Fraud Investigation Reports in Practice

Investigation reports are written by fraud examiners after completion of internal reviews in client organizations when there was suspicion of financial wrongdoing. Fraud examiners are expected to answer questions regarding what happened, when it happened, how it happened, and why. This book presents a number of case studies of investigation reports by fraud examiners, offering a framework for studying the report as well as insights into convenience of fraud.

The case studies, including KPMG and PwC, focus on two important subjects. First, convenience themes are identified for each case. Themes derive from the theory of convenience, where fraud is a result of financial motives, organizational opportunities, and personal willingness for deviant behaviors. Second, review maturity is identified for each case. Review maturity derives from a stages-of-growth model, where the investigation is assigned a level of maturity based on explicit criteria. The book provides useful insights towards approaching fraud examinations to enable better understanding of the rational explanations for corporate fraud. The book is framed from the perspective of private policing, which contextualizes how investigation reports are examined.

This book is a valuable resource for scholars and upper-level students researching and studying auditing and investigation work in the corporate and public sectors. Business and management as well as criminal justice scholars and students will learn from the case studies how to frame a white-collar crime incident by application of convenience theory and how to evaluate a completed internal investigation by fraud examiners.

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Fraud Investigation Reports in Practice
Convenience and Corporate Crime

Petter Gottschalk
# Contents

*List of illustrations*  
ixi

## Introduction  
1

1 Convenient Organizational Opportunity  
19

- High Social Status in Privileged Positions  20
- Legitimate Access to Crime Resources  27
- Disorganized Institutional Deterioration  30
- Lack of Oversight and Guardianship  36
- Criminal Market Structures  40
- Interactions between Crime Enablers  42

2 Born Free by Ernst & Young  
51

- Reactions from the Accused  52
- Offender Convenience Themes  54
- Fraud Investigation Outcome  56
- Investigation Report Maturity  57
- Examination Consequences  62
- Examiners Review Examiners  66
- Norwegian Foundation Authority  69
- Lacking Directorate Response  70

3 Danske Bank by Plesner  
81

- The Previous Bank Scandal  81
- Offender Convenience Themes  84
- Fraud Investigation Outcome  85
- Investigation Report Maturity  88
4 Equinor Energy by PwC

United States Offshore Oil 92
Offender Convenience Themes 94
Fraud Investigation Outcome 96
Investigation Report Maturity 97

5 Hurtigruten Cruises by Wiersholm

National Symbol Hurtigruten 103
Offender Convenience Themes 104
Fraud Investigation Outcome 107
Investigation Report Maturity 110

6 Norfund Foreign Aid by PwC

Business Email Compromise 115
Executive Email Impersonation 118
Offender Convenience Themes 120
Fraud Investigation Outcome 122
Investigation Report Maturity 124

7 Obos Housing Facilities by KPMG

Cooperative Member Revolt 129
Motive Convenience Themes 131
Opportunity Convenience Themes 133
Willingness Convenience Themes 134
Investigation Report Outcome 136
Investigation Maturity Assessment 137

8 Samherji Fishing by Wikborg Rein

Al Jazeera News Investigation 142
Kveikur News Investigation 143
Samherji Fishing Press Release 144
DNB Bank Corrupt Transactions 146
Whistleblower Johannes Stefansson 151
Wikborg Rein Fraud Investigation 153
White-Collar Crime Convenience 157
Al Jazeera Investigation Evaluation 158
9 Wirecard Banking by KPMG

Motive Convenience Themes 164
Opportunity Convenience Themes 167
Willingness Convenience Themes 171
Investigation Report Outcome 171
Investigation Maturity Assessment 175

10 Stanland Autobiography

White-Collar Support Member 184
Offender Convenience Themes 188
How He Reinvented Himself 190
White-Collar Support Group 191

Conclusion 198

Index 203
Illustrations

Figures

0.1 Structural model of convenience theory for white-collar crime 7
0.2 Maturity model for internal private investigations with four stages 8
2.1 Convenience themes in the case of Foundation Born Free 54
2.2 Maturity level for the Ernst & Young (2020) investigation at Born Free 59
3.1 Maturity level for the Bruun Hjejle (2018) investigation at Danske Bank 83
3.2 Convenience themes in the case of Danske Bank 84
3.3 Maturity level for combined investigation by Plesner (2020) at Danske Bank 90
4.1 Convenience themes in the case of Equinor 94
4.2 Maturity level for the PwC (2020) investigation at Equinor 99
5.1 Convenience themes in the case of Hurtigruten 105
5.2 Maturity level for the Wiersholm (2020) investigation at Hurtigruten 111
6.1 Convenience themes for the criminal organization against Norfund 121
6.2 Maturity model for internal private investigations applied to PwC (2020) 125
7.1 Convenience themes in the case of Obos 132
7.2 Maturity level for the KPMG (2021) investigation at Obos 138
8.1 Convenience themes in the case of Samherji 158
8.2 Maturity model for investigative journalism by Kleinfeld (2019) at Al Jazeera 159
9.1 Convenience themes in the case of Wirecard 165
9.2 Maturity level for the KPMG (2020a, 2020b) investigation at Wirecard 179
10.1 Convenience themes in the case of Craig Stanland 188
Table

10.1 List of podcast episodes in the first year of white-collar crime week 194
Introduction

Investigation reports are written by fraud examiners after completion of internal reviews in client organizations when there was suspicion of financial wrongdoing. Client organizations hire fraud examiners to reconstruct past events and sequences of events. Fraud examiners are expected to answer questions regarding what happened, when it happened, how it happened, who did what to make it happen or not happen, and why it happened or did not happen.

This book presents a number of case studies of investigation reports by fraud examiners. The case studies focus on two important subjects. First, convenience themes are identified for each case. Themes derive from the theory of convenience, where fraud is a result of financial motives, organizational opportunities, and personal willingness for deviant behaviors. Second, review maturity is identified for each case. Review maturity derives from a stages-of-growth model, where the investigation is assigned a level of maturity based on explicit criteria.

The purpose of this book is to combine insights into convenience of fraud and a following investigation when the offense is detected. Convenience theory is an integrated, deductive, and up-and-down explanation of crime where individual and organizational themes interact with each other. This emerging theory describes crime as a choice, where the relative convenience of legitimate versus illegitimate actions influences the tendency to commit crime. It is the relative extent of convenience that determines whether an offense is attractive. A very conveniently oriented decision-maker may resort to illegal activities when legal activities are slightly more stressful. A less conveniently oriented decision-maker may try intensely to solve problems and explore opportunities without violating the law. The research literature on convenience theory is growing (e.g., Braaten and Vaughn, 2019; Chan and Gibbs, 2020; Dearden and Gottschalk, 2020; Hansen, 2020; Kireenko et al., 2019; Leasure and Zhang, 2018; Otu and Okon, 2019; Reese and McDougal, 2018; Stadler and Gottschalk, 2021; Vasiu and Podgor, 2019).

The research literature focuses on convenience theory applied to white-collar offenders, and so do the case studies in this book. A white-collar offender is a person of respectability and high social status who commits economic crime in the course of occupational activities (Benson and Simpson, 2018; Craig and Piquero, 2017; Gottschalk and Tcherni-Buzdeo, 2017; Holtfreter, 2015; Huisman, 2020; Huisman, 2020; Huisman, 2020; Huisman, 2020)

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Logan et al., 2019; Pontell et al., 2014; Schoultz and Flyghed, 2016, 2019, 2020a, 2020b, 2021a, 2021b; Sutherland, 1939, 1983; Wall-Parker, 2020).

Investigation reports by fraud examiners represent the result of private policing, which is provision of policing services such as investigations and detective work other than by public servants (Brooks and Button, 2011; Button, 2020; Button et al., 2007a, 2007b; Button and Gee, 2013; King, 2020a, 2020b; Schneider, 2006; Williams, 2005a, 2005b, 2014). Fraud examiners at local law firms and global auditing firms conduct internal investigations at client organizations such as private enterprises and public authorities. Just like federal and public police investigators (Lee and Cho, 2020), private examiners need knowledge and awareness of typical human error sources such as confirmation traps, tunnel vision, and social stereotypes (Bjerkenes and Falsing, 2018; Goodman-Delahunty and Martschuk, 2020; Lee and Cho, 2020). For example, gender stereotypes distinguishing women and men along traditional thinking can cause investigative errors (Brands and Mehra, 2019).

More than a decade has passed since Schneider (2006) and Williams (2005a, 2005b) emphasized the problematic role of fraud examiners in internal investigations, as examiners conduct private policing of economic crime. In the meantime, however, the business of fraud examinations has grown substantially in forensic departments in auditing firms and in consulting departments in law firms. Examples of auditing firms include Deloitte (2015), Ernst & Young (2020), KPMG (2020), and PwC (2020a, 2020b). Examples of law firms include Plesner (2020), and Wiersholm (2020). This book develops such referenced examples into case studies of internal investigations of economic crime focusing on internal investigations by fraud examiners.

The problematic role of fraud examiners emphasized by Schneider (2006) and Williams (2005a, 2005b) was exemplified more recently by King (2020c: 16) in terms of the transnational nature of many investigations:

The complexity of financial and corporate crime investigation, coupled with the mix of occupational jurisdictions, raises issues for regulators that may be difficult to overcome, such as creating formal regulatory training programs for private investigative certification. The changing nature of private investigation presents several issues that need resolving, specifically regulation and licensing.

The private forensics business of fraud examinations has expanded rapidly in recent years. One of the reasons is the lack of public police priority to investigate financial crime generally and white-collar crime particularly (Brooks and Button, 2011; Button, 2020; Button and Gee, 2013; Button et al., 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2009, 2014; Cullen et al., 2020; Gottschalk, 2020a, 2020b; Gottschalk and Gunnesdal, 2018; Lord and Wingerde, 2020; Wood, 2020). Police agencies are not prepared to meet the growing need for policing financial crime, especially crime by white-collar offenders, as public police is finding it difficult to adapt to a rapidly changing landscape (Button et al., 2009; Loveday, 2017). Specially
trained detectives for white-collar crime are almost non-existent or incompetent (Skidmore et al., 2018). Public police agencies involved in financial crime investigations concerned with white-collar offenders are typically under-resourced. They lack training, and they perceive that there is a high level of complexity associated with these types of investigations that they do not handle professionally. They do not understand business transactions and offender behaviors, and they may have negative attitudes towards victims (Button et al., 2008; Skidmore et al., 2020). They do not necessarily feel sorry for banks, vendors, shareholders, investors, or employers who suffer from fraud, corruption, or embezzlement. The police duty of care is often neglected or ignored in identifying the need for support of financial crime victims (Button et al., 2009). Furthermore, it is often suggested that fraud victims are largely to blame for their own victimization. Fraud victims are sometimes seen as greedy, opportunistic, and naïve, who lack the necessary skills to control their own activities (Button et al., 2014; Webster and Drew, 2017). For example, if an employee embezzles the employer, it is not obvious that the case is a priority matter for public policing. Rather, an employer is supposed to have control mechanisms to prevent an employee from wrongdoing.

Compared to other types of crime, such as street crime, research has confirmed that governments and law enforcement agencies do not prioritize financial crime (Cullen et al., 2020; Skidmore et al., 2020). Often, police executives do not view financial crime as part of their core duties (Crocker et al., 2017). A lack of competence and apparent disinterest in financial crime in policing persists, despite the growing and overwhelming evidence that financial crime is one of the most commonly experienced crime types (Skidmore et al., 2020) that harm individuals, organizations, as well as society with low detection rates (Andresen and Button, 2019; Gottschalk and Gunnnesdal, 2018; Huff et al., 2010), where offenders tend to move under the radar (Williams et al., 2019). Like many other professionals, police officers tend to prefer case work where they understand what is going on, which is typically street crime. Investigations into fraud compete for resources and are generally overshadowed by high-profile crime such as homicide, drugs, and child abuse (Button et al., 2012).

The lack of appropriately trained police investigators increases the volume of undetected and unsolved financial crime cases (Button et al., 2014), which is now partly taken over by the private fraud investigation industry (King, 2020a, 2020b; Wood, 2020). Corporate victims and other stakeholders want to find out what happened, how it happened, when it happened, why it happened, and who did what to make it happen or not happen. An investigation is the information-gathering process aimed to uncover what happened, how the misconduct or offense was committed, by whom, so as successfully to draw conclusions in the reconstruction of past events (Lee and Cho, 2020).

In some countries, organizations are required by law to investigate after whistleblowing of suspected wrongdoing. Organizations typically do not have relevant competence to reconstruct past events. Therefore, they hire private examiners to investigate allegations and accusations that emerge from
whistleblower reports. A whistleblower is a person who is or was associated with the organization, who notices deviance, and who reports observations in an acceptable manner to someone who can do something about it. In many countries, you are not a whistleblower if you were a victim of the wrongdoing. Whistleblowing has received increased research interest in recent years (e.g., Alleyne et al., 2013; Andrade, 2015; Björkelo et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2016; Bussmann et al., 2018; Culiberg and Mihelic, 2017; Dyck et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2015; Keil et al., 2010; Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli and Near, 2013; Mpho, 2017; Park et al., 2020; Potipiroon and Wongpreedee, 2020; Rehg et al., 2009; Shawver and Clements, 2019; Tankebe, 2019).

Client organizations hire fraud examiners from local law firms and global auditing firms to conduct internal investigations. The result of an examination is a report of investigation that is handed over to the client, and the report becomes the property of the client since the client paid for the investigation. These reports are the subject of study in this book. A typical report is one hundred pages long and presents a mandate, a procedure, and findings. Unfortunately, most clients keep reports secret and confidential (Gottschalk and Tchemi-Buzzeo, 2017; Stenström, 2018). “Typically, corporations tend to take their own measures to resolve instances of fraud without resorting to the police” (King, 2020a: 1). “Corporate clients can effectively choose to sidestep the criminal justice system and not report matters to authorities, propagating debate on the treatment of white-collar criminals compared to others” (King, 2020b: 9). Therefore, only a few investigation reports become available to identify convenience themes and review maturity for research presented in this book.

Beneficiaries of reconstructing past events and sequences of events can range from everyone, as in the case of the criminal justice system, to only those entities that fund private internal investigations. Furthermore, “the public police, as an institution of the criminal justice system, inherently possess a punishment or coercion-based mentality propelled by their authority as agents of the criminal law and their capacity to apply state-sanctioned force” (Wood, 2020: 25). In contrast, private examination of economic crime is consulting work where fraud examiners are supposed to conduct internal investigations to establish facts and advise clients what to do next.

The business of internal investigations by fraud examiners seems to be growing more rapidly than national and international public police organizations to combat fraud (Wood, 2020: 26):

Determining the ratios of private agents to public agents is invariability hard to do with much accuracy, but it is clear that private policing entities surpass the latter in sheer numbers and to varying degrees across established democracies and countries in transition.

An example of private examination is the investigation of suspected insurance fraud. Stenström (2018: 478) studied the ways private investigation is organized with regard to profitability for insurance firms in Sweden:
While the literature on private policing has enhanced our understanding of its growth, scope and normative implications, less is known about how “hybrid” policing is conducted to make profit. Informed by 38 qualitative interviews with the seven largest insurance companies in Sweden, the article details how power relations are organized to ensure that the private policing of insurance claims supports and does not pose a threat to profit. Drawing on evidence from the empirical research, a range of issues are discussed, including the relationship between private policing and state power, and the intertwined governance of both claimants and policing actors.

Stenström (2018) found that an investigation has to be profitable, which means that a small claim cannot cause a large investigation effort. A relevant example here from the neighboring country Norway is the insurance company Gjensidige, which has a claim against some Hells Angels members. Since Gjensidige believes there are few valuable assets to be retrieved from the Hells Angels members, the insurance firm is not willing to spend resources investigating them. While the perspective of corporate social responsibility might imply that the insurance firm should nevertheless investigate and thus help Norwegian police investigate organized criminals such as Hells Angels, the insurance firm is reluctant to do it (Gottschalk, 2013). The perspective of internal investigations by fraud examiners being profitable is relevant for this book, as a fraud examination effort can be considered an investment, where benefits can exceed costs of the investigation. King (2020a) argues that nine attributes are critical for the corporate investigator’s inquiry success: communication, motivation, industry experience, qualifications, police or regulatory experience, business acumen, conceptual thinking, resilience, and rapport building.

The purpose of this book is to study cases of internal investigations by fraud examiners. The book presents two frameworks to study investigation reports by fraud examiners. First, a structural model is introduced to identify convenience themes in each case study. Second, a stage model is introduced to identify maturity level in each case study.

The emerging theory of convenience for white-collar crime is concerned with financial possibilities and threats, organizational opportunity to commit and conceal financial crime, as well as personal willingness for deviant behavior. The research literature on convenience theory is growing (e.g., Braaten and Vaughn, 2019; Chan and Gibbs, 2020; Dearden and Gottschalk, 2020; Gottschalk, 2020b; Hansen, 2020; Kireenko et al., 2019; Leasure and Zhang, 2018; Otu and Okon, 2019; Reese and McDougal, 2018; Vasiu and Podgor, 2019).

White-collar offenders commit financial crime during their occupations (Craig, 2019; Craig and Piquero, 2016; Dearden, 2016, 2017, 2019; Jordonoska, 2018; Klenowski et al., 2011; Onna, 2020; Onna and Denkers, 2019). Convenience theory suggests that the financial motive in white-collar crime is to explore possibilities and avoid threats; the organizational opportunity is to commit as well as conceal crime, while the willingness is deviant behavior by justification and neutralization (Vasiu and Podgor, 2019). The theory of
Convenience is an integrated and deductive perspective based on the synthesis of individual-level, group-level, and nation-level themes (Chan and Gibbs, 2020; Gottschalk, 2020b). Convenience theory builds on previous theoretical perspectives on fraud, such as the fraud triangle, the fraud scale, the fraud diamond, the MICE model, and the ABC model (Desai, 2016), as well as general theoretical perspectives on economic crime.

Convenience is the state of being able to proceed with something with little effort or difficulty, avoiding pain and strain (Mai and Olsen, 2016). Convenience is savings in time and effort (Farquhar and Rowley, 2009), as well as avoidance of pain and obstacles (Higgins, 1997). Convenience is a relative concept concerned with efficiency in time and effort as well as reduction in pain and solution to problems (Engdahl, 2015). Convenience is an advantage in favor of a specific action to the detriment of alternative actions. White-collar offenders choose the most convenient path to reach their goals.

White-collar crime results from delinquent behavior by individuals in competent positions (Piquero, 2018). White-collar offenders commit and conceal their crime in a professional setting (Gottschalk, 2020a, 2020b) where they have legitimate access to premises, resources, and systems (Logan et al., 2019). The benefit from white-collar crime might be financial gain, personal adventure, or some other desired outcome (Craig and Piquero, 2017; Jordanoska, 2018; Sutherland, 1939, 1983; Williams et al., 2019).

Figure 0.1 illustrates the structure of white-collar convenience as derived from the research literature within criminology, sociology, psychology, and management (Gottschalk, 2020b). The extent of white-collar crime convenience manifests itself by motive, opportunity, and willingness. The motive is either occupational crime to benefit the individual or corporate crime to benefit the organization because of possibilities or threats (Alalehto, 2020). The ability of white-collar offenders to commit and conceal crime links to their privileged position, the social structure, and their orientation to legitimate and respectable careers (Friedrichs et al., 2018).

The personal willingness for deviant behavior manifests itself by offender choice and perceived innocence. The choice of crime can be caused by deviant identity, rational consideration, or learning from others. Social identity is an individual’s self-concept as an organizational member (Piening et al., 2020). The perceived innocence at crime manifests itself by justification and neutralization (Schoultz and Flyghed, 2020a). Identity, rationality, learning, justification, neutralization, and lack of self-control all contribute to making white-collar crime action a convenient behavior for offenders (Craig and Piquero, 2017; Engdahl, 2015; Holtfreter et al., 2010; Sutherland, 1983; Sykes and Matza, 1957).

In criminology, the conceptualization of deviant behavior is implicitly negative actions that lack conformity to norms (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Deviant behavior typically causes harm to victims. Offenders depart from norms in destructive ways. In our context, deviance is negative departure from norms by white-collar offenders.
In white-collar research, there are different kinds of conception and operationalization of the construct of white-collar crime. Even though Sutherland (1939) coined the term more than eight decades ago, white-collar research remains preoccupied with definition. While many still engage in agitation and dispute about the white-collar crime concept, as exemplified by Galvin (2020), this research simply applies the basic characteristics of the offender, which include status, trust, and access.

Each case study in this book applies the described structural model for convenience theory in Figure 0.1. Each case study also applies the maturity model for private investigations in Figure 0.2.

Stages of growth models for maturity levels help to assess and evaluate a variety of phenomena (e.g., Masood et al., 2020; Röglinger et al., 2012; Solli-Sæther and Gottschalk, 2015). Stage models predict the development or evolution of investigative maturity from basic performance to superior results (Iannacci et al., 2019: 310).
They also suggest that this development is progressive (i.e., each successive stage is better than the previous one), stepwise (i.e., each step is a necessary prerequisite for the following step in the sequence), and prescriptive (i.e., each step must occur in a prescribed order in accordance with a pre-existing plan or vision), thus emphasizing the chain of successful events rather than the mechanisms by which subsequent stages come about.

Here we apply the concept of stages in terms of maturity levels to evaluate private internal investigations (Brooks and Button, 2011; Button and Gee, 2013; Button et al., 2007a, 2007b; King, 2020a, 2020b; Schneider, 2006; Williams, 2005a, 2005b). The purpose is to develop characteristics of investigations at different maturity levels. Based on previous studies of investigation reports (Gottschalk, 2020a), we present a five-stage model as illustrated in Figure 0.2.

The four maturity levels in the stage model for fraud examinations have the following descriptions:

1. Activity-oriented investigation: The examination is a chaos. The investigation focuses on activities that may have been carried out in a reprehensible manner. The examiners look for activities and prepare descriptions of these. Then examiners make up their minds whether the activities were reprehensible or not. Here it is often auditors and others with financial knowledge. They are to assess financial transactions and management of assets. The investigation at level 1 is often passive, fruitless, and characterized by

![Figure 0.2 Maturity model for internal private investigations with four stages](image-url)
unnecessary use of resources. At this lowest maturity level, investigators typically attempt to find an answer to the question: What happened?

The investigation might cause more confusion than before the examination was initiated. The investigation is typically insufficient, inadequate, surface-oriented, a waste of time, useless, passive, unprofessional, worthless, immature, unacceptable, bad, meaningless, fruitless, awful, and chaotic. The investigation is often a failure and a disaster. The investigation lacks useful results and has little or no value. Investigators typically look where it is easy to find something, rather than searching for relevant information to solve the case. This stage might deserve the following label: Waste of time.

**Problem-oriented investigation: The examination is a mess.** The investigation focuses on an issue that needs clarification. Examiners are looking for answers. Once examiners believe they have found answers, the investigation is terminated. It is important to spend as little resources as possible on the investigation, which should take the shortest possible time. Delamination and management are important for success. The client had an unresolved problem, and the client regulates premises for the investigation. There is no room for investigators to pursue other paths than those that address the predefined problem. Here it is often lawyers and others with legal knowledge. They are to map the facts. At this second maturity level, investigators typically attempt to find an answer to the question: How did it happen?

Often, little or nothing comes out of the investigation. The investigation is typically random, amateurish, formalities-focused, somewhat beneficial, but not enough, mainly descriptive, problem-oriented, neutral, unsystematic, inadequate, activity-oriented, shortsighted, fruitless, deviations-oriented, reactive, questions-oriented, and messy. The investigation tends to lack scrutiny, is a collection of information without analysis, and has too many assumptions that make conclusions less valid or invalid. The investigation is superficial and very limited. This stage might deserve the following label: Wishful thinking.

**Detection-oriented investigation: The examination is a disclosure.** The investigation focuses on something being hidden, which should be revealed. Investigators choose their tactics to succeed in exposing possible misconduct and perhaps even financial crime. Investigative steps are adapted to the terrain, where different sources of information and methods are used to get as many facts on the table as possible. Here it is often police-trained investigators and other private detectives. They are to uncover possible crime. While level 1 and level 2 are focused on suspicions of financial crime, level 3 is focused on suspicions against potential financial criminals. There are always criminals who commit crime. Level 3 has a focus on individuals, while level 2 has a focus on activities. Level 3 is characterized by the search for responsible persons who may have abused their positions for personal or corporate gain. This is a more demanding examination, because suspicions and suspects must be handled in a responsible manner in relation to the rule of law and human rights. Level 3 investigations are active with significant breakthroughs in the examinations.
Introduction

Investigation projects are carried out in a professional and efficient manner. At this third maturity level, investigators typically attempt to find an answer to the question: Why did it happen?

Examiners are successful in identifying and documenting some new facts. The investigation has a clear perspective. It is competence-oriented, average, biased, targeted, systematized, integrated, moderate, indifferent, standard, competent, cause-based, revealing, and disclosure-oriented. The investigation is problem-oriented and limited by the mandate. The investigation is reflective, yet only slightly above average. This stage might deserve the following label: Better luck next time.

Value-oriented investigation: The examination is a clarification. The investigation focuses on value created by the examination, where the investigation is an investment by the client with an expectation of benefits exceeding costs. The ambition of the investigation is that the result will be valuable to the client. The value can lie in clean-up, change, simplification, renewal, and other measures for the future. The investigation also focuses on being justifiable. A number of explicit considerations are identified and practiced throughout the inquiry. In addition, the investigation has a focus on explicit decisions regarding information strategy, method strategy, configuration strategy, and system strategy. By explicit strategic choices, the investigation becomes transparent and understandable to the parties involved and affected. It is often examiners in interdisciplinary teams who are to contribute to value creation for the client. Level 4 investigations are characterized by the active use of strategies, with significant and decisive breakthroughs in the inquiries, which lay the foundation for learning and value creation in the client’s organization. The value may, for example, be that detected deviations and wrongdoings become sanctioned and corrected in a satisfactory manner. At level 4, detection, disclosure, clarification, and solution are seen in context. There will be less to detect in the future if prevention is strengthened. It will be better in the future if the case is completely resolved. The examiners create value by proper investigation. Value is created before, during, and after the investigation.

Before the investigation, risk understanding and prioritization are developed. During the investigation, method understanding is developed. After the investigation, barriers are built against fraud, holes are closed, routines are developed and practiced, and evaluation is established on a continuous basis.

At this top maturity level, investigators try to find the answer to the questions: What went wrong, what can the client learn, and how can wrongdoing be prevented from happening again in the future?

Examiners at level 4 are able to reconstruct past events and sequences of events. The investigation is responsible, detailed, conscientious, enough, professional, neutral, unprejudiced, integrated, proactive, preventive, mature, competent, systematic, professional, explorative, immaculate, expedient, truth seeking, facts-based, complete, independent, and clarifying. The investigation adds value. The investigation is thorough and works well. This stage might deserve the following label: Time well spent.
The investigation is an investment. The investigation makes a valuable contribution to the client organization, where investigation benefits exceed investigation costs. The investigation is optimal, innovative, profitable, strategic, extraordinary, outstanding, provident, value-oriented, advanced, learning-focused, valuable, irreversible, truth-based, socially responsible, exceptional, excellent, perfect, exemplary, and a profitable investment. The investigation is a masterpiece and enrichment for the client and society. The investigation is complete and influential. The investigation is strategically a success. This stage might deserve the following label as well as the first-mentioned label: Here’s my money.

Fraud examination strategies influence the level of maturity, where Gottschalk (2020a) makes distinctions between five strategies. First, knowledge strategy defines the areas of expertise that fraud examiners must apply to the task of reconstructing past events and sequences of events, where knowledge sharing from different professionals is required (Muhammed and Zaim, 2020). Very often, knowledge of the law is the dominating expertise applied, while there is a lack of organizational and accounting knowledge in the investigation. Next, information strategy defines sources of information that contribute to reconstructing past events and sequences of events. Very often, formal documents such as minutes of meetings are the dominating source applied, while there is a lack of investigative interviewing and visits to potential crime scenes. Third, value configuration strategy defines the primary activities in the investigation. Very often, the value chain is the dominating configuration, where tasks follow in a sequential manner, while the alternative of the value shop is a more relevant configuration, where tasks follow each other iteratively by returning to earlier tasks. Fourth, systems strategy defines the application of information technology and digitalization in the investigation. Very often, simple search words are used in digital queries that provide few and inconclusive instances of suspicious activities. Finally, methods strategy defines the overall approach and perspectives in the investigation. Very often, fraud examiners conduct interviews in a confrontational rather than cooperative manner. Very often, examiners have a thinking style of systematic analysis rather than the challenge style or the risk style of investigative thinking.

Each case study in this book applies the described model of maturity in fraud investigations. Each case study also applies the structural model of convenience theory as illustrated in Figure 0.1. The emerging theory of convenience for white-collar crime is concerned with financial possibilities and threats, organizational opportunity to commit and conceal financial crime, as well as personal willingness for deviant behavior.

The methodology applied to investigation reports in this book is content analysis (Bell et al., 2018; Braaten and Vaughn, 2019; Saunders et al., 2007). Content analysis is any methodology or procedure that works to identify characteristics within texts attempting to make valid inferences (Krippendorff, 1980; Patrucco et al., 2017). Content analysis assumes that language reflects
both how people understand their surroundings and their cognitive processes. Therefore, content analysis makes it possible to identify and determine relevant text in a context (McClelland et al., 2010).

Chapter 1 presents the core of convenience theory in terms of convenience themes in the opportunity structure for misconduct and crime. Convenience themes include high social status in privileged positions, legitimate access to crime resources, disorganized institutional deterioration, lack of oversight and guardianship, and crime market structures. Such themes contribute to the convenience of offending by privileged individuals.

In the following nine chapters, case studies are presented to identify specific convenience themes as well as to assess review maturity of investigation reports. Chapter 2 analyzes the case of a publicly funded entity where whistleblowers had presented allegations of fraud that were then investigated by audit firm Ernst & Young. Chapter 3 analyzes the case of a Danish bank where bank customers perceived illegitimately being denied funds that was investigated by law firm Plesner. Chapter 4 analyzes the case of an energy company where large-scale spending occurred in the United States that was investigated by audit firm PwC. Chapter 5 analyzes a Norwegian cruise line that seemed to ignore a Covid-19 outbreak for financial reasons, which was then investigated by law firm Wiersholm. Chapter 6 analyzes the case of funds that never arrived at the correct destination of Cambodia, but rather disappeared, where the disappearance was investigated by audit firm PwC.

Chapter 7 analyzes the case of executives who allegedly provided illegitimate preference to an entrepreneur, which was then investigated by audit firm KPMG. Chapter 8 analyzes the case of alleged corruption from an Icelandic seafood company to Namibian ministers to gain access to fishing rights that were then investigated by law firm Wikborg Rein. Chapter 9 analyzes a German financial institution that was accused of accounting manipulation, which was investigated by audit firm KPMG.

The final Chapter 10 is a different case study of a convicted white-collar criminal in the United States who recently wrote his autobiography. Based on his book, it is possible to identify his convenience themes when committing fraud.

References