

the social role of the man of knowledge

florian znaniecki

new introduction by lewis a. coser

**THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE
MAN OF KNOWLEDGE**

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THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE

Florian Znaniecki

*With a New Introduction by
Lewis A. Coser*

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	vii
I. SOCIOLOGY AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE	1
II. TECHNOLOGISTS AND SAGES	23
III. SCHOOLS AND SCHOLARS AS BEARERS OF ABSOLUTE TRUTH	91
IV. THE EXPLORER AS CREATOR OF NEW KNOWLEDGE	164
INDEX	201



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INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION

Lewis A. Coser

On rereading my 1968 introduction to Florian Znaniecki's *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* more than fifteen years later, I have the impression that it was in part inspired by a tendency to whistle in the dark. Discussing the various versions of the sociology of knowledge from the German Marx-Mannheim-Scheler tradition to the French tradition elaborated by Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, I seem to have felt that in order to win over the reader to consider the study of the sociology of knowledge I had to stress achievements in this field even when actual results were still rather scarce. Although I made a valiant attempt to show that the sociology of knowledge was alive and kicking both here and abroad, the attentive reader might well have concluded that my assessment was overoptimistic. By and large there was much promise to this approach but relatively little solid progress.

This is not to say that the 1950s and 1960s lacked some solid achievements. Alvin Gouldner's *Enter Plato*,¹ much of the work of C. Wright Mills,² and my own *Men of Ideas*,³ testified to the fact that the sociology of knowledge was able to inspire authors of significant works.

The revival of interest in the sociology of knowledge in the 1970s and 1980s indicates that books such as those of Mills or Gouldner were not a flash in the pan but already documented a true revival of the tradition of the sociology of knowledge. To begin with, the much-belated publication of some of the earlier work of Karl Mannheim may have had consequences for the

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE

sociology of knowledge that can compare to the publication of the so-called *Parisian Manuscripts* in the 1930s for the re-appraisal of the work of Karl Marx.⁴

Second, the rapid influence of the sociology of science as a result of the pioneering work of Robert K. Merton⁵ and his disciples as well as the seminal contributions of Thomas Kuhn⁶ has apparently inspired the sociological analysis of other cultural phenomena. Third, the development of postpositivist philosophy of science through such scholars as Stephen Toulmin and Imre Lakatos⁷ has created a receptivity to Mannheim's and Durkheim's thought that was almost completely wanting when orthodox logical positivism dominated the scene. Historians and sociologists of science no longer felt that the origins of scientific ideas, as distinctive from their verification, was subject to chance and not susceptible to sociological analysis. Instead they now held that both the origin and the verification of scientific ideas were in large measure explainable by sociological investigation; ideas did not occur in a social vacuum.

In addition to this change in the climate of ideas, the recent appearance of a number of works of a high order of excellence testifies to a new interest in the sociology of knowledge. The work of C. Wright Mills and Alvin Gouldner have become models for younger sociologists, many of whom have contributed to *Theory and Society*—the journal founded by Gouldner. Barry Schwartz, in *Vertical Classification*⁸ has argued persuasively that notions such as “high” and “low,” “above” and “below,” and “up” and “down,” are mental constructs freighted with moral meanings beyond their spatial connotations, so that what is “above” or “higher” connotes moral superiority. In similar ways the work of Eviatar Zerubavel, in both his *Hidden Rhythms* and *The Seven-Day Circle*⁹, shows in instructive ways how time and time reckoning are central parameters in the structuring of the social world. They establish powerful markers that punctuate all social living. Durkheim would surely approve. In anthropology, the work on social

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION

classification by Mary Douglas¹⁰ as well as almost all the structural anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss¹¹ builds on notions to be found, if only in *nuce*, in the work of Durkheim and Mauss on primitive classifications¹² and in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*.¹³

I would love to show that the seeds of Znaniecki's *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* have also begun to emerge from the snow that has covered them for a long time. This is the case to some extent. Robert K. Merton has long been familiar with Znaniecki's work, which he has discussed and applied in several publications,¹⁴ and I think it likely that Diana Crane in her sociology of science¹⁵ as well as in her analysis of other cultural phenomena has been influenced by Znaniecki. Yet clearly Znaniecki's progeny in this country has not yet shown the same vigor as that of Mannheim or Durkheim. But at least the sociology of sociology in its effort to develop or reformulate some of Znaniecki's distinction between types of knowledge and types of circles that are receptive to them has followed to some extent in his wake.¹⁶

I hope that this new edition will help spread the renown of Znaniecki as a theorist of the production and reception of ideas, and that it will soon bear fruits comparable to those in the wake of Durkheim and Mannheim.¹⁷ Znaniecki's coauthorship of the first major sociological research monograph in America, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, was a major achievement. I think that his book *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* is of comparable worth. It is high time that those who have long tended to denigrate in public though using in practice the work of the sociologists of knowledge in general and of Florian Znaniecki in particular, come out of the closet and acknowledge that, much like Molière's *Bourgeois gentilhomme*, they have been speaking prose, namely, using the approach of the sociology of knowledge, without realizing it.

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE

1968 Introduction

To Florian Znaniecki, whose long-neglected and yet seminal *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* is now again made available, belongs the unique distinction of being a Founding Father of two distinct national traditions of sociology: the Polish and the American. In his native Poland, where sociology had not been a university subject before the 1920s, he created almost single-handedly a tradition of empirical research focused on the careful examination of autobiographical life histories of peasants and workers. He founded the Polish Sociological Institute and started the *Polish Sociological Review*. The current rapid growth of sociology in Poland is based upon, and is hardly conceivable without, the methodological and theoretical groundwork laid by Znaniecki and his students in the time between the two world wars.

In the United States, where he worked during World War I and from 1932 to 1934, and again from 1940 to his death in 1958, Znaniecki found an already flourishing sociological discipline and collaborated intimately with key figures in that discipline, particularly with William I. Thomas. His distinct contributions to the development of a mature American sociological tradition are such that he must be judged to be one of the Fathers of American sociology as well.

Florian Znaniecki was born in 1882 in what was then the German-occupied part of Poland. His father, of gentry stock, lost his estate when the son was only a few years old and spent the rest of his life as a manager of estates in Russian-occupied Poland.¹⁸ After studying at the universities of Warsaw, Geneva, Zurich, Paris and Crakow, Znaniecki obtained his Ph.D. from Crakow in 1909. His chosen field was philosophy and his first works are in that area, though already revealing a strong interest in the social roots of ethics. Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, Znaniecki met W.I. Thomas, who had come to Poland to study the backgrounds of Polish peasants on their home grounds in connection with his large-scale investigation of

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION

Polish immigrants in the United States. Thomas persuaded Znaniecki to come to America to assist him in this study, and their intimate collaboration finally resulted in the publication of the monumental *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*,¹⁹ the first major empirical work of social research ever undertaken in this country. In its creative interplay between theoretical orientations and novel research techniques and methodology, it is a landmark of modern sociology and one of the few classic works produced in American social science to date.

After his collaboration with Thomas, Znaniecki decided definitely to shift his focus of interest from philosophy to sociology, yet his thorough training in philosophy, especially in value theory, is apparent to any reader of his sociological works. Znaniecki was a very hard worker and a prolific writer. I have no access to the nine volumes he published in Polish or to the very many articles he authored in that language. Of the nine volumes he wrote in English, *The Method of Sociology*,²⁰ *Social Actions*,²¹ and *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*, in addition, of course, to *The Polish Peasant*, are likely to prove the most enduring.

Although certain aspects of all these works, especially *The Method*, inevitably will appear somewhat outdated to the contemporary reader, most of them strike one upon rereading by the amazing extent to which they have withstood the test of time. For example, the sophisticated way in which Znaniecki already treated the concept of social role in the early thirties may surprise those students who labor under the belief that this concept originated in the work of Ralph Linton published in 1936.²²

Znaniecki's major contribution to the methodology of the social sciences lies in his insistence that sociology, as a science of human action, must focus on the subjective meaning that actors give to the situation in which they find themselves. Building, one presumes, on his earlier investigations of social values, Znaniecki maintained, during a period in which behaviorism

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE

and “positivism” tended to dominate the field, that, “The scientist who wants to study [human] actions inductively must take them as they are in the human experience of those agents and reagents; they are his empirical data inasmuch as and because they are theirs.”²³ For Znaniecki, cultural data are distinguished from natural data by the fact that the latter are independent of the experience of human agents while the former possess a “humanistic coefficient.” This emphasis on the centrality for sociological investigation of the subjective meanings, the goal striving, the “definition of the situation” of human actors, was cogently and persuasively argued by W.I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki almost two decades before Talcott Parsons arrived at similar conclusions in his *The Structure of Social Action*.²⁴ While some of the common roots of both Znaniecki’s and Parsons’ conceptualizations may be found in the tradition of Dilthey and Max Weber, Znaniecki and Thomas also made skillful use of American pragmatic philosophy and social psychology, as represented by William James, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey and Cooley, among others. They developed an orientation to the data of sociological studies which has become basic in current research and theory.

The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge builds skillfully on the author’s past work, but uses it for a somewhat different purpose. It is a contribution to the sociology of knowledge, that branch of sociology which may be broadly defined as the study of the relation between thought and society.

When Znaniecki published this book in 1940, American sociology had just begun to assimilate the major contributions to this field made in the twenties by two German thinkers, Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim. The earlier Marxian and Durkheimian contributions to this field had also begun to make an impact in America.²⁵

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION

While the antecedents of the sociology of knowledge may be traced back to such thinkers as Francis Bacon and the French *philosophes* of the eighteenth century, the roots of systematic sociology of knowledge are to be found in the Marxian tradition in Germany and the Durkheimian tradition in France.

In his attempt to stand the Hegelian panlogical system on its head, in his attempt, that is, to document that, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary their social existence determines their consciousness,"²⁶ Marx was led to a resolute functionalization of the realm of thought. Systems of ideas in this view are dependent on their proponents' social roles and positions, particularly their class positions. The eternal verities and the received doctrines of a period, Marx asserted, must be understood in the last analysis as the expressions of the class positions of their exponents.

When Karl Mannheim began in the 1920s self-consciously to elaborate the sociology of knowledge as a distinct scientific discipline, he placed himself in the Marxian tradition, though he also was influenced by German historicism, phenomenology, and Gestalt psychology. But he departed in one crucial way from his Marxian antecedents: while to the Marxists the tracing of connections between ideas and the social position of their exponents had been mainly a polemical weapon to discredit the claims of adversaries, Mannheim intended to make the sociology of knowledge a scientific and neutral tool of analysis. All ideas, he asserted, not only those of adversaries, are related to, and hence are influenced by, the social and historical situation from which they emerge. The very fact that each thinker is affiliated with particular groups in society, that he occupies a certain status and enacts specific social roles, influences his outlook and the perspective through which he approaches the world of experience. All thinking is socially and existentially determined, or, at least, codetermined. Ideas are "bound to a location" in the social process. The various sets of ideas that contend on the market place of the modern world express the aspirations of

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE

different groups and classes, and the task of the sociology of knowledge consists in ascertaining the empirical correlations between intellectual standpoints and structural-historical positions.

Max Scheler, the other modern German originator of the sociology of knowledge, was only peripherally influenced by the Marxist tradition which looms so large in Mannheim's work. He was a disciple, though a rather heretical one, of the phenomenological school. Accordingly he rejected what he felt to be the excessive preoccupation with class factors in the generation of ideas and argued instead that there was no constant independent variable, such as class position, that could account for the emergence of variant sets of ideas. A variety of "real factors," Scheler taught, had been, over the course of history, responsible for the emergence of particular thought products. While in the modern world class factors did indeed loom large, blood and kinship ties had been the independent variable in primitive societies, and political factors had been central in the premodern world. Furthermore, Scheler rejected what he considered the excessive relativism of previous theorizing. He attempted to counter it by the assertion that all these ideas were but glimpses into an eternal Platonic realm of unchanging and absolute essences, although particular sets of ideas would indeed emerge only when the requisite "real factors" helped open the "sluice-gates" of the stream of thought.

Both Mannheim and Scheler devoted a major part of their sociological work to investigations of the connections between thought and society. In contradistinction, Emile Durkheim, the major French contributor to the sociology of knowledge, wrote relatively little on the subject. Yet his work, though possibly even more marred by somewhat dubious epistemological speculations than that of the Germans, must be considered part of the most vital pioneering effort in that field.

Durkheim was led to the field in the course of his continuing warfare against psychologistic and atomistic explanations of

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION

social behavior. He attempted to establish the social origin and function of morals, values, and religion and to explain these as different forms of “collective representations” rather than as the results of private cogitation of individual thinkers. Durkheim did not remain content with tracing this or that particular set of ideas to sociohistorical circumstances. He attempted instead to demolish the Kantian emphasis on the unvariant and universal categories of the human mind by claiming that the fundamental concepts of thought, especially the concepts of time and space, are societal creations. Society, Durkheim asserted, is decisive in the genesis of logical thought through its forming the categories of which that thought is made. He argued that temporal and other classifications among primitive people closely approximate the social organizations of the tribe. The first logical classes were classes of men. Animals, plants, and other objects of the environment were classified in terms of clan belongingness, lineage, or kinship group. Chronological divisions correspond to the periodical recurrence of feasts and public ceremonies so that the calendar expresses the rhythm of collective activities. In similar ways, social organization has been the model for the representation of space, and the heavenly city is but a projection of its earthly counterpart. All symbolic thought, to Durkheim, derives from societal organization.

A variety of other contributions to what by the late 1930s had become the discipline of the sociology of knowledge would have to be considered if one were to explore all antecedents of Znaniecki’s book. The work of the major American pragmatists, Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead in particular, are relevant in this respect. However, here I must remain content to sketch, even if only in broadest outline, some of the pitfalls confronting Florian Znaniecki in the methods of his predecessors.

Znaniecki believed that the most fundamental difficulty with

much of previous theorizing was the heavy intrusion of epistemological and metaphysical assumptions in what purported to be a substantive field of sociological investigation. When the sociology of knowledge attempted to transform itself into a "sociological theory of knowledge" Znaniecki felt it trespassed on forbidden ground. "As a theory of knowledge, a 'science of sciences,' it would have to determine its own character as sociology; whereas as sociology it would determine its own character as a science of sciences."²⁷ The sociology of knowledge should not be considered a special sociological epistemology but a substantive sociological field. Though he did not specifically write on this, one can surmise that Znaniecki would have found grave fault with major aspects of the thought of his predecessors in this respect. A few illustrative examples will have to suffice.

Mannheim's universal relativism or relationism clearly involved him in peculiar difficulties. Just as the classical Cretan who asserted that all Cretans were liars thereby invalidated the truth value of his own statement, so the implication in Mannheim that all thought is existentially determined and hence invalid must also apply to the thought of Karl Mannheim. The notion of absolute relativism, it has been argued repeatedly against him, is self-contradictory since it implies its own lack of validity. Mannheim, at least in some of his writings, attempted to occupy an Archimedian point outside the world of empirical social phenomena in order to pronounce judgments on the social determination of all thought. Mannheim was well aware of these difficulties and attempted in a variety of ways, none fully successful, to overcome them. In certain of his later writings he obviated the difficulties in his earlier positions by no longer insisting that existential positions led to invalid judgments but stressed only that given perspectives were likely to lead to partial views. Moreover, he abandoned earlier and excessive claims as to the total determination of the realm of ideas. "It is of course true," he asserted more modestly, "that in the social sciences, as

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION

elsewhere, the ultimate criterion of truth and falsity is to be found in the investigation of the object, and the sociology of knowledge is no substitute for this.’’²⁸ Nevertheless the bulk of Mannheim’s writings still contains several passages in which he comes close to the genetic fallacy of making the validity or invalidity of an idea dependent upon its social location. It behooves later students of Mannheim, and Znaniecki was among them, to separate the empirically verifiable parts of his work from his other rather unfortunate forays into epistemology.

What held true for Mannheim held true *a fortiori* for Durkheim and Scheler. The latter’s theory of eternal essence is a metaphysical theory that does not lend itself to scientific validation and can hence have no place in a substantive sociology of knowledge. Durkheim’s attempt to overthrow Kant was likewise bound to impart an aura of dubious metaphysics to what was *in nuce* a fruitful pioneering step in the substantive sociology of knowledge. In particular, it seems impossible to derive the categories of symbolic thought from the characteristics of social organizations, since the capacity for symbolic thinking must be taken as a root potential of all human existence. Symbolic thought makes human social life possible.

Znaniecki resolved to impose upon himself a strict self-denying ordinance: he was to eschew every temptation to deal with epistemological questions. His was to be a strictly scientific and substantive inquiry. In tune with his earlier methodology he was only to assume that every thinker claims that his system of knowledge is true and objectively valid. It was not the business of the sociologist, he believed, to investigate or invalidate these claims to truth. ‘‘The sociologist is bound to abide by whatever standard of validity those individuals or groups apply to the knowledge in which they take an active share.’’²⁹ Not the

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE

investigator's "definition of the situation" but that of the subject must inform the study. Whether systems of knowledge may be judged to be true or false, valid or invalid, does not concern the sociologist, who must remain content to trace their origins and consequences, their functions and dysfunctions. Znaniecki summed this up eloquently: "When he is studying their social lives, he must agree that, as to the knowledge which they recognize as valid, they are the only authority he need consider. He has no right as a sociologist to oppose his authority to theirs: he is bound by the methodical rule of unconditional modesty. He must resign his own criteria of theoretical validity when dealing with systems of knowledge which they accept and apply."³⁰

Not only did Znaniecki reject all epistemological and metaphysical speculations, he also restricted his attention to what Werner Stark has called the microsociology of knowledge.³¹ That is, he did not concern himself with "the total intellectual atmosphere of society" or "the total historical movement of the social system."³² He more modestly limited himself to the study of the social roles of creators and carriers of knowledge and of the social and organizational structures within which they function.

Znaniecki set himself a twin task: to develop a typology of the variety of specific social roles that men of knowledge have played, and to investigate the normative patterns which govern their behavior. A central tool for the investigation of both these problems is the notion of "social circle," that is, the audience or the public to which thinkers address themselves. Znaniecki shows that thinkers, at least in heterogeneous societies, are not likely to speak to the total society but rather tend to address selected segments or publics. Specific social circles bestow recognition, provide material or psychic income and help shape the self-image of the thinker internalizing the normative expectations of the audience. Thinkers are expected to live up to certain demands of their circles and these in turn grant certain rights

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION

and immunities. Men of knowledge anticipate the demands of their public, and they tend to define data and problems in terms of these actual or anticipated audiences. Thus thinkers may be classified in terms of their audiences and the performances that are expected of them within the social context in which they are variously enmeshed.

A major part of the book is devoted to Znaniecki's classification of various social roles that men of knowledge can play. He distinguishes, *inter alia*, Technological Advisors; Sages, that is, men who are expected to provide ideological justifications for the collective aims of their groups; Sacred and Secular Scholars (who in turn fall into various subtypes, from "discoverers of truth" to "disseminators of knowledge," from "systematizers" and "contributors" to "fighters for truth"). He also deals with Creators of Knowledge, who in turn may be Fact-Finders or Discoverers of Problems.

This is by no means an arid exercise in classification. Znaniecki shows that the demands of the social circle on the man of knowledge vary with the specific role he is expected to play. Thus, technological leaders are not expected to search for new facts that might undermine belief in the correctness of previously programmed activities. They are institutionally expected to regard new facts with suspicion. In contrast, creators of knowledge are rewarded for the discovery of new facts. Each particular social role that the man of knowledge assumes carries with it certain types of expectations; each social circle rewards and punishes particular types of intellectual performance.

Znaniecki's book provides important clues to the study of the reception or rejection of novel ideas, as Robert K. Merton quickly recognized in a review written shortly after its appearance. It allows us to specify "the ways in which various social structures exert pressure for the adoption of certain attitudes toward new empirical data."³³ For example, the sage, a reformer or an apologist for the existing order, knows the

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE

answers and hence cannot search for the new facts that might prove to be unsettling. Scholars, on the other hand, "have positive or negative attitudes toward genuinely new facts, depending on the extent to which the school's system is established: in the initial stage new facts are at least acceptable, but once the system is fully formulated the intellectual commitment of the school precludes a favorable attitude toward novel findings."³⁴ Hence Znaniecki allows us to move a considerable distance from the global assertion that all organizations and social structures are necessarily conservative and disinclined to recognize innovation, by focusing attention on the structural sources of *neophobia*. Had Znaniecki written today, it may be remarked in passing, he might have found it profitable to investigate the complementary structural conditions for *neophilia* as well, that is, the one-sided value emphasis on what is new, which is so pronounced nowadays among certain unattached intellectuals whose audience demands of them a restless search for new stimulants to revive jaded intellectual or esthetic palates.

Znaniecki is not content to delineate a variety of social roles for men of knowledge, but also provides important clues to understanding the process through which such roles may be transformed and superseded. He shows, for example, that certain schools of religious thought can perform their tasks to an optimum extent only when they succeed in insulating their practitioners from contact with rival schools. As a sacred school loses its monopoly and is forced to contend with others, it can no longer rely on unexamined faith but must develop rational modes of persuasion. The challenge of conflicting belief systems contributes to a process of gradual secularization of major portions of sacred knowledge, and fields previously preempted by Sacred Scholars gradually are taken over by their Secular counterparts. Conflicts of ideas, Alfred North Whitehead once argued, are not a disaster but an opportunity. Znaniecki would have readily agreed. They are an opportunity, above all, for

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION

replacing the closed mental world of the sage with the open universe of the explorers of knowledge.

These few examples of Znaniecki's creative uses of his approach to the sociology of intellectual life must suffice to move readers of this book to think of particular problem areas that deserve to be investigated from the perspective of Znaniecki's conceptual framework. This is indeed his chief merit; he provides a storehouse of suggestive leads and concepts for a future well-rounded sociology of men of knowledge.³⁵ Znaniecki, in his modest way, did not set out, as did so many of his forebears, to provide all the answers. His is an open-ended work of scholarship, and his role was that of the explorer of knowledge rather than that of a sage. He desired his future readers to become fellow explorers rather than disciples.

Notes

¹ Alvin Gouldner, *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origin of Social Theory* (New York: Basic Books, 1965).

² C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), as well as most of his other works.

³ Lewis A. Coser, *Men of Ideas* (New York: Free Press, 1965).

⁴ Karl Mannheim, *Structure of Thinking*, ed. and introd. by David Kettler, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982; Karl Mannheim, *Konservatismus*, ed. and introd. by David Kettler, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1984). See also Volker Meja and Nico Stehr, eds., *The Sociology of Knowledge Dispute* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).

⁵ Robert K. Merton, *The Sociology of Science* (New York: Free Press, 1970).

⁶ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

⁷ Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). Cf. also Barry Barnes, *Scientific Knowledge and Scientific Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974); & Michael Mulkay, *Science and the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979).

⁸ Barry Schwartz, *Vertical Classification: A Study in Structuralism and the Sociology of Knowledge* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981).

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE

- ⁹ Eviatar Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms: Schedules and Calendars in Social Life* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981); *The Seven Day Circle: The History and Meaning of the Week* (New York: Free Press, 1985).
- ¹⁰ Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).
- ¹¹ Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie Structurale* (Paris, 1958).
- ¹² Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, *Primitive Classifications* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967).
- ¹³ Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York: Free Press, 1947).
- ¹⁴ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, enlarged ed. (New York: Free Press, 1968); and Robert K. Merton, *The Sociology of Science* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973), esp. chap. 2.
- ¹⁵ Diana Crane, *Invisible Colleges* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1972).
- ¹⁶ Nicholas C. Mullins, *Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary American Sociology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973; and Larry T. Reynolds and Janice M. Reynolds, *The Sociology of Sociology* (New York: J. McKay, 1970), esp. the paper by Irving Louis Horowitz, "Mainliners and Marginals: The Human Shape of Sociological Theory," pp. 340-70. Cf. also Lewis A. Coser, "Two Methods in Search of a Substance," *American Sociological Review* 40 (December 1975): 691-700.
- ¹⁷ For an excellent introduction to present trends in German and French sociology of knowledge see Nico Stehr and Volker Meja, eds., *Society and Knowledge* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1984).
- ¹⁸ For biographical and bibliographical data I have relied heavily on Professor Helena Z. Lopata, Znaniecki's daughter, in her introduction to Znaniecki's posthumous *Social Relations and Social Roles* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965).
- ¹⁹ W.I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 5 volumes (Boston: Badger, 1918-20).
- ²⁰ New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1934.
- ²¹ New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1936.
- ²² Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936).
- ²³ *Social Actions*, p. 11.
- ²⁴ New York: Free Press, 1949; 1st ed. 1936.
- ²⁵ For a fuller introduction to the history of the sociology of knowledge cf. Lewis A. Coser, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in Coser and Bernard Rosenberg, *Sociological Theory* (Macmillan, 1957); and Lewis A. Coser, "Sociology of Knowledge," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.
- ²⁶ Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Chicago: Kerr, 1904), pp. 11-12.
- ²⁷ This volume, p. 4.

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION

²⁸ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), p. 4.

²⁹ This volume, p. 5.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³¹ Werner Stark, *The Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

³² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

³³ *American Sociological Review* 6 (1941): 111-15. Reprinted in Coser and Rosenberg, *Sociological Theory*, pp. 351-55. The quote is on p. 353 of the reprint.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 353-54.

³⁵ For an attempt to use some of Znaniecki's categories see Lewis A. Coser, *Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's View* (New York: Free Press, 1965).