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MUSLIMS OF POST-COMMUNIST EURASIA

Edited by
Galina M. Yemelianova and Egdūnas Račius

Muslims of Post-Communist Eurasia

This book discusses the evolution of state governance of Islam and the nature and forms of local Muslims' rediscovery of their 'Muslimness' across post-communist Eurasia. It examines the effects on the Islamic scene of the political and ideological divergence of Central and South-Eastern Europe from Russia and most of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Of particular interest are the implications of the proliferation of new, 'global' interpretations of Islam and their relationship with existing 'traditional' Islamic beliefs and practices. The contributions in this book address these issues through an interdisciplinary prism combining history, religious studies/theology, social anthropology, sociology, ethnology and political science. They analyse the greater public presence of Islam in constitutionally secular contexts and offer a critique of the domestication and accommodation of Islam in Europe, comparing these to what has happened in the international Eurasian space. The discussion is informed by the works of such thinkers as Talal Asad, Bryan Turner, Veit Bader, Marcel Maussen and Bassam Tibi, and utilises primary and secondary sources and ethnographic observation. Looking at how collectivities and individuals are defining what it means to be Muslim in a globalised Islamic context, this book will be of great interest to scholars of Religious Studies, Islamic Studies, Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology.

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Preface

This volume addresses the existing epistemological and methodological lack of connection between, on the one hand, the study of Islam in Russia and most other countries situated in the central and eastern part of post-Soviet Eurasia and, on the other, the post-communist countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltics. This is so even though the countries in both regions share a common communist past, and in some cases an even lengthier common history. These countries' historical commonalities account for their considerable societal, cultural and ideational similarities. In the last three decades, since the fall of the Iron Curtain, these commonalities have been challenged as a result of Central and South-Eastern Europe's increasing political and ideological 'Europeanisation' characterised by the centrality of the discourse of liberal democracy, the nation state, individual human rights and the collective rights of national and religious minorities. A corollary has been the advance in Central and South-Eastern Europe of the liberal 'European' mode of state governance of Islam and the wider openness of local Muslim communities to Islamic theological and political influences emanating from the Islamic heartland. By contrast, it appears that Russia, Central Asia and most of the Muslim Caucasus have largely remained within 'Eurasian' parameters, defined by political authoritarianism, social conservatism and solidarity, and tight state control over the Islamic domain.

To explore the impact of this discursive divergence on Muslim communities across post-communist Eurasia we have gathered together 18 leading researchers on Islam and Muslims from both regions. Some of them were participants in the panel 'Muslims in post-Communist Lands: Between Traditional and Global' which we organised within the framework of the EASR international conference in Tartu, Estonia, in June 2019. The focus of the volume's enquiry is the post-communist evolution of state governance of Islam and the nature and forms of local Muslims' rediscovery of their 'Muslimness'. Contributors to the volume are particularly concerned with the following four questions. How has the new division into 'European' and 'Eurasian' political realms affected the ideological orientation and politics of various national Islamic leaderships, as well as the ethnic composition, doctrinal affiliation and Islamic practices of

grassroots Muslims? A second question investigates the main factors defining the relation between tradition and innovation in Islamic beliefs and practices in various local and national Muslim communities and organisations. Third, we ask how the governance of religion, and of Islam in particular, has evolved since the end of communism across the wider Eurasia and how this evolution has affected state-Muslim relations. The fourth question deals with how different Muslim collectivities and individuals are defining what it means to be Muslim in a globalised Islamic context. The volume's contributions address these issues through an interdisciplinary prism combining history, religious studies/theology, social anthropology, sociology, ethnology and political science. The authors base their analysis on diverse primary sources, including official documents and statistics from Muslim religious administrations (muftiates), Islamic organisations and state departments dealing with religious issues; as well as on their ethnographic observation of Islamic practices and semi-structured interviews with practising Muslims, high-ranking Muslim 'clergy' and government officials dealing with Islam and religious matters.

The processes taking place across post-communist Eurasia are examined at both institutional and grassroots levels. This determines the volume's division into two parts. Part I, which consists of ten chapters, deals with the Islamic dynamic in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Tatarstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. It examines the implications of changes occurring in the political system and legislation, particularly pertaining to the governance of religion, for institutionalised Muslim 'clergy' and state-Muslim relations, as well as for the internal dynamics among the institutionalised forms of Islamic religiosity. It locates the discussion of the greater public presence of Islam in constitutionally secular contexts within the secularism/desecularisation debate. Part II, which has eight chapters, explores the changing meanings and practices of Islam, as well as the very nature of religious authority in the face of increasingly globalised Islamic discourse and external Islamic theological and social influences. It is particularly concerned with the ways in which various local Muslim communities relate to the 'Islamic tradition' and how they negotiate its place vis-à-vis novel 'globalised' forms of Muslimness. This discussion is informed by findings from Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chechnya, Georgia, Hungary, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Romania and Uzbekistan. We hope that the volume sheds light on the questions under discussion and in doing so raises new ones.

Galina M. Yemelianova (London) and Egdūnas Račius (Kaunas) –
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Part I

Institutionalised Islam and State-Muslim Relations

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1 The Many Faces of Islam in Post-Communist Eurasia

Galina M. Yemelianova and Egdūnas Račius

Introduction

The collapse of communism and the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s triggered major political, societal and religious changes across the formerly communist lands of Eurasia. At a geopolitical level, these developments triggered a new division between, on the one hand, Russia and most other post-Soviet states and, on the other, ex-communist Central and Eastern European countries, including the ex-Soviet Baltics, most of which subsequently joined the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty Organization (NATO). At a religious level, the end of totalitarian atheism enabled Muslim religious communities to once again reconstitute themselves and reconnect to the worldwide commonwealth of fellow believers – the *ummah*. An important part of this reconnection has been the proliferation of new interpretations and practices of Islam, thus increasing not only the Islamic spectrum but also the potential for intra-communal as well as state-Muslim tensions and conflicts. The response of various national and religious Muslim leaders and ordinary Muslims to the newly emerged plurality of Islamic interpretations and influences, including those available online and through social media, has varied due to significant differences in the size and the Islamic history of particular Muslim communities, and the specifics of a particular country's official governance of Islam. More importantly, the new geopolitical rearrangement of post-communist space has been accompanied by significant changes in state governance of Islam, as well as other religions across this wide region. This introductory chapter provides a comparative perspective on how the state and Muslims across Eurasia have negotiated their post-communist transition. It is particularly concerned with the evolution of the governance of Islam and Muslims in various post-Soviet and post-communist countries. Our discussion begins with a brief historical overview of the specifics of Islam across the region. We then examine trans-national Islamic movements and ideologies which have been introduced in the region since the collapse of communism. The chapter's final section deals with the specifics of governance of Islam in both the 'European' and 'Eurasian' political contexts.

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The spectrum of Islamic religiosity in Eurasia: a historical overview

Normative Islam

There is a considerable variation in the history and depth of the Islamic presence across different parts of post-communist Eurasia. Thus, Islam has the longest history in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where it was brought in the seventh century by Prophet Muhammad's Companions. In the 640s CE Muslim Arab troops took Darband (Derbent) in southern Dagestan, Bardh'a/Partaw (in present-day Azerbaijan) and Tiflis/Tbilisi (in present-day Georgia). By the mid-650s, the Arabs had conquered most of the territory of the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan (Yunusov 2004: 43). In parallel, they conquered Merv (in present-day Turkmenistan) and the Ferghana valley. Both regions were Islamised by force and through proselytism and incorporated first into the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750) and, subsequently, the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258). Dagestan and parts of present-day Azerbaijan and Armenia formed the Caliphal provinces of Arran (Caucasian Albania), Arminiyya and Azerbaijan (Vacca 2017: 44), while the Ferghana valley was included in the Caliphal province of *Mawarannahr* (lit. 'What is beyond the River'; referring to the Amu Darya – GY).[1] The Arabs named Darband *Bab al-Abwab* (Gate of all Gates), referring to its position as the gateway to their northern territories. In 736, the Umayyads established the Emirate of Tiflis (736–1122) in the east of present-day Georgia (*Jurzan,* in Arabic sources).[2] Since then the north-eastern Caucasus, and particularly multi-ethnic Dagestan, has been the regional centre of Islam and Arab Islamic culture, and its *ulama* (Islamic scholars) were involved in the codification of the Shafi'i *madhhab* (juridical school) of Sunni Islam (Yemelianova 2020: 125), which explains the continuing dominance of the Shafi'i *madhhab* among most Dagestanis, Chechens and Ingush, as well as, initially, among present-day Azerbaijanis. However, as a result of the conquest in the sixteenth century of present-day Azerbaijan by Shi'i Safavids, the bulk of its Muslims switched from Sunnism to Shi'i Islam (*Ithna 'Ashariyya*, or Twelver branch) of the Ja'fari legal school.

In Central Asia, which was largely populated by Iranians (present-day Tajiks and others) and various Turkic peoples (present-day Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and others), it was the Hanafi *madhhab* which eventually became dominant. The important role in this development belonged to Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (853–944), a native of Samarkand, who founded the major orthodox Sunni theological school – *al-Maturidiyyah* – which acquired prominence among the various Turkic peoples of wider Central Asia.[3] However, from the eleventh century, most Muslims in the Badakhshan region of present-day Tajikistan have adhered to the Shi'i Isma'ilism of the Ja'fari *madhhab*.[4] From the tenth century, under the influence of Central Asian merchants and proselytisers, Hanafi Sunnism also took root among the Volga

Bulgars,[5] who were among the ancestors of the present-day Volga Tatars.[6] Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, the proliferation among Tatars and other Turkic peoples of Hanafi Sunnism received a further boost after a large part of Eurasia (Russia, Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia) became included within the Genghizid (Mongol) Empire, the ruling elite of which had converted to Sunni Islam of Hanafi *madhhab*. During that time some Muslim Tatars migrated to present-day Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and Belarus, thus forming the historical core for these countries' autochthonous Muslim populations, known as Lipka Tatars.

At roughly the same period, Hanafi Sunnism was introduced in Dobruja in present-day Romania by Seljuq Turks arriving from Anatolia. Between the late fourteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the main promoters of the Turkish version of Hanafi Sunnism across Eurasia were the Ottoman Turks who, at different periods, controlled present-day Crimea, Adjara, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and other territories of South-East Europe (the Balkans).[7] Under the Ottoman and Crimean Tatar influence, the majority of the Caucasus' Turkic Nogais, Kumyks and Karachai-Balkars, as well as various Circassian peoples and Adjarians, converted to 'Turkish' Hanafism. In the Balkans (especially in present-day Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Romania), which were under Ottoman rule for over five centuries, the Turks Islamicised a notable sector of the autochthonous population and introduced Ottoman Muslim structures, including muftiship,[8] *tekke*s (Islamic lodges) and *medreses*/*madrasah*s (Islamic schools) (Chapters 9, 10 and 17). The Ottomans were responsible for the formation in the region of a distinctive Islamised ethno-religious group – the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims).

Sufism

The advance of normative Islam occurred alongside the spread of non-legalistic Islam, predominantly in the form of Islamic mysticism, commonly known as Sufism (*tasawwuf*). In the Caucasus, the first Sufis appeared in southern Dagestan between the tenth and eleventh centuries. Darband, in particular, hosted such influential Sufi thinkers as Abu al-Jurzani (d. ca.1098) and Abu Bakr al-Darbandi (ca.1058–1145),[9] who followed in the steps of the main Ṣufi rationalists, Abu al-Qasim al-Baghdadi (830–910) and Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri (986–1074), as well as Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058–1111), a leading Ash'arite thinker.[10] Dagestan and some other parts of the north-eastern Caucasus witnessed the spread of so-called popular or 'folk' Sufism which became the main form of Muslimness among some local Muslim populations. During the Seljuq and Genghizid domination, there emerged the first Sufi *tariqah*s (brotherhoods) in the Dagestani highlands. Until the fifteenth century, the most influential among them was the Suhrawardiyyah[11] which was backed by the rulers of Iran. From the sixteenth century, the Suhrawardiyyah was superseded by the Naqshbandiyyah,[12] which had links with the Ottomans. The Naqshbandiyyah's Mujaddidi-Khalidi branch[13]

gained particular prominence, its followers deviating from the Sufi triad of shari´ah-ṭariqah-haqiqah (shari'ah-path-truth) by focusing on shari´ah, perceived as the Muslims' sole defence against rule by foreign *kafir*s (infidels).

In the course of the Caucasus War (1817–64), the Naqshbandis turned into militant *ghazi*s (fighters in the name of Islam) fighting against the Russians. Following St. Petersburg's crushing of the *ghazawat* (Islamised resistance), a large number of them conducted *hijrah* (emigration) to the Ottoman Empire, while the remainder either went underground or switched their allegiance to the Qadiri *tariqah*,[14] the members of which accepted peaceful co-existence with the Russians within the Russian state (Akaev 2010: 66). Since then, the Qadiri *wird* (branch) of sheikh Kunta-hajjee Kishiev (d.1867) has been particularly influential among Chechens and Ingush. In the early twentieth century, Dagestan also acquired the Shadhili *tariqah*.[15] Under Soviet atheistic rule, the positions of the Naqshbandiyyah, Qadiriyyah and Shadhiliyyah were severely undermined, albeit these *tariqah*s retained their secretive existence. Since the end of communism, Naqshbandi, Shadhili and Qadiri Sufism has turned into the dominant forms of 'official' Islam in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia. In neighbouring Azerbaijan, historically among the first Sufis were Yasawis,[16] Khalwatis[17] and Bayramis[18] who appeared there during the Seljuq domination. In the sixteenth century, northern Azerbaijan also acquired a notable number of Naqshbandis and Qadiris, and southern Azerbaijan Kubrawis.[19] However, by the end of the Soviet era, unlike in the north-eastern Caucasus, Sufism had largely disappeared in Azerbaijan.

In Central Asia, throughout history, the Yasawiyyah, Naqshbandiyyah, and, at some periods, the Mawlawiyyah[20] were among the largest *tariqahs*. The Yasawi *tariqah* was particularly influential among the region's various Turkic peoples, while the Naqshbandiyyah included Muslims of Turkic (Uzbeks, Kazakhs and others) and Iranian (Tajik and others) ethnic origins. It is significant that Central Asia's Naqshbandis, who belonged to the Sufi school of Khwaja Yusuf Hamadani (d.1147), combined Islamic mysticism with mundane activity. In the fifteenth century, under the Timurids (1370–1469), they underwent organisational institutionalisation and became politically and economically involved with the ruling elites. Under the Uzbek dynasty of the Shaibanids, who succeeded the Timurids, there emerged powerful Naqshbandi dynasties – the Ahraris[21] – who obtained hereditary rights to the title of sheikh al-Islam of Samarkand (Yemelianova 2019: 25–26). During the imperial Russian, and, especially Soviet rule, as in the Caucasus, the Sufi networks were severely weakened and partially disrupted. Still, the Naqshbandis and some Yasawis preserved their enclave and clandestine existence enabling them to re-emerge at the end of the Soviet era during the Gorbachevian liberalisation. In independent Uzbekistan, a sanitised version of Naqshbandiyyah has been officially endorsed and institutionalised (Chapter 13). In the Volga-Urals, which from the times of the Kazan khanate (1438–1552) hosted the Yasawiyyah and Naqshbandiyyah, Sufism was effectively uprooted during the Soviet period.

With the arrival of the Ottomans to the Balkans in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,[22] several Sufi brotherhoods soon became widespread and in fact were instrumental in attracting locals to Islam.[23] As noted earlier, the Ottomans imposed in the region their political-administrative and Islamic structures, including Sufi lodges – *tekke*s. Among the dominant *tariqah*s in terms of size and distribution were the Khalwatiyyah and Bektashiyyah,[24] followed by the Naqshbandiyyah, Qadiriyyah and Rifa'iyyah,[25] as well as the Khalwatiyyah, Mawlawiyyah, Bayramiyyah, Sa'diyyah, Jelvediyyah and Bedeviyyah. In the nineteenth century, the Bektashishiyyah gained a particularly large following in the Albanian-populated lands of the central and western Balkans.[26] By the end of Ottoman rule in the late nineteenth century, there were nearly a hundred Bektashi *tekke*s across the region. After the fall of communist rule, some Bektashis, Khalwatis, Naqshbandis, Qadiris and Rifa'is, although severely bruised, retained a limited presence, while other *tariqah*s ceased to exist.[27]

'Folk' Islam

Finally, historically, as elsewhere in the world, Muslims of Eurasia massively resorted to religious practices and rituals that have little to do with both normative Islam and the more universally recognised types of Sufism, as they absorbed a variety of pre-Islamic beliefs and practices. In the northern Caucasus, a major influence on Islam emanated from local customary norms – *adat*s.[28] In Azerbaijan, Islam became rooted in pre-existent Zoroastrianism, while, in Central Asia, Islam absorbed elements of Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Nestorian Christianity. Between the tenth and sixteenth centuries, the evolution of Islam across a large part of Eurasia was affected by the tribal norms and belief systems of various militarily and politically superior Turkic and Turco-Mongol nomads. Among the Muslim Tatars and some Turkic peoples of the northern Caucasus, an influential factor was the Genghizid Law – the *Yasa* – while among the Caucasus' Circassians, it was the Circassian moral code – the *Adyghe Khabze*.[29] In some parts of the Balkans, Islam merged with pre-existent Eastern Christianity (Orthodoxy), as well as various pre-Christian beliefs. In Bosnia, various heterodox churches drawing on Manicheanism, Dualism and pantheism were of considerable influence. A particular case was the aforementioned Bektashiyyah which combined the outlook of Twelver Shi'ism with doctrinal elasticity. As a result, it was able to absorb the local customs of various Balkan peoples, while in Albania and Macedonia it de facto became synonymous with Islam. Across Eurasia, under the conditions of state atheism, these 'folk' Islamic beliefs and practices turned into key markers of 'Muslimness'. Their main custodians were village imams, elders and female Islamic authorities (*abystai*s, *otin*s and others). With the end of communism and in the face of mass migration from rural to urban areas the bearers of 'folk' Islam have however been left with an ever-shrinking pool of followers.

Revivalist Islam and *jihadism*

In addition to the survival and conditional re-emergence of historical forms of Islamic religiosity, what one has also been observing in Muslim communities across most of post-communist Eurasia is the proliferation of various forms of new globalist Islamic religiosity, which collectively may be referred to as revivalist Islam (Choueiri 2010: 4). In the immediate years following the collapse of the communist system, the agents of revivalist Islam were equally represented by local and foreign actors. Consequently, revivalist Islam, particularly in its Salafi guise, may be found in practically all post-communist Eurasian countries, though the levels of it, let alone its institutionalisation, differ significantly from country to country and there is a general divide between most of post-Soviet Eurasia and Central and Eastern Europe. Although some Islamic revivalists are prone to religiously motivated (political) violence, the overwhelming majority are peaceful and law-abiding citizens who shun violence.

Among locally rooted Islamic revivalist organisations and groupings that emerged during the late communist and early post-communist era were, for example, the Islamic Renaissance Party (the IRP) and the Azerbaijan Islamic Party (AIP). The IRP was established in June 1990 in Astrakhan and had a strong presence in Dagestan and Tajikistan. It advocated the gradual and peaceful re-Islamisation of historically Muslim regions of the USSR through Islamic education and promotion of Islamic family ethics. The AIP, which was created around 1992, sought the gradual transformation of Azerbaijan into an Islamic republic modelled on the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the early 1990s, in the Ferghana valley, there were also the active pro-revivalist organisations of *Baraka* (Blessing), *Tauba* (Repentance), *Islam Lashkarlari* (Islamic Warriors) and *Adolat* (Justice).[30] Subsequently, these organisations and their like either merged with, or were superseded by, transnational revivalist organisations and movements which began to proliferate in the post-communist Muslim lands.

Of particular influence has been the transnational Islamic party – *Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islamii* (HTI, Party of Islamic Liberation) which throughout the 1990s acquired a considerable following in the Ferghana valley, as well as in Tatarstan and Ukraine. The Tahriris, who officially denounced violence, sought the creation of an Islamic state through a gradual societal re-Islamisation. During the same period, the region also witnessed the emergence of local and regional radical Islamic revivalist organisations, some of which embraced jihadism. The major catalysts behind this were armed conflicts – the Bosnia War (1992–5), the Tajik Civil War (1992–7) and the Russo-Chechen Wars (1994–6, 1999–2009). These bloody conflicts, in which many thousands of civilians and fighters lost their lives and over a million of people were displaced,[31] attracted foreign jihadis with international experience going back to the 'Afghan jihad' of 1979–89. Thus, in the course of the Tajik War, the militants from the United Tajik Opposition

(UTO) received military and financial support from Tajik Islamists in northern Afghanistan.

In the North Caucasus, in 2007, radical Islamists under the leadership of Dokka Umarov proclaimed the establishment of the largely virtual Caucasus Emirate (*Imarat Kavkaz,* IK, 2007–13) on the territory of Chechnya, Dagestan and adjacent areas. Although by the late 2000s the jihadi insurgency in the North Caucasus was largely suppressed by the Russian government, cells of radicalised North Caucasian Muslims continued to menace the Russian state for years to come. In 2012–5, many surviving members of the Caucasus Emirate directly entered the global *jihadi* networks by joining al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria – *Jabhat al-Nusra* (The Front of Supporters) – and later the *vilayat Kafkaz* within the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (*Daesh*, 1999–) (Ratelle 2020: 294). As the fighting in Syria and Iraq, but also in Libya, took on a more international face, with over 25,000 foreign fighters from all over the world joining various armed factions, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Volga-Urals and Eastern Europe contributing their share. It is estimated that *jihadi*s from Russia's Caucasus and the Volga-Urals made up between 4,000 and 7,000 (out of a total of Muslim population of around 20 million); from Azerbaijan, around 500 (out of a total Muslim population of 9 million); and from Central Asia, around 4,000 (out of a total Muslim population of 66 million (Yemelianova 2018: 35). In the Balkans, around 300 *jihadi*s came from Bosnia (out of a total Muslim population of 1.8 million); 300 from Kosovo (out of a total Muslim population of 1.6 million); over 200 from Albania (out of a total Muslim population of 1.6 million); and over 200 from Macedonia (out of a total Muslim population of around 675,000, according to 2002 census).[32] It is worth noting that in relative terms, the number of *jihadi*s coming from various post-communist states was considerably lower than the number of *jihadi*s from France, Belgium and some other states of Western Europe (Yemelianova 2018: 35).

Transnational Islamic educational and missionary movements

Post-communist Islamic discourse has also been influenced by various transnational Islamic movements of an educational and missionary orientation. Among the most widespread has been Fethullah Gülen's movement, known as *Hizmet* (Service). At some point, most post-communist states with large or sizable Muslim populations had, or continue to have, *Hizmet*'s daughter organisations, often in the form of NGOs, colleges, publishing houses and businesses (Balci 2018: 58). Though the recent parting of the ways between the Turkish government and *Hizmet* has drastically reduced the latter's activity across the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Turkish Islamic influence, including in the sphere of education, has persisted via the *Diyanet* (Religious Affairs Directorate)

(Chapters 11 and 17). Another major trans-national revivalist movement, *Tablighi Jamaat* (TJ, Society of Preachers), has sought to attract followers in the Eurasian space and has also been active in the sphere of Islamic education in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Chapter 12). In Ukraine, representatives of the transnational Sufi-oriented movement, *Al-Ahbash*,[33] have controlled one of the country's muftiates – SAUM – thus directly entering the sphere of public Islam (Chapter 7).

The region's Islamic domain has also included some predominantly Turkish Sufi and Sufi-oriented groups and movements. Most prominent have been the *Suleymancis*, the followers of the Naqshbandi movement of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888–1959). *Suleymancis* established a presence in the system of Islamic education in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Adjara (Georgia). The other Turkish Naqshbandi sheikh who has acquired some following in Azerbaijan, and to a lesser extent in Kazakhstan, is Osman Nuri Topbaş (b.1942); in Baku, Topbaş' followers forged close links with the Azerbaijan Directorate of Spiritual Affairs which enabled them to run religious institutions in the provinces. Yet another influential Turkish quasi-mystical, apolitical and pietistic movement that has been active in the Balkans and Central Asia is the *Nurcu*, which has been concerned with the promotion of the ideas of the Turkish philosopher and mystic Saït Nursi (1878–1960) about Islam's compatibility with science and modernity. In Central Asia, with the exception of Uzbekistan, the *Nurcu* have been especially influential in the commercial sector and among students (Chapter 11).

'Nationalisation' of Islam: between 'Eurasianisation' and 'Europeanisation'

A common trait among practically all post-communist Eurasian states is the 'nationalisation' of Islam. This is foremost in the cases of newly (primarily first time but also reconstituted) independent states that emerged out of the ruins of the USSR and socialist Yugoslavia. In most of these countries, Muslim populations proceeded with the founding of their (autocephalous) religious organisations – Islamic spiritual administrations, commonly known as muftiates. However, as in many countries there was a dominant ethnic group or particular Sufi group (as in Chechnya and Dagestan) within the Muslim population, this defined the parameters of 'national' Islam. Across the discussed region, the new (or repackaged as new) governing elites embarked on the nationalisation and institutionalisation of Islam in order to retain or establish control over Islam and Muslims. In doing so they endorsed (or orchestrated) the establishment of official national Islamic institutions which they could easily control and coerce, if needed. These national Islamic institutions were to serve as sole representatives and custodians of 'acceptable' Islam and were entrusted by the state with the issuing of 'binding decisions in all administrative and spiritual issues pertinent to the Muslim community' (Roy and Elbasani 2015: 461). At the same time, arguably, these

policies of nationalisation-cum-étatisation of Islam served the worldly interest of subjecting religion to the service of concrete political projects and agendas (Elbasani 2015: 3). This trend of Islam's nationalisation through institutionalisation, though with several notable exceptions, has been common across post-communist Eurasia, albeit it acquired two distinctive forms which could be generally labelled as the 'Eurasian' and 'European' models. While the 'Eurasian' model implied a modification of the state-Muslim relations that existed before the end of communism, the 'European' model represented a departure from those relations in favour of a 'European' system of governance of Islam.

The 'Eurasian' model of state-Muslim relations

Arguably, the 'Eurasian' model characterises state-Muslim relations in the Muslim-majority Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan and Russia (the Volga-Urals and the North Caucasus).[34] It is rooted in early Islamisation accounting for the various degrees of these regions' belonging to Islamic civilisation. Following the end of communism, the countries of these regions have largely retained an authoritarian political system and the institution of the state-controlled muftiate. The effectiveness of the 'Eurasian' model has varied significantly from country to country. In Uzbekistan, the muftiate has become well integrated into the governing structure: it has ensured the separation of Islam from politics and promoted 'Uzbek' Islam, fused with the 'sanitised' Naqshbandiyyah (Chapters 2 and 13). In Turkmenistan, the level of Islamic representative bodies' co-optation within the state structures has exceeded even that of the communist era, as the official Islamic administration was denied the status of muftiate. Instead, the official Muslim clergy, who were affiliated to the *qaziyate* (a lower level of Islamic administration), were turned into civil servants. In Kazakhstan, the state formally retained the Soviet model of state-Muslim relations in the form of the muftiate, which has participated in the state-driven 'Kazakhisation' of Islam by means of the 'Hanafi project'. However, this process has been accompanied by the de facto negation of traditional Kazakh Sufi Islam, intertwined with tribal customs (Chapter 3). In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as in Russia's republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, the preservation of the 'Eurasian' model has been similarly rather superficial as it occurred either alongside the parallel existence of non-state Islamic structures and their representatives, including those linked to the *Tablighi Jama'ah,* the *Hizmet* movement and other foreign organisations and groupings of Salafi, Sufi and missionary orientation (Chapter 12), or the muftiate's implicit Salafisation (Chapter 15).

In historically Shi'i Azerbaijan, the persistence of the 'Eurasian' model has been ensured by sheikh-ul-Islam Allashukur Hummat Pashazadeh (b. 1949) who has been in charge of the Islamic establishment since 1980. Pashazadeh has been directly involved in the implementation of official

Baku's secularist policy in the service of the ruling Aliyev dynasty, according to which 'Azerbaijani' Islam has been portrayed as being apolitical, cultural and trans-sectarian in nature (Chapter 4). An important factor in the 'nationalisation' of 'Azerbaijani' Islam has been Azerbaijan's close relationship with Sunni Turkey, which positions itself as the political model in the Turkic world. Among the channels of Turkish Islamic influence have been the aforementioned Gülenist movement (till 2016) and the *Diyanet* (Chapter 11). In the post-Soviet North Caucasus, all Muslim autonomies acquired their own muftiates which were modelled on the Soviet-era muftiate of the North Caucasus (DUM SK). In the north-east, muftiates have been dominated by the state-endorsed Naqshbandi and Qadiri clergy, and in the north-west, by Hanafi clerics (Chapter 15). In Chechnya, from the 2000s, the level of state control of the Islamic sphere has surpassed that of the Soviet period due to the claim of its leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, to both political and religious authority, and the government-spearheaded societal and partially legal re-Islamisation of the republic along the lines of the Qadiri *wird* (*tariqah* branch) of Kunta-hajjee (Chapter 5).

Since the break-up of the USSR, Russia's Volga-Urals region, with its large Muslim Tatar and Bashkir population, has witnessed the multiplication of Soviet type muftiates competing for the status of Russia's main federal or regional muftiate. A new post-Soviet development has been the establishment in Moscow of an umbrella organisation – the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR, in Russian) – which has challenged the Soviet-era Ufa muftiate (DUMES, in Russian) as Russia's leading federal muftiate. All Tatar- and Bashkir-dominated muftiates have been either directly or indirectly incorporated within the system of government. A special case has been the muftiate of Tatarstan (DUM RT) which developed into the largest muftiate (in terms of the number of affiliated Muslim communities) in European Russia. DUM RT, in coordination with the Tatarstan authorities, has been promoting Kazan as the potential new capital of 'Russian' Islam (Chapter 6).

The 'European' model of state-Muslim relations

The 'European' model of governance of Islam and other religions has been adopted, albeit with significant modifications, in most countries of post-communist Central and South-Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and to some extent in Georgia and Ukraine (Chapters 7–10, 14, 16–18). At its core has been the increasing treatment of Islam and Muslims as they are treated in Western Europe, where they represent a diasporic phenomenon.[35] Thus, unlike in Eurasia and Eastern Europe, where Muslims have lived for many centuries and therefore are regarded as part of the autochthonous population, in Western Europe, with the exception of Spain and Sicily, Islam and Muslims are in historical terms a relatively new phenomenon associated with post-World War II Muslim labour migration from Turkey, the Maghreb, Pakistan,

Kashmir and other Muslim countries and regions. In accordance with the diasporic approach, the indigenisation (naturalisation, normalisation) of Islam requires its domestication by means of 'Europeanisation', which may proceed both bottom-up (initiated by a plethora of Muslim actors, including intellectuals, religious, civil society and political leaders) and top-down (at the initiative of governments of individual European states or supra-national pan-European organisations). The bottom-up 'Europeanisation' of Islam may take place in a variety of spheres. Ruiter talks, for example, about the 'gradual Europeanisation of Muslim theology and practices' (Ruiter 2017: 15), which occurs at the structural (the institutionalising of Islam); practical (the individualisation of Islamic practices) and theological (a new hermeneutics of interpretation of the Qur'an/Sunnah) levels. This Europeanisation, according to him, also involves the establishment of national Islamic councils, the emergence of political and civic leaders and associations, and the Westernisation of mosques. Its other important manifestations are the democratisation of religious authority and the development of Islamic youth culture, where traditional law schools lose much of their meaning, shari'ah undergoes reinterpretation and Islam acquires the status of a minority culture (Ruiter 2017: 15). This impressive, yet undoubtedly not exhaustive, list of areas of purported bottom-up Europeanisation of Islam, along with top-down policies, indicates a process towards an end state which has been variously called 'Euro-Islam' or 'European' Islam.

Euro-Islam

Both terms, 'Euro-Islam' and 'European Islam' came into circulation in the last decade of the twentieth century. The first, arguably coined by Bassam Tibi, signifies 'a cultural pattern of Islam adjusted to the political culture of civil society and to the separation between culture and politics. This liberal design of Islam could result from a process of indigenisation of Islam in which Islam could become European' (Tibi 2001: 206). Accordingly, 'Euro-Islam' is about 'an open-minded cultural and political adjustment of Islam to European standards to facilitate the embracing of European identity by Muslim migrants'. It presents a re-interpretation of Islam which makes it 'compatible with four European constitutional standards: laicism (that is, the separation of religion and politics), secular tolerance based on individual human rights (this includes the freedom of dissent and belief), democratic pluralism and last but not least, civil society' (Tibi 2001: 226). The Europeanisation of Islam towards 'Euro-Islam', according to Tibi, though it may also be top-down, is seen as primarily a bottom-up process: 'Though I do not exclude the state as an actor, I believe that civil society should be the primary framework for making Euro-Islam a reality in Europe' (Tibi 2010: 164). However, it appears that the civil society Tibi refers to means secular lay groups and individuals rather than Muslim religious collectivities. In this regard, his understanding of 'Euro-Islam'

diverges from that which is pursued by national governments in partnership with Muslim religious umbrella organisations, and in the building of which pan-European supranational institutions are engaged. In the end, this 'Euro-Islam' is more political than religious in its nature, the religious side of Tibi's 'Euro-Islam' being relegated exclusively to the private sphere, while the public sphere remains strictly secular. In the end, Tibi's envisioned 'Euro-Islam' is not just a modern 'Europeanised' version of Islam but is arguably merely a sterile remnant of it.

Viewed from a top-down perspective, 'Euro-Islam' implies a transnational pan-European project, covering, if not all European, then at least EU member, states. In this regard, 'Euro-Islam' is a generic term referring to a set of lowest common denominators and criteria deriving from outside the Muslim populations throughout Europe. 'Euro-Islam' is something arguably sterile but acceptable (from the point of view of non-Muslims) across the board. Though individual nation states are prominent actors in laying the foundations for such a version of Islam, they act not individually but as a team, sometimes supervised, but more often tacitly encouraged and guided, by pan-European institutions. The EU itself may become an active participant in the formation of 'Euro-Islam', particularly through the directives of the European Commission and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and similar institutions. Mirtaheri even argues that what he refers to as 'European Islams' but is in fact 'Euro-Islam' as defined above,

> may only appear through active and affirmative engagement of European institutions, including the EU, which in turn, entails more flexible and more pragmatic versions of secularism. Indeed the EU might be better positioned to engage in such initiatives compared to most European governments caught in deadlocked national debates over the integration of Muslims. (Mirtaheri 2010: 84)

European Islam

Tibi's understanding of 'Euro-Islam' is at sharp variance with the other notion, namely, 'European' Islam. The concept of 'European' Islam may be seen as coterminous but not synonymous with that of 'Euro-Islam'. The first difference stems from the fact that 'European' Islam may imply either a pan-European or a national level. While on the pan-European level it may resemble Tibi's 'Euro-Islam', on the national level 'European' Islam inevitably develops plural Islams; every national 'European' Islam may have its own distinct dogmatic, ritualistic, ethical and structural features, thereby making the content of particular 'European' Islams different from each other, even if, arguably, they would share some similarities too. On the pan-European level,

> the notion of a 'European Islam' refers to the creation of a public space common to the various Muslim communities living in Europe and, under the influence of their integration into non-Muslim and largely secularised societies, to the emergence of new interpretations and practices of Islam. (Bougarel 2005a: 29, n. 1)

Bougarel argues that 'one has to consider European Islam not as an existing fact, but as an ongoing process' (Bougarel 2005b: 12). Cesari, however, is unequivocal: 'if European Islam means the adjustment of Muslims' practices to Europe's post-Enlightenment values and norms such as human rights, rule of law, democracy, and gender equality, European Islam already exists' (Cesari 2018: xi). Besides the pan-European level, 'European' Islam implies a national level, where both state (top-down) and non-state (bottom-up) actors participate in the creation and sustenance of it. Though there may be features common to 'European' Islam in different nation-states, because of socio-political differences, including state-religion relations and regimes of governance of religion, it is more appropriate to talk of a spectrum of national European Islams, rather than one universal 'European' Islam. Moreover, in some European states, national 'European' Islam is already seen as a *fait accompli*, a fact, not a project to be pursued.

Specifics of the 'European' model in Eastern Europe

Compared to Western Europe, in a number of Eastern European countries national 'European' Islam is seen by different state and non-state actors, not as a diasporic phenomenon, but as a historical fact and even part of their national heritage, which arguably needs not creation but preservation against unwanted alien and novel forms of Islamic religiosity.[36] Elbasani argues that in post-communist Eastern Europe, in particular the Balkans, the

> term "European Muslim" is now employed to suggest their active support for the post-1989 project of "return" to Europe and the concrete criteria of EU accession – democracy, the rule of law and market economy – with which candidate countries are required to comply'. (Elbasani 2015: 6)

Thus, in post-communist Eastern Europe, 'European Islam' may imply the regaining and preservation of an indigenous Islamic heritage – now, however, filtered through the aforementioned novel EU accession criteria. Indeed, in post-communist Eastern Europe, official national Muslim administrations constantly present Eastern European Muslims as 'indigenous', 'autochthonous', in other words, as being 'of' (Eastern) Europe/Europeans. Consequently, Islam in Eastern Europe (or, to put it another way, the Islam of Eastern Europeans) is unequivocally discursively presented as 'European Islam', in what may be called 'indigenization of religious identity'.[37]

Thus, on the level of national 'European' Islam(s), one may see several ways of understanding the content of 'European Islam' in a given locality, ranging from the 'traditionalist' view (which would include forms of local folk religiosity being incorporated into the notion of 'European Islam') to a 'modernist' view (which would accord the status of 'European Islam' only to reformed modern forms of its religiosity) with a number of intermediary positions. In any case, the designation of Muslims and Islam as 'European' first of all implies a (positively charged) distinction from Middle Eastern, Asian, African and any other possible Islam(s). The keyword 'European' is routinely meant to signal the affinity of this Islam with the perceived European value system. In other words, in the framework of the politics of loyalty and belonging, it is argued by the advocates of this label that the 'European Islam' of (indigenous/autochthonous) Eastern European Muslims belongs in and to this part of Europe, and through it to the entire European cultural zone. As Bougarel notes,

> in many works about south-eastern Europe, Balkan Islam is defined as a "genuine European Islam", since its followers are autochthonous and largely secularized Muslims. Implicitly, this "European Islam" is then contrasted with a "non-European Islam", encompassing not only those countries with a Muslim majority, but also the Muslim migrants who settled in western Europe in the second half of the twentieth century. (Bougarel 2005b: 1)

In post-communist Eastern Europe, in the minds of the local Muslim leadership supported by the mainstream political elite, this 'European Islam' is not only set to stay but also to expand. For this to happen, a double strategy is called for – on the one hand, the promotion of the image and status of local forms of Islam in Eastern Europe as 'European Islam' *par excellence*, and on the other hand, the fending off other (read, alien, and unacceptable) forms of Islam, usually falling under the category of 'revivalist' Islam. The double process of the 'Europeanisation' of Islam and its presentation as 'European Islam' in post-communist Eastern Europe lays the ground for the two-way churchification of Islam in a range of Eastern European countries. While the 'Europeanisation' of Islam works foremost on the legal and political levels, presenting Islam in Eastern Europe as *de facto* already 'European' is promoted primarily by Muslim communities, and particularly by their representative Islamic spiritual administrations. National 'European Islam' falls in between, on the one hand, local cultural forms of Islamic religiosity typical of Eastern Europe, often of a non-normative/non-legalist nature, and, on the other hand, transnational deterritorialised Islam of a revivalist nature. While 'European Islam' seeks to absorb those historical forms of Islamic religiosity, transnational deterritorialised Islam denies their validity altogether and vehemently opposes the Europeanisation of Islam.

The top-down led institutionalisation of Islam, may, and indeed in post-communist Eastern Europe does become co-optation and serves as part of the 'churchification' of Islam, when the state expects representative Muslim organisations to model themselves on and function like Christian Churches with their ecclesiastical hierarchical structures. Though this state-pursued strategy of churchification of Islam is not universal in Eastern Europe, one may discern its features in half a dozen post-communist Eastern European countries, for instance, Bosnia (Chapter 10), Lithuania (Chapter 8), North Macedonia and Bulgaria (Chapter 18). What is understood here as churchification is the requirement or at least expectation on the state's part that national Muslim communities establish representative religious organisations headed by spiritual authorities who not only serve as interlocutors between the state and the Muslim population but also as the sole (hierarchically structured) ecclesiastical institutions, staffed by professional religious servants of different ranks in subordination to each other.

Conclusion

As we have shown, the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s was accompanied by the reconfiguration of the political, social and external orientation of the ex-communist states of Eurasia. While Russia, Belarus, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus (with the exception of Georgia) have combined their nation- and state-building projects with their multi-vector external engagement, the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, the Baltics and to a considerable degree, Georgia and Ukraine[38], have allied themselves politically and militarily with the West, embodied by the EU and NATO. This new political divide of formerly communist Eurasia has had major implications for its Muslims and for state-Muslim relations. In particular, it has led to the emergence of two distinctive models of state governance of Islam. One, the 'Eurasian' model signifies a modification, albeit with significant variations, of the old system based on the state's tight control over the Islamic sphere. The other, the 'European' model, presents an adjustment of state-Muslim relations in Eastern Europe to those in Western Europe, where Muslims are widely perceived through diasporic lenses. In order to overcome this historical and epistemological discrepancy, the East European governments have sought to reinterpret the existing notions of 'Euro-Islam' and 'European Islam' to include the indigenous Islam of the Balkans, Poland and the Baltics. Among the mechanisms of this re-interpretation has been the churchification of Islam which works principally on the legal and political levels, and which presents Islam in Eastern Europe as being intrinsically 'European'.

Despite the outlined divergence in the models of state-Muslim relations across post-communist Eurasia, there have persisted significant commonalities in how the governments of various post-communist countries define 'national' Islam and how they securitise various 'foreign' Islams. At the

theological level, national and local Islamic leaders (perhaps with the exception of *al-Raid*'s leadership in Ukraine) have largely remained within the tenets of 'traditional' Islam and, associated with it, 'folk' Islam. They have barely been involved in the juristic debate related to European *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), or *fiqh al-aqaliyyat* (minorities' *fiqh*), propagated by the al-Azhar scholars Taha Jabir 'Alwani (1935–2016) and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b.1926) (Alwani 2010; al-Qaradawi 2003). Additionally, there have been some common patterns in local Muslims' rediscovery of their Muslimness, in the nature and media of their engagement with the historical Islamic heartland in the Middle East, Turkey and Iran, as well as in their responses to global Islam. We hope this volume will shed some light on both the commonalities and differences in the ongoing Islamic dynamic across post-communist Eurasia and epistemologically reconnect the studies of Islam and Muslims in the Middle East, post-Soviet Eurasia and Eastern and Western Europe.

Notes

1 On the Islamisation of the Caucasus and Central Asia, see Khanbabaev (2010) and Yemelianova (2019).
2 In 1122, the Emirate of Tiflis was finally defeated by the Georgian king, David IV, who re-asserted the supremacy of the Orthodox Church over Tiflis.
3 Here we distinguish between Central Asia in a narrow and a wider sense. The former relates to the five post-Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, while the latter often also includes eastern Russia, the southern Caucasus, Tibet, north-eastern Iran, northern Afghanistan, northern Turkey, north-western Pakistan and northern India.
4 The important role in the spread of Isma'ilism in Badakhshan belonged to its renowned resident, Nasir Khusraw (1004-1088) who converted to Isma'ilism in Fatimid Egypt.
5 Volga Bulgars, who originated from the northern Caucasus, are not ethnically related to the Bulgars of modern Bulgaria. On the adoption of Islam by the Volga Bulgars, see Muslimov (1996).
6 It is believed that the Bulgar ruler Almysh made Islam the official religion on 21 May 922 during the visit to Volga Bulgaria of Ahmad ibn Fadlan, the Abbasid ambassador.
7 On the Turkish Islamisation of South East Europe, see Norris (1993).
8 On the institution of muftiship in the Ottoman Empire, see Repp (1986).
9 On Abu Bakr al-Darbandi and his Sufi encyclopaedia *Raihan al-Haqaiq*, see Alikberov (2003). And on his Ṣūfī encyclopaedia *Raiḥān al-Ḥaqāiq,* see Akiber K. Alikberov, *Epokha Klassicheskogo Islama na Kavaze* (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura RAN, 2003).
10 Ash'arites were the followers of the Basra-based Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (874–936), an adherent of the Shafi'i madhhab and the founder of the more dogmatic theological school within Sunni Islam.
11 The Suhrawardi tariqah originated in today's Iran. It is attributed to Diya al-Din Abu Najib al-Suhrawardi (1097–168) but developed by his nephew, Shihab al-Din Abu Hafs (1145–234) (Trimingham 1971: 14).
12 The Naqshbandi tariqah is named after Sufi sheikh Baha al-Din Naqshband (1318–89), a Persianised Bukharan.

13 The Mujaddidiyyah (from 'tajdid', lit. 'modernisation', in Arabic) was initiated by sheikh Ahmad al-Faruqi al-Sirhindi (1564–624), a leading reformist Naqshbandi sheikh from India.
14 Qadiri *tariqat* is named after 'Abd al-Qadir Gilani (1078–166), a Persian native of Gilan, who adhered to the Hanbali *madhhab*. In the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, the Qadiri *tariqah* was introduced to Syria and Egypt and, in the early seventeenth century to Istanbul, from where it might have spread to the Caucasus (Trimingham 1998: 41).
15 The Shadhili *tariqah* was founded by an influential Moroccan Sufi sheikh Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhili (1196–258).
16 The Yasawi *ṭariqah* is named after Sufi sheikh Ahmad Yasawi (1093–166), a Turkic native of Turkestan in present-day southern Kazakhstan. The Yasawi *ṭariqah* became an important medium of Islamisation among various Turkic peoples.
17 The Khalwatiyyah does not have an original teaching personality as it traces its origin to a number of semi-mystical Persian, Kurdish or Turkish ascetics (Trimingham 1998: 74).
18 The Bayrami *tariqah* was named after the Turkish Sufi sheikh Haji Bayram Veli (1352–430).
19 The Kubrawi *tariqah* was named after Naj al-Din Kubra (d.1221) from Khwarazm.
20 Mawlawis were the followers of Balkh-based mystic Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207–73).
21 Ahraris were followers of Naqshbandi khwaja Ubaidulla Ahrar (1404–90), a native of Samarkand.
22 The Ottomans absorbed Macedonia in 1371, Albania in 1418, Bulgaria in 1422, Serbia in 1459, Greece in 1460 and present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1463. In 1417, they also turned Wallachia (part of present-day Romania) into their vassal (Schwartz 2010).
23 On the origins of Sufism in the Balkans, see Norris (2006).
24 The Bektashiyyah is named after Haji Bektash Veli (1209–71), who was born in Khorasan. Currently, the headquarters of the Bektashi communities is situated in Tirana, Albania.
25 The Rifa'iyyah is named after the Iraqi Sufi sheikh Ahmad ibn al-Rifa'i (1118–82).
26 The increased presence in the Balkans of the Bektashiyyah, which was associated with the Ottoman military establishment, was triggered by its official ban in 1826.
27 For a fuller discussion of Sufism in the Balkans, see Roy and Elbasani (2015) and Elsie (2019).
28 On *adat*s in the North Caucasus, see Yemelianova and Akkieva (2020) and Bobrovnikov (2002).
29 On Adyghe Khabze, see Richmond (2008).
30 In 1996, radical members of these organisations united into a militant revivalist movement – the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – under the leadership of Tokhir Yuldoshev and Juma Hojiev (Namangani) who sought the violent removal of President Islam Karimov from office and the creation of an Islamic state in the Ferghana valley.
31 There are significant variations in the number of casualties during these wars provided by different sources. The average estimations are that during the Bosnian War of 1992–5 the number of dead was around 150,000; during the First and Second Russo-Chechen Wars of 1994–6 and 1999–2009, around 100,000; and

during the Tajik Civil War of 1992–7, around 100,000. See, for example, Burg and Shoup (2015: 169), Yemelianova (2019: 160) and Yemelianova (2020: 252).

32 *The Economist*, 18 April 2015. Available at https://www.economist.com/europe/2015/04/18/fight-the-good-fight (accessed 17 December 2021).

33 *Al-Ahbash*, or *Habashiyya*, is part of the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects (ACIP), founded in 1983 in Beirut by followers of the famous Lebanese Ethiopian-born Muslim scholar Abdullah al-Harari al-Habashi (1910–2008).

34 For more on the 'Eurasian' system of state-Muslims relations, see Yemelianova (2022).

35 For the debate on diasporic Islam, see, for example, Abou El Fadl (2004), Cesari (1995, 2004), Esposito and Voll (2001), Hofert and Armando (2000), Malik (2004), Otterbeck and Nielsen (2015) and Ramadan (2004, 2009).

36 For further elaboration of this argument, see Račius (2020).

37 For more on the indigenisation of religious identity, see Kozák (2009).

38 The war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, might have implications for Ukraine's state-Muslim relations.

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