Psychological Processes and Advertising Effects
Theory, Research, and Application

Edited by
Linda F. Alwitt and
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In the 1980s our understanding of how advertising affects consumer behavior was undergoing a dramatic transformation. Recent theoretical and methodological advances in cognitive psychology, social cognition, and artificial intelligence were largely responsible for this transformation. These advances provided a better understanding of the information acquisition process and how information is stored in memory. Consequently, we have been able to incorporate memory, the processing of visual information and affect into our models of advertising effects. However, there were still many unanswered questions. Among these are: (1) Exactly what is the relationship between the different mediators of persuasion? (2) How is memory for advertising related to persuasion? (3) What are the theoretical underpinnings of attitude toward the advertisement? (4) What determines the effect of persuasion over time? (5) What factors affect attention to advertising? (6) What psychological processes occur during the watching of a television commercial? and (7) What factors affect individual differences in the processing of advertising messages?

Originally published in 1985, the chapters in this volume provide insights into these questions. They are organized in terms of four psychological processes which contribute to our understanding of how advertising works. These are affective reactions to advertisements, persuasion, psychological processes during television viewing, and involvement.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND ADVERTISING EFFECTS
THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATIONS

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Contents

Preface ix

Introduction
Linda F. Alwitt and Andrew A. Mitchell 1

PART I: AFFECTIVE REACTIONS TO ADVERTISING

1. How Advertising Works at Contact
Rajeev Batra and Michael L. Ray 13
   Introduction 13
   Affect and Involvement: An Expanded
   Theoretical Model 14
   Methodological Pre-studies 23
   A Test of the Theoretical Model 26
   Conclusions and Implications 37

Richard J. Lutz 45
   Introduction 45
   Origins of Aad 46
   Implications for Advertising Pretesting 56
   Summary 60
### 3. The Influence of Affective Reactions to Advertising: Direct and Indirect Mechanisms of Attitude Change

*Danny L. Moore and J. Wesley Hutchinson*

- Introduction 65
- Direct and Indirect Influences of Ad Affect on Brand Attitude 66
- Ad Affect and Brand Awareness—An Experiment 70
- Conclusions 85

### PART II: PERSUASION

#### 4. Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion: The Role of Message Repetition

*John T. Cacioppo and Richard E. Petty*

- Introduction 91
- The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion 92
- Message Repetition 96
- Theoretical Analysis 100
- The Role of Message Repetition: Empirical Tests 102

#### 5. Conceptual and Methodological Issues in Examining the Relationship Between Consumer Memory and Judgment

*Meryl Lichtenstein and Thomas K. Srull*

- Introduction 113
- The Nature of the Problem 114
- A Proposed Solution 115
- Some Methodological Cautions 123
- A Few Remaining Issues 125

#### 6. The Relationship Between Advertising Recall and Persuasion: An Experimental Investigation

*Ann E. Beattie and Andrew A. Mitchell*

- Introduction 129
- Research Goals 137
- Method 138
- Results 142
- Conclusions 147
- Summary 152
- Appendix A: Coding of Advertisement Recall 155
7. A Reliable Sleeper Effect in Persuasion: Implications for Opinion Change Theory and Research  
   Anthony R. Pratkanis and Anthony G. Greenwald 157
   Introduction 157
   The History of the Sleeper Effect as a Laboratory Finding 159
   Implications of a Reliable Sleeper Effect 168

PART III: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES DURING TELEVISION VIEWING

8. Online Cognitive Processing of Television  
   Daniel R. Anderson 177
   Introduction 177
   A Comment on Methodology and Theory 178
   A Description of Television Viewing at Home 179
   Visual Attention to Television 186
   Implications for Production and Future Directions 195

9. EEG Activity Reflects the Content of Commercials  
   Linda F. Alwitt 201
   Introduction 201
   Method 202
   Results 207
   Discussion 215
   Conclusions 216

PART IV: INVOLVEMENT

10. Cognitive Theory and Audience Involvement  
    Anthony G. Greenwald and Clark Leavitt 221
    Consumer Behavior Conceptions of Involvement 221
    Attention, Levels of Processing, and Involvement 224
    Research Procedures and Levels of Involvement 227
    Levels of Representation 230
    Applications to Advertising and Consumer Behavior 235
    Conclusion 237
11. The Effect of People/Product Relationships on Advertising Processing
   Peter Cushing and Melody Douglas-Tate 241
   Introduction 241
   People/Product Relationships 243
   Analysis of Group Responses to Advertising 250
   Issues and Implications 255

12. Understanding Consumers' Cognitive Structures: The Relationship of Levels of Abstraction to Judgments of Psychological Distance and Preference
   Thomas J. Reynolds, Jonathan Gutman, and John A. Fiedler 261
   Introduction 261
   Background 263
   Method 265
   Results 266
   Implications 269
   Summary 271

13. Concluding Remarks
   Linda F. Alwitt and Andrew A. Mitchell 273
   Introduction 273
   Toward a Theory of Persuasion 273
   Implications for Advertisers 287

Author Index 295

Subject Index 301
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Our understanding of how advertising affects consumer behavior is undergoing a dramatic transformation. Recent theoretical and methodological advances in cognitive psychology, social cognition, and artificial intelligence are largely responsible for this transformation. These advances have provided a better understanding of the information acquisition process and how information is stored in memory. Consequently, we have been able to incorporate memory, the processing of visual information and affect into our models of advertising effects. Because of this, richer models of advertising effects are being developed, which include these psychological processes. We also have new methodologies such as the measurement of response times, that are able to provide sensitive tests of these models.

In order to obtain a better understanding of these changes, it is useful to examine the dominant model of persuasion in the early- to mid-1970s, as exemplified by the learning model proposed by McGuire (1968). In this model, an individual has to expend considerable effort in actively processing the information in the message and go through five basic stages before persuasion could occur. These stages are attention, comprehension, yielding, retention of message, and action. Later McGuire (1978) hypothesized that for a given message, there is a certain probability that each stage would occur during exposure to a message. The probability of each stage occurring is independent, so the probability that a given message would be successful is the product of the probability of the occurrence of each stage. Consequently, the likelihood is small that any message would be successful after a single exposure.
Modifications of this model stressed the individual’s reaction to the message and identified two important mediators of persuasion. These were cognitive responses (Greenwald, 1968; Wright, 1973) and belief formation and change (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Lutz, 1975). Theoretically, cognitive responses, or more specifically, counterarguing and support arguing represent the yielding stage while belief formation and change represent the retention stage. However, it should be noted that this latter mediator is a measure of the retention of encoded information from the message as opposed to retention of the message in episodic form.

This class of models might be viewed as a high involvement/verbal response model. It assumes that individuals actively process information from persuasive messages and may resist persuasion through the generation of counterarguments. Although it was rarely explicitly stated, these models are generally interpreted to assume that attitude formation and change is mediated only through verbal responses to the communication or through the product attribute beliefs that are formed or changed. Although there is considerable empirical evidence supporting this assumption, this evidence has been generally obtained from experiments where the experimental stimulus was a single, verbal message on a topic that was highly relevant to the subjects.

Although many researchers questioned whether this high involvement/verbal response model was the only way persuasion might occur, there were few well-defined alternatives to it. One, discussed by Krugman (1965), argued that the viewing of television commercials occurs under conditions of low involvement; however, the psychological processes that would cause persuasion under these conditions were not clearly stated. Perhaps because of methodological problems, little empirical research was directed at understanding the psychological processes underlying persuasion or even determining if persuasion would occur under these conditions. Ray, et al. (1973) also discussed alternative models of how advertising may affect consumer behavior. These alternative models were defined by different orderings of the three attitude components—cognitive, affective, and conative—and the market conditions that may cause these alternative orderings. Under low involvement conditions, for instance, Ray, et al. (1973), hypothesized that conations follow cognition and that affect occurs after conation.

As mentioned previously, there have been many changes in our understanding of advertising effects. These have occurred in four general areas. The first involves the defining of alternatives to the high involvement/verbal response model. Gardner, Mitchell, and Russo (1978) argued that two critical factors affect the information acquisition process. These are the amount of attention devoted to the message and the processing strategy used to process information from the message. Reducing attention levels has been found to reduce the amount of counterarguing or support arguing (Petty, Wells, &
INTRODUCTION

Brock, 1976) which, in turn, either enhances or limits the amount of attitude change.

Two different types of processing strategies were defined by Gardner, Mitchell, and Russo (1978). The first is a brand processing strategy where individuals actively process the information from the advertisement to form an evaluation of the advertised brand. Under full attention, this process is similar to the high involvement/verbal response model discussed earlier. The second is a nonbrand processing strategy which occurs when individuals process information from a persuasive communication to achieve goals other than brand evaluation. Under these conditions they do not form an evaluation of the advertised brand during exposure to the advertisement. They do acquire some information about the advertised brand through incidental learning and a memory trace of the advertisement is retained in memory. At some later point in time, the individual may retrieve this information from memory and form an evaluation.

Chaiken (1980) and Petty and Cacioppo (1981) have also recently discussed alternative information-acquisition processes. These processes were identified by manipulating message relevance. The same message is made either highly relevant or largely irrelevant to the subject population. When the message is highly relevant, the subjects actively process the information from the communication using the high involvement/verbal response process that was discussed earlier. Chaiken refers to this as a systematic process and Petty and Cacioppo call this the central route to persuasion. This process is also consistent with Gardner, Mitchell, and Russo's definition of a brand processing strategy under conditions of full attention. When the message is largely irrelevant, the subjects use other cues, such as the number of arguments (Chaiken, 1980), or the attractiveness of the models used in the advertisement (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). Chaiken refers to this as a heuristic process, and Petty and Cacioppo call this the peripheral route to persuasion. The nonbrand processing strategy of Gardner, Mitchell, and Russo, while not precisely the same as the heuristic process defined by Chaiken or the peripheral route to persuasion, is similar. The primary difference appears to be that with a nonbrand processing strategy, the individual does not form or change an evaluation of the message topic during exposure to the message.

The second area concerns the conceptualization of involvement. Currently, a number of different conceptualizations of involvement exist in the literature. The first defines involvement in terms of the types of verbal responses made by the individual during exposure to the advertisement. Krugman (1967), for instance, has used the number of linkages made between the advertised product and the individual's life during exposure to an advertisement as a measure of involvement. An alternative conceptualization defines involvement as a motivational state. As such, it has both intensity and direction. Mitchell (1981) has related intensity to the amount of attention devoted
to the persuasive communication and direction to the processing strategy that is used. Cohen (1983) uses a similar definition, however, he defines involvement only in terms of intensity and suggests the use of the shared attention paradigm to obtain measures of involvement.

Other researchers have defined involvement in terms of commitment to a particular brand or product category (e.g., Lastovika & Gardner, 1979), while Houston and Rothschild (1977) have discussed three different types of involvement—enduring, situational, and response involvement. Enduring involvement refers to the ongoing relationship between the individual and the product or brand, while situational involvement recognizes transitory factors that may affect this relationship. Finally, response involvement concerns the type of response the individual makes toward the product.

The third area concerns the effect of an individual's affective reactions to the executional elements of the advertisement. Under the traditional high involvement/verbal response model, these executional elements were viewed only as vehicles for communicating the message. However, recent research indicates that the individual's affective reactions to the executional elements of the advertisement also affects persuasion. Mitchell and Olson (1981) showed subjects advertisements that contained photographs that were designed to create positive or neutral affect. The results of their study indicate that the product attribute beliefs that were formed did not mediate all the attitudinal differences that were found; however, the use of a second mediator, a measure of the individual's attitude toward the advertisement, did explain these differences. Mitchell and Olson (1981) suggested that these effects may occur through classical conditioning. Later, Mitchell (1983) presented a model of these effects based on the current research on mood and emotion that included a role for autonomic arousal. Ray and Batra (1983) also discussed how consumers' affective reactions toward advertisements may affect consumer behavior, however, they emphasized the attention-attracting role of these reactions.

The final area involves the processing of visual information. As mentioned previously, most of the research on persuasion has used only written messages; however, most advertisements also contain visual elements. Some of the early work in this area by Rossiter and Percy (1978, 1983) used Pavio's dual coding model (1971) to explain the effect of visual components in advertisements. According to their double loop model, the visual and written elements of an advertisement may create visual imaging that enhance memory and may result in attitudinal differences. Mitchell (1983) has discussed a similar model that differs on a number of important points. Both visual and written elements in advertisements may create or change product attribute beliefs or they may create an emotional response. The product attribute belief effects are mediated through Fishbein's Attitude Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) while the emotional responses seem to be mediated through attitude toward the advertisement.
In summary, then, although the high involvement/verbal response model is still acknowledged to be a valid model of the persuasion process, it is no longer recognized as the only model. Alternative models of the information acquisition process have been discussed, including heuristic processing (Chaiken, 1980), the peripheral route to persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) and nonbrand processing (Gardner, Mitchell, and Russo, 1978). Under these alternative processes, individuals do not fully process all the information in the advertisement—instead, they use other cues such as the attractiveness of the models used in the advertisement or their affective reaction to the advertisement in evaluating the advertised product. These latter processes have been defined as low involvement processes. Consequently, with these alternative processes, verbal responses and the beliefs that are formed or changed do not explain all of the reliable variance in attitude formation or change. In addition, attitude formation and change can occur without full comprehension of the message.

Although these alternative models provide a new perspective for understanding how advertising works, there are still many unanswered questions. Among these are: (1) Exactly what is the relationship between the different mediators of persuasion? (2) How is memory for advertising related to persuasion? (3) What are the theoretical underpinnings of attitude toward the advertisement? (4) What determines the effect of persuasion over time? (5) What factors affect attention to advertising? (6) What psychological processes occur during the watching of a television commercial? and (7) What factors affect individual differences in the processing of advertising messages?

The chapters in this volume provide insights into these questions. They are organized in terms of four psychological processes which contribute to our understanding of how advertising works. These are affective reactions to advertisements, persuasion, psychological processes during television viewing, and involvement. In a sense, this organization forces a Procrustean solution on the order of the papers because those four psychological processes are highly interrelated in advertising. For instance, the effect of the emotional content of advertising and affective responses to it cannot be discussed without also considering the role of involvement. As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, involvement is also closely intertwined with persuasive effects of messages. Persuasion, involvement, and affect in advertising are mechanisms that work most often today within the communication medium of television. Thus, while each chapter emphasizes one of the four psychological processes, it also addresses aspects of the other processes.

The everyday evaluation of effective advertising in the marketplace has been guided by the traditional high involvement/verbal response model of the persuasion process that was discussed earlier. Under this model the advertisement itself was simply a vehicle for presenting the message. Little or no attention was paid to consumer reactions to the advertising itself, yet most ad-
vertising professionals would argue that the execution must be inextricably entwined with the message in order to sell the advertised brand. Indeed, for some advertising the execution is the message. Recognition of the important role of affective reactions to advertising is the main emphasis of the chapters in Part I of this volume.

In Chapter 1, Batra and Ray, drawing on a long history of advertising research at Stanford University, incorporate affective responses to advertising as a mediating variable into a model of how advertising works. They test this model using data on responses to different types of advertising executions for a number of product categories. According to this model, affective mediating responses are important in influencing brand attitudes, and appear to act through brand familiarity.

Attitude toward the advertisement has been identified as an important mediator of the persuasion process, however, as discussed previously the theoretical underpinnings of this construct are not well understood. Lutz, in Chapter 2, presents a typology of factors that may affect attitude toward the advertisement and discusses situations when attitude toward the advertisement may have its greatest effect on brand attitudes.

In Chapter 3, Moore and Hutchinson review research on the relationship of attitudes toward the advertisement, memory, and brand attitudes. They postulate an immediate direct transfer of advertising affect to brand attitudes as well as a delayed indirect relationship between attitude toward the advertisement and brand attitudes which operates through brand familiarity after exposure to the advertising.

One of the oldest and strongest links between advertising and psychology is persuasion, the theme of Part II of this volume. The mechanisms of persuasion in attitude theory have long influenced theories of how advertising works and how it is evaluated. Petty and Cacioppo (1983) have alerted us to the importance of both the executional elements of advertising and the advertising message as mediators of persuasion in consumers. In Chapter 4, they relate their ideas on central and peripheral routes to persuasion to the issue of message repetition. They offer evidence that repetition of the same message without variation leads rapidly to tedium or advertising wearout. Repetition of a pool of different advertising executions, however, does not. These results are interpreted in terms of the peripheral and central routes to persuasion.

Marketing managers responsible for advertising budgets often rely on measures of how well people recall an advertisement as criteria for evaluating whether and how much to spend on airing a particular advertising execution. Yet there is little evidence that recall of advertising is related to sales of the advertised brand (Gibson, 1983). To the extent that sales can be predicted by persuasion or brand attitudes, the relationship of recall to persuasion is of interest. The next two chapters in Part II are concerned with limits of the rela-
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between recall and persuasion in advertising. Lichtenstein and Srull, in Chapter 5, demonstrate that recall of product related information for a new product from an advertisement influences purchase intent only when consumers do not form an evaluation of the advertised brand during exposure to the advertisement for a new product. They suggest that consumers who evaluate a product as they watch its advertising (brand processing strategy) will form an evaluation that is stored separately from the content of the advertising. Because it is stored separately, the content will not be readily available when the evaluation is recalled. However, consumers who do not form an evaluation of the product during exposure to the message (nonbrand processing strategy) retrieve the advertisement from memory and construct an evaluation based on that memory.

Like Lichtenstein and Srull, Beattie and Mitchell, (in Chapter 6) also provide evidence that the relationship between recall and judgment is mediated by the type of processing strategy that consumers use during exposure to the advertisement. Beattie and Mitchell showed their subjects a large number of advertisements for hypothetical products so they would not be able to remember all the advertisements. They then examined factors that affect the recall of the advertisement and the relationship between recall and persuasion. Beattie and Mitchell also find that when subjects do not form an evaluation of the advertised product during exposure to the advertisement, there is little relationship between recall of the advertisement and persuasion. However, like Lichtenstein and Srull, they find a relationship when subjects do not form an evaluation of the advertised brand during exposure to the advertisement.

Because there is often a delay between exposure to advertising and the opportunity to purchase the advertised product, the delayed effect of persuasion is of great interest to advertisers. In the 1950s there was some evidence that persuasion is sometimes greater after a delay than immediately after the persuasive message is presented; this is called the "sleeper effect." In Chapter 7, Pratkanis and Greenwald report that the sleeper effect is difficult to produce in the laboratory. An increase in persuasion over time can be found, however, when the persuasive message is immediately followed by another message that disparages the source of the persuasive message. Any increase in persuasion after a delay is really due, Pratkanis and Greenwald hypothesize, to rapidly forgetting the source disparagement over time and more slowly forgetting the persuasive message. The result is seemingly greater persuasion after a delay than immediately after the persuasive message.

Although advertising is usually evaluated on the basis of the entire advertising execution—in terms of recall, persuasion, liking of the execution—the executional decisions involved in developing and producing that advertising are made on the basis of scenes, details, and fraction-of-a-second events in the commercials. Part III of this volume is concerned with consumer's reac-
tions to the moment-by-moment flow of events within television commercials.

In Chapter 8, Anderson discusses how people process television programs on a moment-by-moment basis, based on ten years of monitoring people watching television both in the laboratory and in their own homes. He discusses their viewing behavior as well as three principles that seem to determine attention to television.

All of us would agree that a viewer's responses to on-going events in a commercial are controlled by the brain. In Chapter 9, Alwitt relates the electrical activity of the brain (EEG) to the presence of events such as brand mention, zooms, or music in commercials. Despite the complexity of brain activity, individual differences among people's backgrounds and needs, and the limits imposed by a new experimental area of research where there are few guidelines, relationships were found between the commercial content and EEGs.

Involvement of a person with ongoing events, with an object, and with characteristics of an object are aspects of a somewhat vague concept that plays an increasingly central role in theories of persuasion. Indeed, many of the papers in this volume discuss one or another aspect of involvement. Part IV includes three papers that concentrate on different aspects of the concept of involvement. In Chapter 10, Greenwald and Leavitt define involvement in terms of the amount of attention devoted to an advertising message. They argue that involvement with advertising increases as one moves from focal attention to comprehension to elaboration and that different advertising objectives require different levels of involvement in order to be optimally effective.

Another aspect of involvement is how products and brands fit into the lives of the people who buy them. Four types of product users are characterized in terms of how they relate to products by Cushing and Douglas-Tate in Chapter 11. They also demonstrate that these four types of product users respond differently to advertising.

Still another way of considering involvement is how people relate products to their values, motivations and lifestyles in making consumer decisions. Reynolds, Gutman, and Fiedler, in Chapter 12, analyze "laddering," a consumer research methodology for relating product attributes to a consumer's values. By examining product preferences and the perceived importance of reasons for buying a product, they conclude that, because laddering taps basic values as well as attributes and benefits to the user, it has an advantage over techniques such as conjoint measurement or multi-dimensional scaling in developing advertising strategies.

REFERENCES


AFFECTIVE REACTIONS TO ADVERTISING
INTRODUCTION

It is by now a commonplace that consumers' "low involvement" processing of television ads is different from the initial processing earlier assumed in the advertising literature. Our understanding of these processes, however, is still largely speculative, and certainly incomplete.

Over the last two years, our research has investigated such processing in an attempt to identify situations where advertisers may safely reduce levels of repetition frequency. While this is an applied and managerial objective, it has led us into investigations of the role of different kinds of affect in the processing of advertising messages.

By "affect," we mean here the sorts of feelings towards a stimulus which lead to relative preferences for that stimulus out of a class of similar stimuli. Further, we are concerned only with the kinds of affect involved in preferences, rather than the kinds that constitute emotions such as shame, guilt, etc. (see Zajonc, 1980, p. 152).

Our investigations into the role of affect in such "low involvement" advertising processes have revealed, we believe, some very fundamental insights into how "low involvement" television advertising—indeed, all television advertising—is processed on contact. These basic processes are discussed in this chapter. While the research question is posed in terms of "low involvement" advertising processes, the model presented helps to show the different ways in which all television advertising works.

We begin with our theoretical development by briefly reviewing the role of different sources of affect in advertising processing, as developed in previous
research, and then turn to our extension of currently popular positions. This involves our incorporation, into current models, of two different components of brand attitudes, and of affective, in addition to cognitive, mediating responses. We then develop our operational definition of "message response involvement," and use it in hypothesizing that the two components of brand attitudes make different "percentage contributions" to purchase intentions under different message response involvement conditions.

We then present the empirical evidence, first in reports on two methodological pre-studies, and then in the study to test the theoretical model developed. The final section discusses the results, their implications, and future research.

AFFECT AND INVOLVEMENT: AN EXPANDED THEORETICAL MODEL

The Sources of Affect across Advertising Situations

Research into the situational role of affect in advertising is, of course, not new. Following Krugman's (1965) initial characterization of most television advertising as being "less involving," research showed that the hierarchy-of-effects typically found in such advertising is such that messages tend to produce behavioral change that precedes, rather than follows, changes in attitudes, or affect (Ray et al., 1973). Within this hierarchy, however, while the effects of behavior on attitude are readily interpretable in terms of attribution (Kelley, 1967) and self-perception (Bem, 1965) mechanisms, the earlier link—that of advertising (awareness) inducing behavioral change—is more puzzling, and has naturally led to much research and speculation about process.

In earlier research at Stanford, it was found that the major impact of ad exposure in "low involvement" situations was on measures of awareness, which then led (less strongly) to changes in purchase intentions, without attitude change (Ray et al., 1973; Ray & Sawyer, 1971). Krugman's explanations of how "low involvement" advertising works, in fact, sometimes invoke mechanisms of repetition-induced "overlearning" and at other times of "gradual shifts in perceptual structure." To use more recent jargon, the important processes were believed to be brand name "salience" and "availability" (Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).

That this initial link is exclusively "awareness-driven" is now less certain, however. Recent research suggests that other mechanisms may be at play as well. In particular, it has been suggested—and our recent studies show—that affect is not absent from this initial link. It is, however, a different kind of affect from the one usually studied. The affect invoked here thus differs from
the one produced by the sort of active processing of advertising messages that Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) argue leads to changes in component attribute beliefs before leading to changes in attitude, the sort reflected in the “cognitive responses” usually studied.

There have, in fact, been clues for some time that the popular “cognitive response” (Greenwald, 1968; Wright, 1973) explanation of advertising effects does not provide a complete explanation of “low involvement” advertising processing. For instance, Wright’s study showed, as have others subsequently (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) that the explanatory power of support arguments (SAs), counterarguments (CAs), and source derogations (SDs), in explaining ad-induced changes in attitudes, was noticeably weaker in the “low involvement” manipulation than in the “high involvement” one. In Wright’s 1973 study, for instance, attitudinal variance explained dropped from (a maximum of) 43% to (a maximum of) 27%. Some important mediating processes are apparently missing from the set of cognitive responses usually analyzed.

Recent research has indicated what these missing mechanisms might be. Studies indicate that attitude to the advertising itself leads to changes in brand attitudes (Gorn, 1982; Mitchell & Olson, 1981). From social and cognitive psychology have come models of attitude change processes variously labeled as “heuristic” and “peripheral,” to reference just two (Chaiken, 1980; Cialdini, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1981). Most such models show that such less involving processing typically involves “limited elaboration” of message arguments, with persuasive impact stemming largely from execution cues and source likeability.

Some of these studies, in fact, demonstrate clear interactions between involvement levels and message strategy: Attitude change attempts that use superior attribute arguments are more successful in high involvement situations than in low involvement ones, with the opposite result holding for source (message execution) likeability (Chaiken, 1980; Gorn, 1982; Petty & Cacioppo, 1980; Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981).

These recent studies show convincingly that the source of affect toward the brand may be different in high and low involvement situations. They do not, however, argue for—or attempt to measure—the effect of these sources on two different kinds of affect, or the different types of responses that may mediate the effects of these two sources.

We suggest, and here provide evidence for, a model of initial advertising processing that holds not only that attitude change can stem from (broadly speaking) two different sources of affect, but also that these two sources act through different mediating responses and on two different components of brand attitudes. There do seem to be two different “routes” to attitude change. There is more to these routes, however, than just different sources of affect.
Two Kinds of Mediating Cognitive Responses

We have referred to the demonstrated inadequacy of currently studied cognitive responses in explaining how advertising works in "low involvement" situations. To give but two examples, the correlations of the responses studied (support arguments [SAs], counter arguments [CAs], and source derogations [SDs]) with dependent brand attitudes is significantly lower in the low, compared to the high, involvement manipulations (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Wright, 1973).

It would seem that some important mediating responses are not being captured by these three response categories. Since recent studies seem to suggest that attitudes to the ad (Aad) mediate brand attitudes, responses mediating this Aad ought to be collected, coded, and analyzed as well.

Such Aad-mediating responses are likely to be very different from the cognitive responses typically studied, because ads are not pallid statements of positions on issues, such as those studied by Chaiken, 1980, or Petty & Cacioppo, 1979. Rather, they are complex messages, combining attribute statements with humor, music, story elements, affectionate vignettes, role portrayals, attractive (or unattractive) visuals, and the like. Some of these elements persuade, others evoke technical appreciation, some irritate, others create a mood of "upbeat" surgency while others create moods that are heartwarming, or just plain relaxing or soothing. Some elements distract; while distraction influences on cognitive response production have been studied before (Festinger & Maccoby, 1964; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976), such influences typically have been embedded in the task environment, rather than within the stimulus itself. All of these ad-evoked responses should mediate one's attitude to the ad, and very few of these are captured as SAs or CAs.

There is a clear need, therefore, to collect, code and analyze such affective and distracting responses, in addition to the standard SAs and CAs. Our first pre-study developed a data collection methodology and coding scheme to do just that, and the main study reported here demonstrates clearly their utility in showing how such different responses differently mediate the impact of ad messages and execution elements.

Two Components of Affect Toward the Brand

There has been some interest recently in the existence of a "pure, non-cognitive" affect, distinct from the affect developed on the basis of the cognitive appraisal of a stimulus object (e.g. Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Zajonc, 1980). Such affect is hypothesized to be, in some sense, "primary and effortless."
Various authors have invoked such affect in speculating on the mechanisms underlying the link between advertising repetition and brand attitudes. Relying largely on the robust results on the "mere exposure" effects in social psychology (Harrison, 1977; Sawyer, 1981; Zajonc, 1968), these authors have claimed that advertising repetition, especially in "low involvement" situations, influences purchase intentions and brand attitudes through the creation of such exposure-based affect (Batra & Ray, 1983a; Greenwald, Leavitt, & Obermiller, 1980).

At the same time, evidence has accumulated that brand attitudes are not unidimensional.

In the 1970's the model of attitude structure frequently used was that of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), who argued that attitudes consisted of a unidimensional affect, based on component beliefs evaluated in an "expectancy-value" fashion. Their conception relied heavily on the identification of a primary "evaluative" dimension to concept ratings, as identified by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957). Tests of construct validity were provided by Ostrom (1969) and Kothandapani (1971), using the criteria of Campbell and Fiske (1959).

Recent work has suggested, however, that the Fishbein-Ajzen unidimensional model of attitude structure is wrong. Recent studies by Bagozzi and colleagues (Bagozzi, 1981; Bagozzi & Burnkrant, 1979; Bagozzi, Tybout, Craig, & Sternthal, 1979) have applied the more powerful (Kenny, 1975) Confirmatory Factor Analysis technique to assess the convergent and discriminant validity for the tricomponent and unidimensional models, and have reached dramatically different conclusions. Their analysis suggests quite clearly that attitudes are not unidimensional, but instead have two distinct components, an "affective" and a (multidimensional) "cognitive" one.

In fact, multi-component models have a long history, going back to Rosenberg and Hovland (1960), Katz and Stotland (1959), and others. Going back even earlier, it appears from Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) that while their "evaluation" factor was the first, predominant, and largest factor in "semantic space," as identified through the factor analysis of semantic differential ratings of many concepts, it itself was not unidimensional. Thus they identified clusters of scales within this general evaluative factor, which differentiated between "meek," "dynamic," "dependable," and "hedonistic" goodness (p. 62), and between clusters that were "morally," "aesthetically," "socially," and "emotionally" evaluative (p. 70). Another study of theirs, which factor-analyzed only the 34 items found to load heavily on their evaluative factor, found evidence for 5 factors within it (p. 71).

Further, in a little noticed study, Komorita and Bass (1967) factor-analyzed student attitudes to various issues and found clear evidence for three factors: "functionally evaluative," "affective-emotional," and "moral-
ethical." Triandis (1971, 1977), relying on their study as well as on others, has argued that behavioral intentions are a function not of a unidimensional attitude construct, but instead of "expectations of consequences" (measured on "good-bad" and "valuable-harmful" scales) and of "affect" (measured on scales of "enjoyable," "interesting," and "pleasant").

Despite such evidence, however, studies of attitude formation and change continue to use a unidimensional operationalization of attitudes, usually a "good-bad" semantic differential item (or a few very similar items). This is true even for recent studies investigating the two different "routes" to attitude change (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Gorn, 1982; Mitchell & Olson, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1980). We believe that, taken together, the studies reviewed strongly suggest a two-component model of brand attitudes (affective predispositions to brands), and call for their separate modeling and measurement.

We hypothesize that one component, here called "utilitarian affect," would be based on an appraisal of the product's instrumentality in delivering physical attributes. The other, here called "hedonic affect," would be an approach-avoidance feeling—a "hedonic tone"—towards the product as a whole. While the utilitarian component should be based on physical brand attributes, the hedonic component, on the other hand, should be created by the classical conditioning of affect from ad executions, from ad frequency "mere exposure," etc., and would be "brand specific" instead of being based on component attributes.

Using such a two-component structure model, therefore, we suggest that the "two routes" of attitude change probably work on two different components. Testing such a hypothesis, however, calls for the measurement of these two components. Our second pre-study supported the hypothesis of two components of attitudes, established that they can be discriminated using semantic differential items, and identified specific items to use in such measurement. When used in the study reported here, these scales (despite heavy "concept-scale" interaction) offer some support for our hypothesis that the two routes to attitude formation and change do work differentially through two components, though major measurement problems remain.

Message Response Involvement

Thus far, we have used the term "involvement" rather loosely. It is not our objective here to add to the voluminous literature on what that concept implies, or how it should be operationalized. What follows is a brief restatement of a position we have previously advanced (Batra & Ray, 1983b). Reviews of the involvement literature may be found in Houston and Rothschild (1978) and Mitchell (1979).

We argue that in using the term "involvement" we need to make a crucial distinction between product class involvement and message response involvement, for the two are qualitatively different phenomena.
**Product class involvement** refers to the care with which a brand choice is made. This should be a motivational construct, a function of the level of perceived risk or brand differentiation in the relevant product category. It is an enduring predisposition, though there could be temporal differences in its intensity. Such product class involvement could be measured, perhaps, by the importance of a brand choice being correct, across product categories.

**Message response involvement**, on the other hand, refers (conceptually) to the “depth” of processing for a particular message, by a particular recipient, at a particular time. Such “depth of processing” is conceptualized as message processing involving greater “cognitive elaboration,” leading to greater persistence of message effects (cf. Anderson & Reder, 1979; Craik & Lockhart, 1972). This is a situational state, not an enduring predisposition (see Mitchell, 1979). Most importantly, this construct is not purely motivational in origin. Such processing “depth,” however operationalized, would be a function not just of the viewer’s motivation to respond “deeply,” but also of his/her ability to do so, as a function of prior usage and knowledge, and of the opportunity to do so, caused by message pace and distraction, for instance (See Wright, 1981.)

This three part conceptualization of the antecedents to message response involvement is supported by a great deal of research at Stanford, which has been concentrated on the various modes (or hierarchies) of initial processing (cf. Batra & Ray, 1983a; Ray, 1976; Ray, 1979; Ray, 1981; Ray et al., 1973). In this research series it has been repeatedly found that greater “depth of processing” (or the “learning” hierarchy of response as opposed to the “low involvement” one) occurs when there is: (1) “involvement,” defined somewhat as we would define the motivational product class involvement here; (2) perceived or known differentiation between brands with respect to attributes, reflecting both the ability and motivation antecedents; (3) experience in purchasing in the product category, again reflecting ability; and (4) communication in media that allow depth of processing such as print or word-of-mouth, obviously similar to the opportunity antecedent posited here.

This past conceptualization both provides refinements to and also falls short of the present one. In terms of refinements, the past research suggests that the three antecedents would act in a multiplicative way to lead to depth of processing or message response involvement. Thus if a person has a high level of the motivational product class involvement, but low ability or opportunity, depth of processing is unlikely. This explains why many schemes to explain communication response behavior on the basis of product class involvement alone have failed (Ray, 1979).

Another refinement suggested by this past research tradition is that there may be interactions among these antecedents. For instance, there may be a point where very high experience-ability would lead to diminished motivation, as in mature product categories where consumers have so much experi-