


STEVE J. STERN, EDITOR

SHINING AND OTHER PATHS

War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995



Shining and Other Paths

A book in the series LATIN AMERICA OTHERWISE:

LANGUAGES, EMPIRES, NATIONS

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Shining and Other Paths

War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995

Edited by Steve J. Stern

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for the students

at the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal

de Huamanga in Ayacucho, Peru

and for their families

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❖ ABOUT THE SERIES

❖ *Latin America Otherwise: Languages, Empires, Nations* is a critical series. It aims to explore the emergence and consequences of concepts used to define “Latin America” while at the same time exploring the broad interplay of political, economic, and cultural practices that have shaped Latin American worlds. Latin America, at the crossroads of competing imperial designs and local responses, has been construed as a geocultural and geopolitical entity since the nineteenth century. This series provides a starting point to redefine Latin America as a configuration of political, linguistic, cultural, and economic intersections that demand a continuous reappraisal of the role of the Americas in history, and of the ongoing process of globalization and the relocation of people and cultures that have characterized Latin America’s experience. *Latin America Otherwise: Languages, Empires, Nations* is a forum that confronts established geocultural constructions, that rethinks area studies and disciplinary boundaries, that assesses convictions of the academy and of public policy, and that, correspondingly, demands that the practices through which we produce knowledge and understanding, about and from Latin America be subject to rigorous and critical scrutiny.

Latin America’s postcolonial history has been marked by its neocolonial legacies. Since the middle of the century the continent has erupted in civil war and political violence—including the Cuban revolution, dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala, hard fought wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador. While Latin America’s new democracies have been much heralded, battles for political power in Peru—between Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian state—have added a twist to this political complexity.

From the early 1980s to the early 1990s Peru was convulsed by a

ferocious civil war. By 1992 predictions of Lima's impending collapse dominated national conversations. Just as quickly, with the arrest of Sendero Luminoso's leader, Abimael Guzmán, this violent, surprisingly successful, and enigmatic movement crumbled. Intellectuals, journalists, and pundits, as well as Peru's political class were at a loss to explain these extraordinary times, compounding Sendero Luminoso's mysterious development, appeal, and failure.

The essays in the collection address the enigmas and exoticisms cloaking Sendero. They attend to the movement's social roots, its ability to compel fierce loyalty and equally fierce rebuke, its varied regional patterns of success and defeat, its gendered contours and consequences, its legacies for political rule and political culture. Placing the seemingly inexplicable in history's thicket of possibilities, this volume, taken as a whole, builds a deep and nuanced historical analysis of Peru's harrowing war. In the process it dissipates the enigmas that contributed to Sendero's terrible cachet.

❖ PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

❖ This book originated when a group of faculty and students at the University of Wisconsin–Madison began discussing the difficulty of understanding the origins, social dynamics, and consequences of the political agony that convulsed Peru in the 1980s and early 1990s. Frustration, urgency, and opportunity all played roles in our discussions. The frustration emerged from a sense that our inherited knowledge and the available intellectual frameworks were inadequate for achieving a deep, multifaceted understanding. Urgency derived from the sense that Peru and Peruvians had been living a great disaster and a decisive watershed period; these conditions seemed to demand, almost as an ethical priority, that we mount an effort to improve understanding and interpretation of Peru's recent history. A sense of opportunity also emerged. A number of intellectuals and activists had "come of age," intellectually, during Peru's war years. Their field knowledge and analytical flexibility, if integrated into a carefully designed and multigenerational collaboration, might help develop the fresh knowledge and analysis that seemed so urgent.

Out of these discussions emerged a planning group for an international conference, entitled "Shining and Other Paths: Anatomy of a Peruvian Tragedy, Prospects for a Peruvian Future." This conference was held at the University of Wisconsin on 27–30 April 1995. We coordinated the conference with student reading and research in experimental courses at the graduate and undergraduate levels. Subsequently, the editor of this volume worked intensively with conference authors to sharpen and integrate their essays. In some instances, the rewriting process led to new or thoroughly revamped essays. Our hope is that we have molded our efforts into an original

and coherent book whose whole is larger than the sum of its parts, and that the book captures in some way the intellectual excitement of the conference.

This project drew on the help of many people and agencies. My partners on the symposium planning group included Marisol de la Cadena, Nancy Forster, Florencia E. Mallon, William Ney, Guido Podestá, Frank Salomon, and during his time as Tinker Visiting Professor at Madison, Carlos Iván Degregori. Without their enthusiasm and suggestions, the intellectual design of the conference and our ability to identify and invite knowledgeable participants would have been much weaker. Indispensable logistical support, publicity, and sponsorship of the conference were provided by the staff of the Latin American and Iberian Studies Program, especially William Ney, Kristen Smith, and Carrie Johnson. In addition, Laura Fuentes and Janet Melvin provided translation support for students and community members who attended and participated (the conference was conducted in Spanish to facilitate more fluid discussion and debate among the panelists).

I owe an especially important thank you to the co-authors of this book. Their good will and collaborative spirit at the 1995 conference and during the arduous process of intellectual critique and editorial nagging that followed it reminds me that sometimes, and however imperfectly, the metaphor of intellectual “community” really works. Among the coauthors, I owe special thanks to Carlos Iván Degregori, who was a wonderfully generous intellectual partner during the semester when we team taught and prepared for the conference, and to Florencia E. Mallon, who shared knowledge and provided support and perspective as the conference results evolved into a book.

Several additional intellectual contributions must also be acknowledged. First, the undergraduate and graduate students who worked with Professor Degregori and me during the Spring 1995 semester tolerated experimental team teaching with a great deal of good will and energized the campus community and the conference sessions with their intellectual insights, feedback, and engagement. Second, important contributions were made by scholars who contributed commentaries and related background papers to the panels. These discussants and authors included José Gonzales, Gustavo Gorriti, Christine Hunefeldt, Enrique Mayer, Alfred McCoy, David Scott Palmer, Leigh Payne, Deborah Poole, Gerardo Rénique, Frank Salomon, Thomas Skidmore, and M. Crawford Young. Third, during the postsymposium phase, a series of readers helped sharpen the book manuscript and provided welcome advice. I wish to thank Peter Klarén, John Tutino, and an anonymous reader for their excellent advice, as well as Valerie Millholland,

Rosalie Robertson, the team of editors and production assistants at Duke University Press, and the manuscript's copy editor, Linda Gregonis.

I am enormously grateful to Nancy Appelbaum, without whose assistance this book would not have happened. The bulk of this book was written by Peruvians and Nancy worked heroically in the translation of their essays (chapters 1, 2, 4–6, 9–14). Although we cotranslated the essays and I assume responsibility for any mistakes and infelicities, Nancy did the work of creating quality first-draft translations, tracking exchanges on specific points and problem areas, and incorporating revisions. Nancy also served as the manuscript manager, coordinating communication with the authors and me during a year when I was in residence in Chile and pulling the book together into a unified manuscript and set of diskettes. That Nancy performed these tasks so well while completing her own pioneering dissertation on Colombian history speaks volumes about her intellect, energy, and organization. Thanks, Nancy, for making this book possible.

The maps in this volume were produced by the Cartographic Laboratory of the University of Wisconsin, and I wish to thank Onno Brouwer and Qingling Wang for their superb help. I also wish to thank Danny Holt for providing helpful background research at a crucial juncture. Conference participants supplied the photographs in this volume, and specific credits run as follows: page 48, Eloy Neira and Aroma de la Cadena; page 74, Gustavo Gorriti and *Caretas*; pages 106–7, Rodrigo Sánchez; pages 188, 246 (ronderos at market), 474 (ronderos as patriot-citizens), Ponciano del Pino; pages 246, 361 (Shining Path women), Robin Kirk and Orin Starn; pages 284, 418 (Guzmán on television), Carlos Basombrío; pages 361, 475, Isabel Coral; pages 418–19 (Fujimori photos), Dante Piaggio. Thanks to all, and to Marisol de la Cadena, Florencia E. Mallon, and Patricia Oliart for securing access to various photos.

For economic assistance that made the 1995 conference and this book possible, I gratefully acknowledge the Anonymous Fund, Brittingham Fund, Graduate Research Committee, and Nave Fund at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Title VI program of the U.S. Department of Education, and the Visiting Professor Program of the Tinker Foundation.

During and after major collective traumas, the problem of memory and forgetfulness often becomes an important cultural issue. My connection to the Ayacucho region, and to the students, faculty and staff, and families affiliated with the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, runs deep and is a bittersweet blend of affection, hope, and pain. This book's

dedication is one way of expressing that I have not forgotten the youth and families who have suffered so much and nonetheless insist on a future of hope, and that I have not forgotten the generosity of those who have welcomed me. This book is for you, gratefully, affectionately, hopefully.

Steve J. Stern
Madison, Wisconsin,
September 1997

✦ INTRODUCTION

Beyond Enigma: An Agenda for Interpreting Shining Path and Peru, 1980–1995

Steve J. Stern

✦ Enigma, exoticism, surprise: These sensibilities have often marked discussion of Peru during the profound political upheaval and violence that marked the 1980s and early 1990s. An aura of enigma has often swirled around the theme of Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”), the Maoist political party that proclaimed an insurrectionary war in May 1980. Sendero launched its war conventionally enough by burning ballot boxes in Chuschi, a pueblo in the Ayacucho region of Peru’s center-south highlands. But the symbols used later that year to announce the war in Lima, the capital city and national media center, seemed exotic expressions that invited ridicule. Limeños awoke to the sight of dead dogs tied to lamp posts and traffic lights. The accompanying signs proclaimed “Deng Xiaoping, Son of a Bitch,” as if mention of the architect of counterrevolution in China were a sufficient and relevant political explanation.¹

Given the distant preoccupations and arcane symbolism of Sendero, and the participation of most of the Left in Peru’s return to electoral politics and civilian government after an extended period of military rule (1968–1980), the Maoist sect’s declaration of war seemed out of step with Peruvian history. Given the snobbery, racism, and indifference that attended Limeño perceptions of the highland Department of Ayacucho—the birthplace of Sendero, noted mainly for the confluence of an extremely impoverished indigenous peasantry in the countryside and a politically effervescent university culture in the region’s small capital city—Sendero also seemed an expression of isolation and peculiarity. Odd political trajectories, proclamations, and utopias might mark the political world of educated mestizos and Andean Indians in faraway, backward highland provinces.

The surprises that lay in store added to the enigmatic aura. After all, in

1980 few persons outside the Ayacucho region took Sendero all that seriously. Few, aside from the Shining Path militants themselves, would have predicted that self-styled revolutionaries from an extremely impoverished and largely Indian highland region could effectively spread a ruthless war through much of the national territory, sustain it into the 1990s, then provoke a sense of imminent government and social collapse in Lima by 1992.

By the mid-1980s, Sendero had become harder to dismiss. Its capacity to function as a tenacious, brutally effective political and war machine had sparked declarations of emergency military intervention in numerous departments. The war also provided the military with a platform to conduct an Argentine-style “dirty war” against presumed subversives in Ayacucho, and yielded massacres of journalists, peasants, and prisoners that seemed to implicate the military as well as Sendero and sparked media scandals. At the same time, Sendero’s ideological dogmatism and its almost celebratory embrace of violent bloodletting as purification and heroism became increasingly evident. This was a political force that looked with contempt upon leftists who approached politics through compromise and coalition. Sendero looked with contempt, as well, upon politics as the process of building legitimacy through “soft” means—through alliance with semi-autonomous social movements and grassroots organizations or through campaigns of discursive persuasion and mobilization. Yet dogmatic sectarianism and a horrifying will to violence had not implied political ineffectiveness.

Sendero’s strangely out-of-step political preoccupations and symbolism; its birth in a regional world that blended Andean Indian communities, a decomposing rural oligarchy and hacienda system, and radicalized university intellectuals and students; its amazing capacity to build utopian dogmatism and contemptuousness into an effective political war machine: these would have been sufficient to generate an aura of enigma and exoticism. Other forces worked in a similar direction. For Sendero’s supporters and sympathizers, the political party’s mystique and intimidation lay precisely in its self-projection as a force uniquely brutal, effective, and accurate in reading the march of historical destiny. For Sendero’s critics and rivals, the understandable desire to draw moral distance encouraged depiction of Sendero as a freakish evil force outside the main contours of Peruvian social and political history—more an invention of evil masterminds and an expression, perhaps, of the peculiarity of a particular regional milieu than a logical culmination or byproduct of Peruvian history. For supporters, critics, and agnostics alike, the ethnoracial othering of native Andeans as “Indians,”

governed by a mysteriously different worldview, could also prompt exoticist interpretations. Sendero's spread expressed the cultural marginality and ignorance of Indians, or their disposition toward outbursts of utopian millenarianism to overturn evil.²

Small wonder, then, that terms like "idiosyncratic," "magically elusive," "strange dovetailing," and "exotic and enigmatic" attach so readily to otherwise disparate discussions of Sendero. The mixed sensibilities of peculiarity, surprise, and disgust encourage adjectives that draw moral distance and emphasize uniqueness.³

But the sense of enigma and surprise was not really limited to Sendero Luminoso alone. In the 1980s and early 1990s Peru as a whole seemed to lurch from surprise to surprise.⁴ Consider four such surprises. First, the declaration of armed insurgency in 1980 seemed absurdly out of step with the turn of the polity and the leftist opposition toward competitive electoral politics. Even *Patria Roja*, the Maoist political group most inclined to reject elections and promote armed insurgency, accepted the turn. The seriousness of the armed conflict—its capacity, along with erratic economic performance and steep declines in real wages, to destroy the effectiveness of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980–1985), and to return the military to a leading political role in national life—defied expectations of regional and political containment. Why did a historically archaic Maoist sect, so at odds with the direction of change among most of the Latin American and Peruvian Lefts, prove so able to wage war, organize a social support base, and read the flow of history?

Second, the victory of the leftist coalition *Izquierda Unida* in Lima's municipal election of 1983 and the capture of the presidency by APRA's Alan García in 1985 seemed to signify the ascendancy of a Center-Left alternative marked by populist economic assistance and development projects, anti-imperialism, and political rather than military means of defeating insurrection. Within three and a half years, however, the ferocity of a foreign exchange crisis and subsequent economic shock treatment and the failure to win the war against Sendero had destroyed García's credibility and a Center-Left solution. The main contenders of the 1990 presidential elections—Mario Vargas Llosa, as the novelist-turned-candidate of a "new" neoliberal Right, and Alberto Fujimori, as an "unknown" who rejected politics as usual—signified an unraveling of hopes once placed in established Center-Left parties. Fujimori surprised the electorate by winning, then surprised the populace by adopting a harsh neoliberal shock treatment that drove key

commodity prices skyward and contracted the economy. Why did Left and Center-Left politics implode so dramatically, and why did a political novice steal the political show even from the neoliberals?

Third, as Peru entered a period of severe neoliberalism and economic hardship (accompanied by cholera outbreaks in 1991) for the impoverished majority, the insurrectionary war intensified in Lima. The insurgents' declaration that they had reached the "strategic equilibrium" stage of the war in May 1991, the urban bombings and the assassinations of alternative political leaders that choked Lima with fear during the next fifteen months, the suspension of the Congress, judiciary, and Constitution in President Alberto Fujimori's self-coup (*autogolpe*) of April 1992 all seemed to signify imminent national collapse. Yet it was Sendero that collapsed when its mythic leader, Abimael Guzmán, was captured in September and the movement's political capacity abruptly declined. Only retrospectively did it seem obvious that Sendero had lost the war between 1989 and 1992, despite appearances to the contrary. In those years, the profound alienation of peasants from Sendero's politics crystallized as organized resistance, facilitated by a certain rapprochement between the military and peasants. The rural resistance to Sendero, along with gains in military-police intelligence, had rendered Sendero vulnerable even as it appeared to approach the threshold of a decisive victory. How could Sendero have approached strategic victory and strategic defeat *simultaneously*?

Fourth, the sense of incomprehensibility was reinforced by the intensity with which Peruvian politics seemed to concentrate distinct historical times and tendencies into a single conjuncture. There were several prominent contenders for political space in the Peru of the 1980s, the armed Maoist revolutionaries preoccupied with the Sino-Soviet split and the course of the Chinese Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s being only one. Leftist and Center-Left populists (Alfonso Barrantes, the Marxist who won the 1983 mayor election in Lima, and Alan García, the president whose election in 1985 revitalized the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance [APRA] party's earlier legacy of social critique) evoked a politics of reform, anti-imperialism, and mass appeal that bubbled to the fore repeatedly in Latin America between the 1930s and 1960s. The avuncular president Fernando Belaúnde, whose election recalled a politics of enlightened centrism and moderation—development projects, frontier colonization, and mild social reformism—that had seemed fresher in the early 1960s resurfaced. More ominous was the guerrilla force Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru

(MRTA), whose leadership genealogy and eagerness to lead a revolutionary tide sparked by bold armed action and symbolism brought back to life the groups inspired by the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s. Then there was the military, whose anti-insurgency campaign and political control in the provinces evoked the dirty wars and foundational military regimes of South America in the early to mid-1970s. In the neoliberal revolution that redefined political discourse in the Latin America of the 1980s stood a pair of leading prophets—Hernando de Soto, author of the manifesto *El otro sendero* in 1986, and Mario Vargas Llosa, presidential candidate in 1990. Finally there was a political “unknown,” Alberto Fujimori, whose election captured the sense of exhaustion with old political schemes and yearning for truly fresh alternatives that launched “new” politicians out of “nowhere” in the Latin America of the late 1980s and early 1990s. How could each of these political players have a bright day in the sun during a relatively compressed historical conjuncture? And why could so many decline so precipitously and unexpectedly from the political heights?

To be sure, Alejo Carpentier noted long ago in his classic novel, *Los pasos perdidos*, that there is a Latin America tendency toward the coexistence of political times that seemed, in other parts of the world, to separate themselves in a more chronologically ordered sequence. As a Carpentier character succinctly put it: “You must remember that we are accustomed with living with Rousseau and the Inquisition, with the Immaculate Conception and *Das Kapital*.”⁵ Nonetheless, the Peru of the 1980s and early 1990s presented an extreme case of historical coexistence and compression where populists, developmentalists, revolutionaries, “dirty war” leaders, neoliberals, and unknowns could all build a formidable political presence for a time, yet quickly lose the political magic. The political congestion tested the limits of comprehension, enhanced the probability of sudden surprise twists, and added to a sensibility of crisis and uncertainty.⁶

In short, the surprises and the velocity of Peruvian political life seemed to defy well-worn scripts of classification, chronicling, and explanation. In this sense, the enigma and shocks associated with Sendero were part of a larger sense of enigma and surprise associated with Peru.

The sensibility created by a rush of twists and turns, genuinely surprising and often difficult to explain, is that of day-to-day journalism. Important events seem to fall from the sky, in an unpredictable yet steady stream of happenings that shock and change our social world, for reasons that remain somewhat mysterious. Such events are like acts of God or Nature. An

earthquake strikes here, a hurricane there; an assassination strikes here, a massacre there. One rushes to provide a basic chronicling of the event and its immediate consequences. Yet who knows when, where, or why the event happened? Before deep analysis or reflection are forthcoming, another *novedad*—a landslide here, an uprising there—drops out of the sky to command our attention. If the velocity of major surprises and events prevents deep follow-up analysis, the sense of connection and patterning that contextualizes and historicizes events becomes difficult to establish. The sense of a chaotic world buffeted by accident and surprise becomes increasingly difficult to resist.⁷

This sort of sensibility was quite evident in the 1995 symposium that evolved into this book. Particularly in the first days of our intensive meetings, the role of accident or chance in history (*el azar en la historia*) was a recurring refrain. Resort to the phrase did not reflect a lack of empirical knowledge, analytical skill, or theoretical talents by the participants. It reflected an honest expression of the sensations of wonder, unpredictability, and limited deep comprehension forged out of an experience permeated by shock as well as grave seriousness. Life had moved through unsuspected twists and turns that seemed to matter greatly, at least until the next turn of events. Under the circumstances, the futility of prior conceptual frameworks and analytical expectations became all too evident. The refrain expressed, as well, a drawing of moral and intellectual distance from the teleological readings of history promoted by Sendero. After all, it was Sendero that proclaimed a piercing and totalizing ability to read and lead the contradictory march of history toward its inexorable, triumphant outcome. The desire to draw distance from the confident teleologies of Sendero resonated readily with post-modern intellectual skepticism toward grand narrative and totalizing frameworks.

Yet the dichotomy between history as teleology and history as chance event is too rigid and self-defeating. Both poles destroy the blend of curiosity and craft that constitute the art of contextualized historical analysis. If history is a teleological march toward a predestined and irreversible grand conclusion, and all that happens is merely a step on the inevitable road, there is little to analyze, question, or research deeply. The context and the story lines are a given. But if history is a chance sequence of events that happen without cause, or more precisely, for reasons so immediate and so infinitely varied that they constitute the equivalent of a game of chance, then there is also little drive to analyze, question, or research deeply. The context is transparent and immediate, the story line is an episodic string of events.




Figure I.1. Peru, circa 1980. Note: Dashed lines demarcate the five departments of the center-south sierra analyzed extensively in part II of this volume, and the Department of Puno, analyzed in part III.

Between the pole of overdetermined teleology and that of near-random chance breathes the art of contextualized historical analysis: the study of human beings in their time dimension as an unfolding pattern of possibilities and probabilities—some realized and others unrealized, some pulling human groups in similar directions, others at cross-purposes, some more structurally entrenched and others more susceptible to change, all constituted in part by human action.

The agenda of this book is to move “beyond enigma” by bringing the art of contextualized historical analysis to the war that engulfed and redefined Peruvian society from 1980 to 1995. I have argued that the sense of enigma that surrounds the Sendero phenomenon and Peru more generally is understandable. But the task faced here is to historicize and contextualize the social origins, dynamics, and consequences of a time that constituted a major watershed, when much was at stake and long-lasting legacies were forged. This task is all the more difficult if we wish to keep our intellectual balance by sidestepping easy, yet shallow apparent solutions. On the one hand, we need to avoid overdetermined explanatory logics that erase altogether the sense of wonder, unusualness, and extreme human condition that constituted part of the experience and its meanings. On the other hand, we must also avoid a reductionism that collapses the wide social experiences and frustrations that generated and fed civil war into its narrowest dimension—the story of a freakish fringe group, led by evil masterminds, who came together in a particular province in the 1960s and 1970s, organized an ideology and a set of cadres, and waged and lost a brutal war in the 1980s and 1990s.

This book, then, is a collective effort to build a historical analysis of war and society in Peru’s time of upheaval. We undertake this task through analysis of five themes: the historical roots of political convulsion and revolutionary projects in the highlands, the failed struggle of Shining Path to conquer the peoples of the center-south highlands, the destruction of apparent “third political paths” in Lima and the highlands, the war experience of women and their emergence as new citizen-subjects, and the consequences of the war for political rule and political culture. (See figure I.1 for geographical orientation to the main regions and sites considered in this book.) These themes are considered in parts I to V, respectively, of this book, and in a brief conclusion that sets forth findings that cut across the various book sections. Let us turn to our first major theme: the historical roots of the political sensibilities and projects that plunged Peru into war in the 1980s.

Notes

- 1 The seven short essays by the editor of this volume (the general introduction, the introductions to each of the book's five major themes or sections, and the general conclusion) are synthetic interpretations that dialogue directly with the information and analyses presented by my collaborators in this book. For this reason, the essays tend to eschew detailed annotations. For readers who wish additional orientation to *Shining Path* and to the contextual information presented in the essays by the editor, key works are Degregori 1990a; Degregori (ed.) 1996; Gorriti 1990; Manrique 1989; *NACLA* 1990–1991, 1996; Palmer (ed.) 1992, 1994; Palmer 1995; Poole and G. Rénique 1992; Starn 1991b; and for fuller bibliographical orientation, P. Stern 1995. The story of the dogs slung from posts and lights is well known: see, e.g., Degregori 1994: 51–52; Rosenberg 1991: 146.
- 2 On the theme of millenarianism and utopias in Andean history and its vexed place in interpretation of *Shining Path* and violent outbursts as exotic expressions of the Indian Other, the most flagrant example of overheated claims based on little evidence is Strong 1992a, 1992b; compare the critique of Mario Vargas Llosa in Mayer 1991; and the critique of anthropology in Starn 1991a. By far the most subtle exploration of utopias in Peruvian history and culture is Flores Galindo 1988a, a brilliant study that avoids the trap of treating *Shining Path* as a projection of the exotic Andean Other; see also Brown and Fernández 1991.
- 3 For the quotes, see Poole and G. Rénique 1992: xiii; Guillermoprieto 1994: 261; Strong 1992a: 61; Rosenberg 1991: 146. It should be underscored that these works are otherwise vastly different in approach. For example, Strong emphasizes the exotic aura of the Andean Other, and Poole and G. Rénique (cf. 1991) seek to strip away exoticism.
- 4 The “surprises” that follow are based on the discussions at the 1995 conference that evolved into this book, my personal experience and observations of unfolding events, and the sources cited in note 1.
- 5 Carpentier 1957: 53.
- 6 The sense of extreme crisis and incomprehensibility contributed, as well, to apocalyptic sensibilities. These emerged not only in the fascination with the millenarian themes described earlier, but in literary works that suggested an end of worlds; see, e.g., Vargas Llosa 1984.
- 7 Obviously, I refer here to day-to-day journalism in its function as a chronicle of news, rather than investigative journalism by reporters who take a “time out” from the daily grind to write articles and books that probe a social issue more deeply. The best journalists, of course, try to balance the two functions.

✦ PART ONE

Within and Against History:

Conceptualizing Roots

❖ INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE

❖ Sendero Luminoso emerged both “within” and “against” history. On one level, the combination reflected Sendero’s self-proclaimed place as the agent of a world history destined to conclude in Communist Revolution (an agent “within” history), and as the vanguard whose ownership of Truth and Knowledge set it against the State and revolutionary pretenders (leadership “against” history). On a deeper level, the combination of “within” and “against” reflected the ways Shining Path represented one logical culmination, among several logical culminations, of the forces that bred oppositional politics in twentieth-century Peru. As a probability or culmination “within” history, the Sendero phenomenon belonged to a family of similar phenomena anchored in Peruvian historical processes. As a historical possibility in competition “against” other historically grounded projects and possibilities, Sendero’s capacity to dominate the 1980s—to plunge a society and its politics into profound upheaval—fell far short of inevitability, and its unique features would prove important over the course of the war.¹

In Peru, as in much of Latin America, a certain exhaustion of the Old Regime had set in by the 1960s. To understand the sensibilities that informed this exhaustion, one needs to reach back to earlier moments of twentieth-century critique of the established order.² In Peru, as elsewhere in Latin America, a cycle of sharp political dissidence and mobilization defined the late 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s as a time of middle class and worker mobilization against politics as an aristocratic bastion. This was a period when new political parties and leaders emerged and sought to establish a more inclusionary political and social system. In the case of Peru, the social mobilizations of the period involved a remarkable variety of groups—workers and trade union groups in cities, mining camps, and sugar plantations; uni-

versity youth and intellectuals, including “insurgent intellectuals” from the provinces; indigenous and mestizo peasants in various highland provinces; and urban poor and migrant populations in Lima.

The period also witnessed the birth of oppositional political parties (APRA and the Communist Party) sharply critical of the established order and successful in establishing substantial social followings. The pressures for social inclusion generated an ambience for the emergence of dissident intelligentsias and opportunities for populist political leaders to promote a “new” style of state politics. Several presidencies, those of Augusto Leguía and Luis Sánchez Cerro during the 1920s and early 1930s and of Luis Bustamante y Rivero and especially Manuel Odría during the 1940s and 1950s, would include important populist phases and styles of rule. In short, the new social forces encouraged a certain massification of politics and an environment of critique that placed traditional aristocratic politics on the defensive by the 1920s and 1930s. The new political and intellectual environment undermined national political rule as a series of pacts and intrigues within a club of gentlemen and oligarchs with narrow social bases.

Yet the currents of political critique and social inclusion developed within sharply delimited spaces. Periods of military rule and repression repeatedly “interrupted” or drove underground the social and political organizations, including APRA and the Communist Party, that pressed for a more inclusionary and responsive state.³ Over time, in part, perhaps, as a survival strategy in a political system inclined toward repressive “interruptions,” political leaders and parties retreated from their earlier, more populist and “radical” stances. In addition, they abided by an implicit pact not to press the question of agrarian reform, to leave unchallenged the concentrated land tenure regime and servile social and ethnic relations that structured life in many rural highland provinces. Instead, political demands were confined largely to the needs of the urban groups, workers, and laborers of the coastal provinces who comprised the parties’ historical social base. In short, the “new” political currents and parties that had challenged the structure of politics and society and pressed for social inclusion in the 1910s through 1930s had become “old” by the 1940s and 1950s. Their relative ineffectiveness and moderation, relative accession to the continuity of an exclusionary social order made them parts of a reconstructed Old Regime.

By the 1960s, the reconstructed Old Regime seemed increasingly untenable for several reasons. First, it granted more latitude to pressure for

social inclusion in the coastal cities, especially Lima, than in the rural highlands, where state support of the hacienda system and ethnic domination continued to reign. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, a series of peasant mobilizations in the central and southern highlands (especially in Junín and Cuzco) shook the political order. The land invasions contributed to a sense that land reform and the break-up of servile rural relations in the highlands were issues that could no longer be sidelined or postponed in national politics. Second, the reconstructed Old Regime delivered neither steady economic growth that might satisfy the interest group needs of an expanding middle-sector and urban poor population, nor a political system that effectively incorporated dissident parties and intelligentsias. Import-substitution industrialization failed to yield an economic “take-off” powerful enough to break the effects of international commodity price cycles, a modest internal market, foreign ownership of key economic sectors, and concentrated income distribution. In addition, APRA and the Communist Party, the mass parties that originated as vehicles of sharp political critique and mobilization, had lost much of their luster. As mentioned earlier, periods of military rule and repression had rendered them ineffective as contenders for national political power, and the effort to survive and find spaces in a hostile political system had dulled their once radical edge. Third, the political and cultural impact of the Cuban Revolution made obstacles to social change and inclusion much more difficult to tolerate. The mystique of Cuba undermined the political credibility of slow paths to social transformation and posed the question: Why not a revolution now?

The exhaustion of the reconstructed Old Regime provoked unprecedented political stirrings in the 1960s. The successful presidential campaign of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (president, 1963–1968) included rallies and appeals in the southern Andean highlands, provinces marked by indigenous majorities and mobilizations for land reform. The new campaign style rendered uncertain the implicit pact by which the coastal political system would leave unchallenged the social order of the rural highlands. In 1965, radical youth inspired by the Cuban Revolution split off from APRA and the Communist Party and organized as guerrillas. They proved politically and militarily ineffective, but the campaign to defeat them contributed to currents within the military that questioned the viability of a social order premised on rural degradation. In 1968, the new currents dramatically took over national life. A Left-leaning military government headed by Juan

Velasco Alvarado ousted Belaúnde and launched a “revolution” that included anti-imperialist expropriations, agrarian reform programs in the sierra and coastal provinces, and worker cooperatives in capitalized enterprises.

As we shall see later, especially in the essays by Hinojosa and Mallon, the Velasco regime (1968–1975) had a profound impact on the history of the Peruvian Left of the 1970s. Its rhetoric promoted a Left-leaning “common sense” in popular culture, and complicated the task of differentiation between an oppositional Left and a state that proclaimed similar social objectives. At the same time, its on-the-ground politics—often haphazard and bumbling implementations of proclaimed programs and ideals or disempowering practices that seemed to “betray” general policies and proclamations—opened up breaches between expectation and reality. The breaches fueled radical disillusion.

In short, a new era of radical and reformist politics was born between the late 1910s and 1930s, but by the late 1950s and 1960s the new currents had, by a combination of repression and cooption, become part of a reconstructed Old Regime and its political exhaustion. In the initial period political ferment meant an invention of new languages of political and cultural critique, and new forms of organizing pressure for social and political inclusion. Eventually, political ferment meant the invention of subsequent languages of critique condemning the errors and limitations that doomed earlier efforts at social transformation to failure, and that extended a rather radical oppositional “common sense” to broad reaches of society, including sectors of the military.

Within this broad historical context, the three essays in Part I help specify the sociopolitical dynamics and sensibilities that made Sendero Luminoso a culmination “within” history—within the interplays between the Left, the state, peasants, and dissident intellectuals that shaped the politics of sierra rebelliousness and radicalism in the twentieth century.

Marisol de la Cadena’s study traces the emergence and evolution of an insurgent intelligentsia between the 1910s and the 1960s. The insurgent intellectuals promoted a politics of regional emancipation that challenged the aristocratic politics of Lima gentlemen, as well as the cruder politics of *gamonalismo* in the rural highlands. (*Gamonalismo* refers to rule by provincial landowners and their allied merchants, authorities, and intermediaries over Indian peasants and servants. The term evokes “feudal-like” relations of human ownership and physical abuse buttressed by ethnic hierarchies; the non-Indians, or *mistis*, who became petty or grand versions of *gamo-*

nal masters included mestizos and “whites” of tainted social origin.) De la Cadena traces the interplay of race and class, and the role of knowledge and intellectuals, in the emerging politics of critique and emancipation. She shows that during the 1920s, the critical founding period for leftist politics and indigenismo, dissident political figures and intellectuals developed a complex coordination of ethnoracial and class thought. In an era of scientific racism, intellectuals sought to avoid the trap of biologically defined racial destiny, yet their lived experience was thoroughly permeated by racial feeling and sentiment. They responded to this dilemma by promoting ideas that emphasized the cultural and moral bases of racial character and improvement, and by establishing a certain dialogue between positive cultural values inherited from an Indian past and values derived from the politics of class conflict and socialism.

Between the 1930s and 1960s, this creative tension, in many ways the heart of José Carlos Mariátegui’s political “agony” and his dialogue with indigenistas such as Luis Valcárcel, gave way to a sharper split. A gulf emerged between a dissident politics driven by a language of class and mass parties on the one hand, and a politics of cultural education and indigenismo, more easily domesticated and subsumed within the politics of a developmentalist state, on the other. Yet as de la Cadena also shows, this divergence did not seal dissident political figures and intellectuals—often mestizos or descendants of highland *provincia* families—from the structures of racial sentiment and hierarchy that permeated Peruvian life.

The legacy of this trajectory, especially in the highland regions, was the rise of a class-driven politics of critique disdainful of ethnoracial languages of analysis and social emancipation, yet nourished implicitly by social statuses, yearnings, and alienations derived from racial hierarchy and degradation. An added legacy was a political culture that tightly joined ideas of social advance and dissidence with ideas of superior knowledge and education. Under these circumstances, radical political projects energized by desires to liberate Indians, or by desires to project persons of “tainted” social backgrounds (persons of racially mixed or *provincia* descent) into social leadership, might nonetheless resort to class-driven languages and code words. The language of class silenced explicit racial categories and analysis, or referenced them by allusion, even though racial sentiments remained present and important. Under the circumstances, too, dissident intellectuals who laid claim to special knowledge (theory) and higher education (university studies) could establish themselves as forceful players in the politics

of regionalism and social emancipation. Indeed, as Florencia Mallon has shown recently, the failure of the national state to build organic bridges to the local intellectuals and political movements of highland rural communities ended up widening spaces for a radicalized political culture *de provincia*.⁴

The nexus of class-driven language, implicit ethnoracial sentiment, and knowledge-based politics analyzed by de la Cadena not only proved central in the formation of Sendero Luminoso (formally, Partido Comunista del Perú—Sendero Luminoso) as a distinctive political party and project under the leadership of university philosopher Abimael Guzmán in the 1960s and 1970s. They were also evident in a wide array of leftist political parties and projects and, to a certain extent, within the Left-leaning “revolution” promoted by the government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975), during the same years.

Ivan Hinojosa’s essay analyzes the mix of similarities and differences that place the formation of Sendero Luminoso within a “family” of leftist political parties and projects of the 1960s and 1970s. Hinojosa’s analysis helps situate Sendero within the specificities that made the Peruvian version of the Latin American Left unusual, not only for its size, radicalism, and impact on political culture (the creation of a dissident “common sense”), but also for the strong influence of Maoism.⁵

The “radical” military government of Velasco (1968–1975)—which nationalized oil holdings, promoted expropriations of highland haciendas, organized worker coops in more capitalized agrarian and industrial enterprises on the coast, and purchased military equipment from the Soviet Union—played a key role in generating a Peruvian Left whose specific features were unusual within Latin America. Velasco’s languages of anti-imperialism, land reform, and worker ownership contributed to a more oppositional common sense and political milieu and fostered political spaces and projects that fed popular mobilization and organization. In addition, it complicated differentiation between the state and the Left. The differentiation issue was rendered acute by the Velasco government’s discursive claims to have forged a “revolution” between capitalism and Communism; by the disillusion derived from its notorious on-the-ground tendency toward confusion, retreat from social empowerment, and authoritarianism; and by the failure of continuity that culminated, in 1975, with Velasco’s replacement by a more conservative, “second phase” military government led by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez.

As Hinojosa demonstrates, the political spaces and differentiations that

emerged in the military years help us to understand Sendero Luminoso as one logical culmination, among several logical culminations, within Peruvian and Left political culture. On the one hand, the political spaces, disillusionments, and differentiations of the military years contributed to the appeal of Maoism and ideas of armed struggle in radicalized leftist parties and discourses. On the other hand, they also contributed to leftist leadership of a massive wave of political and social mobilizations that contributed to the unravelling of the Morales Bermúdez regime in the late 1970s, and to the re-establishment of electoral constitutionalism and political coalitions whose practical effects undermined armed vanguardism. Within this context of ambivalence and contradiction in leftist political parties and political culture, Sendero distinguished itself neither by its Maoism nor by its idea of armed struggle as a necessity of revolution, but rather by discarding the ambivalence. Sendero rejected the sully effect of coalition politics with other leftist forces and isolated itself from the wave of mobilizations that marked the late 1970s; it granted top priority to preparing to wage a “popular war” at all costs. Shining Path was a deadly precipitate purified out of a more complex leftist solution.

If Hinojosa offers a history of political parties, factions, and ideas that locates the senderista branch of politics within a tree of related branches, Florencia Mallon probes the experiential processes and frustrations that rendered Sendero-like approaches to politics and utopia—particularly, contemptuous distrust of Andean peasant political culture, and conviction that revolutionary war to conquer state power was urgent and necessary for social liberation—alluring to political activists. Once again, the legacy of the Velasco era proved crucial. Mallon focuses on the politics of land reform and land invasion in Andahuaylas (in Apurímac, the Department that borders Ayacucho on the east) in the early 1970s. The case study matters not only because it came to weigh heavily, as a political allegory, on the consciousness of the Left and the military. It also matters because the experience of key individuals and subregions exposes the *processes* of personal idealism, frustration, and drawing of lessons that rendered activists more receptive to Sendero-like approaches to politics.

Mallon demonstrates the unfolding frustrations that bred Sendero-like omens or conclusions. Individuals whose political beginnings as agrarian activists linked them to the Velasco state (as employees of SINAMOS, the agrarian reform agency and bureaucracy for highland haciendas) came to view SINAMOS and the state as part of the problem rather than the solution.

Activists who varied significantly in their styles of political engagement with peasants—Lino Quintanilla married into a peasant community and leaned toward a deeper and more respectful form of engagement with peasant political culture, Julio Mezzich and Félix Loayza tended toward shallower and more authoritarian links—ended up drawn toward similar self-critiques and conclusions. Radicals who considered the Velasco government's repression of the agrarian movement after negotiating initial accords with mobilized peasants criticized a "treasonous" Left whose compromises with the state betrayed popular needs.

At an experiential level, then, the political commitments and frustrations that emerged in the agrarian turmoil of Andahuaylas, and in the wider consumption of the Andahuaylas affair as political allegory, lent a certain attraction to what Mallon calls "shining omens." For an important fraction of radical activists, the experience of Andahuaylas encouraged sentiments and analysis that defined alleged pseudo-leftists and the state as coprincipal enemies, Andean peasants, including community leaders and elders, as politically suspect, and armed struggle as a paramount priority.

Taken together, the essays by de la Cadena, Hinojosa, and Mallon illuminate the ways Sendero Luminoso emerged as a political phenomenon "within"—not merely "against"—history. The development of a class-driven language of political insurgency led by provincia intellectuals and knowledge claims, yet nourished implicitly by ethnoracial hierarchy, sentiment, and yearnings; the emergence of a radical leftist family of parties differentiated from the failed Velasco project and drawn, ambivalently and paradoxically, toward ideas of armed struggle as well as participation in political and social mobilizations that fed a return to constitutional politics and electoral coalition-building; the specific experiences of political disillusion, "awakening," and drawing of lessons that fed the allure of an authoritarian utopia imposed through revolutionary war: These forces created an environment, within leftist political culture and a popular political culture that incorporated many leftist ideas by the late 1970s, conducive to a Sendero-like phenomenon.

Sendero's launching of a revolutionary war in 1980 was one logical historical culmination, within several plausible and competing culminations, of the interplay between leftist politics and social discontent. Revolutionary war by Maoists was not, of course, the only possible culmination. We will temporarily postpone consideration of "other" political culminations until discussion of the essays in part III. More generally, parts II and III will draw

out the many ways Sendero acted as an agent “against” history. For now, however, let us turn to the uncomfortable task of specifying Sendero’s place “within” the major currents of twentieth-century Peruvian history.

Notes

- 1 The other historically grounded projects that represented alternate culminations of leftist history will become apparent as this book proceeds. They included radical and Center-Left versions of populism that pursued transformation largely through nonviolent social mobilization and electoral contests, grassroots activist work that granted less priority to loyalty to particular political parties and lines, and nonsenderista versions of armed struggle.
- 2 The discussion on the cycle of political discontent and pressure between the 1910s and 1930s, and its eventuation in a reconstructed and exhausted Old Regime by the 1960s, draws on a variety of sources. I am grateful, as well, to Florencia E. Mallon for illuminating discussions. For helpful works, see, in addition to de la Cadena’s essay in this volume, Poole and Rénique 1992; Cotler 1991; Bertram 1991; Klarén 1973; Stein 1980; Flores Galindo 1980; G. Smith 1989; Seligmann 1995; and the still useful Handelman 1974 and Bourricaud 1989.
- 3 A point worth noting is that military governments that repressed and “interrupted” pressures for inclusion organized by political parties and other groups could themselves resort to populist forms of inclusion. A well known example is the government of Manuel Odría, which repressed APRA fiercely but also responded to the aspirations of the urban poor who moved to Lima in search of work and housing. For perspective, see Degregori, Blondet, and Lynch 1986.
- 4 See Mallon 1995, which may be usefully supplemented by G. Smith 1989 and Seligmann 1995. See also Thurner 1997, an important new study that traces a history of nineteenth-century misencounters between the creole republic and indigenous communities. Thurner’s study illuminates the failure of effective organic linkages to local indigenous peoples and intellectuals and provides a helpful backdrop for understanding the racial imagery of “Indians” evident in the indigenismo of the 1920s.
- 5 On the role of the Left in creation of a dissident common sense, I have benefited from the illuminating study of G. Rénique 1996, which may be supplemented by the fascinating and suggestive treatment of schooling in Portocarrero and Oliart 1989.

❖ ONE

From Race to Class: Insurgent Intellectuals

de provincia in Peru, 1910–1970

Marisol de la Cadena

Have you all noticed what is happening to the *cholo* Tello? They say that now he is a doctor and plans to travel abroad! Don't you remember that he was one of so many *serranitos* who lived poorly and people said he was a "witch" because at night he chatted with "skulls" and "bones of pagans?" Don't you all remember that the police took his skulls to see if he was "crazy" or "possessed" like the newspapers said in Lima? — *Some neighbors of Julio C. Tello in Lima, circa 1917*¹

Tello is a national institution all by himself, and there is more work going on in his museum with a higher class of personnel than I have seen anywhere else. This old Indian is really as good as the tales that are told about him, and if he falls short by some academic standards I'll still maintain that he is the greatest archaeologist in the New World, and I'll argue the point in detail if someone else wishes me to. Also I'm inclined to think that he is the cornerstone of social science in Peru in spite of the fact that he deals with a distant time. — *Carl O. Sauer, U.S. geographer, 1942*²

❖ In the secondary schools of Peru, students learn that Julio C. Tello was one of the first and most important archaeologists in the country. Sometimes teachers will mention that he was born in the province of Huarochirí, in the sierra that overlooks Lima. They never recount, and perhaps do not even know, that the future archaeologist arrived in the capital in the first decades of the century, with his father and a little bundle of clothes. Much less do they suspect that his neighbors in Lima called him a *serranito*, a word that emphasizes his "Indian" physical features, which is how the geographer Carl O. Sauer, without cultural or social inhibitions, referred to him.

This chapter will analyze two periods in the history of Peruvian academic culture that serve to contextualize the preceding quotes. The first, from the 1910s to the 1930s, was an era of “insurgency” by intellectuals from the provinces. The second began in the 1940s when the intellectuals *de provincia* began to capture intellectual spaces. Sauer witnessed this moment and Tello was one of the first provincials incorporated into the intellectual elite of Lima. The second period ended around 1970, when the distinction between provincials and Limeños, although it did not disappear, became more diffuse. The central argument of this essay runs as follows. While in the first period, “race” (*raza*) was a central category of intellectual analysis, description, and diagnosis of “Peruvian society,” in the second period the academics decided to replace race with notions of “culture” and social class. Nonetheless, race continued to matter in daily life and in the social hierarchies that governed relationships between intellectuals and other members of the society analyzed by the intellectuals. Thus, the racial taxonomies that the intellectuals used in the first epoch did not lose their importance. On the contrary, although race was no longer used explicitly in academic discourse, the categories of analysis that prevailed after the 1930s referred to race implicitly.

The purpose of this essay is not to analyze intellectual figures or the ideas of the Shining Path elite. I merely seek to describe the academic culture of the provinces and its relationship with Lima before the war unleashed by Abimael Guzmán and the intelligentsia that surrounded him. As we shall see in the epilogue, although Shining Path intellectuals defined themselves as outside of history, in truth they most certainly were not. Not only were they part of Peruvian academic culture, but in this culture they occupied a social space that, like any other, was immersed in historically constructed relations of power. In addition, senderista ideas and sentiments were nourished by the pre-1970 antecedents examined here. In this context it is important to study the relations of subordination vis-à-vis Limeños in which intellectuals *de provincia*, such as Abimael Guzmán and his immediate circle, found themselves before the 1970s.

The First Decades of the Century

The comments of Julio C. Tello’s neighbors enunciated one element of the racial hierarchies that colored life in Lima during the early decades of the twentieth century. Tello lived poorly on money sent by his parents and

an aunt, and on incomes from small projects. He rented a small room on Chillón street in a working-class neighborhood. Don Julio shared with his neighbors their economic poverty and their phenotype—brown skin, straight hair, and short height. They were *cholos*, a flexible social label that broadly included all of those who did not have white skin. The difference between Tello and his *vecinos*, however, was that Don Julio was *serrano* (from the sierra). Incrusted in geography, the cultural construction of race in Peru assumed, and continues to assume, that *serranos* are inferior to *costeños* (people of the coast) because they descend from Indians. Obviously, the Indians occupy an inferior place in the reigning socioracial taxonomy, and because Tello's neighbors had been born in Lima, therefore, they were supposedly superior. But to their surprise, Tello inverted the relation by acquiring a university degree and becoming a "doctor." He was not a folk healer (*curandero*), an occupation with which his neighbors were surely familiar, but rather a medical doctor. He had acquired knowledge that was socially accepted among the "whites" of Lima. Although this title placed him above the masses of *serranitos* ("little *serranos*") who migrated to Lima in search of a better future, Tello and his cohorts, in their relations with Limeños, had to struggle against the racial stigma of not being socially white.

The racism of "superiors" in regards to the "inferiors" was complicated. The governing elite of the country tempered racism with certain "patriotic exigencies" (in the words of the aristocrat Javier Prado).³ The elites went from "rehabilitating the indigenous people," to "promoting" education in the provinces, and eventually to accepting the legitimacy of "nonwhite" intellectuals. To patriotism they added, in the first years of the provincial intellectual insurgency, the prestige attributed to science that circulated in political thought in Latin America.⁴ One result was that in Peru the idea spread that academic knowledge provided legitimacy to politicians; thus, it was imperative to replace the military-political bosses (*caudillos*) with politician-intellectuals.⁵ The equation of academic knowledge with political power, in a context of commercial expansion, opened the space for a large number of middle-class men from the provinces to join university studies with political careers. In addition to renovating the political life of the country, the combination of the academy and politics served as a mechanism of social ascent for individual provincials, first in their places of origin and then in Lima.

An important ingredient in this new conjuncture was the defeat of the political monopoly of *civilismo*, the political group that had governed Peru since 1895 and represented the landowning aristocracy. The downfall of

the civilistas began in the early 1910s and culminated when Augusto B. Leguía (1919–1930) became president of the Republic. The name of “New Fatherland” (*Patria Nueva*) with which he baptized his administration signaled the emergence of a new governing class. At first, the new provincial intellectual-politicians played a preponderant role in the Leguía regime—as part of the *Patria Nueva*, they personified the opposition to the intellectual aristocracy. By 1923, when the Leguía administration began to withdraw support for the provincials—to the point of exiling and imprisoning them—the intellectual opposition was already incrustated in Peruvian politics. Years later they would become the intellectual elite. From the 1920s and 1930s, the most prolific artists and academics in Peru were either anti-aristocrats, provincials, or both. Nonetheless, neither the avalanche of their production, nor their indisputable preeminence in Peruvian intellectual life, erased the evidence that, like Tello, they were *serranos* or *provincianos*. Although their academic titles distanced them from the rest of the *cholos* and silenced public acknowledgment of their skin color, the perception of the provincials as a racially different group was widely accepted.

The Repudiation of Scientific Racism and Racial Sentiments

As in other countries of Latin America, the idea of “scientific politics” (*política científica*) became popular in Peru in the first decades of the twentieth century. Influenced by the ideas of the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó and the Argentine José Ingenieros, the new Peruvian intellectuals—both conservatives and progressives—sought to replace rule by the military caudillo, and to research the past “scientifically” to find the precolonial and colonial roots of the country. This, they claimed, would help them to formulate policies consistent with the culture of the population and render governance feasible. In general, the new politico-intellectual class sought to invent the Peruvian nation in order to govern it. The generations of Peruvian intellectuals that lived in the first decades of the century believed it their duty to orient their academic knowledge toward the solution of national problems.⁶

As actors in a period in which “race” was considered to be one of the most relevant areas of scientific innovation, the intellectuals perceived the racial composition of Peru as an important national problem. Nancy Leys Stepan, in her study of national projects in Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, discovered that the efforts of intellectuals in these three countries to reevaluate “the national self were carried out in the name of race, not in

rejection of race as an explanatory variable.”⁷ The Peruvian case was somewhat different. The most influential among the new Peruvian intellectuals faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they rejected the scientific notion of race as a biological inheritance and the racial taxonomies that created definitive racial scales. On the other hand, they continued to believe in racial hierarchies and therefore constructed taxonomies that included both social hierarchy and the possibility of “ascending” racially.

Let us begin with one aspect of their dilemma. For José Carlos Mariátegui, the famous radical intellectual, the concept of biological race was “totally fictitious and assumed” and the notion of inferior races had served “the white west in its work of expansion and conquest.”⁸ Hildebrando Castro Pozo, an intellectual from Piura who was very active in Lima during the first years of the Leguía government and very influential in Mariátegui’s work, thought that “the racist vocabulary is a convenient cliché without scientific substance to explain, conceal, and excuse certain socio-economic-political pretensions.”⁹ Víctor Andrés Belaúnde, one of the leading intellectual renovators of conservatism, shared this position. He considered “unacceptable and simplistic the conclusion of the ethnologists who have dogmatized so much regarding the racial inferiority of the aboriginal race, its defects and the vices of *mestizaje* [race mixture] and the biological degeneration of the whites.”¹⁰

Yet, the new intellectuals were also enmeshed in what Mariátegui called “racial sentiment.”¹¹ The new intellectuals—whites and nonwhites, aristocrats and nonaristocrats, conservatives and radicals—lived lives that were socially and culturally shaped by racial hierarchies. The experience of the cholo Tello and his neighbors was not exceptional. Consider, for example, the case of the medical doctor Nuñez Butrón from Puno:

In the community of Jasana while the inhabitants called him *misti* . . . in the capital of the province of Azángaro they called him Indian . . . and after he was educated they considered him *misti*. In Puno, in the School of San Carlos they labeled him a provincial Indian and then when he excelled they considered him *misti*. In Lima, he was considered *serrano* and *provinciano* . . . in the University of Arequipa they called him Indian and *chuño* [desiccated potato] only later to promote him to a social category equal to that of his classmates, and when he returned [to Puno] and to his *pueblo* there was no one who would call him Indian. Spain was the only place where they considered him an equal.¹²

Nuñez Butrón did his university studies in Arequipa, Lima, and Barcelona. In the first two cities and in Puno, depending on who would speak with him and where, Nuñez Butrón was classified differently—as nonwhite, but located differently within the complex gamut of numerous, subtle, and culturally constructed racial possibilities that differentiated among nonwhites. His becoming a doctor erased the label “Indian” that had been applied to him as a native of an indigenous community, as the degree of “Dr.” elevated him to the level of his provincial classmates. In the eyes of an aristocrat such as Belaúnde, however, he would continue to be seen as a serrano and provincial. Only in Spain, where the cultural construction of race operated differently, did the Puneño doctor find himself free of Peruvian-style racial relationships and etiquettes.

Racial *sentiments*, as meanings and values that are actively lived and felt—in other words as part of what Raymond Williams calls a “structure of feelings”—were a central part of the Peruvian cultural construction of race and they colored alternative racial scientific taxonomies.¹³ Peruvian racial sentiments ended up mixing, in complex ways, a rejection of biological determinism with ideas of racial difference and “legitimate” hierarchies derived from them. The new generation of intellectuals shared a sense of shame about the racism of previous generations. Conservatives and progressives relieved their shame by believing that it was possible to improve the “inferior” races. The principle disagreement that divided them (which roughly coincided with the division between Limeños and provincials) was about the most appropriate formula for “improving” the races and changing the racial physiognomy of the country.

Provincials versus Limeños

Provincials and Limeños coincided partially in their diagnostics of the ills that plagued the country. After visiting Cuzco, José de la Riva Agüero, Limeño aristocrat and political ally of Víctor Andrés Belaúnde, complained of the electoral practices of political caudillos: “Election season will arrive with its boisterous retinues and abuses; the vast and solitary plaza will boil with inebriated people, lassoed from the most distant villages; shouts will be heard, ferocious insults, shots, and running; some unfortunates will die without knowing why, nor by whom; the mob will acclaim the candidate imposed, ephemeral feudal *señor*, often incapable of understanding a program or conceiving of an idea, mute instrument of the government or of a

friend.”¹⁴ During his stay in the “Imperial City,” Riva Agüero was a guest of local intellectuals, who probably influenced his opinion of local politics.¹⁵ Note the similarity between the preceding quote and the following affirmation by Luis E. Valcárcel: “The boss (*cacique*) is omnipotent in his province. His power is unlimited . . . once the electoral base atomizes, no resistance is possible. Then comes the candidacy of an outsider, supported by the central government and through transactions with the *gamonal*, who cedes to his demands in exchange for a “plate of lentils” represented by a sub-prefectureship.”¹⁶

The agreement between the Lima and Cuzco perspectives ended here. Searching for a way to transform the electoral process they criticized, Riva Agüero’s political group blamed the problems on the “provincialism” of the politicians, while Valcárcel’s group blamed *gamonalismo* (“bossism”; for a more extended definition, see introduction to part I). Both concepts interwove racial sentiments and moral judgments. The difference was that provincialism implicated the provincial intellectuals, while *gamonalismo* excluded them. According to the intellectuals of Cuzco, a group to which Valcárcel belonged, the *gamonales* were mestizos from the pueblos who lacked the education afforded by the city, the university, or privileged birth. Products of scientific politics, the intellectuals who used both categories believed that education could create morally correct, and therefore superior, individuals.

In addition to identifying the *gamonales* as the cause of regional vices, the provincials accused the aristocratic intellectuals of centralism (*centralismo*). The polemic between centralists and regionalists, as the provincials referred to themselves, was not new. The innovation of the period of the Patria Nueva (1919–1930) was the environment of “scientific politics” in which this polemic was immersed and the central role of education in the polemic. In addition to their political debates, the provincial insurgents worked actively in their regions to improve education at all levels. Not only did they consider the contributions of university graduates important for regional progress. The insurgent intellectuals also thought that spreading and raising the level of education in Peru would contribute critically to solving politico-moral problems that plagued the country, from the highest spheres of government to the smallest villages.¹⁷ In the first years of scientific politics, university education served as a catapult for the new political generation. According to Limeños and provincials, the subordination of the latter diminished if they were academics. At the same time, one of the

causes of delegitimization of the Lima intellectuals was that they were seen as perpetuating the “monopoly trust of intelligence and culture in the hands of the oligarchy” and thus retarding and opposing the country’s progress.¹⁸

Provincials and Limeños had a complicated relationship: Both groups were very conscious of the social place they occupied in the academy of the capital, where cultural perceptions of race were an important component. Emilio Romero, the geographer from Puno, recounted:

I cannot forget my life in Lima at that time, the year of the centennial of national independence. The mornings in the patios of [the University of] San Marcos were for us a glorious compensation for our nostalgias, but after mid-day our Limeño friends disappeared along with the grand figures created by our fantasy . . . we admired the great writers and teachers of Lima, but they were unreachable constellations for our humble lives. . . . Some time later, Víctor Andrés Belaúnde, always cordial, democrat to the core, spoke to us of this discriminatory situation of the provincial, telling us that in Lima he who was not proud of being Limeño aspired at least to being *Arequipeño*.¹⁹

Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who would go on to found the APRA party and become one of the most important leaders of renovation, also belonged to this insurgent generation of provincial intellectuals. Born in Trujillo, the coastal city in which his mother also was born, his father was a serrano from Cajamarca and the son of school teachers. Víctor Raúl attended the University of Trujillo where he and some other future APRA members belonged to a somewhat iconoclastic group self-dubbed as La Bohemia Trujillana.²⁰ The future party founder himself moved to Lima in 1917, with a small inheritance, to study in the University of San Marcos. Regarding his arrival in the capital, he recalled: “I arrived in Lima thinking about the great honor of being in the same classrooms with personages of whom the newspapers had said so many things. Sr. Smith, the teacher; Dr. Jones, the wise man; the witty Sr. So and So, all produced a certain fascination for me. And the first impression of our men of letters was really admirable. They were solemn, elegant, measured, and courteous men who spoke in high-pitched voices, making theatrical gestures as they conversed, and they seemed to me to be geniuses, absolute geniuses, indisputable geniuses, indeed universal geniuses!”²¹

Later, swept up in the opposition intellectual insurgency and conscious of racial culture in Lima, Haya de la Torre would change his opinion. “Be-

ginning with the Rector . . . the University of San Marcos is . . . a dated institution, conventional, aged. To have a name, money, or to submit to the reigning clique is to be consecrated . . . in Peru it is enough to be the co-owner of the largest and oldest civilista daily for a chair to be conceded to a dandy [*fifi*].”²² Overtly, the political dispute between provincials and Limeños consisted in mutual accusations of academic ignorance, political ineptitude, and immorality. More covertly, the dispute contained racial sentiments. In addition to lacking the economic privileges enjoyed by the centralist intellectuals, as provincials the new intellectuals were marked as non-white. The mark diminished them in daily life, as is clear in the recollections of Romero and Haya de la Torre.

But racial sentiments also transcended daily life and colored the political concepts these intellectuals invented. Regionalism was not only a movement of economic and political revindication through which the insurgents sought to distribute power equitably between the provinces and the capital. It also represented “a redemptive rebellion . . . a movement of racial revindication.”²³ According to Luís Alberto Sánchez, the provincial insurgency had to “prove that the ‘cholo’ is also someone and that he has his valor and his word.”²⁴ As in the cases of Julio C. Tello and the Puneño Nuñez Butrón, for many other provincials the insurgency of the new intellectual elite was not simply a space for social ascent. Given the cultural construction that related Peruvian geography and race, regionalism was also a social movement directed by the provincial elite and destined to transform the average phenotype of Peru’s governing class. The radical Mariátegui wrote during the 1920s that “Regionalism . . . more than a conflict between the capital and the provinces, reflects a conflict between the coastal and Spanish [read: “white”] Peru and the serrano and indigenous Peru.”²⁵ From an officialist perspective, in 1929, in the closing period of the Patria Nueva regime, a pro-Leguía Senator from Cuzco, sensing that regionalism had already emerged victorious, agreed that “electoral regionalism made us face up to struggling victoriously against the voracious appetites of the Limeños who presumed to distribute deputorial and senatorial seats, as one would say, ‘in the family,’ systematically excluding us, the ‘cholos serranos,’ even though they had no other titles beyond having been born on the banks of the Rímac [River].”²⁶

Echoing the racial sentiments expressed in José Angel Escalante’s speech, and perhaps to distinguish himself from the civilistas he had defeated electorally, Leguía answered the senator from Cuzco by saying: “I do not have *prejudices of caste* or of doctrine. I came to make a country and I am doing

so with its own elements. In the coast I irrigate, in the sierra I communicate, in the *selva* I colonize.”²⁷ Leguía’s answer used the word “caste” as a synonym for race and juxtaposed the notion with the economic and social geography of the country. His answer also revealed that Leguía embodied a political opening for the provincials. Familiar with the political feuds between Limeños and provincials, during the first years of his administration he played the regionalist card and surrounded himself with socialist and regionalist advisors, among them Hildebrando Castro Pozo and José Antonio Encinas. He ended his government surrounded by conservative provincials, such as the same Escalante quoted earlier, and the hacendado from Huancaavelica, Manchego Muñoz. For their part, the aristocratic intellectuals, such as José de la Riva Agüero and Víctor Andrés Belaúnde, chose self-imposed exile or were officially exiled by the government.²⁸

A problem Leguía’s astuteness did not resolve that also colored the racial aspects of the regionalist revindication was the gendered language used to characterize provincials and Limeños. During the first stage of a competition for “manliness” (*hombria*) among politicians, the provincials constantly associated Limeños, radicals and conservatives alike, with “the feminine.” In an era in which being intellectual was a prerequisite for being a politician, such reference implied that the effeminate Limeños were of diminished intellectual capacity and therefore had limited potential to govern. One of the most eloquent in his diatribes against the “effeminate” Limeños was Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Recall, for example, our earlier citation of his denunciation of the mediocrity and corruption of intellectual life. In this denunciation the editor of a civilist daily was a “dandy,” or *fifi*, clearly an allusion to the aristocracy and effeminate ignorance that marked an aristocrat.

Toward the end of the *Patria Nueva*, when the provincials were no longer relegated to the margins of the intellectual-political life of the country, the provincials’ claim of *hombria* associated femininity with conservatism, and manliness with social change and even revolution. Echoing this change, the exiled Haya de la Torre wrote to the editor of the magazine *La Sierra* in 1928: “before the University Reform of 1919, our youth believed that masculinity was Don Juanism and creole talent and spark.” Elsewhere he exclaimed: “Peru has seen the end of the deceitful youth consecrated to things of señor de la Riva Agüero, Marquis and boss of a party of *señoritos* [who were] servile to the past, effeminate, and ventral.”²⁹ As for the radicals, Ricardo Martínez de la Torre (a disciple of Mariátegui in the 1920s who later became a Communist Party ideologist) defended the masculinity of

the Limeño radicals who had been criticized by their counterparts in Cuzco: “From this ‘Limeñismo’ of these ‘Costeño fags’ who ‘bathe often,’ those champions of a false suicidal provincialism, who are afraid even of their own shadows, have much to learn. Our proletariat of the factories of Lima and Vitarte has conquered a prominent place within the social history of America as the vanguard of the emancipatory movement of the militarized masses who move towards socialism.”³⁰

Years later, masculinity and revolution—or at least masculinity and “renovation”—would be considered as one. Within this unity, the provincials would continue to claim priority. Once masculinity and revolution were equated, provincials and Limeños still debated who among them would revindicate the men of Peru.³¹

Indian or Mestizo? The Influence of Cuzco in the Intellectual Insurgency

By the mid-1920s, regionalism had a name of its own: *indigenismo*. Indigenismo was a social and cultural movement led by intellectuals of the provincial elite and some Limeños, including peasants and workers. Beyond aspiring to transform the governing class’s phenotype, indigenismo also promoted the production of art, music, and literature inspired by the Andean landscape and the supposed customs of its native Andean inhabitants, and destined for local elite consumption. The assumption was that this artistic outpouring would awaken sentiments of appreciation for the country—defined as a symbiosis of landscape and history—that inspired the art. Indigenismo thus represented an effort to create cultural manifestations that might identify Peru as a “nation.” This framework was hegemonic among the country’s intellectuals. Even conservative intellectuals criticized those who did not subscribe as Europeanized and effeminate.³² The supposed masculinity of the indigenistas emanated from the sierra, which they exalted as the source of nationalist impulses. Painters, novelists, musicians, and choreographers described serrano scenery, told stories, played melodies, or dramatized legends set in the Andean mountains.³³

The indigenistas produced cultural manifestations colored by an image of the nation in which the greatness of the Inca Empire was prolonged and offered the possibility of regenerating the “indigenous race,” which despite centuries of torment had remained culturally “pure.” The new cultural and intellectual Peruvian personality that indigenismo promoted had supposedly freed itself from colonial sentiments of disdain for Peruvian indigenous

culture, sentiments that the new intellectuals attributed to the previous generation. Mariátegui wrote: "In the paintings of Sabogal and Camino Blas and the poems of Vallejo and Peralta *the same blood circulates* . . . they fulfill a *complex spiritual phenomenon* that is expressed distinctly but coherently by the painting of Sabogal . . . the historical interpretation of Valcárcel, and the philosophical speculation of Orrego, all of which announce a *spirit purged of intellectual and aesthetic colonialism*."³⁴

Indigenismo was the vehicle of expression of the intellectual personality of the artists and provincial thinkers (including all of those mentioned in the preceding quote) who, regardless of their physical features, saw themselves as members of the same race ("the same blood") because they were capable of creating a culture purged of colonialism. This new race was not merely biological; it was a new spirit that created a culture of sufficient vitality to create a nation and transform the colonialism of the past.

A key indigenista cultural concern of the intellectual insurgents, including Mariátegui, was the premise that culture could transform race. They inverted reigning beliefs whereby race determined culture. Expanding upon its original premise, indigenismo was a political movement that had as its goal "the revindication of the Indian." Despite the renovation implied by the indigenista premise, however, the "revindication of the Indian" accepted the prevailing assumption that the indigenous race needed improvement in order to be included as part of the nation. This idea was shared by nationalist Latin American movements of the period, among them the indigenista movements in both Peru and Mexico. Both movements distinguished themselves from other nationalist movements, such as that of Argentina, for example, because although the Peruvian and Mexican indigenistas were centrally concerned with the "inferior races," their nationalist solutions did not include a continuing process of bleaching through biological mixing with ostensibly "superior" races.³⁵

In the Peruvian case, the battle against the ideas of the oligarchy influenced the proposals and revindictory ideals of the indigenistas. During its period of domination, the Peruvian intellectual oligarchy had advocated eugenics, which the generation of the 1920s found abominable. Such ideas ranged from the physical extermination of the Indians (citing the United States as an example) to matrimonial eugenics. The former proposal did not find many adherents even among conservatives, who with few exceptions condemned it. On the other hand, conservatives of the nineteenth century held hopes about the cross-breeding of indigenous people with "coastal

racés” to create biological mestizos.³⁶ It is possible that the nineteenth-century consensus influenced the rejection, also widely agreed upon, of biological notions of race in 1920. As mentioned earlier, the aristocrat Víctor Andrés Belaúnde and the radical José Carlos Mariátegui both considered such notions false. But while Belaúnde proposed the mestizo as the national ideal, the indigenistas of the 1920s, distinguishing themselves from the aristocracy, rejected the idea of the mestizo as the social type to which the Peruvian race should aspire.

Neither of these proposals was free of racial sentiments. Progressives and conservatives shared ideas about the inferiority of “the Indians” and the beneficent role of primary education in regenerating *la raza*. They also believed that “superior” persons were marked by their benevolence toward inferior classes (a benevolence that liberals attributed to education and conservatives to religion). In this context, the politician-intellectuals proposed alternatives to eugenics. Readers of such French theorists as Lamarck, the Peruvian intellectuals incorporated into their proposals the idea that the environment was important in the formation of “social types.” In those years this scientific belief freed both groups equally from accusations of racism.³⁷ Yet, what made some of them progressives and others conservatives, and what differentiated their political projects, was their choice of which natural and cultural environment would provide the ideal scenario for Peru’s development as a nation.

For Víctor Andrés Belaúnde and his followers, the environment that would improve the race was that of the Hispanic city, the fountain of social mestizaje, center of the agricultural market and industrial activity, and source of culture and religion.³⁸ This viewpoint presupposed the absolute superiority of the mestizo in relation to the Indian. Mariátegui did not agree. He believed that “the Indian, in his facility for assimilation of progress and of technology of modern production, is not absolutely inferior to the mestizo. On the contrary, the Indian is generally superior.”³⁹ This quote makes clear that Mariátegui thought about and experienced Peruvian racial hierarchies. Nonetheless, he relativized them. This stance was very important for his political proposals and in his agony—to use the phrase and idea of Alberto Flores Galindo—his effort to merge national (conceived as “indigenous”) and international (Marxism and “social class”) frameworks to understand Peru and offer solutions.⁴⁰ Considering the influence of environment on the races and adding the cultural ingredient enabled Mariátegui to relativize racial hierarchies. He suggested that in the sierra, the Indian was not

inferior to the mestizo. "In his native environment, *as long as migration does not deform him*, he has no reason to envy the mestizo." And, although "indigenous society can be more or less primitive or retarded . . . it is an *organic type* of society [and] culture."⁴¹ The inclusion of culture as one component of race permitted Mariátegui to argue in favor of the Indian. Yet, in assuming the superiority of "purity" over "hybridization," he agreed with one of the central paradigms of European theories about biological determinism of race. Ironically he introduced an argument that countered his own efforts to cast racial hierarchies as relative. In the mestizo, Mariátegui found "imprecision and [racial-cultural] hybridism . . . that results from a dark predomination of negative sediments in a sordid and morbid stagnation."⁴²

The influence of Cuzco indigenismo and particularly that of its academic leader, the archaeologist and historian Luis E. Valcárcel, was very strong on this point. For the insurgent intellectuals of the 1920s, the Inca capital of Cuzco provided an alternative urban symbol for serrano Peru. In addition, in 1909 Cuzco had been the site of the first university reform movement in Latin America. In 1919, when the new intellectuals were still university students, they chose this city as the headquarters of the National Student Congress (Congreso Nacional de Estudiantes). In the 1920s, the region was the scene of an indigenous political movement that was exceptionally successful in transcending the limits of regional opinion and captivating the attention of the Lima press. According to Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, "from Cuzco emerged . . . the new inspiration for Peruvian youth. From it, the popular universities, from it, the interest of educated youth in the social problem, from it, the devotion to the indigenous cause."⁴³

Undoubtedly the Cuzco intellectuals were influential in the creation of indigenismo, above all in the political and academic foundations of "indigenous culture" and "the Indian." During its most active years, the indigenismo of Cuzco expressed the same disdain for the "mestizo" that had characterized the racial sentiments of the local elite since colonial times. The concept of gamonalismo was derived precisely from this scorn towards the latifundistas of the rural pueblos. The urban intellectuals characterized these gamonales as ignorant and therefore abusive toward the Indians. One of the most important tasks of the Cuzco defenders of the Indian was the political condemnation of the mestizo gamonal, which implied distinguishing between the gamonal and the just *hacendado*.⁴⁴ The difference between Indians and mestizo gamonales was rooted in racial-cultural purity of the former and the hybridism of the latter. When Luis E. Valcárcel founded

the Historical Institute of Cuzco (Instituto Histórico del Cuzco) he said, "We still possess the marvelous tongue of the Great Empire's founders . . . but the victor's destructive labor continues to wear it away, to the point of reducing its vocabulary to perhaps only a thousand words, making it more mestizo every day, making it lose its philological individuality. The Instituto plans to cultivate the pure Quechua that is still preserved in certain places and cultivated by many illustrious individuals."⁴⁵

The crusade for the revalorization of indigenous culture was a struggle for purity and implied the condemnation of cultural-racial hybridism. In an apparent paradox, this condemnation was progressive in that it coincided with the conservative repudiation of the eugenicist theses of the nineteenth century. Consider the following comment by José Carlos Mariátegui: "To expect indigenous emancipation through purposely crossing the aboriginal race with white immigrants is an anti-sociological innocence, conceivable only in the rudimentary mind of an importer of merino sheep."⁴⁶ Mariátegui would not challenge Valcárcel's condemnation of the mestizo.⁴⁷ On the contrary, he shared Valcárcel's opinions regarding the "sordidness" and "morbidity" of the mestizo. Mariátegui, however, criticized eugenics and believed that the social sciences, not the biological sciences, were appropriate for political analysis. His was an uncommon opinion in the first decades of the twentieth century, when biology constituted the epicenter of knowledge about the human species.⁴⁸ When Mariátegui, Luis Valcárcel, and their cohort combined environmental theories of race with social sciences, they portrayed the "environment" that "nourished" race as one that included—centrally—"social environment."⁴⁹ This stance placed them hastily on the frontiers of knowledge for the period, where they redefined race-biology as race-culture. In addition, in the case of the indigenista followers of Valcárcel and Mariátegui, the choice of the Indian as the race-culture upon which to construct the nation located them in the political vanguard, even though this choice implied a condemnation of the mestizo.

Mariátegui and the Provincials: Race, Indigenismo, and Nationalist Socialism

According to Alberto Flores Galindo, "from his particular elaboration between Marxism and the nation, Mariátegui ended up developing a specifically Peruvian, Indo-American way of conceiving Marx."⁵⁰ The many provincials who passed through the home of the founder of Peruvian social-

ism collaborated in developing this approach. Emilio Romero remembers that when he met Mariátegui in Lima, Mariátegui, already ill and sensing that death was near, told him “that there was no time to lose, that he needed social, economic, and all kinds of information about my native land, Puno . . . proposing to me that I pick a day of the week. He would prepare a brief questionnaire for each week about which we would converse. I asked him for time to converse with some eminent co-provincials of mine . . . to provide a foundation for my conclusions. José Carlos extended both hands to me and I saw two diamonds gleam in his pupils. . . . At times I came to think that Lima would have become intolerable for the provincials had we not had the refuge of his mansion.”⁵¹

At that time, Lima was still a relatively small city, which facilitated contact and exchange among provincial intellectuals. Don Emilio recounts that he visited Mariátegui on the same street—Jirón Sagastegui—where another Puneño, José Antonio Encinas, also resided. Encinas, a lawyer who in Puno had been Romero’s primary school teacher, and Valcárcel, an historian, influenced Mariátegui’s definition of the Indians as a race-culture of agriculturalists. Mariátegui cited Encinas when he said: to “retire [the Indian] from the land is to alter profoundly and possibly dangerously the race’s ancestral tendencies.”⁵² He was inspired by Valcárcel when he said “the Inkaic people were a race of peasants ordinarily dedicated to agriculture and herding.”⁵³ Combining the historical and legal interpretation of these two intellectuals, Mariátegui concluded that “the indigenous question begins in our economy. It has its roots in the ownership of the land.”⁵⁴

Thus, Mariátegui incorporated economic aspects into the notion of race-culture. The leap from this step to an identification of the Indians as peasants would not be long in coming. Let us see how the indigenista interpretation of the “indigenous community” or “*ayllu*” provided elements for the leap. To legitimate his proposals with the “discoveries” of the nascent social sciences, Mariátegui used a book that he considered “in accord with the research methods of modern sociology and economics.” The author was Hildebrando Castro Pozo, who had based it on his experience in the Mantaro Valley in Peru’s Central Sierra. Castro Pozo balanced out the controversial Valcárcel, “whose propositions regarding the *ayllu* seem to some to be excessively dominated by the ideal of indigenous resurgence.”⁵⁵ According to Mariátegui, the Piura-born Castro Pozo concluded “that [the indigenous community] is still a living organism . . . [which] demonstrates the vitality of the indigenous communism that impels the aborígenes to varied forms of

cooperation and association.”⁵⁶ Mariátegui, Valcárcel, Encinas, Castro Pozo, and even Haya de la Torre considered that, historically, the natural social space of the “indigenous peasant” was the ayllu (or community), which they defined as a receptacle for lifeways and culture, in which the Indian could fully develop his faculties. [*Editor’s note*: The ayllu has long been considered a key building block of indigenous identity and community groupings, and is now conceptualized by anthropologists and historians as a flexible referent for indigenous groupings that claim descent from a common ancestor. The flexibility of the referent implies that smaller ayllu groups or lineages may be incorporated into larger, “maximal” ayllu groupings that serve as the main branches of an Andean “community” or ethnic group. The larger group identity is held together by a sense of metaphorical kinship within and between ayllus.] Moreover, the community represented a form of land tenure that harmonized with indigenous culture.⁵⁷

Although some of the indigenista intellectuals, including Valcárcel and his Cuzco followers, were not decidedly socialist, the indigenismo of the provincial intellectuals provided Mariátegui with elements to fuse his racial sentiments with his own socialist vocation. Inspired by his readings of the authors mentioned previously, and doubtlessly by other lesser known ones, Mariátegui concluded that “the communist spirit identifies the Indian” and that “the community corresponds to this spirit.”⁵⁸ As it was defined in the 1920s, the indigenous community gave Mariátegui the intellectual resources to imagine and propose a nationalist socialism, the central component of which was the indígena as a race-culture determined by environment and agricultural labor, and which would be revindicated by receiving land. In addition to the racial and cultural contradiction between the Indian of the ayllu and the mestizo gamonal, he noted a contradiction regarding the forms of property inscribed in each culture. The collectivism of the first opposed the individualism of the second, which resulted in a class contradiction between the hacendado and the campesino.

Not surprisingly, if the agricultural environment molded the indigenous race, then the city also molded the race of its inhabitants. For Mariátegui, while “in the feudal latifundia, the backwards village, the mestizo lacks the means of ascension . . . in the city he is saved by the distances that separate him from the white . . . the mechanization and discipline of [the city] are automatically imposed on his habits.” The redemption offered by the city derived from class consciousness and from the labor relations that made such consciousness possible. This was true of blacks as well as mestizos.

“Industry, the factory, the union redeem the black from his domesticity. Erasing among the proletarians the frontiers of race, the consciousness of class morally elevates the black.”⁵⁹

Class consciousness—also a result of environment—would redeem certain racial problems. Once acquired, such consciousness would have revindictory potential greater than that of education, biology, or non-revolutionary socioeconomic progress. On the flip side of the coin, bourgeois social environments, which were racially identified as white, had the effect upon nonwhites of erasing their consciousness of their physical appearance and of producing similar racial sentiments among people of distinct races. For the nonwhites selectively incorporated into such environments, “class solidarity is added to solidarity of race or of prejudice and this sentiment extends to a large part of the middle classes who imitate the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie in their disdain for plebeians of color, even when their own mestizaje may be all too evident.”⁶⁰

Socialist indigenismo was very important in the country until the end of the 1920s. Mariátegui’s teachings had spread, especially in the sierra, where intellectuals saw in the identification of socialism and nationalism a revindication of and a means of expressing their racial sentiments. From Puno (in a periodical of limited circulation published through the heroic forces of its editorial committee), a provincial intellectual named Emilio Armanza wrote an article eloquently titled “Confessions of the Left.” In it he declared: “We will never be able to understand capitalism and our organization will continue to be capitalist as long as we do not examine ourselves. We never believed that the socialist tendencies came from Europe. We are socialists by virtue of our racial spirit and telluric inspiration.”⁶¹ During the following years the political debate would drive a wedge between this identification of socialism and national culture. It would displace the notion of raza from the political scenario, which was being transformed by political professionalization.

Political Modernization: From Race to Class and from Indigenismo to the Party of the Masses

The decade of the 1930s marked the beginning of a new political period in Peru. Provincial insurgents (including intellectuals and workers) and rural and urban folk organized opposition political parties. Within these parties, and outside them as well, the provincials reversed their political subordi-

nation and became official opposition leaders. The dawn of the period witnessed the dispute between Mariátegui's political group and the Comintern, the death of Mariátegui, and the founding of the Communist Party affiliated with the Soviet Union.⁶² Subsequently, Hildebrando Castro Pozo and Luciano Castillo founded the Socialist Party in Piura, and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre converted the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) into a political party. At the beginning of this period there emerged clearly the idea of the political Left, both electoral and clandestine. In the elections of 1931, Haya de la Torre was his party's presidential candidate; the Communist Party put forward Eduardo Quispe Quispe, a "Puneño indígena."⁶³

Distancing themselves from the rhetoric of indigenismo, the radical intellectuals accepted their own identity as mestizo and blamed the "Indiofile current" of having judged "the mestizo with too much injustice and severity."⁶⁴ The Piurano writer and Socialist Party co-founder Hildebrando Castro Pozo, proposed that the leader of the Indian was the mestizo—not any mestizo, but rather those mestizos transformed by their class consciousness or their intellectual knowledge. As Don Hildebrando wrote: "The unsuspected mestizos, such as our coastal-serrano workers, and the *yanaconaje* [a reference to sharecropping] from both geographic zones . . . are free from any defect or suspicious interests, and also a group of intellectuals of the same nature who never transgressed their principles of honorable manliness and brotherhood towards the Indian . . . and this because in the present the Indian himself will not know even for various decades how to resolve the problem of his lands, much less that of his acculturation."⁶⁵

The creation of political parties and the new dynamic they imprinted upon popular protest did not mean the disappearance of the patriarchal racial sentiments that also characterized the earlier period. Paternalism toward the Indian as a symbol of *hombria* was present in Castro Pozo's declaration. Nonetheless, he expressed such sentiments with a renovated vocabulary that interwove race and social class, and the counterpart of class—class consciousness. In using this new rhetoric, the provincials converted themselves into official leaders who spearheaded political and cultural change. For example, the Puno-born lawyer José Antonio Encinas—advisor to the Tawantinsuyo Pro-Indigenous Rights Committee (Comité Pro-derecho Indígena Tawantinsuyo), who had been a primary school teacher of Emilio Romero and one of the inspirations for Mariátegui's indigenista socialism, became the rector of the San Marcos University in 1930. It was the first time that a provincial directed Lima's famous university. Using the new vocabu-

lary to express his racial sentiments and his opinions about the new situation, Encinas remembered: "The feudal castle that was San Marcos came tumbling down in 1930. On its ruins a new type of university began to be built in which we were to venerate all that is our own. The old obsolete University had because of *classist prejudices* neglected our history, our geography, our social and economic problems. The new had the purpose of opening new furrows. This desire that began to crystallize was labeled 'Communism' [by pointing to] student political restlessness . . . in order to impede this liberation that came from the provincial element of the University, they closed San Marcos and placed at its gates a permanent guard of soldiers."⁶⁶

If this had been written in 1920, Encinas would perhaps have called the prejudices of the old San Marcos aristocrats "racial" rather than "classist." Along with this change of political vocabulary, related transformations took place in the 1930s. One of the most important changes, despite the student political restlessness described by Encinas, was the disappearance of personages who fused "political" and "academic" dissent, and intervention in public life, as had the provincial rebels of the indigenista decade. In great measure this disappearance was a consequence of the new forms of activism employed by the opposition organized into political parties. From the Peruvian Communist Party, Martínez de la Torre criticized the intellectuals, calling them "petty bourgeois professionals who seek to contribute their 'intelligence' [sic] to the movement, their labor therein being precisely negative." He called for the "active intelligence" of the political militants to oppose the "inert intelligence" of the academics.⁶⁷ In addition, and to no lesser degree, the disappearance of the politician-academic was the consequence of fourteen years of persecution that the country's presidents unleashed against the opposition, beginning in 1931, when General Sánchez Cerro defeated Leguía.⁶⁸ The proscription of the opposition political parties ended momentarily in 1945 with the electoral victory of the Democratic National Front, which included APRA, the Communist Party under the name of the Socialist Vanguard (Vanguardia Socialista), the Socialist Party, and two new groups. The leader of the front was José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, who developed a populist policy of confronting dominant sectors, basically the hacendados, some exporters, and financiers.

During the period of political "modernization," which was also in part a period of clandestinity, the politicians became professionalized. The intellectuals, for their part, assumed academic responsibilities. At first, the intellectuals encountered difficulties such as those recalled by Encinas earlier.