

I.B.TAURIS

EMPIRE AND EDUCATION UNDER THE OTTOMANS

POLITICS, REFORM AND RESISTANCE FROM THE TANZIMAT TO THE YOUNG TURKS

EMINE Ö EVERED

Emine Ö. Evered earned her PhD in History from the University of Arizona, and is currently an Assistant Professor of History at Michigan State University. In addition to her work on Ottoman schooling and educational politics, her research also covers histories of disease and public health in the Middle East.

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EMINE Ö. EVERED

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TIMELINE

1789–1807	Reign of Sultan Selim III
1798	Napoleon's invasion of Egypt
1802	Wahhabis seize Mecca
1804–1813	First Serbian Uprising
1807	Deposition and later assassination of Sultan Selim III
1807–1808	Reign of Sultan Mustafa IV
1808–1839	Reign of Sultan Mahmud II
1811–1818	Ottoman/Egyptian—Wahhabi War
1815–1817	Second Serbian Uprising
1821–1829	Greek War of Independence
1830	French invasion and seizure of Ottoman Algeria
1832	Treaty of Constantinople and establishment of Kingdom of Greece
1839	First major *Tanzimat* decree, also specified as the *Hatt-ı Şerif* of *Gülhane*
1839–1861	Reign of Sultan Abdülmecid I
1853–1856	Crimean War
1856	Second major *Tanzimat* decree, specified as the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* or the *Islahat*
1861–1876	Reign of Sultan Abdülaziz I
1866–1869	Cretan Revolt
1867	Ottoman forces expelled from Serbia
1869	Education Act of 1869

1876	Reign of Sultan Murad V
1876–1909	Reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II
1877	Romanian War of Independence
1877–1878	Russo-Turkish War
1878	Sultan Abdülhamid II suspends Ottoman Constitution and Ottoman Parliament in February Treaty of San Stefano signed March 3 Cyprus Convention on June 4 results in Britain's acquisition of Cyprus from Ottomans in exchange for British support both at Congress of Berlin and *vis-à-vis* Russia Prizren League first convenes on June 10 in the southern Kosovo city of Prizren Treaty of Berlin results from the Congress of Berlin, which was held in June and July
1880	*Rumeli Vilayetleri Nizamnamesi* drafted by Ottomans
1881	French seizure of Ottoman Tunisia Establishment of Kingdom of Romania
1882	Provincial Education Directorates with inspectors established in the Ottoman Empire Britain invades and seizes Egypt Establishment of Kingdom of Serbia
1884	Education Contribution Tax (or *maarif hisse-i ianesi*)
1885	Eastern Rumelia united with Principality of Bulgaria Serbo-Bulgarian War in November
1895–1897	Cretan revolution, ending with Great Powers' occupation of island
1898	Cretan state established
1908	Young Turk Revolution compelling Sultan Abdülhamid II to reinstate Ottoman Constitution and Ottoman Parliament Establishment of Kingdom of Bulgaria with Principality of Bulgaria's declaration of independence from Ottoman Empire Annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary Unification of Crete with Greece
1909–1918	Reign of Sultan Mehmed V

1910	Establishment of Kingdom of Montenegro
1911–1912	Italo-Turkish War
1912	Italian seizure of Ottoman Libya
1912–1913	First Balkan War
1913	Second Balkan War
	Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 results in Ottoman renunciation of claims to Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, with varying degrees of British authority/annexation asserted over each
	Ottoman cession of Albania following the Second Balkan War
1914–1918	World War I
1918–1922	Reign of Sultan Mehmed VI
1918–1923	Anglo-French occupation of Istanbul
1922	Ottoman Empire and sultanate abolished
1924	Caliphate abolished

PREFACE

Once known as "the Eternal State," the Ottoman Empire by the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could no longer confidently bear that appellation. During these pivotal years, imperial dissolution transpired rapidly as a consequence of economic decline, intense competition with other empires, and rising desires within the empire's diverse communities to establish independent nation-states. Amid these dynamics, Ottoman leaders sought to implement modernist philosophies and ideals of state and education, charging the empire's diverse schools with the mission of fostering cohesion and imperial loyalty in the face of territorial annexation by European rivals and outright secession by minority populations.

My book surveys and analyzes the politics and practices of modern schooling agendas in the Ottoman imperial provinces from 1869 until the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. My analysis shows that late Ottoman educational politics emerged both as state-led initiatives to achieve social and political control through top-down governmental "reform" schemes *and* as contested terrains in center-periphery struggles over matters including—but often extending far beyond—curriculum, teachers, and educational taxes. I contend that late Ottoman education cannot be viewed simply as the state's imposition of its will on powerless and passive populations. Rather, it must also be viewed with regard to local adaptation, negotiation, acceptance, and resistance. Indeed, the narrative is not simply one of policies centrally imposed

and locally assimilated; it is a dynamic history of varied social interactions with diverse factors of influence and mixed outcomes. Thus my book, distinct from existing works on Ottoman education, critically evaluates the politics of actually *implementing* educational policies, on the one hand, and of *resisting* them, on the other hand, as experienced and documented in late Ottoman Balkan and Arabic-speaking provinces of the Middle East and North Africa.

Moreover, the primary materials employed for my study are from the Maarif İraade collection of the Başbakanlık Archive in Istanbul, Turkey, and include: records from the Ottoman Ministries of Education, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Internal Affairs; records from the office of the Grand Vizier; commission reports, correspondence, curricula, and textbooks; and, key imperial decrees relevant to various aspects of education during the years analyzed. Impressed by the empire's record-keeping capabilities, in general—particularly in the decades preceding its collapse, I was most intrigued by how the records of correspondence contained within this collection conveyed educational matters from a plurality of perspectives that were often at odds with one another. Because these documents were previously not utilized by historians of Ottoman education, my case studies (or chapters), analysis, and conclusions are novel in terms of content and perspective(s).

Although each chapter of my book may be viewed as a distinct vignette that renders unique insight into the overall conduct of Ottoman governance throughout the empire, they convey collectively a comprehensive portrayal of Ottoman statecraft and schooling. My thesis is that educational policies aimed at building citizenship and loyalty instead heightened ethnolinguistic and religious identities, thus contributing to—rather than inhibiting—the empire's demise. In presenting this local yet regionally-comprehensive history of Ottoman education, my study thus highlights the varied agendas behind imperial educational policies, their application to subject populations and places, and community-scale reactions.

Finally, as a contribution to the study of the Ottoman Empire, in general, and its histories of education, in particular, from the vantage of comparative and world histories of empire and education, I decided to include as my first appendix to this book my translated and edited

version of the Education Act of 1869. Although many of the events covered in my book transpired in the decades following the authoring of this act, its foundational and symbolic significance for the empire both in education and in governance made it a point of recurring reference in my own study and a text of paramount importance in many others. To this end of enhancing accessibility to this field in Ottoman and education studies, I also sought to include a thorough glossary of many relevant terms and concepts. In these regards, I hope that my book inspires further historical analysis of schooling and society-state relations in the late Ottoman period.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Since the time that I began to work on the early stages of what developed into both my career and this book, I have accrued many debts to many people. I will try to speak to those who were most helpful, inspirational, or just fun to be with along the way. My love of history was nurtured and encouraged by a few of the teachers who inspired me as a student at Atatürk University in Erzurum, Turkey. In particular, I am grateful to Muhsin Bozkurt for sharing his appreciation for and love of Ottoman Turkish and for helping me to realize its rich diversity and many subtleties. I also am extremely grateful to Dündar Aydın, who always had faith in me. As a research question, the topic of education in the late Ottoman Empire was first suggested to me by my former advisor in History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Kemal H. Karpat. As a graduate student in Madison, his enthusiasm for topics of nationalism and religion in the Hamidian era was contagious, and I appreciated his insights during this early stage in my work.

As a PhD student in History at the University of Arizona, I benefitted greatly from the advising team that supported my further development as a student and historian. My co-advisor and Ottomanist advisor Linda Darling provided continuous support throughout my time in Tucson, and she has been a good friend ever since. My co-advisor Julia Clancy-Smith was a great source of motivation and continues to inspire me to write beyond the narrative style that I was indoctrinated in as an undergraduate and early graduate student in Turkey. Finally, Laura

Tabili was extremely generous with her time, her editorial and other suggestions, and her example as a scholar and mentor.

Before I even arrived to begin my first tenure-stream position in History at Michigan State University (MSU), Mark Kornbluh, David Bailey, and Pero Dagbovie helped me to feel welcome and like I was a part of the community in East Lansing. From the time of my arrival, I benefitted greatly from the time and dedication demonstrated by Mark Kornbluh as he created an inclusive and productive atmosphere for junior faculty like me in the department. Since Mark's departure, I have continued to receive terrific support and advice from Walter Hawthorne. Serving as both official and unofficial mentors, many of the senior faculty that I met when I began at MSU have also been strong sources of support; in particular, I would like to thank Alan Fisher, Gordon Stewart, Lisa Fine, Leslie Moch, Sayuri Shimizu, Susan Sleeper-Smith, Pero Dagbovie, Kirsten Fermaglich, Daina Ramey Berry, David Robinson, Laurent Dubois, Maureen Flanagan, and Keely Stauter-Halsted. During my first years at MSU, I also greatly enjoyed both the large number of new historians at MSU and the reading group that some of us attended—especially Katie Dubois, Erica Windler, Ethan Segal, and Ben Smith. I am also very grateful to Laura Fair for her friendship and the time shared gardening at her farm.

In terms of institutional, scholarly, and financial assistance, I have been fortunate for the support that I received. The NAEd/Spencer Fellowship that I received enabled me to focus on my documents and writing for one year, and grants from MSU through the CASID (Center for Advanced Study of International Development), GenCen (Center for Gender in a Global Context), and Muslim Studies programs all provided various research support grants, as did the Department of History through MSU's Sesquicentennial award for cartographic and GIS support. I benefitted greatly from assistance received from staff at the Başbakanlık Archive (especially from Ömer Ceylan) and the Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi—both in Istanbul, Turkey's National Library in Ankara, at the National Archive in Washington, DC, at the Regenstein Library's Middle East collection at the University of Chicago, and at MSU in both the inter-library loan department and at RS/GIS (especially from Sarah AcMoody). Organizationally, while

I have enjoyed some of the larger conferences, I really feel that I have benefitted most from the smaller meetings held under the auspices of both GLOW (the Great Lakes Ottomanist Workshop—not to be confused with the other organization sharing that acronym, the Great Ladies of Wrestling) and MEHaT (Middle East History and Theory) at the University of Chicago.

Additionally, although edited and augmented substantially since its original publication, one of my chapters draws heavily upon my article "An educational prescription for the Sultan: Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa's advice for the maladies of empire," which appeared in 2007 in *Middle Eastern Studies*, volume 43, number 3. I am grateful for being able to republish portions of it in its reworked form herein.

Many friends and associates have also provided encouragement, suggestions, and morale along the way. In particular, going back to Erzurum, I am forever grateful to my friend Deniz Bilgen. Since arriving at MSU, I have enjoyed the friendship of Gamze Çavdar and Yavuz Yaşar, Jyotsna Singh, and Mara Leichtman. Beyond MSU, I have appreciated suggestions received during my sometimes-annual (especially at MESA) discussions and encounters with Hale Yılmaz, Kent Schull, Nancy Stockdale, Gavin Brockett, Carolyn Goffman, Ben Fortna, Tijana Krstic, and Ryan Gingeras. Also at MSU, my undergraduate research assistant and honors advisee Patrick Heffner was especially helpful.

In bringing my manuscript to publication, I am grateful for the comments of anonymous reviewers at I.B.Tauris and the assistance provided by Rasna Dhillon and Tomasz Hoskins. Though my thanks are many, I claim all responsibility for any errors or shortcomings in this final product.

In reflecting upon my upbringing and my family, I am inspired by the memories of my late mother and father. I am grateful to my mother, Şükran, as she taught me first-hand about the limitations of illiteracy for girls and women in a context with profound societal and cultural restrictions, and to my father, Ömer, who came to appreciate the value of learning and eventually overcame his fears of allowing for an educated daughter. I am also grateful to my brother Muzo, always there when I needed help and an unwavering friend, and to my sister

Fatoş, a dear friend and fighter. Some of my in-laws were also quite helpful, as my late mother-in-law Barbara A. Evered helped me to free up my summers while I completed my dissertation by having her son and grandson visit at the cabin, and my late sister-in-law Dana L. Evered was nothing short of a second mother to our son.

In closing, I save my greatest thanks for last. For Kyle—for whom my words are insufficient for conveying the gratitude that I have—we not only grew up together over the last twenty years (since meeting in Karpat's seminars) but he also helped to incorporate my studies of Ottoman history into our lives along the way, I thank you. Finally, for our son, Augie, who grew up hearing about a dissertation—and then a book, who wanted to learn the Ottoman alphabet as he saw his mother reading and writing, and who helped me learn about childhood and education in America through sharing his own, I dedicate this book.



Figure 1: Provincial map of the late Ottoman Empire[1]

CHAPTER 1

NO OTTOMAN CHILD LEFT BEHIND: ON GOVERNMENTALITY AND EDUCATION

> Government as a general problem seems to me to explode in the sixteenth century, posed by discussions of quite diverse questions. . . . There is government of children and the great problematic of pedagogy that emerges and develops during the sixteenth century.
>
> Michel Foucault on governmentality[2]

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire undertook major reform programs to reconstitute and enhance its power through the development of a modern state structure.[3] One of the most critical of these initiatives, the Education Act of 1869 (translated in full and presented in Appendix 1), introduced a centralized and compulsory education system that was modeled after the French example.[4] While thorough implementation was delayed until the 1880s,[5] this intervention in the lives and communities of the empire's populations was influenced not only by developments in Western philosophies and systems of governance[6] but also by the eroding sovereignty of the Ottoman state over its own territories and peoples.

Confronting many challenges, the empire's modernizing elites hoped that their anticipated system of education would reduce social

and political disorder and create a cohesive society under a state-centered ideology of Ottomanism. The aspirations of the Ottoman state to spread education to the most remote regions of the empire, however, were often frustrated. Its goals were stymied by the empire's dwindling financial and institutional resources, its immense geographic extent and demographic diversity, and escalating competition with foreign powers.[7] Implementation was also impeded by the fact that various ethnonational[8] and religious communities within the empire already had high-quality schools available for their children.[9] This was especially true among urban communities of some—though definitely not all—non-Muslim populations. Moreover, it was not uncommon for those non-Muslims with the economic means to do so to send their children abroad for advanced schooling. The existence of such schools was a fact known by most Western observers of the day, such as the American William Eleroy Curtis (1850–1911), an author and proponent of America's growing role in global affairs:

> The Greeks, Armenians, and Jews each have their own schools connected with their churches and maintained by private contributions. Some of them offer a high standard of education and have fine libraries.[10]

Hyde Clarke confirmed the same when he wrote, "Some of the schools of the Greek and Armenian communities in Turkey are equal to anything in Europe."[11]

When the Education Act of 1869 was proclaimed, many minority communities thus already had not only their own developed systems of schooling but also their own ideals and expectations about the purposes of an education. As a result, groups of various ethnonational and religious compositions throughout the empire were drawn into an emergent system of imperial education. Given that many of these communities had—and sought to retain—their own schools and educational agendas, relationships of contestation emerged frequently. Such confrontations led to instances of acquiescence, resistance, and negotiated alternatives, based on the relative demands and positions of the communities and the state. In short, and as this study establishes,

given the empire's geographic, institutional, and fiscal limitations, local communities and individuals shaped the Ottoman state's ambitious education policies as implemented, at least as much as they were shaped by these policies.

This book examines these interactions over education and governance in the different parts of the empire where ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse populations lived. The communities examined, which were located in the Balkans and in the Arabic-speaking Middle Eastern and North African provinces, displayed multifarious responses to centralized education. This book thus brings together a view not just of the decrees that emerged from Istanbul but also of local, communal claims and reactions to the state. It does so in order to analyze critically varied roles in the dynamics of center-periphery relations that shaped the contours and conduct of imperial educational politics and the empire's governance of minority communities in the late Ottoman era.

As I demonstrate in subsequent chapters, however, the new tools and techniques of political administration that the empire adopted—to include the implementation and application of modern schooling policies—proved not infrequently to be insufficient and even counterproductive for effective Ottoman governance. Moreover, the state's attempts to render an inclusive and attractive imperial ideology of citizenship failed to match the unifying fervor of emergent ethnonationalisms. Meanwhile, the constant interference of Western powers—which claimed to be merely promoting reforms for minorities and modernization—also frustrated Ottoman efforts to establish and retain control. In the words of one eminent scholar of European history, by demanding privileges for various ethnoreligious groups, "the very Western European powers that were aggressively establishing direct rule within their own domestic territories successfully pressed Ottoman authorities to create special statuses for ostensible nationalities, thus hindering the establishment of direct rule and generalized citizenship in the empire."[12]

From Sovereigns to Educators

Emerging at the beginning of the fourteenth century as a small frontier principality in Anatolia, the Ottoman Empire grew rapidly to

incorporate ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse communities under the sovereign rule of their leaders, the sultans.[13] Organizing these distinct subject communities along the lines of their religious affiliations, in a sociopolitical structure known collectively as the *millet* system, the Ottoman Empire was able to administer a diverse population by granting to its subordinate communities, or *millets*, a semiautonomous status.[14] So long as these communities were loyal to the empire and recognized its sovereignty under the sultan, the system functioned well enough. However, various processes (e.g., the rise of ethnonationalist movements in the years following the French Revolution) that were under way and specific events (e.g., Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, and the increasing frequency of insurrections by local, semiautonomous leaders governing peripheral Ottoman territories)[15] that occurred by the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries created new challenges in Ottoman statecraft—and to Ottoman legitimacy, altering drastically the empire's otherwise remote relationships with the majority of its diverse communities.

As the empire entered into the modern era, any exercise of absolute control by a distant sultan, as conditioned by generalized policies of pluralism and relative autonomy in the empire's peripheries, was no longer practicable. Internally and externally, the state and its leaders were threatened. The search for an ideology that could integrate all communities and strengthen the state in the face of foreign and domestic challenges continued until the empire's demise in the early 1920s.[16] Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism were pursued by various leaders, parties, and governments of the empire from 1839 until its eventual collapse.[17] Of these, Ottomanism was the least exclusive and most common. After 1839 the Ottoman government endeavored steadily to expand its administration over its existing territories to permit far greater control over its subject peoples. In these contexts, Ottoman governance entailed attempts at social engineering and political retuning of state-society relations—shifts in statecraft that had obvious parallels and precedents in the rise of the modern states of Western Europe.

The reforms for modernization came with an emphasis on a new identification for all Ottoman subjects that was intended to go beyond

traditional relationships of loyalty to the state and sultan. Ottomanism was thus the state-based identity expected of all subjects living in the empire's lands. Anticipating that this statewide identity would bring together the empire's diverse communities without challenging their existing identities (as based on religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other factors), Ottoman leaders expected that major reforms extending equal rights to all subjects and incorporating them into a centralized administrative apparatus would block further developments of fractious ethnonationalisms and serve as a bulwark against foreign intrigues. Decrees (i.e., the *Tanzimat* reforms) were announced in 1839 and 1856, declaring and guaranteeing the equality of all citizens regardless of religion.[18] Given the population's profound ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity, most Ottoman statesmen viewed this state-based identity as the most neutral and least antagonistic ideology to pursue as the empire struggled for social unity and economic and political stability.

Following patterns of worldwide change in the realms of education and citizenship-building that were intended to make state-sponsored schooling more accessible to the youth of ordinary families, not just the children of elites,[19] nineteenth-century Ottoman rulers elected to adopt similar policies and goals. Reformers in the state aimed to achieve this objective through the establishment of a centralized school system for all children of the empire. This evolution of the state as educator hypothetically enabled it to assume and wield enormous power, as the state thus declared its right to intervene pedagogically in the life of every child within its domains. This was a new chapter in state-child and state-citizen relations; providing schools was a governmental intervention that went far beyond existing traditions of education. The Ottoman reformist elite came to view schooling all children of the empire as an essential service (and strategy) in counteracting growing social unrest throughout the empire's territories.

These developments in Ottoman educational policies reflected attempts to extend imperial governance not only to the population but also to the political economy of the empire.[20] Schooling and vocational training were viewed increasingly as necessary initial steps toward a wider industrialization that the Ottoman economy needed to foster to compete effectively both internationally and at home.[21] Education

would give the state an opportunity to socialize children at an early age so that they would become loyal to the empire, would be integrated with other community members, and would also make vocational and fiscal contributions to the empire's economic health.

Facing ethnonationalist separatisms and regional demands for autonomy, reformers within the state and beyond saw centralized education as a means to isolate and eradicate phenomena of ethnonational and religious resistance and to integrate different communities into a shared, multinational or cosmopolitan, modern Ottoman society. In countering social unrest within the empire, education thus became the centerpiece in the state's wider citizenship project. Such projects are, in truth, twofold initiatives to promote state legitimacy among a population. First, legitimation happens directly through instruction (i.e., indoctrination) in citizenship-building lessons. Second, it occurs through the indirect accord (i.e., contract) that a state strikes with its ruled populace when services (e.g., education) are provided and accepted. Indeed, the potential power of schools made education an attractive undertaking for many modernizing, citizenship- and nation-building states of the era,[22] and the Ottoman Empire, with its citizenship-building aspirations, was thus not unique in this regard. What distinguished the Ottoman Empire from Western and a few other emerging nation-states of the day was its status as a vast land-based imperial entity that included so many ethnically, linguistically, and religiously different communities within its contiguous borders.[23]

Given this complex social structure and geography, the introduction of Ottomanism as the overarching identity for the empire's diverse communities—many of which were pressing for increased autonomy and even territorial sovereignty—was a calculated measure that the Ottoman state was compelled to take. This empire-wide identity passed through various manifestations as the nineteenth century came to a close and the social and territorial structure of the empire changed substantially. Concurrently and in site- and population-specific contexts, the state also focused on the Islamic identity of its majority Muslim population when tactically advantageous.[24] This was true especially during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909). Nonetheless, although the ideology of the Ottoman state would incorporate and shift

to Islamism when expedient, the broad principles of central education established with the Education Act of 1869 continued in force amid such modifications. While the goals of the state would thus encourage Muslim unity, the principles of—and the techniques for achieving—a centralized system of education remained intact and were indeed enforced more rigorously as the years progressed.

It must be acknowledged that, while the Education Act of 1869 was a significant intellectual and institutionally legislated moment, it was not the beginning of the state's direct involvements in education, nor was it the genesis of thinking about modern or mass schooling within the Ottoman Empire. During the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state started paying attention to education, especially during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–39).[25] Efforts to spread education to the masses and to employ modern ideas only became viable, however, after the Education Act of 1869, which hypothetically systematized over the whole of the empire what earlier sultans had pushed for piecemeal. There were, therefore, already state schools in the Ottoman Empire by 1869, but they were limited in numbers and locations, and they lacked administrative coordination. After 1869, state schooling became (at least conceptually—until full implementation in the 1880s) a different phenomenon, one that would diffuse from the center of the empire to its peripheries, with greater consistency in form and content. It is also important to note that prior to 1869 there existed not only state schools but numerous community schools at local levels, established by each religious denomination to train its own children. There were missionary and foreign schools as well, and the empire also permitted private schools. For Muslim children, the *mektebs* and *medreses*, as managed by religiously trained teachers, or *müderris*, were the most common forms of primary and postprimary schools that were available.

The Education Act of 1869 allowed all of these existing schools to continue to operate, but it also attempted to marginalize some of them. Making private, missionary, and foreign schools subject to state licensing, registration, and inspection, the Ottoman state endeavored to pave its own way to establishing its preferred alternatives. Non-Muslim community schools were also subject to the same state provisions, but

the state refrained from interfering in their religious or language teaching, especially at primary levels of education. The Muslims' *mektebs* and *medreses* and their teachers were targeted much more directly, as the state saw the education provided by the *mektebs* and *medreses* both as backward and ideologically unsuitable, on one hand, and as incapable of fulfilling the empire's political and developmental needs, on the other. For this reason, the Ottoman state, through decree and discourse, attempted to alter existing Islamic community schools and offer its own state schools as the most appropriate option in providing for Muslim children's education.

This focus on reforming or replacing Muslim primary schools derived from several factors. In the nineteenth century, the Islamic religious establishment opposed many of the centralizing reforms that the Ottoman state initiated. As a consequence, leaders within the state commonly perceived and depicted the religious establishment as anti-modernist and reactionary. Ottoman reformers thus endeavored to depict the empire as—and to function eventually as—the ideal provider of primary education for its Muslim children, a job previously in the hands of the traditional religious establishment. In characterizing the religious establishment as backward, the state conversely empowered itself to define its own educational plans and its schools as "progressive" or, more commonly, as "scientific" alternatives. When the state initiated its reforms, although many *mektebs* and *medreses* retained some of their traditional elements and continued to employ some of the same teachers, the state mandated ceremonial transitions authorizing and reestablishing each of these schools with the state's seal of approval. *Mekteb* and *medrese* teachers were now subject to retraining and certification, and the schools themselves were subject to licensing, registration, and inspection.

The Ottoman Empire's emergence as educator gave the state the necessary credentials and means to promote its modern state- and citizenship-building plans. This development, however, was also a transition from an imperial state that legitimated its sovereignty on the basis of dynastic and religious grounds to an entity that staked its legitimacy on its capacities to modernize—modernize itself, its economy, and its populace. Cultural and societal transformations were hypothetically in

the hands of the state, as presumed educator, and schooling was thus employed not only to spread redefined images of sultan, caliphate, and empire but also to connect the state more directly with its people. Despite the obvious paternalism in this pedagogical approach to governance, actually achieving integration and loyalty through a centralized education system was a constant struggle not only for the state but for its subject communities. Indeed, inherent to this transition to a state—albeit an empire—that prioritizes the development of its populace as an ultimate objective and source of legitimacy, is a significant amplification of the capacities and consequences of subjects' resistance. In the Ottoman context, the ideas and techniques that the state employed to rule its population and to school its children were complicated greatly by its subject communities and their disparate demands. As a result, when we examine the state's efforts to govern its populace through education, we observe many different contours of what we may identify as both imperial hegemony and Ottoman governmentality, as per the works of Gramsci and Foucault, respectively.[26]

Imperial Hegemony and Ottoman Governmentality

A critical examination of the nineteenth-century Ottoman experience in terms of Michel Foucault's conceptualization of governmentality can best explain many of these processes of change not only within the empire but also in the form and function of the empire itself.[27] Although Foucault employs the term *governmentality* to trace the developments of political change in the West—its unique histories of "governmentalization of the state"[28]—his inquiry is also revealing in non-European contexts of modernization and political consolidation. Observing shifts in the forms of governance during the eighteenth century, he describes their manifestation as a "distinctly new form of thinking about and exercising of power."[29] This new form of governance was indeed based on the use of knowledge and control and thus constituted a "rationality of social control."[30] Foucault identifies the development of governmentality as essential for the survival of the modern state. The eighteenth century saw an elaboration in the forms of Western administrative states, which were expanding their claims of sovereignty from their

territories and all those "subjects who inhabit it"[31] to a broader focus on the population itself. Underlying these shifts were concurrent developments in the power of states to dictate, to coerce, and to discipline. The effective state would now function, as Foucault recalls Guillaume de La Perrièr's metaphor, like the bumblebee armed with knowledge that "rules the beehive without needing a sting."[32] Though the Ottoman leadership increasingly sought to master its knowledge of its domains and subjects, this idea of rule *sans* sting was a novelty quite far from the realities of a sometimes desperate Ottoman state.

Foucault asserts that the emergence of governmentality in the eighteenth century was attributable to booms in population, agricultural production, economic growth, and the availability of money. Demographic growth and associated levels of economic and fiscal prosperity thus became the focus for state leaders; more so than simply knowing one's territory. As a consequence, effective control (i.e., both knowing and managing) of these numbers became the "ultimate end of the government."[33] While states made their subject populations into the targets for development, advances in states' capacities to exert control were also devoted to matters of political economy. After all, "to govern properly, to ensure the happiness and prosperity of the population, it is necessary to govern through a particular register, that of the economy."[34]

The new notion of the government—and of society, therefore—required that it be a state of "each and all" caring for every individual and the entire population.[35] Since the populace was the paramount focus of governmentality, the state was expected to look after the "welfare of the population, the improvement of its conditions, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on."[36] Such newly idealized roles of states were both the reason and the justification for the large-scale campaigns in education, in health, and in other social realms that became the standard in developed and modernizing states as the nineteenth century progressed. The Ottoman Empire strove to follow this trend, establishing schools and opening new medical centers, but it did so in the relative absence of analogous foundations, such as comparable economic growth and resources, political power, and societal cohesion. It is worth noting that most of these new roles taken on by governments had traditionally been in the hands of religious establishments.

In essence, by pledging to shoulder the burdens of caring for the sick, alleviating poverty, and educating children, new states were replacing religious institutions.[37] The new providers of such services were now the secular states, initiating major shifts in the arrangements of "pastoral power."

As noted previously, a significant component in the emergence of governmentality was the development and adoption of tools and techniques to learn more about the populations that states sought to govern. The quantity of information collected depended not only on the capabilities of the state but also on its goals regarding its peoples. As James C. Scott astutely writes,

> Just as a woodsman who takes only an occasional load of firewood from a large forest need have no detailed knowledge of that forest, so a state whose demands are confined to grabbing a few carts of grain and the odd conscript may not require a very accurate or detailed map of the society. If, however, the state is ambitious . . . then it will have to become both far more knowledgeable and far more intrusive.[38]

The ability to collect pertinent, useful information was also dependent on a state's desire and capacity to make such information "legible"—or actionable. Examining nineteenth-century statistical collections in his largely biographical study of American Francis A. Walker, Matthew Hannah demonstrates how the United States employed such information in formulating and implementing policy with respect to Native Americans.[39] Inventories amassed by states about peoples and resources were thus, in Scott's words, "organized in a manner that permit[ted] them to be identified, observed, recorded, counted, aggregated, and monitored."[40] In the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, especially after the rise to power of Abdülhamid II in 1876, there was a major expansion in surveillance and in the collection of information for the purposes of controlling populations.[41] Although the empire already kept very good records for taxation purposes, there was an explosion in the types and the volumes of information that were collected by the Ottoman state of the late nineteenth century.

Once the state is empowered by data on its subjects, its methods of control, coercion, and discipline become a significant component of our inquiry into governmentality. According to Foucault, discipline in society existed before the rise in governmentality, but it became "more important or more valorized . . . at the moment when it became important to manage a population."[42] Governmentality emerged not in isolation but rather in concert with the progression from the "society of sovereignty" to the "disciplinary society" and then to the "society of government." Manifestations of governmentality thus preserved the features of previous systems by adding new dimensions. This evolution of governmentality would result, at its final stage, in a tripartite "sovereignty-discipline-government" political entity.[43]

One of the major developments in Ottoman statecraft during the nineteenth century was the dissemination of new ideas concerning governance. Many of these novel political philosophies envisioned and advocated a more modern and effective state. With the *Tanzimat* decrees of 1839 and 1856 and pressures toward realizing a bureaucratic state, many within the Ottoman ruling elite gradually changed their perceptions of government and governance. Amid this trend that fostered liberal reforms in the empire's societal and political structures, there were also currents of thought that promoted recognition of total equality among all subjects living within the empire and the creation of a more representative body of governance in the form of an Ottoman parliament. All of these goals, it was imagined by many of their advocates, might be secured by enacting a constitution. In further contextualizing the Education Act of 1869, we might thus regard it as initially an outgrowth of this liberal *Tanzimat* era and associated notions of constitutionalism.

While all of these currents of political change were under way by 1876, when Abdülhamid II ascended to the throne and vowed to adopt a constitution, he reversed course two years later, shelving any ratification of the document. According to his purported memoirs, he possibly even viewed constitutionalism as a medicine for specific ailments—but not one to be used as a panacea.[44] Not until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and their replacement of Abdülhamid II with another sultan in 1909 was the constitutional matter brought back for discussion.[45]

Nonetheless, he did retain and advance particular liberal reforms that had arisen since the *Tanzimat* era, as was the case with the Education Act of 1869, which really only began to be realized by the 1880s.

There were thus two major developments in nineteenth-century Ottoman governance and political life. First, there was the emergence of a modernist state under the 1839 *Tanzimat*—though much of what was associated with the *Tanzimat* reforms was hypothetical, implemented only at limited scales, in later years, or not at all.[46] Second, there was the subsequent period of particularly autocratic governance from 1876 onward. Though this period was lacking a representative parliament (after Abdülhamid II's first year as sultan) and a constitution, Abdülhamid II's policies also sought to penetrate the daily lives of local communities in an effort to foster loyalty and achieve state control.

Hamidian Governmentality

Generally referred as the "Hamidian era" in Ottoman history, the reign of Abdülhamid II is described as such to highlight his direct involvement in imperial administration, despite the pressures to ratify a constitution and create a functioning parliamentary state. For this reason, the Hamidian era presents historians with a prime opportunity to examine the development of governmentality, or the "art of governance," within a modernizing non-European, absolutist context.[47] Using schooling in the empire both as our topical focus and as a medium for our inquiry into this development, we can ascertain both the roots and the techniques of the Hamidian era's "authoritarian governmentality."[48]

With its focus on all peoples of the empire and its usage of the emerging bureaucratic tools and techniques at the disposal of modernizing countries, the Hamidian state was truly the pioneering force in an Ottoman governmentality. This was apparent particularly in the empire's extensive collection and use of data and in its efforts to insinuate itself into the daily lives of all members of its subject population; measures justified by authorities for the sakes of both modernization and security. The ideas of, and mechanisms for, governance that had been available to Western leaders since the eighteenth century were

increasingly adopted by Ottoman rulers in their pursuit of more effective administration of the empire.

Late-nineteenth-century Ottoman governance was also the culmination of a century-long set of processes. While it accomplished a partial transition into a bureaucratic and centralized state during the nineteenth century, the government also underwent another major shift, focusing ever more of its attention on its own population. The rise of ethnonationalisms among the empire's subjects compelled rulers to become more introspective regarding their population, but the subjects of this administrative reorientation very often perceived it to be intrusive and inappropriate—thus further alienating the people from the state that sought to bring them closer. To survive, the empire found it necessary to learn more about its subjects and to control them more directly, yet subject communities that were accustomed to rather indirect measures by the empire chaffed at transformations that brought the imperial state into a more direct rule over them—compelling various peoples to react against control in ways that even gave rise to separatism. In many respects, therefore, Abdülhamid II's reign was the zenith of the empire's most dramatic changes in governmentality but also the period of the populace's most overt reactions against the state, observable at both center and periphery.

Although most literature concerning the rise of governmentality has pertained to its manifestations in liberal societies, there also exist expressions of "authoritarian governmentality" that "operate through obedient rather than free subjects, or at a minimum, endeavor to neutralize opposition to authority."[49] As I have observed, the late Ottoman period revealed features common to the notion of authoritarian governmentality. This was especially true during the rule of Abdülhamid II, whose policies focused so heavily on controlling the empire's populations that it pursued an overriding objective to eliminate any and all words of opposition and acts of resistance against the state. In his supposed memoirs, Abdülhamid II (or the author purporting to be the sultan) likened himself to the gardener who protects his plants from dangerous pests, justifying the use of censorship to ward off subversive ideas and ideologies from the empire's vulnerable population.[50]