



*Routledge Cultural Heritage and Tourism Series*

# **URBAN RECOVERY**

**INTERSECTING DISPLACEMENT WITH  
POST WAR RECONSTRUCTION**

Edited by Howayda Al-Harithy



# Urban Recovery

This book calls for re-conceptualising urban recovery by exploring the intersection of reconstruction and displacement in volatile contexts in the Global South. It explores the spatial, social, artistic, and political conditions that promote urban recovery.

Reconstruction and displacement have often been studied independently as two different processes of physical recovery and human migration towards safety and shelter. It is hoped that by intersecting or even bridging reconstruction with displacement, we can cross-fertilize and exploit both discourses to reach a greater understanding of the notion of urban recovery as a holistic and multi-layered process. This book brings multi-disciplinary perspectives into conversation with each other to look beyond the conflict-related displacement and reconstruction and into the greater processes of crises and recovery. It uses empirical research to examine how trauma, crisis, and recovery overlap, coexist, collide, and redefine each other. The core exploration of this edited collection is to understand how the oppositional framing of destruction versus reconstruction and place-making versus displacement can be disrupted; how displacement is spatialized; and how reconstruction is extended to the displaced people rebuilding their lives, environments, and memories in new locations. In the process, displacement is framed as agency, the displaced as social capital, post-conflict urban environments as archives, and reconstructions as socio-spatial practices.

With local and international insights from scholars across disciplines, this book will appeal to academics and students of urban studies, architecture, and social sciences, as well as those involved in the process of urban recovery.

**Howayda Al-Harithy** is a Professor of architecture at the department of architecture and design at the American University of Beirut and a Research Director at the Beirut Urban Lab. She is the editor of *Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction: Case Studies from Lebanon in the Aftermath of the 2006 War* published by Routledge in 2010.

## **Routledge Critical Studies in Urbanism and the City**

This series offers a forum for cutting-edge and original research that explores different aspects of the city. Titles within this series critically engage with, question and challenge contemporary theory and concepts to extend current debates and pave the way for new critical perspectives on the city. This series explores a range of social, political, economic, cultural and spatial concepts, offering innovative and vibrant contributions, international perspectives and interdisciplinary engagements with the city from across the social sciences and humanities.

### **Socially Engaged Art and the Neoliberal City**

*Cecilie Sachs Olsen*

### **Peri-Urban China**

Land Use, Growth, and Integrated Urban–Rural Development

*Li Tian and Yan Guo*

### **Spatial Complexity in Urban Design Research**

Graph Visualization Tools for Communities and their Contexts

*Jamie O'Brien*

### **Housing Displacement**

Conceptual and Methodological Issues

*Edited by Guy Baeten, Carina Listerborn, Maria Persdotter and Emil Pull*

### **Urban Recovery**

Intersecting Displacement with Post War Reconstruction

*Edited by Howayda Al-Harithy*

For more information about this series, please visit [www.routledge.com/Routledge-Critical-Studies-in-Urbanism-and-the-City/book-series/RSCUC](http://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Critical-Studies-in-Urbanism-and-the-City/book-series/RSCUC)

# **Urban Recovery**

**Intersecting Displacement with Post War  
Reconstruction**

**Edited by  
Howayda Al-Harithy**

First published 2022  
by Routledge  
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge  
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,  
an informa business*

© 2022 selection and editorial matter, Howayda Al-Harithy; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Howayda Al-Harithy to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

*Trademark notice:* Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

*British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data*

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-0-367-55042-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-55043-1 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-09170-7 (ebk)

# Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	viii
<i>List of tables</i>	xiii
<i>List of contributors</i>	xiv
<i>Acknowledgement</i>	xvii
<b>1 Re-conceptualizing urban recovery in the age of protracted displacement</b>	<b>1</b>
HOWAYDA AL-HARITHY	
<b>PART I</b>	
<b>Understanding systems and scales of governance</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>2 Global Compacts or containment? Geopolitics by design</b>	<b>15</b>
JENNIFER HYNDMAN	
<b>3 Refugees, resettlement, and the territorial correlates of resilience</b>	<b>35</b>
DIANE E. DAVIS	
<b>4 Spatial patterns, gray spacing, and planning policy implications: The urbanization of forced population displacement in Lebanon</b>	<b>65</b>
MONA FAWAZ, MONA HARB, AND CARLA AL-HAGE	
<b>5 Governing displaced cities: Calibrating reconstruction amidst instability</b>	<b>90</b>
LOREN LANDAU	
<b>6 City Development Frame: The City as a unit of the countryside recovery (Azaz City in Syria)</b>	<b>108</b>
GHIATH AL JEBAWI	

**PART II**

**Housing the displaced** 139

- 7 Understanding protracted displacement through the dwelling:  
The temporal injustice of the not quite, not yet solutions to  
refugee crises** 141

CATHRINE BRUN

- 8 Learning to be a city: Emerging practices for housing  
the displaced in Bar Elias (Lebanon)** 167

JOANA DABAJ, CAMILLO BOANO, AND HOWAYDA AL-HARITHY

- 9 The recovery of Baghdad's neighborhoods in the aftermath  
of 'Al-Taifiyah' sectarian conflict** 188

NAMARIQ AL-RAWI

**PART III**

**Conceiving of cultural heritage in the recovery process** 215

- 10 From recovery to resilience: Challenges and opportunities  
for post-crisis recovery of urban heritage** 217

ROHIT JIGYASU

- 11 The [framing] of heritage in the post-war reconstruction  
of Beirut central district (Lebanon)** 239

HOWAYDA AL-HARITHY AND DINA MNEIMNEH

- 12 The politics of urban recovery in a Soviet-era spa resort town:  
Heritage tourism and displaced communities in Tskaltubo,  
Georgia** 271

SUZANNE HARRIS-BRANDTS AND DAVID SICHINAVA

- 13 Creative institutionalism: Statecraft beyond the state  
in Palestine** 295

CHIARA DE CESARI

- 14 Souls of homes: Heritage as a manifestation of community  
relationships through space and time** 320

EVA ZIEDAN

**PART IV**

**Space and imaginaries in framing post-crisis recovery(s)** 343

**15 Transient city – steadfast camp: Re-construction of ancient Rome and present Dheisheh** 345

ELENA ISAYEV

**16 Urban recovery at the mall: Displacement and solace in Beirut’s spaces of consumption** 376

JUDITH NAEFF

**17 Confiscated imaginaries: Notes on a work in progress** 397

OMAR MISMAR

*Index* 411

# Figures

3.1	(a) Zaatari refugee camp, Jordan; (b) Syrian Refugees, Ouzai Complex, Saida, Lebanon	39
3.2	Streetscape refugee housing, Jordan	46
3.3	Palestinian camp, Lebanon	46
3.4	Refugee housing, Jordan	48
3.5	Formal housing in Grenada, 2019	51
3.6	Irregular settlement, Paraiso, 2019	52
3.7	Informal settlement, Villas de Granada, 2019	53
3.8	Meeting between villa residents and land-use plan contractors, Villas de Granada, 2019	55
4.1	(a) Densification of existing fabric in the Old City of Saida, sketch of a street elevation. (b) Densification of existing fabric in the Old City of Saida. Additions are invisible in the top view. Legends: Urban residential fabric, monuments, and building fabric	70
4.2	Location of recently built housing compounds along the main roads in Halba. Legends: Urban residential fabric, constructed housing compounds	71
4.3	Agricultural tracts in Zahle and location of informal tented settlements. Legends: Agricultural tracts, ITSs	73
4.4	Housing quality in compounds and other forms of housing in Halba	74
4.5	Comparative Housing Indicators across three locations in Saida	75
6.1	Cities network in north Aleppo	110
6.2	Research and analysis tools	113
6.3	Informal building and urban sprawl - houses built on planned streets and houses built outside the zone of 2008 masterplan	115
6.4	Azaz urban challenges	117
6.5	HLP complexity analysis	125
6.6	Land values in Azaz, July 2019	127
6.7	Shifting structure and power in the local council in Azaz	129
6.8	Template and elements map work together	131
6.9	Template tool software	131

6.10	Example of the functionality of the CDF – Template Tool	133
6.11	Example of the functionality of the CDF – Elements Map Tool	133
7.1	(a) Cooking in the corridor in a collective centre in Tbilisi. (b) A shared bathroom at the end of the corridor, Collective Centre Tbilisi	151
7.2	(a) Hotel Iveria Collective Centre in 2003. (b) Hotel Iveria became Radisson Blu	154
7.3	(a) Eka’s occupied space in 2010, before building. (b) Eka’s completed flat	159
8.1	The expansion of Bar Elias	171
8.2	The ‘city centre expansion’ and the ‘peripheral agriculture fields’ in Bar Elias	172
8.3	Fahim’s new building in Bar Elias	174
8.4	New construction within the agriculture fields in Bar Elias	178
8.5	An abandoned villa that is rented to a Syrian refugee family within the agriculture fields in Bar Elias	178
8.6	ITSs in Tell Serhoun in Bar Elias	179
8.7	Al-Awda URDA camp in Bar Elias	180
8.8	Diagram of spatial practices and housing transactions	182
9.1	Residential land management, allotment, and management after the mid-1950s	191
9.2	Districts and neighborhood distribution in Baghdad before 2003	193
9.3	Districts distribution and the map of the Green Zone	195
9.4	Conflictual power distribution in Baghdad after the war and occupation in 2003	196
9.5	Sample area in Jihad/Baiya District showing population subjectification inside neighborhoods	197
9.6	The sectarian landscape and shift in the social fabric in Baghdad	199
9.7	Palm groves in Kadhimiyah District under constant threat of Allotments due to slums invasion	201
9.8	Checkpoint on a bridge before the main entry to Al-Qadisiya neighborhood in Baghdad	202
9.9	Eight Locations to be distributed to low-income class as stated in Law No. 254 in 2013	207
10.1	People were keen to reconstruct local shrines and community structures that were damaged in historic settlement of Sankhu following the 2015 Nepal earthquake	221
10.2	Traditional public space in Bungamati settlement used for constructing temporary shelters following the 2015 Nepal earthquake	222
10.3	Traditional festivals, such as Macchenderanath Jatra held after 12 years, were disrupted due to the 2015 Nepal earthquake	224
10.4	Santipur shrine and frescoes in the interior walls were damaged due to the 2015 earthquake. Community decided to repaint the fresco rather than restoring the damaged one	225

10.5	The house designs and the layout of villages reconstructed after the 1993 Marathwada earthquake in India had no link with traditional architecture and planning. As a result, many of these villages were not occupied by the beneficiaries, who preferred to reconstruct their traditional shelter	228
10.6	In the absence of proper knowledge, many traditional houses were wrongly repaired using new materials following the 1993 Marathwada earthquake	230
10.7	The skeleton of disaster-prevention centre in Shizugawa town in Minami-Sanriku-Cho damaged by the 2011 tsunami in the east coast of Japan was turned into a memorial	232
10.8	Traditional water structures in the historic city of Bhaktapur in Kathmandu valley, Nepal, helped in providing water for essential services in the immediate aftermath of the 2015 earthquake	233
10.9	In the aftermath of the 2011 tsunami following the great east-Japan earthquake, historic shrines such as Kaminoyama Hachimangu in Shizugawa town became social anchors for bringing together communities that were split and displaced. The local priest of the shrine organized many activities to bring together communities displaced after the tsunami	234
10.10	In the reconstructed town of Shizugawa, the landfilling to raise the height of the village to protect the town from future tsunami has disturbed the traditional relationship with the river that was manifested through various festivals and social activities of the community	234
11.1	Aerial view of the BCD in 2002	242
11.2	APUR masterplan 1977	243
11.3	Map of demolitions in the BCD	245
11.4	(a) The masterplan of Dar al-Handasah 1991. (b) Perspective view of BCD as per the masterplan of 1991	248
11.5	(a) The SOLIDERE revised masterplan 1994. (b) Perspective view of BCD as per the revised masterplan of 1994	251
11.6	The Garden of Forgiveness	255
11.7	Archaeological remains in the new Souks	256
11.8	The Foch-Allenby conservation area	257
11.9	St. George Greek-Orthodox Cathedral	259
11.10	Saifi village neighborhood	261
11.11	The new Beirut souks	262
12.1	Sanatorium of the Georgian Institute of Resort Studies, in Tskaltubo, Georgia	272
12.2	Sanatorium Imereti in Tskaltubo, Georgia	272
12.3	Sanatorium Iveria in Tskaltubo, Georgia	273
12.4	Sanatorium Tbilisi transformed by IDPs	273
12.5	Plan of Tskaltubo, showing the central park space with bathhouses, surrounded by peripheral sanatoria	276

12.6	Military servicemen outside of the Sanatoria of the USSR Ministry of Defense, (now Legends Tskaltubo Spa Resort), circa 1960s	277
12.7	A pig grazing outside the former Savane sanatorium	279
12.8	Interior of the Bathhouse #6 visited by Stalin	285
13.1	Historic village of Beit Ikka; an Israeli settlement is visible in the background on the right. Photo by Michel Salameh	296
13.2	(a-c) The 2006 newsletter of the Palestinian Museum of Natural History and Humankind	300
13.3	Beit Ikka after restoration by Riwaq	304
13.4	Sculptural installation by Majdal Nateel, <i>Dream Is Possible</i> , in a restored historic building in Ramallah during Qalandiya International 2016	310
13.5	The Palestinian Museum	311
14.1	Community-based living heritage paradigm	322
14.2	Location of the four case studies	323
14.3	The ancient hydraulic structures in the Orontes River Basin	324
14.4	The contemporary hydraulic structures in the Orontes River Basin	325
14.5	An irrigation channel before maintenance works, Al Ghab Plain	326
14.6	An irrigation channel after maintenance works, Al Ghab Plain	327
14.7	Al Ghab community-based living heritage	328
14.8	Military checkpoints, Aleppo 2013	330
14.9	Aleppo community-based living heritage	332
14.10	Locals from Raqqa; locals came back to clean their neighbourhood	334
14.11	Raqqa community-based living heritage	335
14.12	Families around Al Khazzan Square; Umm al Ghayth has returned. Tell Hasan Basha 2015	337
14.13	Tell Hasan Basha community-based living heritage	338
15.1	Looking across Dheisheh Refugee Camp, West Bank, Palestine	348
15.2	Aerial view of Dheisheh Refugee Camp and adjacent Suburb	350
15.3	The courtyard of Al Feniq Cultural Centre, Dheisheh Refugee Camp, the West Bank, Palestine. A gathering for a workshop: Reading Fanon in Palestine Today	359
16.1	Beirut Souks, a pedestrian shopping mall	377
16.2	Beirut Souks, international chains	377
16.3	ABC mall, Achrafieh, rooftop	385
16.4	ABC Mall, Achrafieh, interior	386
16.5	Sebastian Dahl, From the series Downtown Beirut	392
16.6	Sebastian Dahl, From the series Downtown Beirut	392
17.1	Tent no. 6, Camp 007, Qab Elias, Bekaa Valley, Lebanon	399
17.2	Billboard issued by the Lebanese Army to celebrate the 73rd Lebanese Independence	399
17.3	Tony Elieh, Dubious Prototype (Confiscated Imaginaries)	403

xii *Figures*

17.4	Tony Elieh, Dubious Prototype (Confiscated Imaginaries)	403
17.5	Tony Elieh, Dubious Prototype (Confiscated Imaginaries)	404
17.6	Tal Abyad, blueprint from Dubious Prototype (Confiscated Imaginaries)	404
17.7	Al Qusayr, blueprint from Dubious Prototype (Confiscated Imaginaries)	405
17.8	Raqqa, blueprint from Dubious Prototype (Confiscated Imaginaries)	405
17.9	Deir el Zour, blueprint from Dubious Prototype (Confiscated Imaginaries)	406
17.10	Homs, blueprint sample from Dubious Prototype (Confiscated Imaginaries)	406

# Tables

4.1	Number of Syrian refugees and Lebanese individuals in the cities of Saida, Zahle, and Halba in 2018	67
8.1	Changes in land prices in the central Beqaa Valley between 1976 and 1984.	169
9.1	Classification of residential areas according to Law No. 156/1971	192
9.2	Land-use changes to residential at the request of the Iraqi Parliament decisions between 2004 and 2009	206

# Contributors

**Howayda Al-Harithy** is a Professor of Architecture at the department of architecture and design at the American University of Beirut and a Research Director at the Beirut Urban Lab. She is the editor of *Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction: Case Studies from Lebanon in the Aftermath of the 2006 War* (Routledge, 2010).

**Jennifer Hyndman** is a Professor of Geography at York University in Toronto. Her research focuses on the geopolitics of forced migration, the biopolitics of humanitarian responses to displacement, and refugee resettlement. Her most recent book (with Giles) is *Refugees in Extended Exile: Living on the Edge* (Routledge, 2017).

**Diane Davis** is the Charles Dyer Norton Professor of regional development and urbanism at Harvard's Graduate School of Design (GSD), and a co-director of the risk and resilience track of the Master in design studies program. Research interests include relations between urbanization and national development, socio-spatial practice in conflict cities, and new territorial manifestations of sovereignty.

**Mona Fawaz** is a Professor of Urban studies and planning at the department of architecture and design and a research director at the Beirut Urban Lab at the American University of Beirut. She is the author of over 50 scholarly publications addressing issues of urban history and historiography, social and spatial justice, informality, law, housing, land, property, space, and planning theory.

**Mona Harb** is a Professor of urban studies and politics and a Research Director at the Beirut Urban Lab at the American University of Beirut. Her research examines the roles of multiple actors in the spatial production and governance of the city and investigates how oppositional politics and urban activism may lead to political change.

**Carla Al-Hage** is an architect and urbanist, and a researcher at the Beirut Urban Lab at the American University of Beirut. She holds a Bachelor in Architecture and an MPhil in Architecture and Urban Studies from

the University of Cambridge, UK. Her research at the Lab focuses on the urbanization of forced population displacement in secondary Lebanese cities.

**Loren Landau** is a Professor at Oxford and Witwatersrand Universities. A political scientist by training, his interdisciplinary scholarship explores mobility, multi-scale governance, and the transformation of socio-political community across the global south. He has published widely in the academic and popular press and works closely with civil society, local government, and international organisations to promote inclusion amidst widespread mobility and dislocation.

**Ghiath Al Jebawi** is a development systems researcher. Fascinated about digital systems and their architecture, Al Jebawi is educated as an architectural engineer, and urbanist from Damascus University (2010) and Politecnico di Milano (2016). He investigates in communities in motion, socioeconomics, and local governance. Al Jebawi is dedicated to the spatial, cultural, social, environmental, and digital narration of development.

**Cathrine Brun** is a Professor and the Director of the centre for development and emergency practice at Oxford Brookes University. She is a geographer researching protracted displacement and the ethics and politics of humanitarianism, particularly focusing on housing and home, place and temporality from the perspective of what people do when living with displacement.

**Joana Dabaj** is a co-founding architect, urban designer, and researcher at CatalyticAction, a UK charity that empowers communities through innovative community-led interventions. Building on her extensive experience in design in development, migration, and human rights in the Middle East, she has recently been working closely with displaced and host communities in Lebanon to co-design and implement interventions of strategic value.

**Camillo Boano** is a Professor of urban design and critical theory at The Bartlett Development Planning Unit at UCL, UK, and a Professor of Architectural and urban design at the dipartimento interateneo di scienze, progetto e politiche del territorio, politecnico di Torino, Italy. He is a Co-Director of the UCL urban laboratory and the author of *The Ethics of a Potential Urbanism: Critical Encounters Between Giorgio Agamben and Architecture* (Routledge, 2017).

**Namariq Al-Rawi** is an architect and independent urban researcher who obtained her master's degree from Stuttgart University in international urban studies with a focus on integrated urbanism and sustainable design. She investigates in her researches the effects of physical and social destruction and the possibilities of reconstructing stricken cities in her homeland Iraq.

**Rohit Jigyasu** is a conservation architect and risk management professional from India, currently working at ICCROM as Project Manager on urban heritage, climate change and disaster risk management. He is also the

Vice President of ICOMOS and its International Scientific Committee on Risk preparedness.

**Dina Mneimneh** is a practicing architect and researcher based in Beirut, and a graduate of the American University of Beirut (AUB). Her design and research contributions span across the fields of public architecture, sustainable urban development in historic environments, and post-war reconstruction of Beirut's city centre.

**Suzanne Harris-Brandts** is an Assistant Professor of architecture and urbanism at Carleton University and co-founder of the design-research practice collective domain. Her research brings together design and the social sciences to explore issues of power, equity, and collective identity in the built environment.

**David Sichinava** is an Assistant Professor of human geography at Tbilisi State University and co-founder of the design-research practice collective domain. His research focuses on the social, spatial, and temporal aspects of inequality, the politics of urban development, and the role of civil society in urban policy. David is also a Research Director at the Caucasus Research Resource Centre (CRRC-Georgia).

**Chiara De Cesari** is an Associate Professor in European studies and cultural studies at the university of Amsterdam. Her wide-ranging re-search explores how forms of memory, heritage, art, and cultural politics are shifting under conditions of contemporary globalization and state transformation.

**Eva Ziedan** is an archaeologist, heritage specialist, and community development expert with more than ten years of field experience in the Middle East and Europe. Ziedan's work examines how living heritage is about re-adapting to develop concrete socio-economic benefits and ensuring the continuity of human interaction.

**Elena Isayev** is a historian and archaeologist focusing on migration, hospitality, and displacement. She has written on *Migration Mobility and Place in Ancient Italy*, and on agency for the Red Cross. She currently leads *Imagining Futures through Un/Archived Pasts* (AHRC, GCRF Network+), and is a Professor of ancient history, university of Exeter, UK.

**Judith Naeff** is an Assistant Professor at the Leiden University Institute for Area Studies (LIAS) working in the field of cultural studies with a focus on the contemporary Middle East. She has extensively studied and published a monograph on urban imaginaries of post-civil-war Beirut in 2018.

**Omar Mismar** is an interdisciplinary artist based in Beirut, Lebanon. He has participated in exhibitions in San José Museum of Art, San José (2018), MoMA, New York (2018), Homeworks 8, Beirut (2019), and Oakland Museum, California (2020) among others. Mismar is Assistant Professor of Visual Arts at the American University of Beirut.

# Acknowledgement

This book would not have been possible without the inspiration, help, and support of so many students, researchers and colleagues. I would like first to thank the Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture at the American University of Beirut (AUB), the Ford Foundation, the RELIEF Centre at the Institute for Global Prosperity, University College London (UCL), and L'Institut Français du Proche-Orient for funding the City Debates conference that I organised in April 2019. I take this opportunity to thank all of those who helped in conceptualising and organizing the conference that led to the publication of this edited volume, including all my graduate students who took the City Debates seminar of 2019 and my colleagues Mona Harb, Mona Fawaz and Camillo Boano.

This book brings together some of the impressive scholars who participated in City Debates 2019 to contribute unique insights into the timely topic of urban recovery across different dimensions, expertise, and disciplines. I would also like to extend my thanks to my colleagues Robert Saliba and Jala Makhzoumi for their support with the book proposal.

I am very grateful for my research team that helped me with the organisation of City Debates 2019 and the preparation of the manuscript of this book: Najmeh H. Viki, Batoul Yassine, and Ali Khodr. Special thanks go to Abir Eltayeb who played a key role in bringing the conference and the edited volume to light. Her dedication through organizing, communicating and editing ensured the completion of both.

*Howayda Al-Harithy*  
*Beirut*  
*March 2021*



**Taylor & Francis**

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

# 1 Re-conceptualizing urban recovery in the age of protracted displacement

*Howayda Al-Harithy*

## Introduction

In today's world an unprecedented rate of one person every two seconds is forcibly displaced due to disasters and violent conflicts. Calling the period of 2010–2019 a decade of displacement, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports, 'At least 100 million people were forced to flee their homes during the last 10 years, seeking refuge either within or outside the borders of their country'.<sup>1</sup> Displacement and reconstruction are more critical than ever with the total number of displaced people worldwide reaching 79.5 million by the end of 2019 due to conflicts, violence, and persecution (UNHCR, 2019). This edited book therefore frames the following question: What does urban recovery look like in the age of mass and protracted displacement? It thus aims to re-conceptualize urban recovery at the intersection of *displacement* and *reconstruction*.

Reconstruction and displacement form two independent scholarly trajectories that do not intersect often enough to enrich or challenge one another. While reconstruction is mostly focused on the physical aspects of the built environment, displacement emerges as a human-centred discourse that encompasses the social and temporal dimensions of human migration towards safety and shelter. And, while displacement has occupied a central focus in research across historical, urban, anthropological, geographical, cultural, and refugee studies, emerging threads call for more interdisciplinary and spatial reflections. This book therefore brings together different disciplinary perspectives into conversation with each other and with empirical case studies. These perspectives look beyond conflict-related displacement and reconstruction to explore the greater processes of crises, trauma, and recovery, and examine how they overlap, co-exist and collide and hence, redefine each other. The goal is to understand how the oppositional framing of destruction versus reconstruction and place-making versus displacement can be disrupted; how displacement is spatialized; and how reconstruction is extended to displaced people rebuilding their lives, environments, and memories in new locations. In the process, displacement is framed as an agency, the displaced as social capital, post-conflict urban environments as archives, and reconstructions as socio-spatial practices.

The idea for this book was initiated in the wake of City Debates 2019, an international conference on contemporary urban issues that I organized in April 2019 at the American University of Beirut, titled *Urban Recovery at the Intersection of Displacement and Reconstruction*. The conference examined the spatial modalities that inhabit and represent these intersections. It was premised on the following: ‘While reconstruction has long been debated, its intersections with protracted and mass displacement call for more critical conversations’.<sup>2</sup> The book is designed to bring together the variety of approaches and perspectives that were debated during the conference and share them with the wider academic and professional community throughout the region of the Middle East and beyond.

This book is therefore an invitation to re-conceptualize urban recovery by exploring how reconstruction and displacement intersect across volatile contexts from a Global South perspective. It is hoped that by intersecting and even colliding reconstruction with displacement, we can cross-fertilize and contaminate both discourses positively towards a greater understanding of the notion of urban recovery as a holistic and multi-layered process; one that goes beyond the physical and the humanitarian and proposes a more inclusive and multidisciplinary approach. This approach transcends the formal and the immediate to include informal practices and tune to the complexity of the accumulation and archiving of history. The book is, thus, an in-depth exploration of spatial, social, artistic, virtual, and political modalities that promote the process of urban recovery. It is at the same time an interrogation of the strategies and discourses surrounding recovery, reconstruction, and displacement. These explorations and interrogations are directed towards understanding how violence and protracted displacement impact urban practices; posing urban recovery as a complex process that challenges existing conventions, tackles displacement as urban agency, and engages reconstruction as being equally occupied with the intangible.

The content of this book and its thematic structure explore narratives of displacement and modalities of reconstruction through multiple lenses such as time, space, locality, gender, sectarianism, and memory. The thematic intersections between reconstruction and displacement are organized around understanding systems and scales of governance; housing the displaced; conceiving of cultural heritage in the recovery process; and spaces and imaginaries of post-crisis recovery(s).

### **Conceptualizing recovery**

Existing literature presents wide-ranging differences in the definitions and conceptualizations of recovery that have provoked the entry point of this book. While diverse definitions co-exist, recovery as a construct evolved over the past three decades from a term that is synonymous with reconstruction to an iterative process that is intertwined with development, reconstruction, or resilience, to then emerge as an open-ended participatory

process that is locally informed and socially anchored. When used in relation to post-conflict or post-disaster, some scholars reduce recovery to the physical aspects of the built and natural environments, often equating it with reconstruction while calling for the implementation of comprehensive urban planning schemes. Other scholars think of recovery as an ongoing act of resilience that starts before a crisis ends, while others link it to bottom-up strategies that involve contextual and participatory approaches. These differences in conceptualizations lie largely in the disciplinary or sub-disciplinary framing; of particular interest here are the differences that emerge in the conception of recovery among the three strands of post-disaster recovery, post-war reconstruction, and humanitarian aid and relief.

This section of the chapter offers an overview of the different definitions and conceptualizations of recovery and identifies the main theoretical shifts that have taken place in the literature. It then positions the book and its thematic tracks in relation to such trajectories. It is important, however, to note that the different definitions of recovery have developed and continue to co-exist in parallel. Recovery remains open to further conceptualizations upon which the invitation of this book is extended.

Early research equated recovery with reconstruction of the physical environment but paved the way for more critical conceptions of recovery in relation to reconstruction (Haas, Kates, and Bowden, 1977; Bolin, 1976, 1982; Bolin and Trainer, 1978; Drabek and Key, 1984; Oliver-Smith, 1986; Bates and Peacock, 1993). The distinction between recovery and reconstruction was sharpened when the literature shifted from a focus on pure tangible reconstruction schemes to the recovery of intangible dynamics and networks. This significant shift became apparent after the end of the post-Yugoslav collapse and the siege of Sarajevo in 1996. The sole focus was no longer on the reconstruction of the built environment as was the case following the World War II. Recovering memories, practices, and a sense of place became crucial in the aftermath of violent conflict, as well as state rebuilding and community reintegration. For example, when the physical impact of urban trauma is considered, authors such as Shaw (1996) and Zetter (2005) focus on the need to tie recovery to reconstruction, and hence development. They suggest a push for more sustainable economic structures as part of the reconstruction agenda. Stanley-Price (2007) ties reconstruction to the recovery of cultural heritage. He views it as a priority, along with the provision of shelter, basic needs, and services for people. It encompasses elements of both tangible and intangible heritage, including the restoration of symbolic monuments, cultural practices, and markers of national identity by looking at the significance of home and land in the minds of people. In addition to material losses, he further argues that cultural heritage is grounded in people's personal and collective histories and their visions for their neighbourhoods. He, thus, focuses on reviving the cultural fabric of a place, including the identities of individuals, their communities, and sense of belonging. Similarly, Gotham and Greenberg (2008) consider

the activation of cultural institutions as paramount to recovery, alongside the provision of humanitarian aid and immediate housing.

Addison (2003a, 2003b) ties reconstruction to recovery through his conception of ‘broad-based recovery’. To Addison, achieving recovery in Africa from an empirical point of view requires a set of parallel actions that go beyond the act of rebuilding damaged physical infrastructure. These actions include peace building, securing political stability, strengthening the functions of the state, resettling refugees, and rebuilding the social and economic sectors. Addison (2003b) argues that moving from conflict to recovery in Africa can only be secured when peace is sought and broad-based recovery is designed to improve the livelihood of all social groups, especially the disadvantaged. In this case, achieving recovery includes two requirements. The first requirement is the balanced and active role of all the stakeholders involved in the recovery process. Involvement in recovery is illustrated by a ‘reconstruction and growth’ pyramid where national and international actors are key players. At the base of this pyramid are local communities. To Addison (2003b), success lies in the ability of communities to rebuild and strengthen their livelihoods. The second requirement proposes legislative and political reform to accompany the reconstruction of physical, natural, and human capital. Here, Addison (2003b) draws a parallel between reconstruction initiatives and the legislative and political reform. While both are imperative to achieving recovery, they need to be addressed in tandem: prioritizing one over the other can lead to a narrow rather than broad-based recovery. Recovery for Addison (2003a, 2003b) is therefore a two-fold condition that is reached through reconstruction and reform.

Over the last three decades, the term recovery further evolved as an alternative to reconstruction that does not assume a return to the previous state that was linked to the roots of conflict. To Barakat and Zyck (2009, p.1072):

Although the term ‘reconstruction’ has gained considerable momentum, it has also been criticised for suggesting a return to the *status quo ante* which had been implicated in the cause of the conflict. The constructive urge, it was implied, had failed to adequately deconstruct the weaknesses and vulnerability factors evident in the pre-conflict environment. In the light of such debates, ‘recovery’ gained favour for its pre-existing use in economic, social, medical and psychological realms and because of its apparent distance from the infrastructure-oriented connotations and origins of reconstruction.

As such, the conceptualization of recovery shifted from framing it as a return to the *status quo ante* to a ‘new normal’. According to Chang (2010), recovery produces an environment that becomes the ‘new normal’. In this case, building back as before either becomes impossible due to irreversible social, political, and economic changes or reproduces the conditions that created the disaster. It is, however, important to note that adapting to

the ‘new normal’ might not always lead to a ‘new better’. Chang (2010) therefore conceptualizes recovery as an adaptive process that negotiates the reconstruction of pre-disaster systems with major alterations of those systems.

In parallel, scholars also challenge the conception of recovery as linear. They advance a more critical take that acknowledges recovery as iterative with overlapping phases at multiple scales from local, regional, to national (Berke, Kartez, and Wenger, 1993; Neal, 1996; Chang, 2009). Post-disaster scholars begin to conceptualize recovery as a process that is versatile, complex, and without an endpoint. They no longer conceive of disaster as an interruption in development and recovery as a reversal process seeking to restore the pre-disaster normality. Rather, recovery begins to be conceived as complex and nonlinear and results in a ‘new normality’; an environment that was altered and reconfigured by the disaster. In the process, recovery prioritizes re-establishing people’s lives over physical rebuilding (Olshansky, 2005). Scholars even add that a successful recovery improves a community’s disaster resilience rather than re-establish their vulnerabilities (Mileti, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004). As a result, recovery emerges as a process of rebuilding both the physical and the social. It involves more than the reconstruction of the built environment and is more appropriately conceptualized as a social process that is shaped by both pre- and post-disaster conditions. It acknowledges the challenges faced by people as well as the recovery of the built and natural systems. As such, recovery in post-disaster literature is defined as the process of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the spatial, socio-cultural, economic, and natural environments through pre-event planning and post-event actions (Smith and Wenger, 2007).

This invited the conceptualization of recovery in relation to the urban and to resilience. Davis (2005) focuses on resilience while examining the impacts of Mexico City’s disastrous earthquake on the spatial, physical, social, and political character of the capital city. She questions how a city can recover from a disaster of this magnitude by being more resilient. Davis (2005) defines recovery through resilience as more than mere physical rebuilding. It is understood in terms of the enduring qualities of places, people, and their social practices and values. It allows cities to respond to the stresses of disaster by transforming and adapting to a new state. Furthermore, Davis’s (2005) work proposes a link between recovery as a process and the practice of urban citizenship. The earthquake in Mexico City exposed the hidden corruption embedded in the city and acted as a catalyst that mobilized citizens to search for social justice. It expanded the understanding of recovery to become an opportunity for people to seek answers to what they need for a better future, with lessons learned from the past. Davis (2005, p. 260) makes the following propositions while distinguishing between the resilience of the people and the resilience of corrupt systems that produce a recovery shaped by the ‘logic of money and power’: ‘a city is more than its buildings and, thus, resilience must be understood as more than physical reconstruction’. As such, ‘reconstruction is not necessarily recovery

(or vice versa), and resilience is not always a good thing'. Similarly, Vale and Campanella (2005) define resilience as the capacity of a city and its people to rebound from a disaster. Campanella (2006) explores recovery in New Orleans after hurricane Katrina and its ability to rebound from a disaster. As Davis (2005), Campanella (2006) links resilience to recovery, not only through the physical recovery of the city itself, but also to the recovery of the social fabric. For Campanella (2006), recovery is defined in terms of the resilience of the residents to reclaim their neighbourhoods after a disaster. Cities, to Campanella, are not just buildings; they are sets of communities with people, culture, and heritage that define resilience and possible recovery. Recovery does not necessarily mean bringing back the city to its initial state; it is also not about physical improvements to neighbourhoods. Recovery is about ensuring that people maintain their bonds and community relationships. As such, Campanella (2006) argues that recovery is difficult when the post-disaster reconstruction of a city is imposed on the residents, leading to relocation and further damage. He stresses the importance of local bonds between the residents to ensuring recovery; recovery is then linked to the state of mind of the residents living in the city where social bonds outlast disaster. Campanella (2006) further argues that a city is as resilient as its residents who are willing to come back and claim it as their own.

Another shift occurred when recovery is conceptualized as an open-ended process within a participatory framework, as opposed to a top-heavy one. It has been argued that urban planners can play a vital role in instigating change by adopting resilience as a strategy and augmenting the collaborative role of communities in the recovery process. Authors such as Davoudi (2012) and Owen (2015) stress the importance of resilience in pre- and post-urban planning. Davoudi (2012) emphasizes that a positive change is possible through dialogue between urban planners, NGOs, humanitarian agencies, and residents. Tag-Eldeen (2017) highlights the importance of the local application of recovery using participatory urban planning tools and involving affected communities in the process. In this case, urban planners employ their professional skills to learn from communities and understand their priorities, roles, and expectations in reaching successful recovery and development goals. Therefore, participatory urban planning reinforces communication and provides a platform for negotiation among the different involved actors for effective decision-making as an end goal. Long-term community outreach in decision-making is also fundamental to sustaining recovery and resilience. Brown (2013) and Tag-Eldeen (2017) therefore advocate for an interdisciplinary recovery discourse, combining urban planning with political reform, disaster risk and mitigation, and humanitarian relief to formulate strategic plans in pre- and post-conflict and disaster conditions.

Once recovery is conceptualized as an open-ended process that focuses on the intangible within the participatory framework, some scholars begin to define it as social recovery. Tierney and Oliver-Smith (2012) call for

an integrated approach to recovery, conceptualized as an all-encompassing social process that is conceived, implemented, and experienced within physical, natural, cultural, economic, and institutional environments. The authors, thus, focus on the social recovery of households, neighbourhoods, and communities, involving both civil societies and government actors. As a result, physical reconstruction and social recovery become intertwined in the larger recovery process. In fact, Tierney and Oliver-Smith (2012, p. 124) define social recovery as the following:

Disasters exist as complex material events and, at the same time, as a multiplicity of interwoven and often conflicting social and cultural constructions. Social recovery is therefore inextricably linked to the recovery of structures and infrastructural elements, ecosystems, organizations and institutions, economic activity and culture, making recovery a truly holistic process. Thus, some of the most crucial and interesting research challenges concern the interfaces among these different environments.

March and Kornakova (2017) advocate for people-oriented and holistic development schemes within the social recovery agenda. They argue that physical recovery is not independent of the social, economic, and environmental concerns that constitute human settlements. According to the authors, neglecting community concerns can increase socio-economic inequalities among vulnerable groups affected by conflicts and disasters. Andrews and Caron (2016) highlight the need to mitigate community vulnerabilities through more socially just recovery schemes. They consider the challenges faced by all people as well as the built and natural systems. Therefore, the literature reached a conceptualization of urban recovery as an inclusive social process that is shaped by both pre- and post-crisis conditions.

### **Structure of the book: Re-conceptualizing urban recovery in the age of protracted displacement**

This edited book recognizes the multi-dimensional facets of recovery in the literature, including the physical, economic, social, political, and cultural. These dimensions are interrelated in complex ways to provide a more holistic and participatory conceptualization of recovery. There is, however, a need to advance the discourse to explore the role of gender and minority groups in post-rupture recovery. Furthermore, although emerging trends in the literature are moving towards social recovery in the Global South, they tend to overlook the agency of displaced communities as an economic capital in the recovery efforts and decision-making processes.<sup>3</sup> This book hopes to advance the conversation and re-conceptualize urban recovery in relation to displacement. This is part of a greater effort to address urban

ruptures that started in the City Debates 2019 conference and will continue in the research and work pursued in the newly established Beirut Urban Lab at the American University of Beirut. The Urban Recovery Platform at the Beirut Urban Lab aims to advance recovery through research and capacity-building workshops, as a process that is triggered by different types of ruptures and violence and is impacted by displacement and local and national politics and power relations. The Platform conceives of urban recovery as going beyond restoration or regeneration. It is neither a 'post' condition nor a physically bounded process. It is a process that is, at times, intertwined with conflict and displacement across temporal and geographic moments. In its extreme form, it is a process of reconfiguration that addresses all urban vulnerabilities and injustices to the displaced communities, and is an opportunity to investigate how the spatial, socio-cultural, and the imaginative dimensions of urban existence are included and translated. In practice, urban recovery to the Beirut Urban Lab operates within a framework that is bottom-up, participatory, socially just, and inclusive. It is also people-centred, heritage led, and place specific.

The authors in the book offer new interpretations of urban recovery. Jennifer Hyndman, for example, extends the notion of urban recovery in scale and nature. She frames recovery within the international (geo)political context and discusses the recovery of refugee-migrant subjectivity and refugees as city makers and challenges the status quo of 'occidental humanitarianism'. Namariq Al-Rawi focuses on the urban recovery of Baghdad's neighbourhoods in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the rise of local sectarianism. She views urban recovery as an act of resistance and reversal to sectarianism through the reactivation of the physical and social networks of the city. Urban recovery in the work of Ghiath Al Jebawi emerges as an experimental initiative by a small community of activists in the Syrian countryside of Azaz. Chiara de Cesari proposes creative institutionalism in promoting local culture as a process of social recovery even before a conflict is over. Isayev explores recovery through imagined constructions of communities in Palestine and Rome, and their relationship to land beyond nation-states and spatially contained citizenship.

This book is structured around four thematic intersections that facilitate for critical and cross-dimensional conversations on overlapping narratives of displacement and spatial modalities of reconstruction: understanding systems and scales of governance, housing the displaced, conceiving of cultural heritage in the recovery process, as well as space and imaginaries in framing post-crisis recovery(s). The thematic intersections incorporate the work of local and international scholars and experts on displacement and reconstruction, as well as those who can locate these themes in a longer historical trajectory. It engages them in an interdisciplinary reflection on the challenges, approaches, and politics involved in the complex operations and networks of local and international actors, as well as communities involved in urban recovery.

***Part I. Understanding systems and scales of governance***

As cities receive and accommodate waves of displaced people over time in large numbers, global agreements and compacts across nations aim to strengthen the international response to large movements of refugees while alternative models of local governance emerge to meet their daily needs for shelter and public services. The chapters in this section of the book explore: (1) the role of Global Compacts in normalizing extended exile; (2) the scales at which institutional risks and resilience strategies associated with refugee migration unfold; (3) the informal management of displacement in the face of deficient and outdated urban planning systems; (4) the impact of refugee mobility and multilocality in generating new forms of political engagement on the municipal level; and (5) experimental activism that balances the work of government units in generating socio-economic benefits.

***Part II. Housing the displaced***

Displaced people fleeing conflict are faced with the immediate challenge of adapting to sudden change while recreating a house for themselves in a new environment. The chapters in this section of the book tackle the question of housing for the displaced as agents of urban transformation across multiple scales, ranging from the building, the neighbourhood, to the city. They explore (1) the theoretical debates around home-making under protracted displacement, primarily the practice of carrying one's memories and lived experiences of a previous home to a new one; (2) the active agency of displacement in the making of urban territories across peri-urban residential areas and agricultural fields; and (3) the role of foreign invasion and local sectarian violence in reinforcing socio-spatial divisions between different neighbourhoods and the resiliency of the residents in reactivating their city.

***Part III. Conceiving of cultural heritage in the recovery process***

Cultural heritage is defined as a social construct that incorporates both the tangible and intangible elements of the built and natural environments. It is recognized as an open-ended process of production and transformation of symbols and meanings throughout history, sustained by its rooted links to communities, their socio-spatial practices, and local identities. In post-conflict and post-disaster environments, cultural heritage becomes closely intertwined with processes of historical editing and rewriting and the need to safeguard people's projected memories of the past for future generations. The chapters in this section of the book explore (1) the value of mainstreaming cultural heritage in the greater recovery process; (2) the commodification of heritage to project a sterile image of post-war national unity; (3) the redevelopment of a legacy of heritage buildings through a selective reading of history; (4) the role of creative institutionalism in

reimagining state functions and negotiating opposing claims by different groups to the histories of old cities; and (5) bottom-up approaches by local activists aiming to revive damaged natural heritage and social practices to generate socio-economic benefits.

#### ***Part IV. Space and the imaginaries of post-crisis recovery(s)***

Urban recovery is conceived as an ongoing process that equally addresses all levels of human vulnerabilities and injustices while navigating omnipresent politics and power relations. To counter these barriers to urban recovery, the chapters in this section of the book delve into the imagined, sometimes whimsical, narratives of space from an artistic point of view. They explore (1) the imagined community and its ties to land under spatio-temporal conditions of post-exile; (2) the design of shopping malls that inspire a sense of amnesic disorientation and echo conditions of protracted displacement; and (3) the visual representation of legal documents to discourse the politics of post-war reconstruction.

#### **Notes**

1. UNHCR, Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2019. <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019/>.
2. City Debates 2019 Concept Note by Howayda Al-Harithy.
3. The 2006 Reconstruction Unit at The American University of Beirut, co-founded by the editor of this book, was a key moment that allowed, for the first time, the participation of the Lebanese public in the physical, social, and psychological reconstruction and recovery efforts following the 2006 war, which resulted in the death of 1,183 civilians, the indiscriminate bombardment and destruction of hundreds of villages, the levelling of 612 schools, and the displacement of 1,000,000 people. Public exposure and engagement with the reconstruction and post-war planning policies meant that a much more holistic approach to recovery was attempted and reflected on in a scholarly publication. See *Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction: Case Studies from Lebanon in the aftermath of the 2006 War*, edited by Howayda Al-Harithy (Planning, History and Environment Series. Routledge, 2010).

#### **References**

- Addison, T. (ed.). (2003a). *From Conflict to Recovery in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Addison, T. (ed.). (2003b). From Conflict to Recovery? In *From Conflict to Recovery in Africa*, edited by T. Addison. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Andrews, C., and Caron, C. (2016). Long-term Disaster Recovery Planning in Urban Centers: The Role of Land Tenure and Housing in Reducing Vulnerability. In *Scaling Up Responsible Land Governance*. Washington, DC: World Bank Land and Poverty Conference.
- Barakat, S., and Zyck, S. A., (2009) The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery, *Third World Quarterly*, 30(6), pp. 1069–1086.

- Bates, F. L., and W. G. Peacock. (1993). *Living Conditions, Disasters and Development: An Approach to Cross-Cultural Comparisons*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
- Berke, P. R., Kartez, J., and Wenger, D. (1993). Recovery after Disaster: Achieving Sustainable Development, Mitigation, and Equity. *Disasters*, 17, pp. 93–109.
- Bolin, R. C. (1976). Family Recovery from Natural Disaster: A Preliminary Model. *Mass Emergencies*, 1, pp. 267–277.
- Bolin, R. C. (1982). *Long-term Family Recovery from Disaster*. Boulder, CO: Natural Hazards Center, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.
- Bolin, R. C., and Trainer, P. (1978). Modes of Family Recovery Following Disaster: A Cross-National Study. In *Disasters: Theory and Research*, edited by E. L. Quarantelli, pp. 234–247. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Brown, B. J. (2013). *Disaster Preparedness and the United Nations: Advance Planning for Disaster Relief*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Campanella, T. J. (2006). Urban Resilience and the Recovery of New Orleans. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 72(2), pp. 141–146.
- Chang, S. E. (2009). Urban Disaster Recovery: A Measurement Framework and Its Application to the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. *Disasters* 34, pp. 303–327.
- Chang, S. (2010). Urban Disaster Recovery: A Measurement Framework and its Application to the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. *Disasters*, pp. 303–327.
- Davis, D. (2005). Reverberations: Mexico City's 1985 Earthquake and the Transformation of the Capital. In *The Resilient City, How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster*, edited by Vale, L. and Campanella, T., pp. 255–280. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Davoudi, S. (2012) Resilience: A Bridging Concept or a Dead End? 'Reframing' Resilience: Challenges for Planning Theory and Practice Interacting Traps: Resilience Assessment of a Pasture Management System in Northern Afghanistan Urban Resilience: What Does It Mean in Planning Practice? Resilience as a Useful Concept for Climate Change Adaptation? The Politics of Resilience for Planning: A Cautionary Note. *Planning Theory & Practice*, 13(2), pp. 299–333.
- Drabek, T. E., and Key, W. H. (1984). *Conquering Disaster: Family Recovery and Long-term Consequences*. New York, NY: Irvington.
- Gotham, K., and Greenberg, M. (2008). From 9/11 to 8/29: Post-Disaster Recovery and Rebuilding in New York and New Orleans. *Social Forces*, 87(2), pp. 1029–1062.
- Haas, J. E., Kates, R., and Bowden, M. (1977). *Reconstruction Following Disaster*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- March, A., and Kornakova, M. (2017). Planning for Recovery: Ideas and Problematics. In *Urban Planning for Disaster Recovery*, edited by March A. and Kornakova M., pp. 231–248. Oxford and Cambridge: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Mileti, D. S. (1999). *Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States*. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press.
- Neal, D. (1996). Reconsidering the Phases of Disaster. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, 15, pp. 239–264.
- Oliver-Smith, A. (1986). *The Martyred City: Death and Rebirth in the Andes*. Albuquerque, NM: The University of New Mexico Press.
- Olshansky, R. B. (2005). How Do Communities Recover from Disaster: A Review of Current Knowledge and an Agenda for Future Research. Paper presented at the 46th Annual Conference of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Kansas City.

- Owen, G. (2015). City of Risk: Organization and Individualization in the Urban Recovery of New Orleans. *Minnesota Review*, (84), pp. 83–91.
- Shaw, T. M. (1996). Beyond Post-conflict Peacebuilding: What Links to Sustainable Development and Human Security? *International Peacekeeping*, 3(2), pp. 36–48.
- Stanley-Price, N. (2007). The Thread of Continuity: Cultural Heritage in Postwar Recovery. In *Cultural Heritage in Postwar Recovery*, edited by Stanley-Price N., pp. 1–16. Rome: ICCROM Forum.
- Smith, G. P., and Wenger, D. (2007). Sustainable Disaster Recovery: Operationalizing an Existing agenda. In *Handbook of Disaster Research*, pp. 234–257. New York, NY: Springer.
- Tag-Eldeen, Z. N. (2017). Bridging Urban Planning Knowledge into Post-Disaster Response: Early Recovery Road Map within the International Humanitarian Cluster System. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 24, pp. 399–410. DOI:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.05.023.
- Tierney, K., and Oliver-Smith, A. (2012). Social Dimensions of Disaster Recovery. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies & Disasters*, 30(2), pp. 123–146.
- UNHCR. (2019). *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019*. Copenhagen: UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019/>.
- Vale, L., and Campanella, T. (eds.). (2005). *The Resilient City, How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., and Davis, I. (2004). *At Risk: Natural Hazards, Peoples' Vulnerabilities and Disasters*. Routledge: London.
- Zetter, R. (2005). Land, Housing and the Reconstruction of the Built Environment. In *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*, edited by Barakat S., pp. 155–172. London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

## **Part I**

# **Understanding systems and scales of governance**



**Taylor & Francis**

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

## 2 Global Compacts or containment?

### Geopolitics by design

*Jennifer Hyndman*

While academics, billionaires, politicians and United Nations agencies staff across the world promote a suite of *solutions* to the *crises* of displacement, this chapter traces some of these ‘big ideas’ and shows how they are not so new. Ultimately, the proposed fixes do little to redesign humanitarian responses for refugees-migrants or reorganize responsibility for protecting displaced people compelled to leave their home countries.<sup>1</sup> To be more precise, the Global Compacts that were launched with such fanfare in 2016 serve to instantiate the status quo: money from the wealthiest states fund major host countries in the global South and Middle East to support refugees, reproducing the containment of displaced people in their *regions of origin*. Complementary regional measures to keep people at or near home figure alongside these international agreements. For example, the European Union’s (EU) migration ‘partnerships’ include individual *compacts* that have ‘priority partners’ with countries such as Lebanon and Jordan; such compacts aim to provide support for refugees and host communities in refugees’ *regions of origin* and thwart onward journeys to the EU (European Commission, 2016).

The language of ‘solutions’ is not new, and yet this latest round of proclamations and prescriptions might be considered ‘recipes for recovery’, but not for those who find themselves in conditions of protracted displacement. Rather, many of the solutions are aimed at helping major refugee host states to continue to cope with these responsibilities. At the end of the day, the solutions preferred are in the interests of the wealthy global North states that do not want any more asylum seekers on their territories. How can ‘recovery’ be recast to address the status quo of containing displacement ‘over there’, offshore, not in our backyard? While I have no easy answer to this question, this chapter also aims to address the intransigence of states – all of which signed on to the New York Declaration (NYD) for Refugees and Migrants in 2016 – but have agreed to take little action since the release of the final 2018 texts of Global Compacts for Migrants and on Refugees. Urban recovery in this book is defined as a process that is multi-layered and bottom up. Recovery that includes the urban, but invokes multiple scales, including the global, will have to address the messier

politics of colonial legacies, the shift away from Cold War priorities, and the Orientalist portrayals of migrants and refugees who are represented as ‘not us’ (Kyriakides et al., 2018).

Since the end of the Cold War, when the ideological and political value of the refugee diminished dramatically, there has been little appetite for receiving displaced people across borders (Reynolds and Hyndman, forthcoming). The majority of the world’s governments may have signed onto the main international refugee treaties and they may have legal obligations to receive asylum seekers *on paper*, through the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In practice, however, increased border enforcement and *preclusion* – the prevention of the arrival of asylum seekers by ‘pushing the border out’ (Arbel and Brenner, 2013; Reynolds and Hyndman, forthcoming) – has been the rule among global North governments for some time. As early as the 1990s, the Canadian Government posted airline liaison officers (ALOs) in locations as far away as Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi to examine documents before passengers boarded planes *en route* to Canada. Borders moved outward transnationally, so that monitoring and preventative measures could block potential asylum seekers from reaching Canada or other territories.

In the spring of 2015, however, public opinion began to change when a ship full of 800 migrants capsized off the Italian coast (*The Guardian*, 2015). In early September, the tragic image of Alan Kurdi, a well-dressed Syrian toddler drowned and lying face down on a Turkish beach affected people deeply across the globe. This tragic image of this child was notable for its ability to transcend the us-them binary, to get beyond Orientalist representation (Gökarıksel and Secor, 2015). By the end of the year, one million people had arrived in Europe by sea, with some 4000 suspected to have died (Clayton and Holland, 2015).

The immense loss of life at sea among asylum seekers to Europe that began in 2015 was also seen by many EU governments as an immense threat. Germany and Sweden opened their ports of entry to asylum seekers, especially from Syria, while other member-states built walls and detention centres to deter migrant-asylum seekers from landing on their territory. The Dublin Regulation III provides rules for which country should register and process asylum seekers, normally the first country in which an asylum seeker lands. Yet this regulation largely fell apart in 2015, and the internal borders of the EU abolished by the Schengen Agreement emerged once more, as Germany opened its doors, and Hungary, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia and others successively closed their borders.

This short overview provides only the basic context from which both the EU agreements on migrants (also confusingly called compacts) and Global Compacts stem, but is essential to understand their genesis. Many scholars have published more detailed, geographically specific, portraits of these crossings (Crawley et al., 2018; Vaughan-Williams and Pisani, 2018). Almost immediately, in early 2016, the EU had created compacts with several of

the transit countries through which Syrians were moving; I highlight examples of this ‘migration partnership’ between the EU and Lebanon as well as Jordan. Turkey receives the most funding from the EU in its opaque deal that keeps asylum seekers in Turkey and out of the EU, but that case study is beyond the scope of this chapter.

In the fall of 2016, the UN Summit on Refugees and Migrants was launched and the NYD was rolled out; then President Obama convened a donor meeting. Some 50 states committed \$4.5 billion, \$1b from the United States alone (UNHCR, 2016). The first substantive paragraph of the NYD, signed by 193 states in September 2016, reads:

Since earliest times, humanity has been on the move. Some people move in search of new economic opportunities and horizons. Others move to escape armed conflict, poverty, food insecurity, persecution, terrorism, or human rights violations and abuses. Still others do so in response to the adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters (some of which may be linked to climate change), or other environmental factors. Many move, indeed, for a combination of these reasons.

(UNGA, 2016)

This excerpt acknowledges the multiple motivations to move and the dimensions of power, violence and privation that shape different combinations and permutations of human movement. In a subtle way, it unsettles the categories and any easy distinction between refugees and migrants, just as the term ‘survival migrants’ highlights the partiality of the international legal refugee definition (Betts, 2013). While the narrowness of the 1951 Convention Refugee definition is not explicitly addressed, the need for a ‘big tent’ under which many vulnerable people on the move could find support is clear.

Understanding the relationship between the large-scale arrival of mostly Syrian asylum seekers, vivid deaths so close to home in the Mediterranean and the European ‘crisis’ it generated is vital to tracing the international solidarity that emerged, namely the NYD. From this declaration in 2016 to the final texts of the Global Compacts in 2018, solidarity has waned, I contend, but global North ‘cash for containment’ flows generously.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I analyze the NYD and in an effort to historicize refugee protection, I note how closely it echoes, in parts, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. I trace how the NYD lays out a plan for two international compacts, and show how the Compacts stray from the ideals of the NYD. Moreover, I emphasize how the EU agreements with Lebanon and Jordan (also confusingly called ‘compacts’) were concluded quickly to stem the flow of asylum seekers from these countries, even before the UN summit in fall 2016 began.

Second, I provide a critical overview of the Global Compacts and their genesis. As a foundation for the analysis, I reiterate the case that Wenona Giles and I have made that *solutions* as technical fixes to clearly diagnosed

problems are not the answer to the geopolitics and disparate power relations of widespread or protracted displacement (Hyndman and Giles, 2017). Drawing on our analysis and findings, I argue that the conversation needs to change from ‘fixes’ and ‘solutions’ to a reframing of language and power that can genuinely address ‘responsibility sharing’ for asylum seekers-refugee-migrants among states, unsettling the disparate North–South divide. At the risk of oversimplifying the global refugee regime, the wealthy global North states currently *pay* support for displaced persons, while global South countries *host* the vast majority of people forced to flee.

Third, I critically review and assess some salient ‘big ideas’ (Crawley, 2018), or solutions, that have been presented by academics and others over the past few years to address the refugee ‘*crisis*’ and forced migration more generally. From the isolationism of ‘Refugee Nation’ to the utopic if more grounded idealism of *Refugia*, or a reinvented twenty-first century version of the Nansen passport (which helped create new homes for Europe’s displaced after World War II [WWII]), I outline some of the concrete options for change on offer at the current juncture. I do so with trepidation, as the entire project of finding ‘solutions’ for displacement is state-centric and geopolitically fraught.

Fourth, I acknowledge scales of analysis and action that are not international and state-centric, as the compacts are. In Beirut, refugees are ‘city makers’ and self-authorize and actualize their own protection (Fawaz et al., 2018). In Southern African cities, asylum seekers shed their monikers and find work, housing and education for their children (Landau and Duponchel, 2011; Kihato and Landau, 2017). Moreover, other scholars in countries located outside the parameters of international refugee law have pushed back against the Global Compacts, noting their exclusions and flaws. The chapter concludes by highlighting the Kolkata Declaration as a subaltern response to and pushback against the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), not a solution. India, like much of South and Southeast Asian as well as the MENA region or ‘Middle East’, lies outside the legal frame of the Eurocentric GCR. The Kolkata Declaration is a manifesto for self-authorized notions of security and protection for people who are displaced but are also workers who must forge livelihoods under conditions not of their own making. It also recognizes that sovereign states act to protect displaced persons in need, even without the (weak) obligations codified in international refugee law.

One can make the case that the rise of the NYD and the Global Compacts that followed emerged from the anxiety of the ‘migrant crisis’ in Europe, stemming largely but by no means solely from the Syrian civil war. Acute civil war in Syria since 2011 displaced millions of people both internally and as refugees well before 2015. As others have argued, the declaration of a ‘crisis’ performs political work, creating a space for extraordinary measures, both in the name of security and humanitarian response (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). Accordingly, ‘crisis’ has given rise to international

solidarity, as outlined in the NYD, and new ideas for making the international refugee regime work better. ‘Crisis’ has also done a great deal of political work in the name of national security: further securing borders in wealthier countries and creating grounds for returning migrants to their places of departure through what the EU used to call bilateral readmission agreements; these are now called ‘compacts’, somewhat confusing the regional EU compacts and the global ones on refugees and for migrants. The less visible and more protracted displacement of refugees is not as spectacular, or always as fatal as crossing the Mediterranean has been; it is often a ‘slow violence’ of deprivation and precarious impermanent status in a host state (Hyndman, 2019). Any new protection strategies must address not only those asylum seekers-refugee-migrants *en route* to Europe or North America, but also those precariously perched in conditions of displacement for years and decades (Mixed Migration Platform, 2017).

### **The New York Declaration and promise of change**

The NYD of 2016 proclaims its commitment to migrants and refugees as bearers of the same human rights in Section 1.6:

Though their treatment is governed by separate legal frameworks, refugees and migrants have the same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms. They also face many common challenges and have similar vulnerabilities, including in the context of large movements.

(UNGA, 2016)

This excerpt underscores the nuance required in understanding people on the move. Categorical distinctions are blurred. Commonly held rights for all – refugees, migrants and people who do not move at all – are affirmed.

The document is inspiring; it genuinely appears to want to make a difference and change the status quo:

We declare our profound solidarity with, and support for, the millions of people in different parts of the world who, for reasons beyond their control, are forced to uproot themselves and their families from their homes.

(from Section 1.8)

Refugees and migrants in large movements often face a desperate ordeal. Many take great risks, embarking on perilous journeys, which many may not survive. Some feel compelled to employ the services of criminal groups, including smugglers, and others may fall prey to such groups or become victims of trafficking. Even if they reach their destination, they face an uncertain reception and a precarious future.

(from Section 1.9)

These passages are worth rehearsing at length because they resonate with, and echo in spirit the pledges and politics of the post-WWII period, when displacement was rampant, and many people were stateless. The pledges continue:

10. We are determined to save lives. Our challenge is above all moral and humanitarian. Equally, we are determined to find long-term and sustainable solutions. We will combat with all the means at our disposal the abuses and exploitation suffered by countless refugees and migrants in vulnerable situations.

11. *We acknowledge a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner. We will do so through international cooperation, while recognizing that there are varying capacities and resources to respond to these movements. International cooperation and, in particular, cooperation among countries of origin or nationality, transit and destination, has never been more important; ‘win-win’ cooperation in this area has profound benefits for humanity. Large movements of refugees and migrants must have comprehensive policy support, assistance and protection, consistent with States’ obligations under international law. We also recall our obligations to fully respect their human rights and fundamental freedoms, and we stress their need to live their lives in safety and dignity. We pledge our support to those affected today as well as to those who will be part of future large movements* (emphasis added in italics).

Upon rereading the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the NYD echoes similar language. ‘All human beings are born free and equality in dignity and rights’, reads article one of the UDHR (UNGA, 1948, Article 1). ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’, reads Section 1.13 of the NYD, which goes on to add an important contemporary rejoinder in the context of displacement:

...We recall that our obligations under international law prohibit discrimination of any kind on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Yet in many parts of the world we are witnessing, with great concern, increasingly xenophobic and racist responses to refugees and migrants.

(from Section 1.13)

The excerpt above from the NYD is more contemporary, and addresses race, gender, and other axes of difference head on in comparison to the European WWII Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR referred to displacement in Europe while the NYD is more global South and

West Asia/Middle East in its scope. Yet the spirit of both documents is very similar. While the NYD represents an impressive international consensus about the plight of the displaced, it is not without precedent.

The NYD also provides a framework for the Global Compacts, one *for* migrants and the other *on* refugees (Clark-Kazak, 2018; UNGA, 2016). The choice of prepositions is interesting. Perhaps the biggest promise made on the refugee front albeit in rather vague language is this:

68. We underline the centrality of international cooperation to the refugee protection regime. We recognize the burdens that large movements of refugees place on national resources, especially in the case of developing countries. *To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees*, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States.

(from Section 4; emphasis added.)

How exactly responsibility can be shared more equitably is not elaborated in the Declaration. Such detail was seemingly left to be worked out in the GCR. At the Summit, all 193 Member States of the United Nations unanimously adopted the NYD for Refugees and Migrants (Resolution 71/1), a striking consensus at a time when Europe was managing a million asylum seekers. Even as countries signed on to this non-binding and sorely needed expressions of concern, many details still needed to be worked out.

### **Containing human displacement through regional compacts**

The scale, scope and protracted nature of human displacement are more acute today than at any time since WWII. After WWII, an international refugee regime was established to manage human displacement in Europe. A major international treaty was signed, the *1951 Convention Relating to Refugees*, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was formed (with a temporary mandate) to oversee the protection of European refugees and find new and permanent homes for them. By the 1960s, it became clear that human displacement was not going away, nor did it affect only Europe, and the 1967 Protocol to the Convention was signed. The Protocol extended the Convention beyond Europe and lifted the temporal restriction of post-WWII displacement, but it kept the same persecution-focused definition of refugee derived largely from the violence and conflict in Europe during WWII.

When the Cold War ended two decades ago, it realigned the geopolitics of asylum altogether, devaluing the 'refugee' dramatically. During the ideological battle between capitalist and communist superpowers and the bitter proxy wars that it spawned, admitting refugees was evidence of one side's

superiority over the other. Whereas refugees were once proof of ideological superiority by a largely capitalist superpower, they became seen as a ‘burden’ on host countries and the international community. And human displacement became more and more protracted (UNHCR, 2012). Alternative, innovative, unique and new approaches to refugee protection are sorely in demand and are being developed by practitioners, policy makers and scholars across world regions.

More than 65 years after its inception, the international refugee regime still exists, but its efficacy and influence have been compromised since the end of the Cold War. Its architecture and membership, generated through a ‘First World’/Western Cold War lens that resulted in the United Nations system, excluded many parts of the globe, rendering it a partial constellation of protection in two senses: the legal part of the regime relates to about half of the world’s displaced people; and its Western conception and legal frameworks focus on civil and political rights at the expense of social, economic and cultural ones (Hathaway, 1995).

The UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, provides material humanitarian assistance and protection against forced return (i.e. *non-refoulement*) where possible. UNHCR’s three ‘durable solutions’, however, fail to deliver much protection for refugees in the current context: 1) voluntary repatriation is at a 30-year low; 2) local integration into a nearby host country is not an option for most refugees, with 85% of the world’s total living in global South/Middle Eastern and North Africa (MENA) regions; and 3) refugee resettlement to countries like Canada is modest, affecting about 1% of refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2012, 2018). Hence, in 2016, the UN released the NYD and launched Global Compacts on which all UN member countries were unanimous: change is needed. Refugee protection needs are largely unmet and are unfairly shouldered by poorer countries in the global South and Middle East.

Protracted refugee displacement is the norm, not the exception, among the world’s 25 million refugees (UNHCR Executive Committee, 2009). At least 65% of refugees are in what the UNHCR calls ‘protracted refugee situations’ (PRS).

Well before the NYD was signed, however, the EU was organizing a different kind of response to the asylum seekers arriving mostly from Syria, but also Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa and other regions. The NYD even signals some of this prior response in relation to *readmission agreements*:

We note that cooperation on return and readmission forms an important element of international cooperation on migration. Such cooperation would include ensuring proper identification and the provision of relevant travel documents. Any type of return, whether voluntary or otherwise, must be consistent with our obligations under international human rights law and in compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. It should also respect the rules of international law

and must in addition be conducted in keeping with the best interests of children and with due process. While recognizing that they apply only to States that have entered into them, we acknowledge that existing readmission agreements should be fully implemented. We support enhanced reception and reintegration assistance for those who are returned.

(from Section 3; Commitment for Migrants, number 58, p. 728)

Readmission agreements aim to ensure safe and orderly return of asylum seekers deemed ineligible to remain in a given state. Yet such agreements are also insisted upon by global North states, normally in relation to less powerful and poorer states, to prevent and/or ensure return of uninvited migrants from global South countries. Such agreements may seem like ‘deals’ if one accounts for the ‘aid’ wealthier states employ to incentivize them. For example, Australia has given the Indonesian Government billions of ‘development’ dollars in exchange for bilateral ‘cooperation’ in preventing boat arrivals on Australian shores and providing temporary housing and essential support for asylum seekers on various Indonesian islands, such as Java and Lombok (McPhail, Ochoki Nyamori, and Taylor, 2016).

### *The rise of the Global Compact on Refugees*

From the ‘zero draft’ to the final third draft in June 2018, the GCR saw many iterations and went through a number of consultations at various regional, national and international scales. Perhaps the strongest language in the GCR comes through in its emphasis on combatting all forms of discrimination, promoting gender equality, empowering women and girls, and ending all forms of sexual and gender-based violence. Refugees are to be treated as participants in their own protection. Delivering on these laudable goals through a framework of loans and aid to refugee-migrant host countries will be more difficult.

The GCR is convention-centric, by which I mean it performs a *legal orientalism* (Ruskola, 2013) that renders states that do the hard work of protecting displaced people beyond the view and treaties of the international refugee regime. The protection of millions of people in this region is sequestered off to individual states through the compacts (or deals) with the EU. Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, along with vast world regions located in South and Southeast Asia, are simply left off the GCR plans for Comprehensive Refugee Response Frameworks (CRRF), a major tool used to show the application and relevance in 13 case studies (none of which are in the Middle East and North Africa – MENA – region or South or Southeast Asia, but instead were all in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South America). Countries like Lebanon have specific agreements, also called compacts, with the EU, which supports the refugees Lebanon hosts but also provides development funds for Lebanese governments and vulnerable segments of its civil society (European Commission, 2017).

A brief note about the EU-Lebanon compact illustrates how this Migration Partnership Framework trickles down. Since 2011, the European Commission (EC) has provided more than €1.6 billion in assistance to Lebanon for both bilateral assistance (€292 million) and particularly in response to the Syrian crisis (over €1.3 billion). The EC lists the important projects which these funds contribute to: humanitarian protection for the most vulnerable, including but not limited to refugees; ensuring decent living conditions for refugees and access to basic services for them *in Lebanon*; and stimulating as well as supporting economic growth for all Lebanese and refugee groups in the country: ‘The aim is to foster the inclusive socio-economic development of Lebanon and increase the refugees’ contribution to its economic growth’ (EC, 2019). While never explicit, onward movement to Europe is to be thwarted.

Giles and I have argued that the problem of protracted displacement is ‘crisis’ by design, not an anomaly to world politics. While international refugee law and human rights law may provide basic protection for refugees and other migrants, a *geopolitical* consensus among the wealthiest countries to support and finance management of human displacement in ‘haven countries’ prevails (Hyndman and Giles, 2017). Betts and Collier (2017) galvanize and build upon this consensus, arguing that more support from the global North should support refugees in host countries located in their *regions of origin*, called ‘havens’. They aim to improve conditions for refugees and host states in this offshoring model, but do little to reimagine protection and security for displaced people, especially those facing precarious protracted conditions.

### ***The culmination of the Global Compact for Migration***

The Global Compact for Migration, specifically called the Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, is both aspirational and inspirational. It is, however, largely derivative of existing commitments, especially the UN’s Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030. The lead agency for this compact is the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a recent addition to the United Nations associated organizations. Until it was incorporated as such, IOM was a contractor that states could hire to manage various dimensions of migration, from detention to accompaniment (Ashutosh and Mountz, 2012). It still lacks a specified mandate and mission. What is problematic about this new arrangement and IOM’s lead on the GCM is that IOM can no longer be paid by UN organizations for specific ‘jobs’, yet it has no guaranteed funding stream from the UN coffers. Like UNHCR and UNICEF, IOM needs to raise funds to operate, but no longer from ‘member states’. This creates, in my view, a conflict of interest in generating the recommendations in the GCM. Almost half of the GCM recommendations represent functions and tasks that IOM has done in the past and has competence to perhaps do in future. In short, the GCM looks like, in part, a funding proposal for IOM.

The GCM is the default document for states that have not signed on to international refugee law, which amounts to much of the MENA region, as well as most of South and Southeast Asia. In other words, the GCR is highly exclusionary because of its legal focus on the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, as well as the states that have signed these treaties.

### **Big ideas, muted hope**

This section briefly outlines some ‘big ideas’ to solve the protracted human displacement conundrum, namely 1) a GCR-friendly approach; 2) a transnational citizenship choice for those who prefer to live in the diaspora; and 3) based in the historical aftermath of WWII, an idea that worked for many European refugees, more mobility for displaced people to choose a safe destination employing a Nansen-like passport.

I did consider including a fourth idea, the Refugee Nation approach first pitched well before the others in 2015 by Jason Buzi, an Israeli-born Silicon Valley billionaire, but it does not belong in the same comparison with the others. Refugee Nation (Lam, 2015) envisions an island, financed by Buzi, where all the world’s refugees could find a common home. Robin Cohen (2015) engages with Buzi’s proposal, but ultimately departs from it and finds the more transnational idea elaborated below of Refugia. Buzi’s ‘island solution’, one defined by refugee apartheid and isolation was then improved upon by the Egyptian billionaire, Naguib Sawiris, who suggested that any islands to be purchased should be part of the EU, likely Greek islands since that country was bankrupt at the time. In this way, the islands would come with built-in rights and a solid system of governance. Isolating displaced people from dozens of different nations, speaking many languages, with no obvious basis for ‘nation-ness’ (Anderson, 1991, p. 3), autonomy or livelihood is not an option that can be taken seriously.

The three ideas outlined below are important to consider, given the scale and protractedness of displacement. I heard the first one proposed at the City Debates forum at the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 2016; it touted the promise of refugee employment in ‘special economic zones’ in Jordan. It was an anomalous presentation in a sea of carefully researched, critically informed papers. Refugees could be put to work in garment factories, what some might call ‘sweatshops’. The idea that refugee host countries would like (more) World Bank concessionary loans in return for their good deeds is rather insulting, if perhaps practical where foreign exchange is in short supply (Zamore, 2018). The idea that international financial institutions (IFIs) should incentive refugee-hosting in global South countries, called ‘havens’ by some scholars, is one of the most unusual applications of the export-oriented industrialization strategy since its debut in the early 1980s (Dicken, 2015). Such practices have been the ‘recipe’ of IFIs since the 1980s, but using the international loans to finance factories to hire refugees was a new twist. It is also rather twisted to consider putting refugees to

work by day in factories, without any clear provision for residency status or a pathway to such status.

I call this option ‘the GCR-friendly model’, one outlined in the GCR, but before that by Oxford academics, Betts and Collier (2017). Proponents of such zones argue that World Bank loans can incentivize the hosting of refugees. Such zones have been operating for more than three years; but have they worked? The jury is out, but no conclusive evidence that it has worked has been presented. Leah Zamore, co-author of the third option in this section, has argued that fierce competition in lending terms has put the IFIs out of business when many global South countries need access to loans. Chinese concessionary loans are the norm in much of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (excluding India, a country concerned about this trend).

Betts and Collier (2017) separate the world into ‘fragile states’ that produce refugees, ‘havens’ for their safety and ‘honeypots’ – the wealthiest countries – seemingly reserved largely for those already in them. The two scholars say that the main distinction between a migrant and refugee is the ‘psychological impetus’: ‘Migrants are lured by hope. Refugees are fleeing fear. Migrants hope for honeypots; refugees need havens’ (Betts and Collier, 2017, p. 30). This apparent categorical clarity so oversimplifies the conditions that precipitate people’s mobility, it is hard to take their typology seriously (Crawley, 2017). Betts (2013) himself argues that the Convention refugee definition in law is too narrow to capture the wide gambit of political conditions and violence that define ‘survival migration’. The very idea that migrants are greedy and refugees are worthy pits these two groups against one another when Crawley (2017) and Skleparis (2018) among others, show how the membership in these two categories is overlapping, changing over time and anything but clear-cut. The book also demonizes the displaced as though they were a threat and/or a contagion. In one example, ‘[t]he displaced swarmed across Syria’s borders to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon’ (Betts and Collier, 2017, p. 104).

Haven countries do the hard work of hosting the vast majority of the world’s refugees, or so the theory goes. They should be supported by the so-called honeypots for all their good work, but there is no challenge to the status quo, whereby more than 85% of refugees reside in global South countries. A majority of the world’s refugees have found asylum in just a few ‘haven states’, located in the global South (Betts and Collier, 2017). Instead of low-interest loans to help these overburdened states kick-start their economies and get further into debt, how can protection be reimagined? How can responsibility be renegotiated to redistribute support for those displaced? The disparate and sharing unequal responsibility of refugees is acute. Zamore (2018) has criticized this position, stating that at the very least, existing host countries should be receiving debt relief, not more loans. Cash transfers or debt write-offs to assist these indebted states are more reasonable prospects, creating more equity between so-called global North ‘honeypots’ and ‘havens’ in the global South, including in the MENA region.