

A NEW A-Z OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

**CHRIS FARRANDS, IMAD EL-ANIS,
ROY SMITH & LLOYD PETTIFORD**
Edited by **LLOYD PETTIFORD**



I.B. TAURIS

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‘This is an encompassing and wonderful effort to look at International Relations, not as an isolated discipline with unique technical terms – that give rise to a compartmentalised technical virtuosity – but as something that opens onto, just as it has absorbed from, the wider world and its varied histories. It is different from other such dictionaries and is a much grander intellectual effort. International Relations finally becomes part of a complex historical sociology of knowledge.’

Stephen Chan, Professor of International Relations, SOAS

‘Very well written and cogently argued ... it will undoubtedly appeal to an undergraduate and postgraduate audience, as well as their teachers, especially with the continuing preoccupation with theory in all major courses.’

**Professor Jack Spence OBE, Department of War Studies,
King’s College London**

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Introduction

At first sight, to write a dictionary entry seems easy. You write on a specific topic, often a mere single word that you know something about, looking up what you are not sure of, and checking what you thought you knew. But as you move from one single entry to the whole dictionary project, the enormous ambition of the whole idea becomes clear. A dictionary captures a whole field. It claims to have grasped the vocabulary of that field, but the language of a field of study does not just reflect it – it creates it, manipulates it, reflects dominant ideas and offers the possibility at the same time of ways of expressing resistance to those dominant ideas. Language defines and limits any area of life, including, of course, academic study and research. True, this *New A-Z of International Relations Theory*¹ is not like the great dictionaries and encyclopaedias of the eighteenth century, which attempted to set out the whole of then-existing human knowledge. It has much narrower objectives. But even so, to try to grasp the whole of a complex field as it changes day by day is surely more than ambitious: it is arrogance.

The authors of this dictionary do not, of course, fully share these views. But they are well aware that we live in an era of uncertainty and anxiety, of rapid change in many aspects of global politics, of the shift of power around the world system, the rise of new agendas, the spread of new forms of conflict and violence, and of shifts in the underlying patterns of beliefs and values. In this setting, to try to fix the vocabulary of a subject in a text that claims some kind of authority is very difficult. What Zygmunt Bauman (2007) has called ‘liquid modernity’ is not easily pinned down. When things change faster, language changes more rapidly, and whether or not they are actually changing as fast as Bauman suggests, language, including the language of international relations, is changing fast enough to make his case more convincing. At the same time, we would argue that it is all the more important to

study International Relations, and all the more important to have a sophisticated vocabulary to do this. If studying IR in a complex world is difficult, students all the more need what support different tools can give them.

An up-to-date dictionary which recognizes these changes, and the diversity of the world around us, is therefore all the more valuable. But this is not a dictionary of IR; it is a dictionary of IR theory. It is designed to help students at any level find their way through the thickets and difficulties of the subject, to be more than a friendly guide when you start the subject and need to acquire the vocabulary quickly to be able to work in the field, and then to be a work of useful reference which you will draw on throughout your study of the subject, whether that is for one year on an MA or over the three or four years of a degree programme. Theory does always relate to practice, to the world of our experience, although the relationship may sometimes be elusive. But since theory is the way in which we make sense of a field of study, it is an essential entry point to the study of the subject as a whole.

A conventional lexical dictionary has two main choices. It can present a normative account of language, as many used to do: 'this is what this word should mean' or 'this is how that word should be used in polite or educated or civilized company'. Or it can be descriptive, setting out how language is actually used by the whole community of those to whom it belongs. The editors of both the leading English language dictionaries, the *Oxford English Dictionary* in the UK and the US *Webster's English Dictionary*, have long aimed to describe current language use as accurately as possible as it evolved, reflecting current practices in the uses of words and the construction of meanings across the Anglo-Saxon world. But even so, this has often produced howls of anguish from those who would keep 'slang' out of dictionaries, who protested furiously at the inclusion of the everyday swear words that we – well, nearly all of us – use all the time, and who felt unable to recognize the peculiar diversities of modern English, including Indian, Caribbean and American versions, web jargon and textese, scientific specialist vocabularies, regional dialect, street slangs and creoles. These questions about the recognition of diversities of language use are also about power. They are about who defines what counts, and what is excluded. And they are, in fact, questions of international relations as well as inter-cultural relations. In the same way that anyone compiling an English dictionary has to ask 'Whose English?', so the choice of entries in an IR dictionary has to ask 'Whose IR?' Theory is not a fixed body of knowledge, but it is also not neutral, either in the face of the realities and conflicts in the world, or in the face of academic debates about the scope and nature and purpose of

studying the subject at all. It is highly contentious in its boundaries and methods, in its attempts to be critical – critical of what and in what ways? To represent the field as a stable system of agreed ideas would be totally misleading. But equally, there are some powerfully persistent ideas within the field; and there are some arguments which have an important claim on our attention – albeit perhaps our critical attention – because they have had such an enduring presence in debates about the international realm.

In putting this dictionary together, the authors have drawn on a very wide range of teaching experience which includes work with schoolchildren (some as young as eight, but mostly at an age where they were about to enter university); as well as with adults at all levels from first-year initial teaching to MA and doctoral level; and including high-level professional courses for the military, for foreign service personnel, and for women and men working in non-governmental organizations, international activity in churches, and global businesses of many kinds. This experience has helped us to identify what questions students ask, how we might best organize some of the answers, and what language to put the answer in.

For the most part, this has been a very good experience for us. We have worked together on the project, and although each entry has been initially drafted by one member of the team of authors, all the entries have been reviewed by all the group and there has been extensive discussion and dialogue about how to construct the dictionary, what to include, and how long each entry might be. We have also drawn on advice from our own students, from other colleagues in IR, and from specialists in learning and teaching and academic writing – including especially Lisa Clughen, learning and teaching coordinator in the School of Humanities at Nottingham Trent University, who has helped coordinate writing workshops at which parts of the book were produced, and brought her own extensive teaching experience to bear on the entries as well. This does not excuse us from responsibility for the final result, but we think it has helped immensely to improve its quality.

‘What’s in a name?’ asked Juliet. But however naïvely in love she may have been, she should surely have known how important the names of the Montague and Capulet families were in a city riven by clan rivalries which constituted both the politics and the everyday street violence of the time. Naming is always a political act (Derrida 1995). Names have a force of their own. But the decision as to who has the right to grant or impose a name is fundamentally about power. Consider all those places around the world which were called Victoria or Salisbury or Oxford or London (sometimes with a ‘new’ in front of the name)

which have recently been renamed with their original name in an indigenous language (in New Zealand, Canada, parts of Africa or Australia, for example). Post-colonial theory warns IR not to reify Western or Euro-centric versions of the narratives and vocabulary of its subject. So, too, feminist theory challenges the scholar to question the gendered nature of established vocabularies and the world they construct. And critical theory invites the interrogation of knowledge claims. So Robert Cox (1981), in one of the most widely quoted aphorisms in the field, notes that theory is always for someone and some purpose. The authors of this collection cannot deny their origins or their standpoint, but the variety of their backgrounds and experience, of their ages, and of their specialisms, may help to contribute to the value of the entries.

The scope of the dictionary

Drawing these threads and questions together, we have tried to do four main things in this dictionary. First, we have tried to identify the questions our readers, especially students of IR, will want to ask. Students want a readable, well-organized guide to concepts and debate – whatever level they study IR. To give them access to the core vocabulary of the field is to help them spread their wings and fly for themselves in the subject. Anyone who has taught first-level students of IR will have watched as they struggled at first with jargon, then grasped it and became more confident, and then, usually fairly quickly, became fluent in what had at first seemed like a foreign language. Main entries in the dictionary have to be accessible to beginner readers if it is to fulfil its task. Not all our students, and not all readers of this book, will be at an introductory level, and we have attempted the difficult task of satisfying the more advanced reader's possible questions too. Some students approach IR for the first time on an MA programme where they have a pretty sophisticated general level of knowledge, and often a strong background in philosophy or languages or cultural studies, or whatever. They may have less understanding of the specific nature of work in IR, but they want to get up to the standard of their MA group quickly. And students will typically take a core course in IR theory at second- or third-year level, rather than at first-year level, where they need help and guidance in forming arguments and finding the exact word as well as a deeper understanding of theory – for them, too, a dictionary will still be useful. The *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* and the excellent online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* are examples of publications that are useful for students and researchers well beyond first-year level. But this difference

of markets creates a conflict of demands on how the book is drafted, which is explained in the last section below.

Second, the entries here have to be fair to the intentions and arguments of the protagonists in debates in IR. This does not preclude criticism of those scholars. But we aim to present a diversity of arguments from a range of positions while in each case giving the first place to the ‘case for’ a particular approach or conception, and only later looking at critical responses to it (where that is appropriate). This is not, after all, a lexical dictionary. We do not try to sum up how a word or concept can be translated in a phrase. We have selected a set of core concepts to explain in some detail – some briefly, some at greater length, depending on the complexity of the arguments – their centrality to debate in IR as evidenced by discussion in the main journals and other literature; but above all, have focused on our judgement of what questions student readers will ask.

Third, we have tried to move away from conventional or traditional IR theory. There are existing guides, some long-published, to IR (see especially Evans and Newnham 2004 and Knutsen 1997). But the main guides to the field tend to reflect the world of the 1970s or earlier, both in terms of some of the issues they discuss and in terms of the theoretical debates they touch on. Indeed, there is nothing at all available like this present dictionary in terms of its scope. We take seriously the need to include a diversity of positions well beyond ‘realism’, ‘liberalism’, ‘imperialism’ and ‘free trade’, although all these and other mainstream conceptions receive a full treatment here. But we also draw on post-colonial and post-modern debates. We recognize the significance of a diversity of critical theory approaches which reflect the variations in Marx’s influence within IR (if ‘communism’, orthodox Soviet Marxism–Leninism, is mostly defunct within the field after 1989, Marxism more broadly defined certainly is not). We give equal billing to ‘rationalist’ and ‘interpretivist’ approaches to the subject. We recognize the impact of debates on gender and sexuality, on the diversity of actors beyond the state, and on the ‘new’ agendas (not so new now) of environment, global media, new forms of security, and new patterns of conflict. We also borrow from debates about globalization and globalism, the transformation of technology and the growth of global civil society and global human rights. This is indeed a much broader conception of the subject than the traditional agenda of international – meaning inter-state – politics. We need to address these questions not just because of our own preferences – although they do reflect our own views – but also because they reflect changes in the world of negotiations, conflict and cooperation. And we need to explore them because they reflect the range of questions students ask about IR as they study it.

Fourth, we have aimed to engage with the wide range of non-Western or non-Euro-centric thought about international relations, which the mainstream has so often neglected. In the contemporary world one can see the emergence of India, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa as much more significant players in international relations, as well as the emergence of China as an economic and political player of great importance. If you questioned the idea of Chinese importance, you might do so on the grounds that although China has some nuclear forces, and a very large if not very well equipped land army, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head is well short of that of other principal players in the world system. All this may be true. But insofar as the crisis the world is in at the moment is a financial and trade crisis, China is committed to addressing it because its economy is so export-dependent, and also because it is the main holder of US debt (US government bonds) and liquid cash (dollars) in the global system. But dollar holdings and nuclear power do not address questions of terrorism; and it will require very different kinds of technology and political action to confront the problems presented by global warming and climate change, the other great new crisis alongside the much older problems of poverty and exclusion in the world system.

To examine and make sense of these kinds of questions requires a new vocabulary and a new way of thinking about international institutions and international cooperation. Those who continue to hold the view that established theories are best able to explain these events have at the least to adapt both the thrust and the vocabulary of their theories to take account of these changed agendas. Also, non-Western thought offers powerful resources which can be brought to bear on a critique of the mainstream ideas. As Connolly (2005) has argued, we live in a plural world shaped by dialogue between different forms of knowledge, as well as by conflicts of ideas and forms of explanations. Unlike some over-optimistic liberal thinkers, we cannot assume that good ideas will triumph; unlike some more conservative ones, we cannot assume that all the good ideas are to be found in the existing mainstream, never mind in the 'West'. For different reasons, including simply the value of these ideas and theories for their own sake, it is important to recognize the value of non-Western IR. But there is a great diversity of it, and while some may seem relatively straightforward or to have parallels in existing arguments, this may not be so when we look in detail. Reading the fierce debate between the great mid-twentieth-century philosophers Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas on justice between peoples, it is at least clear that the traditional idea of justice in biblical Judaism is very different from more

contemporary views; but their debate is nonetheless directly relevant to many contemporary problems, including, of course, those in the Middle East. Reading the great conversation between the god Krishna and the Prince Arjuna, which forms the basis of the core debate in the *Bhagavat Gita* on the possible justification for killing in war (the earliest available account of a ‘just war’ doctrine), we have access to a religious and social thought of great sophistication (Zaehner 1969). But while the Hindu doctrine is in some ways similar to the Western ‘just war’ doctrine developed over time between St Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Vittoria and Grotius, it is sufficiently different to put a reader on their guard – this is a different world, with a different language, and a different sensibility, as well as different grounds for theological argument.

In opening these questions of non-Western thought we have been conscious that our selection here is limited, that we could have done more; but we have aimed to be pragmatic about what we include and we have touched on questions that, as we have already said, we might anticipate arising in class discussion. We have tried to look at least a little at some key concepts in Islamic as well as Hindu and Judaic international thought; and we have acknowledged that there is a body of African theory and theory-as-practice. We have tried to take account of some of the rich traditions of international and inter-cultural thought among indigenous peoples, including both traditional ideas and contemporary arguments for indigenous knowledge and indigenous rights. We have asked what questions might arise in looking at relations between cultures, as well as relations between political communities and economic blocs. Our separate entries are intended to help the reader understand the history of the subject, and we as a group of authors/editors and as teachers put some emphasis on the history of thought in IR as well as on current issues. But we aim also to help the reader engage with current issues. Whether one accepts the now rather discredited hypothesis advanced by Huntington in the 1990s about a future ‘clash of civilizations’, or the important but perhaps over-optimistic response by Iran’s President Khatami advocating a ‘dialogue of civilizations’, it is equally important to recognize and think critically about all sides of the argument; and that is assuming that there are probably many more than two sides to this debate, as Fred Halliday (1994) has suggested. To write a dictionary of IR theory on the understanding that there are often many sides to a discussion, and that IR will not progress unless these conversations are open – allowing different participants to listen to each other as well as to speak – is to put a considerable burden on language. But that is the project we have undertaken here.

Uses of this dictionary

The stories International Relations tells itself

The history of the study of IR is a long and complicated set of different engagements with war, violence and conflict, but also with language, ritual, diplomacy, institution-building and mutual recognition. It is told well elsewhere (see especially Knutsen 1997), although often neglecting the non-European dimensions which have been better represented in historical sociology, anthropology and ethnography. The story told by some orthodox texts, that the academic study of IR began when the first professorship in the subject was created at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth in 1919, marks an important step change in the way IR was studied. But it is a false mythology. In the first place, it exaggerates the impact of professors in any field. But what is often called ‘classical theory’, represented by the work of scholars such as Martin Wight (1994) and C. A. W. Manning (1962), actually only emerged as part of a series of debates in the late 1950s and 1960s. And there had been many studies of aspects of IR for thousands of years before 1919. These are found in classic historical and legal works. They are ornamented by great works of classical political theory – among them, Machiavelli (2004), St Augustine (1977), but also the work of Al-Farabi (Galston 1990) and Maimonides (1974), of Sun Tzu (1963) and Kautilya (2003). They also include the great debate on the authority of international law between Grotius and Pufendorf in the mid-seventeenth century, which still touches on questions of human rights, torture and humanitarian intervention (‘the responsibility to protect or the new imperialism?’) in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, they engage important works on trade, protectionism, cultural relations, migration, religion and social movements which have troubled many different writers in different civilizations, and on which none has a clear monopoly of right.

This is not even a start at giving a full account, but simply to re-emphasize the point we have already made: that there is a great deal of international theory available to us, that it has been the subject of discussion for thousands of years – albeit often not under the label ‘international theory’ – and that we repudiate key elements of this enormously valuable heritage at our peril. The Qur’an gives a clear argument on this: even if we are not Muslim, or not religious at all, we might see the force of the injunction that ‘God created the nations and the peoples so that they might meet and have knowledge of one another’ (Qur’an, 49:13, ‘the Private Apartments’). As soon as we recognize that there is a diversity of peoples, social practices, languages, powers and institutions, we might recognize the need to accept and understand how they are different from

us, and how we can relate to them. That means studying IR. And it means having the vocabulary to do so.

Practical issues

You can expect to use this book like a normal dictionary. Bull (Hedley) will come before realism, and so on. However, some words or names for which you – personally – might want or expect to have their own entry may not do so. Here, you can start by using the cross-referencing index. You will notice that some words in the text are emboldened; these are ideas/concepts/authors which are made reference to in at least another entry. So, if you see a word in bold, you can use the cross-referencing index to find out where else it appears. Finally, entries are of different lengths – these relate to the importance we have attached to them in the context of IR theory and not necessarily the overall importance which might be attached to them in a wider context. So, for instance, we might regard Fidel Castro as an important figure in international politics, without giving him his own entry here.

Notes

- 1 Following a convention in the subject, we use ‘international relations’ to mean the ‘real world’ of relations between peoples, states, social movements and institutions. We use ‘International Relations’ (or just IR) to refer to the academic study of that subject. We use ‘global politics’, ‘international politics’, ‘international political economy’, and ‘global political economy’ as different terms – they are *not* interchangeable. How and why they are used differently are explained in particular entries in the dictionary.

A

African international relations: theories and practices

This entry is organized as follows: (i) pre-colonial structures and patterns, including ideas and practices of international relations, **authority**, rule, **diplomacy** and inter-cultural relations; (ii) anti-colonial and post-colonial theories and debates; (iii) contemporary theories and practices of politics, **the state** and the international; (iv) debates on African **development** as IR **theory**; and (v) key African authors in IR and related fields.

Any attempt to give a full account of **non-Western IR theory** needs to address African political traditions, although this is complex given the number of traditions and debates about them, and arguments about evidence. There is a distinctive set of experiences which shapes African thinking about IR. Africa is generally recognized as the origin of all human species, so we might expect African international relations to have ancient roots; but there is only very limited written and oral – as opposed to archaeological – evidence from earlier than the reporting of Greek and Roman sources such as Herodotus. **Migration** around the continent of large communities of people, both in the prehistoric past and more recently, has shaped patterns of language, culture and widely shared religious principles. It has produced a complex pattern of inter-ethnic mixing. As historians such as Basil Davidson (2004) have noted, this **history** is rich and important, despite often being misrepresented as one of few achievements and little significance in both Western and African writing. It is, however, arguably impossible to understand past or recent thought and practice of African international relations as ‘international relations’ in a traditional Western sense without conceding in advance the Western definitions of what IR is, what it is not, and how it is related to the cultural, aesthetic, social and

pragmatic distinctiveness of African thought – to judge African IR as ‘traditional Western IR’ is already to lose much of its distinctiveness. To make sense of it, one needs to start with a more open, inclusive and critical sense of what it might be. There is no easy answer to the question of where to start, except that it is impossible to evaluate African contributions to IR if one only thinks in the categories of conventional Western IR. This is a field that excites researchers, but annoys anyone who wants a quick answer.

Patterns of relations between nomadic and settled agricultural peoples have always co-existed alongside the formation of great states – mostly kingdoms – and the rise and fall of **empires**. African kingship has been a distinctive form of leadership with its own sources of religious, social and military authority. This has generally been rooted in traditional authority from tribe and ancestors. Even after the conversion of much (but not all) of Africa from animism or ancestor worship to Christianity or **Islam**, the traditional roots of belief and political bonding remain powerful and openly significant. This in turn influences some theories of national political leadership today. Powerful pre-colonial rulers were able to deal on the basis of equality with European, Chinese and Middle Eastern **powers** (famously including the meeting of the African Queen of Sheba with the biblical Jewish King Solomon, which most scholars would date fairly approximately around 1000 BC). But it is very difficult to reconstruct an ‘**objective**’ African past and then to account for present experiences in terms of this; and post-colonial theories help to explain this: post-colonial theory points to the intellectual power of colonial **knowledge** structures which provide a systematically distorting mirror of the past that scholarship has to struggle to overcome.

Family and tribal leadership has long been, and remains, important in African politics: most leaders on independence had a senior tribal role as well as a democratically elected role, and this underpinned their authority – especially with more conservative groups in **society** (in South Africa this includes both Nelson Mandela and his main African political rival in the 1990s, Chief Buthelezi). After independence, it became fashionable among some of the new, mainly middle class, elites to denounce tribalism as outdated and primitive; and also to denounce Western academic theories which put an emphasis on tribal structures and practices as important factors in African culture, society and politics. It may well be that many Western theorists put much emphasis on tribalism as the cause of **conflict** and the lack of development or **modernity** for racist reasons. But alongside **colonialism**, it would now be generally recognized both that tribal structures in

Africa provide continuity and stability in many societies, and that tribal conflicts cut across national boundaries and political *institutions*. It would also be widely agreed that tribal patronage is the root of quite a lot of corruption, and that tribal structures were manipulated for their own purposes by colonial powers (for example in Rwanda, where colonial manipulation of artificially created 'tribal' divisions were a major factor in the 1994 *genocide*). The most fundamental 'international relations' in much of contemporary Africa, not excluding the parts which have a majority Muslim population, are relations between clan and family groups; and although the use of the word 'tribe' by Western scholars is sometimes frowned upon, it is the word most African people use to describe one of their primary identities, the source of their family names, and the focus of primary allegiance. Yet the difficulty of talking about tribal politics is one of the main problems of any international relations of Africa – and post-colonial theory – and suggests the need both to recognize this fact and to recognize the sensitivity of the discourses which it evokes.

African nationalism has roots which we can identify in the identities of strong kingdoms and communities going back as far as there are records. These include Dahomey, Benin, the original Zimbabwe state, and many others. It is neither specifically a 'modern' nor specifically an anti-colonial form of *identity*. But it has been strongly shaped by both the coming of modernity and the impact of colonial change and domination, and before formal colonization it was shaped by the growth of the slave trade from the fifteenth century onwards. African nationalism has tended to focus on individual state units, most of which are based on colonial administrative units. Nationalism therefore frequently cuts across traditional tribal, cultural, language group and ethnic community boundaries. But attempts to revise the boundaries of most states have been rejected both internally and internationally, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU – replacing the OAU through the Sirte Declaration, adopted in 1999 and entering into force in 2001) have insisted that as far as possible existing boundaries should be maintained to prevent the disorder of renegotiation, even if many of the boundaries have little historical legitimacy. The exceptions – such as the secession of Katanga from Congo in 1960, of the Ibo people at the start of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967, and of Western Sahara in the 1980s – have failed, and have been the focus of bitter conflict. The only successful secessions and change of state boundaries (that of Eritrea from Ethiopia, and South Sudan from Sudan) have also left unresolved conflicts. This tends to support the view of AU diplomats. But nationalism is also fiercely demonstrated in some inter-state conflicts, in the loyalties which have helped to

end a number of civil **wars**, and in passionate sporting support for teams and individuals across Africa – not least in the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

Pan-Africanism is the sense that there is, and should be, a common shared identity across Africa and among all Africans, sometimes expressed as a specifically anti-European identity by the signifier of ‘Afrika’ rather than the originally European – and therefore imposed usual expression – ‘Africa.’ Pan-Africanism grew among intellectuals in the 1930s, often especially among writers and journalists who were living in the colonial metropole. It was championed by political leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, and Tom Mboya in Kenya, and by writers such as Aime Cesaire and Felix Houphouët-Boigny.

African development: Much recent theoretical attention has focused on the failure of development to take place. In these debates, Dambisa Moyo, Claude Ake and others have contributed African perspectives. Pieterse (2009) gives a useful summary of these debates. A significant consensus has emerged that corruption and civil conflict have slowed or reversed African development, as well as weak **governance**; but these arguments have been put to different purposes by writers from different theoretical perspectives. However, one can also assert that African societies, with some obvious exceptions including the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, have actually developed very significantly in the last 150 years. Most African countries have grown in economic terms, have improved their uses of technology, have become more educated and caring societies, and have improved their ability to ensure basic needs and food **security**. There is no doubt that they have done this on the basis of internally generated capital and skills and entrepreneurship. The best evidence for this comes from World Health Organization statistics on life expectancy and on the survival of young children, together with **United Nations** (UN) figures on literacy and improved women’s health. However, there is also no doubt that only a few countries have been able to grow consistently enough over time to match many Asian countries in being able to narrow the structural gap between them and the major developed societies. And there is no doubt that they have been able also to use some of the enormous flows of development aid and inward investment effectively; but there is a great deal of debate about *which* elements of aid and investment have been effective and why, and *how far* that has genuinely supported domestic capital creation and skills in being the cause of development. Nor is there agreement on how far continuing epidemic disease alongside continuing flows of skilled **labour** to developed economies is really harming development, although there is no doubt it has *some* effect. This has encouraged new approaches to development – those which were more

'bottom up'; which took on trust ordinary people's knowledge of what worked in the economy; which respected the 'good governance' agenda but did not use it to impose Western practices on established societies; and which allowed local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and **civil society** organizations to play important parts in development without being eclipsed by large NGOs imported from outside. These questions form the current debate in development.

Different theorists have given different accounts of the failure of African states. There is plenty of evidence for this in some cases, but it does not justify the generalization that 'the African state' has failed. Often, what has failed are first or second generation post-independence political systems based on modernizing nationalist ideologies imported from Europe or Asia. For Christopher Clapham (1985), state failure is a key element in the failure of African development, and his account is widely accepted providing it is applied in some states and not in all. But the work of scholars such as Clapham has drawn attention to the need to improve governance structures and, more fundamentally, to replace old elites and 1950s-style modernizing nationalism with something else which is able to command popular support. Moyo (2009) has also pointed to the corruption of modern states in Africa and their frequent dependence on Western aid money siphoned into the political system. But there are also examples of good practice in African politics and development, and while it is important to emphasize in any account that there are important failures, damaging external interventions, and weak economic structures, there have also been important successes in the record of African politics and international relations. This includes the record of South Africa in its political evolution up to and since 1994; the growth of Mozambique and Tanzania in the last decade; and the success of a number of southern African countries in mobilizing **resources** against HIV/AIDS and drug resistant TB. In more specifically academic terms in IR, it also includes the achievement of key scholars in innovations in the field, such as Claude Ake and Olatunde Ojo (both Nigerian), Ali Mazrui (Kenyan), Joseph Magutt (Kenyan), Mamadou Diouf (Senegalese) and Dambisa Moyo (from Zambia), as well as writers who emphasize an African viewpoint who are not from Africa – including Basil Davidson (originally British) and Walter Rodney (originally Guyanese).

Agent (agency, actor, actorness)

In traditional Western IR **theory**, the main actors are states (however constituted). In this view, there is little more to discuss about actors and 'actorness' (debates on what qualities constitute an actor), so there is no 'problem' about who or what

actors are, or what role, rights and powers that implies. States, in this view, uniquely have both the **power** and the **authority** to act in the international realm. Authors who agree with this view include classical international lawyers (especially the late seventeenth-century scholar Pufendorf (1994)) and twentieth-century **realist** theorists, such as Manning (1962), Northedge (1969) and Wolfers (1962). States alone have the quality of agency, or **autonomy**, to act and make choices for themselves. Or, in Manning's account, and borrowing a sporting analogy, states alone have the right both to play the game and to write its rules. In doing so they also have political and ethical responsibility for their actions. Individuals or organizations act in the international realm insofar as they represent state decisions and state authority. Or, alternatively, they act illegitimately, and are to be treated as pirates or **terrorists** or threats to **the state**. The only tolerable non-state actors are those which are ineffectual, including global **institutions** and interest groups such as **NGOs**. This account of agency underpins most traditional studies of foreign policy (traditional **foreign policy analysis**, **strategic studies**). Also, in this view, only states recognize who counts as an actor, and only other states get that recognition. The classic formulation of this view was the influential legal theory of Pufendorf, which rejected some of the more 'liberal' ideas in **Grotius**, and which in turn shaped the highly state-centric account of **international law** given by **John Austin** in the 1840s. In **Austin's** view, only states are sovereign, and only states have the power to issue law or to act with legitimate **violence** in international affairs. Therefore, international law is a set of principles with no value other than mere 'moral suasion'; and international institutions (Austin was thinking of agreements at the various Congresses of early nineteenth-century Europe) are a fiction masking pure state interest. Nobody has the authority to act as an autonomous agent in the world of international relations other than states in this view – including individuals ruling as 'sovereigns' and state institutions.

This view has long been contested by liberal writers, and in the last 20 years critical and post-modern or post-structural writers have joined them. A series of debates on these issues has shaped the substance of IR, especially in the leading academic journals. Liberal thought has long challenged this conservative (**realist**) view. Drawing on Kant and Grotius, liberals give the quality of agency (a capacity and right to act autonomously, or, at least, with a measure of autonomy) to a plurality of different kinds of actors, including firms, financial institutions, NGOs and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). Liberals are particularly committed to the view that individuals have both political and moral responsibilities in all politics, including in international relations. More recently, **constructivist** and

post-modern writing has added to this critique. **Liberalism** has tended more towards a pluralist view of IR, in which there is a diversity of legitimate actors and authorities – including IGOs whose authority may arise from their role and their technical competence, as well as from the rules agreed by member states for their **governance**. Liberals suggest the authority to act of some international organizations may have its origins in individual states' decisions; but it has often, and sometimes very fundamentally, transcended those origins. Thus, many actors other than states have legitimate authority to act with a measure of autonomy in the international system: i.e. they have agency.

Liberal theory thus sees **NGOs** (ActionAid, Amnesty, Oxfam, Human Rights Watch and other **human rights**, trade, environment and **development** organizations) as legitimate and effective actors in IR. They also see agency held by multinational companies and other organizations which engage in trade and financial transactions. Liberals also (perhaps selectively) recognize movements of national liberation, as well as **social movements**, as legitimate actors with full political agency whether or not they have a formal legal status. Critical theorists and **Marxists** add that popular social movements also have similar authority, for example in national liberation struggles against oppressive or colonial government powers or occupying invaders. Liberals (and others) stress the importance of basic principles of human rights in undermining the notion that only states are legitimate actors. States, too, have to answer for their actions, in this view – either to formal legal bodies such as the International Criminal Court, or to less formal but powerful authority including both religious and secular principles. Most liberals, and many **post-structuralists**, would also add that although states exercise **sovereignty** free of apparent constraints, there are real constraints in the form of responsibilities which states have chosen to take on: whether or not they have entered them voluntarily, states still have to keep their obligations. And commentators from both the left and the right add that although states have a formal role in IR, the key agents holding both the power and responsibility of choice are always individuals, people capable of acting as moral agents as well as holding political power. Dictators and democratically elected leaders alike, they argue, owe international obligations which they can be punished for breaking (if they can be arraigned). It is through this logic that individuals – as ethical actors and as rights holders – are understood as actors having the rights and responsibilities of agency and choice in both liberal and post-modern theories of IR. This is an important foundation of the liberal notion of global **society** – a society constituted of and for these individuals.

The agency-structure question does not just ask whether explanations in IR work at the level of structure (as **Marxism**, **structuralism** and structural **realism** propose), or at the level of agency (as liberals, **post-modernists** and others argue). It also suggests methodological questions which arise at the same time. One part of this methodological debate is about **determinism**; that is, the question of whether structures or other forces determine behaviour and outcomes in IR, meaning also that we do not need to look for other explanations. If the balance of power determines the pattern of IR, we don't need to look anywhere else for an explanation. If the financial structures of capitalism determine the patterns of IR, then equally (a rather crude kind of Marxist explanation) we do not need to take other factors into account very much at all. But if either the balance of power (a realist explanation) or the financial basis of the structure of production has a strong shaping influence on outcomes, without fully accounting for what happens, we obviously need to take other factors into account, and a fully **determinist** explanation is inappropriate. Those 'other things' may well need to include the choices of leaders and the accidents of daily social life. But it might be more nuanced to suggest not that explanations are either all one thing (determinist/structured) or all another (choice or agency), but that there is a spectrum between extreme free choice/agency and extreme structural determination. Explanations of contemporary IR mostly lie somewhere along that spectrum, suggesting that a combination of qualified autonomy and qualified structural shaping is at work. Most real-world situations lie at some point between the two ends. To say that individuals or states have agency may be to say they have that minimum of **freedom** of choice and manoeuvre necessary to take responsibility for their actions. Only a very few radical liberal individualists would deny that at the same time there are *some* real structural and other constraints on individuals. But they are constraints, rather than wholly determinant of action.

Constructivists have influenced all of this debate since the late 1990s, and given it much more focus. Such constructivists include Alexander Wendt (1992) and Steffano Guzzini (2006), who have put most emphasis on the importance of the agency-structure question in debates in IR theory. Much of the argument in the previous paragraph is consistent with a constructivist view, among others.

To talk of agency is also to open questions of the capacity to act – what does it take to have that capacity, what **resources** does it require, what institutional and organizational abilities? Some states may claim what is called 'formal sovereignty', but in effect they have little real capacity to act because either the state has been subverted by external influences, or it has been paralysed by internal political

terrorist or criminal groups to such an extent that it has collapsed – for example Somalia in the last decade or more.

Discussion of agency also opens important questions of ethical or moral authority. If actors (whether we are talking of states, groups, institutions or individuals) have no effective agency, then they can have no responsibility for what they were doing. It is only those who can be held to have a real choice about their actions who can be held morally responsible for them. Are states, then, agents? Constructivist IR theory has taken a distinctive approach to this question. The agent-structure question is seen as both a methodological and an **ontological** question which, although it has always been implicit in debate about IR theory, arose in a particularly important form in the mid-1990s. Briefly, it seemed to have become *the* defining issue of current IR theory. This is partly because, in the view of constructivists, all other scholars had handled it inadequately. The question remains an important one, although it is no longer as central to current debate in IR as it was a decade ago.

The question of agency is also a question of **causation**: can the causes of international relations in general, or in a particular organization and processes, be put down to specific structures, or to the actions of key actors? But this begs the question of how we might justify the procedures we use to answer the question (the methodological dimension) and what entities we assume actually exist in establishing our answer (its ontological dimension). The agent-structure question was a way of drawing up the parameters of debate in IR at least as much as anything else. It was a fruitful question at least in that the debates it led to provided one of the main stimuli for the development of constructivism, especially in Wendt's work (1999), and also for a useful re-evaluation of **critical realism** in IR at the same time.

There is no 'solution' to the agent-structure question, just as there is no resolution to many basic philosophical questions. But it may be helpful to redefine the issue: it does not need to be presented as a choice between either agency or structural explanation. Instead, the question might be formulated as a spectrum ranging from the extremely highly individualistic – which emphasizes strongly the choices actors make – to the extremely highly structured, which emphasizes the dominant role of environment and key structures in determining outcomes. Most theories of IR – including foreign policy, **conflict** and political economy theories, as well as more general theories of IR – can be located *somewhere* on this spectrum, combining elements of structural explanation and agent **causation**, but in different 'mixes'. In this view, the extreme ends of the spectrum, then, represent **ideal**

types of theory rather than specific instances. This is not, it should be stressed, a ‘solution’ to the problem, but a way of formulating it so as to think it through more carefully. Within IR theories, there are many examples where this sense of a spectrum of structure/agency makes sense. Thus, there are both non-Marxist and Marxist theories in IR which tend towards the determinist (structural) end of the spectrum. Theories of balance of power tend to emphasize the dominating role of the balance without generally seeing it as a determining structure. **Waltz’s** *Theory of International Politics* (1979) has strongly determinist implications, although he has tried to deny or qualify that view since the book was published. Marxist theory has its own debates, with some authors adopting a more structural approach that stresses the determinist role of the key structures; and some (notably Gramscian theories) leaving more scope for a variety of factors to interact – including ideas, choices and contingencies. Since **Marx** was highly ambivalent about the agent-structure question in his own work – dealing with it in at least three different ways in different parts of his work – perhaps this is not surprising.

Amin, Samir (1931–)

A distinguished economist and voice of the Global South associated with the (overlapping) world systems and dependency theories. Born in Egypt in 1931, he has contributed very extensively to critical neo-Marxist literature on international relations, alongside writers such as Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank and **Immanuel Wallerstein**. Amin’s particular contribution to this literature has been to explore how state **power** has evolved to maintain capitalist forces *within Third World* societies; to map the ways in which monopoly power penetrates those societies, and the ways in which developed and ‘developing’ economies and elites come to cooperate in the maintenance of an established order.

Amin’s work includes some important historical analysis of the trajectory of contemporary political economy, which accounts for a great deal of his publication record. His work, especially his historical analysis, is respected beyond the political positions with which he is usually associated. Of all the **structuralist**, world systems or dependency theorists, he is the most widely taught and referenced in emerging world scholarly research and teaching, although he may be less well-known than Wallerstein or Frank in the developed world. Because he draws attention to rural and peasant experience in the Global South, he has sometimes been referred to as a ‘Maoist’ – a label he has not disavowed; but his writing is considerably more theoretically nuanced and broadly grounded than that label might suggest.

It is actually quite difficult to pin Amin down in terms of contemporary labels for different factions of the internationalist left; he has drawn on and influenced a wide spectrum of positions critical of **globalization**, global capitalism and the failure of developing societies to develop for reasons his most recent writing describes as ‘mal-development’ rather than ‘under-development’. At the time of writing (2014) he is, at 83 years old, still an active scholar who has contributed to recent debates on civil **conflicts** in west Africa (he has lived for some time in Dakar), on the ‘War on Terror’ and its crises, on the West’s energy dependence, and on the dangers of both Islamophobia and radicalized fundamentalist **Islam**.

Anarchism/anarchy

Anarchism (literally, from the Greek, ‘without rule’) is generally understood as a belief in the value of a free **society**; free, that is, from the domination of state **power**. However, important strands in anarchist thinking also include the belief that ‘property is theft’ (Proudhon), and that any formal institutional frameworks are likely to constrain individual expression and individual rights. This second idea can be traced back through the **history** of anarchist thought in the nineteenth century to radical religious and economic individualism in and before the Reformation. The term ‘libertarian’ may imply – especially in the US – ‘right wing’ thought (e.g. Ayn Rand) similar to anarchism, which is generally seen as a ‘left’ position.

‘Anarchy’ is always ambiguous: it can mean without rule – i.e. a form of chaos; *or* without ruler (i.e. without central government or state); *or* without central regulation (i.e. people as individuals make rules and **governance** systems at a highly decentralized or individual level). **Hedley Bull** defends the idea that international society is anarchic in the second sense in *The Anarchical Society* (2012). Anarchism as a developed political position has had profound influence among writers who contested both contemporary **liberalism** and contemporary Marxian or **structuralist** thought – including many in the global and local environmental movements and those involved in ‘deep green’ politics; and was the moving spirit of 1960s opposition to both communism and liberalism in popular culture and radical politics. Anarchism influenced many post-modern writers, most evidently (in the US) Chomsky and Rorty and (in Europe) **Michel Foucault** – especially his last work, when he was much-engaged in local struggles about sexuality and environmental issues.

Despite the rich history of anarchism as **philosophy** and **ideology** within international relations, anarchy has become most used in international relations as a

way of describing a situation in which there is no central government to arbitrate disputes among states; accordingly anarchy becomes central in accounting for state behaviour. In terms of practical international relations, ideas of anarchy were particularly important in the complex political arena of the Spanish civil war of 1936–39.

Anderson, Benedict (1936–)

Anderson has written extensively on questions of **history** and **identity** – originally from a **Marxist** point of view but increasingly from a more complex (although still materialist) position. He was also one of the original theorists of the ‘new left’ in Britain in the 1950s, and one of the founders of the *New Left Review* which attacked the cruelty and sterility of established **Leninism** but explored new approaches to what is often called ‘Western **Marxism**’. Anderson also took part in a series of sharp disputes among different fractional groups of British and European Marxism in the 1970s. He has at the same time established a world reputation as a historian of Indonesian **society** and politics, which is the focus of most of his writing.

However, Anderson’s most important contributions to social **theory** – which is directly relevant to IR theory – is his study of the impact of industrialization on European identities, *Imagined Communities*. The book is much misunderstood by those who read it carelessly. It traces the ways in which community and identity were refashioned in and after the Industrial Revolution. It argues against both the vulgar Marxist idea that identities can be understood in purely material terms (i.e. that ideas and ideologies can be explained in terms of material, economic and technological causes alone); and against the liberal or post-modern view that ideas and ideological movements form the basic causes of social and economic change in themselves. Written at a time when Marxist ideas were under heavy attack after the ‘collapse of communism’ in Europe in 1989, *Imagined Communities* does not simply suggest that communities identify themselves as a simple act of imagining any way they choose, but that there is a dialectical interaction between ideas, **social movements**, chance events and economic and technological structures which produce complex and often unpredictable outcomes as **narratives** of **nation, empires**, community, **gender** and ethnicity are fought over.

This has been read in two ways: either as an attempt to retrieve a kind of sophisticated materialist history from the wreckage of the fall of communism; or as a concession to liberal history by a Marxist who has largely given up on his core beliefs. Readers who only think about the title of his book misunderstand its

purpose, which is the first rather than the second. Because of the sophistication of his account, rather than because of its exact ideological position, Anderson's work has commanded respect across the field of contemporary history and political science, and his ideas have contributed significantly to what Kratochwil and Lapid (1995) called 'the return of culture and identity in IR' – influencing liberal scholars and many who would not welcome any label, as well as those in the reconstructed Marxian position he has actually always consistently held.

Arabic Golden Age scholarship

This entry examines the significance for thought in IR and social **philosophy** of the period of the Baghdad caliphate and its aftermath, often known as the 'Golden Age of Arabic scholarship'. The reader may wish to read it alongside the entry on **Islam**.

After the establishment of the Baghdad caliphate in AD 762 by the Abbasids, the new city was founded. It grew rapidly in wealth and reputation, and its community of scholars (we would now call them a 'university') grew equally rapidly in size and prestige. The gathering of scholars in the new city provided a powerful basis for new research as well as for the rediscovery and preservation of ideas. Most famously, the Baghdad scholars collected, commented on and developed classic Greek scholarship, including the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Galen and Archimedes. But they also brought together ancient Persian learning (especially in astronomy and philosophy) and classic Indian thought (especially in mathematics and **science**, as well as religious thought) with these influences.

Fired also by a new Islamic sensibility, and extensive debates on the main Islamic **texts**, this produced a renaissance in learning in almost all fields. This resonated into Europe and the East, and created an enduring heritage of ideas. Among the most important of these scholars, Al Kindi (died AD 873) and Al Waqidi (died AD 823) were among the first to translate classic Greek and Persian texts into Arabic, providing commentaries and starting a long **hermeneutic** tradition interpreting meanings as well as language. Al-Farabi (died AD 951) was the most important commentator on Aristotle's *Politics* and his *Ethics*. But Al-Farabi also wrote on the art of statesmanship and government, and has a claim to be the most important political theorist of the Golden Age. His method of argument – taken from a then important trend in religious commentary which was elaborated also by Ibn Sina (known in Europe as Avicenna, died AD 1037) – was one of disputation of meaning through reasoning. This 'struggle of interpretations' or *ijtihad* was an important part of the flowering of debate in all sciences and arts in the Golden Age. It

was used also by Al-Ghazali (died AD 1111), who critically developed ideas from Platonic philosophy, including the political programme in *The Republic*.

However, at the start of the twelfth century, political authorities in Baghdad turned against the openness of debate for a combination of religious and practical reasons, seeking tighter control of political discussion. The ‘closing of *ijtihad*’ was an important moment in the whole **history** of Islamic thought, one which Al-Ghazali was co-opted to lead, even though he had earlier been a leader of interpretive openness. The abrupt shift not only heralded the end of the Golden Age and the imposition of orthodoxy in law, philosophy and theology – and so also in **political theory** – it also led to a shift in Arabic science away from speculative reasoning and towards the description of the world. This led to a decline in philosophy and a restriction of religious debate which, in the view of many, made it harder for later Islamic scholars to re-interpret the coming of **modernity**.

It also opened the way for some of the greatest minds in the Arabic world to turn to geography and descriptive science, and to continue to develop the medical **knowledge** which was one of the great achievements of the Golden Age. Peripatetic scholars who turned to geography when no longer able to rely on support in Baghdad gave accounts of their travels. These included two of the greatest minds of the post-Golden Age: Ibn Battuta (died AD 1368) and Ibn Khaldun (died AD 1406). Both travelled into the Christian and Mongol worlds, to Africa and India, and their writings demonstrated the connectedness of worlds which others (including traditional religious authorities in both Makkah (Mecca) and Rome) had wanted to see as deeply separated. Their work remains an example of open-mindedness in cross-cultural discussions, as (to take one example) **Robert Cox**’s use of Ibn Khaldun to demonstrate the possibility of a non-orthodox understanding of critical IR demonstrates. In their own time, the records of their travels also influenced European travellers who had access to them in Latin or Italian translations – not least Marco Polo and Vasco da Gama. In a small way they could be said – for good or ill – to have helped to create the imaginations which founded the age of European **imperialism**.

The scholars of the Arabic Golden Age were important for at least three main reasons. First, they preserved texts and manuscripts, translated them, and sought out correct readings of them. Much ancient Greek and Latin scholarship was only preserved because of their influence. Although their role in preserving Persian classic texts was much less (because Persia did not experience the equivalent of the European ‘Dark Ages’), their preservation in Arabic was important. Second, they developed as well as preserved – and in the process enriched their own civilization.

It is today quite difficult to separate out the place of these varied influences in Islamic scholarship, so deeply embedded have they become; although it is also true that this offends some traditionalists (salafists) who would return Islamic self-understanding to rely on only the very earliest of its beliefs. Third, as part of this synthesis, commentators and scholars mapped out a relationship between faith and reason which seemed to satisfy both. This was important in itself in Islamic scholarship, and sustained the growth of scholarship not only in Baghdad, but also in Cordoba, Cairo, Damascus, at the first European medical school in Salerno, and in Sicily, and, after the Ottoman supremacy was eventually established, in Turkish Constantinople. This spread of ideas and forms of argument is the fourth reason why the Golden Age was so important: ideas filtered into Europe, and made their way beyond India to China. The movement shaped the fusion of faith and reason in Moses Maimonides (a Jewish scholar, but who worked in the Arab tradition based in Cordoba in Spain), whose integration of Greek philosophy with Torah scholarship (notably in *The Guide to the Perplexed*, 1974) precedes the work of Spinoza in the seventeenth century. And through Avicenna, Averroes and Maimonides, these influences shaped the work of the greatest philosophic synthesis of the age in the writings of Albert the Great and St Thomas Aquinas in Paris – who had good access to the main sources from the Golden Age – in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Aquinas' whole body of work would have been impossible without these earlier developments. That includes his political writings and, significant especially for IR, his important developments building on **St Augustine's** invention of the doctrine of 'just war'. Fifth, one further reason why the Arabic Golden Age is of such importance is that it provides important **resources** for contemporary Islamic scholars, including those engaged in arguments against 'jihadism' and modern salafism. The 'reopening of *ijtihad*', meaning the re-creation of a tradition of open interpretation of texts and judgements in the spirit of the early Baghdad scholars, has been an important tool of contemporary thinkers – including Tariq Ramadan, Mona Siddiqi and many others – who have challenged both the West's frequent reading of the Islamic world as a site only of **terrorism**, extremism and the violent anti-intellectualism of the many so-called 'fundamentalist' groups (such as the Taliban in Afghanistan). Reopening *ijtihad* as a systematic method of reasoning, in their view, offers pathways for Islam to keep its own integrity, but also to work within and fully recognize the modern world. Whatever view one takes of these arguments (and there are plenty of positions one might take), the claim that the Golden Age provides intellectual vitality and intellectual resources for contemporary scholarship is hard to challenge.

Aron, Raymond (1905–83)

Raymond Aron was a leading French sociologist who wrote one of the first, and one of the most influential, IR textbooks: *Paix et Guerre Entre Les Nations* (1962). The book shows the influence of his background and of his sociology. A Gaullist resistance fighter who opposed both the pervading **Marxism** and the more radical conservatism of some of his contemporaries, his approach to IR is best described as a fusion of Weberian **liberalism** and Durkheimian (i.e. non-**Marxist**) **structuralism**. Aron did not found a French school of International Relations because much French academic study of IR was too traditionally rooted in the study of law and formal **institutions**, and because some opposing academics were too rooted in Marxist politics to take anything seriously from such a patently liberal standpoint. However, over time, his work has come to have extensive influence, and has contributed to both studies of **historical sociology** and of international norms, as well as the interaction of culture, politics and **social movements**.

In his major work, Aron describes global politics as a system. This work can be related to writers such as Morton Kaplan, whose *System and Process in International Politics* (1957) famously adopted a systems analysis approach to the study of IR. But Aron's conception of a system is one inhabited by human beings who interact, share values, and have **conflicts of ideology** as well as interests. Aron rejects the **functionalism** of Kaplan's (much imitated) approach. He draws on Lévi-Strauss as well as Durkheim, but acknowledges some debt to the systematic sociology of Robert Merton and the Chicago School, who were also the primary influence on Kaplan. Aron was a professional journalist and he adopted a sceptical and critical view of both left-leaning and right-leaning political ideologies and related academic writings. He was particularly critical of notions of **citizenship** other than those associated with the **nation state**. Despite an acknowledgement of increased inter-connectedness between national economies, Aron stressed the significance of national governments in determining who was classified as a citizen of **the state** and eligible for the entitlements and obligations such designation conferred. In his article 'Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?' (1974) he presented a forthright rejection of the view that emerging global issues would lead to forms of allegiance and **authority** beyond national governments. This was not a denial that such issues existed. Rather it was a reaffirmation of the centrality of national governments as the dominant form of political organization.

Ashley, Richard

Ashley has been a leading contributor to 'post-modern' thought in IR. He was one of the first to challenge the orthodoxy of **realist** and liberal writing in the 1980s,

and co-edited the seminal 1989 collection of essays *International/Intertextual Relations*. The richness of Ashley's thoughts is qualified by a convoluted writing style. He draws on a broad range of ideas from **political theory**, which adds to the complexity of his argument. The main thrust of his work has been to use ideas drawn from phenomenology and **critical theory** to disrupt the **narratives** and, as he argues, the intellectual complacency and ethical blindness of orthodox approaches. Drawing in particular on Derrida and Spivak, as well as Foucauldian **discourse analysis**, he shows how conventional IR tries to achieve forms of 'closure' that fix identities and subjectivities which cannot be so fixed and which idealize **the state** both as **actor** and as moral and political space. He traces this closure to the rationalist and Kantian origins of modernist Western thought. He also argues that these conventional approaches show a lack of imagination with which IR theorists should re-engage. His attack on conventional IR **theory** is part of a thorough assault on modernist **Enlightenment** ideas in social theory. He is also a strong critic of **positivist** methodologies and neo-Marxist or **socialist (structuralist)** approaches in IR.

Atomistic approach

An atomistic approach tries to achieve understanding through breaking down the topic under discussion into the smallest possible elements to explore how they work and how the separate elements can then be understood to link together. It is the opposite of a **holistic** approach. In **foreign policy analysis** it is typified in the work of Michael Brecher. In 1975 he founded the International Crisis Behaviour Project, which attempted to understand and analyse the component parts that led to various crises. Another example of this approach is the ongoing Correlates of War Project. This project was founded in 1963 by J. David Singer as an attempt to provide a scientifically rigorous range of data sets of information relevant to the causes and continuation of warfare. This includes data on inter-, extra- and intra-state **conflicts**, national military capabilities, levels and type of bilateral trade, territorial change, and alliances. Both of these examples highlight the minutia of specific incidents and interactions with a view to building a meaningful analysis drawn from the building blocks of individual pieces of information.

Such **scientific approaches** to the study of international relations have been criticized for being overly deterministic and too reliant on sometimes questionable quantitative data. In another context, linked to contemporary international relations, atomism has been blamed as central to global environmental problems. The tendency of contemporary human beings is to continually break down

problems and issues into component parts, thereby making them amenable to analysis. However, it is argued that this is also causing them to lose sight of the intimate connections between organisms and systems at all levels of life, which might be better understood holistically. In both cases an atomistic approach is one which relies on a particular approach to **science** stemming from Newtonian physics.

Augustine (St Augustine of Hippo, AD 354–430)

Early fifth-century Christian bishop of Hippo, in present day Algeria. Enormously influential as a theologian, and one of the most influential African thinkers in IR, he has shaped IR **theory** in four main respects. First, he is one of the originators of a theory of **human nature** as sinful. This view runs through much '**realist**' thinking, as opposed to the broadly optimistic view held by liberals that both human nature and human **institutions** are perfectible and so capable of **progress**. Human nature is sinful, according to Augustine, because of the nature of Original Sin, but also because humankind is too easily led astray by basic instincts, by the arrogance of believing they are right, and by their 'perpetual fall from grace' with God. While all people are marked by these characteristics, and are foolish to think they can escape them, it is rulers who are most likely to fall victim to the arrogance of **power**. From this vision – which Augustine developed both in his most famous book *The City of God* (1977), and in his letters and sermons – follows the idea that politics is necessarily difficult and often unavoidably tragic because governments may not have the luxury of choosing a good from a bad choice, and may have to choose between two evils. Only a strongly religiously informed ruler can hope to achieve this.

Second, Augustine was a defender of strong state power or strong government, necessary to curb the sinfulness of citizens and to maintain order (and, for Augustine especially, to suppress heresy). These two beliefs have come to be main pillars of realist political thought, including secular realist thought, shaping the **philosophy** of writers as diverse as Hobbes, Schmitt, Niebuhr, Kissinger and Oakeshott. But also, and third, Augustine was one of the founders of the (Christian) 'just **war**' tradition which flowered especially in the work of Aquinas and Vittoria; seeking to put limitations on when and why states should go to war and on how they should fight in order to maintain principles of right. In taking this position he was arguing against the **pacifism** of many early Christian church teachers. Finally, Augustine's influence extends into recent IR and **political theory**, since there has been important re-evaluation of his work, shaping

post-modern IR theory, especially through the work of Hannah Arendt and William E. Connolly – who give sophisticated revisionist readings of his work. Connolly can be seen as partially rescuing Augustine from the ways in which realist political theory has come to read him; Arendt draws on his pessimism and his idea of the tragic nature of human experience to develop her critique of contemporary (1950s) liberal optimism.

Austin, John (1790–1859)

An English legal theorist who formulated the ‘strong **theory**’ of **sovereignty** which holds that sovereignty is the supreme principle of politics and law, and therefore the only source of judicial principles. Since law is always only properly called law where it is the ‘command of a sovereign’, there can be no law or legally justified enforceable norms outside the boundaries of the sovereign state; ‘all else is pure suasion’. This ‘all else’ includes **international law**, which Austin denied had any **authority** whatsoever beyond its purely moral influence. This view is not wholly original. It is implicit in some classic Roman jurisprudence and in some of the writings of Samuel Pufendorf, which denied the importance attributed to principles of natural law advocated by Vittoria and **Grotius**. Austin’s view was strongly influential in the mid-nineteenth century, and offers one version of the ‘positive theory of international law’ – although it has also been widely challenged. Some **realist** writers have also taken up his view in the twentieth century, although it is more cited than adhered to, even by realists. His influence is most widely felt in IR through the use made of his work by C. A. W. Manning, including his denial of the right of international **institutions** or international law to comment authoritatively on the apartheid **regime** in South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s; and through his work being quoted in Alan James’ work on sovereignty.

Austin’s views have also been used by a number of critics at different times to attack the role of international institutions, especially the **League of Nations** and the **United Nations** (UN), and to discount the significance of the growth of the international **human rights regime** and the International Criminal Court. No more than a small minority of international lawyers now accept Austin’s views, but they may retain a little influence in international **political theory**. The concept of international law that stands above national jurisdictions has evolved in both theory and practice. While Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations retains the disclaimer that the UN will not intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic concern of sovereign states, the creation of bodies such as the International Court of Justice demonstrates jurisdiction above the level of

the **nation** state. The **European Union (EU)** is a supranational body with a legal framework that can declare judgements that overrule national governments' preferred policies. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has a dispute mechanism that is, in essence, a form of international law.

Autarky

Autarky (sometimes 'autarchy') is a governmental policy aimed at maximizing **autonomy** or independence from other states. This policy can be of a moderate or even a radical (extreme) kind, but generally the word 'autarky' is reserved for a policy or argument for more radical or violent insistence on separateness from others. This may also (in contemporary politics) be part of an anti-**globalization** movement. In the case of a more moderate search for autarky, governments may seek to minimize their dependence on other states and **markets**, but without damaging their international relations to a great extent. More radical forms of autarky are characterized by the prioritization of minimizing dependence on other states or markets no matter what the political or economic costs to **the state's** international relations with other states. Furthermore, with regard to the economic well-being of the state, governments pursuing autarky often see independence and self-reliance as being of more importance than maximizing economic growth. Autarky is a type of policy pursued especially, but not exclusively, in financial and economic terms. Due to the inherent relationship between economics and politics in international relations, autarky has implications for political and **security** independence and autonomy – which are also very important policy goals for many states. An autarkic economy is one which is closed (voluntarily or through exclusion by others), or one that does not engage extensively in international trade in order to avoid commercial or financial dependence on others. A reasoned argument for autarky is exemplified in Friedrich List's (1789–1846) study of *The National System of Political Economy* (1841). But sometimes the arguments are less reasoned and more grounded in a form of irredentism or nationalism as a 'gut feeling' in popular politics of which some politicians take advantage. Autarky as a political programme is a fundamentally anti-liberal position, as well as an illiberal one.

Historically, autarky has never been fully achieved even though there are many examples of states pursuing radical forms of it. Throughout much of the modern era of a capitalist global economic system of production and consumption, autarky, when pursued, has been seen as inefficient and costly to economic **development**, and, ultimately, state capabilities. The complexities of modern economic needs necessitate