# SUPERPOWERS AND CLIENT STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The imbalance of influence

Edited by
Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
WAR AND SECURITY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST

ROUTLEDGE

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
WAR AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Volume 12

# SUPERPOWERS AND CLIENT STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

# SUPERPOWERS AND CLIENT STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

## The imbalance of influence

Edited by
MOSHE EFRAT AND JACOB BERCOVITCH

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1991 by Routledge

This edition first published in 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*



*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-138-19428-1 (Set)
ISBN: 978-1-315-54183-9 (Set) (ebk)
ISBN: 978-1-138-65126-5 (Volume 12) (hbk)

**Publisher's Note**
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent.

**Disclaimer**
The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

# Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East

## The imbalance of influence

Edited by Moshe Efrat and
Jacob Bercovitch


London and New York

First published in 1991
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001



Typeset by Amy Boyle Word Processing
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Biddles Ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn



*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*
Superpowers and client states in the Middle East:
the imbalance of influence.
1. Great powers. Foreign relations with Middle East.
2. Middle East. Foreign relations with great powers
I. Efrat, Moshe II. Bercovitch Jacob 1947–
327
ISBN 0-415-00490-X

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data*
Superpowers and client states in the Middle East: the imbalance of influence/edited by Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch.
p. cm.
ISBN 0-415-00490-X
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Middle East – Foreign relations – United States. 2. United States – Foreign relations – Middle East. 3. Middle East – Foreign relations – Soviet Union. 4. Soviet Union – Foreign relations – Middle East. 5. United States – Foreign relations – Israel. 6. Israel – foreign relations – United States. 7. Soviet Union – Foreign relations – Syria. 8. Syria – Foreign relations – Soviet Union.
I. Efrat, Moshe, 1927– . II. Bercovitch, Jacob.
JX1581.M628S87 1991
327'.0956–dc20 90-45662
CIP

To the memory of Sir David Roberts, KBE, CMG CVO

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

# Contents

# Tables

# Foreword

Since 1945 the Middle East has never been far from the top of the international diplomatic agenda. Its strategic importance, its oil resources, its significance as the cradle of the three great monotheistic religions and the risk that its conflicts could lead to superpower confrontation have all focused attention on the search for peace. Sadly, diplomatic attention has not always been accompanied by the necessary degree of understanding of the region and of the aspirations of its peoples. The fall of the Shah exposed the shortcomings of much western analysis of developments in Iran and underlined the need for diplomats and academics to share their insights in the search for greater understanding.

In recent years western observers have struggled to understand the reasons for the spread of so-called Islamic fundamentalism and to find ways to combat the evils of Middle East terrorism. This effort continues; but in 1988 other developments both challenged our understanding and created new opportunities to advance the search for peace and stability in the Middle East. *Glasnost* is affecting Soviet policy in this region as in other areas; the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq conflict offers the prospect not only of peace in the Gulf but of wider rearrangement of the political jigsaw of the region; and the Palestinian *intifadha*, together with Jordan's severance of some of its links with the West Bank, has forced all concerned to realize that Israel's occupation of Arab territory cannot be sustained on the present basis.

But the challenge is not only to outside observers: the peoples of the Middle East also need to understand more clearly each other's aspirations. The region's conflicts cannot be solved from outside. Solutions cannot be imposed; they will have to be agreed by the parties. The Security Council can call for a ceasefire, as it did in the Gulf, but it took Iran and Iraq to decide on that course. There will be no lasting solution to the Palestinian problem, too, until the Israelis are prepared to recognize and accommodate the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and

until the Palestinians understand Israelis' deep-rooted yearning for security and are prepared to accommodate it.

One area of recurrent misunderstanding is the belief that the superpowers can determine the policy of their so-called clients in the region, and that if the US and USSR were therefore to agree the region's problems could be sorted out without the need for any effort by the parties. This volume performs a valuable service by illuminating not only the extent of US influence on Israel and Soviet influence on Syria but also the real constraints on their exercise of that influence.

It is particularly fitting that the editors have decided to dedicate this book to my late colleague, Sir David Roberts. David had an enormous zest for life and an enviable gift for friendship. Beneath his bluff and unacademic façade, he was an intellectual of stature, an outstanding classical scholar, as well as a notable Arabist. He brought to all his work the intellectual curiosity of the true academic as well as the professional skills of the policy maker and diplomat. His lively and readable book on the Ba'ath party and modern Syria published in 1986 testifies to these talents; I only wish that it had been available to guide me during my own time in Damascus.

David's long and distinguished career took him to Japan, Africa and the Caribbean. But his real expertise was in the Middle East, from his first posting in Baghdad in 1948, where he set himself to learn Arabic, to his service as British Ambassador in Syria, the UAE and Lebanon. His understanding of Syria and Lebanon in particular was unrivalled. In retirement he continued to devote his considerable energies to Middle East issues. He worked tirelessly for greater British-Arab understanding as Director-General of the Middle East Association and as Chairman of the British-Lebanese Association. He greatly valued his association with Durham University, which helped him to pursue his research, and he gave generously of his time in writing, lecturing and media appearances until the last: indeed his contribution to this book was submitted only a day or two before his death.

In all this, David's aim was to promote greater understanding of the Middle East he loved and between its peoples. His family and many friends will regard the dedication of this book to him as a peculiarly happy recognition of his contribution to the search for peace in the Middle East.

Patrick Wright
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London

# Acknowledgements

This book had a longer gestation period than we had envisaged or intended. The book began with our belief that a better understanding of the factors that shape the relations between the superpowers and their respective clients in the Middle East is essential if we are to make any progress towards peace. Realizing this belief and editing the volume has proved a more complex and time-consuming task than we had initially reckoned on.

We owe thanks to many friends and colleagues. First and foremost we owe special thanks to the contributors for their patience, understanding and co-operation. For their helpful ideas and comments we would like to thank our colleagues at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the London School of Economics, the University of Canterbury, Harvard University, the Johns Hopkins University, SIPRI and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the USA. We would especially like to thank Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, Uri Bialer, Ray Goldstein, Herb Kelman, Saadia Touval, Jim Sebenius, Philip Windsor, William Zartman, Thomas Ohlson and Daniel Gallik. All provided us with useful ideas, but none should be held responsible for what appears below.

We wish to thank the staff at the Library of Congress and the libraries of the London School of Economics and International Institute of Strategic Studies for obtaining any report or monograph we required.

Michael Leifer deserves special thanks for encouraging us to complete the project. We are also grateful to the Centre of International Studies of the London School of Economics for providing hospitality in a stimulating intellectual environment. Our editor at Routledge, Sue Joshua, was a model of the sympathetic and supportive editor. We are grateful to her.

We also wish to acknowledge a special debt to Gillian Wess who helped in so many ways, and to Jean Bailey for her continuing support.

A few months after submitting the draft of his chapter, Sir David Roberts passed away. We thought it fitting to dedicate the volume to his memory. We are grateful to Lady Roberts for all her help and to Sir Patrick Wright for his contribution.

Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch

# Introduction

*Jacob Bercovitch*

Of all the regions in the Third World, the involvement of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East has had the greatest impact on, and posed the greatest challenges to, their bilateral relations. Their competition for influence and attempts to shape events in that explosive and unpredictable area has become one of the most salient features of international relations in the post-war era. Their rivalry for power, so well controlled at the global level, occasioned some of the gravest crises in their relations because each was supporting or cultivating allies on different sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This book analyses the nature of superpower involvement in the Middle East, paying particular attention to the relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and their small regional allies. What makes this relationship so interesting is that it affects virtually every aspect of Middle East politics. And yet despite its importance it remains insufficiently studied and far from being well understood. We hope the book will rectify this anomaly.

First, then, why has the Middle East been the focus of such prolonged and sustained competition between the superpowers? What form does their rivalry assume? And what role do the small states in the area play in this competitive game? American and Soviet encroachment in the Middle East began as a result of World War II. In the wake of their victory over the Axis powers, and the demarcation of spheres of influence in Europe, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to assume a more active world role and to expand their influence as far afield as possible. The Middle East became the battleground for some of the early skirmishes of the cold war (e.g. Iran, Turkey and Greece). American containment, its stance against expanding Soviet presence and influence, given a concrete expression in the Truman Doctrine in 1947, became the operating principle of its foreign policy everywhere. Wells and Bruzonsky (1987) are right to point out that with this policy American leaders 'without fully appreciating the magnitude of the task accepted not only the responsibility of protecting the Middle East against Soviet

aggression but also the obligation to help develop solutions to problems created by years of European imperialism'.[1]

The Soviet Union, for its part, saw the Middle East as a region contiguous to its own borders and one capable of posing a potential threat to its own security. Not unnaturally, the Soviet Union sought to limit the build-up of hostile forces and establish its own influence more directly in the region. The Middle East thus became the arena for disputed political, military, economic and ideological interests between the superpowers.

Each superpower may acknowledge that the other has important interests in the region, but unlike Europe, the competition for power and influence in the Middle East is more intense, geographically unlimited and seemingly more difficult to moderate. Aggravating efforts to moderate the competition between the two superpowers is the attempt by each to develop military bases and facilities in the region (e.g. the US in countries such as Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union in countries such as South Yemen, Egypt — until 1972 — and Syria) and the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Superpower competition in the Middle East is affected by, and in turn affects, the many shifts and changes in the area. It is embedded in, and often complicates, the global efforts to avoid a dangerous confrontation.

Since 1956 and, more dramatically, 1967, the Middle East has been assessed in a zero-sum fashion. What one superpower does is inevitably seen by the other as a threat to be countered. Neither side is prepared to trust the other, and so each superpower, in an insistent and often unbridled fashion, strives to affirm its support for the smaller states of the region.

Apart from the political-strategic reason, both superpowers have economic interests in the Middle East. The United States is determined to ensure continuing access to the oil resources of the Gulf, while the Soviet Union, as an oil-producing country, has an interest in trying to control or deny its flow. Another economic consideration which both superpowers have in the region concerns the massive transfer of financial resources that accrue to them as a result of their sales of conventional arms in the region. For the Soviets this provides much-needed hard currency, for the Americans an opportunity to recycle petro-dollars. Economic considerations influence superpowers' conception of the region and the degree to which they become involved in its affairs.

In addition to all these, the United States and the Soviet Union have interests in the Middle East that derive from internal considerations (i.e. the existence of a large Muslim community in the Soviet Union and a vocal Jewish minority in the United States). They both have ideological interests that relate to their

desires to support political groupings and regimes that share their own values. Finally, they have a long-standing interest in shaping and affecting the process and outcomes of peace-making efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They also have a genuinely common interest: the need to develop norms and crisis-management techniques to ensure that their regional allies do not drag them into a war with each other.

While there may be some disagreement with respect to the priority assigned to these different interests, there can be no disagreement as to how best they can be promoted: by the cultivation of friendly allies and the formation of a regional coalition of small states, through a policy of political support or military co-operation. In a protracted and unstable conflict, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict has been, the desire of regional states for strong and protective friends coincides with the superpowers' wish to gain a foothold in the area. Thus, the competitive intrusion of the superpowers into the region is intensified by the local states' demands for special arrangements with a protective superpower. The United States and the Soviet Union, responding to such demands, made common cause and entered into formal and informal alignments with any state, however different culturally and politically it might be, that professed to be either anti-communist or anti-capitalist.

The Arab states and Israel, whose relations were primarily of the aggressive kind, needed military hardware and were impressed by military power. The United States and the Soviet Union had this power and, what is more, could project it to the farthest distance to protect a friendly ally. With the Soviet Union protecting the Arab states and the United States protecting Israel, both superpowers were able to establish a diplomatic basis in the region and gradually extend their influence by arrogating to themselves the role of attractive and reliable patrons.

The temptation to score off each other and acquire many allies was, for both superpowers, an inevitable outgrowth of their military, strategic and economic considerations and their attempts to make special claims to specific regions of influence. Dealing with their small regional allies (who manifestly needed their political and military support) has, however, posed more acute dilemmas for the superpowers than they had envisaged. Somehow the relations between the superpowers and their regional allies (some of whom can only be defined as client states) has given the latter occasions to pursue opportunistic policies and exploit their patrons in a manner that has exacerbated the relations between the superpowers, and created more instability in the Middle East.

That the relations between the superpowers and their small regional allies could have been so problematic, may in itself be something of a paradox. After all, the superpowers possessed

power, could project power and exercise power; their regional allies in the Middle East were small, did not possess such power and badly needed the protection of a strong patron. On the face of it, Israel's relations with the United States or Syria's relations with the Soviet Union should have been defined in terms of small states' compliance. Looking at them dynamically, as we do in this book, no one could describe Israel and Syria as passive pawns, pressured and manipulated by their powerful patrons to pursue policies against their will. As Christer Jonsson (1979) notes, 'superior military force cannot guarantee small state compliance with superpower interests, and relative weakness does not entail only liabilities for the small state'.[2]

Whereas much of the literature on the Middle East takes the relations between the superpowers and their regional clients as given, we wish to address ourselves to a serious study of the complexities and ambiguities of these relations. We believe that the relations between superpowers and small states are plagued by dilemmas and uncertainties and that they have to be unravelled within an intellectual framework. The *exercise* of influence in superpower-client relations cannot be inferred from the *possession* of power resources. We need a more sophisticated scheme to account for the complex mosaic of influence and rivalries in the Middle East. The patron-client concept, with its differentiations between power capabilities and the exercise of influence in specific contexts, goes a long way towards explaining the roles of the superpowers and their client states, and the capacity of each to initiate and influence events in the region.

Devising an appropriate policy to deal with the new realities in the Middle East, or pressing for a more vigorous superpower approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, can only be a useful exercise if it takes into account the shifting balance of interests and influence in superpower-client state relations. Were such an approach to be adopted, we would note that the instruments of power place as many constraints as they confer advantages on superpowers' intentions and policies. The relative power — and influence — of the superpowers has been reduced considerably. They have, between them, nearly 50,000 nuclear warheads, but this hardly gives them the clout and political influence they desire. The threat of power may have some credibility in managing Soviet-American relations; it is not a credible threat in managing relations with a client state.

The thesis we wish to advance, using case studies from the Middle East, is that we need to move away from analyses of international power in studying relations between unequal states. The superpowers possess power, but are not necessarily powerful. They have, as Paul Kennedy so ably notes, reached their zenith

of influence, but are doomed, like any other hegemony-seeking powers, to rely more and more on smaller allies and to slip into a relative decline.[3]

The gradual loss of superpowers' influence and control is hastened by the high cost of maintaining a strong defence establishment, the declining utility of force, the growing reluctance of small allies to comply and economic difficulties at home.[4] All this produces a more uncontrollable, if unpredictable, international environment. Such an environment clearly favours the smaller states by giving them the opportunity to ignore, or reverse, superpower policies, or extract a high price for their own support.

The patron-client framework we develop in this book permits us to study relations and influence patterns in specific contexts. Studying the relations between the superpowers and their regional clients in the Middle East, we can see quite clearly that the clients' massive dependence upon their respective superpower has not been translated into effective loss of influence. If anything, the reverse is true. Their very weakness and dependence has given Israel and Syria a bargaining strength and an ability to influence events that far outweighs any power considerations. A crucial advantage of the patron-client framework is that it can account for such relations and the outcomes it produces.

In the first part of the book Bercovitch and Windsor present the patron-client framework, explore its dimensions and suggest its relevance to the study of the Middle East. In parts II and III of the book an in-depth examination of two contrasting case studies is presented. Reich, Sheffer and Efrat examine the dynamics of the United States-Israel relations in all their manifestations, while Freedman, Roberts and Efrat focus on the relationship between the Soviet Union and Syria and the factors and variables that shape this relationship. Finally, Efrat draws conclusions from these case studies and offers insights on the usefulness of the patron-client framework.

An understanding of the constraints, opportunities and common interests in the relations between the superpowers and their clients in the Middle East, which we present below, offers the best platform for launching a renewed, sensitive and realistic effort to bring greater security to the region and achieve a peaceful management of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even a modest step towards this goal will be considered a major achievement.

## NOTES

1 S.F. Wells and M.A. Bruzonsky, 'Introduction' in S.F. Wells and M.A.

Bruzonsky (eds), *Security in the Middle East* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1987), 5.

2 C. Jonsson, 'The paradox of superpower: omnipotence or impotence?' in K. Goldmann and G. Sjostedt (eds), *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence* (London: Sage Publication, 1979), 73.

3 P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).

4 These are elaborated in W. Goldstein, 'The erosion of the superpowers: the military consequences of economic distress', *SAIS Review* 8, 1988, 51-68.

# Part I

# In search of a theoretical framework

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

# 1 Superpowers and client states

## Analysing relations and patterns of influence

*Jacob Bercovitch*

### INTRODUCTION

It is something of a truism to observe that international relations have changed dramatically in recent decades. Assumptions about global politics that were current a few years ago now come under increasing scrutiny and are found wanting. The traditional image of international relations, with its emphasis on sovereign and independent states, delicate calculations of, and a constant struggle for, power, and an overall distribution of resources that permitted and promoted a measure of security through some balancing of capabilities, is as uninstructive as it is inaccurate in describing the contemporary era. The rhetoric of the old realism, which articulated this image, is flawed and outmoded. We need new assumptions, new ideas and a new framework to understand international relations in general and the interaction of states in particular. It is the purpose of this chapter to offer such a framework.

How does one purport to explain international behaviour? How do we make sense of the complexities of international life? How can we offer useful insights on those countless actors and myriad interactions that make up the international arena? More specifically, how do we explain the problem of order and the problem of relations between states? Obviously, we require a model or a theoretical basis. To understand, interpret or merely cope with the complexities of world politics, we need an organizing device, a distinctive image or a model. However poorly conceived or imprecise a model may be, it does at least have the advantage of delimiting reality and ordering it into more meaningful categories. Hopefully, the gain of a more adequate image of international relations will be greater than the loss entailed by the degree of abstraction and simplification which characterizes such efforts.

### IMAGES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

How, then, does one account for the behaviour of states, and to

what extent does the structure of international relations influence that behaviour? Two different mental images, or models, can be discerned. There is an image which emphasizes power and military capabilities, according to which the international system, and the states comprising it, are dominated by the superpowers. There is another image, that of interdependence, which stresses the extent to which economic and other non-military capabilities have become central, and the degree to which each state, even the mightiest superpower, is dependent on others. The problems of how order is maintained and what affects the relations between states are handled very differently within each intellectual tradition.

## The realist image

Traditional writing on international relations presented us with a fairly straightforward model. A few assumptions, collectively constituting the realist perspective, are integral to this model. First, nation-states are assumed to be sovereign, independent and coherent actors. They are also assumed to be the dominant, if not the only, actors on the international arena. Second, states think and act in terms of power — its pursuit and consolidation. They do so because power is a valued goal in itself, but also because its collective pursuit by a number of independent actors will inevitably produce an international structure that distributes capabilities in such a way as to maintain order and stability. Third, force is a major means of influence. States may, and indeed do, use force to preserve their interests, or to get other states, with less force at their disposal, to do as they are bid. Fourth, issues of power, peace and security are the most compelling issues around which states interact.

Within this image the behaviour of sovereign states is largely determined by power resources and power differences. Those who have power and capabilities, whom we normally designate as great powers, or in a few cases, superpowers, exercise influence over those who have little or no power. Norms, values or even rudimentary notions of morality have but little effect on the behaviour of states. Relations between states are manifestly one-sided. The great powers may intervene in the affairs of other states, go to war and acquire new territory. The smaller states and those with little power try to get out of the way. The great, dominant powers determine and define international order; the small, subordinate, states comply with this process. The powerful do as they wish, the weak do as they must.

This image of international relations as a rigid power hierarchy, at the apex of which we have the two superpowers,

the Soviet Union and the United States, and at the bottom a number of mini-states, possesses little, if any, utility in accounting for the *actual* relations between states or for their complexity and ambiguity. How far can we use such insights as this image provides to explain, for instance, the relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba, Poland or Syria, or the relations between the United States and Panama, Greece or Israel? The answer to this question would seem pretty straightforward. And yet for years the realist image, with its emphasis on the role of power and coercion, has been embedded in the official orthodoxy of statesmen and policy makers and served as a basis for formulating balance-of-power and collective-security theories to explain interstate behaviour.[1]

## The interdependent image

Another image which purports to offer a more valid understanding of international relations is the globalist or interdependent image. Central to this image are the following assumptions. First, the role and significance of the nation-state has declined considerably since World War II. Alliances, international organizations, multinational corporations and a wide variety of non-state actors have ended the sovereignty of the state, and have, in many ways, rendered the state an ineffective, if not obsolete, actor. Second, nuclear weapons have made force an unlikely tool of international diplomacy. Force can now no longer be utilized as an instrument of foreign policy; so to use it would be both irrational and counterproductive. Third, the range of issues in international relations has changed. The multiplication of actors has generated new issues such as welfare, pollution, resources, trade, race and development. The traditional concern with power, peace and security may be there, but the agenda for the 1990s will be dominated by these new issues. Fourth, the rise of new actors and new issues has inevitably produced a form of co-operation, or interdependence, between states — a co-operation that transcends national boundaries.[2]

What are the implications of this image, and to what extent does it offer a better understanding of the relations between international actors? The globalist image emphasizes interdependence — across a wide range of issues and values — between actors. Interdependence on multiple issues diffuses and decentralizes power considerably and makes the prospect of one actor dominating the others, at all times over most issues, extremely unlikely. Multiple ties and the reduced role of force have shrunk power differences and collapsed the international hierarchy. Each state may now exercise influence over others

with respect to one issue (e.g. arms transfer), but in itself be influenced over another issue (e.g. energy resources). Everything, in a way, has become relative.

The globalist, or interdependent, image offers very different answers to the problems of order and the relations between states.[3] With power and influence decentralized, though not of course equally distributed, and with states sensitive to the vulnerabilities of their interdependence, the ability to dominate or exercise influence becomes very elusive. Within such a structure the problem of order and the nature of the interaction between two or more states are determined by the bargaining process, the negotiating skills and the resolve of each actor.

Where weak states are not really weak and the strong are not really that strong, small states are not really qualitatively different from major states. Each can influence the other under certain circumstances and determine the nature of order in the system. Again if we revert to the two dyads examined in detail below, that of the Soviet Union and Syria and the United States and Israel, we can see quite clearly that there were many instances where the superpowers realized their objectives *vis-à-vis* their smaller allies. Equally, though, there were at least as many cases where the smaller states had their way. Interdependence, it seems, helps to redress the balance that may result from unequal size or resources.

The interdependence image offers a more sophisticated picture of international relations. It is an image which recognizes that policy-outcomes do not necessarily reflect an actor's position on some international hierarchy, nor even possession of resources. This image suggests that influence is a multi-directional phenomenon, and that such international order as we have is the product of numerous decisions by many actors. Who gets what, where and how, is not so much a function of where one is, on some imaginary hierarchy, but is something that is more related to issue importance, the extent to which a relationship is valued, and the style of bargaining each state adopts. Both great and small powers can exercise influence and affect international order, both retain a capacity for choice and independent action. And finally, each country may, under certain circumstances, drag the other into its own plans, battles or designs.

This image allows us to study various forms of relations and patterns of influence between superpowers and small states. A small state may require physical protection, and be expected to render some political services in return for it, but it may often embarrass its protector, frustrate its designs and occasionally even embroil it in a regional conflict. Dominance and influence are not unilateral, nor is the problem of order resolved by the strong states. Complexity, interdependence and multiple channels