Emeritus Professor, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, Australia; Senior Research Fellow, Toda Peace Institute, Tokyo, Japan; and former UN Assistant Secretary-General.

Thomas G. Weiss is Presidential Professor of Political Science at the CUNY Graduate Center, USA; Distinguished Fellow, Global Governance, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, USA; and Global Eminence Scholar, Kyung Hee University, Korea.

Fabrice Weissman is Research Director at the Centre de Réflexions sur l'Action et les Savoirs Humanitaires (CRASH) hosted by the Médecins Sans Frontières Foundation, Paris, France.

Rorden Wilkinson is Deputy Vice-Chancellor Academic and Professor of International Political Economy at the Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.

Paul D. Williams is Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, USA.

Ren Xiao is Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy at Fudan University, Shanghai, China.

Yongjin Zhang is Professor of International Politics, University of Bristol, UK.

Susanne Zwingel is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University, USA.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABMT	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ACSRT	African Union’s African Center for Study and Research on Terrorism
ACTA	Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEEP	Africa-EU Energy Partnership
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AG	Australia Group
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ALAC	At-Large Advisory Committee
ALBA	Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas
AMIS	Agricultural Market Information System
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMR	antimicrobial resistance
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
AoA	Agreement on Agriculture
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASIS	American Society for Industrial Security
ASP	Assembly of States Parties
AU	African Union
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India, and China
BI	Brookings Institution
BIAC	Business and Industry Advisory Committee
BIT	bilateral investment treaties
BOAD	West African Development Bank
BoP	base of the pyramid
BPA	Beijing Platform for Action
BPoA	Barbados Programme of Action
BRAC	Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (originally, now superseded by the abbreviation alone)
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
BRICSAM	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and Mexico
BRIICS	Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
BWI	Bretton Woods Institutions
CABEI	Central American Bank for Economic Integration
CAN	Andean Community of Nations
CAT	Committee Against Torture
CBDR	common but differentiated responsibilities
CCS	carbon capture and storage
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CEB	Chief Executives Board [UN]
CEDAW	Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CEIP	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CERD	Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination
CERDI	Center for Studies and Research on Development at the University of Auvergne
CFA	Comprehensive Framework for Action
CFCs	chlorofluorocarbons
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CHR	Commission on Human Rights
CIC	Center on International Cooperation
CIMMYT	International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CITES	International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora
CIVETS	Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa
CMS	Convention for the Conservation of Migratory Species
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CONGO	Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations
COP	Conference of the Parties
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership
CRA	Currency Reserve Agreement
CRC	Committee on the Rights of the Child
CRPD	Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSC	country-specific configuration
CSCE	Commission on Security Cooperation in Europe
CSD	United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CSI	Container Security Initiative
CSR	corporate social responsibility
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
CTAG	Counterterrorism Action Group

CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTC	Counterterrorism Committee
CTED	Counterterrorism Executive Directorate
CTITF	United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Taskforce
CVE	countering violent extremism
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DAW	Division for the Advancement of Women
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DfID	Department for International Development [UK]
DFS	Department of Field Support
DNS	domain name system
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EADB	East African Development Bank
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECA	UN Economic Commission for Africa
ECB	European Central Bank
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECLA	UN Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EIB	European Investment Bank
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ELCI	Environment Liaison Centre International
EMs	emerging market economies
ENDA	Environnement et Développement du Tiers-Monde
EP	European Parliament
ERSG	Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General
ETUC	European Trade Union Council
EU	European Union
EULEX KOSOVO	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL COPPS	European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FAC	Food Aid Convention
FACI	forensic accounting and corporate investigations

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FCL	flexible credit line
FCTC	Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
FDI	foreign direct investment
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIU	financial intelligence unit
FMCT	Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FSAP	Financial Stability Assessment Program
FSB	Financial Stability Board
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
FTF	foreign terrorist fighters
FUNDS	Future UN Development System Project
G7	Group of Seven
G8	Group of Eight
G20	Group of 20
G77	Group of 77
GAIN	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GAVI	Global Alliance on Vaccination and Immunization
GCERF	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GDP	gross domestic product
GECF	Gas Exporting Countries Forum
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEI	Green Economy Initiative
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
GFC	global financial crisis
GHGs	greenhouse gases
GOARN	Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
GPN	global production networks
GRI	Global Reporting Initiative
GUF	Global Union Federation
GVC	global value chain
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HCN	host-country nationals
HEW	hypermasculine Eurocentric whiteness
HIPC	heavily indebted poor country
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HLP	High-level Panel
HLPE	High-level Panel of Experts
HLPF	High-level Political Forum

HLTF	High-level Task Force on the Food Security Crisis
HRC	Human Rights Council
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
IAASTD	International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IANA	Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IAVI	International AIDS Vaccine Initiative
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IBSA	India, Brazil, and South Africa
ICANN	International Association for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICIS	Interpol Criminal Information System
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICM	Intergovernmental Committee for Migration
ICPAT	Inter-governmental Authority on Development's IGAD Capacity-building Program Against Terrorism
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
ICPO	International Criminal Police Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSID	International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICSU	International Council of Scientific Unions
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter American Development Bank
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	international financial institution
IFOR	Implementation Force in Bosnia
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGBP	International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IIASA	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development

IIJ	International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
INF	Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
INGO	international nongovernmental organization
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
IO	international organization
IOC	International Oceanographic Commission
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IOSCO	International Organization of Security Commissions
IoT	Internet of Things
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPE	international political economy
IPPDDHH	Instituto de Políticas Públicas de Derechos Humanos
IPRs	intellectual property rights
IR	international relations
IRO	International Refugee Organization
IRRI	International Rice Research Institute
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	import-substitution industrialisation
ISIL/ ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (also known as Daesh)
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
ITO	International Trade Organization
ITR	International Telecommunication Regulations
ITS	International Trade Secretariats
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
ITUC-PERC	ITUC-Pan European Regional Council
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
JCLEC	Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LDC	least developed country
LED	light-emitting diode
LGBTI	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
LGBTQ	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer
LGBTIQ+	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer +
LGBTIQA2+	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, ally, two-spirit
LICs	Low-Income Countries
LIO	Liberal International Order
LLDC	landlocked developing country

LNHO	League of Nations Health Organization
MAD	mutually assured destruction
MAP	Mutual Assessment Process
MARPOL	International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
MDB	multilateral development bank
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
Mercosur	Common Market of the South
MFN	most-favored nation
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MINUSCA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MIST	Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey
MNC	multinational corporation
MNLA	<i>Mouvement national pour la liberation de l'Azawad</i>
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
MOU	memoranda of understanding
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières [Doctors without Borders]
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
MUJAO	<i>Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest</i>
NAALC	North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
NAB	New Agreement to Borrow
NAFSN	New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCUC	Noncommercial Users Constituency
NDB	New Development Bank
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development
NGF	New Global Finance
NGLS	Non-Governmental Liaison Service
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NHS	National Health Service
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NIIO	New International Information Order
NPE	normative power Europe
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRSRO	Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
NSA	non-state actor
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS	Nuclear Security Summits
NTB	non-tariff barriers

NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
O5	Outreach 5
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCO	overseas capacity operations
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OIHP	Office International d'Hygiène Publique
OLADE	Latin American Energy Organization
ONOMUZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in el Salvador
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSAGI	Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P5	permanent five members of the UN Security Council
PA	principal-agent
PAMECA	Police Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PCL	precautionary credit line
PDP	product development partnership
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PHEIC	public health emergency of international concern
PICMME	Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
PIPA	Protect Intellectual Property Act
PMSC	private military and security company
POC	protection of civilians
POPs	persistent organic pollutants
POW	prisoner of war
PPP	purchasing power parity
PPE	personal protective equipment
PRC	People's Republic of China
PREJAL	Promoting Youth Employment in Latin America
PRTs	provincial reconstruction teams
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative

PTA	preferential trade agreement
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
PVE	preventing violent extremism
R&D	research and development
R2P	responsibility to protect
RAINS	Regional Acidification Information and Simulation
RATS	Regional Antiterrorism Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RDB	regional development bank
RfC	request for comment
RFMO	Regional Fisheries Management Organization
ROC	Republic of China
S&P	Standard & Poor's
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAFE	Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade Framework
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCIMF	Sub-Committee on IMF Matters
SCN	Standing Committee on Nutrition
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCOPE	Scientific Committee on the Problems of the Environment
SDB	sub-regional development bank
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDNT	Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SDSN	Sustainable Development Solutions Network
SDT	special and differential treatment
SE4ALL	Sustainable Energy for All
SEARCCT	Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counterterrorism in Kuala Lumpur
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission
SIDS	small island developing state
SOGIESC	sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, and sex characteristics
SOPA	Stop Online Piracy Act
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
SRSG	special representative of the Secretary-General
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TB Alliance	Global Alliance for TB Drug Development
TCN	third-country nationals
TEEB	Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity
TNC	transnational corporation
TOC	transnational organized crime
TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TPS	Temporary Protected Status
TRIMs	Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures
TRIPs	Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
TUAC	Trade Union Advisory Committee
TUCA	Trade Union Confederation of the Americas
UCLG	United Cities and Local Governments
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAMID	United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCCT	United Nations Counterterrorism Centre
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCHE	United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
UNCLOS	UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHABITAT	United Nations Habitat
UNHCR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNITAID	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
UNGC	United Nations Global Compact
UNMA	United Nations Mine Action
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMIS(S)	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency

UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
UNSCOB	United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans
UNSOA	UN Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNWOMEN	United Nations Women
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
UPR	universal periodic review
UPU	Universal Postal Union
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USMCA	United States, Mexico, Canada trade agreement
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTR	United States Trade Representative
W3C	World Wide Web Consortium
WAGS	Working Group on Situations
WBG	World Bank Group
WCIT	World Conference on International Telecommunications
WCL	World Confederation of Labour
WCO	World Customs Organization
WEO	World Energy Outlooks
WEU	Western European Union
WFC	World Food Council
WFP	World Food Programme
WFTO	World Fair Trade Organization
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WGC	Working Group on Communications
WHA	World Health Assembly
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WSSD	World Summit on Social Development
WTO	World Trade Organization



PART I
INTRODUCTION



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

International organization and global governance in a turbulent world

Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson

The early years of the twenty-first century’s third decade have brought the kind of changes likely to shape world politics for some time to come. The last time a pandemic ravaged the planet was a century ago. Just as World War I (WWI) was drawing to a close, an outbreak of influenza (H1N1)—incorrectly, but commonly known as “Spanish Flu” and better understood and labeled as the “Great Influenza Pandemic”—began circulating. Over the course of 1918–1920, an estimated one-third of the global population was infected and 50–100 million people died.¹

It would be incorrect to suggest that the post-WWI outbreak of H1N1 and COVID-19 are the same, that they had common effects, or that pandemics on this scale are once-in-a-century events. The similarities and differences between the 1920s and today are instructive, nonetheless. As we put this book into production, more than half a billion COVID-19 cases had been confirmed and 6.3 million people had lost their lives to the pandemic.² The post-WWI H1N1 virus continued to circulate in the global population for decades. COVID-19 was far from running its course. Significant differences exist between the post-WWI era and our own in that monitoring and detection have improved significantly, as has the capacity to produce vaccines at scale, even if access by the world’s poorest to these and other prophylactic measures remains a blight on our collective humanity. The war in Ukraine broke out as

CONTENTS

■ Bringing international organization and global governance to the fore	6
■ International organization and global governance: one to another	8
■ Thinking differently about global governance	12
■ About the book	13
■ Conclusion: moving forward	15

the world began the long recovery from COVID-19, whereas the Great Influenza Pandemic occurred, in large measure, after the cessation of hostilities. The war in Ukraine has not, so far, brought the great powers into conflict with one another—though all are involved in some way via economic sanctions, weapons and munitions supplies, and so on. And WWI was of course a massive conflagration between Europe’s major powers and, later, the United States and others.

The sub-title for this introduction borrows from our late colleague James Rosenau the notion of “turbulence.” In particular, we need to move faster and considerably further away from the state-oriented models of world politics that still dominate the fields for most readers of this volume, international relations and international organization.³

Global governance is significantly different today than in the early twentieth century. At that time, the first attempt at building world institutions under the League of Nations was beginning. Global governance had previously been exercised through a range of private actors and ad hoc international mechanisms (intergovernmental conferences and great power alliances, among others) underpinned by an older European system of diplomacy. Global governance did not have at its core the vast array of intergovernmental agencies that characterizes the public elements of contemporary world order. The inevitable corollary is that the role of international organizations and their relationship to global governance is and will be different from a century ago.

This historical contextualization not only underscores the different contemporary effects of global governance actors but also the long-run changes in global governance that require us to explore the ways that the world is governed and managed. Most critically, they have and will continue to change, as we have argued at length elsewhere.⁴ They also shape our understanding of what future global governance could look like. And that future requires us to move beyond an assumption that the way the world is currently governed, and the role of international organizations therein, will evolve in a linear fashion. We explore what future global governance might resemble in the companion volume *Global Governance Futures*.⁵

There are, nonetheless, common themes as well as distinctions between these two turbulent periods. Economic nationalism is on the rise now, as it was in the 1920s. The initial post-WWI period saw an economic boom before the stock market collapse of 1929 and an era of depression unfolded. We too have experienced a period of significant asset price growth before the sharp falls of the first six months of 2022. While the next decade is unlikely to see a new bout of intergovernmental institution-building, the current system is under significant pressure not only from the pandemic but also longer-run questions of relevance, over-stretch, ineffectiveness, and omission.

These pressures result not just from the pandemic and the war in Ukraine but also from longer-run issues that underscore the importance of understanding international organization and global governance. Climate change remains of critical importance and urgency. Eight of the years in the decade since we published the first edition of this book have been the hottest on record.⁶ Moreover, we continue to witness even more severe weather worldwide—more floods, more drought, more wildfires, and more hurricanes and typhoons. In addition, always in the background are haunting images of the incapacity of global humanitarian instruments to protect the lives of

the world's "at-risk" populations; the all-too-harrowing recollection of past failures in Rwanda and Somalia were still searing our memories with Syria's, Myanmar's, and Eritrea's ongoing agonies an ever-present daily media bill-of-fare even before one-third of Ukraine's pre-war population became refugees and internally displaced.⁷ And the global finance, trade, and development architectures all continue to labor under the palpable effects of long-standing problems and shortcomings. The chapters that follow reflect these recent and enduring problems, including the impact of the pandemic, war, inflation, food shortages, and supply-chain problems that make ever clearer the impacts of the continuing absence of a robust global regulatory regime.

It is not just these obvious shortcomings that point to the importance of understanding better international organization and global governance. It is the increasingly pluralistic nature of global politics and the changing roles of myriad actors therein. States have experimented with alternative intergovernmental arrangements—such as the current profusion of "groups," with the Group of 7/8 (G-7/G-8—now presumably and permanently only the G-7 again with Russia's pariah status) and the Group of 20 (G-20) being the most prominent—to coordinate policy in key areas. Regional arrangements continue to drive forward economic integration and sometimes peace operations; and states have taken on the role of managers of global interdependence.

A burgeoning nongovernmental sector is engaged in myriad activities ranging from familiar roles in disaster relief and poverty alleviation through to the implementation of micro-credit and micro-finance programs, to shaping global policy frameworks in development and health.⁸ Knowledge networks and knowledge management⁹ play an important role in policy formulation and dissemination.¹⁰ At the same time, other less salubrious actors have become embroiled in the governance of global affairs. Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are increasingly prominent in almost all arenas of conflict.¹¹ Criminal gangs organize and traffic indentured workers, women, and children from the borderlands of the industrialized world to the plantations of the southern United States and the sex industries of Western Europe and Asia. Terrorist groups and networks have become more active and lethal across the globe, generating and fueling instability and raising questions over the capacity of international mechanisms—among many others—to control their spread.¹²

Credit-rating agencies, multinational corporations (MNCs), and financial markets are key to the functioning of the global economy often intruding into the pockets of everyday life.¹³ Transnational religious movements—some interfaith, many not—have come to be seen as important development actors setting the pace for some initiatives while acting to block others.¹⁴ Moreover, it is not just the number of actors involved in the governance of the globe that also requires us to develop a keen sense of the way that the world is organized. We also need to get a better grip on the role that flows of information facilitated by digital communications, electronic transactions, and the Internet are increasingly shaping life on the planet.

Strikingly, the way that these actors and mechanisms are arranged in relationship to one another, the power that underpins them, and the ideas and ideologies that drive their overall assemblage are not as central to the study of international relations (IR) as they ought to be. While they are concerns of all the major approaches within the wider IR discipline, international organization and global governance are often treated as subfields and commonly as synonyms for each another. More often

than not, only one element or issue area—for instance, the United Nations or the multilateral trading system—is engaged, frequently in isolation from others, thereby ensuring that the relationship between them is seldom fully diagnosed and understood. Yet for us, they are not merely curious and divisible phenomena but rather essential elements of the form and function of world order; this chapter and the 55 others that follow demonstrate why.

We aim to correct this misrepresentation in the remainder of what follows and in our further introductions that begin each of the six subsequent parts of the book. Certainly, others have written important interpretations that shed light on the global governance puzzle,¹⁵ but none has done so in a manner that attempts to grapple with its complexity in the way that the sum of the following chapters do. We made that claim in the first and second editions of this book; it is even more accurate here with thoroughly revised and expanded contributions from our stable of authors and additions—conceptual as well as empirical—that expand the breadth of subject matter. The centrality of questions about how the world is organized and governed—and a better understanding of the role myriad actors play in the governance of global life—offers an intriguing framework for what we believe continues to be the most comprehensive guide yet published to help readers assemble the many pieces of the contemporary global governance puzzle.

The remainder of this introduction spells out what we believe matters and why in the fields of international organization and global governance with an overview of the intellectual terrain that we see as expansive and indicative of the broad landscape with which we grapple. We also say a little about why we as a community of scholars have not really put the international organization and global governance together very well. Thereafter, we explain why the book’s contents are essential reading, and we parse briefly the substance of its main parts. We also provide more detailed introductions at the beginning of each of the following six main substantive parts of the book in order to provide a guide to reading and an aid to understanding.

Bringing international organization and global governance to the fore

International relations—as a field of study and as a real-world pursuit—has always been concerned with international organization and global governance. Indeed, it could be argued that understanding how the world is governed—of which an appreciation of how relations between states are organized—is key, and has always been and remains one of the primary concerns of IR scholars.¹⁶ Yet, the central relationship between international organization and global governance to the study and practice of IR is rarely appropriately acknowledged and understood.

Rather, and much to the detriment of comprehending better how the world is ordered, international organization and global governance have tended to be a combination of all or some of the following elements:

- the activities of the UN and other major international organizations;
- subsets of the broader field of IR;

- the preserve of normative and idealistic projects concerned with making the world a better place;
- the low politics of mundane bureaucracies working on more technical economic, environmental, and social issues and not the high politics of security, warfare, and defense; and
- conspiracies about world government.

Yet to present international organization and global governance in these terms risks misunderstanding because the questions with which they are concerned are core, not peripheral endeavors of the major intellectual traditions in IR. A brief *tour d'horizon* illustrates why.

Realism, in both its classical and neorealist variants, has as a constitutive tenet an assumption of how the world is organized. Hans J. Morgenthau was, among other things, concerned with varying forms of international order—imperialism, world government, alliances, self-determination—as well as with mechanisms of governance—the balance of power, international law, and supranational forms of arms control. Moreover, he examined (but did not necessarily advocate) alternative “future” forms of global governance—world state, world community, and the politics of accommodation.¹⁷ Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist formulation posits the international system as comprising a structure and a set of interacting units.¹⁸ As in the classical earlier formulation, there is no central authority that orders the units; instead, their relations *vis-à-vis* one another are determined by their relative power capabilities. In both variants, Realism has a clear idea of the overall structure of how the world is governed, and the primary task for many is to deal with the negative effects of this form of organization.

Liberal internationalists and their modern (neo)liberal institutionalist, neofunctionalist, cosmopolitan, and constructivist counterparts also recognize the pernicious aspects of the way that world politics is organized. However, rather than focusing on the development of self-help manuals designed to bolster state power in the face of changes in relative power capabilities, they emphasize moments of common interest in which cooperation between and among states occurs, and in which such cooperation becomes institutionalized and regularized. These moments of cooperation shape and constrain state behavior via systems of rules, norms, practices, and decision-making procedures that may or may not be guided by progressive ideas and ideologies.¹⁹ The result is a focus on possibility, wherein questions not only address how the world is governed but also on how it *ought* to be governed.²⁰

More critical traditions too have ideas of world order as central tenets in their intellectual cannon. Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches understand transnational and global organizations as institutional responses to the exigencies of capitalist expansion.²¹ Feminist and Queer scholars see forms of organization, institutionalization, and regularization as helping perpetuate unequal relations between genders and based on sexuality, irrespective of what might look like progressive policies and elements.²² Post-structural approaches demonstrate a concern for the way that the world is governed through discourse and practice.²³ Post- and de-colonial scholars reflect upon the historical processes that have ensured that Western European (including

US) imperial orders and patriarchal and heteronormative systems continue to serve as dominant modes of subordinating Others.²⁴

Yet, for all their (albeit often unrecognized) centrality to the core intellectual traditions of IR, international organization and global governance are hardly unproblematic, nor is the relationship between them uncomplicated. Partly because international organization and global governance are often taught as IR subfields rather than as primary concerns in and of themselves, little clarity exists about their core meanings, overlaps, and contradictions let alone how individual theoretical approaches understand and interpret them. In some instances, international organization and global governance are treated synonymously; in others, they relate only to what international organizations “do”; in others still, such variance exists in what is treated as the intellectual and empirical terrain as to render both of the terms largely meaningless.

International organization and global governance: one to another

At its most basic, international organization refers to an instance—or, in an historical sense, a moment—of institutionalization in relations among states. Inis Claude’s formulation makes that point distinctly: “International *organization* is a process; international *organizations* are representative aspects of the phase of that process which has been reached at a given time.”²⁵ His and other classic definitions of international organization are inexorably bound up with a normative desire to see existing organizations as moments in a progressive march toward growing global institutionalization and order. We tend thus to use international organization to refer to formal interstate institutions that are, or have the potential to be, planetary in reach—such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organization (WTO), although any regional, less formal interstate arrangement can be and often is classified in this way as well. Indeed, analyses of the European Union (EU) are often features of North American classes on international organization; whereas in Europe, supranational European institutions, and their relationship to the post-war political economy of that continent, are usually viewed as distinct enough to merit separate courses from the treatment of intergovernmental organizations.

Confusing matters further for students, at least initially, is the seeming conflation of the term “international organization” with “institutions” and “regimes.” Although they are not the same, the familial relationship requires further explanation. Strictly speaking, international organizations (as opposed to the singular international organization as a process) are formal intergovernmental bureaucracies. They have a legal standing, physical headquarters, executive head, staff, and substantive focus for their operations. Hence, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a specialized agency in the UN system that exists to coordinate and entrench in international legal frameworks the protection of intellectual property rights worldwide; its headquarters are in Geneva; it has 193 member states; and its secretariat is overseen by a director-general. Other organizations might also be “international” in their focus and remit—such as the World Economic Forum that meets yearly in Davos, Switzerland—but are not intergovernmental and are better described as

“institutions”—forums, semi-permanent gatherings, or transnational arrangements depending on their specific character.

An international institution is broader. Whereas international organizations are formalized bureaucracies (and again it is worth bearing in mind that the “s” not only pluralizes the word but refers to specific entities and not a process), international institutions can be both formal and informal manifestations of regularized interstate behavior. So, while international organizations are also international institutions, a moment of regularized interstate behavior that does not have a legal personality, a headquarters, a secretariat, and an executive head is not. Here we can think of a range of institutions, including, but not limited to, semi-formalized groups of states—the G-7, or Group of 77 (G-77) developing countries—and regularized balances of power between states, including the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe and the twentieth-century Cold War. Thus, international institutions are instances of international organization, but they are not necessarily international organizations. As such, we tend to define them—as Robert Keohane does—as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”²⁶

An international regime is slightly different again, although there is a relationship between both international organizations and international institutions, on the one hand, and international regimes, on the other hand. Stephen Krasner’s formulation remains the most widely accepted: “Implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”²⁷ Despite this commonly accepted definition—which suggests they are essentially synonyms of international institutions—international regimes are more accurately viewed as the range of activities that are, in part, created by the behavior-shaping effects of international organizations and institutions.

We have in mind, for example, an area of activity such as the international trade regime. Even in the absence of current global, regional, and national rules, systems of regulation, and organizational structures, international trade would have taken place. Today’s international trade regime is distinct because of the behavioral rules, practices, norms, and decision-making procedures of the WTO; myriad regional trade arrangements such as the USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement—NAFTA); research by and conversations in such UN bodies as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Trade Centre (ITC); and an even greater number of bilateral agreements. In addition, there are also national trade policies, the behavioral practices of private firms, and the lobbying efforts (effective or otherwise) of various nongovernmental actors.²⁸

A key concern of scholars is to understand how power is embedded in the way that the behavior of states—and their economic and political agents, including firms that may be multinational but nonetheless emanate from and retain an organic connection to their states of origin—is shaped by international organizations, institutions, and regimes. Work by Robert Cox and Craig Murphy, for instance, has explored organic connections between dominant states and the creation and evolution of international institutions.²⁹ Robert Keohane, Robert Wade, and Rorden Wilkinson have examined how the interests of powerful states are embedded in the very design

of institutions and their effect on institutional and regime development over time.³⁰ Catherine Weaver has explored how institutional development can reinforce a form of organization that perpetuates dominant relations of power.³¹ Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal's work on principal-agent theory likewise has examined how state imperatives are manifest in organizational behavior and the deviations that occur therefrom.³² Thomas G. Weiss has probed the relationship between ideas and the creation and development of international organizations.³³ And Susan Park and Antje Vetterlin have examined the role norms play in shaping state behavior and the construction of economic regimes.³⁴

Although insightful work continues within the confines of traditional courses in the field of international organization, it requires a specific recognition of greater global complexity and ongoing changes (technological, economic, political, and ethical) that demonstrate how the world is governed in a multidimensional fashion. Part of this evolution was foreshadowed by work being carried out under the auspices of international institutions and regimes, but the end of the Cold War really shone a spotlight on the full view of the range of actors operating across borders—and increasingly globally—that needed explaining. Regimes and institutions provided a partial analytical solution, as did attempts to refresh multilateralism as a specific organizational type.³⁵

However, it was the emergence of the term “global governance” in the 1990s—with the publication of James Rosenau and Ernst Czempiel's edited volume, the report by the Commission on Global Governance, and the first issue of a new journal³⁶—that really captured the post-Cold War *Zeitgeist*, and that has enabled IR scholars to begin to grapple more fully with how the world is organized in all of its complexity. Nonetheless, and as we argue below, the analytical utility of the term “global governance” has not yet been fully realized.

Suffice to say, global governance is different from the field of international organization and related work on international institutions and regimes. The core idea is still one of organization—in the sense of the structure and order of things—but the scale and level are different, as is the understanding of the specific forms of organization. Scale-wise, global governance refers to the totality of the ways, formal and informal, the world is governed. The emergence and widespread recognition of transnational issues that circumscribe state capacity along with the proliferation of non-state actors responding to perceived shortfalls in national capabilities and a willingness to address them in the context of a perceived crisis of multilateralism combined to stimulate new thinking.

The imperative is to establish the general character of global governance and to identify the dominant actors and mechanisms. Critics have suggested that it is little more than a kitchen-sink approach with an all-too-fuzzy grasp of the way the world works.³⁷ While containing elements of apparent accuracy, this characterization misses the importance of struggling to capture more fully the totality of ways life on the planet is ordered. It has encouraged investigators to ask questions not only about who and what were involved in governing the world but also about how any particular form of organization came about and the results of its particular mechanisms of control.

However, it is not just this scale and comprehensive embrace that make global governance distinct. It is also the manner and the value of global governance as an

optic for encompassing interactions at all levels of life. What happens in one corner or at any level (local, national, regional, or global) can have repercussions in all other corners and at all levels. Global governance is thus not just about relations among states—although they remain a crucial aspect of the wider puzzle. It is also about the relationship between global policy-making processes and their implementation in particular localities, the effects of local actions on global life, the roles and effects of those involved in making global governance happen, and the interrelationships that exist between institutions, actors, and mechanisms at every level in-between. As James Rosenau noted, inevitably in this mix are countervailing tendencies. He referred to “framegration” to capture the centripetal and centrifugal, integration versus fragmentation, tendencies toward lower and higher levels of the contemporary order.³⁸ However, the continued compartmentalization of global social life into easily consumable levels of analysis hinders our digestion of how the world is governed.

This simplification tells us that there is an obvious relationship between international organization and global governance—because international organizations are essential and visible aspects of how the world is currently governed—but the terms are not synonymous and certainly not coterminous. Moreover, whereas international organization points primarily toward states and emphasizes intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), global governance is far more encompassing. Clearly, the UN Security Council and its members (especially its five permanent ones) are important in the arena of international peace and security, but so too are MNCs, private security firms, transnational criminal networks, terrorist organizations, the media, regulators, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Equally, the range of mechanisms by which governance is exercised dramatically increases in moving from international organization to global governance. “International” governance (by which we mean “interstate”) is limited to those structures that can be agreed by member states to operate under the auspices of a given organization. International legal frameworks are the most common, occasionally backed by some kind of enforcement mechanism—as in the case of the WTO’s dispute settlement body (albeit currently somewhat moribund), the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) pursuit of perpetrators of mass atrocities, or the Security Council’s authorization of sanctions, international judicial pursuit, and military force. *Ad hoc* instances of states acting in concert (for example, in coalitions of the willing) also are part of the picture and a common bill-of-fare in foreign policy. In the realm of global governance more broadly, however, a range of other mechanisms are sometimes equally or even more influential. Financial markets perhaps provide the most prominent illustration. The mechanisms for buying and selling, and the commercial innovations that they drive and encourage, can have dramatic effects, as Jennifer Clapp and Eric Helleiner’s work on the financialization of global food markets shows.³⁹

Moreover, an exclusive emphasis on states misses numerous examples of steps in issue-specific global governance—for instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for the laws of war and humanitarian principles; the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (or FIFA, its familiar abbreviation) for the world’s most popular sport (football/soccer); and by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) for the Internet. Increasingly, private-sector

standard-setting is becoming a foundation for addressing global food and hunger problems, with representatives of industry, unions, NGOs, and multi-stakeholder coalitions determining policies and compliance as much or more than many governments; meanwhile, public–private partnerships are being forged between state and non-state actors at all levels.⁴⁰

Less obvious structures of global governance are found not only in the standard-setting activities of such IGOs as the International Organization of Standardization (ISO) but also in the lobbying activities for commercial interests trying to get particular sizes, shapes, weights, and others accepted as standards.⁴¹ Other sources of governance can be found in fledgling and evolving electronic and social media regimes,⁴² and in the activities of the super-rich, not only in their consumption patterns but also in their philanthropic activities.⁴³

Similarly, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s Ratings Group render judgments that are authoritative enough to cause substantial market responses.⁴⁴ Private regulatory initiatives govern supply chains across the globe to set environmental, food safety, and social standards to such an extent that private not public standards are the prime determinants of access to most western markets.⁴⁵ Even for a security issue like piracy, a hybrid private–public initiative seems at least as likely to help forge agreement on the parameters of addressing that global problem as governments by themselves or shipping and insurance companies on their own.⁴⁶

Thinking differently about global governance

“Global governance” is, of course, not an unproblematic label. Many criticisms arise because of its apparent catch-all quality and of the refusal of those who engage in its study to ask new questions, and who often find it useful to confine their intellectual remit to a static and known range. Yet global governance’s primary utility lies not only in working out theoretical and empirical parameters but rather in reorienting the way that we ask questions about the world around us. It behooves us to ask and answer questions about how the world is governed, ordered, and organized. These questions not only give us an insight into the way, as John Ruggie remarked, the “world hangs together,”⁴⁷ but they also have the potential to overcome some of the fragmentation that IR as a scholarly pursuit has suffered over recent decades.

Increasingly IR has come to consist of a set of separate and discrete intellectual endeavors that make it possible to develop sophisticated frameworks, but that have tended to generate introspective debate among a limited group of advocates rather than a more open-ended conversation among scholars with disparate views to find fertile common ground to be plowed for the field as a whole. Refocusing on questions of how the world is organized and governed has the potential to restrain further intellectual fragmentation and reinvigorate the discipline as a whole because—as we illustrated earlier—it has been a separate concern of all IR major theoretical traditions.

There is, however, a need to address a related problem first if global governance is to realize its potential as a core rather than a peripheral pursuit for the field of international relations. The paucity of existing IR frameworks to explain adequately

changes ushered in by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a host of new actors on the world stage were key factors leading to the emergence of the term “global governance” and the accompanying cottage analytical industry that has grown over the last three decades. One consequence of capturing growing global complexity has been to encourage an overly close association between the term and the specific post-Cold War moment in which it emerged. A related consequence has been a failure by analysts to rescue the term from this narrow historical association and to test its utility as a lens through which to view past and future world orders in addition to better understanding the one in which we currently reside.

If global governance provides a helpful perspective for today, it should also help to understand the relations that were maintained by, and the systems of governance between and among, a variety of actors in other eras: the Greek city-states; China and its tributaries; various Indian empires and states and other regimes across the Middle East, Asia, and Central and Southern America; the empires of Rome, Persia, and Egypt, as well as the kingdoms and empires of pre-colonial Africa; the Islamic caliphates and non-Muslim empires; and the European papal and non-papal states and imperial systems. The framework should also shed light on Cold War bipolarity, the immediate post-Cold War’s unipolar moment, or the world order of today for which we have no convenient label.

In short, global governance should provide ample insights into the differing forms of overarching world orders that have existed—and which need further investigation to unravel the full range of means by which they were and are held together. Global governance thus should help us understand where we came from and why we are where we are, as well as a way to formulate strategies and tactics for where we should be going. We have begun this task in a number of essays,⁴⁸ which we have continued in our book-length *Rethinking Global Governance*.⁴⁹

About the book

The following chapters provide a comprehensive overview of the historical foundations of the current world order’s evolution as well as its key dynamics; the major conceptual and theoretical approaches to the study of international organization and global governance; and the role of states, their coalitions, and IGOs as well as important non-state humanitarian, security, and economic actors. They also explore in detail how global governance is manifest in economic and social arenas. We have sought, simultaneously, to end the separation and confusion between the way that we conceptualize and study international organization and global governance, to examine the role of many major actors, and to explore the differential manifestations of governance in particular fields while not losing sight of the big picture.

In designing, commissioning, and arranging the contributions, we sought to assemble as many of the pieces of the international-organization-and-global-governance puzzle that we could sandwich between two covers. Our aim was to be as comprehensive as possible. We also sought to enable course leaders to design classes around the issues that they wanted to highlight, while providing a one-stop resource for further reading and wider contextualization. So, classes emphasizing the

security, economic, social, legal, or other aspects of international organization and global governance are able to select chapters from each of the book's parts, while simultaneously pointing students to related and seemingly not-so-related topics for further investigation. Likewise, introductory classes could be designed around the empirical aspects of international organization and global governance with a modest dose of theory to help make sense of the material. More advanced classes will inevitably make greater use of the full range of contextualization and theory chapters as well as a broader slew of the empirical contributions. To guide readers, all contributors have suggested "additional reading" at the end of their chapters, pointing to sources to begin reading prior to tackling more specialized publications found in endnotes.

The six substantive parts of this book represent essential divisions of the way that we as editors think about the issues. We thus begin with five essays in Part II that provide the backdrop for consuming and digesting the substance in the rest of the book, *Contextualizing International Organization and Global Governance*.

The 13 chapters in Part III deal with *Theories of International Organization and Global Governance*. All too often works covering international organization and global governance have provided only cursory accounts of theory and the tools that different approaches offer; or else they have omitted theoretical discussions altogether. We strongly believe that readers should understand the dominant, emerging, or even previously popular ways that key schools of thought have tried to make sense of the way that the world is governed before attempting their own original syntheses. These essays look at how we have come to understand the way that the world is governed since the beginning of the Westphalian order with some useful pointers that lead us to ask questions further back in time. This part aims to see how key approaches can lend clarity to understanding international organization and global governance. Many of the contributions explore how each can be reformulated and, in some instances, combined to bring the normative project underlying many of the "isms" back into clearer focus and break new ground. Some have been adapted from dominant IR perspectives. Others have been tailored to look specifically at the subject matter at hand. That said, as an intellectual community, we have yet to develop anything approximating specific theories of global governance.

Part IV of the book contains seven chapters that explore *States and International Institutions in Global Governance*. As indicated, international organizations have often been seen to be the main pillars undergirding the way that the world is governed. So, this part examines some of the main units around which the field has revolved, including the role that states and the institutions that they have created play in contemporary global governance.

The eight chapters of Part V move beyond state-centrism to cover *Non-state Actors in Global Governance*. As indicated, the proliferation of such actors and the scope of their activities have been central to explaining the burgeoning field of global governance. So, this part seeks to probe the implications for international organization and global governance of many key non-state actors. Too often, analysts merely add them into the international-organization-and-global-governance mix and then just stir. They thus appear as after-thoughts in books and articles that are otherwise just about specific IGOs. Our aim is to examine these actors as more mainstream

components of international relations courses and research, introducing them before exploring how they contribute to global governance across issues.

Part VI contains ten chapters on *Securing the World, Governing Humanity*. One of the main explanations for human efforts to govern the world better has been the need to foster international peace and security, and so the reader encounters what undoubtedly are the familiar topics of threats and solutions related to the so-called high politics of bombs and bullets. In most texts, these would be the “no questions asked” security institutions. However, given how wide we believe that it is necessary to cast the international organization and global governance net, it is essential to explore issues across a variety of areas that offer a more complete and complex picture of how to perceive the way that international peace and security is governed.

The 12 chapters of Part VII, the final in the book, attempt the impossible task of surveying what passes for *Governing the Economic and Social World*. Whatever we mean by “peace,” it certainly entails more than the absence of war and large-scale organized violence. Thus, the book concludes by examining the various components of a fairer world order, including several pressing issues that many would characterize as “security” challenges even as others would interpret them as so-called low politics.

Conclusion: moving forward

By disaggregating topics in the way that we have and then putting them back together, we can better understand the complexity, the range of sources of authority, and the multiple ways that power and authority are exercised in contemporary world politics. This approach provides building blocks for the way that we need to think about world order today, and in the future. What becomes clear is that the field of international relations should be widened and deepened.

In the years since the first and second editions, the only constant has been change. We are proud in these pages to have assembled a strikingly diverse and impressive team of authors whose essays—which we discuss in more detail in the six separate introductions to each of the book’s main substantive parts—help all of us to continue the unfinished journey toward a better understanding of global governance.

Notes

- 1 Arnstein Aassve, Guido Alfani, Francesco Gandolfi, and Marco Le Moglie, “Epidemics and Trust: The Case of the Spanish Flu,” *Health Economics* 30, no. 4 (2021): 840.
- 2 These figures were those reported on 24 June 2022 by the World Health Organization COVID-19 dashboard, <https://covid19.who.int>.
- 3 James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1990).
- 4 See Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, *Rethinking Global Governance* (Cambridge: Polity, 2019); also, Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority, Power and Change,” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (2014): 207–215.

- 5 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, eds., *Global Governance Futures* (London: Routledge, 2022).
- 6 Josh Davis, “The Last Eight Years Have Been the Hottest on Record,” *National History Museum News*, 22 January 2022, <https://www.nhm.ac.uk/discover/news/2022/january/-last-eight-years-have-been-the-hottest-on-record.html>.
- 7 Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss, *War, Politics, and Humanitarianism: From Solferino to Syria and Beyond* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).
- 8 Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown, eds., *The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); and Jan Aart Scholte with Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *Civil Society and Global Finance* (London: Routledge, 2002).
- 9 Nanette Svenson, *The United Nations as a Knowledge System* (London: Routledge, 2016); and Tatiana Carayannis and Thomas G. Weiss, *The “Third” United Nations: How a Knowledge Economy Helps the UN Think* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).
- 10 Diane Stone, “Introduction: Global Knowledge and Advocacy Networks,” *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs* 2, no. 1 (2002): 1–11.
- 11 Peter Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
- 12 Peter Romaniuk, *Multilateral Counterterrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation* (London: Routledge, 2010).
- 13 Timothy J. Sinclair, “Round up the Usual Suspects: Blame and the Subprime Crisis,” *New Political Economy* 15, no. 1 (2010): 91–107.
- 14 Katherine Marshall, “Governance and Inequality: Reflections on Faith,” in *Global Governance, Poverty and Inequality*, ed. Jennifer Clapp and Rorden Wilkinson (London: Routledge, 2010), 295–313.
- 15 Anthony McGrew and David Held, eds., *Governing Globalization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Margaret P. Karns and Karen Mingst, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009); and Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan Sell, eds., *Who Governs the Globe?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 16 Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin, 2012).
- 17 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985).
- 18 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
- 19 Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
- 20 For example, David Held, *Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
- 21 See Paul Cammack, “The Governance of Global Capitalism: A New Materialist Perspective,” in *The Global Governance Reader*, ed. Rorden Wilkinson (London: Routledge, 2005), 156–173; Stephen Gill, “New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy,” *Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change* 10, no. 1 (1998): 23–38; and Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).
- 22 Shirin Rai and Georgina Waylen, *Global Governance: Feminist Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008); and Gülay Caglar, Elisabeth Prügl, and Susanne Zwingel, *Feminist Strategies in International Governance* (London: Routledge, 2013).
- 23 Heikki Patomäki, “Problems of Democratizing Global Governance: Time, Space and the Emancipatory Process,” *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 34 (2003): 347–376; and Luigi Pellizzoni, “Governing through Disorder: Neoliberal Environmental Governance and Social Theory,” *Global Environmental Change* 21, no. 3 (2011): 795–803.

- 24 See, for example, Himadeep Muppidi, “Colonial and Postcolonial Global Governance,” in *Power in Global Governance*, ed. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 273–293; and Cynthia Weber, *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
- 25 Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares*, 3rd edition (New York: Random House, 1964), 4.
- 26 Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1988): 383.
- 27 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 185.
- 28 Erin Norma Hannah, “NGOs and the European Union: Examining the Power of Epistemes in the EC’s TRIPS and Access to Medicines Negotiations,” *Journal of Civil Society* 7, no. 2 (2011): 179–206.
- 29 Robert W. Cox, ed., *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); and Murphy, *International Organization*.
- 30 Robert O. Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London: Routledge, 2002); Robert Hunter Wade, “What Strategies Are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The World Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space,’” *Review of International Political Economy* 10, no. 4 (2003): 621–644; and Rorden Wilkinson, *The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade* (London: Routledge, 2006).
- 31 Catherine Weaver, *The Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
- 32 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (1998): 3–32; Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds., *Delegation under Agency: States, International Organizations, and Principal–Agent Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- 33 Thomas G. Weiss, *Global Governance: Why? What? Whither?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013); Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, *Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); and Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, *UN Ideas That Changed the World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).
- 34 Susan Park and Antje Vetterlin, eds., *Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and World Bank* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 35 Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed., *Global Transformations: Challenges to the State System* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992); Keith Krause and W. Andy Knight, eds., *State, Society and the UN System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995); Robert W. Cox, ed., *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); Stephen Gill, ed., *Globalization, Democratization and Multilateralism* (London: Macmillan, 1997); Michael G. Schechter, ed., *Future Multilateralism: The Political and Social Framework* (London: Macmillan, 1999) and *Innovation in Multilateralism* (London: Macmillan, 1999).
- 36 James N. Rosenau and Ernst Czempiel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and since 1995 the quarterly *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*.
- 37 Lawrence Finkelstein, “What Is Global Governance,” *Global Governance* 1, no. 3 (1995): 367–372.

- 38 James N. Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," in *The Global Governance Reader*, ed. Wilkinson, 45–67.
- 39 Jennifer Clapp and Eric Helleiner, "Troubled Futures? The Global Food Crisis and the Politics of Agricultural Derivatives Regulation," *Review of International Political Economy* 19, no. 1 (2012): 181–207.
- 40 Benedicte Bull, "The Global Elite, Public–Private Partnerships and Multilateral Governance," in *Global Governance, Poverty and Inequality*, ed. Clapp and Wilkinson, 209–234.
- 41 Craig N. Murphy and JoAnne Yates, *The International Organization for Standardization (ISO): Global Governance through Voluntary Consensus* (London: Routledge, 2009).
- 42 John Mathiason, *Internet Governance: The New Frontier of Global Institutions* (London: Routledge, 2009).
- 43 Michael Moran, *Private Foundations and Development Partnerships: American Philanthropy and Global Development Agendas* (London: Routledge 2013).
- 44 Timothy J. Sinclair, *The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
- 45 Axel Marx et al., eds., *Private Standards and Global Governance: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).
- 46 Danielle Zach, Conor Seyle, and Jens Vestergaard Madsen, *Globalizing Governance: The Case of the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia* (Broomfield, CO: OneEarthFuture Foundation, 2013).
- 47 John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity* (London: Routledge, 1998), 2.
- 48 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, "Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority, Power and Change," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2014): 207–215; "Continuity and Change in Global Governance," in *Rising Powers, Global Governance, and Global Ethics*, ed. Jamie Gaskarth (London: Routledge, 2015), 41–56; "Change and Continuity in Global Governance" and *Ethics & International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2015): 391–395 and 397–406; "The Globally Governed—Everyday Global Governance," *Global Governance* 24, no. 3 (2018): 193–210; and "The Missing Middle: Behind-the-Scenes Global Governance," *Global Governance* 28, no. 1 (2022): 11–34.
- 49 Weiss and Wilkinson, *Rethinking Global Governance*.

PART II

CONTEXTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Students are often poorly served when it comes to the background of—or what might better be thought of as the “back stories to”—international organization and global governance. All too often accounts of the formation of specific international bodies are prefaced with ready-made accounts of the end of war and an aspiration to avert the possibility of a slide back into hostilities as the engine for a bout of institution building. Certainly, there is merit in these interpretations. Often, however, they do not offer a sufficiently rounded account of the slow and incremental struggles and processes that lie behind the emergence of international organizations or of the dramatic accelerators of transformational moments in history.

Our willingness to consume easily digestible pieces of history as substitutes for more involved stories results from our natural eagerness to become familiar with an entire terrain of study as quickly as possible. This reflects the limitations of space in any publication and the fact that these stories are not straightforward, and that their content is often contested—potted introductions do not convey nuances.

We do not claim to have a monopoly of insights into contemporary global governance or the role of international organizations therein. We have, however, tried to be as extensive in our coverage as the limitations of space allow. And we have done so by bringing together five chapters by some of the academy’s leading scholars.

Contextualizing international organization and global governance, chapter synopses

We asked authors to write on those areas in which they are recognized experts, to build upon but also take forward their existing work, and to offer as robust an account as they could of one aspect of the formation of, and dynamics within, the way that the world is currently organized. The chapters are arranged so that they begin with an exploration of the evolution of global governance as a phenomenon before unpacking in further detail some of its constitutive aspects: law, power, authority, and agents. Thus, they focus on driving impulses and incremental developments that ushered forth a global institutional complex (Craig N. Murphy, Chapter 1); the evolution of an international legal apparatus as both a necessity for states—and other actors—to manage their relations, as well as a vehicle pressing for change (Charlotte

Ku, Chapter 2); the manner in which power is diffused and concentrated among international organizations as core components of contemporary global governance (Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Chapter 3); the forces and tendencies that have led to a diffusion of authority across the globe and the resulting challenges (David Held and Eva-Maria Nag, Chapter 4); and the identity of the governors in this complex, multilayered, multifaceted, and multi-actor system (Susan K. Sell, Chapter 5).

In Chapter 1, “The emergence of global governance,” Murphy outlines the private, hidden, and seldom acknowledged origins of contemporary global governance beginning in the “inter-imperial world” (the term he uses for the nineteenth century, in which international organization was predicated on managing relations among colonial powers), where technical standards helped spread industrial capitalism and soothe the tensions that its spread necessarily created. This world of “creeping” global governance begins with seemingly inconsequential agreements on such things as common chemical and electrical units. However, they paved the way for companies to exploit new markets and for ever greater numbers of new consumers to acquire goods that previously had been unavailable while simultaneously bringing them into an expanding market system. Accompanying these technical developments were progressive social agendas driven by constellations of civil society actors, interstate conferences on human health, among others, and transnational associations dealing with working conditions and the plight of industrial labor. But Murphy also shows how states were important components of this nascent system. Such incremental global governance nonetheless set the stage for a step-change in world order under the leadership of the United States after World War II, generating, among other things, the UN system; and it has helped create the kind of world economy that we currently have. He reminds us that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine accompanied by nuclear saber-rattling amid the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have reinforced the requirement for continual efforts to improve the ways that we govern the globe.

Murphy’s chapter offers an insight into the incrementalism that lies behind today’s forms of international organization and global governance. Locking in the developments that this incrementalism generated in the form of transnational, international, and global legal frameworks is also a key part of the story, which Ku picks up and explores in “The evolution of international law” as a complex and multifaceted system in Chapter 2. She shows how, since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, a body of international agreements, norms, declarations, interstate concordats, and public and private arrangements have combined to generate an international legal regime that despite lacking the enforcement capabilities of its domestic counterpart, mediates state behavior, helping promote peace, human rights, and other progressive social agendas. Ku further shows how the particular way international law has evolved imbued it with a dynamism that enables it to respond to stakeholder needs and continue to, as she puts it, to “address the wellbeing and safety of individuals, provide order for the collective political and economic interests of states, and facilitate increased levels of cross-border/transnational activity.” Crucially, Ku demonstrates how the kind of global governance that we had in the past—the strictly interstate system of the post-Westphalian era—has generated forms of international law that have also fundamentally changed that system into the multivariate incarnation of today.

In tandem, Murphy and Ku show how incremental developments in forms of regulation at multiple levels—movements in which international organizations have played key roles—have been major drivers in establishing today’s complex system of global governance. In Chapter 3, Barnett and Duvall add power to the mix by exploring how international organizations can act simultaneously to reinforce existing power relations among member states, as well as to help diffuse power among state and non-state actors. Their chapter “International organizations and the diffusion of power” explores how institutions enable power to be used, and how they can act as progressive forces mediating the capacity of powerful states and elites. Barnett and Duvall lay the groundwork for the exploration of the various theoretical approaches to IO and global governance discussed in the following part of the book by showing how power is understood by each of the schools of thought that are covered.

Chapter 4, “The diffusion of authority,” is an elaboration by Eva-Maria Nag on the chapter in the previous edition written by her late partner, David Held. Together Held and Nag develop the “back stories” to international organization and global governance; they thus aim to reflect not just “international organization” (the first half of this book’s title) but also a range of transnational and other actors active in shaping the way that the world is currently governed, or “global governance” (the second half of the title). Yet, for all the diffusion and positive elements that it has brought—particularly in constraining the capacity of states to exercise power in illegitimate ways—Held and Nag’s argument resembles that of Barnett and Duvall. Even in a complex multilayered, multi-sector, and multi-actor system of global governance, state sovereignty remains a stumbling block to the realization of many agendas. In examining nuclear proliferation, climate change, and COVID-19, they articulate the urgent need to improve the tools for global policymaking and action if these dangers are to be overcome and peace and stability are to become more widespread in the decades ahead.

In Chapter 5, Sell asks that question that is so often missing from debates about the way the world is organized, “Who governs the globe?” Set against an account of the development of the international organization and global governance literatures, she illuminates those agents able to exercise power across borders, set agendas, influence policy, establish rules, implement programs, and evaluate and adjudicate outcomes. Importantly, she notes, despite the range of agents involved in the governance of world affairs, and the vast capabilities of some, none governs alone. While scholars have begun to come to grips with this reality, major and minor powers alike continue to ignore this basic fact. Moreover, the means to determine representation, accountability, and legitimacy are not straightforward. In particular, Sell argues persuasively that all approaches to global governance must begin to reflect better the lives of the governed and not merely the interests of the governors.

Where to now?

All the chapters in this part are essential reading to enable a better grip on the origins of, key aspects within, and principal questions pertaining to contemporary international organization and global governance. For extensive investigations

into the shape of the current global order, none is dispensable. For time-pressured introductions on international organization alone, Ku, and Barnett and Duvall are prerequisites. More wide-ranging engagements with global governance should begin with Murphy and then explore Held and Nag, and Sell. After this part, readers can turn to the main theoretical traditions in the field that are surveyed in the next part of the book.

CONTENTS

■ Global governance before the Great War	24
■ The UN era	26
■ Late twentieth-century crises and “global governance”	29
■ What the phrase denotes	31
■ Conclusion	33

The emergence of global governance

Craig N. Murphy

Most things exist long before they are named. So it is with global governance. A century ago, before World War I, the globe was already governed by a thin network of public and private international organizations linking the industrial core countries of the main European empires that had so recently succeeded in conquering and divvying up the entire world. The organizations served a small but crucial part of the new imperial economies: their fundamentally new industries—electrical power, pharmaceuticals, and various new consumer products—were the economic engines of the second Industrial Revolution.

This particular moment in the globalization of industrial capitalism ended with the Great War, the inter-war depression, and the war’s more horrible successor. Yet even throughout that dark 30-year period, activists and statesmen tried to form new international institutions that could rebuild the pre-war global economy on a more secure, more peaceful foundation. The League of Nations failed, but its experiment with enlarging international peace was more successfully replicated in the United Nations, the center of a new global system of public and private organizations that also helped foster the second age of rapid economic transformation—the automobile and jet age of economic growth from the 1940s to the 1970s.

By the mid-1990s, this mid-twentieth century world economy was changing once again, in part because China and the former socialist bloc countries were clamoring for deeper integration into the international economy and in part because this dominant and Western-centered economy had been stagnant for 20 years even while it was being transformed by revolutions in global communications, transportation, and trade—transformations that mid-twentieth-century international institutions had fostered but were unable to control. It was in this context of a global manufacturing

economy emerging outside the confines of existing international regulations that the phrase “global governance” was first heard. The phrase referred to something that existed, yet something that needed to be reformed, something that demanded as much creative attention of the world’s leaders as their predecessors had devoted to the inter-imperial institutions that they built in the 1880s and 1890s and to the UN system in the 1940s.

The unsolved problems of global governance that existed when the term was first used are still with us. They define a large part of the field that this volume addresses. A related second large part of the field is connected to what global governance has done so successfully: fostering the internationalization (now, the globalization) of industrial capitalism. This chapter describes the nineteenth-century origins of global governance and the later rise of the UN system. It then outlines the more recent crises that led to the development of the term “global governance,” identifies the most fruitful ways the term has been used by activists and scholars and concludes with some questions to keep in mind when studying and reflecting on global governance.

Global governance before the Great War

Looking back to the world before World War I at the time of the 1929 Wall Street crash, a young American economist, Robert Brady, wrote about the consequences of the late nineteenth-century expansion of Japan, the United States, and at least eight European powers:

All of these are, of course, matters of common knowledge to any schoolboy. But their significance lies in this—for the first time in many centuries, the known world was politically organized into definite imperial states whose political, military, and naval power depended directly upon their respective industrial resources. The greatest market areas in human history were open for exploitation. Science, invention, and the machine process had made mineral and chemical resources the key to power and placed the wellbeing of the peoples within national/[imperial] borders. In other words, the world was organized on the basis of mass markets, mass production, and mass distribution. In the task of exploiting the resources of national and dependent territories, of refining, transporting, fabricating, and distributing products, machine technology played a dominant role.¹

The part of the world where the machines were made, where most of the machines lay, and where the overwhelming bulk of the trade in industrial goods took place was held together by the strong but thin threads of international institutions: the score or so public international unions and the hundreds of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) created in the last third of the nineteenth century.

The public international unions linked together the communication and transportation systems of separate empires (the International Telegraph Union was established in 1865 and the International Railway Congress Association in 1885). They established necessary industrial standards and inter-imperial rules governing intellectual

property (the International Bureau of Weights and Measure was established in 1875 and the International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property in 1893). They also administered aspects of the inter-imperial monetary system and helped maintain rules of trade (the Latin Monetary Union was established in 1865 and the Brussels Tariff Union in 1890). Of course, the Bank of England and the British government (the putative nineteenth-century hegemonic power) played central roles in these aspects of early global governance, too.

In addition, a few international organizations supported large groups within the industrial core of the inter-imperial world that were likely to be harmed by the growing trade in industrial products fostered by the other public international unions. The International Association for Labour Legislation, established in 1889, attempted to end the race to the bottom in wages and labor standards that had begun when low-wage newly industrialized countries entered the inter-imperial trading system, a system of relatively free trade in industrial goods. Today it may seem ironic that the major concern was the relative poverty of workers in places like Norway and Sweden. The International Institute of Agriculture was established in 1905 and aimed to redress the information imbalance between, on the one hand, shippers and agricultural cartels, who had a great deal of knowledge about both agricultural supply and demand, and, on the other hand, small European and American farmers, who had little knowledge of either.

The Labour Association, which began as a cooperative project of labor unions and concerned citizens, is typical of global governance in the inter-imperial world: some of it was done by private international NGOs. This was especially true when it came to creating essential measurement and interoperability standards for the new industries of the Second Industrial Revolution. Late nineteenth-century international conferences of scientists and engineers reached an agreement on common chemical and electrical units and measurement systems. Electrical engineers established their major industrial standard-setting body, the International Electrotechnical Commission, in 1906. Chemists and chemical engineers created the predecessor of today's International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry in 1911, institutionalizing a chemical standards regime that they had established in 1892.

NGOs and the international social movements that they helped institutionalize played an additional important role by broadly championing the internationalization of the economy that the public international unions would secure. The Free Trade Movement—which included working-class consumers and homemakers throughout the industrialized world as well as the more often remembered manufacturers who benefited from lower tariffs—gave many governments the political will to extend the most-favored-nation trading system that was pioneered by Britain and France in 1860. The Red Cross Movement, the International Labor Movement, International Law Movement, and Peace Movement all worked for progressive social measures that directly helped secure the newly internationalized economic order.

They and other international social movement organizations also helped secure the new economy indirectly by promoting “internationalism” in general. In case after case, international NGOs used the political space created by the unions to argue that it was only right for similar forms of international cooperation to be tried in the various social fields as well.

The UN era

Akira Iriye, the eminent global historian, writes about how the pre-war experience of international NGOs began to shape the world that the US government tried to create first through the League of Nations and then through the UN:

In a book published during the [first] war, Mary Follett, an American political scientist, wrote that “association is the impulse, the core of our being,” and since “the creative characteristic of war is doing things together,” it was imperative to “begin to do things together in peace” through the efforts of people united not by herd instinct but by group conviction.

Iriye argues that Follett

may well have had in mind the American Friends Service Committee and other organizations established during the war when she noted, “... the modern hero goes out to disarm his enemy through creating a mutual understanding.” The American Century was beginning to be defined... through the spread of NGOs, both domestic and international.²

In 1933, Robert Brady wrote that the new associations—whether made up of engineers, workers, or social reformers—all looked forward to a world economy of the greatest possible engineering efficiency: the production of the greatest number of useful goods with the least waste of resources and labor. Such an economy required regulation, *global* regulation, because “*national* regulation is largely, and in some cases, completely ineffective in the modern world.”³

Yet, ironically, Brady argued, the desire to achieve the greatest possible engineering efficiencies initially only gained ground as part of a struggle to create ever more efficient *national* economies, a struggle initiated by the shortsightedness of the Treaty of Versailles:

The reparation debts to be paid by Germany to the Allies... called for an export value surplus, which Germany could achieve only by underselling its commercial rivals—Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. These countries, the future recipients of the reparations, in order to protect their own disorganized industries and markets, imposed tariff barriers against the flood of cheap German goods. Needless to say, this action necessitated still cheaper production in Germany in order that its goods might climb over the tariff walls.... Meanwhile, international competition took the form of concerted national movements to regain markets formerly held and to keep present markets by producing cheaply at home—and, under large-scale industry, that means by realizing the economies of mass production by rigid standardization and simplification.... The rapid growth of trade associations and industrial mergers in this country [the United States] and the renewal of the cartel movement in Europe, made possible standardization and simplification throughout entire industries.⁴

Long before European butchery resumed in 1939, mixed economies of capitalist enterprises regulated by private associations and the state to achieve engineering efficiencies existed throughout the industrialized world. The exception was the Soviet Union, where the state attempted to follow a more thoroughgoing form of planning directed toward the same end.

As World War II wound down, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration remained committed to creating the foundation of world peace on which a *global* system of regulation could ensure the prosperity that could come from the production of the greatest number of useful goods with the least waste of resources and labor. The administration's chosen instrument for achieving this end was the wartime alliance, which Roosevelt had named "the United Nations." The allies reconfigured the world organization into the peace-maintaining instrument of the Security Council supplemented by a universal membership General Assembly, which was given light oversight over the central administration (the Secretariat), and a smaller Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with similarly light oversight over a system of relatively autonomous UN specialized agencies, most of which were direct descendants of the public international unions. A few new ones—the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and a stillborn International Trade Organization (ITO) that generated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—were designed to play critical roles in the new post-war world economy.

The Security Council was a substantial innovation in global governance. Recent research, however, suggests that the UN system has contributed more through peace-making between adversaries (especially before they engage in all-out war) through peacekeeping and through peacebuilding via the work of the UN development system. Joshua Goldstein's book that documents this impact, *Winning the War on War*, also points to the post-war role of the international peace movement and of its close allies in international peace research. Above the title on the cover of the book's paperback edition, celebrated psychologist Steven Pinker writes, "The greatest untold story of the last two decades."⁵ It is certain, although the story really begins in 1946 when the post-war UN first opened shop.

Beyond contributing to this foundation of peace, the UN system has played roles similar to those that the public international unions played before World War I: supporting the communication and transportation infrastructures that link the world economy, maintaining global rules governing intellectual property, working with the complex system of standard-setting bodies united under the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), established in 1946 to maintain necessary industrial standards and to establish them in the new industries of the post-war automobile and jet age. It worked with key national governments and private international associations to support and regulate the global monetary and financial system, and maintain the rules for international trade.

When it came to supporting groups that could have been harmed by a growing international industrial economy, the post-war global governance system included fundamentally new activities and practices. Labor was in part protected by standards established by the International Labour Organization (ILO, the UN's first specialized agency and the continuation of the organization with the same name from the League

of Nations, and successor to the nineteenth-century International Association of Labour Legislation). However, the more important protections for workers and farmers through the non-communist industrialized world came from formal and informal agreements among Western powers to protect their growing welfare states and the domestic class compromises on which they were based. As the levelheaded international political economist and sometimes senior UN official John G. Ruggie has long argued, the post-war international economic order involved embedding a system of increasingly free trade in industrialized goods within a larger set of social norms. The GATT actually protected Western and Japanese farmers *from* international *laissez faire* by keeping their products off the negotiating table and by facilitating a host of other domestic social policies throughout the industrialized world.⁶

The other great innovation came in the way that the UN system treated the less industrialized peripheries of the pre-war empires, the peoples of what was first known as the “Third World” and now the “Global South.” People there, just like farmers in the industrialized world, had reason to fear a more deeply integrated but unregulated global capitalist economy. The post-war system did not give the Global South the prosperity of the growing industrial economies of the North or the protections offered to farmers and industrial workers there, far from it. The GATT provided no exception (implicit or explicit) for the agricultural products of the Global South and parts of the UN system (especially the IMF and the World Bank) were always ready to oppose new welfare policies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, or the Caribbean. Nevertheless, the UN system *did* provide significant support for decolonization and a limited form of economic development: something short of catch-up with the industrialized world.

Support for decolonization began as early as 1946 and increased as the former colonial majority of the UN grew. From its beginning, the world organization provided technical assistance and humanitarian support that has strengthened state institutions in every part of the developing world. In fact, since the 1970s, the vast majority of the UN system’s staff and resources have been devoted to its country offices throughout the Global South. From the point of view of staff time and expenditures, the “UN system” and the “UN development system” are both service providers that operate in the developing world, and both are quite different from the image of the UN gleaned by observing the goings on in the multilateral talking shops in New York and Geneva.⁷

Of course, the system’s role as an interlocking set of ongoing conversations matters a great deal; and just as in pre-war public international unions, some of the most important talking has always been done by NGOs, especially social movement organizations pushing for global attention to social and environmental issues. The relatively constant post-war expansion of international human rights law and the UN system’s human rights activities reflects the long-standing process of NGOs using the political space created by organizations that promote the internationalization of the economy to demand international cooperation in other fields as well.

The UN’s environmental work differs only slightly. The global environmental harms that have been the focus of the UN’s environmental conferences, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), and the environmental assistance provided by the UNDP and the World Bank are all consequences of the type of economy that global governance always fostered.

Late twentieth-century crises and “global governance”

The environmental agenda became a permanent part of the UN’s work with the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, where governments affirmed 26 principles. Over half were concerned with adding support for national environmental problems to the agenda of the UN development system. Six referred to the degradation of parts of the global commons. Included were specific references to biological diversity (“wildlife” in the outdated and imprecise terms of the day) and the oceans. The remaining items included a “polluter pays” principle and support for more environmental education and research to be undertaken by international organizations.⁸ In keeping with this declaration, the main result of the Stockholm conference was a UN system committed to aiding developing countries with *all* their environmental problems, and to studying and proposing ways to deal with those *few* environmental problems of a truly global nature. Those problems, especially the consequences of pollution of the atmosphere, along with species depletion and pollution of the oceans, became the first of four long-term crises of international governance.

The second crisis emerged at almost the same time. With their proposals for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), governments of developing countries began demanding that global economic governance be reformed to ensure that their countries actually caught up with the industrialized world. Some governments hoped to achieve this through a kind of general strike by raw materials producers. When Arab oil producers successfully carried out a producers’ strike against the United States and some Western European countries as part of Arab strategy in the 1973 war against Israel, many in the North saw that action and the subsequent worldwide recession as causing the end of the long period of post-war growth. While that conclusion may be unfounded, the crisis in North–South relations certainly has continued throughout the decades of relatively slow growth in Western economies that started in the 1970s.

At the beginning of that era, first the United Kingdom, then the United States, and then many other Western countries turned away from welfare-oriented policies based on constant increases in productivity (ever greater engineering efficiency), to *laissez faire*-oriented policies of limited government and reliance on the market to lower the prices of labor and raw materials. To use the words of Thorstein Veblen, the economist who had inspired the young Robert Brady, governments and business elites stopped relying on the efficiencies provided by “the engineers” to ensure prosperity; they turned instead to “the price system”—in the same way that Veblen described their predecessors as having done after World War I,⁹ and with similar results. The fact that the economic policies of the 1980s onward led to greater income inequality and income stagnation for most wage earners in the industrialized world created the third long crisis. Income inequality across countries also increased as lenders (especially the IMF and World Bank) imposed the new Western economic orthodoxy on much of the developing world.

Many early analyses of this economic shift overlooked the degree to which a further internationalization of industrial capitalism underlay the observed crisis—a further internationalization supported by revolutions in communication, transportation, and industrial standards that had been fostered by global governance in the

UN era. The latest communication revolution began with the fantastic increase in available bandwidth for intercontinental messages provided by early communication satellites. In the first year that we had such a satellite, 1962, it carried about 400 such messages. Today, every person who reads this book probably uses more intercontinental bandwidth every week; one needs only to think of the sources of the internet pages that people typically access, and how frequently they do so. A major source of all that bandwidth is the satellites maintained by Intelsat, a hybrid organization whose original members included both governments and private companies. Similarly, consider the clothes people today typically wear and the objects they have around them; most of these things travel great distances before they get to the people who use them, something that would not have been possible 40 years ago. This is a consequence of the global manufacturing economy, a precondition for which was the tremendous reduction in intercontinental shipping costs that came with containerized shipping, which only took off after the ISO established a shipping container standard in 1968.¹⁰ Of course, a second key element in the making of the contemporary world was China's initially cautious entry into the global economy beginning in 1978, something facilitated by UN technical assistance.¹¹

With the fall of the socialist bloc regimes of Eastern Europe a decade later, the UN system faced a fourth crisis: the massive increase in demands for peacemaking and peacekeeping services in conflicts that became resolvable because the sides were no longer supported by competing superpowers (as in Central America and Southern Africa) and those that flared up because the control imposed by the Cold War balance of forces was lifted (as in the Caucasus and the former Yugoslavia).

The end of the Cold War also provided new opportunities for global governance. The promoters of the more integrated global manufacturing economy—especially major companies and the US government—used the opening provided by the evaporation of the major alternative to global capitalism to promote stronger rules for liberalizing international trade and investment. The vehicles were through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and for increasing the power of owners of patents and copyright through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs). Of course, the critics of a more powerful, less-regulated global capitalism saw in these developments a deepening of the third crisis, the turn away from welfare-oriented economic policies to a kind of liberal fundamentalism that increased inequality. In Ruggie's terms, by the early 1990s, the challenge of embedding global markets in a system of larger social norms had become much greater than ever before.

It was in the context of these four crises that an independent commission supported by the UN secretary-general and chaired by then Swedish prime minister Ingvar Carlsson and former Commonwealth secretary-general Shridath Ramphal coined the current usage of the term "global governance." The 1995 report of the self-named "Global Governance Commission" proposed reforms in international institutions and some national policies to: address global environmental problems; respond to the demands of developing countries for a more equitable and less hypocritical global economic order; restart a global industrial economy focused on real increases in productivity and strong commitments to sharing the benefits of growth; and strengthen the UN system to deal with all the new demands for its peacekeeping

and humanitarian services.¹² In the same year, the Academic Council on the UN System launched a new journal called *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*. In 1999, the fifth year that the phrase was used, Google Scholar reports that there were over 1,000 articles and books published that used it. Twelve years later, there were about ten times that number, about the same number that used “international security,” and more than twice the number that refer to “international political economy.” The use of “global governance” continues to grow faster than that of either of these other terms.

What the phrase denotes

Obviously, scholars have found “global governance” to be a useful term, but perhaps activists have found it even more useful. If Google Scholar gives us about 16,000 new citations to “global governance” in the last year, Google *per se* gives us 160,000, most of them from advocacy organizations or individuals who want to change some aspect of the way the world is governed. The term is used in a multitude of different, if related, ways across these many thousands of sources. It may be helpful to close this opening chapter to the subject by suggesting that the most fruitful use of the term has been contributing to our understanding of how the world works and what we might do to change that.

In that context, any definition that pulls us toward treating global governance as “all kinds of governance, everywhere” should probably be avoided because such definitions (and they exist) give us little opportunity to say anything that we could not say just by referring to “governance.” “*Global governance*” more reasonably refers to a kind of governance—or at least, to attempts to establish governance—at a particular level.

Miles Kahler has observed that some of the most useful literature on global governance seems to embed within it a preference for “subsidiarity,” an idea that collective problems are best solved at the lowest level at which they can be solved. Therefore, the best form of global governance would be limited to collective problems that could not be solved by organizations at any lower level, for example by national governments (individually or in coalition) or by international professional associations and the like.¹³ Kishore Mahbubani, a founder of one of the first public policy graduate programs that focuses on global governance, expressed this view when he wrote:

Mao Zedong was right. We should always focus on the primary, not secondary, contradictions. And right now, our primary global contradiction is painfully obvious: the biggest challenges of governance are global in origin, but all the politics that respond to them are local. There are many wise leaders around the world, but there is not enough global leadership.¹⁴

Arguably, we can still point to some successful forms of governance at the global level; we can, for example, point to the decreasing frequency and violence of war

that Goldstein attributes to the governance provided by the UN and the peace and peace research movements. At the same time, we must recognize, as the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine reminded us, that the global problem of controlling war and aggression by the nuclear powers is far from solved. Mutual Assured Destruction (with the appropriate acronym of MAD) may keep the nuclear giants from destroying each other, but it does not protect the vast majority of the world's people from their armies.

Perhaps better examples of successful governance include the diminishing frequency and intensity of famine due to the work of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the diminishing lethality of infectious diseases, even pandemics, something that the horror of COVID-19 may make us forget. The comparably virulent flu epidemic global flu epidemic of 1918–1920 killed between 25 and 50 million people out of the world population of less than two billion. At the end of the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic, worldwide deaths were six million out of a population of eight billion. The difference had to do with advances in science, and with the global pandemic governance system that had been created over the previous century. This system, with all of its failures, reflected a practical form of subsidiarity in which a global-level push for vaccinations and the sharing of knowledge combined with national and local policies to monitor, control the disease's spread, and get the shots in arms.

Even if we embrace the desirability of subsidiarity, we need to recognize that organizations or coalitions often try to exercise governance at a global level, even if it is unwarranted. The contrarian Andrew M. Scott was deeply convinced that all the attempts to increase the world's many channels of communication, lower the costs of travel and transportation, and otherwise facilitate trade and interaction did more harm than good. From Scott's point of view, the ISO, the WTO, TRIPs, TRIMs, and the ICAO are all global governance, but they *create* global problems rather than solve them.¹⁵

It may be worthwhile remaining agnostic about that point, but there is less reason to be agnostic about Scott's (or Mahbubani's) conclusion about industrial capitalism and economic globalization. They are fostered by the standards and controls exercised by the governments and organizations promoting an unregulated liberal world economy, and they create global problems that are dealt with by relatively ineffective structures of global governance. The late Susan Strange, one of the founders of the field of International Political Economy and someone suspicious of the notion of global governance, in her last article, "The Westfailure System," pointed to three global problems of this sort, problems about which both Mahbubani and Scott would agree: the limited number of truly global environmental problems created by two centuries of industrial economies in a world in which no one has effective responsibility for maintaining the various global commons; the regular recurrence of international financial crises created by the vested interest of most of the relevant actors in maintaining geographic spaces in which the main rules do not apply; and persistent and sometimes growing inequalities across classes and regions, a problem of capitalism at all levels, but one that becomes increasingly global as economies become more integrated.¹⁶

Strange relates these three core global problems to another small set of problems that some analysts might want to consider separately: pandemics such as HIV/AIDS

(which during Strange’s lifetime was the subject of global governance as ineffective as that now directed toward climate change); transnational organized crime (TOC) and the particular fields in which it tends to operate (drugs, human trafficking, and the arms trade); and the connected problem of internationalized terrorism (made possible by unregulated global finance and the arms trade). Scholars and policymakers might want to add to this list. For example, in thinking about the sources of the power of TOC, the persistence of the unregulated arms trade, and problems created by dictators and warlords, we need to add a global tendency to overvalue the military. Nevertheless, the number of such issues will still be small.

Even when we add all the fields in which there is some kind of global governance that is not needed—such as in encouraging economic globalization—the entire field of “global governance” is not a large one. However, it is of great significance.

Conclusion

If the approach to global governance suggested here is appealing, it would be worthwhile to ask of anything written on the subject, including the chapters in this volume: “Is this a field in which there should be global governance? Is it a field in which problems exist at a global level that cannot be solved at any other level? If not, and if some kind of system of global governance does exist or is being attempted, then why is that the case? Who is being served by this unnecessary global governance, how and why has this happened, and is there anything that can be done about it?” If it is a field in which there should be effective global governance, but none exists, it is necessary to ask: “Why not? Who is being served by this lack of governance, why and how has this happened, and is there anything that can be done about it?”

After all, whether or not global governance, in itself, exists (as this chapter argues that it has for more than a century), the concept of “global governance” exists. And it does so for a particular purpose: to help us think critically about problems that humanity (and even the whole planet) shares that cannot be solved by individuals, families, private organizations, states, or traditional international relations alone.

Additional reading

- 1 Daniel Deudney, “The Great Descent: ‘Global Governance’ in Historical and Theoretical Perspective,” in *Why Govern? Rethinking Demand and Progress in Global Governance*, ed. Amitav Acharya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 31–54.
- 2 Douglas R. Howland, “An Alternative Mode of International Order: The International Administrative Union in the Nineteenth Century,” *Review of International Studies* 41, no. 2 (2014): 161–183.
- 3 Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York: Penguin, 2012).
- 4 Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).
- 5 Dan Plesch, *America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged Peace* (London: IB Tauris, 2011).

- 6 Dan Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., *Wartime Origins and the Future United Nations* (London: Routledge, 2015).
- 7 Bob Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 2009).
- 8 Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
- 9 Thomas G. Weiss, *Global Governance: What? Why? Whither?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).

Notes

- 1 Robert A. Brady, *Industrial Standardization* (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1929), 8.
- 2 Akira Iriye, “A Century of NGOs,” *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 3 (1999): 425–426, quoting Mary Parker Follett, *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government* (New York: Longmans, Green), 193–195.
- 3 Robert A. Brady, *The Rationalization Movement in German Industry: A Study in the Evolution of Economic Planning* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1933), 395.
- 4 Brady, *Industrial Standardization*, 14.
- 5 Steven Pinker on the cover of Joshua S. Goldstein, *Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide* (New York: Plume [Penguin], 2012).
- 6 One of the best assessments of the continuing value of Ruggie’s analysis is Andrew T. F. Lang, “Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of International Trade,” in *Embedding Global Markets: An Enduring Challenge*, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 13–45.
- 7 Two recent empirical studies of these roles are Craig N. Murphy, *The UN Development Programme: A Better Way?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Stephen Browne, *UN Development Programme and System* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). Murphy’s “Foreword” to Browne’s book, xix–xx, provides the data for the assertion about UN system staff and expenditures.
- 8 “Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,” 15 June 1972, <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503>.
- 9 Thorstein Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1921).
- 10 A clear introduction to Intelsat’s organizational history and impact is Patricia McCormick, “The Privatization of Intelsat: The Transition of an Intergovernmental Organization to Private Equity Ownership,” in *Telecommunications Research Trends*, ed. Hans F. Erlich and Ernst P. Lehrmann (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008), 45–74. On containerized shipping, see Marc Levinson, *The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
- 11 Murphy, *The UN Development Programme*, 177–181.
- 12 Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- 13 Miles Kahler, “Global Governance Redefined,” in *Challenges of Globalization: Immigration, Social Welfare, Global Governance*, ed. A. C. Sobel (London: Routledge, 2009), 174–198.
- 14 Kishore Mahbubani, “The Problem with Presidents,” *Newsweek*, 30 August 2010.
- 15 Andrew M. Scott, *The Dynamics of Interdependence* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
- 16 Susan Strange, “The Westfailure System,” *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 3 (1999): 345–354.

CONTENTS

■ The status of international law today	36
■ Authoritative decision-making	37
■ International law and the global political environment	40
■ Conclusion	41

The evolution of international law

Charlotte Ku

International law derives its authority, legitimacy, and effectiveness from the norms, processes, and institutions that comprise the international legal system. International law is implemented and given effect by the system's stakeholders who created the system and make the law—a self-enforcing characteristic that is often regarded as a weakness. In reality, it provides international law the opportunity to evolve in response to changing needs and values.

Historically, Westphalian international law reflected the interests and values of states undertaking obligations through an expression of state consent. The enforcement of those obligations was based on self-help, with reciprocity serving as both carrot and stick. Disputes might be referred for a peaceful resolution to a fellow sovereign or mutually acceptable third party like the pope, but an allegedly injured state was free to retaliate with force—if it had the capability to do so. Within its territory, the rulers of a state governed as they deemed appropriate; but the mobility and industrialization of the nineteenth century changed this by greatly increasing cross-border interactions of both governments and their citizens.

In response, states created international organizations (IOs) in the twentieth century to enhance their ability to pursue their interests and carry out expanded responsibilities in the new transnational environment. The role of international organizations (IOs) in shaping the post–World War II liberal international order, now under attack, has negatively impacted attitudes toward international law. Although international law and IOs are closely related, the former stands on its own as a legal system and can provide applicable rules and guidance for governance in a multipolar and divided twenty-first-century world—as it did before the twentieth century.

As an institution and factor in international relations, international law predated both IOs and global governance. This chapter shows that it played a crucial role in the development of both by elaborating the scope of state responsibility; recognizing individual human dignity and responsibility; and defining pathways to fulfill international obligations. Having met these needs for a century, however, international law today struggles in a global political environment in which its impact on international behavior and its coherence and authority as a legal system are challenged. Because international law has not yet responded to the global reality of multilevel, multisector stakeholders, sources of authority, and capacity, it has under-utilized those elements in the making and implementation of international obligations.

The status of international law today

The development, implementation, and evaluation of international law occur in multiple transactions in numerous locations and settings. One study found 82,000 publicized international agreements and as many as 100,000 additional interstate agreements in force.¹ There are also numerous “atypical” instruments, including: multilateral frameworks and general declaratory instruments in treaty form; soft law in non-treaty form, like codes of conduct, guidelines, and statements of principles; memoranda of understanding and other informal implementation instruments; political accords; the implementation activities of nongovernmental organizations; UN General Assembly resolutions of a lawmaking quality; UN Security Council resolutions; resolutions of other IOs with lawmaking capacity; and declarations of intergovernmental conferences.²

To this list, we can add statements of standards and practices agreed upon by states, IOs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other non-state actors like corporations. Not all these agreements and actions are of equal importance, but the overall volume of activity generated by treaty and non-treaty forms of international cooperation is significant. It has contributed to developing the capacity of international law to function, but in its volume, it has also created confusion as to the legitimacy and authority of these varying forms of agreement.³

In all lawmaking, competing values and approaches vie for adoption as a prevailing norm. These values and approaches affect state practice that gives rise to customary international law, as well as the negotiation of a treaty or other form of agreement. A customary law rule requires that,

State practice, including that of States whose interests are directly affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform... and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.⁴

The same criteria apply to any claimed exception to general practice. In the *Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway, 1951)*, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled:

that the method of straight baselines [as differing from the general practice of following the contours and indentations of the coastline], established in the Norwegian system,... had been consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the attitude of governments bears witness to the fact that they did not consider it to be contrary to international law.⁵

The opportunity to express consent and to see mutual recognition of obligations is key to the binding character of international agreements, but formal agreement is only one mode of regulating the performance and behavior of states. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for example, was a political statement rather than a legal instrument; but its system of follow-up conferences provided the opportunity for political activism and transnational networking by human rights NGOs in the Warsaw Pact countries that contributed to the end of the Cold War.⁶ The existence of institutional frameworks—international and domestic, public and private—available to carry out international obligations is part of international lawmaking today. ICJ Judge Rosalyn Higgins described international law as “a continuing process of authoritative decisions.”⁷ It is important to ask where and when such decisions are made and by whom.

Authoritative decision-making

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia that concluded Europe’s Thirty Years War has provided the foundation for authoritative international law decision-making for over 375 years. It established an international order based on a multiplicity of sovereign states with responsibilities to each other and, eventually, to the people and resources they governed. In the nearly four centuries since, both the breadth and depth of those responsibilities and the modes of discharging them have undergone substantial change. Although states remain sovereign within their territories, they have come to accept levels of outside scrutiny and intrusion that were unthinkable a century ago.⁸ The legitimacy of certain actions, like decisions to use military force, is increasingly judged based on consistency with international standards, practices, and policies.⁹ The requirement for some form of collective authorization of any use of force, although still under challenge, was non-existent in 1900.

There is an increased emphasis on performance as a basis for government legitimacy. Individuals are more vocal in their demands of governments and other institutions, and they use technology to create networks with like-minded individuals to pursue their agendas.¹⁰ The state is no longer the only broker of power and interests, but it has proven its capacity to adapt to the changing needs of domestic and international governance. International law has provided it with the means to do so.

One manifestation of states’ adaptability is their creation of IOs to enhance governments’ capacity to provide for the well-being of their citizens, stewardship of resources, and global economic development. The sovereign state triumphed in the seventeenth century because it best served the organizing needs of the time. It

had the financial and political resources needed to fund military forces and advance elites' interests. State leaders undertook to mutually empower other entities that most closely resembled their own, squeezing out alternative forms of governance over time. International law expressed and validated a state's capacity to control people and territory and to carry out international obligations.

In contemporary terms, mutual empowerment of the state took place in the 1950s and 1960s with the concerted efforts of newly independent states in the United Nations to end colonialism. These states worked assiduously in the General Assembly to maintain a focus on decolonization and to vilify and shun states that failed to conform.¹¹ UN General Assembly resolutions and ICJ advisory opinions eventually led to the end of South African control over South West Africa (originally a League of Nations mandate), the abandonment of white-minority rule and apartheid in South Africa, and the independence of Namibia in 1990.

That a forum like the UN was available to new states to pursue their decolonization agenda shows how a structure created by states under classical Westphalian international law facilitated the pursuit of new substantive norms. IOs originally intended to help states meet their own objectives and developed independent capacities, including secretariats and other derivative organizations or emanations. With each such step, a new dynamic and potentially a new actor enters the international system, bringing to it new capacity, but also competing interests that complicate the political and international legal environments. As José Alvarez wrote, "[t]he age of global compacts is not coincidentally the age of IOs."¹² There are now multiple treaty-making venues that determine the scope and content of an agreement. State power is altered in these settings, with smaller states and NGOs able to wield disproportionate influence. For example, a UN General Assembly initiative by Trinidad and Tobago to create an international criminal court eventually led to the conclusion of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July 1998.¹³

Adding complexity to the current normative environment is the growing body of international law created by IOs themselves. The 1948 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the *Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations* was a milestone because it recognized that the UN possessed sufficient international legal personality to pursue a claim against a state for harm done to a UN agent.¹⁴ As the UN has become more operational, it has found itself incurring legal responsibility and liability while struggling with its inherent lack of capacity to discharge legal obligations in the same way that states do.¹⁵ This lack of capacity delayed until 1999 the UN's formal adherence to international humanitarian law for its operations.¹⁶ The UN has also legislated state behavior, as in the 2001 UN Security Council resolution 1373, directing all states to take action against the financing of terrorism and terrorist activities.

IOs play a direct role in treaty and lawmaking. To create a common legal framework for countries otherwise lacking laws or processes in areas like cross-border insolvency or secured transactions, intergovernmental bodies like the UN Conference on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or private ones like the Hague Conference on Private International Law draft model laws representing the best or most widely accepted practices around the world.¹⁷ These model laws offer states a suite of resources, including interpretive guides and compilations of case law, to assist in

the adoption and implementation of domestic legislation. They may also privilege the interests and practices of early and dominant players in these legal frameworks.

An IO that fosters tighter harmonization and potential dominance of the global economy is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Its 38 members, among the world's largest economies, must provide detailed reviews of national practices prior to joining to determine their compatibility with OECD standards.¹⁸ In 2017, the organization moved beyond its member states to encourage uniformity in the tax area by adopting the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty-Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (MLI). This novel treaty superimposed its terms over existing bilateral treaties for parties accepting the MLI. Its purpose is to “sav[e] jurisdictions from the burden of bilaterally re-negotiating these treaties”¹⁹ and to harmonize the terms of more than 3,000 bilateral tax treaties in force around the world.

The novelty of extending consent to and obligation under one treaty onto other treaties without further action necessitated the issuance of a legal note stating how the agreement functions under public international law:

The MLI is a multilateral treaty which will be applied *alongside existing bilateral tax treaties modifying their application*. In this way, bilateral treaties can be modified in a synchronized and consistent way to swiftly implement the tax treaty-related BEPS [Base Erosion and Profit Sharing] measures.²⁰

Existing treaties of parties to the MLI are effectively amended without review, renegotiation, or specific expression of consent to new terms, although allowances are made for carve-outs for old treaty provisions. Seemingly desirable to promote efficiency, the reach of this single treaty is wide, affecting more than 90 jurisdictions and nearly 1,700 bilateral treaties.²¹ Such assertive behavior by IOs is fueling a backlash against them as the product of elites rooted in the values of a western liberal order. Ironically, there is also a backlash from disadvantaged populations within OECD member countries.²²

The fact that the privilege of self-government now requires states to recognize the responsibility to protect (R2P) populations from mass violence and brutality shows that the development of norms and institutions does not stand still.²³ Once adopted, new norms and practices not only become part of international law, but the modes and processes used to achieve them are also available in other issue areas. The practice of using the infrastructure, staff, and know-how of international organizations to facilitate treaty-making, and the number of multilateral treaties that have now been concluded under the auspices of IOs, have given them a stature and possibly even authority that states did not foresee at their founding. IOs provide an established venue in which to harmonize actions that may eventually have legal effects. Such harmonization supplements state practice and bilateral and multilateral negotiations and treaty-making—the traditional modes of international lawmaking—and creates the secondary rules of recognition that international law is said to lack.²⁴

International law and the global political environment

Today, states are expected to provide for their people, safeguard their environment, and enhance national well-being through productive interactions within their own societies and transnationally. The nature of the issues and the variety of people and institutions that are affected by and crucial to its effective functioning have profoundly changed international law. It is now a dense system of legal interactions with connections to national and subnational institutions, IOs, and a host of private actors. The enhanced role of individuals and private enterprises in the international arena has created a post-Westphalian environment in which the international level encounters the local, private, or individual level without a state or public intermediary.²⁵

These developments create a form of cosmopolitan democracy in which individuals have direct access to international activities and can challenge their own government's actions in court or through institutions like the World Bank Inspection Panels. Individuals have acquired direct international responsibility and can be held accountable for mass violations of human rights, as was Sudan's president Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in Darfur.²⁶

IOs provide publicly accessible venues and copious amounts of information to those interested in participating in the treaty-making process. Representatives of 160 states, 33 IOs, and over 200 NGOs attended the 1998 Rome Conference that completed the Statute of the ICC, as did more than 400 journalists.²⁷ In contrast, a century before, 100 delegates from 24 countries participated in the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. Journalists attended, but had little press access to the delegates, despite great public interest in the proceedings.²⁸ Despite today's openness, access to an IO may require resources not equally available to all. This uneven capacity to participate may unintentionally widen the gap that public access was intended to close and sow further seeds of distrust among segments of the broader public. Populist political forces have exploited this disquiet by fueling nationalist and anti-scientific sentiments.²⁹

Douglas Johnston's overview of international agreement activity included a spectrum of "atypical instruments" that can also be called "soft law," although the term has created controversy because it blurs the distinction between binding and non-binding commitments.³⁰ It includes political instruments like the 1945 Yalta Agreement and the 1975 CSCE Final Act, as well as statements and practices undertaken to supplement or correct a treaty. In 1992, for example, the parties to the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer adopted a non-compliance procedure worked out by a working group established by the 1987 Montreal Protocol to the Convention. Resolutions, declarations, codes of conduct, and guidelines of IOs, including those for World Bank operations, are yet another form of soft law, as are world conference declarations, agendas, programs, and platforms for action.³¹ Norm-making also occurs through "statements of principle from individuals in a nongovernmental capacity, texts prepared by expert groups, the establishment of 'peoples' tribunals, and self-regulating codes of conduct for networks of professional peoples and multinational corporations," such as the MacBride and Sullivan Principles.³²

A growing body of empirical work shows that such informal mechanisms do influence state behavior and therefore the development of international law.³³ Of

further relevance is work showing that, whether the norm is hard or soft, compliance can be achieved if there is a culture that encourages adherence to it. Employing the concept of acculturation advanced by Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, we find that “global- and regional-level institutions systematically influence state-level legal and policy choices.”³⁴ One key factor of influence is common membership in an international organization.³⁵

Though normatively enriching, this complex of venues and approaches raises questions of accountability and legitimacy as the public grapples with compliance requirements and standards of unclear origins. One remedy has been to link soft law practices to hard law at another decision-making level by incorporating international law into private entities regulated principally by domestic law. Transnational corporations adopting codes of practice of corporate social responsibility, for example, commit themselves to adhere to good labor practices, anti-corruption requirements, and environmental protection by complying with domestic law in their worldwide operations.³⁶

States utilize soft international law in areas where they have not yet agreed on hard law, albeit without penalties for non-compliance. An example is the preservation of the world’s forests through the standards of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), formed in 1993 by loggers, foresters, environmentalists, and sociologists. The FSC’s purpose is to provide an international forum for the development of principles and standards to guide “forest management toward sustainable outcomes.” FSC standards are now in use in over 70 countries.³⁷ Such soft law provides states flexibility, as they do not risk creating institutions that turn out to be costly and possibly inappropriate, ineffective, or difficult to adapt or eliminate over time.³⁸ Soft law enables them to work on compliance while developing an understanding of the costs and benefits of eventually entering a formal international agreement.³⁹

In such ways, the present international legal environment provides an opportunity for global actors to seek out the most effective operating capacity, whether national or international. International soft law can draw on hard national institutions to strengthen it, and soft private sector practices might eventually harden into a hard international law instrument like a treaty. This relationship can provide accountability and legitimacy for soft law informal practices through their connection to a hard institution or formal process. The key is that states and other actors continue to look to international law and legal institutions to promote orderly and reliable behavior and to shape the expectations of their citizens and each other.

Conclusion

At the end of the twentieth century, there were 158,000 treaties and agreements and 125 international courts and tribunals, “legal regimes for each and every issue area in foreign policy.”⁴⁰ Has this thickened international legal system led to a more orderly and law-abiding world? The complex of legal tools now available to conduct transnational activity is large, but it has also created opportunities for states to exploit the loopholes created by a multi-layered international legal system. In the wake of 9/11, the United States concluded bilateral treaties with countries

worldwide to set up detention centers where interrogation practices prohibited by domestic US law could be used. Some European countries avoid international obligations for the care of refugees and migrants by turning them away from a country's territorial waters.⁴¹

Despite its universalist aspirations, international law and its tenets may be understood differently depending on where it is practiced, interpreted and taught. The views of some actors are more important than others, even in a world of formal sovereign equality with multiple institutions and processes to enable wider access. There is little novel in recognizing such power disparities; what is novel, however, is the increased number of venues and levels at which these power dynamics now exist.⁴² International legal scholars and practitioners must understand the full legal and normative context in which a norm operates to assess its implications.

Further chipping away at international law's coherence is the sheer number of separate legal regimes functioning as part of the international legal system.⁴³ Authoritative action may now come from multiple sources, including subnational or private entities, leading to a fragmentation of international law as it deals with such multidimensional, multisector, and multilevel issues as sustainable development, environmental protection, and the economic and other well-being of individuals. The ILC described the problem confronting the coherence of international law as follows:

The fragmentation of the international social world has attained legal significance especially as it has been accompanied by the emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice.... The result is conflicts between rules or rule systems, deviating institutional practices and, possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, despite multiple demands and competing lawmaking authorities, international law remains a legal system with its own unique functions and purposes. Its principles and structures, even as they evolve, facilitate international and transnational relations and interactions. The challenge is to ensure that actors at both the international and domestic levels recognize that norms and practices need to be understood in the context of the relationship between international, national, and subnational legal systems. That relationship is less a hierarchical one than it is a symbiotic partnership; these systems interact with each other to transform national norms and local practices into global norms, and vice versa.

IOs exist today because states need to address cross-border issues in an interconnected world. They used international law to create IOs, which, in turn, have increased the capacity of international law to meet its objectives by organizing permanent staffs and venues for legal interaction and ongoing development of norms and standards. These connections and relationships have created more controversy as international norm development and implementation increasingly interact with domestic public and private discourse and decision-making. As they do, states and other international actors will continue to rely on international law's core principles and structures to harness new capacities, manage new challenges, and meet the

ongoing needs of the multifaceted global legal system that international law helped create.

Additional reading

- 1 Karen J. Alter, *The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
- 2 José E. Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-Makers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- 3 Paul F. Diehl and Charlotte Ku, *The Dynamics of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 4 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, *Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- 5 Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, eds., *Transnational Legal Orders* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
- 6 David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
- 7 Charlotte Ku, *International Law, International Relations, and Global Governance* (London: Routledge, 2012).
- 8 Anthea Roberts, *Is International Law International?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
- 9 Charles B. Roger, *The Origins of Informality: Why the Legal Foundations of Global Governance Are Shifting, and Why It Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
- 10 Beth A. Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Notes

- 1 Douglas M. Johnston, *Consent and Commitment in the World Community* (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1997), 8–9.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 25.
- 3 UN International Law Commission, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,” Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN document A/CN.4/L/682, 13 April 2006 (hereafter ILC Fragmentation report).
- 4 ICJ Reports, *North Sea Continental Shelf Cases*, Judgment of 20 February 1969, 75.
- 5 ICJ Reports, *Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway)*, Judgment of 18 December 1951, 27.
- 6 Daniel Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
- 7 Rosalyn Higgins, “Policy Considerations and International Judicial Process,” *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1968): 58–59.
- 8 The US State Department listed 50 separate transactions and reports—often book length—submitted to UN human rights treaty bodies to fulfill a variety of reporting requirements. Universal Periodic Review, <https://www.state.gov/universal-periodic-review/> and US Treaty Reports, <https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/u-s-treaty-reports/>.
- 9 Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson, “Conclusion: Toward a Mixed System of Democratic Accountability,” in *Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law*,

- ed. Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 349–383.
- 10 James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 195.
 - 11 United Nations and Decolonization, <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsqt>
 - 12 José E. Alvarez, “The New Treaty-Makers,” *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 25, no. 2 (2002): 217.
 - 13 Christiane E. Philipp, “The International Criminal Court—A Brief Introduction,” in *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, vol. 7, ed. A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2003), 331–339.
 - 14 ICJ, *Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations* at <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/4>.
 - 15 “UN Sued over Haiti Cholera Epidemic,” *Guardian* 9 October 2013, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/un-sued-haiti-cholera-epidemic>. On sexual abuses committed by UN peacekeepers, see un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56854#.WS4oPy-cHs1.
 - 16 “Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law,” UN document ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, at <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instreet/unobservance1999.pdf>.
 - 17 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), “Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,” https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/cross-border_insolvency or “Model Law on Secured Transactions,” https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/securityinterests/modellaw/secured_transactions.
 - 18 “OECD welcomes Costa Rica as its 38th Member,” <https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-welcomes-costa-rica-as-its-38th-member.htm#:~:text=The%20OECD’s%2038%20members%20are,Norway%2C%20Poland%2C%20Portugal%2%20Slovak>.
 - 19 OECD, “Multilateral Instrument Information Brochure,” May 2020, <https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-instrument-BEPS-tax-treaty-information-brochure.pdf>.
 - 20 OECD, “Legal Note on the Functioning of the MLI under Public International Law,” emphasis added, <https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/legal-note-on-the-functioning-of-the-MLI-under-public-international-law.pdf>.
 - 21 OECD, “MLI Information Brochure,” <https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-instrument-BEPS-tax-treaty-information-brochure.pdf>.
 - 22 Lisa Dellmuth, Jan Aart Scholte, Jonas Tallberg, and Soetkin Verhaegen, “The Elite-Citizen Gap in International Organization Legitimacy,” *American Political Science Review* 116 no. 1 (2022): 283–300; also “Why People Oppose Globalization,” Rutgers Business School (2017), <https://www.business.rutgers.edu/business-insights/why-people-oppose-globalization>.
 - 23 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
 - 24 Jonathan I. Charney, “Universal International Law,” *American Journal of International Law* 87 no. 4 (1993): 547.
 - 25 David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
 - 26 *The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir*, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir>.
 - 27 Alvarez, “The New Treaty-Makers,” 220.
 - 28 Arthur Eyffinger, *The 1899 Hague Peace Conference: The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999).
 - 29 Saskia Brechenmacher and Thomas Carothers, “Examining Civil Society Legitimacy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/02/examining-civil-society-legitimacy-pub-76211>.
 - 30 Dinah Shelton, “Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of Soft Law,” in *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System*, ed. Dinah Shelton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 8.

-
- 31 Michael G. Schechter, “Conclusions,” in *United Nations-Sponsored World Conferences: Focus on Impact and Follow Up*, ed. Michael G. Schechter (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001), 218–222.
 - 32 Christine Chinkin, “Normative Development in the International Legal System,” in *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System*, ed. Dinah Shelton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 29.
 - 33 Xinyuan Dai, *International Institutions and National Policies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
 - 34 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, *Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 12.
 - 35 *Ibid.*, 58–60.
 - 36 Isabella D. Bunn, “Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability,” *American University International Law Review* 19, no. 6 (2004): 1265–1306.
 - 37 Forest Stewardship Council, <https://fsc.org/en>.
 - 38 Andrew Guzman, *How International Law Works* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
 - 39 Richard L. Williamson, Jr., “International Regulation of Land Mines,” in *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System*, ed. Dinah Shelton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 505–521; and Charles B. Roger, *The Origins of Informality: Why the Legal Foundations of Global Governance Are Shifting and Why It Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2020).
 - 40 Tanja Aalberts and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, eds., *The Changing Practices of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018): 208.
 - 41 Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen, *The Changing Practices of International Law*.
 - 42 Anthea Roberts, *Is International Law International?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
 - 43 See ILC fragmentation report.
 - 44 *Ibid.*, 10.

CHAPTER 3

CONTENTS

■ Theories of IOs	47
■ Power and IOs	50
■ Compulsory power	51
■ Institutional power	52
■ Diffusing power	55
■ Conclusion	56

International organizations and the diffusion of power

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall

At the risk of simple-mindedness, there are two schools of thought regarding the relationship between international organizations (IOs) and the diffusion of power.¹ One school suggests that IOs are conservative organizations that are designed to freeze existing configurations of power. Indeed, states create rules associated with international institutions precisely to establish an order that preserves the status quo. If they are doing their job, then they are not diffusing power. The other is that IOs are expected to pluralize power. The world is constituted by radical inequalities of power, with some states having an abundance and others a scarcity, and the United Nations and other IOs essential to global governance help to level the playing field by giving an opportunity for the weak to have a voice and neglected issues to be seen. In reality, both camps are right: IOs can be defenders of the powerful and agents of reform. In fact, individual IOs such as the United Nations can function in both capacities. The UN Security Council, for instance, is a bastion of privilege reflecting the distribution of power in the international system seven decades ago, while many of the UN's specialized agencies seat NGOs from the Global South and powerful states at the same table.

This chapter offers one way of thinking about how IOs might be simultaneously reform-minded and defenders of the status quo. We begin by briefly discussing

several prominent theories of IOs and their depiction of the role that IOs play in the global order. While several of the best-known theories see IOs as preserving the existing distribution of power and interests, constructivist and critical approaches to IOs offer several reasons why they might also be intended and accidental agents of inclusion and empowerment. Specifically, our discussion of the diffusion of power focuses on how IOs might potentially reshape the social relations that affect the ability of actors to control the conditions of their future. Simplistically asked: how might IOs further the conditions that allow actors to speak for themselves and to act in ways that further their interests? In order to provide a partial answer, we observe that the ability of IOs to have this intended effect can be accomplished via two different kinds of power—compulsory and institutional. Compulsory power highlights how IOs can take direct action to alter the conditions of existence for actors, for instance when peacekeeping forces defend the lives of civilians in South Sudan. Institutional power emphasizes how IOs can work indirectly to guide action in directions that potentially improve the positions and ability of once marginalized and vulnerable actors; for instance, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* drastically altered how the international community defined international peace and security and debated the kinds of tools that were needed for the post-Cold War system. These mechanisms of power highlight how IOs might be able to shape the conditions of existence of other actors, not whether that effect of their actions ultimately preserves or diffuses power. To fill in the blanks, we return to theories of IOs for guidance, because different theories make different claims regarding the likelihood of whether IOs will defend or assail the status quo. Our takeaway line is this: modern IOs are often designed by (the most powerful) states to advance their interests, which can have the principal effect of reproducing the existing distribution of power; but they also have certain qualities and characteristics that can lead them to act in ways that improve the capacity of actors to shape the conditions of their fate.

Theories of IOs

The literature identifies two primary reasons why states create IOs. The first is to help stabilize an international order and a set of political arrangements. Put more accurately, the most powerful states in the international system have the most say over the design and function of IOs; and since their goal is to preserve power, they are likely to design IOs as instruments of their foreign policy goals, ensuring that they can block action that they perceive to be counter to their interests. In this view, most closely associated with realist international relations theory, IOs are accomplices of powerful states and serve an essential function in freezing the existing international order, defending the privileges of the powerful, and making sure that the weak remain so, continuing to suffer what they must. Specifically, the most powerful states decide which IOs are created, what they are, how they make decisions, and how they operate. To ensure their dominance, powerful states constrain IOs in various ways, including making them dependent on states for financing and establishing decision-making procedures that give powerful states preferential treatment. If we

want to know what IOs do, we should look at what the most powerful states allow and want them to do.

The second reason, found in institutionalist theories, offers a slightly less severe but nonetheless rather button-down view. These approaches argue that states create institutions to enhance the prospects of cooperation, overcome problems associated with collective choice, and increase individual and collective well-being. In other words, states have an interest in creating the conditions for cooperation and mutual welfare gains, and institutions are invaluable in that regard. Institutionalized cooperation is no guarantee that all will benefit equally. In fact, the most powerful states are likely to benefit more than the least powerful, with the important consequence that institutions might well be responsible for widening existing asymmetries of power. For all their disagreements regarding whether IOs matter, realists and institutionalists largely concur that IOs are either conservatives or compassionate conservatives, but in either case, they are largely sympathetic to (or captured by) the existing distribution of power. Radical theories of IOs, including Marxist and most critical theoretical approaches, also see IOs as defenders of privilege, although in most analyses the real beneficiaries are not states but rather elites or dominant classes at the expense of workers, migrants, peasants—that is, most of the world’s population. In general, these approaches give little reason for the hope that IOs provide the have-nots of the world with the ability to improve the conditions that shape their lives as they see fit.

Yet other schools of thought can imagine IOs not just as defenders of the *ancien régime* but also as levelers of privilege. Both constructivism and critical theory shift attention away from interests toward culture, norms, ideas, rules, and discourse, demonstrating that the “social” features of life play a primary role in shaping how the world is understood, how actors understand themselves and others, and what sorts of practices and arrangements are considered legitimate.

In so doing, they make three valuable moves, which combine to generate a more nuanced understanding of the simultaneously conservative and reformist tendencies of IOs. First, these theories move us away from actors and toward underlying social relations and structures, thus enabling us to better understand how the already existing global culture shapes what IOs are and what they do. In this respect, they are like Marxist theories, but with an important difference: whereas Marxist theories typically reduce the underlying structure to economics and property relations, constructivist and critical theories are more attentive to the presence of multiple, and not always consistent, cultural fragments. For instance, important elements of contemporary global culture include liberalism, rationality, and technocracy.

Second, the presence of these overlapping and sometimes contradictory cultures may give IOs relative autonomy. In other words, IOs can be neither merely playthings of states nor free agents able to do as they will. IOs, like most actors, have some potential for relative autonomy. But the fact that they have some relative autonomy does not tell us what they will do with that autonomy. They might use their relative autonomy to act in ways that are consistent with the underlying rules of the game, or they might use their autonomy to challenge those rules, or a mixture of the two.

Third, constructivist and critical approaches to the study of IOs point to two culturally inscribed reasons why they might, however unwittingly, diffuse power. To begin with, IOs seek legitimacy. In many respects, legitimacy is the IO’s fuel

and currency of power. When they are viewed as legitimate, their member states are more willing to acquiesce to, defer, and support IO activities. Legitimacy has procedural and substantive dimensions. Procedural legitimacy refers to the process by which decisions are made. Although there are lots of ways to make decisions, in contemporary affairs, modern governance is seen as legitimate to the extent that it operates according to basic principles of fairness and rationality. Fairness is often defined as meeting, as close as possible, democratic principles that give all members a voice regardless of their power or wealth. Conversely, if an IO is viewed as being under the undue influence of major powers, then it and its actions will lack a fairness component of legitimacy. Consequently, IOs will try to present their decisions as the result of inclusive and fair decision-making procedures. To give more than lip service to inclusion, many IOs work to ensure that even small and weak states have their interests represented in international policy discussions (while keeping the discussions acceptable to the dominant powers).

In addition to abiding by fair processes, IO legitimacy is also dependent on their perceived efficiency, impartiality, and objectivity, values that are prized in all modern organizations. Although IOs are often a far cry from the idealized image of a well-oiled machine, they aspire to have various kinds of qualities that are associated with the best features of bureaucracy: control on the basis of expertise; the division of the organization into spheres of competence and specialization; the establishment of procedures that standardize responses to the context; and the creation of a decision process that is driven not by politics but rather by the objective application of rules in a fair-minded way. These organizing principles are technical and political. The rise of the bureaucratic ideal in the nineteenth century was seen as a way of removing existing advantages and power because decisions would now be made on rational, objective criteria and not on the basis of who has influence and connections. In general, IOs that tip their hand to the principles of fairness and rationality are more likely to try to exclude politics and power in their decision-making procedures.

IO legitimacy is also based on substantive legitimacy, that is, whether its actions are consistent with the values of international society. The international realm is comprised of many, and often conflicting, values, but many of the defining values are associated with liberalism. The liberal international order might be at its demise, but IOs continue to adhere to many of the values associated with it, including development, justice, and individual freedom. In other words, while these IOs might not necessarily exhibit liberal qualities in how they make their decisions, they might be liberal if judged by their aspirations. Many of these IOs continue to support the holy trinity of liberalism: rule of law, individual rights, and free markets. These virtues are among the reasons why liberals have been the most ardent and long-standing champions of IOs. IOs are judged not only by whether they can work to reinforce, and guard against the backsliding of, liberal values, but also by their ability to diffuse them around the world. and to promote the establishment of markets, democracy, and human rights. In general, IOs often oppose the old order; they are champions of those whose voices might otherwise not be heard; and they are promoters of global and domestic institutions that advance equality of opportunity and inclusion.

In sum, because IOs are frequently created by powerful states to preserve their interests, the reasonable expectation is that they will serve the status quo and work

against any sort of redistribution, diffusion, or pluralization of power. Yet because IOs require legitimacy to be effective, because they are generally advocates of a liberal worldview, and because they are supposed to operate according to rule-governed principles, they also can be expected to work against the status quo and toward the conditions that enable states and non-state actors to have a greater say over their lives. IOs not only demonstrate both tendencies, but individual IOs are often at war within themselves, simultaneously championing and critiquing the power distributions underlying the existing world order.

Power and IOs

Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects on actors that shape their capacity to control their fate. This definition is broader than the one favored by international relations theorists, which is normally taken to be the ability of A to get B to do something it would rather not do. In that standard approach, generally associated with realist international relations theory, power is largely limited to how one state is able to use resources to force another state to do something against its will.

Yet power is not only overt; it can be covert as well. We inhabit structures, institutions, and other social spaces that limit our ability to influence decisions that matter to us. They do so through formal politics and informal governance. For instance, one-way institutions exercise power by keeping items off the agenda. If they are off the agenda, they cannot be discussed. And if they cannot be discussed, then those who care about them have been effectively silenced and disempowered.

Power not only shapes what we can do but also how we see the world, how we see ourselves, how we define our interests, and what we believe is possible and even qualifies as a problem to be addressed. In other words, power's effects are evident not only in terms of acting but also in terms of constituting, comprehending, and interpreting the world. Democracy might be seen as the great leveler of power, but the rising rates of inequality and disenfranchisement worldwide suggest that the marginalized members of society invariably have a hard time making their voices heard. We inhabit structures, such as capitalism, replete with mechanisms that help to produce the rich and poor, and convince the poor that this system of inequality is in their interest. We also exist in a world in which various kinds of discourse—including racism, civilization, and gender—have lasting effects on the identity, interests, and practices of everyone involved. The standard realist approach articulates only one way to conceptualize how our ability to shape our future is limited; we need to imagine the existence of other kinds of global relations that can be disempowering or empowering.

In a previous effort to demonstrate the many ways power exists in international affairs, we defined power as premised on two analytical dimensions: the kinds of social relations through which power works (in relations of interaction or social relations of constitution); and the specificity of social relations through which effects are produced (specific/direct or diffuse/indirect). These distinctions draw our attention to the question of whether power operates through actions (e.g., the ability by some

actors to keep issues off the agenda) or structures (e.g., the underlying distribution of wealth that allocates privilege and vulnerability); or whether these effects are easily traceable to an identifiable source (e.g., the person holding the gun) or diffuse and not traceable to an identifiable source (e.g., discourses of civilization that produce the categories of civilized and uncivilized). We used these different analytical dimensions (actions and structure; direct and diffuse) to generate four concepts of power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. These different conceptualizations provide different answers to the fundamental question: in what respects are actors able to control their own fate, and how is that ability limited or enhanced through social relations with others?

To explore how IOs diffuse power entails situating IOs in relationship to these different kinds of power, and examining how they might be directly and indirectly implicated in altering the social relations that enhance the ability of actors to control their fate. Simply put, how do IOs enable or constrain the ability of actors to shape the circumstances of their lives? Compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power point to different mechanisms whereby these effects are accomplished—with the former two pointing to interactions and the latter two to structures. We limit the discussion here to compulsory and institutional power, the most important forms through which IOs affect the diffusion or concentration of power.

Compulsory power

This first and most well-known kind of power concerns a situation in which one actor, A, behaves in a way that gets another actor, B, to do something that the latter would not do otherwise. *Intentionality* is often treated as an important element of this form of power. In this view, what counts is that A wants B to alter its actions in a particular direction. Although sympathetic to this formulation, we want to insist that compulsory power also exists even without intentionality on the part of A. When states use force, people die. Sometimes they are the intended targets, but quite a few are unintended, euphemistically known as “collateral damage.” Unintended does not make it any less compulsory, as we define it. What this suggests is that perhaps the best way to assess the existence of power is from those on the receiving rather than the giving end. Another characteristic of compulsory power is that A exerts power because it has material and ideational *resources* at its disposal that lead B to alter its actions. Scandinavian countries arguably are able to influence global outcomes because they have a perceived quality of character and not because these thinly-populated countries are closer to the Arctic and go months without daylight. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) use normative resources to induce targeted states to alter their policies through a strategy of “naming and shaming.”

IOs exhibit compulsory power if their actions directly shape the circumstances of another, affecting in turn what the other actor does or the other’s ability to determine its own fate, and if a particular IO’s material and ideational resources account for the change in circumstances and actions of the other. This is not an uncommon occurrence. International financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are able to use their capital to get borrowing

states to adopt “best practices,” slash budgets, and redirect economic resources. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) can shape the life chances of refugees and other displaced peoples by giving them strong incentives to return home by decreasing their rations. Peacekeeping troops, at times, use force to deter would-be violators of the ceasefire and protect civilians from non-state armed actors. Yet when IOs do exercise compulsory power, it is often through symbolic and normative resources rather than material ones. Because of its administrative and bureaucratic role, UNHCR has the power to determine who gets legal protection as a refugee and who does not. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has the power to indict government officials, but because this capacity is not backed by any real enforcement mechanisms, the primary effect is to create global *personae non grata*. But the fact that the ICC lacks formal authority does not mean it has no compulsory power, for the very ability to create such legal and political categories can have powerful effects for targeted states.

Institutional power

Institutional power highlights how actors are able to guide, steer, and constrain the actions and circumstances of others through the rules that exist in structural positional differences in formal and informal institutions. Institutional power differs from compulsory power in various ways, but two are most important for this discussion. Whereas compulsory power entails the direct control of one actor over the conditions and actions of another, institutional power reflects indirect control. Specifically, the conceptual focus is on the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B. Working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, A can guide, steer, and constrain the actions (or non-actions) and conditions of existence of others. Institutions are nothing if not bundles of rules that specify who is included, who can talk, whose voice carries weight and counts, and what can be discussed and when. While often the rules were originally formulated by those with the most compulsory power, few institutions remain the instrument of a single actor or coalition. It is certainly possible that a dominant actor maintains total control over an institution. If so, then it is arguably best to conceptualize that institution as possessed by the actor, and with its compulsory power. But rarely is the institution completely dominated by one actor. Instead, most institutions have some independence from even the most specific resource-laden actors; rules that can take on a life of their own; and even their own independent institutional identity and range of action to the point of frustrating their original creators.

Second, institutional power also highlights the sometimes hidden power at work even without an obvious connection between two actors. Institutional power considers how power can operate *indirectly*. Compulsory power looks for a chain of events like: “Do it!” “No.” “If you don’t, we will deny you what you need.” “OK.” But institutional power acknowledges the existence of power even when there is no observable action, and when power works through institutions that have the effect of obscuring its presence. Compulsory power looks for dogs that bark and bite. But rules, for instance, can create the proverbial dogs that do not bark but nevertheless