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Bertrand Russell

The Analysis of Mind

ROUTLEDGE


The Analysis of Mind

Bertrand Russell wrote *The Analysis of Mind* during one of the most turbulent periods of his life. He began it in 1918 whilst in prison in London for his opposition to the First World War, and completed it in Peking (now Beijing) in 1921, where he had been giving lectures at the National University.

It is a vital book for understanding Russell's philosophy. He argues for a fresh conception of the mind, provided by his eclectic fusion of William James's 'neutral monism'; the emerging theory of behaviourism, to which Russell was strongly drawn; and his own new causal theory of meaning. As such, *The Analysis of Mind* built a foundation for the distinctive brand of much of his later philosophical writing. In his customary sharp prose, Russell explores fundamental questions about the mind, including desire and feeling; the vexed relationship between psychological and physical laws; sensations and mental images; memory; belief; and emotions and the will.

This Routledge Classics edition includes an Introduction by Thomas Baldwin.



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Bertrand
Russell

The Analysis of Mind

With an Introduction by Thomas Baldwin



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INTRODUCTION TO THE ROUTLEDGE CLASSICS EDITION

Russell wrote *The Analysis of Mind* during one of the most turbulent periods of his life. He began its composition in May 1918 while he was in Brixton prison for four months because of his opposition to the First World War, and completed it in Beijing in January 1921, where he had been giving some lectures (during this visit Russell became so seriously ill that his death was announced, first in the Japanese press, and then in the British press, which enabled him to read his own obituary notices when he recovered). Meanwhile he had visited Bolshevik Russia in 1920 and begun his relationship with Dora Black, who accompanied him on his visit to China, nursed him through his illness there, and married him on their return to England in August 1921. Along with these activities and emotional involvements, Russell continued to write at an extraordinary rate. While in prison, as well as starting work on what was to become *The Analysis of Mind*, he wrote up some lectures on logic and mathematics as his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (published in 1919). Once back from Russia he wrote *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (published in 1921) in which he praised the communist ideals of the Bolshevik revolution but expressed his

anxiety about the dictatorship of the proletariat; all the time that he was in China he was gathering materials for his book *The Problem of China* (published in 1922).

The Analysis of Mind, as the published text shows, is based on a series of fifteen lectures, though the variations in the length of the 'lectures' as published (from more than 30 pages to less than 10 pages) indicate that the book is not just the script of Russell's lectures. Russell gave these lectures in London from October 1919 until March 1920, and then again in Beijing later that year while he was turning them into the book which was published in June 1921. Russell begins the book with a short preface in which he says that his aim has been to reconcile two current tendencies in contemporary science with which he has some sympathy although they appear to be inconsistent: (i) a materialist approach to psychology which is exemplified by behaviourism; and (ii) an approach to physics inspired by Einstein which replaces traditional conceptions of matter with a conception of events as fundamental. This is an unusual way of introducing his topic, since the tension between psychology and physics has usually been thought to be the difficulty of finding a place for the subjective aspects of psychological phenomena in the objective world of physical objects. Russell's approach reverses this: for him it is psychology which is materialist, at least insofar as it is behaviourist, while the priority afforded to space-time events in contemporary physics challenges traditional conceptions of matter. As Russell's discussion proceeds, however, he turns back to the traditional difficulty of framing a satisfactory account of human psychology which is consistent with our understanding of the physical world, and suggests that the way to reconcile psychology and physics is to adapt a position proposed by William James in his 1904 essays "Does Consciousness Exist?" and "A World of Pure Experience". James argues here that the familiar view that there is a fundamental distinction between mind and matter is a mistake; instead, mind and matter should be understood as different, but not incompatible, conceptualizations of a single, fundamental, substance that is 'neutral' between them – hence the name 'neutral monism' for this position. So, Russell suggests, if one can formulate both psychology and

physics in terms of different aspects of this neutral substance, there need be no conflict between them. James called this neutral substance ‘experience’ (as in the title of his essay “A World of Pure Experience”), though, as Russell remarks, this title suggests that the position is not altogether neutral, but tacitly idealist. Russell himself takes it that it is ‘sensations’ which are the fundamental neutral substances, where these are conceived as events that have both a psychological aspect, as sensing, and a physical aspect, as what is sensed – colours, sounds, smells etc. Russell acknowledges that in using this terminology he is harking back to the position of Ernst Mach whose *Analysis of Sensations* (1886; tr. 1897) he alludes to briefly in *The Analysis of Mind* (p. 108) and at greater length elsewhere. Whether sensations, as conceived by Mach and Russell, are themselves entirely neutral is open to question; Russell himself writes that ‘the physical world itself, as known, is infected through and through with subjectivity’ (p. 176). But it is not important here to pursue this issue since in *The Analysis of Mind* Russell is primarily concerned to present an analysis, a theory, of mind based on the conception of sensations as fundamental substances with both mental and physical aspects.

Before turning to the central themes of Russell’s theory it is important to consider why Russell felt at this time that it was important to address questions in the philosophy of mind directly. In his early philosophy he had relied on the presumption that mental states such as perception and belief involve reference to something non-mental, to ‘objects’ perceived or believed which may be unreal or false as well as real or true (in the light of current debates it is worth noting that Russell was familiar with Brentano’s thesis that reference to objects, or ‘intentionality’ as Brentano calls it, is the mark of mental phenomena – see pp. 5–6). Russell had initially conceived this reference to objects as *consciousness* of objects, typically as consciousness of propositions, complex objects such as the false proposition that France is a monarchy. But as he became persuaded that there was no place in his philosophy for unreal objects (such as the present King of France) or false propositions (such as that France is a monarchy) he adopted the view that mental states like belief involve a complex ‘multiple

relation' to real objects such as France and monarchy which he would previously have regarded as constituents of the propositions believed. The details of this position do not matter here; what is important is that it was criticized so forcefully by Wittgenstein that Russell was persuaded that 'what wanted doing in logic was too difficult for me' (as he wrote in 1916 to Ottoline Morrell). Nonetheless he returned to this topic in Lecture IV of his 1917–18 lectures on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" (*The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* 8, pp. 191–200), and three points from this lecture are significant: (i) he acknowledges that his previous multiple relation theory was unsatisfactory; (ii) he credits Wittgenstein with making it clear to him that the logical form of beliefs and similar mental states is quite different from that of other complex phenomena; (iii) he entertains the hypothesis that the account of belief advanced by James provides a way of dealing with the problems he had encountered, but rejects this on the grounds that James's position does not really deal with belief at all. In subsequent notes and essays, such as those written while he was in prison, however, he begins to reconsider this third point and to explore ways of dealing with beliefs which combine points from James's pragmatism and neutral monism with the logical distinctiveness of beliefs which Wittgenstein had emphasized. My suggestion, then, is that *The Analysis of Mind* is Russell's attempt to provide a new theory of mind which, by providing a satisfactory account of belief, solves what he calls 'the central problem in the analysis of mind' (p. 177), and thus moves his philosophy decisively beyond the block which he had encountered as a result of Wittgenstein's criticism of his earlier position.

To say this is not, of course, to imply that all here is new. Russell relies on the method of 'logical construction' which he had developed in his mathematical logic and then put to use to explain the relationship between 'The World of Physics and the World of Sense' in his 1914 lectures *Our Knowledge of the External World*. In *The Analysis of Mind* he uses very much the same line of thought to explain the relationship between sensations and the physical world. But what is novel in *The Analysis of Mind* is that he uses the same method of logical construction to construct psychological items, minds, from the same neutral

particulars, sensations. Whereas it is the physical aspects of sensations, their colours, shapes, sizes and so on which are the basis for the construction of physical objects, it is the psychological aspect of sensations, the seeing, feeling, touching and so on which are to be the basis for the constructions of minds. And what is significant here is the way in which Russell argues that because there are these two different methods of construction, drawing on different aspects of the one basic type of thing, sensations, it follows that the basic laws of physics and of psychology are radically distinct and mutually irreducible. So despite the *ontological* monism of his conception of sensations, there is a mind/matter *nomological* dualism in his radical separation of the laws of physics from those of psychology. Although Russell's way of formulating this position is idiosyncratic, it is a type of position which has become increasingly influential, most commonly as 'non-reductive physicalism' according to which psychological laws are not reducible to the laws of physics, although psychological states are constituted by physical states (see, for example, J. Fodor, *Psychosemantics*, MIT, Cambridge, Mass.: 1987). Contemporary positions of this kind take it that the ultimate particulars are physical, and thus differ from Russell's neutral monism; but they share Russell's insight that ontological monism, whatever the ultimate particulars may be, does not require a reductive monism which holds that all truths, and in particular all natural laws, are of just one type.

Russell begins *The Analysis of Mind* by identifying beliefs and desires as fundamental mental states, and the conception of psychology that guides his discussion is broadly that of our common-sense 'belief-desire' psychology. In particular, this provides the context for his discussion of behaviourism. Russell is sympathetic to behaviourist accounts of desire, but holds that such accounts do not do justice to the structure of beliefs, which depend on words and imagery in a way which behaviourism cannot accommodate. In the case of desire, Russell argues (in Chapter 3) that the basic phenomenon is a 'behaviour-cycle' whereby an animal or human engages in a type of action that brings about a result whose occurrence puts an end to the action. The result is the purpose of the behaviour-cycle, and the

animal or human desires this purpose while the behaviour-cycle is in progress. Russell acknowledges that this schema is too crude to account for many human desires, which are often accompanied by beliefs about them which give rise to further desires. But, he argues, while desires of this kind are more complex than simpler ones, they do not undermine the validity of the basic approach. It is, in fact, not difficult to see that Russell's account of the primitive phenomenon of desire is too crude: as Wittgenstein observed in his 1930 *Philosophical Remarks* §22 it implies that 'if I wanted to eat an apple, and someone punched me in the stomach, taking away my appetite, then it was this punch that I originally wanted'. But one can construct a modified version of Russell's account by introducing the concept of a function and proposing that desires are states of an organism whose proper function, when they are activated, is to cause the organism to take actions which lead to a specified outcome and then become inactive. This position is not vulnerable to Wittgenstein's objection, but it does have one implication which is significant for assessment of Russell's approach. With his emphasis on behaviour-cycles, Russell presents his account of desire as basically behaviourist; but the modified account is one according to which desires are states of an organism whose function is to cause behaviour-cycles. So the position is not behaviourist, but 'functionalist', in that it acknowledges the physical reality of states which are identified by their function. Just how the concept of a biological function is best understood is disputed, but that dispute is not of concern here (for a general discussion of functionalism in the philosophy of mind, see D. Braddon-Mitchell and F. Jackson, *Philosophy of Mind and Cognition*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007).

It would be neat if one could portray Russell's account of belief, or some modified version of it, as similarly functionalist. But in fact his account of belief is altogether more complicated. He does briefly discuss the behaviourist view that beliefs can be defined by their contribution to voluntary action, but he rejects this view for the reason that many of our beliefs do not contribute to our voluntary actions, and even when he has acknowledged that beliefs need be no more than dispositions to act, he holds that this objection is decisive

(pp. 189–90). His real objection, I think, is that a behaviourist approach cannot provide a satisfactory account of the content of beliefs; for this is the issue which had been central to his earlier problems concerning beliefs and to which he now devotes most attention. The account he now proposes is that beliefs combine a feeling of assent with a complex structure of images or words which combine as propositions to provide the content of what is believed, where ‘image-propositions’ are the fundamental type of content. He recognizes that this account of belief conflicts with behaviourism, but holds that on this point behaviourism ‘seems to me flatly to contradict experience’ (p. 116). But it is more important for him to assess how the account of belief fits with his neutral monism and the thesis that sensations are the basic particulars. Russell treats the feeling of assent as a distinctive sensation, so there is no difficulty about this point. What, however, about images? Russell’s view is that while they are not sensations, they are ‘copies’ of sensations, simple or complex, which they resemble (p. 116). So there is here an extension to Russell’s ontology: sensations are not the only fundamental particulars, there are also images. But since they resemble sensations, their addition is only a minor qualification of his neutral monism. And this resemblance helps to determine their content, what they are images of, though Russell adds that images often have distinctive effects, and where this is so, these effects also help to determine their content (p. 157): what makes a vague image of a dog an image of some particular dog is the fact that it has effects similar to those of the presence of that dog (p. 158–9). It is not easy to make good sense of this, but if one modifies the position by considering not the causal efficacy of an image, but the fact that the sensation which it ‘copies’ was itself caused by the presence of the dog in question, one arrives at a more sensible position which combines resemblance with causation as joint criteria for what an image is an image of. And once this modification is made, the central role of images in Russell’s account of the content of beliefs implies that this content is also determined in part through a causal theory.

Russell’s account of the meaning of images leads directly into his account of the meaning of words, since he holds that in thought the

words of 'inner speech' replace or recall images, a fact which shows us the 'most essential function of words, namely that through their connection with images, they bring us into touch with what is remote in time or space' (p. 154). What is different about words, of course, is that there can be no direct appeal to resemblance in determining their meaning; apart from the way in which their use is associated with images, Russell takes it that the main resource for determining their meaning is causal: 'The relation of a word to its meaning is of the nature of a causal law governing our use of the word and our actions when we hear it used' (p. 151). Russell gives no examples of causal laws of this kind, and we may well doubt that there are any; there is no causal law which determines the varied response of people who hear the sentence 'Liverpool FC is the greatest football club in the world'. One might reply that in a case of this kind the varied responses of people depend on their antecedent beliefs, and thus that the situation is comparable to complex causal situations. In a sense, something of this kind may be correct: but the varied responses are not effects determined by causal laws. Furthermore, since these responses depend on the antecedent beliefs of those who hear the sentence, and since for Russell the content of these beliefs depends on the meaning of the word-propositions involved in these beliefs, he cannot invoke these beliefs to explain the meaning of a word-proposition. What is right about Russell's position is the connection he draws between meaning and use, since, as Wittgenstein famously put it in *Philosophical Investigations* (§43), 'For a large class of cases of the employment of the word "meaning" – though not for all – the word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language'. Quite how the connection between meaning and use is to be further elucidated is a central issue in the philosophy of language, but it is certainly clear that it is not a matter of causal laws linking use and subsequent action. Arguably, there are cases where the situation here is comparable to that which applies to images, in that causation does contribute to determining the meaning of a word, not through the effects of its use, but because of the causes of its use – for example through the causal transmission of the name bestowed upon an object or person at its

'baptism'. But this causal theory of names is far removed from Russell's proposal, so it would not be correct to regard his causal theory of meaning as a precursor of more recent causal theories of names.

When, towards the end of *The Analysis of Mind* in Chapter 13, Russell presents a correspondence account of the truth of propositions, it is notable that he does not appeal to the causal aspect of his account of meaning. Following Frege, he affirms that 'we know the meaning of a proposition when we know what would make it true and what would make it false' (p. 210), and since he goes on to say that 'The meaning of a proposition is derivative from the meanings of its constituent words' (p. 210) it follows that the meanings of these words must specify their contribution to the truth-conditions of propositions in which they occur. Instead of indicating how these contributions might be based on the causal effects of their use, however, Russell returns to some of the considerations which had been central to his earlier discussions of belief, for example concerning negation, while introducing new points such as that propositions themselves are facts, and that simple image-propositions correspond to objective facts in a quasi-pictorial way. These points are reminiscent of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Russell had received a manuscript copy of the book in August 1919 before they met in December that year, when Russell agreed to provide the introduction for the book which he completed in April 1920. So Russell would surely have been thinking about Wittgenstein, whom he mentions in a footnote (p. 215, note 3), when completing his lectures and turning them into a book.

Russell connects his discussion of truth with his account of knowledge, and here the break with his earlier philosophy is striking. In his popular book *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912, p. 75) he had maintained that 'All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation'. In a note on memory written in 1918, however, he writes of himself as 'Having extruded "acquaintance" as an ultimate relation' (*Collected Papers* vol. 8, 1986, p. 262). This 'extrusion' is indeed complete in *The Analysis of Mind*: the word 'acquaintance' simply does not occur in the book. So there is no question here of 'knowledge by acquaintance'. While sensations

have a fundamental role in our knowledge of the world, he maintains that because of their neutral status as both mental and physical they are not 'cognitions' of the world: in virtue of their physical aspects they are *themselves* the colours, shapes, sounds, tastes etc. which he had previously taken to be the objects of which sensation yields knowledge by acquaintance (p. 106–7). Instead, their contribution to knowledge is causal: the occurrence of sensation gives rise to judgments of perception which normally constitute knowledge when they are true, although they are inherently fallible (p. 205). Russell develops this new account of knowledge by placing it in the context of the behaviourist approach to the mind he has already introduced, which leads him to consider the suggestion that the possession of knowledge is basically a matter of having reliably true beliefs (p. 198). Russell presents this position by comparing the situation of one who possesses knowledge with that of an accurate thermometer; the idea is that in both cases changes (in belief in one case, in the level of mercury in the other) are reliably linked to changes in the environment. Russell observes, however, that possessing knowledge is not just a matter of being a reliable instrument – a thermometer does not 'know' the temperature of its environment. Someone with knowledge must also have purposes in relation to which their beliefs are appropriate. But since he has argued for a behaviourist account of purpose, linked to his account of desire, there is no need on that account to hold that knowledge includes a requirement the beliefs be supported by evidential reasoning. So, to use a contemporary idiom, Russell's account of knowledge is 'externalist'. Russell adds that this approach does not provide a refutation of philosophical scepticism, which remains 'logically unassailable' (p. 209); but, he maintains, we do not need to be able to refute the sceptic's arguments in order to assure ourselves that we do have knowledge.

Current work in epistemology is dominated by sophisticated externalist theories of the kind Russell presents, but Russell's work in proposing a position of this kind passes unrecognized. This situation is all too characteristic of contemporary attitudes to *The Analysis of Mind*. We have tended to think of Russell as a philosopher whose great

works fall within the period from his beginning to write *The Principles of Mathematics* in 1900 to the completion of *Principia Mathematica* in 1913; and we have regarded his later works with suspicion, as evidence of ‘falling off’ after he had abandoned his work on logic and language. Within the analytic tradition in philosophy, it was only in the 1970s that the dominance of a philosophy of logic and language that owed much to Russell’s early work was challenged by those who held that the study of language is inseparable from an understanding of the mind – a challenge which has led to the proliferation of sophisticated functionalist theories of mind and externalist theories of knowledge. But this was just the project which Russell attempted in *The Analysis of Mind*, and despite its idiosyncrasies, the book does begin to sketch out some of the positions which are central to current debates. *The Analysis of Mind* is a book which deserves to be rescued from the oblivion into which it has fallen.

Thomas Baldwin,
March 2022.



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PREFACE

This book has grown out of an attempt to harmonize two different tendencies, one in psychology, the other in physics, with both of which I find myself in sympathy, although at first sight they might seem inconsistent. On the one hand, many psychologists, especially those of the behaviourist school, tend to adopt what is essentially a materialistic position, as a matter of method if not of metaphysics. They make psychology increasingly dependent on physiology and external observation, and tend to think of matter as something much more solid and indubitable than mind. Meanwhile the physicists, especially Einstein and other exponents of the theory of relativity, have been making "matter" less and less material. Their world consists of "events," from which "matter" is derived by a logical construction. Whoever reads, for example, Professor Eddington's *Space, Time and Gravitation* (Cambridge University Press, 1920), will see that an old-fashioned materialism can receive no support from modern physics. I think that what has permanent value in the outlook of the behaviourists is the feeling that physics is the most fundamental science at present in existence.

But this position cannot be called materialistic, if, as seems to be the case, physics does not assume the existence of matter.

The view that seems to me to reconcile the materialistic tendency of psychology with the anti-materialistic tendency of physics is the view of William James and the American new realists, according to which the "stuff" of the world is neither mental nor material, but a "neutral stuff," out of which both are constructed. I have endeavoured in this work to develop this view in some detail as regards the phenomena with which psychology is concerned.

My thanks are due to Professor John B. Watson and to Dr. T. P. Nunn for reading my MSS at an early stage and helping me with many valuable suggestions; also to Mr. A. Wohlgemuth for much very useful information as regards important literature. I have also to acknowledge the help of the editor of this Library of Philosophy, Professor Muirhead, for several suggestions by which I have profited.

The work has been given in the form of lectures both in London and Peking, and one lecture, that on Desire, has been published in the *Athenæum*.

There are a few allusions to China in this book, all of which were written before I had been in China, and are not intended to be taken by the reader as geographically accurate. I have used "China" merely as a synonym for "a distant country," when I wanted illustrations of unfamiliar things.

Peking,
January 1921.

1

RECENT CRITICISMS OF “CONSCIOUSNESS”

There are certain occurrences which we are in the habit of calling “mental.” Among these we may take as typical *believing* and *desiring*. The exact definition of the word “mental” will, I hope, emerge as the lectures proceed; for the present, I shall mean by it whatever occurrences would commonly be called mental.

I wish in these lectures to analyse as fully as I can what it is that really takes place when we, e.g. believe or desire. In this first lecture I shall be concerned to refute a theory which is widely held, and which I formerly held myself: the theory that the essence of everything mental is a certain quite peculiar something called “consciousness,” conceived either as a relation to objects, or as a pervading quality of psychical phenomena.

The reasons which I shall give against this theory will be mainly derived from previous authors. There are two sorts of reasons, which will divide my lecture into two parts:

- (1) Direct reasons, derived from analysis and its difficulties;
- (2) Indirect reasons, derived from observation of animals (comparative psychology) and of the insane and hysterical (psycho-analysis).

Few things are more firmly established in popular philosophy than the distinction between mind and matter. Those who are not professional metaphysicians are willing to confess that they do not know what mind actually is, or how matter is constituted; but they remain convinced that there is an impassable gulf between the two, and that both belong to what actually exists in the world. Philosophers, on the other hand, have maintained often that matter is a mere fiction imagined by mind, and sometimes that mind is a mere property of a certain kind of matter. Those who maintain that mind is the reality and matter an evil dream are called "idealists"—a word which has a different meaning in philosophy from that which it bears in ordinary life. Those who argue that matter is the reality and mind a mere property of protoplasm are called "materialists." They have been rare among philosophers, but common, at certain periods, among men of science. Idealists, materialists, and ordinary mortals have been in agreement on one point: that they knew sufficiently what they meant by the words "mind" and "matter" to be able to conduct their debate intelligently. Yet it was just in this point, as to which they were at one, that they seem to me to have been all alike in error.

The stuff of which the world of our experience is composed is, in my belief, neither mind nor matter, but something more primitive than either. Both mind and matter seem to be composite, and the stuff of which they are compounded lies in a sense between the two, in a sense above them both, like a common ancestor. As regards matter, I have set forth my reasons for this view on former occasions,¹ and I shall not now repeat them. But the question of mind is more difficult, and it is this question that I propose to discuss in these lectures.

A great deal of what I shall have to say is not original; indeed, much recent work, in various fields, has tended to show the necessity of such theories as those which I shall be advocating. Accordingly in this first lecture I shall try to give a brief description of the systems of ideas within which our investigation is to be carried on.

If there is one thing that may be said, in the popular estimation, to characterize mind, that one thing is "consciousness." We say that we are "conscious" of what we see and hear, of what we remember, and of our own thoughts and feelings. Most of us believe that tables and chairs are not "conscious." We think that when we sit in a chair, we are aware of sitting in it, but it is not aware of being sat in. It cannot for a moment be doubted that we are right in believing that there is *some* difference between us and the chair in this respect: so much may be taken as fact, and as a datum for our inquiry. But as soon as we try to say what exactly the difference is, we become involved in perplexities. Is "consciousness" ultimate and simple, something to be merely accepted and contemplated? Or is it something complex, perhaps consisting in our way of behaving in the presence of objects, or, alternatively, in the existence in us of things called "ideas," having a certain relation to objects, though different from them, and only symbolically representative of them? Such questions are not easy to answer; but until they are answered we cannot profess to know what we mean by saying that we are possessed of "consciousness."

Before considering modern theories, let us look first at consciousness from the standpoint of conventional psychology, since this embodies views which naturally occur when we begin to reflect upon the subject. For this purpose, let us as a preliminary consider different ways of being conscious.

First, there is the way of *perception*. We "perceive" tables and chairs, horses and dogs, our friends, traffic passing in the street—in short, anything which we recognize through the senses. I leave on one side for the present the question whether pure sensation is to be regarded as a form of consciousness: what I am speaking of now is perception, where, according to conventional psychology, we go beyond the sensation to the "thing" which it represents. When you hear a donkey

bray, you not only hear a noise, but realize that it comes from a donkey. When you see a table, you not only see a coloured surface, but realize that it is hard. The addition of these elements that go beyond crude sensation is said to constitute perception. We shall have more to say about this at a later stage. For the moment, I am merely concerned to note that perception of objects is one of the most obvious examples of what is called "consciousness." We are "conscious" of anything that we perceive.

We may take next the way of *memory*. If I set to work to recall what I did this morning, that is a form of consciousness different from perception, since it is concerned with the past. There are various problems as to how we can be conscious now of what no longer exists. These will be dealt with incidentally when we come to the analysis of memory.

From memory it is an easy step to what are called "ideas"—not in the Platonic sense, but in that of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, in which they are opposed to "impressions." You may be conscious of a friend either by seeing him or by "thinking" of him; and by "thought" you can be conscious of objects which cannot be seen, such as the human race, or physiology. "Thought" in the narrower sense is that form of consciousness which consists in "ideas" as opposed to impressions or mere memories.

We may end our preliminary catalogue with *belief*, by which I mean that way of being conscious which may be either true or false. We say that a man is "conscious of looking a fool," by which we mean that he believes he looks a fool, and is not mistaken in this belief. This is a different form of consciousness from any of the earlier ones. It is the form which gives "knowledge" in the strict sense, and also error. It is, at least apparently, more complex than our previous forms of consciousness; though we shall find that they are not so separable from it as they might appear to be.

Besides ways of being conscious there are other things that would ordinarily be called "mental," such as desire and pleasure and pain. These raise problems of their own, which we shall reach in Chapter 3. But the hardest problems are those that arise concerning ways of