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The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War

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DONALD KAGAN

Cornell University Press

ITHACA AND LONDON

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For my son, Bobby

Preface

The attempt to write another book on a subject so old and so often treated requires an explanation, perhaps even a defense. Thucydides, after all, dealt with it authoritatively, and most of our evidence comes from his history. Yet it is rewarding to take up the matter once again. In the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth, to be sure, such titanic figures as Grote, Beloch, Busolt, and Meyer undertook encyclopaedic histories of Greece in which they dealt with the origins of the Peloponnesian War in detail and with great intelligence and learning. In my judgment there is, even today, no better study of the problem than the sober and magisterial account of Busolt. Therein lies one of the reasons for writing this book, for in the years since Busolt wrote, a great deal of new material has been given to us, chiefly in the form of Athenian inscriptions. In addition, more than half a century of important scholarship has illuminated Greek history. No one can write about Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War in quite the same way after the publication of the *Athenian Tribute Lists,* Gomme's *Historical Commentary on Thucydides,* or Mme de Romilly's *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien,* not to mention many other important monographs and articles. It therefore seems desirable to treat the question once again in a thorough and detailed manner, taking account of the new epigraphical evidence and the great mass of modern scholarship.

Each generation needs to write its history for itself. Our questions are likely to differ from our fathers' and grandfathers'. Constant reappraisal can only be beneficial for the discovery of the past and its meaning, for over the years only the permanently illuminating questions will remain vital. I should be less than candid if I did not

admit yet another purpose in writing this history. I agree with Thucydides that useful truths about human behavior in political situations can be learned from a careful and accurate study of the past. I believe some truths of great relevance to our modern predicament may arise from an investigation of how the Greek states came to fight a terrible war that destroyed the vitality of a great civilization.

The origin of the Peloponnesian War is a problem in diplomatic history, and I am convinced that diplomacy cannot, without serious distortion, be treated in isolation from the internal history of the states involved. As a result, I have tried, where the evidence permits, to trace the connection between domestic politics, constitutional organization, and foreign affairs. It is clear, of course, that questions of a social and economic nature may also have a great effect on foreign affairs, though a rather smaller one in antiquity than they seem to have now. Our evidence, however, does not allow us to see any certain or even probable influence, except in the most indirect way. Our ancient sources view the problem chiefly in political terms. My own conviction is that they do not seriously mislead us.

Some remarks about method are in order. It seems to me that anyone who works with Thucydides must make patent his judgment on two basic questions: the history of the composition of the work, and the authenticity of the speeches in it. I shall discuss these questions in greater detail in connection with my interpretation of particular events, but the reader deserves to know in advance my general opinion. On the question of composition it is essentially unitarian, and very close to that of John Finley, who assumes that the work as we have it is not too far from what Thucydides ultimately intended:

> That is not to say that early passages may not exist in the *History;* it is inconceivable that Thucydides did not take notes or that he failed to use them when he wrote his final work. It is merely to say that the work which we have should not be regarded as an agglomeration of passages written at widely different times and imperfectly blended together by reason of the author's premature death, but rather as composed primarily at one time with the help of earlier notes and, if broken at the end, incomplete perhaps in several places, yet possessing after all the unity which might be expected to result from a period of more or less sustained composition.[1]

[1] John H. Finley, Jr., *HSCP,* Suppl. I (1940), 257.

Assuming the essential unity of composition, I have avoided using the excuse that Thucydides had no time to fill in the gaps or to reconcile his later opinions with earlier ones as a means of explaining difficult passages.

The problem of the speeches is old and persistent. Opinions range from one extreme, that they are fictions completely invented by Thucydides, to the other, that they are close to verbatim reports of what the speakers said. The truth is clearly in between, but I am persuaded that it is far closer to the latter view. A great deal of the debate has surrounded the admitted ambiguity of the words *ὡς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν*, which Richard Crawley translates, "what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions." Far too little attention has been given to the unequivocal force of the words that follow: *ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται*,[2] which Crawley translates, "of course adhering as closely as possible to what they really said." My own judgment is the same as that of F. E. Adcock:

> We are told, indeed, that, in composing his speeches, the historian kept as closely as possible to "the overall purport or purpose of what was actually said," written in such a way as to coincide with his opinion of what the several speakers would most likely have presented to their hearers as being "what the situation required." The reference to his own opinion represents a limiting factor in one way, as his reference to the "overall purport or purpose of what was actually said" is a limiting factor in another way. Thus when the procedure has been applied, the reader will know something at least of what was actually said. Thucydides limits his knowledge in terms of the difficulty (or even impossibility) of remembering precisely what was said.[3]

Thucydides' statement, of course, precludes the possibility that he invented any of the speeches he reports. As long ago as 1889, Nissen dismissed Grote's treatment of the Peloponnesian War, expressing astonishment that "he even treats the speeches as contemporary documents."[4] The reader will find me guilty of the same naïveté.

A word is necessary, too, about the use of ancient literary sources

[2] 1. 22. 1. References are to Thucydides unless otherwise attributed.

[3] F. E. Adcock, *Thucydides and His History* (Cambridge, 1963), 27–42.

[4] H. Nissen, *Historische Zeitschrift,* N. F., XXVII (1889), 386.

other than Thucydides, chiefly Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus. The *Lives* of Plutarch are based on a wide variety of sources, some good and some bad, some going back to the fifth century and some much later. For the period with which we are concerned, Diodorus depended chiefly on Ephorus when he was not following Herodotus or Thucydides. Ephorus wrote in the fourth century and is not to be compared with Thucydides either as a source or as a historian, but he did include some material omitted by Thucydides, as did Plutarch. As far as I have discovered, there is rarely any reason to prefer either Plutarch or Diodorus to Thucydides where they contradict him. The problem is what to do when they merely supply additional material. The recent tendency has been to be rather severe in judging the value of their data. We may all agree that their chronology is usually untrustworthy and that they do not deserve the authority of Thucydides' reports, but it seems to me that criticism has gone too far. My own approach is somewhat more trusting. Plutarch is like Herodotus, for he compares the various reports he has (written, to be sure, unlike the oral accounts received by Herodotus); he often cites his authorities; and he is prepared to reject lies and absurdities. Whatever the merits of his own judgment, there is no doubt that he preserves much that is valuable. Ephorus is less useful, but does not deserve to be ignored. I have applied the same criteria to the information supplied by Plutarch and Diodorus as I have to other ancient sources. I believe it to be true unless it is demonstrably self-contradictory, absurd, or false. Employing these canons, I have made more than a little use of their work.

It remains to speak of a device that the reader will from time to time encounter. I have often drawn historical analogies between situations in the fifth century B.C. and modern events. I am fully conscious of the danger in such analogies. I hope that I have used them appropriately and with due caution, but in any case, I think it better to show openly what was in my mind when I arrived at my conclusions and generalizations. As a historian, I naturally think of events and situations that seem similar to the ones I am studying. My judgments about historical events are based on my own experience, what I have learned of the events of my own time, extended by what I have learned of previous ages. As M. I. Finley has put it, "historians generalize all the time at the beginning and in the course of

every study they make, and the more conscious they are of this, the more control they will have over their generalizations." [5] I have tried to make the sources of my own generalizations more explicit by means of the analogies I have drawn. The reader will find that a large number of them come from the period preceding the First World War. This is not accidental, for I have been much impressed by the illumination a close study of the origins of that war, so copiously documented, can provide for an understanding of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The reader can judge for himself whether that impression is justified.

I should like to thank Bernard Knox, B. D. Meritt, and my colleague Walter LaFeber, who read this book in typescript and helped me to avoid many errors. I am grateful to the Cornell Research Grants Committee and to the Humanities Faculty Research Grants Committee of Cornell University for supporting my work and helping me with the preparation of the typescript. Special thanks are due to the Senior Fellows of the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, D.C., for providing me with a splendid and uninterrupted year of scholarship at the Center. I am most grateful to my colleagues who held junior fellowships that year for making it a pleasant and enlightening experience. My greatest debt is to Mr. Knox, whose skill in directing the Center for Hellenic Studies is matched by his keen wit, broad knowledge, and deep devotion to Classical studies. Finally, I should like to declare how much I owe my wife, who has made my home a place of refreshment and recreation from which I can return to my studies with renewed vigor.

D. K.

Ithaca, New York
October 1968

[5] M. I. Finley in *Generalization in the Writing of History,* Louis Gottschalk, ed. (Chicago, 1963), 27.

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Abbreviations and Short Titles

AC	*L'Antiquité Classique*
AHR	*American Historical Review*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
ASI	E. Badian, ed., *Ancient Societies and Institutions*
ATL	B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and F. M. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*
BSA	*Proceedings of the British School at Athens*
Beloch, *GG*[2]	K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte,* 2nd ed.
Bengtson, *GG*	H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte,* 2nd ed.
Busolt, *GG*	Georg Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*
Busolt and Swoboda, *GS*	Georg Busolt and Heinrich Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*
CAH	*Cambridge Ancient History*
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
CW	*Classical World*
De Sanctis, *SdG.*	Gaetano De Sanctis, *Storia dei Greci*
FGrH	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*
Glotz and Cohen, *HG*	Gustave Glotz and Robert Cohen, *Histoire Grecque,* II
Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*	A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*
Grote	George Grote, *A History of Greece*
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*

JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
LCL	*Loeb Classical Library*
Meyer, *Forschungen*	Eduard Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte,* II
Meyer, *GdA*	Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*
PACA	*Proceedings of the African Classical Association*
PW	Pauly-Wissowa and others, *Realenzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*
Riv. di fil.	*Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica*
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*
SIG	W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*
TAPA	*Transactions of the American Phililogical Association*
Tod	M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century*

The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War

Le cose passate fanno luce alle future, perché el mondo fu sempre di una medesima sorte, e tutto quello che è e sarà è stato in altro tempo, e le cose medesime ritornano, ma sotto diversi nomi e colori; però ognuno non le ricognosce, ma solo chi e savio è le osserva e considera diligentemente.

FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI
Ricordi, Serie Prima, 114

Introduction

Thucydides began to write a history of the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians because he expected that it would be "great and most worthy of the telling." [1] He was not disappointed, for in duration, extent, fierceness, and significance it surpassed all previous Greek wars. It was the "greatest upheaval that had come to the Greeks, to some portion of the barbarians, one might even say to the greater part of mankind." [2] From our viewpoint it was something even more; it was the crucible in which the life of the polis was tested.

Even by ancient standards, the city-states that emerged from the chaos of the Greek dark ages were weak and insubstantial creatures. Their economic well-being depended upon social and political stability and on freedom from external attack. Good fortune freed them from the danger of predatory neighbors during their most vulnerable period. No great aggressive empire held sway in the eastern Mediterranean in the vital years between the Dorian invasion and the Battle of Marathon. In the west, the Roman giant was still only an embryo. Colonization, which siphoned off excess population, and transient popular tyrannies, which broadened the political and social base of the city-state, allowed it to survive and flourish in the seventh and sixth centuries. By the time the Persian Empire could mount a serious external threat, the Greek cities were strong enough to combine and to offer a successful resistance.

[1] All translations are my own unless otherwise attributed. In translating Thucydides I have made frequent use of the Loeb translation of C. Forster Smith and the Budé edition by Mme de Romilly. I have not hesitated to borrow their phrasing when I could not improve upon it.

[2] 1. 1. 2.

The Persian Wars, however, made dramatically clear the inherent contradiction in the life of the polis. Freedom, independence, autonomy, even self-sufficiency were its ideals. In practice, of course, they had always been limited, but the essence of the Greek political system was a number of independent states, each observing its own constitution and each conducting its own foreign affairs. To be sure, the Peloponnesian League and other local organizations had come into being, but the members maintained much of their freedom and autonomy. The war with Persia showed that survival might depend on the ability of the Greeks to unite against a common danger on a long-range basis. The problem how to reconcile freedom and autonomy with the necessary subordination of sovereignty was now thrust upon the Greeks.

Plataea and Mycale did not end the Persian threat, so the Delian League under Athenian leadership was invented to meet it. The league became the Athenian Empire, an organization different from, but not completely dissimilar to, the Peloponnesian League. Greece was now divided into two great power blocs that came into conflict in the fifth and sixth decades of the fifth century. The mid-century battles did not immediately resolve the issue of hegemony. Each side emerged with its organization intact, but worn out by the effort of competition and sobered by the knowledge of its rival's strength. The Thirty Years' Peace presented an opportunity for the Greek states to adapt themselves to the new realities. Two great states now led the Greeks. They differed in character, in ideology, and in the nature of their power. If they could limit their desires, avoid conflict, and refuse to be dragged into wars by lesser states, they might hope to live in harmony with one another and so bring a general peace to the Hellenic world. Had they done so, no foreign enemy could have prevailed against their combined power, and in peace and prosperity, the polis could have further developed its genius. In the event, Sparta and Athens were unable to live in peace; the Peloponnesian War came, bringing death, poverty, civil strife, and foreign domination. It permanently damaged the economic well-being, the social stability, the military power, and, finally, the self-confidence of the Greek city-states.

Thucydides thought that the war was inevitable. "I think," he said, "that the truest cause, but the least spoken of, was the growth

of Athenian power, which presented an object of fear to the Spartans and forced them to go to war." [3] Modern historians have argued about the causes of the war, but few have doubted its inevitability, and small wonder. Thucydides' account of the events leading to war is powerful and compelling, while rival explanations, both ancient and modern, have been infinitely less persuasive. His terse, carefully arranged description of the growth of the Athenian Empire and the Spartan response seems to leave no alternative to war.

It is precisely the question of inevitability which most engages the interest of the modern reader, and probably Thucydides would have wished it so. He saw his work as a "possession for eternity," useful to "such men as might wish to see clearly what has happened and what will happen again, in all human probability, in the same or a similar way." [4] He would expect us to seek insights into modern problems in his account of the great war between Athens and Sparta, and not the least of such insights would be the inevitability of a war arising from the conditions he describes. Must a rivalry between two powers leading rival blocs come to blows? So general a question cannot be answered by the historian; indeed, in his professional capacity he cannot even ask it. But there are other questions that he can and must ask; though they cannot be answered with certainty, the questions are legitimate, and the attempt to answer them may teach us something about that "human probability" of which Thucydides wrote.

We must ask whether the *détente* achieved by the Thirty Years' Peace could have endured, whether there were real alternatives to the policies that led to war. Did Spartan or Athenian interests demand a final resort to war? Or did war come in spite of those interests? In attempting to answer these questions, we must resist the temptation to follow blindly the greatest of ancient historians. His account was begun during the war, and he did not survive it by many years. The persuasive force of a brilliant contemporary account by a historian who was a participant in some of the events and an

[3] 1. 23. 6. *τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν.*

[4] 1. 22. 4. *ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι.*

eyewitness to many others, who questioned and cross-questioned witnesses to events he did not see himself, must be enormous. But the viewpoint of a contemporary has its shortcomings. The force of the *fait accompli,* the feeling that what happened had to happen, is compelling even for those with the perspective of many centuries. How much more so it must have been for Thucydides. We must resist the powerful attraction of his interpretation, at least provisionally, in order to test its validity.

The very concept of inevitability presents some problems. What does inevitability mean in the realm of human affairs? Leaving aside the metaphysical question of free will versus determinism, we may still raise legitimate questions as to the extent of man's freedom to make political decisions. There can be no doubt that some apparent choices in the realm of human affairs are in fact precluded by previous events, while others are made more likely. But men can make decisions that alter the course of events. It is the difficult but necessary task of the historian to distinguish between relatively open choices and those that are only apparent. When Thucydides suggests that the Peloponnesian War was inevitable, he is, of course, correct. That is, at some point in time before the clash of arms, there was no way to alter the course leading to war. What makes the assertion of inevitability challenging and important is the selection of that point in time. To say that the war became inevitable once the Spartan army crossed the Athenian frontier is obvious and trivial. That the war was fated from the beginning of time is a philosophical or metaphysical proposition not subject to historical analysis. It is on the ground between these extreme positions that historical discussion must take place.

The Thucydidean view is neither trivial nor metaphysical. It is clear that Thucydides believed that the rise of the Athenian Empire after the Persian Wars, in a world where another great power already existed, made a clash between them unavoidable. His famous excursus which begins in 479 with the retreat of the Persians and describes the rise of Athenian power is intended to support that interpretation. We may believe that Thucydides was right about the causes of the First Peloponnesian War (461–445), but we must remember that it was ended by a peace whose transitory nature, obvious to us, may not have been so to contemporaries. The question

before us is whether that peace might have been maintained, whether Athens and Sparta were destined to go to war *after* 445.

Our best source of information for the years 445–431 is the history of Thucydides. Let us examine it, along with our other evidence, to see what events took place and what decisions were made that led to war, but let us ask at every opportunity whether another decision was humanly possible. Freely admitting that at some particular moment circumstances may offer men only one practicable course of action, let us not forget that at other times they are free to choose among several possibilities and so influence their destinies for good or ill; the fault is often not in our stars, but in our selves.

Part One

The Alliance System and the Division of the Greek World

1. The Spartan Alliance

The Peloponnesian War was not fought by individual Greek states but by two great coalitions, the Peloponnesian League and the Athenian Empire. In some important ways the two were similar, each providing an example of what has been called an "Alliance Under a Hegemon." [1] Each was "an alliance of a leading state with a number of others, not limited in time or by any specific aim, implying a leading position of the one state in war, and soon also in politics, loosely organized at first, but clearly an attempt at a unit transcending the single state." [2] But in many crucial ways they were different, and the differences affected their capacities both to wage war and to keep the peace. The two alliances, moreover, were historically related and not always at odds. If we are to understand the coming of the great war, we must have a clear picture of the nature of the two leagues and of how they came into conflict.

Historians with a taste for paradox are accustomed, with Voltaire, to say of the Holy Roman Empire that it was not holy, neither was it Roman, nor was it an empire. Similarly, it is tempting to say of the Peloponnesian League that it was not really a league, nor, strictly speaking, was it altogether Peloponnesian. It included states to the north of the Isthmus of Corinth, and relationships among its members were loose enough to make such terms as *league* or *confederation*

[1] The designation was invented by Victor Ehrenberg (*The Greek State* [Oxford, 1960], 112) and comprehends the Peloponnesian League, the first and second Athenian leagues, and the League of Corinth.

[2] *Idem.*

inappropriate. The term most frequently used in antiquity was *symmachia,* which we may translate as "alliance," a term as ambiguous in English as it is in Greek. The ancients usually called the group the "Lacedaemonians and their Allies," [3] a term that modern historians would do well to adopt, had not the title Peloponnesian League already gained universal currency.

The evidence for the nature of the Spartan alliance, its history and development, is scanty and difficult to interpret, giving rise to a great diversity of opinion. The Spartan alliance was not a response to an external threat, like the Hellenic League, formed to fight the Persians in 481, or like the Delian League, formed to prosecute a war of revenge and liberation against Persia in 478/7. It was instead the product of a Spartan policy aimed at guaranteeing the security of Sparta and its domination of the Peloponnese.[4] By the beginning of the sixth century, Sparta's persistent problem—the suppression of her helots—was well under control, and she could turn to the northern Peloponnese.[5] Up to that time Sparta had followed the obvious policy pursued by a strong state toward her weaker neighbors. After defeating them, she incorporated their territory, treating some, the *perioikoi,* as subject freemen, and others, the helots, as something very much like serfs. In this way the southern and western regions of the Peloponnese had become Spartan territories without autonomy. The Spartans were now free to turn to their northern neighbor, Tegea. Not until the middle of the sixth century were the Spartans able to conquer this Arcadian city, for the Tegeans were tough fighters who put up a long and fierce resistance. At last the Spartans sought the advice of the oracle at Delphi and were told that they must acquire the bones of Orestes in order to take Tegea. A clever Spartan discovered the bones of a giant buried at Tegea, so we are told, and took them home. Shortly thereafter the Spartans took Tegea.[6]

The victory over Tegea was a turning point in Spartan policy. Instead of annexing the territory of the Tegeans, the Spartans con-

[3] Busolt and Swoboda, *GS,* 1330.

[4] Victor Martin, *La vie internationale dans la Grèce des cités* (Paris, 1940), 206; Ehrenberg, *The Greek State,* 118–119.

[5] G. L. Huxley, *Early Sparta* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 65.

[6] Hdt. 1. 66–68; Huxley, *Early Sparta,* 65–68; Ehrenberg, *PW, s.v.,* "Sparta," 1383.

cluded an alliance that was to prove lasting.[7] Among other things, the treaty provided that the Tegeans were not to harbor Messenian refugees and that Tegean supporters of Sparta would not be harmed. The major provisions are not mentioned, probably because they were so well known. They surely must have included the formula that was the basic ingredient of all future treaties between Sparta and her allies and that established the nature of Spartan hegemony: the allied states promised to "have the same friends and enemies and to follow the Lacedaemonians on land and on sea wherever they might lead." [8] Soon the rest of Arcadia came under Spartan control.[9] By 525 their influence extended to the Isthmus of Corinth, including all the Peloponnesians, with the exception of Argos and Achaea.[10] Each extension of the Spartan alliance meant that one more state had agreed to a treaty that turned control of its foreign policy over to Sparta. This was obviously agreeable to Sparta, but why were their allies willing to enter upon such agreements?

The Tegean experience, of course, offers one explanation. Beaten in the field, the Tegeans must have been glad to accept comparatively generous terms, for they retained their land, their freedom, and some degree of autonomy. Possibly other Arcadian states had a similar experience, but we know that not all the allies had first been defeated in combat, and many must have been glad to enter the alliance. To the conservative cities of the Peloponnese, Sparta's military might offered protection against enemies from within as well as from without. Fear of Argos, the other great Peloponnesian power, and fear of popular unrest which might result in the expulsion of oligarchies and the establishment of tyrannies provided these cities with a strong motive for accepting Spartan leadership.

[7] The alliance is mentioned and some of its provisions described in Plut. *Quaest. Graec.* 5. See also *Quaest. Rom.* 52. Eduard Meyer (*GdA* 2. 766) places the treaty in the sixth century, but Hiller von Gaertringen (*IG,* II, 3) puts it in 468, after the great Arcadian uprising. He is followed by Busolt and Swoboda (*GS,* 1320, n. 3). L. I. Highby (*The Erythrae Decree, Klio,* Beiheft, XXXVI [1936], 72–73) argues persuasively for a sixth-century date, which I accept.

[8] Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 20; Busolt and Swoboda, *GS,* 1320 and 1325.

[9] Busolt and Swoboda, *GS,* 1320; Herodotus (1. 68) tells us that by the time of the Tegean defeat the Spartans controlled the greater part of the Peloponnese.

[10] Ulrich Kahrstedt, *Griechisches Staatsrecht* (Göttingen, 1922), I, 28–29.

In the seventh century the Argives had dominated the Peloponnese, and even in the sixth they tried to control its northeastern section. To such states as Phlius, Sicyon, and Corinth they posed a continual threat. In 546 the Spartans defeated Argos in battle, gained control of the Thyreatis, a disputed area on the border between Laconia and the Argolid, and the island of Cythera off the southeastern Peloponnese.[11] The victory was important, for it extended Spartan influence to the northeastern Peloponnese and showed that the leadership of the entire Peloponnese had shifted from the Argolid to Laconia. It is important to notice, however, that from necessity or by design, Argos was neither captured or destroyed. For the time being she was weakened, but she remained a possible menace. The enemies of Argos were loyal to their Spartan allies not only from gratitude but perhaps from apprehension as well.

The sixth century was a period of tumultuous domestic strife in the Greek city-states. The growth of commerce, industry, and population had severely strained the political and social stability of the aristocratic republican governments of Greece. In the seventh century tyrannies had appeared in Argos, Sicyon, Corinth, and Megara, as well as in other cities outside the Peloponnese. Some of these persisted into the sixth century, but most had begun to outlive their popularity, while the upper classes had at last begun to regroup their forces and try to restore oligarchic rule. By the middle of the century, Sparta had taken the lead in the struggle against tyranny and in defense of oligarchy. Plutarch records a list of tyrants supposedly removed by the Spartans.[12] It includes tyrannies at Corinth, Ambracia, Naxos, Athens, Sicyon, Thasos, Miletus, Phocis, and in Thessaly. The list is not in chronological order, and some of the interventions are implausible, if not impossible. Still, Plutarch is surely reporting a reliable tradition when he says, "We know of no city of that time so zealous in the pursuit of honor and so hostile to tyrants as the city of the Lacedaemonians." [13] Sparta, like all ancient states with a "mixed constitution," was really an oligarchy, the natural refuge for exiled aristocrats and oligarchs. She did not merely

[11] Hdt. 1. 82; Huxley, *Early Sparta,* 70–73.

[12] *Mor.* 859 D.

[13] *Mor.* 859 C; see also Thuc. 1. 18. 1.

destroy the tyrannies, step aside, and let nature take its course.[14] Her policy was to promote oligarchy and defend it against its enemies. "The Lacedaemonians did not lead by holding their allies subject by the payment of tribute; instead they took care that they were governed by oligarchies in a manner conformable to Spartan interests." [15]

The alliance that Sparta led into the fifth century, the nucleus of the grand coalition that turned back the Persian invasion, was founded on Spartan military might and bound together by a mutual distrust of Argos as well as a common interest in defending oligarchy. But were there no other ties binding the members of the alliance, more formal and lasting than Spartan power or shared interests, both of which might be transitory? Were the members tied to one another or merely to Sparta? What were the rights and duties of Sparta and of the subsidiary allies? In short, what was the constitution of the Peloponnesian League? To this apparently simple question scholars have returned widely diverging answers. At one extreme is the view of Ulrich Kahrstedt:

> Membership in the league was based on perpetual treaties and indeed only with Sparta; there was no entry into the league by a decree of admission of all previous members, as in a federal union [*Verein*]. The league originated through the fact that Sparta made a pact with Tegea and grew because it did the same each time with almost every state of the neighboring territory. It is logical that, even later, states could not enter except by making a treaty of alliance with Sparta whose content either copied or was similar to that of the others which had been concluded earlier. The constitution of the league consisted merely of ties which ran from Sparta to the individual *poleis;* there were no ties that bound these to one another, no regulation of constitutional relations at all. . . . Thus, it is really wrong to apply modern terms like league, confederation, or confederacy to this political structure.[16]

At the other end of the spectrum stands Jacob Larsen, who believes that some time about 505 the equivalent of a constitutional convention of the allies of Sparta met to found the Peloponnesian League.[17] The purpose of that convention, he says, was to adopt two

[14] Huxley, *Early Sparta,* 75; H. T. Wade-Gery, *CAH,* III, 568–569.

[15] 1. 19.

[16] Kahrstedt, *op. cit.,* I, 81–82.

[17] Larsen's views may be found in a series of articles published in *CP:* XXVII (1932), 136–150; XXVIII (1933), 256–276; XXIX (1934), 1–19,

principles: Sparta must consult a league assembly before demanding support from the allies; and the allies must accept and abide by a majority vote of that assembly. The adoption of these principles "amounted to the adoption of a constitution and the transformation of what had been merely a group of Spartan allies into the organization known to us as the Peloponnesian League." [18] By using evidence from later periods and the historical analogy of other Greek alliances, Larsen tries to reconstruct the very procedure followed by the "constitutional convention." He suggests that first the representatives of Sparta's allies met in a congress and adopted the constitutional principles agreed upon in the form of a number of decrees. "These principles were then embodied in treaties ratified by means of an exchange of oaths." [19]

Larsen alone imagines such a formal arrangement, but others have occupied the middle ground between his view and the very loose organization pictured by Kahrstedt. Georg Busolt emphasized the dualistic nature of the Peloponnesian League, with the Spartans on the one side and the allies on the other.[20] He discerned some fine distinctions within the league:

> In the broader sense all states belonged to the allies of the Lacedaemonians with whom they had concluded a treaty, but the league included only those who took part in its union and in the forces of the league. The looser organization of the league rested in part on the treaties of the Lacedaemonians with the individual states, in part on common decrees which produced a law of the league.[21]

These fine distinctions are very difficult to perceive if one examines the entire history of the league, and they can be maintained only by explaining away exceptions to every rule or basing rules on unique examples. They arise from an unduly legalistic approach to the problem. Even so reasonable a scholar as Victor Martin is not altogether immune from this fallacy. Although he finds Larsen's arguments for the formal organization of the league unconvincing and agrees that

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and in the third chapter of his *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955).

[18] *CP*, XXVII (1932), 140.

[19] *CP*, XXVIII (1933), 265.

[20] Busolt and Swoboda, *GS*, 1330.

[21] *Idem.*

in the beginning bilateral treaties prevailed, he believes that "with time customs were established that, by progressively specifying the rights and duties of the allies after collective undertakings, ended by becoming the same, in a certain degree, as a pact that in every case constituted a body of customs valid for all." [22]

If we are to understand the workings of the Spartan alliance, we must abandon the search for constitutional law, even for "a body of customs valid for all." Kahrstedt was right in seeing that the Peloponnesian League was nothing more than a collection of states, each tied to Sparta by a separate treaty, but even he was too legalistic when he sought general rules governing the relations between Sparta and the allies. The best way to see what difficulties can result from the pursuit of that method is to examine some of the attempts to discover the rules of the league. This is not the place to undertake a full analysis, but we can learn a good deal by examining one question whose importance and relative simplicity give some promise of success in the search for constitutional clarity and uniformity: Could Sparta or could she not order her allies to suppress rebellions within the alliance without consulting an assembly of the league?

The cases that provide evidence on this point occurred at the very end of the fifth century, but we have no reason to believe the alliance had altered in any way. In 403, King Pausanias led the Spartans and their allies against Athens, which had accepted a treaty with Sparta the year before but which was now judged to be in revolt.[23] The Corinthians and Boeotians refused to participate in the campaign, arguing that they would be in violation of their oaths if they attacked the Athenians, who had not broken their treaty. In 400, the Spartans decided to subjugate Elis after years of defiance, and they asked their allies to help against the rebellious state. This time all the allies, even the Athenians, obeyed, but once again the Corinthians and Boeotians abstained.[24] Larsen emphasizes that in both instances the abstaining member states were not punished.[25] He is eager to

[22] Martin, *op. cit.*, 205–206.

[23] Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 30.

[24] Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 21–25.

[25] Larsen (*CP*, XXVIII [1933], 269, n. 37) says that the Boeotians "are hardly to be counted as members of the League." He offers no support for his statement, and we must conclude that he has been influenced by the title

show that the league was a true federation which delegated important powers to its assembly, and so he interprets these events as demonstrating that, while Sparta could act against a rebellious member and ask allied support without first consulting the assembly, if the allies thought Sparta's case unjust, they had not only the right but the duty to refuse. The point is that only the assembly of the league had the right to decide on an expedition, even against rebellious members. "If Sparta acted without consulting the assembly, she ran the risk that members would refuse to support her." [26]

Busolt interpreted the evidence in a different sense. In his opinion, "The Lacedaemonians not infrequently summoned the allies to a campaign without a consultation of the assembly of the league. In this they must have been justified in certain cases, in case of a request for aid by an allied state under attack or of a rebellion by a member state." [27] But if that is true, how could Corinth and Boeotia refuse the Spartan appeal and get off scot free, as Larsen says they did? But the fact is that they did not ultimately escape the wrath of Sparta. The Spartans did not immediately punish them, it is true, but not because the defectors had constitutional right on their side. The Spartans had pressing business elsewhere; they were engaged in an Asian war against the Persians. By 395 the Spartans were at war with both Corinth and Thebes for several reasons, not least among them the fact that the Thebans had refused to join in the attack against Athens and had persuaded the Corinthians to do the same.[28] They went to war in 395 not because it had taken so long to convince them that their allies had acted unconstitutionally, but because they now believed that "it was a favorable time to lead an army against the Thebans and to put a stop to their insolence. Affairs in Asia were going well for them since Agesilaus was winning, and in Greece there was no other war to hinder them." [29]

We can see how arbitrary are all attempts to find regular consti-

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"Peloponnesian League," which did not exist in antiquity. There is no better reason for doubting Boeotian membership in the Spartan alliance at this time than Corinthian.

[26] *Ibid.*, 269–270.

[27] *GS*, 1333–1334.

[28] Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 5.

[29] *Idem.*

tional procedures in the Spartan alliance by looking at Kahrstedt's treatment of the same cases. He does not see them as instances in which Sparta requested aid in putting down a rebellion within the league. Instead, he thinks of them as private wars conducted by Sparta, which, since they were not defensive, did not oblige the allies to help.[30] He believes that the individual members were pledged to support Sparta when she was attacked. When they themselves were attacked, they could expect support from Sparta in return, but the other allies were required to come to their aid only if a league war were declared.[31] Still wrestling with phantom legalities, Kahrstedt suggests that originally there may have been *pro forma* stipulations that required Sparta to abandon its private quarrels in case a league war was declared. But his belief that the alliance rested only on bilateral treaties forced him to the realistic conclusion that such stipulations would be meaningless. "Sparta could each time prevent the outbreak of a league war if it really did not wish to give up its own quarrel, since such a war could not be declared without a decree of the Spartan Apella, as well as a similar decree from the allies." [32]

The most important and unfortunate consequence of the search for constitutional regulations in the Spartan alliance is that it often leads scholars to seek an explanation for a particular historical action not in the immediate political or military situation or in the immediate interests of the participants, but rather in general, formal rules. Such rules must be constructed from what little evidence we have. To an extraordinary degree, most general discussions of the operation of the Peloponnesian League depend heavily on its behavior just before and during the Peloponnesian War. That is hardly strange, for Thucydides' account is the only detailed description we have of its workings. We shall analyze that account later on, but for the moment it is enough to say that the activities of the Spartans and their allies before and during the war could not have been typical. They were about to undertake what everyone knew might be a dangerous and difficult war. Special and unusual measures were taken to meet a special and unusual situation. The actions of the league in

[30] Kahrstedt, *op. cit.*, 92.
[31] *Ibid.*, 90.
[32] *Ibid.*, 92.

432, therefore, should not be considered characteristic, and it is wrong to generalize from them, as all the constitutional analysts do. The fact that they disagree as to the constitutional significance of what takes place is far less important than their common failure to recognize that constitutional analysis is beside the point. If we are to evaluate these and other critical events correctly, we must understand the essentially pragmatic nature of the alliance and try to understand the forces and interests that determined its behavior.

The Spartan alliance was a loose organization consisting of Sparta and her individual allies. Each state swore to have the same friends and enemies as Sparta in return for Spartan protection and recognition of its integrity and autonomy. Since each treaty was sealed by oaths, each state had what amounted to a perpetual alliance with Sparta. The distinction between offensive and defensive wars seems not to have existed, for even though we have many instances of Sparta or its allies refusing to fulfill a military commitment, the argument that an allegedly defensive war is really offensive never is offered as an excuse. This ambiguity was probably only one of many. The wording by which the allied state promised to have the same friends and enemies as Sparta might seem to indicate subservience on their part. In the beginning, when such states as Tegea or tiny Phlius were involved, this was surely true, *de facto,* but it is not clear that even then the obligation ran only one way. In fact, if the promise of Spartan protection meant anything at all, it must have meant that in some cases Sparta would make her ally's enemy her own. Later on, when such powerful states as Corinth and Thebes were included in the alliance, the bilateral nature of the treaty must have been still more apparent. The wording of the treaty, no doubt, was the same as in the treaties with the weaker states, but the mutual understanding of its meaning would be different. It is fruitless to wonder whether the theory behind the treaties implied equality between the signatories or the hegemony of Sparta. Their language was ambiguous, and reality, not theory, provided the interpretive principle.

When Sparta was strong and secure she could call the tune. She helped other states when it was profitable or unavoidable. She compelled others to help her when it was necessary and possible. They sent aid either in the hope of reciprocity, from fear of punishment,

or in pursuit of their own interests. Sometimes states allied to Sparta fought wars against one another. Larsen would have us believe that the normal method for settling such disputes was to submit them to an assembly of the league. Unfortunately, he offers only one instance in support of this contention. Even in that unique case, the suggestion that the hostile states submit their quarrel to the league assembly was rejected, and a war ensued.[33]

The truth is that Sparta interpreted her inevitably conflicting responsibilities in accordance with her needs and interests. In 461/0, for instance, a boundary dispute caused a war between Corinth and Megara. At first the Spartans ignored the affair, but after the Megarians broke away from Sparta by seeking an Athenian alliance, Sparta and her allies supported Corinth because her hegemony and even her security were threatened.[34] In 423, on the other hand, even though the Spartans were temporarily at peace with Athens and so free to act, they chose not to intervene in a war between Tegea and Mantinea.[35] No doubt they found it more important to rest and recover their strength than to join in a war that posed no threat and offered no advantage. The situation was quite different, however, in 378. In that year the Spartans intervened decisively in a war between Orchomenus and Cletor, two small Arcadian towns. On this occasion the Spartans were engaged in a difficult war against Thebes and badly needed the mercenary troops who were fighting for Cletor. The Spartan king Agesilaus simply hired the mercenaries away from Cletor and ordered Orchomenus to desist from war so long as his campaign lasted.[36] On none of these occasions is there any evidence that anyone raised a constitutional issue, much less demanded a league assembly.

The fact is that we rarely hear of an assembly of the league. No meetings of the alliance could take place unless Sparta called them, simply because the only alliances that existed were bilateral treaties with Sparta. Meetings were called only if they were deemed neces-

[33] *CP*. XXVIII (1933), 274–275. The reference is to the quarrel between Boeotia and the Phocians in 395, which led to the Corinthian War. See *Hell. Oxy*. 13. 4.

[34] Thuc. 1. 103. 4; Diod. 11. 79. 1.

[35] 4. 134.

[36] Xen. *Hell*. 5. 4. 36–37.

sary or useful by the Spartans. Of course it would be absurd to think of launching a major war without the consent of the allies on whom success depended. Nevertheless, when King Cleomenes wanted to restore the aristocratic government of Isagoras to Athens in 507, he mustered an allied army not only without consulting an assembly but even without announcing the purpose of the expedition.[37] Only when the battle was about to begin did the Corinthians force a discussion, and their defection forced the Spartans to abandon their scheme.[38] A short time later the Spartans, fearing the vitality of the newly founded Cleisthenic democracy, tried to restore the tyranny of Hippias to Athens. Made cautious by their previous experience, they first called an assembly of their allies. Again they were rebuffed because of the general hatred of tyranny and perhaps because of a common fear of Sparta's growing ambition.

Throughout the fifteen years of the First Peloponnesian War, we hear of no meeting of the assembly of the league. In 432, of course, the Spartans had no choice but to call such a meeting before launching a war against the Athenian Empire. Even then, as we shall see, the assembly served an internal political purpose as well as an international one. In the fourth century Sparta was so powerful that she did not need to consult her nearer and weaker allies, while she often found herself at war against former allies who were stronger and more remote, Corinth and Thebes. As a result, we rarely hear of assemblies of the league. As an Athenian spokesman complained to the Spartans in 371, "You declare enemies for yourselves without consulting your allies whom you lead against them. The result is that often people who are said to be autonomous are forced to fight against their own friends."[39]

Even in this period of their greatest strength and arrogance, however, the Spartans called meetings of the league assembly when it was convenient. In 396, when they were about to launch a great and dangerous invasion of Asia,[40] and in 382, when asked to fight

[37] Hdt. 5. 74.

[38] Larsen believes that in 507 the Peloponnesian League did not yet exist, so an assembly would not be necessary. See *CP*, XXVII (1932).

[39] Xen. *Hell.* 7. 3. 8.

[40] Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 2.

against the powerful and distant Chalcidic League,[41] they called their allies together. They did so again in 376, immediately after a Spartan army was disbanded in discouragement after being prevented from entering Theban territory. At this moment of Spartan dejection and confusion it is not even clear who insisted on a meeting of the assembly.[42] The significant fact that arises from this brief survey is that on every occasion it was political or military reality, not constitutional regulations, which were decisive.

In other matters as well practical considerations ruled. The only formal regulation to which even lip service was paid was the one which demanded help for an ally who asked it, and there was no shortage of excuses for ignoring even that one. The only rules that counted were those imposed by military, political, or geographic reality. These realities enable us to see that Sparta's allies were not uniformly treated. We can discern three categories of allies, a division that was not formal but very meaningful. The first includes small states relatively weak and near enough to Sparta to be easily subject to her discipline. Phlius, Orchomenus, and, by the time of the Peloponnesian War, Tegea, are examples of such states. The second category is composed of states that were stronger, more remote, or both, but not so strong or remote as to avoid ultimate punishment: Elis, Mantinea, and Megara. When Sparta was strong she could and did demand obedience from them. When she was weak or distracted they could go their own ways, attack their neighbors, who might also be allied to Sparta,[43] adopt democratic constitutions,[44] and even make alliances with another state unfriendly to Sparta.[45] Such independence, however, was always temporary and sometimes costly.

The third category consists of states so remote or so powerful that their independence was rarely tampered with and whose conduct of foreign policy was rarely subordinated to Spartan interests. Only

[41] Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 11–23.

[42] Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 59–60.

[43] See Thuc. 5. 31, where Elis attacks Lepreum; 4. 134, where Mantinea attacks Tegea; 5. 29. 1, where the Mantineans subdue part of Arcadia; and 1. 104, where Megara fights Corinth.

[44] Elis: Arist. *Pol.* 1292 b; Xen. *Hell.* 3. 3. 27. Mantinea: Thuc. 5. 29.

[45] Elis and Mantinea with Argos, Thuc. 5. 29 and 5. 31; with Athens, 5. 43 and 5. 46; Megara with Athens, 1. 103. 4.

Corinth and Thebes belonged to this group. Thebes was a conservative agrarian state devoted to oligarchy in normal times. She probably joined the Spartan alliance at the end of the sixth century because of her fear of the Athenian democracy. Her remoteness from the Peloponnese and her powerful army guaranteed her independence. When her interests coincided with Sparta's, which usually meant when Sparta was hostile to Athens, she was a powerful and useful ally. When she believed her interests to be different, she had no hesitation in ignoring Sparta's wishes. A clear instance of Theban independence occurred in 421. On that occasion the Boeotians, under Theban hegemony, refused to accept the Peace of Nicias, which Sparta had made with Athens.[46] They refused to obey Sparta's request to give up their Athenian prisoners and surrender the border fort of Panactum, which had fallen into their hands.[47] This refusal made it impossible for the Spartans to carry out the terms of the peace and was a very serious blow to Spartan policy. In the fourth century, of course, Sparta's imperial ambitions outside the Peloponnese clashed directly with Theban interests, and from at least as early as 395 the former allies were bitter enemies. But even before that period the Spartans could never rely upon the Thebans for certain obedience.

Corinth was a still greater obstacle to unbridled Spartan hegemony. Astride the Isthmus, she could bar extra-Peloponnesian enemies of Sparta or permit them to invade the Peloponnese and threaten Sparta's security. Nor should we forget the critical role played by Argos in Peloponnesian politics. The Spartans knew that so long as the marchland of Thyrea-Cynuria was in their hands, so long as they claimed hegemony in the Peloponnese, the Argives would be hostile, waiting only a convenient opportunity for revenge. Just as Sparta was a guarantee to Corinth against Argive ambition, Corinth was no less a security for the Spartans. Sparta had good reason to fear a rapprochement between Argos and Tegea, a fear realized in 473/2.[48] In 421 the Corinthians threatened to create an alliance uniting Argos, Mantinea, Elis, and Corinth and even held out the possibility of bringing in Megara and Thebes. As a result

[46] 5. 17. 2.

[47] 5. 39.

[48] Edouard Will, *Korinthiaka* (Paris, 1955), 629–630.

they frightened the Spartans once again into a war they did not want.[49] In any war that required money and ships, Corinth was an essential ally. Her wealth was as proverbial as Spartan poverty. After the decline of Aegina, Corinth was the only ally of Sparta that could build, equip, and man a sizable and effective fleet.

For all these reasons Corinth's views could not be ignored, and her independent voice in matters of foreign policy was listened to with attention. It is not too much to say that on certain occasions a Corinthian veto could check a Spartan policy and even that sometimes Spartan policy was really determined at Corinth. In 525 the Spartans, with the enthusiastic support of Corinth, sent an army to Samos to bring down its tyrant, Polycrates.[50] We might think that Sparta's well-known hatred of tyranny was behind this unusual campaign, which took the Spartans not only out of the Peloponnese, but even across the sea. However, the Spartans' motive, at least according to Herodotus, was to avenge the theft of a bowl and a breastplate. Understandably, modern scholars have not been satisfied and have suggested that the expedition was anti-Persian, since Polycrates had become a Persian vassal. Others suggest that it was an attempt to extend Spartan hegemony to the Aegean.[51]

None of these motives is particularly persuasive, but the motive that Herodotus attributes to the Corinthians for participating in the campaign is even more dubious. He says that the Corinthians, like the Spartans, were fighting a war of revenge. Their complaint was that the Samians had given refuge to three hundred boys who were being sent by the tyrant of Corinth to the Lydian king Alyattes to be made eunuchs.[52] Now, by 525, this wrong was more than half a century old. It was a wrong, moreover, done not to the Corinthians, but to a tyrant whose memory they hated, and so it is hardly adequate to explain Corinth's action. What, then, was Corinth's true motive? We know that Corinth was an important commercial state whose products flowed from one end of the Mediterranean to the other in

[49] For a fuller account of these events, see Kagan, *AJP*, LXXXI (1960), 291–310 and *CP*, LVII (1962), 209–218.

[50] Hdt. 3. 47.

[51] These are the suggestions of Georg Busolt, Hans Schaefer, and J. Hasebroek, respectively. They are cited by Will (*Korinthiaka*, 634–635).

[52] Hdt. 3. 48.

the sixth century. Polycrates was a pirate-king who plundered the shipping of any state that sent its cargoes past Samos.[53] It is not hard to believe that the Corinthians were eager to attack Polycrates in order to clear the sea of his pirate ships, put an end to his thalassocracy, and make the Aegean safe for their own ships.[54]

Why did Sparta attack Polycrates? She was neither a naval nor a commercial state. We can find no satisfactory motive, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that she was pushed into the campaign by Corinth.[55] The Spartan alliance was relatively new; the threat from Argos persisted; the danger of a union between Argos, Corinth, and Tegea was not to be ignored. "On the Peloponnesian chessboard the Argive pawn was a piece which Corinth could play against Sparta. . . . There we discern for the first time a new constant in Peloponnesian politics. . . ."[56]

In 507, as we have already seen,[57] the Corinthians showed their independence of Sparta and their decisive influence by preventing King Cleomenes from restoring the tyrant Hippias to power in Athens. The incident showed that Corinth could refuse to subordinate her interests to those of Sparta on certain occasions. An even more telling evidence of Corinth's influence in the Spartan alliance occurred in 461.[58] Relations between Sparta and Athens, correct, if not warm, since the end of the Persian War, began to deteriorate in 462. A great earthquake had struck Sparta a few years earlier, and it was soon followed by a revolt of the helots. Under the urging of the philolaconian Cimon, the Athenians went to Sparta's assistance, but shortly after their arrival they were unceremoniously invited to leave.

[53] Busolt, *GG*, II, 509–510.

[54] Such is the suggestion of Busolt (*ibid.*, 512) and Will (*Korinthiaka*, 636).

[55] This conclusion is well argued and ably defended by Will (*idem.*).

[56] *Ibid.*, 636–637.

[57] See above, p. 19.

[58] My chronology, for the most part, follows that of the authors of *ATL* (III, 158–180) and A. W. Gomme (*Hist. Comm.*, I, 389–413). Their accounts are not identical but not very far apart. The dating of the events between the end of the Persian War and the beginning of the great Peloponnesian War is difficult and uncertain. Although it has sometimes been necessary to depart from their guidance, especially in dating internal political events, I have found their accounts generally persuasive.

This produced a breach in the old alliance that had tied Athens to Sparta during the Persian War and a diplomatic revolution. Athens now allied itself with Argos, the traditional enemy of Sparta. When at last the helot rebels who had held out on Mt. Ithome surrendered under a safe conduct, the Athenians received them and settled them at Naupactus on the north shore of the Gulf of Corinth.[59]

By these actions the Athenians incurred Spartan hostility, but the Spartans were not yet moved to warfare. In 461, however, the Corinthians became embroiled with the Megarians in a quarrel over some border territory.[60] When the Megarians found themselves losing, they broke their treaty with Sparta and joined the Athenians. It is noteworthy that none of our sources suggest that Megara sought Spartan help or arbitration or asked for a meeting of the league. She must have known of Corinth's special position in the Spartan alliance and that Sparta would surely side with Corinth. After Megara's defection the Spartans led a Peloponnesian army against the Megarians, the Athenians sent their own army to defend Megara, and the first war between the two great alliances had begun in earnest.

Here we have a case where Corinthian and Spartan interests were similar if not identical but where the Corinthians pursued their own interests without first consulting their Spartan allies, even though their action strongly prejudiced the position of Sparta. At a time when war between Sparta and Athens seemed possible, the Corinthians were willing to pursue a private quarrel that not only precipitated a war but also guaranteed that the war would be fought under disadvantageous conditions. If the passes through the mountains of the Megarid were firmly in Peloponnesian hands, the Athenians could not invade the territory of their enemies but could be attacked by them. As Gomme has put it, "The cause of the quarrel between Corinth and Megara, περὶ γῆς ὅρων, is characteristic: Corinth was ready to risk the stability of the Peloponnesian League, not to mention the peace of the Greek world in general, rather than give up a claim to some strip of land."[61] The Spartans eventually might have fought the Athenians, but they would certainly not have chosen to

[59] 1. 102–103.
[60] Thuc. 1. 103; Diod. 11. 79.
[61] *Hist. Comm.*, I, 304.

do so in the circumstances forced upon them by Corinth. This was a clear example of the Corinthian tail wagging the Spartan dog.

Whatever the influence in the Spartan alliance of the several allies, it was Sparta that had to provide leadership and military power. If we are to understand the operation of the alliance, we must consider not only the relations between the allies but the problems within Sparta that affected them. In spite of her great military superiority, Sparta was usually reluctant to go to war. Her reluctance was always greater in proportion to the distance from home the Spartan army was compelled to go. The habitual caution at the root of Spartan policy is epitomized in a charming story told by Herodotus. In 499, Aristagoras of Miletus, who was planning an Ionian revolt against Persia, came to seek assistance. He had carefully planned his approach to King Cleomenes, promising him and his city great glory and immense wealth. Now Cleomenes was an unusually aggressive and ambitious king for a Spartan and might have been expected to yield to such temptation. He asked how many days' journey it was from the sea to the residence of the Persian king. Aristagoras was well prepared for this question and had even brought a map. It was here, says Herodotus, that he made his great mistake. He admitted that the journey inland would take three months. "At that Cleomenes cut off the rest of his speech telling of the journey and said, 'Milesian stranger, leave Sparta before sunset, for your words are unwelcome to the Lacedaemonians if you want to lead them on a journey of three months' distance from the sea.'" [62]

It has long been recognized that the chief source of such conservatism was Sparta's fear that the helots would take advantage of a long absence of the Spartan army and rebel.[63] The ratio of free Spartans to helots was in the neighborhood of one to ten,[64] and their relation-

[62] Hdt. 5. 50.

[63] The arguments are given by G. B. Grundy (*Thucydides and the History of his Age* [2nd. ed.; Oxford, 1948], I, 212–239). The same point of view is offered at some length in the first chapter of Georg Busolt's *Die Lakedaimonier und Ihre Bundesgenossen* (Leipzig, 1878) and is the basis of his interpretation of Spartan policy throughout.

[64] This is a conservative estimate, according to Grundy (*ibid.*, 219). Not even Guy Dickins (*JHS*, XXXII [1912], 1–42), who makes a powerful attack on Grundy's theory that population shortage and the helot threat were the major factors in Spartan policy, challenges this estimate.

ship was exacerbated by a long history of rebellions and cruel repressions. The ancient authors were perfectly aware of this threat to the security of Spartan rule and of its effects on Spartan policy. Thucydides tells us, "Most institutions among the Spartans have always been established with regard to security against the helots." [65] Listing Sparta's motives for seeking peace in 421, he emphasizes the desertion of the helots, which gave rise to the ever-present fear that those who stayed would join with those who fled and revolt, "just as they had done in the past." [66] As we might expect, Aristotle offers a general analysis of the problem. "It is agreed that leisure is one of the necessities for a state that is to be well governed; but in what manner this is to be provided is not easy to grasp. The class of serfs [*penestai*] in Thessaly often revolted against the Thessalians, and the same is true of the helots in Sparta, for they are like someone sitting in wait for disasters to strike the Spartans." [67]

Yet another problem continually affected the conduct of Spartan policy, this one arising from the constitution of the Spartan state. Ancient and modern students of constitutions have praised Sparta as a fine example of a mixed constitution. It balanced the monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements in such a way as to produce that rarest of flowers, political stability. The cycle of constitutions described by Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius was not to be found in Lacedaemon. From the middle of the sixth century, when the classical Spartan constitution seems to have reached its final form, until the third century, when it at last succumbed to the force of circumstances, Sparta's mode of government did not change. Her two kings served for life, led her armies, and performed religious and judicial functions; five ephors were elected annually, among other things to watch over the kings; the gerousia performed its senatorial functions, and the apella, the popular assembly, met on occasion to make or ratify important decisions. Such stability might appear to be the best guarantee of a consistent and well-conducted foreign policy. Compared to the constitution of democratic Athens, which in theory, and sometimes in practice, could adopt a policy on one day and its reverse on the next, which could adopt the policy of one man and put its

[65] 4. 80.
[66] 5. 14.
[67] *Pol.* 1269a.

execution in the hands of another, compared to such a constitution the Spartan polity would seem to have great advantages.

The course of Spartan history, however, shows that the stability of Sparta's constitution was not always matched by an equally stable policy.[68] In 506, Sparta, led by Cleomenes, set out on a campaign to put down the Athenian democracy. The Corinthians objected and refused to participate, but what really put an end to the attempt was a decision by Sparta's other king, Demaratus, to return to Sparta without a battle.[69] The Spartans learned the obvious lesson from this experience, and thereafter only one king was permitted to go on each expedition. This new law, however, did not prevent the kings from disagreeing on policy and intriguing against one another. Each could stand at the head of a faction within Sparta and try to advance his own policy while hindering his rival's.[70]

As an element producing instability in Spartan foreign policy, however, the rivalry between kings was far less important than the role of the ephors.[71] To be sure, their initial function may have been to serve as a check on the ambitions of the kings, but by the fifth

[68] For a cautious but incisive analysis of the way in which Sparta's constitution really worked in the classical period, see A. Andrewes, *ASI,* 1–20.

[69] Hdt. 5. 75.

[70] See, for example, the rivalry between Agesilaus and Cleombrotus in the fourth century, which is analyzed by R. E. Smith (*Historia,* II [1953–54], 274–288).

[71] The strongest statement in behalf of the importance of the ephors is that of Guy Dickins (*JHS,* XXXII [1912], 1–42): "From 550 onwards for nearly a century and a half the foreign policy of Sparta was dominated primarily by one consideration, and that not the population question, which did not arise at all until the beginning of the fifth century and only became of supreme importance in the fourth, but rather the issue of a conflict between the kings and the ephors lasting in an acute form for over fifty years and in a milder degree for almost the whole of Spartan history." Dickins' assertion is far too strong. The ancient evidence cited above makes it clear that the population or helot problem was of the greatest importance in the fifth century. Dickins himself admits that the earthquake of 464, which killed many Spartans and caused a helot rebellion, "permanently affected the offensive powers of Sparta," (*ibid.,* 35). His interpretation also goes too far in insisting upon alliances between ephors and a king where there is little or no evidence for them. It is further mistaken in imagining that the struggle was between the institution of the ephorate and that of the kingship. So it may have been at the outset, but by the fifth century it had become merely a factional struggle. In spite of these weaknesses, Dickins' essay is of great value in pointing out

century their role was more complex and even more decisive.[72] They and they alone, it appears, summoned the apella and conducted business before it. They sat with the gerousia, presented business to it, and were its executive officers. They had important judicial powers, notably, the right to try kings on a charge of treason. Chief among their responsibilities was the conduct of foreign affairs; they were, as Greenidge put it, the foreign ministry of Sparta.[73] They received foreign envoys, negotiated treaties, and ordered expeditions once war had been declared. The formula applied to decisions of peace and war was "It seemed good to the ephors and the assembly," [74] but Lysander did not exaggerate too much when he told the Athenians that the ephors alone had the authority in matters of peace and war.[75]

It is not only that these powerful officials often interfered with the pretensions of the kings, for the kings often differed from one another, and for long periods Sparta produced no ambitious kings. The problem was rather that there were five ephors, and decisions were made by majority vote. At any moment, therefore, a policy might be changed by the shifting of a single ephor's vote. Something of the sort happened in 403 when Pausanias persuaded three of the five ephors to order a Spartan army into Attica with himself at its head. The result was the deposition of the Thirty Tyrants, the restoration of the Athenian democracy, and thus the total reversal of Lysander's, and up to that time Sparta's, policy.[76]

Sometimes even a minority of ephors could affect Spartan policy. To be sure, the vote of the majority was supposed to be binding on

the important role of the ephors in making and unmaking policy. He is rebutted in the same number of the journal by G. B. Grundy (261–269). Dickins' response appears in the next number on pages 111–112. More recently, A. Andrewes (*ASI*, 8–10) has rejected the thesis of Dickins for similar reasons. In my judgment, however, he slightly underrates the importance of the ephors in shaping foreign policy and gives correspondingly greater weight to the apella.

[72] The discussion of the power of the ephors which follows owes much to the perceptive account of A. H. J. Greenidge in *A Handbook of Greek Constitutional History* (London, 1902), 102–106; see also Busolt and Swoboda, *GS*, 683–691.

[73] *Ibid.*, 106.

[74] Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 23 and 4. 6. 3.

[75] Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 18–19.

[76] Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 29.

the entire college of ephors, and Xenophon represents the Athenian oligarch Critias as asking the rhetorical question Wouldn't a Spartan ephor who opposed the policy of the majority be generally regarded as deserving punishment? [77] But we learn from Thucydides that in one case, at least, the minority might not quietly accept the majority decision. In the winter of 421/20, when the Peace of Nicias was in effect, Xenares and Cleobulus, two ephors, "who most particularly wanted to break the treaty, made private proposals to the Boeotians and Corinthians" to adopt a policy contrary to the official policy of the state.[78] This very instance illustrates another reason for the potentially disturbing influence of the ephors on Spartan foreign policy. The Peace of Nicias had been negotiated by ephors elected for the year 422/1, but in the following year, "the ephors who happened to be in office at Sparta were other than those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them were even opposed to it." [79] The effect of all this was to produce a disconcerting vacillation in Spartan policy that baffled not only its friends and enemies but neutrals as well. During the early part of the Peloponnesian War, the Great King of Persia, it was reported, did not know what the Spartans wanted, "for though many envoys had come to him, no two said the same thing." [80]

The internal instability caused by conflicts between the Spartan kings, between ephors and kings, among the ephors themselves, and by the annual rotation of ephors could weaken Sparta's control of her alliance. An ally whose policy differed from that of Sparta could use Sparta's internal divisions to further its own ends. The paradox that the most stable of constitutions could produce a very unstable foreign policy added to the inherent difficulties of the Spartan alliance. Sparta's mighty army and her allies gave her enormous power, but if she used that power outside the Peloponnese, she ran the risk of losing its base by helot rebellion or Argive attack; if she did not use it when called upon by her more powerful allies, she ran the risk of losing them by defection. This dilemma severely vexed the Spartans in the course of the fifth century.

[77] Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 34.
[78] 5. 36. 1.
[79] *Idem.*
[80] 4. 50. 2.

2. The Origins of the Athenian Empire

The Athenian Empire resulted from Sparta's unwillingness or inability to extend her power, influence, and responsibility to the Aegean and its borders after the Greek victories at Plataea and Mycale in 479. Those victories had not ended the war against Persia, for the Persians could come again. Even if this were ruled out, the agreements made by the Greeks at the congress of 481 called for continued joint activities against the Persian Empire. That congress created a confederation of Greek states that greatly influenced the formation of the Delian League, which became the Athenian Empire, and we must examine its history.[1]

In 481, Xerxes, Great King of the Persian Empire, began his expedition, ostensibly to attack and punish Athens for her successful defiance of Persia at Marathon. The Greeks, however, had long known that his real purpose was the conquest of all Hellas,[2] so those of them who were not willing to submit met to consider what they should do.[3] The result was the formation of an offensive and defen-

[1] The best recent discussions of the Hellenic League of 481 are those of P. A. Brunt (*Historia,* II [1953/4], 135–163); *ATL,* (III, 95–105; 183–187), J. A. O. Larsen (*HSCP,* LI [1940], 175–213), R. Sealey (*ASI,* 233–256), and H. D. Meyer (*Historia,* XII [1963], 405–446).

[2] Hdt. 7. 138.

[3] Herodotus does not tell us where the meeting took place. Diodorus (11. 3) places it at the Isthmus of Corinth, while Pausanius (3. 12. 6) says it met at the Hellenion in Sparta. Most scholars accept the version of Diodorus, but as Brunt argues (*ibid.,* 148, n. 2), there is no reason to do so.

sive alliance, with Sparta at its head, made up of states bound together by a common danger and by solemn oaths. This was the organization that met again at the Isthmus of Corinth in the spring of 480 to plan the strategy that led to victory at Salamis and later to the decisive victories at Plataea and Mycale. Although Sparta was the leader, and most of the members of the Spartan alliance were also members of the new confederation, this was not merely an extension of the Peloponnesian League.[4] The new group included cities such as Athens, Plataea, Thespiae, and cities of the Aegean islands, which were not members of the Peloponnesian League previously. More important, the Spartans were given command of all the military forces only after a discussion whose nature was contrary to the very essence of the Spartan alliance.[5] The confederation against Persia had no official title, and its members are referred to variously as "the Greeks," "the Greeks who undertook the war against the barbarians," etc.[6]

At their first congress, the Greeks swore an oath whose exact nature we do not know. It is, of course, clear that they promised to fight the Persians "for the common freedom." [7] It is more than likely that they all swore to have the same friends and enemies, and this implied the cessation of quarrels among the allied states.[8] Athens and Aegina, in fact, put aside the conflict that had occupied them for

[4] The authors of *ATL* believe that it was (95–100), but the contrary arguments of Brunt (*loc. cit.*) are more persuasive.

[5] Herodotus (8. 3) tells us that the Athenians had claimed command of the navy but had yielded to the wishes of the allies. No such argument could be contemplated in the Peloponnesian League.

[6] The authors of *ATL* think its name was the "Lacedaemonians and their allies" (III, 97), which is consistent with their belief that it was merely an extension of the Peloponnesian League. Larsen (*op. cit.*, 177), on the other hand, thinks the new organization was called ἡ συμμαχία τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Brunt's arguments (*ibid.*, 145–146) seem decisive against both. It is hard not to agree with his statement that since the Serpent Column, which records the names of the members of the league against Persia, and is the only official document of that league that we have, has at its head merely "The following fought the war," we may conclude that no general name for the league was given, "because there was none to give." (146)

[7] Hdt. 7. 148; Diod. 11. 3. 4, περὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας.

[8] Brunt, *op. cit.*, 157; Hdt. 7. 145 tells that the allies promised to "put an end to all their enmities and wars with each other."

some time. That the promise to fight for the common freedom included an obligation to free the Greek cities of the Aegean and its littoral is made clear by the admission of the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians into the league in 479 [9] and by the league's operations in the Hellespont under Pausanias. The question remains whether or not the alliance was meant to be perpetual. Our sources provide no positive statement that it was, but there is a good deal of evidence that in fact, and in the minds of the members, it persisted even into the Peloponnesian War. Almost twenty years after the formation of the league against Persia, when the Spartans were threatened with a helot rebellion, they called upon their allies for help. Among those who came were the Plataeans [10] and the Athenians.[11] When the Spartans became suspicious of the Athenians and sent them home, the Athenians "abandoned the alliance that they had made with them against the Mede." [12] As late as 427 the Spartans could justify their attack on Plataea by alleging that the Plataeans were in violation of the old treaty against the Persians in siding with the Athenians, who, they further argued, were enslaving Greeks. "Assert your own autonomy," the Spartans urged. "Help liberate the others who shared the dangers with you at that time [during the Persian Wars], swore the same oaths with you, and are now under Athenian rule." [13]

It is clear, then, that during the war against Persia the Greeks formed an alliance of unlimited duration for the purpose of defeating the enemy and winning and maintaining Greek freedom. The allies seem to have been bound to stay at peace with one another and to come to the assistance of a state under attack or in danger of

[9] Hdt. 9. 104.

[10] 3. 54. 5.

[11] 1. 102.

[12] *Idem.*

[13] 2. 72. 1. Larsen (*CP*, XXVIII [1933], 262–265 and *HSCP*, LI [1940], 175–213) believes that the continuing alliance was organized not in 481 but at Plataea in 479. He believes in the historicity of the Covenant of Plataea reported by Plutarch (*Arist.* 21. 1–2) and lately supported by A. E. Raubitschek (*TAPA*, XCI [1960], 178–183). The authors of the *ATL*, (III, 101–104) and Brunt (*op. cit.*, 153–156) regard the covenant described by Plutarch as spurious. For our purposes it is not important whether the continuing character of the Hellenic alliance originated in 481 or 479.

losing its freedom. Unlike the Peloponnesian League, the Hellenic alliance was not based on a series of separate treaties between the states and a hegemonal power. Instead, it was the product of a general covenant which was freely accepted but which did not permit secession. Sparta was chosen to be the hegemonal power, but her hegemony was of a different sort from that which she exercised in the Peloponnesian alliance. Although a Spartan was always commander in chief of any expedition, he needed the consent of the generals from the allied states to carry out his policy. On several occasions the Spartans were compelled to yield and carry out a policy that they did not approve. The covenant made no provision for regular meetings or for financial support. The league was a revolutionary innovation in the relations between the Greek states, made less shocking by the Persian emergency and certain similarities to the familiar Spartan alliance. Its goals and organization, however, were far vaguer than those of that alliance. Only experience would make clear what the true nature of the new league would be.[14]

Immediately after the Greek naval victory at Mycale, the Hellenic League was put to the test. The Ionian cities revolted from Persian rule and appealed to the league for support.[15] The challenge could not be avoided, for it was clear that the Greek force could not guard the rebels forever, yet if the Greeks departed, the Ionians would be left to face the vengeance of Persia. As early as this moment we can discern the disagreement among the Greeks that would soon split them into two hostile camps. The Peloponnesians argued that the Ionians should abandon their homelands and settle on land confiscated from Greeks who had sided with Persia. Even had this been possible, it could scarcely have appealed to the Ionians, who found a champion in the Athenians. The Athenians had an interest in the decision, for they had colonies in the area under discussion and were not eager to abandon them. They argued strongly against withdrawal and won their point. The rebellious islanders were sworn into the Hellenic League, and the Greeks set off for the Hellespont to destroy the bridges that Xerxes had built to connect Asia with

[14] For a discussion of the connection between this league and earlier types of organizations, see F. R. Wüst, *Historia,* III (1954–5), 129–153.

[15] Hdt. 9. 104.

Europe.[16] When the Greeks arrived they found that the Persians had broken the bridges. The Spartan king Leotychidas wasted no time in abandoning the campaign and returning to Greece. The Athenians, however, commanded by Xanthippus, remained to lay siege to the city of Sestus on the Chersonese.[17] It is at this point that Thucydides began his account of the growth of that Athenian power that he believed frightened Sparta into war. Sparta was still hegemon of the Hellenic League, but at the first test her traditional conservatism led her to abandon her responsibility. The new element was the demonstrated willingness of Athens to undertake the burden. The fall of Sestus within a few months proved her ability to do so successfully; Sparta was not the only state capable of providing leadership.[18]

Events in Athens now widened the schism. After the departure of the Persians, the Athenians brought back their families from Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen, where they had taken refuge, and began to rebuild their walls.[19] This was a perfectly reasonable action, for the destruction of their homes and temples would make any people eager to safeguard their city against a future attack. The Peloponnesians, moreover, had been reluctant to defend any cities north of the Isth-

[16] Hdt. 9. 106.

[17] Hdt. 9. 114.

[18] The change in leadership in the war against Persia after 478 is seen in quite a different way by H. D. Meyer (*Historia,* XII [1963], 405–446). In his view it was the result of an Athenian plot carried through in conjunction with Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. There is no space to refute his arguments here, but I find them unconvincing, for they take no note of domestic politics in Sparta and Athens and, most important, ignore the very real possibility that the threat from Persia was not ended and might at any time be realized by a new invasion. Another interesting study, which arrives at different conclusions from the ones offered here, is by R. Sealey (*ASI,* 233–255). In characteristically hardheaded fashion he cautions against an overly idealized view of Greek life. In his judgment, "the League of Delos was founded because of a dispute about booty and its purpose was to get more booty." Such a view is altogether too simple to fit the complicated motives of human actions. It is enough to point out that at least the Greeks of the Ionian mainland, who had just been freed from the Persians and were in imminent danger of reconquest, however many or few they may have been, were interested in something more than booty.

[19] 1. 89.

mus and gave little reason for confidence in a system of collective security based on unfortified cities. The Athenians had built walls round their city in the past without raising any complaints. The events of the Persian War, however, and particularly of the last winter, had changed the climate of Greek opinion. The Spartans, of course, generally preferred to see the Greek towns unwalled and thus more open to coercion by the threat of the Spartan phalanx.[20]

In their eagerness to put the war behind them and to return to normal conditions, the Spartans would probably have ignored the fortification of Athens, but their allies urged them to take action. The allies (Thucydides does not specify, but we may imagine they included Aegina and Megara, old enemies of Athens, and possibly Corinth as well) sent the Spartans to Athens to request that the Athenians should not rebuild their walls but should join them in a policy of razing all walls outside the Peloponnese. They gave the rather implausible grounds that this would deprive the Persians of fortified bases if they should undertake another expedition against Greece.[21] The real reason for the request was that the allies were afraid "of the size of the Athenian fleet, which had not previously been great, and of the daring that the Athenians had shown in the Persian War." [22]

The Athenians ignored the Spartan request and, thanks to the cleverness of Themistocles, were able to build their wall to a defensible height before anything could be done to hinder them. When word came that Athens was safely defended by her wall, Themistocles announced the fact to the Spartans and took the opportunity to apprise them of the new realities in the Hellenic world. Athens was now a walled city and able to protect its inhabitants. "If the Spartans or their allies wish to send embassies to us from now on, they must come with the understanding that we know very well what is in our own interest and in the general interest." [23] The wall was, in the judgment of Athens, advantageous to the Athenians and to all the

[20] 1. 90. 1.

[21] 1. 90. 1–2. As Gomme (*Hist. Comm.*, I, 258) puts it, "a poor excuse, for the possession of walled towns such as Thebes and Athens had not determined the strategy of the Persians."

[22] 1. 90. 1.

[23] 1. 91. 4–5.

allies, "for it is impossible to have an equal or similar weight in the common council except on the basis of equal military power." [24] This amounted to a declaration of independence from Spartan leadership and an assertion of equality in the conduct of the affairs of the Hellenic League. It opened the way for the foundation of the Delian League, but it also was the beginning of the suspicion and fear that would one day lead Sparta to make war on Athens. Up to that point the Spartans were very well disposed to Athens because of its role in the war against Persia. After the speech of Themistocles they showed no resentment and went home without making a formal complaint, "but they were secretly embittered." [25]

The assertiveness of Themistocles seems to have strengthened the influence of the Spartan faction, which favored continued Spartan leadership of the Hellenic campaign against Persia. In the withdrawal of Leotychidas after Mycale we may see the activity of the conservative faction, which was eager to give up extra-Peloponnesian adventures. No doubt they imagined that the Spartan withdrawal would mean the abandonment of the campaign and the return to tranquillity, whatever the cost to the Greek cities still under Persian rule. The Athenian assumption of command, the successful siege of Sestus, the fortification of Athens, and the bold declaration of equality by Themistocles must have damaged their cause among the people of Sparta. It must have been on a wave of anger and disillusionment that the war party came to power, reversed the policy that had recalled Leotychidas, and sent King Pausanias into the Aegean to reassert Spartan hegemony.[26] The immediate results were very pleasing. Spartan leadership was accepted by the Athenians without question, for among Pausanias' fleet were thirty ships from Athens. Pausanias attacked Cyprus, conquered most of it, and then took Byzantium from the Persians.[27]

At this point the influence of transcendent historical forces, whatever their weight at other times, yielded to the peculiarities of the individual. There is some reason to believe that the Spartans might have led the fight for freedom against Persia and maintained their

[24] 1. 91. 7.
[25] 1. 92. 1.
[26] 1. 94. 1.
[27] *Idem.*

undivided hegemony for some time had Pausanias' character been different. In fact, he was arrogant, tyrannical, and venal: "The commanders of the allies were treated with anger and harshness, while he punished the soldiers with whippings or by compelling them to stand all day carrying an iron anchor. No one could get bedding or food, or go down to the spring for water before the Spartans; their servants armed with whips drove away anyone who tried." [28] Small wonder that the Greeks from outside the Peloponnese, unaccustomed to Spartan arrogance, brought charges against Pausanias ranging from tyranny to treason. The Spartans were compelled to recall him and to put him on trial. For the Spartans this must have been more than merely an inquest into the alleged misconduct of a king. It could not avoid becoming a struggle over policy between the two factions. The war party was still strong enough to win an acquittal on the charge of treason and to have Dorcis sent out to replace Pausanias.[29] Their victory was less than complete, for Pausanias was held to account for the personal wrongs he had committed and, more important, the force sent with Dorcis was very small.[30]

The policy of the war party collapsed totally when the allies refused to accept Dorcis as their leader. He and his subordinates returned to Sparta, and the Spartans sent no substitute. Thucydides tells us that the Spartans feared a repetition of the Pausanias affair: "They also wanted to be rid of the Persian war and believed that the Athenians were competent to lead and were at the present time well disposed to the Spartans." [31] These must be the reasons offered by the peace party for the reversal of Spartan policy that they had brought about.

The Ionians and islanders who had been so affronted by Pausanias wasted no time in seeking a new leader. To understand the early history of the Delian League, we must remember that the initiative for its foundation came not from Athens but from those cities she would one day dominate. On the grounds of common Ionian kinship, they pleaded with the Athenians to take the hegemony and defend

[28] Plut. *Arist.* 23. 2–3.

[29] 1. 95. The argument in *ATL,* I, 192 that Dorcis was sent out to replace Pausanias immediately on the latter's recall in the summer of 478 is persuasive.

[30] Thuc. 1. 95. 6.

[31] 1. 95. 7.

them against Pausanias should the need arise.[32] Thucydides tells us plainly that Athens assumed the leadership by the will of the allies (ἑκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων), and the evidence supports him.[33] It is clear that the Athenians required some degree of persuasion; leading the allies against Persia without Peloponnesian support, possibly in the face of Peloponnesian resentment, had some dangers. The Athenians could not know if the Ionians and islanders would prove loyal and willing to face the hardships and costs of the campaign. They were also wary lest the allies merely use them as a threat with which to persuade the Spartans to take a more vigorous role in the Aegean.

Such considerations must have shaped Aristides' reply to the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and other allied captains who came to persuade the Athenians to accept the hegemony. He saw the need and the justice of their proposals, but insisted upon some action that would give the Athenians confidence in them and make it impossible for them to change sides again. Uliades of Samos and Antagoras of Chios immediately insulted Pausanias and drove him from Byzantium.[34] The die was cast, and the allies had proven their eagerness for Athenian leadership.

Their appeals did not fall on deaf ears. The Athenians were, in fact, glad to assume a leading role. It is plain that the tact and gentleness of the Athenian commanders, Aristides and Cimon, was calculated to exploit Pausanias' unpopularity to the advantage of Athens.[35] Herodotus spoke the simple truth when he said that the Athenians "offered the *hybris* of Pausanias as a pretext" when they took away the Spartan hegemony.[36] Their eagerness is not difficult to understand. The Aegean and its borders were outside the normal sphere of Sparta's interest, and involvement in that region was as dangerous to Sparta as it was inviting. For Athens the situation was quite different. Recent events had shown that in case of Persian attack Athens was vulnerable. The Athenian economy was increasingly dependent upon trade, a large part of it in the Aegean and in the Hellespontine region. A significant part of the grain eaten by the

[32] 1. 95. 1.
[33] 1. 96. 1. See Appendix A.
[34] Plut. *Arist.* 23. 4–5.
[35] Diod. 11. 46. 4–5; Plut. *Arist.* 23, *Cim.* 6.
[36] Hdt. 8. 3.

Athenians came from the Ukraine through the Hellespont and the Aegean. It was in large part for these reasons that Athens had planted colonies on the Chersonese in the sixth century. She could not allow the Hellespont and northern Aegean to remain in Persian hands or under threat of Persian control.[37] Athens, moreover, felt an emotional attachment to the Ionians, and their abandonment to Persian rule would have been difficult for Athenian politicians to justify.[38] Finally, coming on the heels of Marathon, Salamis could not fail to instill in the Athenians a new pride, confidence, and ambition, all of which are reflected in the speech of Themistocles to the Spartans. The needs of the allies, the conservative victory at Sparta, and the interests and ambitions of the Athenians all led to the formation of a new organization to fight Persia.

In the winter of 478/7 the allies met at Delos at what we might call a constitutional convention; Aristides the Athenian was probably chairman.[39] The assembly was probably made up of the commanders of the several allied contingents. The purposes of the new league were very much the same as those of the Hellenic League: to avenge Greek suffering by ravaging Persian territory [40] and to liberate those Greeks still under Persian rule.[41] But these were not the only goals, for the members swore to have the same friends and

[37] For a good recent account of Athenian economic developments in this period, see A. French, *The Growth of the Athenian Economy* (London, 1964), especially Chapter 3.

[38] Herodotus (6. 21) tells us that some time after the sack of Miletus by the Persians in 494, which put an end to the Ionian rebellion, Phrynichus presented a play on the subject which troubled the Athenians so much that the whole theatre broke into tears. They later fined the playwright "for reminding them of an evil that touched them so closely" and forbade the further presentation of the play. In the wake of the recent victory over Persia, no one could refuse to support the second Ionian rebellion.

[39] The convention (κοινὴ σύνοδος) is mentioned only by Diodorus (11. 47. 1). The discussion of the original constitution of the Delian League that follows depends chiefly on Larsen's article cited above and *ATL*, III, 225–233. Other useful accounts may be found in Victor Martin, *La vie internationale*, 145–185, and Busolt and Swoboda, *GS*, II, 1337–1360. Brunt (*op. cit.*) offers useful critical remarks on the views of Larsen and *ATL* as well as intelligent suggestions of his own. See also Raphael Sealey, *ASI*, 233–256.

[40] 1. 96. 1.

[41] 3. 10. 3.

enemies.[42] The permanence of the alliance was symbolized by the dropping of iron weights into the sea: the alliance was to last until the weights rose up again.[43]

It is important to notice that although the purposes of the Delian League were almost identical with those of the Hellenic League, the two leagues were not identical in membership, nor was the Delian League competent to act for the Hellenic League without Spartan consent.[44] The membership alone makes the difference very clear. The Hellenic League was composed of Peloponnesians, states from central Greece, and only later of states from the islands and Asia Minor. The Delian League included approximately twenty members from the islands, thirty-six from Ionia, thirty-five from the Hellespont, twenty-four from the region of Caria, and thirty-three from the region of Thrace.[45] It included no Peloponnesian cities but, "in the beginning, was primarily an organization of the Greek cities of the Aegean islands and the coast." [46] In the fourth century Aristotle could look back and see the formation of the Delian League as a "rebellion of the Ionians from the Spartan alliance," a judgment which was inexact but which indicates forcefully how completely independent the new league was from the old.

The true relation of the Delian League to the Hellenic League may be clearer to our generation than to an earlier one. It seems to have been General Alfred Gruenther who first compared the Delian League to NATO, and it is a useful analogy. As NATO is a regional organization, nominally within the principles of the United Nations Organization but really independent of it, composed of some UN members but very clearly excluding others, so too was the Delian League a regional organization, consisting of states who were also

[42] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23. 5.

[43] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23. 5; Plut. *Arist.* 25. 1. Larsen discusses previous opinion of the meaning of the ceremony in a footnote (*op. cit.*, 187, n. 5). Since Larsen wrote, Martin (*op. cit.*, 152, n. 1) has again doubted that it implied a permanent alliance. His arguments are refuted by Brunt (*op. cit.*, 150, n. 1). In this case the majority of scholars is certainly right in seeing the alliance as permanent.

[44] This is the view of Larsen, (*op. cit.*, 184). It is ably refuted in *ATL*, III, 231.

[45] The figures are calculated from the lists given in the *ATL*, III, 194–224.

[46] *ATL*, III, 224.

members of the Hellenic League but clearly excluding others. The Delian League no more required Spartan approval for its actions than NATO requires Russian approval for its. The Hellenic League might call on its Delian members for assistance and technically have the right to do so, just as the UN may call on its members for military or financial support. The hegemon of the former could not be confident of the response any more than the Secretary-General can today. After the foundation of the Delian League the Hellenic League had an increasingly shadowy existence and collapsed at the first real test.

The Delian League became increasingly significant because its purposes were essential to its members and because its organization was clearer, simpler, and more effective than either of the two interstate coalitions that had preceded it. The oaths that sealed the constitutional covenant were taken by Aristides for Athens, on the one hand, and by the Ionians, which means the allies,[47] on the other. From the beginning Athens was recognized as hegemon. The allies swore to have the same friends and enemies as Athens and also appointed the Athenian Aristides to assess the contributions of each state. They chose Athenians only as the financial officials of the league,[48] and Athenian generals commanded all league campaigns.

Hegemony was not domination. In the early period of the league, at least, the Athenians exercised what Thucydides called a "hegemony over autonomous allies who participated in common synods." [49] It is clear that sessions of the synod determined policy in the early history of the league and decided what should be done about recalcitrant or rebellious states. In this synod all members, including Athens, the hegemon, had only one vote.[50] In theory Athens was only an equal partner in the synod, no stronger politically than Samos, Lesbos, or even Seriphos. In fact, the system of equal votes, as the Mytileneans were later to point out, worked in Athens' favor.

[47] *ATL*, III, 227, n. 9.

[48] Walker (*CAH*, V, 46) believes that in the beginning the Hellenotamiae were not Athenian but Delian. For a convincing refutation of this argument, see *ATL*, III, 230, n. 26.

[49] 1. 97. 1.

[50] This is made clear by the speech of the Mytileneans in Thuc. 3. 10–11. The best discussions of the organization and operation of the synod may be found in Larsen, *op. cit.*, 192–197 and *ATL*, III, 138–141.

The greatness of Athenian naval and military power combined with Athens' enormous prestige guaranteed that the numerous small and powerless states would be under her influence, while the larger states such as Samos, Mytilene, Chios, and Thasos, who might have challenged Athenian domination, were easily outvoted. As the Mytileneans put it, "The allies were unable to unite to defend themselves because of the great number of voters." [51] From the beginning, then, Athens was in the happy position of dominating the Delian League without the appearance of illegality or tyranny.

Whatever the disadvantages of such an arrangement, it had one enormous advantage: the league could act swiftly and decisively. There could be no defection on the brink of a campaign such as the one by Corinth that had halted Cleomenes' attack on Athens. As Pericles implied, it was different from the Spartan alliance because it had a common political assembly that could quickly collect to take emergency action.[52] Athens, moreover, had and used the power to see that league decisions were carried out. The hegemonal power collected the contributions to the league treasury strictly and punished refusal to participate in campaigns.[53] The league, unlike its predecessors, even forbade private wars among its members, and Athens punished transgressors.[54]

The Delian League represented an advance over the Spartan alliance in another important aspect: its financial arrangements. Up to the conflict with Athens the Spartan alliance had little need for money. Campaigns were almost always on land, and the Spartans demanded from their allies only that they send the required military contingents. In the forth century the Spartans sometimes required money payments, but the character of their alliance guaranteed that these were for a special purpose and would not continue after the campaign was over. The Delian League, on the contrary, was chiefly a naval confederation whose purposes required that it maintain a fleet in being for an indefinite period. This was a costly undertaking and demanded a well-organized system for regular payments into the league treasury. Athens was given the responsibility of making the

[51] 3. 10. 5.
[52] 1. 41. 6.
[53] 1. 99. 1; 6. 76. 3.
[54] 6. 76. 3; Larsen, *op. cit.,* 188–190.

assessment and of collecting the money. Until 454/3 the treasury was at Delos; after that date it was transferred to Athens. From the beginning there was a distinction between those states who provided ships and manned them and those who paid money in lieu of serving themselves. The burden of providing, manning, and maintaining ships varied with necessity but was often heavier on those who did so than on those who merely paid money and received protection. Heaviest of all was the burden borne by Athens, which not only provided leadership but the largest fleet as well, which she manned and maintained. No doubt, booty collected from the Persians was expected to, and did, meet some of the cost, but the expenditure of time, effort, and lives was not insignificant. We can well understand why "most of the allies allowed their assessments to be changed from ships to money because of their reluctance to embark on military campaigns and so that they might not be away from home." [55] Of course, as the allies shrank from responsibility, the Athenians accepted more of it. This centralizing tendency helped make the league more effective against external enemies, but it led to a gradual but decisive change in the nature of the organization.

By the time of the Peloponnesian War, Athenian statesmen were willing to admit that the Delian League had become an empire and that Athens ruled it as a tyrant.[56] Although we may agree with Thucydides that "the allies themselves were responsible" [57] for the transition to empire, it is important to see how the change took place and by what means the Athenians imposed their will. The first recorded action of the league was the siege of Eion undertaken under the command of Cimon in the autumn of 477.[58] In the next year it was taken from the Persians, and its inhabitants were enslaved.[59] This action was clearly a legitimate step in the war against

[55] 1. 99. 3.

[56] 2. 63. 3.

[57] 1. 99.

[58] 1. 98. 1. For the date, see *ATL*, III, 175–179.

[59] 1. 98. 1. Since Thucydides uses the word ἠνδραπόδισαν, we may be confident that the citizens of Eion were literally enslaved. He often uses δουλεύειν, which can mean the same thing, but when he applies it to cities rather than individuals, it means political subordination, the absence of autonomy, rather than personal slavery. For a clear explanation of Thucydides' use of δουλεύειν, see *ATL*, III, 155–177.

Persia and must have caused no problem. In the same year the forces of the league captured the Aegean island of Scyros, which was inhabited by Dolopians. They were enslaved and an Athenian cleruchy was established on the island.[60] Although the Athenians profited from this expedition, the allies seem not to have objected, and in fact, they had reason to be pleased. The Dolopians who lived on Scyros were a semibarbarous people who made their living by piracy. When the Athenians expelled them, "they liberated the Aegean." [61] The establishment of an Athenian colony was a good way to guarantee continued freedom from piracy in that quarter of the Aegean.

Some time in the next few years the league launched an expedition against Carystus on the island of Euboea. This city was neither under Persian control like Eion nor a pirate state like Scyros, and, so far as we know, it had committed no action to merit an attack. On the other hand, the Carystians had fought on the Persian side in the recent war and so could expect little sympathy from the allies. The usual assumption is that Carystus had held aloof from the Delian League and that this expedition was undertaken to compel her to join.[62] This is supported by Thucydides' statement that the Carystians were not backed by the other Euboean states and finally capitulated on terms.[63] Carystus later appears on the tribute lists as a member making regular money payments. This is the first case of compulsion used to force a state into the league, and it surely had general approval. Apart from the unpopularity of the Medizing Carystians, there were other reasons for the campaign. It would scarcely seem fair that a city should benefit from the league's war against the Persians and its protection from piracy, while allowing its neighbors to bear the cost. The Athenians acted with the support of the league, but the use of compulsion was ominous.

About 470 the island of Naxos, an original member, rebelled from the league. Thucydides does not tell us the reason for this rebellion,

[60] Thucydides (1. 98. 2) says merely ᾤκισαν αὐτοί, but Diodorus (11. 60. 2) makes it clear that it was a cleruchy, the first that we know to have been established under the League.

[61] Plut. *Cim.* 8. 3–6.

[62] *ATL*, III, 198; Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 281–282.

[63] 1. 98. 3.

only that after it had been reduced by siege Naxos was "the first allied city to be subjugated [ἐδουλώθη] in violation of the covenant."[64] We are not told precisely what that means, but it seems likely that Naxos was forbidden a navy and thus would thereafter pay tribute instead of supplying ships and men. Perhaps she received a garrison; perhaps she had some land confiscated, as well as her ships; and possibly an Athenian cleruchy was settled on the confiscated land.[65] Once again we may be sure that Athens had acted with the approval of the league. Rebellion could not be allowed or the alliance would soon disintegrate. But once more Athens emerged stronger than before, having placed violent hands upon fellow Greeks.

Thucydides uses the attack on Naxos as the occasion for a general account of the change in the nature of the league that makes it clear that Naxos was not the only state in rebellion and that increasingly harsh treatment of rebels was the rule. The rebellions came about when members were unwilling or unable to pay tribute, supply ships, or do military service; the Athenians were strict in the collection of tribute and the exaction of service. The demeanor of the Athenian commanders changed as well. The Athenians had gained the hegemony, we are told, in no small measure because of the mildness and tact of such men as Aristides, Xanthippus, and Cimon. Cimon was still on the scene, but the behavior and manner of the Athenian commanders changed with the new circumstances. "The Athenians were no longer equally pleasant as leaders. They no longer behaved as equals on campaigns, and they found it easy to reduce states that had rebelled."[66] From the allied point of view, the rebellions and reductions produced a vicious circle. As each rebellious state was forced to give up her fleet and to pay tribute, it became weaker and Athens proportionately stronger. "The Athenian fleet was increased by their payments, while whenever they themselves revolted, they set about the war without preparation and without experience."[67]

The growing discontent of the allies must have been increased by Cimon's great victory over the Persians at the Eurymedon River on

[64] 1. 98. 4. I follow Classen in thinking that τὸ καθεστηκός means the covenant of the league. See also Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 282.

[65] *ATL*, III, 156–157.

[66] 1. 99. 2.

[67] 1. 99. 3.

the Anatolian coast in 469.[68] The victory was so decisive, the damage to the Persians so great, the booty collected so considerable, as to lead some to believe that the alliance against Persia, with its burdensome payments and service, might no longer be necessary. The Athenians thought otherwise, and they may have been right, for the Persians had certainly not abandoned the Aegean.[69] The allies nevertheless became increasingly restive, and more compulsion became necessary.

In 465 the island of Thasos, a charter member of the league and a rich and powerful naval state, revolted. The causes of this rebellion were quite different from those that seem to have brought on the Naxian uprising. The Thasians broke away because of a disagreement with the Athenians over some trading stations on the Thracian coast opposite Thasos and a mine that the Thasians owned in the same area.[70] These holdings were very rich and their control by Athens would be a great blow to Thasos. At the same time the Athenians were establishing a colony of ten thousand Athenians and their allies at Ennea Hodoi, the site of the future Amphipolis, near the Thracian coast across from Thasos. To be sure, this was an undertaking of the league and made good strategic sense as a base against the Macedonians, but it was probably the foundation of this colony, which would extend Athenian influence to the neighborhood of Thasos, that brought on the rebellion.[71] The colony was abandoned after the colonists suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the natives, but Thasos underwent a siege that lasted for more than two years. When the Thasians surrendered they were forced to take down their walls, give up their ships, the Thracian coast, and the mine to the Athenians, to pay an immediate indemnity, and thereafter to pay tribute.[72] This was the harshest treatment yet imposed; it obviously brought great profit to the Athenians and could not help adding to their unpopularity. It must have been not long after

[68] 1. 100. 1; Plut. *Cim.* 12–14; Diod. 11. 60–62.

[69] Diodorus (11. 62) tells us that right after the battle the Persians, "fearing the growing power of Athens," set about building a great number of new triremes.

[70] 1. 100. 2.

[71] *ATL*, III, 258.

[72] 1. 101. 3.

the fall of Thasos that the situation in the alliance began to reach the condition described by Diodorus:

> In general, the Athenians were making great gains in power and no longer treated their allies with decency as they had done before; instead they ruled with arrogance and violence. For this reason most of the allies could not bear their harshness and spoke to one another of rebellion; some of them even disdained the league council and acted according to their own wishes.[73]

The independence and open defiance implied by the last sentence was, of course, impossible so long as Athens was undistracted. By 462, however, the Athenians were embroiled in a struggle with Sparta on the mainland. Throughout fifteen years she would be involved in a war on land and sea, ranging from Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean to the mainland of Greece. In these circumstances some disaffection was inevitable; the "Crisis of Athenian Imperialism"[74] was at hand. Under the pressure of war and rebellion the Athenians turned to ever harsher means to assure their control of the league. In the process they converted it into an empire.

[73] 11. 70. 3–4.

[74] This apt description is the title of an important article by Russell Meiggs (*HSCP*, LXVII [1963], 1–36).

3. *Sparta after the Persian War*

The Spartan decision to abandon the leadership of the Aegean campaign against Persia had not been taken lightly. An unfortunate combination of circumstances had brought it about, and we may be sure that it left many Spartans dissatisfied. The Persian War had brought Sparta power, influence, and respect unprecedented among the Greek states, but it had also produced a formidable rival to its unique position of leadership. It had offered tempting opportunities for an extension of Spartan influence and power as well as a chance to gain great wealth, but it also brought the prospect of heavy military responsibilities far from the Peloponnese and the danger of corruption in its officials and in its very way of life. Not only the foreign policy of Sparta but its constitution and culture were at stake in the policy debates in the years following the war.

There were, in fact, three choices available to the Spartans. The most ambitious would be to strive for the absolute hegemony over the Greeks by land and sea which Sparta had enjoyed during the war. There can be no doubt that this policy had the support of many Spartans, but it was defeated, for the time being at least, by the disgrace of Pausanias. The most conservative policy would have been to act as though the war had not taken place, to give up all ambitions outside the Peloponnese, and to concentrate on consolidating the Spartan alliance and maintaining the ancestral constitution. The advocates of this policy certainly supported the withdrawal of Pausanias and Dorcis, but their strictly Peloponnesian policy was not immediately victorious. The pride and glory won at Plataea and

Mycale were too fresh in everyone's memory to be so totally abandoned. There was a third possibility: to abandon the war on the sea, for which Sparta was not well suited, and to seek a field for Spartan influence on the Greek mainland, among the Medizers of Thessaly and central Greece. Such a policy would tacitly accept a dualism in the Greek world: Sparta would dominate the mainland, and Athens would control the Aegean. Such an arrangement would not conflict with the continuance of the Hellenic League, in which Sparta could expect to retain her primacy. It was this last policy that the Spartans chose in the years immediately after the Persian War.

It was probably in the spring of 476 that the Spartans moved to put this policy into effect.[1] They sent an expedition to Thessaly under King Leotychidas, the victor of Mycale, to put down the reigning family, the Aleuadae.[2] It was the perfect method for implementing the continental program, for the Aleuadae were Medizers, and Sparta's campaign could be seen as a patriotic obligation for the leaders of the Hellenic League, which had sworn to punish the traitors. At the same time it offered a splendid opportunity to spread Spartan influence on the Greek mainland. Leotychidas was successful on the battlefield, deposing the Thessalian princes Aristomedes and Angelos. All Thessaly lay before him, but once again the venality of a Spartan king undid the success of Spartan arms. Leotychidas accepted bribes from the Aleuadae, was brought back to Sparta for trial, and went into voluntary exile in Tegea.

It was surely as part of the same policy that the Spartans proposed the exclusion from the Amphictyonic League of all states that had not fought against Persia.[3] Their chief targets were Thessaly, Thebes, and Argos, whose exclusion would guarantee Spartan domination of the important religious organizations of continental Greece. It would be a mistake to underestimate the political importance of these religious associations. We shall see that even Athens was con-

[1] It is not possible to establish the date of Leotychidas' expedition to Thessaly with absolute certainty, but I find the arguments of Busolt, *GG,* III: 1, 83, n. 1, and Grote (*A History of Greece* [4th ed.; London, 1872], IV, 349, n. 1) persuasive. Cf. Eduard Meyer, *GdA,* IV: 1, 489–490 and 490, n. 1.

[2] Hdt. 6. 72; Paus. 3. 7. 8; Plut. *De Mal. Herod.* 859 D.

[3] Plut. *Them.* 20. 3–4.

cerned to establish a religious basis for her imperial hegemony. This proposal of Sparta's was intended to provide a similar basis for her own ambitions on the continent. Unfortunately, Athens, in the person of Themistocles, intervened to thwart Sparta again. It is clear that his speech in behalf of the cities threatened with exclusion changed the course of the debate and defeated the Spartan motion. For this action especially, Plutarch tells us, the Spartans came to hate him and began to support his rival Cimon.[4]

The skill of Themistocles and the venality of Leotychidas had put a check to the expansion of Sparta into central and northern Greece, but the agitation for an active policy outside the Peloponnese was not yet silenced. The conflict over policy was in part a conflict of generations; the young Spartans who had thrilled to the joy of victory and had seen the opulence and comparative luxury of cities not bound by the laws of Lycurgus were not eager to subside into the austere confines of Laconia and the Peloponnese. Diodorus records a debate in Sparta in 475 that reveals the division in Spartan opinion.[5] There were many who thought that Sparta had lost the hegemony of the sea without any reason; they were angry with the states who had fallen away from them and joined the Athenian alliance. At a meeting of the gerousia they proposed a war against Athens to regain control of the sea, and at a meeting of the assembly to consider the proposal, the youth of Sparta and a majority of the other members were eager to regain naval hegemony. Diodorus outlines the reasons for their enthusiasm: as naval hegemon, "they would enjoy great wealth, Sparta would become greater and more powerful, and the houses of the private citizens would receive a great increase in their prosperity."[6] The appeal of these frankly imperialistic goals almost carried the day, but at the crucial moment Hetoemaridas, a venerable man of noble lineage and respected character, rose in opposition. We are told merely that he advised that Athens be allowed to keep her naval hegemony, "since it was not advantageous to Sparta to dispute over the sea."[7] Diodorus does not tell us what arguments he offered in support of this advice, but to

[4] *Idem.*

[5] Diod. 11. 50. See Appendix B.

[6] 11. 50. 3–4.

[7] *μὴ συμφέρειν γὰρ τῇ Σπάρτῃ τῆς θαλάττης ἀμφισβητεῖν* 11. 50. 6.

the general surprise it was adopted, and Sparta gave up all thought of a war against Athens.

The story is important, for it shows us clearly the strength and the purposes of the imperial party at Sparta, a party that never failed to play a role in Spartan affairs. The general conservatism of the Spartans should not blind us to the tension within the Spartan state. Strong discipline and tradition prevented the success of the imperial policy most of the time, but the pressure of the imperialists was constant and, on occasion, decisive. Normally the imperialists could not hope to succeed without the leadership of an able king who shared their views. A Cleomenes, a Pausanias, an Agesilaus, or, in unusual circumstances, an almost royal subject like Lysander was needed to defeat the powerful forces of tradition and inertia.

In 475, however, circumstances combined to support inertia. Both Spartan kings, Pausanias and Leotychidas, able generals and ambitious imperialists, had disgraced themselves and discredited their policies. The vacuum caused by their downfall was filled by the respected elders of the gerousia, who were suspicious of the dangers and the corrupting influence of an ambitious foreign policy. They trusted Athens because they had confidence in her leaders, men like Aristides and Cimon. If Themistocles had been in control of Athenian policy, it seems likely that he would have offered some provocation that would have played into the hands of the anti-Athenian forces at Sparta. But Cimon, supported by Sparta, was firmly in control at Athens, proof of the wisdom of the Spartan peace party.

Themistocles, of course, was a lingering threat to Sparta and to its friends in Athens. It was probably about the time when the Spartans were discussing their policy towards Athens or a little earlier that they tried to get rid of Themistocles.[8] They incited the

[8] The chronology of the career of Themistocles is a notoriously difficult question on which there is little agreement. Busolt (*GG*, III: 1, 112, n. 2) provides a useful and detailed discussion, but I believe that the evidence is not such as to produce certainty. With some hesitation I accept the chronology offered by Robert J. Lenardon (*Historia,* V [1956], 401–419 and VIII [1959], 23–48) whose discussion carefully considers all the evidence and analyzes the modern scholarship as well. For my purpose here, the absolute chronology is not very important; all that is required is the relation of the important events to one another. The sequence I advocate, a trial at Athens brought on by the Spartans in which Themistocles is acquitted on a charge

enemies of Themistocles to lodge an accusation of treason against him, providing them with money and with testimony that he was implicated in the crimes of Pausanias. Perhaps the Spartan involvement was too obvious or the recollection of Themistocles' great deeds too fresh; he was acquitted and his popularity enhanced.[9] This turn of events must have alarmed his enemies. They combined against him and succeeded in ostracizing him.[10] Far from putting an end to Spartan troubles, the ostracism only aggravated them. Themistocles went to live in Argos and visited other places in the Peloponnese as well.[11] As Beloch put it, "These were not pleasure trips" [12] and caused Sparta much anguish. In Argos itself a democracy was introduced to replace the oligarchy that had ruled since the Persian War.[13] The vigor produced by the new constitution soon made itself felt in foreign affairs. The Argive democrats determined to restore the power and prestige of their city, and within a few years they had, in one way or another, reduced Mycenae, Tiryns, Cleonae, Hysiae, Mideia and Orneae. The Argolid had been unified under Argive control, and Sparta was faced with a formidable threat on her eastern flank.[14]

At the same time the winds of change were blowing in the north-

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of Medism and bribetaking, the ostracism of Themistocles, his activities in the Peloponnese, another Spartan accusation, and the flight of Themistocles to Persia, is supported by Grote, (IV, 370–372) and Lenardon, among others.

[9] Diod. 11. 54.

[10] Thuc. 1. 135. 3; Diod. 11. 55. 3; Plut. *Them.* 22, *Cim.* 10, *Arist.* 25; Nepos, *Them.* 8; Plato *Gorgias* 516 D. For a discussion of the political union against Themistocles, see Busolt, *GG*, III: 1, 110–112.

[11] 1. 135.

[12] *GG* [2], II: 1, 146, n. 20.

[13] It is impossible to date the introduction of democracy into Argos with precision. We know merely that an oligarchy ruled in Argos up to the Persian War, and that by the time of the Peace of Nicias a democracy had replaced it. Most scholars agree that the democracy was introduced between the Persian War and the alliance between Argos and Athens in 461 (Busolt, *GG*, III: 1, 113–114 and 114, n. 3). With Glotz and Cohen (*HG*, 123), I associate the establishment of democracy with the arrival of Themistocles. Probably the democratic spirit spreading through the Peloponnese had already changed the Argive constitution, and this led him to choose Argos as a refuge. For a different interpretation and chronology, see W. G. Forrest, *CQ*, N.S., X (1960), 221–241.

[14] Diod. 11. 65; Strabo 8, p. 373; Thuc. 5. 47 and 77.

western Peloponnese. Elis, once a quiet region divided among several small villages, was now unified into a single state. The region thereafter grew in prosperity, population, and power.[15] It is clear that the unification was the result of a democratic movement that had made its way even to pastoral Elis.[16] The Eleian democrats, like their Argive equivalents, were ambitious and aggressive. Before long they had begun the conquest of Tryphilia on the border of Messenia. Unlike their oligarchic predecessors, they were not friendly to Sparta but sought friendship with states of similar constitutional organization, like Argos and Athens.

To these Peloponnesian disturbances around this time was added the unification of Mantinea in Arcadia, once again brought about by a democratic faction hostile to Sparta.[17] It is hard to believe that Themistocles, living in Argos and traveling to other Peloponnesian states, had nothing to do with these developments. It is not likely, however, that he had anything to do with bringing newly democratic Argos together with its old enemy Tegea. That unlikely alliance seems to have been the result of an assertion of Tegean independence in the face of Spartan disrepute and apparent weakness. The Tegeans had sheltered Leotychidas when he fled from Sparta, and they could not have won many Spartan friends in so doing. Perhaps they feared a Spartan reprisal; in any event, they concluded a treaty with the Argives. Sparta responded by attacking Tegea and, after a hard battle in which Tegea was supported by Argos, defeated the enemy.

Very shortly thereafter Spartan hegemony was tested by a revolt of all the Arcadian cities except Mantinea. Once again the Spartan phalanx was successful against a numerically superior opponent.[18] With the advantage of hindsight, we now know that this victory put an end to unrest in the Peloponnese for some time, but to the Spartans the extent of their success was not yet apparent. It seems very likely that they tried to strengthen their hold over the allies at this time by introducing the *xenagoi,* Spartan officials who supervised allied contingents, led them to the appointed rendezvous, and as-

[15] Diod. 11. 54; Paus. 5. 4. 3; Strabo 8, p. 336.

[16] Busolt and Swoboda, *GS,* I, 156 and n. 1; Busolt, *GG,* III: 1, 117.

[17] Strabo 8, p. 337; Busolt, *GG,* III: 1, 118–119.

[18] Hdt. 9. 35; Paus. 3. 11. 7; Busolt, *GG,* III: 1, 120–123 and 121, n. 1.

signed them to their battle stations.[19] This tightening of discipline within the Spartan alliance offered little protection against subversion within the allied cities, and so the Spartans directed their attention to a major instigator of revolutionary activities, Themistocles. They claimed to have evidence of his complicity in the treasonable activities of Pausanias and demanded that he should be tried before the Hellenic League. This was at once an attack on a dangerous enemy and a reminder to the Greeks that the Hellenic League was still alive and that a revitalized Sparta still claimed leadership over it. The Athenians were persuaded to surrender Themistocles for trial, which would have meant sure condemnation in a body always dominated by Sparta. Athenian officials, accompanied by Spartans, were sent out to arrest him and bring him to trial, but he was warned in advance and fled, first to Corcyra and ultimately to a position of honor and safety with the Great King.[20] From the Spartan point of view, Themistocles' exile was quite satisfactory, for it removed the fomenter of revolution from the Peloponnese and allowed Sparta to consolidate its military gains, restore its hegemony in the Peloponnese, and repair its damaged prestige.[21]

To the peace party, the events of the years since the great debate of 475 must have fully vindicated its conservative policy. There had been troubles enough in the Peloponnese to occupy the limited Spartan forces without begging for more in a struggle against Athens. The end to adventurous policies had also brought an end to corruption and immorality in the highest places. By no means least important, confidence in the Athenians had been fully justified. They had taken no part in the Peloponnesian uprisings, had given no aid to

[19] Busolt and Swoboda, *GS*, II, 1323 and 1335.

[20] Thuc. 1. 135–138; Diod. 11. 54–56; Plut. *Them.* 23–29.

[21] The foregoing account assumes, with Busolt, that the Spartan victories at Tegea and Dipaea took place in the late 470's. A. Andrewes (*Phoenix*, VI [1952], 1–5) places the Battle of Tegea shortly before the outbreak of the helot rebellion of 465 and Dipaea a short time after it. W. G. Forrest (*CQ*, N.S., X [1960], 229–232) puts Tegea in 469 and Dipaea after the helot rebellion. Although there can be no certainty, I continue to prefer Busolt's arguments, but even if both battles took place as late as 465, our main argument is not seriously affected. We would merely need to say that the Spartans moved against Themistocles before his work in the Peloponnese had taken full effect.

the new democracies, and had been quite ready to turn Themistocles over to Spartan vengeance. Sparta, it could be argued, might now look forward to a return to the peace and quiet of the prewar period, to its virtuous ancestral ways, to a secure Peloponnesian hegemony, defended from barbarian attack by a trusted and reliable Athens. The more militant Spartans might point out that it was an Athenian Themistocles who was at the root of many of their recent troubles and that it was the democratic movement begun in Athens that had revolutionized the Peloponnese. They might be jealous of Athenian prestige and chafe at the need for Athenian good-will to preserve Spartan security, but as long as friends of Sparta ruled at Athens, their cause was not hopeful. The hope of maintaining the new balance of power created by the Persian War rested on the Pnyx, the hill where the Athenian democracy chose its leaders and determined the policies of its state.

4. *Athens after the Persian War*

In Athens there had been no opposition to participation in the Delian League and to continued war against Persia. Themistocles, his political opponents Aristides and Xanthippus, and the rising young politician Cimon all played a leading role in the foundation and early growth of an active policy in the Aegean. If Themistocles was the father of the naval policy, it was Aristides who won over the allegiance of the allies and presided over the formation of the league and the assessment of the tribute, Xanthippus who took command of the first campaigns in the Hellespont, and Cimon who vigorously led the subsequent expeditions.

Like the Spartans, the Athenians could choose from three courses of action: they might refuse to involve themselves in any further action after Plataea and Mycale; they could try to exploit their new power and prestige to dominate all the Greek lands; or they might seek hegemony in the Aegean, leaving the mainland and the west to others. The first option had no supporters, but there was significant disagreement over the other two. The situation in Greece after the Persian War bears some resemblance to the condition of the victorious alliance after the Second World War. In each instance necessity had thrown together two states burdened with mutual suspicion. Differing opinions on war aims, strategy, and tactics had appeared during the war, but as long as there was a common enemy, these differences were muted. In each state some thought the differences transitory and hoped for a solution through mutual trust and accommodation. In each state others considered the differences impossible

of settlement and conflict inevitable. They sought, if not to bring on war immediately, at least to achieve the best possible strategic position for the inevitable clash. In the more recent experience, the "cold warriors" won in both Russia and the United States; in Greece, "peaceful coexistence" was victorious in both Athens and Sparta.

Themistocles was the leader of the faction favoring an aggressive Athenian policy. He tricked Sparta into permitting Athens to build defensive walls and fortify the Piraeus. He continued to sponsor a program of shipbuilding and encouraged the immigration of foreign craftsmen to provide the necessary skilled labor.[1] He was the leading advocate and exemplar of a hard policy toward the allies. Even before Mycale he had ruthlessly extorted money from the islanders of the Aegean. By threat of force he obtained contributions from Carystus and Paros as well as other islands.[2] The plucky citizens of Andros resisted Themistocles' bullying. To his assertion that they must pay because Athens was aided by the two great gods Persuasion and Necessity, the Andrians replied that they too had powerful indigenous gods—Poverty and Helplessness: "Possessed by these gods, we Andrians will not pay, for the power of Athens can never be stronger than our inability." [3] If we interpret the lyrics of Timocreon correctly, Themistocles' exactions were felt as far as Rhodes, where he interfered in the internal politics of the island as well.[4]

It is possible that Themistocles, who certainly had personal connections in western Greece, Italy, and Sicily, had plans for extending Athenian influence to those regions,[5] and that he conceived a plan to make Athens not just the greatest, but the only, naval power in Greece by a single treacherous stroke.[6] The authority for both these conjectures is suspect, but there is little doubt that Themistocles' aim was unchallenged supremacy for Athens over all the Greeks, a policy hostile toward Sparta. We have seen that the arrogance of his reply to the Spartans' objection to the fortification of Athens and the

[1] Diod. 11. 43. 3.

[2] Hdt. 8. 112.

[3] Hdt. 8. 111; Plut. *Them.* 21. 1.

[4] Timocreon is quoted by Plutarch (*Them.* 21. 1).

[5] The little evidence we have is collected and probably exaggerated by Glotz and Cohen (*HG*, II, 55–56).

[6] Plut. *Them.* 20. 1–2.

Piraeus embittered the Spartans and that his success in frustrating Sparta's attempt to drive Medizing states from the amphictyony further enraged them. The continued supremacy of Themistocles would ultimately mean war with Sparta.

Whatever the differences among other Athenian politicians, there was general agreement in opposing Themistocles. It might be expected that Aristides and Xanthippus, old enemies of Themistocles who had suffered ostracism at his hands, might resume their rivalry after the end of the emergency, but they were joined by other powerful noblemen. Cimon, the son of that Miltiades who had been heavily fined by an Athenian court and had died in prison, leaving his children burdened with the unpaid debt, joined in the coalition with the same Xanthippus who had been his father's prosecutor.[7] He had married off his sister Elpinice to Callias, the son of Hipponicus, the richest man in Athens, and brought him into the coalition.[8] He himself married Isodice, an Alcmaeonid, and it was Leobotes, son of Alcmaeon, who brought the charge that sent Themistocles into exile.[9] This union of Philaids with Alcmaeonids and Kerykes, which united old enemies among the richest and most influential families, has led some scholars to believe that the social question was paramount in Athenian politics at this time. They see Themistocles as the champion of democracy and his downfall as the product of a conservative coalition.[10] The facts do not seem to warrant such a conclusion. The Alcmaeonid Cleisthenes founded the Athenian democracy, and the Alcmaeonid Pericles fostered its development; there is no reason to think that the intervening Alcmaeonids opposed it. Aristides was certainly no enemy of a democratic Athens.[11] Whatever his private feelings, Cimon worked within the framework of the Athenian democracy, thrived as a popularly elected leader, and opposed no democratic proposals until Ephialtes' attack on the Areopagus in 462. It is plain that an attempt to check or reverse the

[7] Hdt. 6. 136.

[8] Plut. *Cim.* 4. 7; Athen. 589e; Nepos *Cim.* 1. 3–4.

[9] Plut. *Cim.* 4. 9; 16. 1; *Them.* 23. 1. In *Arist.* 25, Plutarch erroneously calls Alcmaeon the accuser. See Busolt *GG,* III: 1, 110–111.

[10] Busolt, *GG,* III: 1, 110–111; Glotz and Cohen, *HG,* II, 122.

[11] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23. 3 and 24. 3; Plut. *Arist.* 22. 1.

development of democracy in Athens was not the major aim of the coalition against Themistocles.

Equally unpersuasive is the associated charge that the social consequences of Themistocles' naval policy produced opposition. Later critics might charge that by turning the Athenians toward the sea, "he increased the authority of the demos as opposed to the nobles and filled them with presumption, since power now had come to sailors and boatswains and pilots," [12] but we have seen that his opponents supported the naval policy. Even before the Battle of Salamis, when Themistocles was trying to persuade the Athenians to abandon Attica and fight the Persians on the sea, Cimon led a band of his friends up to the Acropolis and dedicated his horse's bridle to Athena as a symbol of his support of the naval policy.[13]

It is clear that the major issue dividing the coalition from Themistocles was the policy of Athens toward Sparta. It must have been apparent to all his opponents that the safe and expedient course was to maintain friendly relations with the Spartans and to encourage their acquiescence to the emergence of Athens as the hegemonal power in the Aegean and the leader of the war against Persia.

For this policy Cimon was the natural leader. Young and vigorous, a brilliant campaigner on land and sea, wealthy and of noble stock, he would in any case have been a natural candidate for high position in the state. His patriotism and devotion to an ambitious foreign policy in the Aegean were beyond question. His gentle and pleasant demeanor, as well as his generosity, endeared him to the people. But what especially made him influential was his special relationship with Sparta. In manner, speech, and training he resembled a Spartan more than an Athenian; he named one of his sons Lacedaemonius; he was the Spartan *proxenus,* their formal representative, in Athens. Small wonder that the Spartans, in spite of his youth, supported him as the leading opponent of Themistocles.

Plutarch is certainly right when he reports that the Athenians were happy to see the favor the Spartans showed Cimon, for they received considerable benefit from the friendly relations he maintained.[14] Athens was left in peace as her fleet went about the business

[12] Plut. *Them.* 19. 4.
[13] Plut. *Cim.* 5. 2.
[14] Plut. *Cim.* 16.

of converting the Delian League into an Athenian empire. At the same time the steady and reliable policy of Cimon enabled the conservative party at Sparta to control their more ambitious opponents. The victory of Cimon and the defeat of Themistocles meant that, for the time being at least, Athens was content with a division of Greece into two spheres of influence. Like the enemies of Athens at Sparta, the enemies of Sparta at Athens had been neither destroyed nor convinced. As long as nothing disturbed the supremacy of Cimon in Athens and the peace party at Sparta, they could only wait.

If we are right in thinking that Themistocles was ostracized in 473, then Cimon's supremacy met with no serious challenge for about a decade. At the end of that time a new generation of politicians emerged to challenge his leadership and his policies. The first hints of trouble appeared during the Thasian campaign. After the Thasians had been beaten by Cimon at sea, they were forced to undergo a siege. Perhaps they were encouraged to hold out by the destruction of the Athenian colonists who had recently been sent to Ennea Hodoi on the Thracian mainland. In any case, they appealed to Sparta for help and were not refused, for the Spartans promised to relieve the pressure by invading Attica.[15] A great earthquake at Sparta prevented the promise from being kept, and the secret agreement did not come to light for some years at least, but as Grote

[15] Thuc. 101. 1. Some scholars have rejected this statement by Thucydides. Glotz and Cohen (II, 135), for instance, doubt that the Spartans made such a promise, "car c'était la guerre ouverte avec la Ligue de Délos." Walker (*CAH,* V, 72) doubts it also and conjectures that the story may derive from Stesimbrotus. The fullest argument for rejecting Thucydides on this point is made by Raphael Sealey (*Historia,* VI [1957]). He warns that Thucydides "is not so reliable an authority on events that occurred before the Peloponnesian War," and that "the historian should beware of statements about secret undertakings and unfulfilled intentions" (p. 369). He appears to have a higher opinion of Thucydides' reliability for the events of the Pentacontaetia and for their interpretation in a more recent article on "The Origin of the Delian League" (*ASI,* 233–255). We have here a straight statement of fact offered by Thucydides on his own authority, and no one has offered a reason why he should have been either misinformed or biased on this point. Most scholars have accepted Thucydides without question. See Grote, IV, 398–400; Busolt, *GG,* III: 1, 203; Meyer, *GdA,* IV: 1, 501–502; Beloch, *GG,* II^2: 1, 149; Bengtson, 189; Hammond *History of Greece* (Oxford, 1959), 290.

pointed out, the promise itself was very significant. "It marks the growing fear and hatred on the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens, merely on general grounds of the magnitude of her power, and without any special provocation. . . . The first intent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian War—is conceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta." [16] Ten years after its defeat by Hetoemaridas in the councils of Sparta, the war party was still strong enough to elect a majority in the ephorate willing to provoke a war with Athens. Had the secret agreement become public, it would have caused great difficulties for Cimon and his policy of friendship with Sparta, but his enemies were deprived of so useful a weapon.

When the attack came, it was on much weaker grounds than Spartan perfidy. In 463, in the third year of the siege, the Thasians surrendered on terms very favorable to Athens. Cimon must have been at the height of his popularity, yet his opponents took the opportunity to attack him on his return from Thasos. They charged that he had accepted bribes from King Alexander of Macedon not to invade that country, when he could have done so successfully.[17] We may dismiss the charge of bribery, as the Athenian jury did. Cimon's wealth and incorruptability were too well known for anyone to believe he would sacrifice his city's interest for money. The trial provided a forum for a debate on foreign policy. Cimon could be accused of lack of vigor in his pursuit of Athens' imperial interests in the northern Aegean, and at the same time, his Spartan policy could be attacked by implication. Cimon's defense shows that he clearly understood the intentions of his accusers. "I am not a proxenus," he said, "of rich Ionians and Thessalians, as some others are so that they may be courted and paid; I am proxenus of the Lacedaemonians and imitate and love their thrift and self-control, which I honor above any wealth, glorifying my city with wealth won from her enemies." [18] He successfully defended his policy of an aggressive war against Persia accompanied by friendship with Sparta and hurled the challenge back into the teeth of his accusers.

[16] Grote, IV, 399–400.

[17] On the surrender of Thasos, Thuc. 101. 3. On the attack on Cimon, Plut. *Cim.* 14. 2–3.

[18] Plut. *Cim.* 14. 3.

Among those accusers was Pericles, son of Xanthippus, a young man not much over thirty just making his debut as an important figure in Athenian politics. As the son of Xanthippus and Agariste, the niece of Cleisthenes, he was born into the aristocratic coalition that had opposed Themistocles and put Cimon into the position of leadership he still held in 463.[19] At first glance it might seem surprising to find him among the accusers of Cimon, but the situation had changed significantly since the leading men of Athens had combined to defeat Themistocles. For one thing, the object of the coalition had been accomplished. Themistocles had been gone from Athens for a decade and from Greece since 471. For another, relations between Athens and Sparta seemed to be going well, and the Spartan peace party appeared to be firmly in control. In the absence of an emergency, there was no reason why the great families of Athens should not return to their political rivalries, which went back at least to the beginning of the sixth century. If family rivalries meant anything at all, then Pericles was the obvious choice to oppose Cimon. His father, Xanthippus, had brought about the condemnation of Cimon's father and compelled Cimon to begin his career burdened by a heavy debt. Perhaps Cimon did not bear a grudge.[20] If not, he was an unusually forgiving man. More important, Pericles appears not to have forgotten the old rivalry. Tacitus was very shrewd when he said that it is human nature to hate those we have wronged. Pericles' election by the people to the role of accuser may have been prompted by the public recollection of his father's success in a similar role against Miltiades.

We would be mistaken, however, in thinking that Pericles' acceptance of the responsibility and his enthusiasm for it [21] resulted only from the old family feud [22] or from mere political opportunism. These certainly played a part in influencing his behavior. A man of his heritage, natural talents, and training could not fail to seek a career in politics and to aim for the highest position in the state.

[19] Plut. *Per.* 3 for his lineage. *Per.* 10. 4–5, *Cim.* 14–15, and Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 27 on the trial of Cimon and Pericles' debut.

[20] Such is the suggestion of Sealey (*Hermes,* LXXXIV [1956], 239).

[21] *οὗτος γὰρ ἦν τῶν κατηγόρων ὁ σφοδρότατος.* Plut. *Cim.* 14. 5.

[22] *Pace* C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford, 1952), 253.

Cimon, the old family enemy, barred the way and seemed to have unquestioned command of the field, so long as the political game were played according to the rules developed since the Persian War. The growth of popular government represented by the reforms of the 480's and the domination of Themistocles posed the gravest threat to the political position of the old families. Hipparchus, Megacles, Xanthippus, and Aristides had all been ostracized, leaving Themistocles, a man of doubtful lineage and demagogic tendencies, in sole command. The Persian War had come just in time to submerge factional strife in the fervor of national defense. Their services in the war raised the prestige and influence of the restored nobles. At its close they were determined not to lose the support of the people and to unite so that Themistocles could not pick them off one by one, as he had in the decade before the war. The result was the political coalition we have described above and the "Areopagite constitution," that Aristotle believes reigned at Athens from 479 to 462.[23]

Some modern scholars have doubted that there was such an "Areopagite constitution." [24] They point to Aristotle's failure to mention any constitutional changes in detail. He says merely, "The council of the Areopagus again grew strong after the Persian War, gaining their hegemony not by a formal decree, but because they were responsible for the Battle of Salamis." [25] When Ephialtes later attacked the Areopagus, he simply took away the additional powers (*epitheta*) by which it had become the guardian of the state.[26] The vagueness of these statements has produced suspicion, but there is little cause for it. The historian of Rome would find it difficult to point to specific measures by which the potentially democratic constitution established by the Hortensian Law of 287 became the nar-

[23] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 25. 1; 24. 3; 41. 2. For arguments in favor of the Aristotelean authorship of the *Athenaion Politeia,* which I accept, see James Day and Mortimer Chambers, *Aristotle's History of Athenian Democracy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), 1–4. Cf. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution,* 27–30.

[24] Day and Chambers (*Aristotle,* 126), for instance, say, "The Areopagite constitution is palpably unhistorical: it was constructed by Aristotle to close the gap between the second democracy of Cleisthenes and the radical fourth democracy begun by Ephialtes."

[25] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23. 1.

[26] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 25. 2.

row oligarchy that the Gracchi tried to destroy in 133. The upper classes, by means of the prestige gained in wars of survival, had merely accumulated unofficial powers, epitheta, one might say, by which they dominated the state. When the Gracchi attacked these usurped powers, the senate had no constitutional right to complain and was compelled to resort to violence. The "Areopagite constitution" had only seventeen years in which to establish itself before a split in the aristocracy brought it under attack, so no revolution was necessary to bring it down. Since Cimon was the unchallenged leader of the state by 463, motives of political ambition surely required that Pericles try to change the rules of the political game.

This was no simple task, for in spite of a reputation for Spartan dullness, Cimon was a shrewd and able man well deserving Plutarch's accolade: "It is agreed that he was not inferior in daring to Miltiades nor in intelligence to Themistocles and more just than either." [27] The traditional political system, where the scions of noble families vied with each other for eminence and the honors of state, had been overthrown by the genius and daring of Cleisthenes. Great nobles had counted on their clients, peasants awed by the wealth, religious influence, and military power of the local nobility, to win elections. The reforms of Cleisthenes had reduced the importance of local influence and aristocratic control of religious shrines.[28] Cleisthenes, moreover, had taken advantage of a new political factor that came to be more and more decisive: the demos, particularly those in and around the city of Athens. These people, in effect, became a part of Cleisthenes' clientele; joined with the traditional supporters of the Alcmaeonidae, they were enough to guarantee a reliable majority for Cleisthenes in the ecclesia. The tool of ostracism, which also depended on a reliable majority in the ecclesia and in the actual vote, protected Cleisthenes from hostile faction leaders and the new constitutions from subversion.[29]

Themistocles had used his talents to gain control of the Cleisthenic political machinery. His naval policy won the devotion of the demos, and his use of ostracism removed all his enemies from the scene.

[27] *Cim.* 5. 1.

[28] D. M. Lewis, *Historia,* XII (1963), 22–40.

[29] For this interpretation of ostracism, see Kagan, *Hesperia,* XXX (1961), 393–401.

The rule of Themistocles might have lasted a very long time, and the power of the noble families, whose leaders languished in exile, might have been permanently damaged were it not for the Persian War, whose political consequences we have already noted. Now Cimon devised a plan whereby an aristocrat might adapt himself to the new political conditions. He began with the inestimable advantage of a well-deserved reputation for heroism in the late war. To this he added an attractive appearance and a gentle and artless manner, both of which had great popular appeal.[30] His foreign policy of aggressive naval warfare against Persia was popular as a continuation of Themistocles' policy. The final ingredient in Cimon's recipe for political hegemony was money, in great amounts but judiciously employed. Cimon had acquired a good deal of money in the form of booty from his successful campaigns. Plutarch's description of how he spent it deserves quotation:

> He took away the fences from his fields, that strangers and needy citizens might have it in their power to take fearlessly of the fruits of the land; and every day he gave a dinner at his house, simple it is true, but sufficient for many, to which any poor man who wished came in, and so received a maintenance which caused him no effort and left him free to devote himself solely to public affairs. But Aristotle says (*Ath. Pol.* 27. 3) that it was not for all Athenians, but only for his own demesmen, the Laciadae, that he provided a free dinner. He was constantly attended by young comrades in fine attire, each one of whom, whenever an elderly citizen in needy array came up, was ready to exchange raiment with him. The practice made a deep impression. These same followers also carried with them a generous sum of money, and going up to poor men of finer quality in the market place, they would quietly thrust small change into their hands.[31]

It is of no great importance whether Plutarch or Aristotle is right as to the recipients of Cimon's bounty; the general picture is clear enough. He had found a way to build and maintain a clientele among the demos to rival that of Themistocles and men like him. Like the Irish political bosses of Boston and New York at the turn of the century, he won a loyal following among the poor voters by taking care of their personal needs and seeing to it that they voted

[30] Plut. *Cim.* 5. 3–4.

[31] Plut. *Cim.* 10. 1–3, translated by B. Perrin in *LCL*.

when they were needed. Another imperfect but revealing analogy is with the Tory democracy of Disraeli, who hoped to maintain the rule of the upper classes by voluntarily attending to the most grievous needs of the people.

Pericles was ill equipped to beat Cimon at his own game. He had no military reputation to match Cimon's; his personal appearance was far less pleasing, for he had an oddly shaped head that excited the ridicule of the comic poets.[32] His manner was unfortunate for a politician who hoped to win the masses away from their favorite. The contemporary poet Ion compared the presumptuous and arrogant manner of Pericles, his pride and disdain for others, with the tactful and easy manners of Cimon. Even if we disregard the poetic fancies of Ion, we must recognize that Pericles' austere and remote personality was a political liability.[33] Although wealthy, he could not compete with the riches of Cimon. For all these reasons he faced a gigantic task when he entered the lists against Cimon. Probably he did not expect to win, but wanted only to bring himself to public attention as a rising young member of the opposition. Since many of his father's supporters must have continued to support Cimon's foreign policy, the major subject of debate, it behooved Pericles to control the fury of his attack. At the trial he got up to speak only once and even then like a man who was merely fulfilling an obligation. Stesimbrotus attributes this mildness to the intervention of Cimon's sister Elpinice.[34] We may attribute it less romantically to prudence.

We have little reason, in fact, to believe that Pericles opposed Cimon's foreign policy. We know that it had been the policy of Xanthippus as well, and we hear of no Periclean statements or actions hostile to Sparta until well after the war with Sparta had begun. It is worth noticing that the man who later opposed Cimon's appeal to help the Spartans when they were endangered by a helot rebellion was Ephialtes.[35] No mention whatever is made of Pericles, and it is hard to believe that any recollection of his opposition would be omitted by later historians aware of his subsequent leadership of

[32] Plut. *Per.* 3. 2–4.
[33] Plut. *Per.* 5. 3–4.
[34] Plut. *Cim.* 14. 4.
[35] Plut. *Cim.* 16. 7–8.

wars with Sparta. In 463 the basis of Pericles' opposition to Cimon, if it was anything more than personal ambition, was domestic and not foreign policy.

The first events in which Pericles is definitely concerned are constitutional and legislative reforms to make the state more democratic. He was associated with Ephialtes in the attacks on the Areopagus that stripped it of its newly usurped powers, perhaps of some of its older ones as well.[36] He is specifically named as the first to introduce pay for jurymen,[37] and Plutarch charges him with the introduction of the theoric fund as well as the jury pay and other public largesses.[38] It is usual to suppose that the opening of the archonship to member of the zeugite class and the re-establishment of the thirty so-called local justices (*dikastai kata demous*), both usually taken to be democratic reforms, were Periclean.[39] To be sure, Pericles is not named as their author, and it is well to remember that the Pericles of the 450's is not the same man who dominated Athens after the ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias, in 443; it is not safe to suppose that everything that happened in Athens between the death of Ephialtes and the death of Pericles is the latter's doing. The fact remains that there is plenty of evidence that Pericles entered Athenian politics as a member of a democratic faction and as the champion of a democratic program.[40]

[36] Plut. *Per.* 9. 3–4; *Cim.* 15. 1–2; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 27. 1. The ancient authors seem to have had conflicting versions of precisely what took place and the true relationship between Ephialtes and Pericles. Aristotle's story that Ephialtes was helped by Themistocles must be unhistorical. The evidence seems to indicate that Ephialtes was the leader of the opposition to Cimon and the Areopagite constitution, and Pericles his lieutenant.

[37] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 27. 3.

[38] *Per.* 9. 3.

[39] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 26. 2–3; see Busolt, *GG,* III: 1, 263–269.

[40] Raphael Sealey, *Hermes, op. cit.,* 234–247, has written a lively attack on the *communis opinio.* His warnings against unfounded assumptions are a useful tonic against attempts to read modern party politics and class struggles into the fifth century. His emphasis on "the family-politics of the great houses" is a necessary corrective, but it goes too far. The fact remains that some great houses or, at any rate, some members of the great houses favored more democratic policies, while others opposed them. The Alcmaeonids in general and Pericles in particular usually seem to have been in

It is the all but unanimous judgment of antiquity that Pericles was a champion of democracy. Plato, the enemy of Athenian democracy, considered him a typical demagogue and corrupter of the people. Aristotle says that when Pericles began his career the constitution became more democratic; because of the changes he and Ephialtes introduced, "the many became bolder and took the state more into their own hands." [41] The question arises chiefly because of the famous dictum of Thucydides that Athens in the time of Pericles "was in name a democracy, but in fact it was the rule of the first man." [42] Plutarch was troubled by it and set himself to resolve the apparent contradiction. He finally decided that Pericles was forced into his early democratic phase by the impossibility of defeating Cimon in any other way, but that after the ostracism of 443 had cleared the field of all rivals, he was able to employ the "aristocratic and royal statesmanship" of his later career.[43]

Some modern scholars have followed Plutarch's interpretation with only minor modifications, seeing 443 as the year in which the character of Periclean rule changed.[44] At least one has solved the problem by suggesting that Pericles never really was a democrat at all.[45] Perhaps the opposite solution is more persuasive. Thucydides' judgment on the Periclean constitution does not seem to accord with the facts he offers. Nobody denies that all questions of policy and all elections were decided in the ecclesia in 430 just as they had been in 450. Public officials underwent preliminary examinations and final audits; panels of citizens elected by lot had final jurisdiction in all matters. Each year Pericles had to stand for election to his office, and at each assembly he needed to win a majority of the voters to his policy. In 430 he was removed from office and fined by an angry citizenry. Even more telling is the fact that they sent a

the first group, while the Philaids in general and Cimon in particular seem to have been in the second.

[41] Plato *Gorgias* 515 E; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 27. 1.

[42] 2. 65. 7.

[43] *Per.* 9 and 15.

[44] Busolt, *GG,* III: 1, 494–497; Hignett, *op. cit.,* 253–257; and Beloch, *Die Attische Politik seit Perikles* (Leipzig, 1884), 19–21.

[45] Sealey, *Hermes, op. cit.,* 234–247.

peace mission to Sparta, in utter contradiction of his policy, while he was still in office. It is hard to deny that

> if democracy means and is government by the citizens, if the *ekklesia* decided policy by vote, if free elections persisted at their constitutional intervals, if Perikles was at all times responsible to the sovereign *demos*, and if an unoppressed political opposition survived, as it surely did, —if all this is so, then Athens was as democratic, not only in theory but in day-to-day practice, as government can conceivably be.[46]

Finally we have the evidence of Pericles' funeral oration. If any speech reported by Thucydides may be considered a close facsimile of what was actually said, it is this one. It is generally agreed to be the finest and most moving encomium of the democratic way of life ever spoken. It is altogether perverse to deny that the man who delivered it after a life in the service of Athens was a sincere believer in democracy. The allegation that he became a democrat out of political necessity need not detain us long. It is a commonplace employed whenever an aristocrat takes his place at the head of a popular movement; it was said of Cleisthenes in antiquity and of Franklin D. Roosevelt in recent times. In all three cases it is in conflict with the evidence.

All this is not to say that the young Pericles of the late 460's was a dreamy idealist unaware of the political significance of what he was doing. On the contrary, he must have known full well the nature of the revolution he was bringing about. We have seen that the rules of the political game made it impossible for him to win. He changed those rules to such good effect that he was ultimately able to dominate Athenian politics as no man had done before and none was to do again. The key to his success was surely the device that his ancient enemies castigated most vehemently: his use of state funds to pay Athenian citizens to perform their civic functions. This was attractive on theoretical grounds, for it made it possible for the Athenian democracy to fulfill its potentiality by allowing all its citizens to perform the duties and achieve the honors of citizenship (μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς) as Aristotle put it, to hold office and to serve on juries, to rule and to judge.[47] It was no less attractive on

[46] Malcolm McGregor, *Phoenix,* X (1956), 93–102.
[47] *Pol.* 1275a. 23–24.

practical grounds, for it undercut a major base of Cimon's strength. No more need the poor seek the charity of Cimon and his political supporters; no more need they feel grateful for his largesse and express their gratitude at the elections and in the ecclesia. Now they could obtain a public support that was more regular, came to them of right and not by charity, and left them free to express the monumental ingratitude that democratic politicians must always expect.

The enemies of Pericles might argue that he had merely "offered the people what was their own," [48] but the people were nonetheless grateful and gave him their support. The ultimate effect was to destroy the revised system of patronage introduced by Cimon once and for all. As the New Deal of Roosevelt put an end to the fiefdom of the great cities, by taking patronage of the poor out of the hands of the local bosses and putting it under the control of the central government, so did the reforms of Pericles put an end to the clientage of the poor Athenian. Henceforth the opponents of Pericles must fight him on the new ground that he himself had chosen.

This domestic revolution was not easy to accomplish and might not have come about had it not been for developments abroad.[49] After the failure of their attack on Cimon's probity, the democrats changed their tactics. They now began a series of attacks on the very center of conservatism and the bulwark of aristocracy, the Areopagus. Ephialtes and Pericles took the lead in charging individual members of the council with mismanagement of the administration.[50] This was a useful softening-up tactic, but it probably would not have brought full success had not fortune intervened. In the summer of 464, Sparta suffered a terrible earthquake, which was soon followed by an uprising of the helots.[51] The effects of the disaster were not easily overcome, and by 462 the helots, who had taken refuge on Mt. Ithome, were still a threat. The Spartans appealed for help to their allies, among them the Athenians, who were particularly wanted for their reputed skill at siege operations. This, of course, led to a debate in Athens.

[48] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 27. 4; Plut. *Per.* 9. 2; Aristophanes *Wasps* 684 ff.

[49] See Appendix C.

[50] Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 25. 2; Plut. *Per.* 9. 3–4; *Cim.* 15. 1–2. Aristotle has Themistocles helping Ephialtes, but that is surely impossible after 471.

[51] 1. 101. 1–2.

Ephialtes led the opposition to the Spartan request for help, urging the Athenians "not to help or restore a city that was a rival to Athens but to let the pride of Sparta lie low and be trampled underfoot." [52] The violence of the language is evidence of the hatred toward Sparta felt by Ephialtes and by at least some part of his faction. No doubt part of it derived from the traditional Themistoclean foreign policy, which sought to make Athens the sole leader of the Hellenes; another part of that hatred must have come from Sparta's consistent support of Cimon, the rival of Ephialtes. But the success of that support was even more detestable because Cimon was the great foe of the democratic constitutional reforms favored by the democrats. He tried to revive the powers that Pericles and Ephialtes had stripped from the Areopagus, and he was probably the first to use a return to the Cleisthenic constitution as a reactionary political slogan.[53] His enemies saw a close connection between his admiration for Sparta and his hostility to popular government, and they made good use of the people's dislike of Sparta, as well as Cimon's outspoken preference for Spartan character and manners.

In spite of the clamor and demagogy of his opponents, Cimon was still powerful enough to carry the day. He persuaded the Athenians to send him at the head of four thousand hoplites to help the Spartans, employing the effective exhortation "not to leave Hellas lame nor see their city deprived of its yokefellow." [54] It is more than likely that if the expedition had gone well and Cimon had returned from a successful campaign with the thanks of a grateful and friendly Sparta, the democratic tide might have been stemmed and even pushed back even then. Events, however, took a different turn.

The Athenians had not been on the scene long before the Spartans sharply changed their policy. For no apparent reason they singled out the Athenians among their allies and sent them home on the grounds that they no longer needed them. Thucydides tells us that the real reason for the Spartans' action was their fear of "the boldness and revolutionary spirit of the Athenians"; since they were

[52] Plut. *Cim.* 16. 8.

[53] Plut. *Cim.* 15. 2.

[54] Thuc. 102. 1–3; Plut. *Cim.* 16. 8–17. 4; Diod. 11. 64. 2–3. For the number of troops, see Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 1138–1144. For the possibly derivative quality of Cimon's remark, see Appendix B, p. 379.

Ionians and not Dorians, "if they remained they might be persuaded by the men on Ithome to change sides." [55] We need not doubt the accuracy of Thucydides' judgment. Even under the command of Cimon, four thousand Athenian hoplites, raised in the free air of democracy and proud of the power and glory of that democracy, must have seemed dangerous indeed to many Spartans. We may imagine the arrogance shown by at least some Athenians as they swaggered through the Peloponnese, called to aid a stricken Sparta. Even very moderate democratic ideas must have been both surprising and shocking to Spartan ears.

But if we penetrate below the general statement of Thucydides, it is possible to see the role that party politics may have played in the Spartan decision. The Spartans could not have failed to hear that the Athenian expedition had not been unanimously approved. They must have known of the opposition of Ephialtes and the hatred of Sparta it reflected. The war party, as we know, had always been suspicious and jealous of Athens, and in recent years it had regained enough power to influence Spartan policy. Perhaps, the frightening behavior and demeanor of the Athenians was enough to swing the balance in its favor. The Spartans may well have realized that to dismiss the Athenians would seriously compromise Cimon's position, probably lead to his overthrow, and the victory of his democratic opponents who hated Sparta. Their action might well lead to war, but they did not shrink from it. We may wonder whether Cimon appreciated the irony of the situation: the expedition that he had urged to guarantee friendship between Athens and Sparta provided the weapon with which his enemies in both states could destroy that friendship.

While Cimon was gone the democrats won a great victory over the Areopagus that stripped it of the additional powers it had gained over the years and left it merely a court with very limited jurisdiction. We may well believe that only the absence of Cimon and his four thousand hoplites made that victory possible.[56] On his return he made every effort to restore the political situation to what it had been before his departure. He tried to restore the lost powers to the Areo-

[55] Thuc. 1. 102. 3; Diod. 11. 63. 2 and Plut. *Cim.* 17. 2 seem to be based only on Thucydides and add nothing to the story.

[56] Hignett, 341.

pagus,[57] but his efforts were doomed to failure. The Spartans had destroyed his political credit. There can be no question that the Athenians regarded the dismissal of their army as a terrible insult, and they were angry with the man whom they held responsible for it. Dislike of Sparta was so deep and general that old friends of the Spartans found it expedient to renounce their association.[58] In such a climate it is hardly surprising that the Athenians withdrew from the alliance with Sparta made at the time of the Persian War. At the same time they made an alliance with Argos, Sparta's traditional enemy, and then brought in Thessaly to form a triple alliance clearly aimed at Sparta.[59] In the spring of 461 the Athenians ostracized Cimon, and the diplomatic revolution was complete.[60] A party hostile to Athens was in control of Spartan policy, and the enemies of Sparta were in command at Athens.

[57] Plut. *Cim.* 15. 2.

[58] For the Athenian reaction, see Thuc. 1. 102. 4; Diod. 11. 63. 3. I believe that Beloch's suggestion (*GG* ², II: 2, 1, 153) that Alcibiades, the grandfather of his notorious namesake, renounced his position as Spartan proxenus at this time is very plausible. See Thuc. 5. 43. 2.

[59] 1. 102. 4.

[60] Plut. *Cim.* 17. 2.

Part Two

The First Peloponnesian War

5. *The War in Greece*

Within two years of Cimon's exile the Athenians were allied with a state that had rebelled from the Spartan alliance and was engaged in combat with several Peloponnesian states. The First Peloponnesian War was on. After the Spartan rejection of Cimon's troops it could scarcely have been avoided. It is interesting to apply Thucydides' judgment of the "truest cause" of the later war to the outbreak of this one. "I think that the truest cause but the one least spoken of was that the Athenians had grown powerful, which presented an object of fear to the Spartans and forced them to go to war." In this case it appears to be right in every particular. The power of Athens had grown enormously since 479, when Thucydides begins his analysis. Fear of Athens was manifest in the debate in the Spartan gerousia of 475, in the promise to help Thasos in 465/4, and finally in the expulsion of the Athenian hoplites in 462/1. The expression of that fear, moreover, was internal and did not need outside goading. When the Spartans made the fateful decision to expel the Athenians, they needed and received no urging from Corinthians, Aeginetans, or Megarians. Always the impetus toward hostilities came from Sparta.

The Spartan attitude reflected an important fact about the condition of the Greek world from 479 to 461: Its stability was apparent only and not real. The alliance between Sparta and Athens was not an alliance of states but of factions. The faction of Cimon and the faction that would be headed by King Archidamus were prepared to accept limits to the hegemonal claims of their states, but in each

state there were significant elements of the population who were not. The political positions of Cimon and the Spartan peace party were not strong enough to resist their enemies indefinitely. The Spartans simply were not yet prepared to share hegemony with Athens, nor were the Athenians prepared to accept Spartan checks on their ambitions. It is easy to believe that if the dismissal of the Athenians troops had not occurred, another *casus belli* might soon have been found. Probably no complex human event can be thought of as inevitable, but the First Peloponnesian War would have been hard to avoid after the formation of the Delian League.

The ostracism of Cimon left his enemy Ephialtes in control of the field, but he was not permitted to enjoy his victory, for an oligarchic plot brought about his assassination.[1] Now Pericles assumed the leadership of the democratic faction and of the state; he was to exercise a powerful influence upon both for more than thirty years. We have seen that although he and Cimon both came from the highest Athenian nobility, they could not have differed more in appearance, style, manner, habits, and prejudices. Their native differences were accentuated by the differences in their training. Cimon received the gymnastic training traditional for Athenian aristocrats. Although not without native wit, he was untrained in literature, rhetoric, and the liberal arts, disciplines that came to be thought of as characteristically Greek.[2] Pericles, on the other hand, was inclined to a life of the mind and was enough younger than Cimon to take advantage of the new intellectual currents that appeared in Hellas in the middle of the fifth century. His friends and teachers were such men as Damon, Zeno, and Anaxagoras, and his conversation of music, poetry, science, and philosophy. When Cimon worked to beautify and glorify his city, he planted plane trees in the agora and built new running tracks for the noble youths who exercised at the Academy.[3] Pericles built the Odeon, commissioned Mnesicles to build the Propylaea, Callicrates and Ictinus to plan the Parthenon, and Phidias to supervise its adornment and to create a statue of the goddess. To his native intelligence and excellent training he added remarkable rhetorical skill and a reputation for absolute

[1] Plut. *Per.* 10. 6–7; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 25. 4.

[2] Plut. *Cim.* 4. 40.

[3] Plut. *Cim.* 13. 8.

incorruptibility.[4] The democratic measures he now put into effect provided the basis for a political strength that would one day be almost unassailable.

In 461, however, his position was far from secure. He was still a very young man, not yet thirty-five, who had come to power by a freak. He had to expect the friends of Cimon to oppose him, and he needed also to win the confidence of the party he led. He may not have approved of a policy of war with Sparta, but it had been the policy of the martyred Ephialtes, and Pericles had no choice but to pursue it. Some time in 461/60 the helot rebels on Mt. Ithome could hold out no longer and surrendered to the Spartans.[5] The conditions were not unduly harsh: the helots might leave freely provided that they did not return. No doubt the Spartans expected the helots and their families to scatter throughout the Hellenic world and never again to pose a threat to the security of the Peloponnese, but if so they were disappointed. Shortly before, the Athenians had taken possession of Naupactus, a town on the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth, which had formerly belonged to the Ozolian Locrians. They offered it to the Messenian rebels, who happily accepted. The Athenians did this, says Thucydides, "because of their enmity toward the Spartans,"[6] and we may well agree with his judgment. To be sure, Naupactus would later prove a useful base from which to harass Peloponnesian shipping, and some Athenians might have thought about that, but the Athenian motive could have been less rational. Stung by the insult so fresh in their memory, they may merely have taken the opportunity to strike back at Sparta in any way possible.

[4] 2. 65. 8; Plut. *Per.* 15. 4–5.

[5] 1. 103. 1. The text says that this happened in the tenth year (δεκάτῳ ἔτει) of the rebellion, which had begun in 464/3. This would put the fall of Ithome in 454/3, and I agree with Gomme and the majority of scholars that such a date is impossible. An emendation of the text seems necessary, and the reading τετάρτῳ in place of δεκάτῳ seems attractive, if not certain. This would place the surrender in 461/0. For a detailed argument of this general view, see Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 401–408 and *ATL*, III, 176, notes 58 and 59. For a recent presentation of a minority view, as well as a review of the scholarship on the question, which has created much interest in the last quarter-century, see D. W. Reece, *JHS*, LXXXII (1962), 111–120, especially note 1 on page 111.

[6] 1. 103. 3.

A splendid opportunity for further revenge soon offered itself. The Megarians, who were engaged in a boundary dispute with Corinth, found themselves getting the worst of the war. No doubt they were aware of the special position Corinth held in the Spartan alliance and despaired of any help from Sparta. Instead, they withdrew from their association with Sparta and entered into an alliance with Athens. The Athenians took advantage of the opportunity to secure Pegae, the Megarian port on the Corinthian Gulf, and to build long walls connecting Megara to Nisaea. Nisaea was Megara's port on the Saronic Gulf, and the Athenians made it secure by garrisoning it.[7] This could only be interpreted as an act of war against the Spartans. Athens' acceptance of a rebellious ally into the Athenian alliance, her fortification of the vital route between the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece were acts that Sparta could not tolerate. The Athenians knew this quite well but did not shrink from the deeds. For them the war had already begun, and the Megarian offer of alliance was a god-sent opportunity to enter that war under favorable conditions.

Control of the Megarid was of enormous strategic value to Athens. It made the invasion of Attica from the Peloponnese almost impossible; the control of Pegae made it possible to supply Naupactus and control the Gulf of Corinth without making the long and dangerous voyage around the Peloponnese.[8] However, the Athenians paid a heavy price, for it was from the Athenian intervention in this Megarian quarrel that "the bitter hatred of the Corinthians for the Athenians first came into being." [9] Gomme thinks that this Corinthian hostility was important as a cause of this war as well as of the greater one some three decades later. "It required," he says, "the energy of Corinth, and some others, to push Sparta into the war; who, in spite of a desire to find every excuse for delay, could not afford to lose the valuable alliance of Corinth and could not fail to see that the Athenian empire really threatened the security of the Peloponnese as well as the rest of Greece." [10]

It is evident that Gomme was thinking more of the war that came in 431 than of its predecessor, for his remarks apply very well to the

[7] Thuc. 1. 103. 4; Diod. 11. 79.

[8] Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 304–305.

[9] 1. 103. 4.

[10] *Hist. Comm.*, I, 305.

later war but not to the earlier. As we have seen, Sparta required no push to persuade itself of the danger to the Peloponnese represented by Athens. The acceptance of the Megarian alliance was a direct blow at the Spartans, who understood it without Corinthian help. Gomme blames the Corinthians for risking the stability of the Peloponnese and the peace of Hellas in a quarrel over a strip of land, but his charge is unjust.[11] Corinth had no reason to expect that Megara would turn for help to Athens, her traditional enemy. She had less reason to believe that the Athenians, who had always had good relations with the Corinthians, would help their enemies. The Corinthians could not be blamed for failing to realize that they were in the midst of a diplomatic revolution and that the Athenian action was directed against Sparta rather than Corinth. The Athenians, to be sure, sowed dragon's teeth when they alienated Corinth over Megara, but the harvest would not come for almost thirty years.

While the Athenians were embroiled in the struggle between Megara and Corinth, their attention was drawn to events far afield. King Inaros of Lybia had led a revolt in Egypt against the Persian king Artaxerxes, who had ascended to the throne only a few years earlier. Realizing that he would need help, he called in the Athenians, who were already engaged in a campaign at Cyprus. They abandoned that undertaking, and with two hundred Athenian and allied ships they sailed up the Nile, having joined forces with Inaros.[12] It is not impossible that the Athenian expedition to Cyprus, whose origin and purposes we do not know, was sent out by Cimon before the break with Sparta had taken place.[13] There is no satisfactory way, however, to place the Athenian acceptance of Inaros' invitation before 460,[14] so we are forced to account for what appears a most reckless action on the part of the Athenians, who were willing to undertake a major commitment in Egypt at the same time that they faced a great conflict with the Peloponnesians.

This problem has troubled modern historians, particularly those eager to acquit Pericles of the charges of recklessness and imperial-

[11] *Hist. Comm.*, I, 304.

[12] 1. 104.

[13] Beloch, *GG* ², II: 2, 205; Nesselhauf, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der delischattischen Symmachie, Klio,* Beiheft, XXX (1933), 6, n. 1.

[14] *ATL*, III, 177, n. 60.

ism. They suggest that he really opposed the expedition, but since he was not yet in a position of strength and was still opposed by the shattered but ever present faction of Cimon, he was compelled to go along with Cimon's policy.[15] Beloch, certainly no friend of Pericles, is nevertheless unable to believe that he was responsible for the Egyptian expedition. "For the dispatch of a great fleet right after Cyprus fully conforms with the spirit of Cimon's policy, while it would have been obvious madness after the break with Sparta, which we may not attribute to such prudent statesmen as Pericles and Myronides." [16] Thus, he is forced to date the expedition to 462/1, which is not acceptable.[17]

There are many things wrong with this argument besides the date. Among the least of these is that none of our sources names Cimon in connection with either this Cyprian campaign or the Egyptian expedition, although they do name him in connection with the Cyprian campaign he led a decade later; nor is Myronides mentioned at all as an Athenian leader just at this time. Beloch, moreover, did not always consider Pericles a prudent statesman incapable of such foolishness, for he believes that he deliberately brought on the great Peloponnesian War merely to protect his political position at home.[18] Much more important, as Gomme has pointed out, is that this view leads to the improbable conclusion that Pericles, "incapable of supporting the Egyptian policy for its own sake, after being quit of Kimon by ostracism, meekly carried on his policy for six long years—in Egypt, though he reversed it in Greece—out of sentimental regard, I suppose, for his rival's name." [19]

Thucydides, as usual, does not allow us to see into the internal

[15] Franz Miltner, *PW,* XIX (1938), *s.v.* "Perikles," 754; Karl Dienelt, *Die Friedenspolitik des Perikles* (Vienna and Wiesbaden, 1958), 12.

[16] *GG* ², II: 2, 205.

[17] W. Scharf (*Historia,* III [1954–5], 308–325) takes a similar view. He believes that the campaigns in Cyprus and Egypt were both purely Cimonian. This leaves him open to the same objection that Gomme makes to Beloch's view (see below, n. 19). That objection seems to me insuperable.

[18] On Pericles as the cause of the war, see *Die Attische Politik,* 19–22. Beloch's judgment on Pericles as a statesman is "Wir können selbst zweifeln ob er ein grosser Staatsmann gewesen ist. . . . Aber er war, wie wir heute sagen würden, ein grosser Parlamentarier." *GG* ², II: 1, 155.

[19] *Hist. Comm.,* I, 307.

political situation, and in this instance our other ancient authorities seem to have had no independent source. Yet, if there can be no certainty about it, the historian must try to divine Pericles' attitude at this early date if he is to understand the later policy of Pericles when his policy was that of Athens. It is well to avoid the mistake of imagining that the policy that Pericles pursued after 450 must have been the same as that which he supported a decade earlier, that there was no development in his thinking, that like the Bourbons of the French Restoration, he learned nothing and forgot nothing. His vehement insistence that there should be no diversionary campaigns in the Peloponnesian War may well have resulted from the bitter memory of the disastrous end to the Egyptian campaign, which he had supported as a young man. Nor should we be surprised to find him supporting a policy of vigorous activity against Persia. His father had helped initiate such a policy; why should he not inherit Xanthippus' foreign policy as well as his domestic feud with the Philaids?

It is also wrong to imagine that only the friends of Cimon were eager for the Persian war. There had never been any disagreement among the factions in Athens as to the desirability of pressing the Persians hard and winning from them whatever profit was available. Themistocles was at least as aggressive in that direction as was Cimon. Ephialtes, as the inheritor of Themistocles' supporters, as the leader of the faction that would be the most imperialistic of all, must surely have urged the continuation of an aggressive policy against Persia. We have no reason to doubt that Pericles, his lieutenant and political heir, was at all reluctant to do the same. If we judge that this action of Pericles and the Athenian democracy was reckless and ill conceived, we should remember that both were young and sanguine, buoyed up by recent success, perhaps intoxicated with a bright new ideology whose glitter had not yet been tarnished by war and corruption. Like the young ideologues of the French and Russian revolutions, they may have felt that men who lived under a noble constitution embodying noble ideas would sweep all before them. If they were foolishly optimistic, it was not the last error they would make.[20]

[20] Grote (IV, 409) and Busolt (*GG*, III: 1, 303) do not raise the question of who was behind the Egyptian expedition. They apparently assume that there was no disagreement among the Athenians on this question, in which

In the spring and summer of 460 the Athenians took steps to secure their communications with their Argive allies. First they descended upon Halieis on the southern shore of the Argolic peninsula. It may be that they were able to gain control of Troezen at this time,[21] for they certainly controlled it later, and we know of no better opportunity. At Halieis, however, they were beaten by a combined force of Epidaurians, whose own territory was threatened, and Corinthians, who were eager to resist Athenian encroachment. But at about the same time, the Athenians won a naval battle off the island of Cecryphaleia, which lay between the Argolic peninsula and Aegina. The first battles of the war were ominous; the Athenians lost on the land and won on the sea.[22]

These Athenian attempts to gain a foothold on the western shore of the Saronic Gulf alarmed and angered the Aeginetans, who now joined the war against Athens. Aegina was an old enemy of Athens, long her rival in trade and now rapidly losing ground in the competition for naval supremacy. Pericles might call Aegina the eyesore of the Piraeus,[23] but the sight of Piraeus, fortified and issuing ever larger fleets of triremes, must have pained the Aeginetans even more. With the help of their allies they fought a great sea battle against the Athenians, who were also supported by their allies. The result

I think they are right. Walker (*CAH*, V, 77) says, "It may well have seemed to Pericles and the other leaders of the democratic party that here was a golden opportunity for teaching Persia the lesson that she needed. If Persia would not have peace with Athens, she should learn once more what war with Athens meant." He is arguing on the assumption that Athens had tried to obtain a peace with Persia in 461 and had failed. I am more in accord with the view of Glotz and Cohen (*HG*, II, 148) that Pericles played a leading role in the decision because he and his faction appreciated "les avantages qu'il tirerait d'une intervention en Egypte, grenier inépuisable, marché à enlever a ses fournisseurs phénicians, position militaire de premier ordre accrochée au flanc de la Perse." G. De Sanctis (*Atthis* [2nd ed.; Rome, 1904], 460) sees the strength of the analogy to the French Revolution and imagines that there were Athenians who were ambitious enough to hope for the unification of Hellas under Athenian leadership.

[21] Such is the suggestion of Grote (IV, 410).

[22] For the battles, see Thuc. 1. 105. 1–2; Diod. 11. 78. 1–2 pictures Athens as winning both battles, but there is no reason to prefer him to Thucydides here.

[23] Plut. *Per.* 8. 5.

was a great victory for the Athenians, who captured seventy enemy ships, landed on Aegina, and laid siege to the city under the command of Leocrates, son of Stroebus. The Peloponnesians withdrew three hundred hoplites who had been helping the Corinthians and Epidaurians and sent them to help Aegina. They tried to force the Athenians to break off the siege by starting diversionary campaigns, but all in vain. By the spring of 457, Aegina was forced to surrender and come into the Athenian league. The Aeginetans pulled down their walls, gave up their fleet, and were enrolled as tribute-paying members.[24]

Shortly after the Athenians had begun their siege of Aegina, the Corinthians invaded the territory of Megara, hoping to force the Athenians to give up the siege. It was a reasonable expectation, for not only was a sizable Athenian force engaged at Aegina, but a large contingent was still off in Egypt. The strain should have been too great, but the daring and resourcefulness of Athens was equal to the test. Myronides gathered together a motley army of men too old and boys too young for ordinary service. He marched them into the Megarid and won a smashing victory over the Corinthians.[25] We may get some idea of the pride the Athenians felt in their remarkable military achievements from an inscription, probably dating from the year 460/59: "The following men of the tribe Erechtheis died in the war in the same year in Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phoenicia, in Halieis, in Aegina, and in Megara." [26]

During all this time the Spartans had done very little, allowing their allies to carry the burden of the fighting. Remembering that they had declared themselves willing to invade Attica a few years earlier with infinitely less provocation, we may wonder why they waited so long to act now. For those who believe that the helot rebellion was still unsuppressed, the answer is obvious.[27] But the simplicity of this explanation is marred by the fact that the Spartans did

[24] Thuc. 1. 105. 2–3; Diod. 11. 78.

[25] Thuc. 1. 105. 3–106. 2; Diod. 11. 79. 1–4. See Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 307–311 for a discussion of the very memorable nature of this victory and its treatment by later historians.

[26] IG, I ^{2}, 929 = Tod, 26. The names of 177 men follow.

[27] Walker, *CAH*, V, 79.

undertake a major expedition in 458,[28] some three years before the surrender of Ithome by their own reckoning. It is hard to believe that by that spring the resistance of Ithome "was already breaking down," when we know that the siege was to last more than two years longer. Still, even if the helot rebellion was already finished, as we believe, we may well imagine that traditional conservatism, intensified by the recent terror, made the Spartans reluctant to take an army of any size out of the Peloponnese. It is possible also that politics may have played a role. Perhaps the victory of the war party had been only temporary; perhaps the unhappy consequences of the insult to Athens had produced a revulsion of feeling and restored the conservatives to power. About this we can only speculate, but whatever the political situation in Sparta, by this time no faction could fail to act. The Athenians were at war with Corinth, Aegina, and Epidaurus, three of the most important allies of Sparta. If she did not act now her hegemony was gone and her security in peril.

Still the Spartans did not invade Attica, the most obvious way to stop Athenian aggression. For this there was the best of reasons: they could not. The Athenian seizure and fortification of the Megarid barred a Spartan army from marching into Attica from the direction of the Peloponnese. For the time being Sparta was frustrated, but soon an unforeseen opportunity presented itself. The Phocians launched an attack on Doris, a small state in central Greece that had a special relationship with Sparta. Legend had it that Doris was the starting point from which the descendants of Heracles launched their successful attack on the Peloponnese, which led to its control by the peoples of Dorian stock. Sparta considered Doris its mother city. When the Spartans heard of the Phocian invasion, they immediately prepared to send help. Gathering a force of fifteen hundred Spartan hoplites and ten thousand allies under the leadership of Nicomedes, who commanded in place of the young King Pleistoanax, they made their roundabout way to the north, by way of the Gulf of Corinth.[29] This was obviously a far larger contingent than could possibly be needed for putting down the Phocians, a task that they accomplished quickly and easily. It is clear that the Spartan

[28] According to the *ATL* chronology; not later than 457 by anyone's account.

[29] Thuc. 1. 107. 1–2; Diod. 11. 79; Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 314.

strategy was to strike at Athens from the only vulnerable direction, the Boeotian frontier.

We are given a tantalizing clue to the mystery of Sparta's internal politics by the appointment of the commander of this expedition. Pleistoanax, to be sure, was too young for the responsibility, but why did the Spartans ignore their remaining royalty and turn to Nicomedes to lead the campaign? The answer must be that the other king was Archidamus. He had already shown and would show again that he was an able commander. We can only conclude that he was passed over because he opposed the expedition and the policy behind it. Perhaps he believed the expedition was too dangerous; perhaps he hoped that even now the Athenians might come to their senses and agree to an honorable peace. The peace party might not be able to impose its will, but it seems to have been able to disassociate itself from what it considered to be reckless policies.

Nicomedes and his supporters, however, had reason to think that their policy might be successful. Instead of returning directly to the Peleponnese by the sea route, they lingered in Boeotia. Thucydides tells us that they were encouraged to do so by "some Athenians who secretly invited them, hoping to put an end to the democracy and to the building of the long walls." [30] The Athenians, fearing an imminent attack by the Spartans, had already begun to build long walls connecting Athens to Phaleron and Piraeus. Later on a third wall, parallel to the Piraeus wall, would be built.[31] The completion of this construction would in effect turn Athens into an island unassailable by land and invincible so long as it retained command of the sea. A consequence of this policy, a direct descendant of the policy of Themistocles, would inevitably be to strengthen the Athenian democracy by emphasizing the navy at the expense of the more aristocratic cavalry. In the absence of Cimon his supporters were leaderless, frightened, and, in some cases, irresponsible. The result is one of the rare cases of treasonable conspiracy in Athenian history. Had Cimon been present, his good sense would have prevented these extremists from having any influence, and he would certainly have discouraged their activities. All our evidence shows him to have been a man comfort-

[30] 1. 107. 4.

[31] See Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 312.

able with the Athenian democracy, who could even live happily under the post-Areopagite constitution. He never allowed partisan considerations to interfere with patriotism; but he was in exile and could do nothing. It is possible that there had been communication between the Athenian oligarchs and the Spartan war party even before the Spartans had left the Peloponnese, but it is certain that their persuasion helped decide Nicomedes to stand and offer battle to the Athenians in Boeotia.

Nicomedes' hopes, however, did not rest only on the weak reed of Athenian oligarchy. The true source of his confidence was Thebes. It was a general rule in the world of the Greek city-states that neighbors were at least mutually suspicious and often hostile. In land-hungry Greece the source of conflict was usually a contest for desirable territory on the borders between neighboring states. For centuries, Sparta and Argos had contended for control of Thyreatis; a border dispute between Corinth and Megara had helped bring on the present general conflict; Athens and Megara had a history of conflict over border territory and over the island of Salamis, which lay between them; and such examples could be multiplied many times.

Athens and Boeotia, of which Thebes was the greatest city, shared a long border by Greek standards, yet until the end of the sixth century they appear to have lived in peace. In part, this demonstrated the dictum that good fences make good neighbors, for the Parnes mountain range made accidental border violations highly unlikely. Boeotia and Attica, moreover, were relatively large and prosperous regions where the pressure of want was not great. When conflict arose late in the sixth century, it was for political reasons. Whereas Athens had been able to unify Attica so successfully that every resident was a citizen of Athens and not of his locality, Thebes had not been able to do the same thing in Boeotia. At its strongest moments Thebes was only the leader of a confederation of autonomous towns with strong local loyalties and varying degrees of friendship for Thebes.

In 519 the Athenians became involved in Thebes' attempt to strengthen her control of Boeotia. They intervened on behalf of the Plataeans' struggle to maintain their independence against a Theban attack. Their success earned the undying friendship of Plataea and

the hostility of Thebes.[32] The Thebans gave evidence of their feelings in 506 when Cleomenes took a Peloponnesian army into Attica to put down the Cleisthenic democracy. They joined with Cleomenes and the army of Chalcis to attack Athens from three sides, beginning the campaign by seizing the border districts of Oinoe and Hysiae. The plan failed when the Corinthians refused to cooperate and the Peloponnesian contingent retired from the field. Free now to turn against the Thebans and Chalcidians, the Athenians defeated them. Enraged by the turn of events, the Thebans turned to Aegina and helped bring on the first of a series of conflicts between Aegina and Athens, but to no avail. The Thebans suffered another defeat at Athenian hands, and their taste for vengeance was unappeased.[33] Plataea remained independent and closely attached to Athens.

The Persian War further estranged the now unfriendly neighbors. Athens fought valiantly for Greek freedom while Thebes Medized. The result was a serious diminution of Theban prestige and influence corresponding with the rise of Athenian power. The Boeotian confederation was dissolved and each city given its independence.[34] A moderate oligarchy seems to have replaced the "dynasty of a few men" who ruled Thebes tyrannically during the Persian War, and it managed to keep Thebes out of trouble until the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War.[35] During the years of peace Thebes was able to retain her strength and to think again of regaining her prestige. It was under these circumstances that the Thebans invited the Spartan army to come into Boeotia and "to help their city to gain the entire hegemony of Boeotia." [36]

[32] For the events of 519, see Hdt. 6. 108 and Thuc. 3. 68. For a discussion of the date, which is debated by modern scholars, see Paul Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie* (Namur, Louvain, and Paris, no date), 30–32. For the early history of Thebes, see Cloché, *ibid.*, 12–29 and F. Schober, *PW*, V: 2 (1934),*s.v.* "Thebai (Boiotien)," 1452–1459.

[33] Hdt. 5. 74–81.

[34] Diod. 11. 8. 13.

[35] The quotation is from Thuc. 3. 62. 3–4. I follow Busolt and Swoboda (*GS*, II, 1413, n. 1) in calling the Theban government a moderate oligarchy. Schober (1462) believes that a democratic government was installed after the war. His position is challenged by Cloché (*Thèbes*, 48–50), who is in essential agreement with Busolt and Swoboda, but calls the new Theban government "un régime aristocratique."

[36] Diod. 11. 81. 2. Justin (3. 6) says that the Spartans fought "ut Boeotiorum imperium his [sc. Thebanis] restituerent."

Diodorus provides us with the clue to Sparta's strange willingness to take a large army out of the Peloponnese to re-establish Theban supremacy in Boeotia at the same time that it was unwilling or unable to invade Attica. The Thebans promised that in return for Sparta's help, "They would themselves make war on the Athenians so that there would be no need for the Spartans to bring an army outside of the Peloponnese." The Spartans were delighted with such a prospect and agreed to the proposal, "judging that it was advantageous to them and thinking that if the Thebans became more powerful they would be a sort of balanced antagonist to the Athenians." As a result they helped fortify the city of Thebes and forced the Boeotian cities to become subject to Thebes.[37]

It is possible, as Thucydides implies, that the Athenians knew nothing of the Theban invitation. They did, however, know of a large Peloponnesian army in Boeotia, and they were suspicious of a plot to overthrow the democracy at Athens. As a result, they marched into Boeotia with the entire force available to them, accompanied by allied contingents including one thousand Argives. The entire force came to fourteen thousand men in addition to a detachment of Thessalian cavalry.[38]

The two armies met at Tanagra. The Athenian force was more numerous, but the Thessalians deserted to Sparta in the midst of the battle, and the Spartans won a victory in which both sides suffered heavy casualties. Although the Spartans controlled the field at the end of the day's fighting, their victory was somewhat Pyrrhic, for they were unable to follow it up and could do nothing but force their way through the Megarid and return to the Peloponnese. The

[37] Diod. 11. 81. 1–4.

[38] 1. 107. 5–7. Thucydides makes no mention of the Theban invitation, which affects his interpretation of the Athenian purpose in taking the field. He says that the Athenians thought that the Spartans ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ διέλθωσιν, suggesting that the Athenians hoped to take advantage of an opportunity to fight, which the Spartans would have been glad to avoid. He also speaks of the Athenians as going out against the Lacedaemonians, making no mention of the Thebans, yet Pausanias (1. 29. 6) tells us he saw a monument to two Athenian cavalrymen who died "fighting the Lacedaemonians and Boeotians on the borders of Eleon and Tanagra." He appears not to have known or not to have believed the story told by Diodorus, but that account appears to be more than plausible. For a discussion of the numbers of troops at the battle, see Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 315.

oligarchic conspiracy at Athens never came to anything, and within two months the Athenians were able to return and conquer a Boeotia that had been abandoned by its Peloponnesian allies.[39]

The Athenians had fought the Battle of Tanagra under peculiar conditions. Suspicion of treason was in the air, and it was natural to suspect that the friends of Cimon might be involved in the plot. Perhaps Cimon feared that some of his disgruntled followers might be tempted or perhaps he merely wanted to clear his friends' reputation and his own and to demonstrate their patriotism. In any event, Cimon appeared at Tanagra in full armor, ready to join his tribal ranks in the battle to come. The Athenian boulé, behaving with the panic that men show when there is rumor of treason in wartime, accused him of coming with treasonable intentions and drove him off.[40] Cimon was not embittered. Instead of sulking, he urged his friends to dispel the suspicion that surrounded them by their bravery in battle. They fought well and must have convinced their countrymen of their patriotism, for shortly after the battle Cimon was recalled from his exile, Pericles himself proposing the decree.[41] He soon was able to arrange a truce of four months with the Spartans and then may have gone off again to his estates in the Thracian Chersonnese to wait until conditions made possible a lasting peace with Sparta and a policy that he could honestly support.[42]

[39] Thuc. 1. 108. 1–2; Diod. 11. 82; Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 315–316.

[40] Plut. *Cim.* 17. 3–4. In his life of Pericles, Plutarch says that Cimon was driven off by "the friends of Pericles" (10. 1), but there is no real contradiction between the accounts. The same men are referred to in both passages: it was the proper duty of the councillors to send a man who had been banished away from the battle. The story that these men were the friends of Pericles is probably true; most councillors in 458/7 were likely to be friendly to Pericles, but Plutarch did not know precisely who they were, although he does have a rather precise knowledge of other things that happend at Tanagra. The tale that Cimon was driven off by "the friends of Pericles" instead of the boulé is merely a gloss by Plutarch or his source.

[41] Plut. *Cim.* 17. 4–6; *Per.* 2–3; Nepos *Cim.* 3. 3.

[42] Diodorus (11. 80. 5) tells us of the four-months' truce. Theopompus (*FGrH*, frg. 88) tells us of Cimon's recall and that he concluded a peace on his return. Busolt (*GG*, III: 1, 317–318) is the source of the suggestion that Cimon went off to the Chersonnese. Plutarch (*Cim.* 18. 1) seems to indicate that the peace Cimon made was the Five Years' Peace, which was not in fact concluded until 451/50.

Almost every element in the story of Cimon's recall has been questioned by modern scholars. The details of his actions at Tanagra have been called "an accumulation of absurdities"; [43] Plutarch's confusion of the four-months' truce with the Five Years' Peace of 451/50 has been taken as a reason for rejecting his entire story; the four-months' truce has been rejected as an invention, and, it has been pointed out, Diodorus does not even connect it with Cimon.[44] None of these objections is very weighty. Plutarch is often guilty of chronological confusion and artistic invention even when he is telling a story that is basically true.[45] The other objections need not detain us long; no one has yet imagined why Diodorus or his source Ephorus should invent anything like a four-months' truce on this occasion, and the omission of Cimon's name is hardly peculiar to this passage.[46]

A more serious objection to our account of events is political: "Why should the Spartans conclude a truce which left Boeotia at the mercy of Athens and secured to themselves no corresponding advantage? . . . Further, if Cimon was recalled in 457 B.C., why is there no trace of his presence at Athens until 451 B.C. Why, above all, was he not sent to the rescue of the Athenian force in Egypt?" [47] These questions make clear the true nature of the problem. Its solution requires an analysis of the political situation, which our sources do not

[43] Beloch, *GG* ², II: 2, 211.

[44] Walker, *CAH*, V, 468.

[45] As Gomme (*Hist. Comm.*, I, 326) has put it, "Beloch shows that the details of this story in Plutarch are impossible; but that is not reason enough for rejecting the whole. The details are embroidery."

[46] The story of Cimon's return is generally accepted. Grote (IV, 416–417), Glotz and Cohen (*HG*, II, 151–152), Busolt (*GG*, III: 1, 258, n. 1 and 316, n. 3), Meyer (*GdA*, IV: 1, 562), and Gomme, (*Hist. Comm.*, I, 326–327) all believe it, though each interprets the events somewhat differently. Raubitschek (*Historia*, III [1954–5], 379–380 and *AJA*, LXX [1966], 37–42) accepts the story but believes that the Five Years' Peace was concluded in 458/7, which I do not accept. Among modern scholars, only Beloch rejects the story outright. Walker, who is inclined to deny its truth, says, "There are only two alternatives: either Cimon was recalled after Tanagra, or he was not recalled at all, but came back when the ten years of his ostracism had expired. A recall, but at some other date than after Tanagra, may be left to those to whom compromise is dear" (p. 469). The interpretation offered here accepts the first of the alternatives.

[47] Walker, *CAH*, V, 468.

make explicit. Once again the historian who wishes to understand this difficult period must try to read between the lines.

It is not difficult for us to imagine the Athenian state of mind on the eve of the Battle of Tanagra. The long walls that would guarantee Athenian security were not yet completed; talk of treason was in the air. A strong Peloponnesian army was united with Athens' rejuvenated and implacable enemy Thebes. Corinth, which had intervened to save Athens from such a danger in the past, was now ranged among its most bitter enemies. A decisive defeat now could well mean the destruction of Athens and its recently acquired power. In such circumstances it was natural to fear treachery from Cimon's appearance. Cimon's behavior and the outcome of the battle changed all that. He and his friends had demonstrated their loyalty and patriotism. The battle, though technically a defeat, was a strategic victory, for the danger of invasion was past, for the moment at least, and the danger of treason seemed to be gone for good. The Athenians, however, could not relax. The Spartans had fought their way back to the Peloponnese by land; they might next fight their way back into Attica. The Athenians could not yet know that the Spartans were prepared to abandon their Theban allies, if, in fact, they had already decided to do so. The situation was still critical. The danger to Athens called for a cessation of factional strife, and the events at Tanagra made it possible.

Pericles, as we have seen, was not necessarily eager to fight Sparta. With others, he had carried on the war as vigorously as was necessary, but we have no reason to think that he was determined to carry it forward. If Cimon was now prepared to accept the reforms that Ephialtes and Pericles had introduced, and it appears that he was, there was no major policy difference between them. At any rate, there was no reason why the Athenians should not use Cimon's unique qualities to win a respite and perhaps an ultimate settlement. The time could be used to further the completion of the walls and to make Athens secure in case the war should continue. Athens had everything to gain and nothing to lose by agreeing to a truce of four months.

It is, of course, more difficult to understand why Sparta was willing to make such an agreement. The problem becomes a bit simpler if we look at the results of Tanagra from the Spartan point of view.

In a battle in which they had risked a sizable army, the Spartans had won a narrow victory that had turned out to be strategically useless. They had, moreover, suffered heavy losses, and the entire course of Spartan history shows how seriously they took the loss of Spartan soldiers. They might very well have re-evaluated their agreement with Thebes, which promised them freedom from extra-Peloponnesian expeditions but which had delivered instead a costly battle in Boeotia that profited Thebes alone. In these circumstances, the idea of a negotiated peace must have seemed more attractive.

It was at this time that news of Cimon's recall came to Sparta. If we are right in thinking that the advocates of peace were already gaining ground, the news could well have turned the tide in their favor. The return of Cimon to Athens might mean a return by Athens to a conservative policy in mainland Greece and a restoration of the friendly relations between Athens and Sparta. It must already have been very clear that the expulsion of Cimon and his troops from Sparta had been a costly mistake, expensive to both the Spartans and Cimon. What could be more fitting than to correct that error through the agency of Cimon himself?

The conclusion of a four-months' truce, far from arousing suspicion, is a reason to have confidence in the historicity of the account. In the first place, it accords well with the necessarily cautious nature that negotiations would have after Tanagra. More telling still is the analogy to a similar truce concluded by the Spartans with the Argives in 418. On that occasion the Spartans and their allies were about to engage the Argives in a great battle on the Argive plain. Just as the armies were ready to come to grips, King Agis of Sparta concluded a truce for four months with one of the Argive generals and with an Argive who was proxenus of the Spartans. The Argives said they would be willing to submit complaints to arbitration and "for the future to make a treaty and keep the peace." [48] This was a clear attempt to win a victory by diplomacy and thus avoid a battle that it appeared the Spartans could win, although at a cost. The Spartans accepted the truce after Tanagra for the same reasons; the peace party must have urged its acceptance in the hope of restoring Spartan policy to its traditional paths.

[48] Thuc. 5. 58–59. For the interpretation of these events, see Kagan, *CP*, LVII (1962), 207–218.

The Athenian victory at Oenophyta shattered all such hopes. The truce was strictly between Athens and Sparta and did not include Boeotia. On the sixty-second day after Tanagra, Myronides took an Athenian army to Oenophyta in Boeotia, where he defeated the Boeotian forces. The Athenians pulled down the walls of Tanagra and became the masters of all Boeotia except for Thebes itself, newly fortified with the aid of Sparta. The Athenians quickly overran Phocis and Locris and would have done the same to Thessaly had they not been checked by the walls of Pharsalus.[49] Democracies were established in the cities of Boeotia, perhaps even in Thebes itself.[50] Suddenly, at one stroke, Athens had become the master of central Greece.

While all this was going on, the Athenians completed the building of their walls. From then on they were invulnerable to Spartan attack. This had all taken place in the period from the late summer of 458 down to the end of the next winter. In the spring of 457 this *annus mirabilis* was capped by the surrender of Aegina and its reduction to a tribute-paying member of the Delian League.[51] All this success could not fail to dampen Athenian ardor for peace. Negotiation could only succeed if Athens were willing to abandon some of the fruits of her victory. Elated by their victories, the Athenians were certainly not willing to make any sacrifices and were prepared to prosecute the war until their enemies should sue for peace.

There is good reason to think that Pericles was not in favor of the second expedition to Boeotia that produced the Battle of Oenophyta. He is nowhere mentioned in connection with that campaign, and here the argument from silence is worth something, for it was common for later writers to attribute anti-Spartan actions to him. It is further true that we have very clear reports of later campaigns that

[49] Thuc. 1. 108. 1–3; Diod. 11. 81–83.

[50] Thuc. 1. 113. 2; 3. 62. 5; Arist. *Pol.* 1302 b 29; Pseudo-Xenophon, *Ath. Pol.* 3. 10–11. See the discussions of Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 317–318 and Cloché, *Thèbes,* 68–69 and 49–50.

[51] Thuc. 1. 108. 3–4; Diod. 11. 78. 4. It is not clear whether Aegina was a member of the Delian League before this war. It is generally assumed that it was not, but was rather a member of the Peloponnesian League. D. M. Leahy (*CP,* XLIX [1954], 232–243) argues in favor of this traditional view. Douglas MacDowell (*JHS,* LXXX [1960], 118–121), however, presents the case for early membership in the Delian League.

he himself led against the Spartans.[52] If he is not named, we have good reason to think he was not involved; if he was not involved, we may suspect that he disapproved.

It is well to keep in mind that in 458/7, Pericles was still under forty and far from the unchallenged master of Athens. For instance, Myronides, the victor of Oenophyta, was a veteran of the Persian War and a man of immense prestige. It is clear that he favored an aggressive policy, and he was not alone. The likelihood is that the warlike faction at Athens simply outvoted Pericles without rejecting what he had done, for the four-months' truce, as we have seen, gave Athens a free hand in Boeotia. The attack may have violated the spirit of that truce but not its letter. When the war policy proved so incredibly successful, the policy we have attributed to Pericles was finished. Pericles could do nothing but bow to circumstances and accept what he could not alter. It must have been at this time that Cimon decided that the political climate in Athens was not to his liking and withdrew until a more favorable season. His efforts to restore peace would not be welcomed by the ebullient Athenians. He would return when the fortunes of war had made them more sober.

In the following summer Athenian daring won additional victories. Tolmides took an Athenian fleet around the Peloponnese. He burned the Spartan dockyards at Gytheum, captured Chalcis, a Corinthian colony on the north shore of the Gulf of Corinth, and inflicted a defeat upon the army of Sicyon.[53] The unbroken series of Athenian successes continued, and the Athenian strategy appeared to grow ever more aggressive.

By the autumn of 457 the Athenian forces were troubling the Persians in Egypt to such a degree that they were compelled to seek relief. As usual, the Great King tried to make use of Greek quarrels to further his own interests. He sent Megabazus to Sparta, supplied with money, to persuade the Spartans to invade Attica and so to draw off the Athenians from Egypt. Megabazus soon found that the money brought no results and returned to Persia with the remaining

[52] Thuc. 111. 2–3; Diod. 11. 85. 1–2; Plut. *Per.* 19. 2–4.

[53] Thuc. 1. 108. 5; Diod. 11. 84 gives a somewhat confused account of this expedition, including activities omitted by Thucydides and placing the settling of Naupactus, which happened earlier, in this year. See also schol. Aeschin. 2. 75.

funds.[54] The Spartans were clearly not ready to risk a major campaign when Athenian power was at its acme. The Persians now had no choice but to undertake a major offensive of their own in Egypt. Megabyzus was sent overland with a very large army to put an end to the uprising. The Egyptians and their allies were quickly defeated in battle. The Greeks were driven from the city of Memphis, which they had held, and shut up on the island of Prosopitis in the Nile. The siege lasted for almost eighteen months, but at its conclusion in 454 the entire Greek force was destroyed, and Egypt was restored to Persian control.[55]

This was a disaster of the greatest magnitude for Athens. The account of Thucydides suggests that almost all of a fleet of two hundred and fifty ships and their crews of forty to fifty thousand men were lost. Even if we reject these figures as too large, the lowest estimate is that of Ctesias, which speaks of forty ships, meaning something like eight thousand men.[56] Even assuming that a good part of the force was not Athenian, such a destruction of Athenians and their allies was nevertheless a tremendous and unprecedented defeat. Its psychological impact must have been even more damaging than the loss of men and ships. It broke an uninterrupted series of Athenian victories over Persia, caused serious unrest in the Aegean, and forced a curtailment of the Athenian efforts on the mainland. A second attempt to win control of Thessaly had already failed, and Pericles' campaigns in the Gulf of Corinth, which took place in the same summer, were Athens' last military activities in Greece until 447. The Athenians were forced to abandon their expansion on the continent to meet the challenge of their first great imperial crisis.[57]

[54] Thuc. 1. 109. 2–3; Diodorus (11. 74. 2) says the Spartans refused the money.

[55] Thuc. 1. 109–110; Diod. 11. 75 and 77. 1–5; Ctesias 32–34.

[56] See Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 321–322 for a discussion of the literature on the size of the Egyptian expedition.

[57] Although Thucydides mentions the Egyptian disaster (1. 110. 5) immediately before he speaks of the Thessalian campaign and the Periclean expeditions (1. 11. 1–3), I believe that these activities took place before news of the Egyptian defeat reached Athens, and Thucydides tells of the defeat when he does merely to complete his narrative of the Egyptian campaign. In this I accept the chronological suggestion of Meiggs, *HSCP*, LXVII (1963), 3–4 and n. 12.

6. The Crisis in the Aegean

The disastrous defeat of the Egyptian expedition seriously challenged Athens' hegemony in the Aegean. The Athenian response took them a long way towards converting their hegemony into frank and open domination. Thucydides is tantalizingly silent on the details of the transition from the Delian League to the Athenian Empire, but we are able to fill in some of the gaps by using the evidence of ancient inscriptions. With their aid we can piece together the steps in the evolution of the Athenian Empire and flesh out the bare statements of the ancient authors.

In the early 450's, Athens was fighting a war on two fronts, against Sparta and her allies on the one hand, and Persia on the other. This put an unprecedented strain on her purse and on her manpower, which, of course, resulted in heavy demands upon the allies. The allies may have been happy to fight against Persia and to join in a campaign against Egypt that promised to bring them great wealth, but they were unlikely to favor the more difficult, less profitable, and emotionally less acceptable prospect of fighting against their fellow Greeks. Perhaps encouraged by Persian intrigue, some of the allies, such as Erythrae and Miletus, took advantage of the terrible defeat suffered by the Athenians in Egypt to revolt.[1] Erythrae

[1] The authors of *ATL* date the rebellions of Erythrae and Miletus before the destruction of the Athenian forces in Egypt. They believe that the allies were reluctant to fight in Egypt, that the Athenians tried compulsion, and that rebellion ensued (III, 253). I have preferred the version of Meiggs (*HSCP*, LXVII [1963], 2), which sees the revolts as a consequence of the Egyptian disaster.

and Miletus were two states on the coast of Asia Minor. The evidence of inscriptions allows us to see how the Athenians dealt with these rebels after the suppression of their revolts.

Our knowledge of the revolt of Erythrae comes from an Athenian decree copied by Fauvel early in the nineteenth century which is now lost. Subsequent work by epigraphers has improved the text to the point where it can now be dated with relative security to the year 452.[2] The decree provides regulations for the control and government of Erythrae following her return to the Delian League after a revolt. The rebellion appears to have been undertaken by an Erythraean tyrant supported by Persia, for each member of the newly established council had to swear not to receive exiles who had fled to the Persians, while the death penalty was prescribed for anyone betraying the city to the tyrants.[3] The new government was a democracy, probably on the Athenian model, certainly supported and supervised by Athens. The decree speaks of Athenian civil officials (*episkopoi*) and a commander of the Athenian garrison (*phrourarchos*). It further requires that the Erythraeans should supply sacri-

[2] The date and the text that establish it are those of the *ATL*, II, 54–57 (D10). It is accepted by Meiggs (*loc. cit.*) and by most epigraphers. In recent years the date of this decree and of many Athenian inscriptions of the third quarter of the fifth century have come under vigorous attack from H. B. Mattingly. His thesis is expressed in the following articles: *Historia*, X (1961), 148–188; *JHS*, LXXXI (1961), 124–132; *CQ*, N.S., XI (1961), 154–163; *CQ*, N.S., XVI (1966), 172–192; and *ASI*, 193–224. In brief, he argues on epigraphical and historical grounds that the decrees that show Athens tightening her grip on the allied states and taking harsh measures belong not in the 450's but in the period of Cleon's eminence in the 420's. The orthodox view is defended by Meritt and Wade-Gery in two articles, *JHS*, LXXXII (1962), 67–74 and LXXXIII (1963), 100–117 and also by Meiggs, *HSCP*, LXVII [1963], 24–30. As Mattingly graciously admits, his argument "seems to have won no adherents. I cannot really complain of this, since my arguments were inevitably far from cogent" (*CQ*, N.S., XVI [1966], 172). He has won no adherent to his general theory in me, but he has made it clear that the dating of each inscription must be carefully examined without prejudice. As Meiggs has put it (*JHS*, LXXXVI [1966], 87), "Mattingly has performed a very useful service in compelling us to examine more rigorously judgments which we have accepted at second hand." Not the least of his services was to provoke the splendid article of Meiggs, which supports the traditional dates in a persuasive fashion.

[3] Lines 25–34.

ficial animals for the Panathenaic Games. If all this seems evidence of naked imperialism, it should be pointed out that the decree is careful not to slight the interests and significance of the league. The councillors swear an oath of loyalty not only to Athens but to the league, and exiles from Erythrae are banished from the entire confederacy. The Erythraeans also retained at least a degree of judicial autonomy.[4]

The revolt of Miletus seems to have taken place about the same time. The absence of Miletus from the first two tribute lists and its presence on the third, the list of 452/1, indicate that the Milesians had been in rebellion but were subdued and returned to the league. We do not have the decree, precisely parallel to the Erythrae decree, which brought the rebellious state back into the league; instead we have a document that gives evidence of a subsequent intervention by Athens into the government of Miletus, dated to the year 450/49. The Regulations for Miletus, as the document is usually called, both resembles and differs from the rules established for Erythrae.[5] The Regulations do not establish a democratic government in Miletus, but they do provide for five Athenian officials, *archontes,* not *episkopoi,* who are to govern in partnership with the magistrates of Miletus. Judicial autonomy is smaller than in Erythrae, and some cases, at least, are to be heard in Athenian courts. An Athenian garrison is established, and it is possible that the Milesians were compelled to supply military and naval help as well as to pay tribute.

It is very instructive to trace the history of Miletus from the rebellion down to the decade before the Peloponnesian War.[6] During the early 450's, Miletus was governed by an oligarchy friendly to Athens. A tyranny, supported by Persia, seized power and revolted. After the

[4] Line 29. L. I. Highby (*The Erythrae Decree, Klio,* Beiheft, XXXVI [1936], 10–33) emphasizes the friendliness of the relations between Athens and Erythrae implied by this decree. A necessary nuance to that interpretation is provided by Meiggs, (*JHS,* LXIII [1943], 23–24).

[5] The text of the decree (Dll) is that of *ATL,* II, 57–60. For the date and interpretation see *ATL,* III, 255–258; Meiggs, *JHS,* LXIII (1943), 25–27; *HSCP,* LXVII (1963),5, *JHS,* LXXXVI (1966), 95; and J. P. Barron, *JHS,* LXXXII (1962), 1–6. I accept Barron's interpretation of Milesian history for this period.

[6] Barron, *JHS,* LXXXII (1962), 1–6. He builds on and develops a thesis established by A. J. Earp, *Phoenix,* VIII (1954), 142–147.

suppression of the revolt, the oligarchy, which had remained loyal in exile, was restored to power. The restored government was shored up by an Athenian garrison and Athenian officials. In 446/5, troubled by the increasing openness of Athenian imperialism, and taking advantage of Athens' preoccupation with a Spartan invasion and the Euboean rebellion, the Milesian oligarchs massacred their democratic opponents and rebelled from Athens. The revolt was crushed, the tribute collected, the oligarchs outlawed, and a democracy on the Athenian model established. As an act of conciliation and encouragement to the new democracy, the tribute was cut in half.[7]

One of the Athenian responses to the crisis caused by the disaster in Egypt was the removal of the treasury of the league from Delos to the safety of Athens in 454/3.[8] Whether fear was the true reason or merely a pretext we cannot know, but the Athenians wasted little time in turning the event to their own advantage. Beginning in that year, they began to collect one sixtieth of the tribute paid by the allies as an *aparché,* first fruits, to Athena Polias, patron of Athens and now patron of the reorganized league.[9] The money collected in this way would soon provide temples on the Acropolis, support the Athenian fleet, provide work for the citizens of Athens, and accumulate as a reserve fund.

So important and radical a change required some justification, and there is reason to think that at this time Athens tried to change the concept behind the league and its very nature. From the beginning, many of the members of the league were colonies that had been sent out by Athens. The Athenians, moreover, had long claimed to be the founders of Ionia, a claim that the Ionians accepted.[10] The year of the transfer of the treasury happened to be one in which the Great

[7] The foregoing account is admittedly only a reconstruction and may not be right in all details, particularly in the attribution of motives. It seems to be very plausible, nonetheless, and explains all the evidence more satisfactorily than any other theory.

[8] Plut. *Per.* 12. 1.

[9] For the replacement of the Delian Apollo by Athena Polias as patron of the league, see Meritt and Wade-Gery, *JHS,* LXXXII (1962), 69–71; J. P. Barron, *JHS,* LXXXIV (1964), 35–48; and A. E. Raubitschek, *AJA,* LXX (1966), 37–41.

[10] Barron, *JHS,* LXXXII (1962), 6 and n. 40 and LXXXIV (1964), 46–47.

Panathenaic Festival, held every four years, took place. The coincidence appears to have produced the idea "that the league be assimilated into a system of colonies, with the four-yearly Great Panathenaia as their common feast." [11] It seems clear that the Athenians placed some stress on the status of their allies as colonies, for colonial status among the Greeks implied not inferiority and shame but equality and pride. Ties between colony and mother city were normally warm and solemnized by common religious observances.[12] Within a few years of the transfer of the treasury, the allies were asked to send a cow and a full suit of armor to the Great Panathenaic Festival, "symbolizing food and military assistance to the mother-city." [13] The burden was not heavy, and the honor of participating in the grand procession to the image of Athena was not insignificant, so "we may suppose it was thought less a burden than a privilege, and so was not a unilateral Athenian fiat but a resolution of the League." [14]

These changes in the nature of the league may or may not have pleased its members, but they certainly did not put an end to the danger to Athens. An inscription dated to 451/0 indicates that the Athenian colony of Sigeum on the Hellespont was threatened by other Greeks encouraged by the Persians.[15] There is good reason to believe, moreover, that many important island members of the league were refusing to pay tribute in the years between 454 and 450.[16]

[11] Meritt and Wade-Gery, *JHS*, LXXXII (1962), 71.

[12] Raubitschek (*AJA*, LXX [1966], 37) points out that the allies of Athens took part in the Dionysian and Eleusinian festivals as well as the Great Panathenaic Festival.

[13] Barron, *JHS*, LXXXIV (1964), 47.

[14] Meritt and Wade-Gery, *JHS*, LXXXII (1962), 71.

[15] *IG*, I², 32; Meiggs, *HSCP*, LXVII (1963), 6.

[16] No payments at all are recorded for Chalcis, Eretria, Hestiaea, Cythnos, Siphnos, Styra, Tenos, Paros, and Naxos for these years, while Ceos, Seriphos, and Andros appear for the first time in 450. These would make up an important part of the total. Although the lists preserved are fragmentary, Meiggs is surely right in saying, "Statistically it is extremely unlikely that a state which has left no trace in the fragments of four lists, from each of which approximately a half is preserved, was paying regularly" (*idem*). The absence of these islands from the lists has been explained in two ways. A. B. West (*AHR*, XXXV [1930], 267ff.) and the authors of *ATL* (III, 267ff.) believe that these islanders supplied ships and not money in this period. Nesselhauf

The troubles Athens faced in securing and reorganizing her empire are enough to explain the absence of any reports of Athenian actions against the Peloponnesians in the years from 454 to 451. In 451, Cimon returned to Athens, the ten years of his ostracism having passed. Whether or not the suggestion that Pericles had already sought to make peace with Sparta through Cimon in 458 is correct, conditions now certainly pushed the Athenians in that direction. The tightening of Athenian control over rebellious cities made them more secure, but it may well have made other cities resentful and restive. The Athenians could not be sure they would not be confronted by a series of rebellions that might threaten the existence of their Aegean empire. Persia, moreover, was once again a serious threat and might bring a fleet into the Aegean to match the mighty army that had triumphed in Egypt. For all these reasons Pericles and the Athenians must have been glad to have Cimon back to negotiate a peace with Sparta for them.[17] Plutarch says that Elpinice negotiated a reconciliation between Pericles and Cimon whereby the former would control the city and the latter command the war against Persia. But at this point there was no need for an intermediary between the two men, who agreed in all matters of policy; the division of responsibility was inevitable in view of the talents of both men and the need for Pericles to retain control of the political base on which his power rested.

In this year Pericles introduced a law limiting Athenian citizenship to those who had two citizen parents.[18] This measure is often seen as a demagogic attempt to please the masses, who were jealous of their privileges, since pay for public duties had made citizenship a precious possession.[19] It is likely that the opposite is true. The expansion of the citizen body was a tradition among democratic politicians. Cleisthenes had increased the citizenry by enfranchising metics. Themistocles had advocated measures to attract emigrants to Athens. In the fourth century it was possible for Aristotle to theorize that democracy itself went hand in hand with a large and growing population. Demagogues habitually created more citizens of the lower

(*Untersuchungen,* 11ff.) and Meiggs (*ibid.,* 6–9) argue that they were disaffected and refused to pay. I find the latter view more persuasive.

[17] Thuc. 1. 112. 1; Diod. 11. 86. 1; Plut. *Cim.* 18. 1; *Per.* 10. 4.

[18] *Ath. Pol.* 26. 3; Plut. *Per.* 37.

[19] E.g., Walker, *CAH,* V, 86.

class, since "a large population generally preserves democracy."[20] Conservatives and oligarchs, on the other hand, always tried to limit citizenship and to maintain the purity of the citizen body. The new advantages of citizenship that had been created by Pericles would have made the lower classes less hostile to a limitation on citizenship. Pericles himself had already achieved political control; further extension of the citizen body was not necessary for his continued eminence. By proposing a law to limit citizenship, he could make a gesture of reconciliation to the supporters of Cimon and to the conservatives in general that would cost him little or nothing. It was a move toward the center of the Athenian political spectrum to match the step taken by Cimon in accepting the reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles. Hignett is certainly right when he says, "Both statesmen were patriotic enough to subordinate their private quarrels to the welfare of Athens. If this was the setting of the citizenship law it must have been either a concession to the conservatives or a measure on which both they and the radical leaders were in agreement."[21]

Such agreement paved the way for the Five Years' Peace, that Cimon concluded with Sparta in 451. Athens had good reason to seek such a peace, but it remains to explain why the Spartans should have been willing to give up a splendid opportunity to roll back the Athenian gains and restore her own former hegemony. In part the answer lies in the return of Cimon and the hope which he always inspired in Sparta, particularly in the hearts of the peace party, that Athens would come to its senses. But Athens was not the only one in trouble. The Athenians had proven themselves a formidable, tenacious, and indefatigable opponent at Tanagra, Oenophyta, on the coast of the Peloponnesus, in the Megarid, and in the Gulf of Corinth. The danger from Argos, moreover, still threatened. If the war persisted, it could not be long before Sparta's old enemy would try to regain the lost provinces of the Thyreatis, the Alsace-Lorraine of

[20] For Cleisthenes and the increase in the citizenry, see Aristotle, *Pol.* 1275b; *Ath. Pol.* 21. 4. For Themistocles, see Diod., 11. 43. 3. For Aristotle's theory, see *Pol.* 1319b and 1321a and James Day and Mortimer Chambers, *Aristotle*. The historicity of the Cleisthenic enfranchisements has been doubted by Day and Chambers and also by J. H. Oliver (*Historia*, IX [1960], 503–507). It is defended in my article in *Historia*, XII (1963), 41–46. See also D. M. Lewis, *Historia*, XII (1963), 37, n. 135.

[21] C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution*, 347.

Argive-Spartan relations. The Spartans, too, could see some advantage in a peace on the basis of the *status quo,* if they could be freed of the danger from Argos. It must have been as a condition of the peace that Athens abandoned her alliance with Argos. The Argives had no choice but to make a Thirty Years' Peace with the Spartans, which they observed faithfully.[22] The Spartans abandoned Thebes, and in return the Athenians deserted Argos.

Athens had reverted to a Cimonian foreign policy: peace with Sparta and aggressive war against the Persians. Very soon Pericles would show that the Egyptian disaster had made him more cautious and more eager to conserve the empire Athens had already won than to risk it by trying to extend it. For the moment, however, his interests were the same as those of Cimon; the empire could not be preserved without a blow to render the Persians harmless. As a result, he surely supported the despatch of a grand armada of two hundred ships under the command of Cimon to gain control of Cyprus. Of these, Cimon sent sixty to help the Egyptian rebels who were still holding out against the Persians. The remaining ships settled down to a siege of Citium on the southeastern coast of Cyprus. There Cimon died, either of wounds or disease.[23]

For almost thirty years he had played a leading part in Athenian affairs. With Themistocles and Aristides, he was a founding father of the Athenian empire. A conservative in temperament, an aristocrat by birth, training, association, and inclination, he nevertheless could adapt himself to a democratic society. An able politician and faction leader, he put Athens before faction. Until his ostracism and the rise

[22] 5. 14. 4; 22. 2; 28. 2. Gomme (*Hist. Comm.,* I, 328) points out that the sequence of events offered here is not the only one possible, that we do not know what was the relationship between the Spartan-Athenian peace and the Spartan-Argive treaty. He is quite right, but where certainty is unattainable, the historian must make do with likelihood. The situation is understood in much the same way as I understand it by Walker (*CAH,* V, 86–87); Beloch (*GG* ², II: 2, 209–210) and Gaetano De Sanctis, (*Pericle* [Milan and Messina, 1944], 125–126). De Sanctis expresses it most neatly: "la tregua di Cimone dovette essere pagata dagli Ateniesi a prezzo abbastanza caro. Essi cioè ebbero a rinunziare all'alleanza di Argo che dava loro il modo d'intervenire a tempo opportuno nel Peloponneso. Ma questo era il prezzo minimo che gli Spartani potessero chiedere. . . ."

[23] Thuc. 1. 112. 1–4; Diod. 12, 3–4; Plut. *Cim.* 18–19. 1.

of Pericles to supremacy, he was the most important man in the state. Even in his absence, like the ghost of Hamlet's father, he haunted the minds of his followers and moved them to action. His appearance at Tanagra may well have avoided treason and a devastating defeat for Athens. His influence played a great part in reconciling the aristocracy to the Athenian democracy and avoiding the bloody civil wars that shattered the tranquillity of other Greek states. Small wonder that Plato, who had rejected the Athenian democracy as a place where a noble soul could practice political virtue, should condemn him as a man indistinguishable from demagogues like Pericles and Themistocles.[24] But Cimon, of course, was not a demagogue. He was a politician who lived in the real world and who tried to restrain the worst inclinations of extremists on the right as well as the left. Unlike Callicles, the young man in Plato's dialogue, he could give an affirmative answer to the question "Have you made your fellow citizens better?" He was a great soldier and a great patriot; Athens would miss him.

After the death of Cimon the Athenians abandoned the siege of Citium, but at the end of the same summer (450) they encountered a combined force of Cypriotes, Phoenicians, and Cilicians at Salamis, a city on the island of Cyprus. The result was a decisive victory for the Athenians on both land and sea. The victorious fleet, joined by the ships that had gone to Egypt, returned to Athens, leaving Cyprus in the possession of Persia, but the main purpose of the expedition had been accomplished. The Athenians had demonstrated that they still controlled the sea and that they were willing and able to resist any Persian attempt to return to the Aegean.

The victory at Cyprus, combined with the removal of Cimon from Athenian politics, gave Pericles a free hand to pursue his own policy. It was then that he freed himself from the past and formulated the foreign policy that he pursued until the end of his life. Themistocles' policy of waging aggressive war against Persia had accomplished all that it could. Athens had profited from it, and her empire was the proof. But the Egyptian defeat had shown clearly that all these gains could be lost by a reckless policy of expansion. The rebellions of Erythrae and Miletus proved that the subject states would rebel if Athens were distracted. This led Pericles to prefer a policy of peace

[24] *Gorgias* 515 d-e.

with Sparta as well. Whatever he may have thought of the Athenian expansion on the mainland—and we may believe that he was less than enthusiastic about it—it too had accomplished all that was likely. Two failures in Thessaly had shown that the northern limit of Athenian influence had been reached. An attack on the Peloponnese would be difficult and dangerous in itself and would surely embroil Athens in a war serious enough to encourage rebellion in the Aegean. In 450, Athens was what Bismarck might call a saturated power. She sought no additional territory, but would take the necessary measures to insure the security of what she already held and the continued splendor of her prestige. The Periclean program, then, was peace with both Persia and Sparta, the defense of Athenian dignity, and firm control of the empire.

In the spring of 449, Athens concluded a treaty of peace with the Great King of Persia.[25] The terms negotiated by Callias, the son of Hipponicus, are reported by Diodorus: "All the Greek cities in Asia are to be autonomous; no Persian satrap is to come closer than a three-

[25] The authenticity of this peace, usually called the Peace of Callias, is one of the most debated questions in Greek history, along with the date of the fall of Ithome and now the authenticity of the Themistocles Decree. In my opinion, the state of the evidence does not admit of certainty. The defenders of authenticity depend on less than excellent ancient authorities. The doubters depend on interpretations of witnesses at least as untrustworthy plus the argument from silence. In this unhappy situation, I prefer the version of Ephorus in Diodorus to the doubtful epigraphical arguments of Theopompus and so am led to accept the historicity of a formal peace. It is important to point out, however, that the debate between doubters and believers is less one of substance than of form. All agree that the fighting between Athens and Persia came to an end and that Pericles immediately felt free to use league funds for his building program. Whether the peace was formally negotiated or not, it was clearly enough understood to be a fact, so that the Athenians were able to divert funds from military purposes to peaceful uses within the same year as the alleged peace. Defenses of the authenticity of the Peace of Callias include H. T. Wade-Gery, *HSCP*, Suppl., I (1940), 126ff.; Gomme, *Hist Comm.*, I, 331–335; *ATL*, III, 275–300; J. H. Oliver, *Historia*, VI (1957), 254–255; A. Andrewes, *Historia*, X (1961), 15–18; Meiggs, *HSCP* LXVII (1963), 10–13; and K. Kraft, *Hermes*, XCII (1964), 158–171. Arguments against are in Walker, *CAH*, V, 469–471; Raphael Sealey, *Historia*, III (1954–1955), 325–333; H. B. Mattingly, *Historia*, XV (1965), 273–281; and the best of all of all the critical accounts, the witty and vigorous article by David Stockton in *Historia*, VIII (1959), 61–79.

days' journey from the sea; no Persian warship is to sail in the waters between Phaselis and the Cyanean rocks; if the King and his generals respect these terms, the Athenians are not to send any expedition against the country over which the King rules." [26] The language and perhaps even some of the terms may have been changed by fourth-century rhetoricians, but there is no doubt as to the meaning of the peace. The Persians gave up their claim to control Greek states in the Aegean, on its coast, and in the Hellespont as well. In return the Athenians agreed to abandon their aggression against the Persian Empire. The Persian War was now truly over. Athens had completed the victory that Sparta had left unfinished after Mycale.

It is not without significance that the peace was negotiated by Callias, the brother-in-law of Cimon. As the husband of Elpinice, he was proof that the friendship between Pericles and Cimon lived on after the latter's death, and he must have done a good deal to allay the suspicions of the Cimonian faction and to win them over to the new policy. Callias was most useful to Pericles as a symbol of unity, and he employed him several times to negotiate important agreements.[27] He is not the only one to give evidence of the extent to which Pericles had drawn close to Cimon and his friends. Cimon himself had married Isodice, a member of the Alcmaeonid family, as was the mother of Pericles. After Pericles had divorced his wife, he gave her to Hipponicus, a relative of Callias. In 433 it is likely that Pericles was behind the appointment of Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, to the command of the first expedition to Corcyra. Finally, it is worth pointing out that Pericles gave great influence to his friend Metiochus; Cimon had a half brother called Metiochus. It is well to remember that "behind the public politics of the Athenian state was the family-politics of the great houses; here Pericles was an adept." [28]

But a masterful touch in managing the factions within the aris-

[26] Diod., 12. 4. 5–6.

[27] He negotiated the treaties with Rhegium and Leontini and the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta in 446/5. The authors of *ATL* (III, 276) distinguish him from Callias, the son of Calliades, who moved the financial decrees of 434 and died at Potidaea, whom they call Callias the Financier. Callias, son of Hipponicus of Alopece, husband of Elpinice, they call Callias the Treaty-Maker.

[28] The quotation is from Raphael Sealey, *Hermes,* LXXXIV (1956), 247. On page 239 he has gathered the prosopographical material reproduced here.

tocracy was not enough in a democracy. Athens in the mid-fifth century was neither the Roman republic nor eighteenth-century England. So radical a change in policy must be explained, justified, and made palatable to the man in the street. Pericles' ancient enemies called him a great demagogue, and the most fervent of his modern enemies has called him not a statesman, but merely *"ein grosser Parliamentarier."* [29] Without prejudice, it may be agreed that he was a brilliant democratic politician who knew that in a democracy it is not enough to conceive and formulate good policies; it is equally necessary to persuade the electorate of their excellence and desirability. Plutarch tells us that he was a brilliant speaker who "showed that rhetoric, as Plato said, is the winning of men's souls," but the speeches in which he must have expounded and defended his program are not preserved.

What is preserved is the description of a dedication that the Athenians made to the god in thanks for the victory at Cyprus. They offered a tenth of the booty of that battle and ordered an inscription by Simonides in honor of the great victory over Persia. It "praised the struggles on Cyprus as the most glorious deed that the world had ever seen. At the same time it was a monument to the whole Persian War, the inclination to which had been embodied in the person of Cimon." [30] Pericles, of course, was behind this propaganda, which sought to demonstrate that the war had been concluded by a glorious Athenian victory instead of a negotiated peace and which seemed to tie Cimon to the new Periclean policy. At the same time this unprecedented generosity to the memory of Cimon could not fail to draw his followers closer to Pericles.

There could hardly be a more suitable occasion for unity at home, for Pericles was faced with extremely difficult tasks in establishing his new foreign policy. On the one hand he must find a justification for the Athenian Empire and the continuation of tribute payments after the original purpose of the league and the tribute had been abandoned. A related problem was his need to justify the diversion of funds from the league's treasury to purely Athenian uses, for Pericles had great plans for the artistic and cultural development of his city. This imperial side of Pericles' problems was very serious, as

[29] Beloch, *GG* ^{2}, II: 1, 154.

[30] E. Meyer, *Forschungen,* II, 19.

the epigraphic evidence clearly shows. In the assessment of 454/3, 208 cities were assessed over 498 talents. By 450/49 the figure had dropped to 163 cities paying less than 432 talents, a drop of over 13 per cent in assessed revenue. In addition, there is evidence that some cities made only partial payments and some paid late.[31] The picture is one of a good deal of resistance to Athenian control on the part of some cities and of hesitation and uncertainty on the part of others. If the empire was not to disintegrate, firm action was needed, and quickly.

The other half of Pericles' assignment was the establishment of a clear policy in regard to Sparta. The peace negotiated by Cimon was plainly only a truce in which time was gained to negotiate a permanent settlement. The death of Cimon intensified the need to conclude such a settlement quickly, for he had been the man Sparta trusted. Pericles would be required to produce deeds instead of words. This presented a serious problem, for between Athens and Sparta there stood a barrier that would have taxed the diplomatic talents and good will of even Cimon: the land empire Athens had acquired on the Greek mainland from Megara to Thessaly. Plainly, the Spartans could not permit this enormous change in the balance of power to become permanent. The likelihood is that the peace party, who surely had negotiated the Five Years' Peace with Cimon, had expected him ultimately to concede at least Megara in the permanent settlement, as he had immediately abandoned the Argive alliance. It is hard to believe that they could have won the Spartans over to their position without such an expectation. The Athenians, on the other hand, had seen the great value of Megara as a barrier to Spartan invasion, and it is hard to imagine any statesman with the will or ability to persuade them to surrender it. Pericles might be eager for peace with Sparta, but he was unable to pay the price the Spartans would surely ask.

In the spring of 449, Pericles boldly attacked both his major problems at once. He introduced a bill

> to invite all Greeks, wherever they lived, whether in Europe or in Asia, whether small cities or large, to send representatives to a congress at Athens, to deliberate about the holy places that the barbarian had destroyed, and about the sacrifices that they owed, having promised them to

[31] *ATL*, III, 28–36; 52–59.

the gods when they fought against the barbarians, and about the sea, so that all might sail it without fear and keep the peace.[32]

Twenty messengers with the maturity and dignity of men over fifty were sent to deliver the invitations, five to Asia and the Aegean islands, five to Thrace and the Hellespont, five to Boeotia, Phocis, Acarnania, Ambracia, and the Peloponnese, and five to Euboea, the regions across from it, and Thessaly. The invitations urged them to come and "share in the plans for the peace and common interests of Greece." [33] The implications for the empire were plain. In this respect the Congress Decree, as it is called, was an attempt to set the claim of Athens to leadership of the Greeks on a new foundation. Religious piety, Panhellenism, and the common good were now to justify continued loyalty and sacrifice. While war had brought the Greeks together originally, let the maintenance of peace and security cement their union henceforth.[34]

There is some disagreement as to what response Pericles expected from Sparta. Some have believed that he was entirely disingenuous, that he anticipated a Spartan refusal, which would allow him to claim the hegemony of Greece by default.[35] At the other extreme is the view that the plan was offered with total sincerity in the hope of establishing a general and lasting Panhellenic peace. In this view the invitation to the congress was evidence of Pericles' honest attempt to restore peace to the Greeks; we should not assume that he expected or even provoked a Spartan refusal as a means of justifying Athenian imperialism. "To assume such a degree of political unscru-

[32] Plut. *Per.* 17. 1.

[33] *Ibid.*, 2–3.

[34] Nesselhauf, *Untersuchungen*, 32 has put Pericles' message particularly well: "Hatte bisher der Krieg die Griechen geeint, so wurde an seiner Stelle jetzt in schlagwortartiger Programmatik die Sicherung des Friedenzustandes als neues Ziel verkündet."

[35] Beloch (*GG* [2], II: 1, 177) thinks that Pericles concluded the peace with Persia in the belief that a war with Sparta was inevitable. Miltner (*loc. cit.*, 763–764) believes that the invitation to the congress was an "Akt von grösster aussenpolitischer Tragweite, indem die Durchführung der einzeln verhandlungspunkte die Anerkennung der Hegemonie Athens in Griechenland, die damals zum ersten Male von Athen beansprucht wurde, bedeutet hatte. . . . Der Plan scheiterte, wie zu erwarten war und wie auch P. vorausgesehen haben muss, an der strikten Ablenhnung Spartas."

pulousness appears . . . misleading." To say that Pericles foresaw the failure of his proposal "really means that he feared it." [36]

If we are to understand the purpose of the Congress Decree, we must eschew both extremes, for each is too simple and fails to reckon with the complexities of the situation. The cynical view neglects the fact that Pericles had already given evidence of his eagerness for peace with Sparta by recalling Cimon and accepting the Five Years' Peace. The picture of Pericles as a disinterested devotee of Panhellenic peace and unity neglects the marvelous advantages to Athens of such a peace as the congress would establish. We may imagine that when Pericles made his proposal he thought there was at least a chance that Sparta's peace party, always anxious to avoid war, and perhaps made more trusting by Pericles' *rapprochement* with Cimon and his faction, would accept the change in the balance of power as a new fact of life and persuade the Spartans to do the same. If this should happen, nothing could please Pericles more, for it would be a diplomatic triumph that would crown his new policy of "pacific imperialism" with success at one stroke.

If the Spartans should refuse, and any realist must have understood that there was a good chance that they would, then nothing would be lost and much would be gained. Athens would have shown its Panhellenic interests and concerns and gained a moral advantage over Sparta.[37] The situation is not altogether different from the one facing the United States after the Second World War. Europe was already well along the road toward being divided into two spheres of influence. The Americans conceived the Marshall Plan with somewhat similar considerations. Their primary political goal was to strengthen western Europe, their own sphere of influence, which faced the threat of dissolution through communist accessions and the secessions from the American camp that would surely follow. On the other hand, it is altogether too cynical to say that the United States was not also moved by sympathy for the suffering people of Europe, by the desire to rebuild that war-shattered continent and return it to peace and prosperity. As it happened, the fulfillment of the second purpose would also help to accomplish the first, and so benefit the

[36] I have paraphrased the words of Dienelt, *op. cit.,* 21. The quotation is from note 28 on that page.

[37] For a similar interpretation, see De Sanctis, *Pericle,* 131–132.

Americans. They did not offer the plan in the confident expectation that it would be rejected by the Russians and their satellites. Acceptance would have pleased the United States, for it would have called off the cold war, which had already begun, in circumstances favorable to the Americans. The Russians' refusal was certainly not startling, but it was far from inevitable. The rejection, however, was a moral victory for the United States and put Russia in a bad light. It also helped justify further steps by which America tried to strengthen its leadership of the West in a world that was now more firmly split.

Like the Russians, the Spartans declined the invitation to participate and wrecked the congress.[38] The Spartan refusal, however, was a great propaganda victory for Athens, for the Athenians could now brand their rivals as indifferent to the welfare of Greece and unwilling to fulfill their sacred vows and duties. Even though the congress never met,

> It emphasized to all the world the claim of Athens to play the dominant role in the religious leadership of Greece, and its failure gave Athens the excuse for considering the reconstruction of her own temples, at least, out of funds collected against the barbarian, as part of an imperial plan which had fallen short of a more nearly perfect consummation through no fault of hers.[39]

Now Pericles was free to restore order to the empire and to guarantee the regular payment of tribute. It is the opinion of the leading historians of the Athenian Empire that Athens accepted a moratorium on tribute payments after the Peace of Callias, that is, for the year 449/8.[40]

> No doubt there had been a spontaneous reaction to the news of the peace in which the allies expressed their conviction that tribute was no longer needed. This attitude of the allies was natural and intelligible. The evidence is that Athens consented and that in the brief hiatus between Confederacy and Empire no collection of tribute was made.[41]

[38] Plut. *Per.* 17. 3.

[39] *ATL*, III, 280.

[40] *ATL*, I, 133 and 175, reaffirmed in *ATL*. III, 278–299 and note 16 on p. 278. The same view is held by Meiggs (*HSCP*, LXVII [1963], 14–15), although with less confidence.

[41] *ATL*, III, 278–279.

The evidence for this conclusion is the tribute lists, for, as usual, the literary sources are silent on the details of imperial rule. Only three quota lists are preserved for the four-year period from 450/49 to 447/6. The first of these, as we have seen, reflects the disturbances in the empire after the Egyptian disaster.[42] There are incomplete payments and states listed with balance due. There is no better way to comprehend the situation than to quote Meiggs' concise account:

> Only two other lists are preserved from this second assessment period, and their numbers do not survive. The first is at the bottom of the front face of the stele, the second on the right side. The second follows closely the order of the first, is complementary to it, and must surely belong to the next year. No fragments survive from the top of the back face. The next list of which the number survives is the list of the tenth year, 445/4, but the list immediately above it on the back face is from the same assessment period, and is almost certainly the list of 446/5. It follows from the evidence either that there is one list missing from the series or that there was a very short list at the top of the back face, providing room for less than 70 cities from an expected total of over 160. This list would be the list of 447/6 and in that year Megara and Euboia revolted. But such a large reduction in numbers from 447 to 446 is not credible, and had this space been occupied by a quota list some fragments would surely have survived and been identified. We should agree with the authors of the *Athenian Tribute Lists* that the space at the top of the back face was unoccupied and that the year in which no *aparchai* were recorded was 449/8.[43]

This reconstruction has been challenged on epigraphical grounds, and it cannot be regarded as decisively demonstrated.[44] But even if we grant that no quota list was inscribed on the stele for 449/8, we need not believe that none was demanded or collected. It is possible that "no *aparchai* were listed, because the whole tribute of the year was given to a special purpose." [45] Another possibility is that domestic opposition by Thucydides, son of Melesias, or someone of the

[42] Meiggs (*HSCP*, LXVII [1963], 14) thinks that it is evidence for the conclusion of the Peace of Callias in 450 instead of 449. In my opinion, it is evidence of the same kind of unrest which we know in Erythrae and Miletus before the peace.

[43] Meiggs, *ibid.*, 15.

[44] See Appendix D.

[45] Meiggs, *HSCP*, LXVII (1963), 15. This is essentially the suggestion made by Meritt ("Athens and the Delian League," in *The Greek Political*

same views may have prevented the payment of the quota to Athena on the grounds that the purpose for which it would be used, the adornment of Athens, was not proper. In this view the tribute would have been collected, but there would be no quota list, since, "our records are of the quota paid to Athena, not of the whole tribute. . . ." [46] Whether or not these explanations are probable, nothing could be less likely than that Athens would take the occasion of the conclusion of peace with Persia to encourage her allies to think that tribute payments might no longer be required. That would only make it more difficult to justify a resumption of payments. It was precisely the purpose of Pericles to maintain and to justify continuity in his imperial policy, to make it clear that the peace did not alter its essential nature. The justification would be different, but the procedures must remain the same. We may be sure that Pericles did not initiate or acquiesce in a temporary halt in tribute payments.[47]

Soon after the failure of the congress the Athenians began to tighten their control over their empire. A papyrus now located at Strasbourg, which seems to be a commentary on one of the speeches of Demosthenes or an epitome of such a commentary, mentions a decree that Pericles proposed in the summer of 449. The papyrus is somewhat mutilated, but the decree has been restored:

the appropriate officials are, [to carry up] at [the Panathenaia for Athena]

Experience, Studies in Honor of William Kelly Prentice [Princeton, 1941], 53) during a period when he was less confident that no tribute was collected in 449/8. At that time he said, "In the present state of knowledge it would perhaps be best not to claim that the absence of the quota list in 449/8 means that no tribute was collected. There are too many uncertain elements entering into the problem of the missing list. A more probable view is that Athens collected some tribute, and that she may have transferred all of it, not merely a quota, to Athena." So far as I can see the uncertain elements have not been significantly reduced since 1941.

[46] Gomme, *CQ*, LIV (1940), 67. Gomme's views on the whole question are on pages 65–67.

[47] For a brief but shrewd evaluation of the problem, see Victor Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles* (Oxford, 1954), 126, n. 1. I can only agree with him that "whatever final answer the epigraphists will find, there can never have been in any one year an official communication to the cities that there was no need to pay."

the money lying in the public treasury [which has been collected from the cities,] a sum of 5000 talents, according to Aristeides' [assessment, and to carry up] to the Acropolis after that [a further 3000] during the period of [construction; and in order to] maintain [control of the sea] the Council to [care for the] old triremes [so as to] hand them over [sound] and to build new ones in addition each [year, besides those already on hand to the number of] ten.[48]

If this version is correct in its essentials, then we have evidence of the beginnings of Pericles' use of league funds for purely Athenian purposes, not necessarily connected with military matters. Five thousand talents were to be taken immediately to begin construction, and after that, a sum of two hundred talents was to be paid each year for fifteen years, to reach the total of the additional three thousand talents. "Athens, at any rate, would rebuild her own temples." [49] The building program, however, would not interfere with the maintenance of the fleet, which would guarantee the freedom of the seas and keep the peace to justify the payment of tribute. The boulé would see to it that the old ships were kept in good repair and that ten new ships were added annually. If we may believe the report of Diodorus that Themistocles had persuaded the Athenians to build twenty new ships each year and that they continued to do so after 477, then the Papyrus Decree of Pericles shows that the peace with Persia made it possible to cut naval costs sharply.[50]

At the same time as the Athenians were laying a moral foundation for their continued hegemony, they were also taking steps to ensure the obedience of their allies. Three epigraphical documents are enough to give us a good picture of the nature of Athenian policy.[51] In 449/8 the Athenian Clearchus moved a decree to close

[48] See Appendix E.

[49] *ATL*, III, 281; Wade-Gery, *HSCP*, Suppl., I (1940), 150–151.

[50] The shipbuilding program of Themistocles is mentioned in Diodorus 11. 43. 3.

[51] The Monetary Decree of Clearchus, *ATL* D14, the Kleinias Decree, D7, and the Treaty with Colophon, D15, are dated by the *ATL* 449/8, 447 and 446 respectively. The first two were once thought to belong to the 420's, and Mattingly, in the articles cited above, would like to keep them in that context, when the evidence for tight Athenian control is undeniable. The thesis advanced here is that a tightening of control was already evident in the 440's as a response to the mid-century imperial crisis. With Meiggs and against Mattingly, I believe that the epigraphic criteria support the early date for the inscriptions.

mints in the allied states and impose Athenian weights, measures, and coins on the allies. The decree was to be posted in each city, by the Athenians if the natives failed to do so. The measures ordered in the decree were to be carried out by Athenian officials in the allied states unless there happened to be none, in which case the local magistrates were to see to their enforcement. To be sure, the Athenians were unable to enforce this decree with total success,[52] but the harshness of the language, the absence of reference to the alliance, the cool assumption that Athenian officials would be present in most cities shows how far things had come since the settlement of Erythrae.

In 447, Cleinias, possibly the father of Alcibiades, moved a decree dealing with the collection of tribute. The "archons in the cities" and the *episkopoi* were to see to it that the tribute was collected annually and brought to Athens. The cities were to record the amount of tribute they sent on separately sealed tablets, and their couriers were to hand over the tablets to the Athenian boulé with the seals intact. Presumably, previous shortages in the tribute payment had been blamed on the couriers. The inscription goes on to speak of the punishment for violations of the tribute regulations:

If any Athenian or ally does wrong concerning the tribute which the cities must send to Athens, having inscribed the amount on a tablet for the couriers, let anyone of the Athenians or allies who wishes charge him before the prytanies. Let the prytanies bring the charge that someone has brought before the boulé, or else each of the prytanies must pay a fine of ten thousand drachmas. If the boulé condemns the accused wrongdoer, it does not have the authority to fix the punishment but must immediately bring the case before the court of the heliaea. And when the court has judged that a wrong has been committed, let the prytanies give judgment as to what the convicted man should suffer or pay. And if someone commits a wrong concerning the payment of the cow and panoply, the charge and the penalty are to be treated in the same way.[53]

Once again we have evidence of Athenian officials established throughout the empire, in this case supervising the collection of the tribute. The procedure for punishing violations is very careful and implies the right of appeal, but initial charge, appeal, and sentencing

[52] E. S. G. Robinson, *Hesperia,* Suppl. VIII (1949), 324–340.

[53] Lines 31–43. My translation considerably expands the terse and legalistic language of the decree in order to make clear my understanding of its meaning. It should be checked against the text, *ATL,* II, 51.

all take place in Athens under the control of Athenians, whether in the boulé or the courts. Finally, by now the payment of a cow and a panoply for the Athenian festivals is universal. As we have seen, this implied that all tribute-paying allies had the status of Athenian colonies.

An inscription embodying an Athenian treaty with Colophon dated in 447/6, combined with what we learn from the tribute lists, gives us more evidence of what was happening to the relationship between Athens and her allies. The tribute quota list for 454/3 shows Colophon paying three talents, but from 450/49 through 447/6 the city appears to be absent from the lists and so to have paid no tribute. From 446 on, the tribute is reduced to one and one-half talents and is paid regularly.[54] The treaty inscription helps us interpret these facts. Its last section deserves quotation, if only for the extraordinary language in which it is couched:

> Let the secretary of the boulé inscribe this decree and the oath on a stone stele in the city within the boundaries of the Colophonians; and let the colonists who have been settled in Colophon inscribe it and the oath on a stone stele in the market place within the boundaries of the Colophonians. And let the Colophonians swear the following: I will do and say and plan whatever good I can with regard to the people [*demos*] of the Athenians and their allies and I will not revolt from the people of the Athenians either in word or deed, either myself or in obedience to another. And I will love the people of the Athenians and I will not desert. And I will not destroy the democracy at Colophon, either myself or in obedience to another, either by going off to another city or by intriguing there. I will carry out these things according to the oath truly, without deceit and without harm, by Zeus, Apollo, and Demeter. And if I transgress may I and my descendants be destroyed for all time, but if I keep my oath may great prosperity come to me.[55]

It appears that the Colophonians had refused to pay tribute for some years, and when the Athenians were free to attend to them, they located a colony either of loyal allies or of Athenians on Colophonian territory. As was their custom when they confiscated land from an allied state, the Athenians reduced its cash contribution. Whatever the government of Colophon had been before, it was now a democracy. Loyalty, it should be noted, was sworn not to the alliance, but to "the demos of the Athenians and their allies." The lan-

[54] *ATL,* III, 282.
[55] *ATL,* II, 69.

guage of the oath was inconsistent with what a Greek would call autonomy.

By 450, of course, the Delian League had been transformed from a collection of autonomous Aegean states under the hegemony of Athens, with its center and treasury at Delos, into an organization of Athenian colonies, still nominally autonomous, but whose center and treasury was now at Athens. Desertions, rebellions, and refusals to serve had reduced the number of naval states and increased the number of those who paid tribute. That tribute now served to widen the disparity in power and influence between the Athenians and their allies.

One of the most useful weapons in maintaining Athenian control was the establishment of cleruchies on allied territory. In 450 cleruchies were sent to Naxos, Andros, and Lemnos. In 447/6 others were established on Imbros, the Thracian Chersonese, Chalcis, and Eretria.[56] A cleruchy, unlike an *apoikia,* or colony, was a settlement of Athenians on land taken from another people. The settlers did not make up a new independent city but remained Athenian citizens, often living side by side with the natives. Plutarch makes the advantages to Athens of such establishments very clear: Pericles sent out the cleruchies "to relieve the city of the lazy mob which took too much interest in public affairs because of its idleness, and to repair the poverty of the people. He did this also to establish a garrison as an object of fear to the allies to prevent them from making a rebellion." [57] The reduction of tribute that went along with the establishment of a cleruchy was more than made up for by the security that Athenian cleruchs, like early Roman colonists, gave to the empire.

The tribute was being paid, although some states were recalcitrant still. It appears that the Hellespontine region was particularly reluctant to pay, and it is likely that Pericles himself led an expedition to Thrace and the Hellespont in 448/7 to "show the flag" and to demonstrate to the more remote members of the empire that the peace with Persia had not ended Athens' hegemony or their own obligation.[58] By 447/6 the tribute lists already show the effects of the tightening Athenian control.

[56] For Naxos and Andros, see Plut. *Per.* 11. 5 and Paus. 1. 27. 5. For Imbros and Chersonese, see *ATL*, III, 289–294. For Chalcis and Eretria, see Diod. 11. 88. 3 and Paus. 1. 27. 5.

[57] *Per.* 11. 5.

[58] Plut. *Per.* 19. 1; for the date, see *ATL*, III, 299.

7. The End of the War

For the time being at least, the imperial part of Pericles' policy was going well. The other half, relations with Sparta, was not equally successful. In 449, soon after their rejection of Pericles' invitation to the Panhellenic Congress, the Spartans embarked upon the so-called Sacred War, in which they took control of the temple of Apollo at Delphi away from the Phocians and turned it over to the Delphians.[1] The Phocians were allies of Athens by virtue of a treaty concluded in 454/3. It is likely that they had gained control of the sanctuary because of this alliance and the Athenian victory at Oenophyta.[2] By their action the Spartans were not violating the letter of the Five Years' Peace, but in attacking an ally of Athens, they were certainly violating its spirit.

The attack is evidence of the restoration to power of the Spartan war party. Any hope that Pericles might have been fully converted to a Cimonian policy, that he might be willing to abandon at least part of his continental empire, was shattered by the Congress Decree. That decree, on the contrary, might appear a manifesto declaring the Athenian intention to claim religious and political hegemony over all Greece. The Spartans, already embarrassed by Athenian successes in central Greece, had suffered a further blow to their prestige as a result of the Periclean maneuver which forced them to

[1] Thuc. 1. 112. 5; Plut. *Per.* 21; Philochorus, frg. 88. I follow the *ATL* for this date and for the date of the Athenian counterattack which Thucydides reports in the next clause (3. 178, notes 64 and 65). Cf. Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 337 and 409 with note 2.

[2] *IG*, I², 26 = Tod, 39; Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 337.

reject an offer to participate in a religious and Panhellenic crusade. The attack on the Phocians and the restoration of independence to the priests of Delphi was a natural result of Sparta's disappointment and anger.

By now Sparta had overcome the effects of the helot rebellion. The peace with Argos guaranteed security on her eastern flank, and the end of Athens' war with Persia freed her from all fear of seeming to do the Mede's work.[3] It is interesting to notice that Sparta, under the control of her bellicose faction, once again took the initiative in bringing on hostilities. The campaign at Delphi could very well bring on a renewal of the war with Athens, for the Athenians had fought at Tanagra with even less formal reason. Here again, the Thucydidean judgment that the growth of Athenian power drove Sparta to war seems quite justified.

In fact, Athens did not immediately respond to the challenge. It was not until the summer of 447 that an Athenian army went to Delphi and restored possession of the sanctuary to the Phocians,[4] by which time the situation had changed. In 449, however, Pericles still hoped to avoid war with Sparta. As we have seen, he was faced with a difficult task of imperial organization which could cause unforeseeable trouble. With the memory of the Egyptian campaign so fresh, Pericles was far from eager to commit Athens to a war on two fronts, especially with its financial condition far from satisfactory. Perhaps he also hoped that his restraint would persuade the Spartans of his pacific intentions and lead them to accept the *status quo*.

It speaks well for Pericles' ability to control Athenian passions that he was able to maintain this policy for two years, during which anti-Spartan feeling must have been great. Perhaps the troubles in the empire helped persuade the Athenians of the need for restraint, but by 447 the situation had become relatively stable, the tribute was once again pouring in, and the more aggressive Athenians were ready for action. Eager to punish Sparta for her attack on their Phocian allies, the Athenians recovered Delphi for the Phocians, and for themselves the honor of the *promanteia,* the right of preferential treatment in consulting the oracle.[5]

[3] De Sanctis, *Pericle,* 135–6.

[4] See note 1 above.

[5] Plut. *Per.* 21.

Plutarch attributes this campaign to Pericles himself, but in this instance we may question his accuracy. It was common by Plutarch's time to attribute a permanent and inflexible hatred of Sparta to Pericles. He introduces the Athenian part of the Sacred War with a typical general remark: Pericles "considered it a great achievement to hold the Lacedaemonians in check, and set himself in opposition to these in every way, as he showed by his actions in the Sacred War." This attribution conflicts not only with the general tenor of Periclean policy in this period, but with Plutarch's own report of Pericles' reluctance to fight in Boeotia in the same year.[6] We cannot be sure, however, that Plutarch is wrong. If he is not, I think it likely that Pericles took command of the expedition under duress or to avoid having it led by a more reckless commander, in very much the same way that Nicias accepted the command of the Sicilian campaign. Whatever Pericles may have thought of this campaign, he certainly tried to check the confident aggressiveness to which it gave rise.

In the spring of 446, Boeotia, where the Athenians had driven out oligarchical governments and replaced them with friendly democracies, experienced an oligarchic revival. Orchomenus and Chaeroneia in particular were recaptured by the oligarchic exiles. Other oligarchic exiles from Locris and Euobea as well as other Boeotians were ready to join in a movement to drive out the friends of Athens and re-establish "autonomy," that is, oligarchic rule free of Athenian interference.[7] Athens was faced with the loss of its newly won land empire in central Greece. Tolmides, one of the most daring and aggressive Athenian leaders, wanted to launch an immediate expedition into Boeotia to recover the lost cities and to restore Athenian influence. Plutarch tells us that Pericles "tried to restrain and persuade him in the assembly, making his famous remark, that if he would not listen to Pericles, he would not go wrong in waiting for time, the wisest of counselors." In this case we may believe that Plutarch is passing on an accurate account, for he reports a famous public remark that is clearly and unambiguously associated with a specific event.[8]

[6] *Per.* 18. 2–3.

[7] Thuc. 1. 113. 1–2; 4. 92. 6; Diod. 12. 6.

[8] The story is told in *Per.* 18. 2–3. Many scholars have doubled Plutarch's story. Busolt (*GG*, III: 1, 421, n. 2) for instance, suggests that this may be

Pericles may have had few supporters for his policy of avoiding conflict with Sparta before the rising in central Greece, but once it had taken place the situation was different. There must have been many men who realized that it would be impossible to hold an area of that size in the face of general hostility.[9] When we find that Orchomenus was now on the same side as Thebes, her traditionally bitter enemy, we get some idea of the strength of feeling that united the class that counted in Boeotia, the landholding citizenry that made up the hoplite phalanx, a strength that could not have escaped the notice of the clearer-thinking Athenians.[10]

In the event, Pericles was unable to stop the expedition to Boeotia. Tolmides took one thousand Athenian hoplites, along with contingents from the allies, to liberate the Boeotian cities in oligarchic hands. The number of Athenians seems quite small in comparison with the four thousand who accompanied Cimon to Sparta in 462 and the thirteen thousand who seem to have been present at Tanagra. It appears that the bold and confident Tolmides considerably underestimated the power of the Boeotian oligarchs. His first campaign was successful, for he captured Chaeroneia, selling its population into slavery and planting an Athenian garrison in it. On the way back, however, disaster struck. At Coronea an oligarchic army from Orchomenus, Locris, Euboea, as well as other Boeotians, ambushed the Athenian army and won a smashing victory. Many Athenians were killed, among them their general, Tolmides. Many others were cap-

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merely an example of Plutarchian invention to contrast the foresight of Pericles with the recklessness of Tolmides. He quotes with approval Duncker's remark that delay would only make the danger from Boeotia greater. I have argued above that the public and specific nature of the story makes it unlikely to be an invention or the mere excuse for the treatment of a familiar *topos*. It is quite true that delay would make the danger of losing Boeotia greater, but that only tells against the veracity of Plutarch's account if we assume that Pericles was unwilling to give up Boeotia at this time. I argue below that the opposite is true.

[9] Gomme (*Hist. Comm.*, I, 339) says: "Doubtless there is some truth in Plutarch's view which implies that Perikles was (by this time at least) against the attempt to hold Boeotia altogether, and that there had been many in Athens, even before the defeat, who felt it was beyond their powers—that it was exhausting rather than adding to their strength."

[10] See the shrewd analysis of De Sanctis (*Pericle*, 134), who speaks of this class as "certo la più potente, e meglio organizzata, la classe della borghesia abbiente che poteva fornirsi di armi proprie."

tured. This one battle put an end to the continental empire of Athens. The Athenians came to terms very quickly; they agreed to evacuate all of Boeotia in return for the repatriation of the captured Athenians. Without Boeotia, Phocis and Locris were untenable.[11]

The defeat at Coronea proved even more costly. Perhaps it helped shatter the Athenians' aura of invincibility; perhaps it was only that the time for a reaction had come. In any case, the Boeotian defeat was rapidly followed by other rebellions. In the summer of 446, Euboea revolted. For Pericles this rebellion was something quite different from the Boeotian uprising. Euboea was a rich and important island containing several cities which paid a sizable tribute. It was located directly on an important route to the Hellespont. Its possession by hostile forces would place an intolerable strain on the Athenian Empire. For these reasons he did not hesitate but immediately crossed the Euripus to put down the revolt. He had scarcely arrived when frightening news compelled his return. Megara, Athens' barrier against a Peloponnesian invasion, had revolted and, with the aid of Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus, had destroyed the Athenian garrison except for those who had escaped to Nisaea. With this barrier removed, a Peloponnesian army was on its way to invade Attica. The Five Years' Peace had just expired, and it looks very much as if the Spartans had planned a concerted attack to coincide with its expiration.[12]

Pericles, of course, had no choice but to defend Attica, and so he took his army back to meet the Peloponnesians, who were engaged in ravaging Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. A decisive battle appeared imminent, but just as it seemed about to take place, the Peloponnesian army, led by Sparta's King Pleistoanax and his advisor Cleandridas, turned around and went home. The ancients explained this strange behavior in the simplest and most obvious way: Pericles bribed Pleistoanax and Cleandridas to abandon their attack.[13] Mod-

[11] Thuc. 1. 113; Diod. 12. 6; Plut. *Per.* 2–3.

[12] Thuc. 1. 114. 1–2; Diod. 12. 5; Plut. *Per.* 22. 1–2.

[13] Plutarch (*Per.* 22–23) says that after the withdrawal the Spartans were furious with both men. Pleistoanax was fined so heavily that he was unable to pay and was compelled to leave Sparta. Cleandridas, says Plutarch, went into voluntary exile and was condemned to death *in absentia*. He caps his story with the tale that Pericles listed in his accounts for that year an item εἰς τὸ δέον. He also reports Theophrastus' story that every year thereafter Pericles sent ten

ern scholars have found that explanation, even if true, to be inadequate. It is perfectly clear that in the conversation that Pericles held with Pleistoanax and Cleandridas more was offered than money. Pericles was prepared to offer peace terms too good to reject in return for a Spartan withdrawal. They must have been very similar too, if not exactly the same as, the terms that would form the basis of the Thirty Years' Peace. Central Greece was lost irrevocably; Megara, supported by a Peloponnesian army and governed by a hostile oligarchy, could only be recovered by an enormous effort, and even then success was not assured. In any case, with the empire in danger, Athens could not afford such an effort. Athens had everything to gain by recognizing the new realities and nothing to lose.

The Spartans, too, had good reasons to avoid a battle. Even if they should win, their experience at Tanagra showed them that an encounter with Athenian hoplites would be costly. It is further true, as De Sanctis has pointed out, that "if Pericles spent money to induce Pleistoanax and Cleandridas to retire from Attica it was money spent uselessly," [14] for all the Spartans could accomplish by a victory was the destruction of a number of Athenian soldiers and the destruction of the Attic countryside. As the Peloponnesian War that began in 431 would show, this would not destroy the Athenian Empire or bring Athens to its knees. If Pericles were prepared to abandon Athenian claims on the Greek mainland, what need was there of a costly battle? No reasonable Spartan could ask for more. To be sure, not all Spartans were so reasonable. The more aggressive shared a hatred of Athens going back to the Athenian challenge to Spartan hegemony in 478. For them nothing but the humiliation of Athens was satisfactory; to accept anything less was treason. Their

talents to Sparta to conciliate Spartan magistrates and buy time with which to prepare for war. It is worth noticing that Ephorus (frg. 193) says only that the Spartans suspected (ὑπολαβόντες) that their leaders had taken bribes. The Theophrastus story can easily be dismissed as an invention to illustrate the common opinion of his time that Pericles was the implacable foe of Sparta. Some scholars have refused to reject the story of the bribe outright, e.g., Walker, *CAH,* V, 90 and E. Meyer, *GdA,* IV, 586. Some believe it to be an invention or ignore it altogether, e.g., Beloch, *GG*², II: 1, 183–185; Busolt *GG,* III: 1, 429. All agree that it is not enough to explain what happened. See especially De Sanctis, *Pericle,* 139.

[14] *Pericle,* 139.

success in winning a condemnation proves only that hatred for Athens was a powerful force in Spartan politics at the moment when the Athenians seemed helpless. A short period of reflection soon restored Sparta to its senses.[15]

The Spartan withdrawal gave Pericles the respite he needed. He returned to Euboea with fifty triremes and five thousand hoplites and quickly subdued it. The settlement of Euboea completed the process by which the Athenians quelled the unrest that had begun after the Egyptian disaster, and at the same time it also completed the reorganization of the league into an Athenian Empire. Tolmides had already established a cleruchy on Euboea, perhaps at the time of the Boeotian rebellions, possibly to prevent oligarchically inclined Euboeans from helping their Boeotian neighbors.[16] Pericles' settlement after the rebellion was firm, to say the least. The Hestiaeans, because they were accused of atrocities, were altogether expelled, and their land was given to Athenian settlers.[17] The rest of the Euboean cities were allowed to negotiate a settlement, but the terms were hardly generous. At Chalcis, for instance, what must have been the best land, in the Lelantine plain, was taken away from the noble Hippobotae. Some of it was assigned to Athena and leased for rental, and the rest was given to Athenian cleruchs.[18] It is likely that a similar cleruchy was established at Eretria. An inscription has been preserved bearing the agreement that the Athenians made with Chalcis. A fragmentary inscription indicates that the treaty with Eretria was very similar.[19]

[15] Compare this experience with the one undergone by King Agis in 418. He too broke off an impending battle to negotiate a truce. The Spartans responded by fining him ten thousand drachmas, burning down his house, and passing a law forbidding him to lead an army out of Sparta without the consent of ten *xumbouloi* especially appointed (Thuc. 5. 63).

[16] Diod. 11. 88. 3; Paus. 1. 27. 5; *ATL,* III, 294.

[17] Thuc. 1. 114. 3; Plut. *Per.* 23. 2.

[18] Aelian *V.H.* 6. 1; Plut. *Per.* 23. I follow the interpretation of the *ATL*, III, 288–297. Cf., however, Nesselhauf, *Untersuchungen,* 135–138 and Gomme, *Hist. Comm.,* I, 344–346, who believe that cleruchies were not established after the rebellion, but that the land was rented both to Athenians and to native Euboeans.

[19] *ATL,* D16 and D17, II, 69–72. For commentaries, see Tod, I, 82–86; Gomme, *Hist. Comm.,* I, 342–345; and the bibliography in *ATL,* II, 69 and 70.

The Chalcidian treaty is not as harsh as it might have been. Chalcis was to retain control over her own magistrates just as the Athenians controlled theirs, "the true mark of autonomy."[20] In other respects, however, the treaty is a very tough document indeed. Even the competence of Chalcidian magistrates was limited, for it did not cover charges of treason or cases in which exile, death, or loss of citizen rights were the penalties. In such cases provision was made for appeal to an Athenian court. The Athenians promised to stand by the treaty and not take arbitrary measures against Chalcis or its citizens, but the Chalcidians had to promise to pay such tribute as would be fixed. For the time being an Athenian garrison would remain on the scene, and Chalcidian hostages would be kept in Athenian hands. Finally, each Chalcidian swore an oath very much like the one that had been imposed on Colophon:

> I will not revolt from the people of Athens by any manner or means, in word or in deed, nor will I obey anyone else who is in rebellion; and if anyone rebels I will denounce him to the Athenians; and I will pay the tribute which I persuade the Athenians to assess, and I will be an ally to the Athenian people as best I can and as justly as I can, and I will help and defend the people of Athens, if someone harms the people of Athens, and I will obey the people of Athens.

The settlements at Chalcis and Eretria are all we need to complete our picture of the condition of the Athenian Empire at the end of the First Peloponnesian War. It was not much different at the beginning of the Great Peloponnesian War a decade later. What had begun as a voluntary alliance of autonomous states had become an imperial organization in which the hegemonal power exacted military support, financial contributions, and religious deference from her colonies. Whatever autonomy might mean, it was plainly incompatible with garrisons, cleruchies, foreign officials, imposed constitutions, and the kind of language found in Athenian imperial decrees. The original aim of war against Persia had been replaced by a more general program that emphasized Panhellenic unity, religious piety, freedom of the seas, and the preservation of peace.

We cannot doubt that most of the members received many advantages from the alliance, but in many cases it was not interest but

[20] Gomme, *Hist. Comm.*, I, 342. The inscription reads: *τὰς δὲ εὐθύνας Χαλκιδεῦσι κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν Χαλκίδι καθάπερ Ἀθήνησιν Ἀθηναίοις.*

compulsion that held the alliance together. By 445 the only states that had significant fleets and were truly autonomous were Lesbos, Chios, and Samos. The next great test of the security of the Athenian Empire would come with the defection of one of these powers. We shall see that Athens met that challenge without changing her imperial policy. We shall also see that her domestic situation between the wars was far more stable than that of her great Peloponnesian rival and could not be successfully exploited by recalcitrant allies. Unlike Sparta, Athens embarked on the years between the wars as the master of her alliance, free to adopt and pursue whatever policy suited her, secure in the knowledge that her leadership would remain firm so long as her fleet was powerful and her treasury full.

In the late summer or early autumn of 446 the Spartans and the Athenians concluded a Thirty Years' Peace, and the oaths that ratified it were taken in the following winter. We do not have a copy or a report of the entire peace, but we can piece its provisions together from scattered references. The Athenians agreed to abandon all their holdings in the Peloponnese. Since there is no mention of Naupactus, Athens was allowed to keep this important strategic location. These were the only territorial provisions. They meant that Athens agreed to abandon her continental empire, which she had, in any case, already lost. In return she got what amounted to official recognition of the Athenian Empire, for Sparta and Athens each swore on behalf of its allies, and the further provisions of the treaty recognized that Greece was now divided into two blocs. Members of each alliance were not permitted to change sides. Neutrals could join either side if they wished. A special arrangement was made for Argos. Although it was joined to Sparta by the Thirty Years' Peace which it had made in 451, it was not included in this peace, which now expressly allowed Argos to make a treaty with Athens if it chose. Such a treaty, of course, could not be directed against Sparta until 421, when the Argive-Spartan treaty expired. Finally, there was a provision that disputes were to be submitted to arbitration.[21]

History provides us with many kinds of peace treaties. One kind concludes a war in which one side has completely destroyed the

[21] For the date of the treaty, see *ATL*, III, 301–302; for its provisions, see Thuc. 1. 35. 2; 40; 44. 1; 45. 3; 67. 2; 67. 4; 78. 4; 140. 2; 144. 2; 145; and 7. 18; Diod. 12. 7; Paus. 5. 23. 3.

other. This is less a treaty than a statement to the relatives of the deceased as to disposal of the body. An example is the treaty concluding the last war between Rome and Carthage. A second variety comes after a war in which one side is clearly victorious and imposes very harsh terms on the loser, who has been defeated but not destroyed. Such was the peace that Rome imposed on Carthage after the Second Punic War, the peace that Germany imposed on France in 1870, and, some have argued, the peace imposed upon Germany at Versailles in 1919. Such a treaty often contains in it the seeds of another war, for it humiliates the loser without destroying his capacity for revenge. A third kind is the treaty that concludes a war in which both sides have been made aware of the dangers and costs of war and the virtues of peace. Such a treaty has as its aim not the destruction and humiliation of one side or the other, but the guarantee of stability and security against a renewal of war. Examples of this variety appear to be the Peace of Westphalia and the settlement with which the Congress of Vienna ended the Napoleonic Wars. Two elements are required for the success of this last variety of peace treaty: it must accurately reflect the military, political, and ideological realities of the situation; and it must be backed by a sincere desire on the part of the signatories to make it work, to look upon it as a lasting peace, not merely a truce during which they can prepare for the next battle.

The peace concluded in 446/5 clearly belongs in this last category, if it is regarded as a true peace at all. Neither side was sufficiently victorious to impose its will on the other, so there could be no question of destruction or humiliation. The question is whether it was intended to be or possibly could be anything more than a truce. It is customary to answer this question in the negative, to consider the First Peloponnesian War merely as a prelude to the decisive contest that must inevitably follow.[22] But this is to judge by the event, to assume that something was inevitable because it happened. If we examine the Thirty Years' Peace without preconceptions, we will find that it contained at least the first element necessary for a

[22] See, for example, the remarks of Busolt, *GG*, III: 1, 438: "Das langjährige Ringen war ein Vorspiel gewesen, in dem die Gegner ihre Kräfte erprobt und an Übung und Erfahrung für den unvermeidlichen Entscheidungskampf gewonnen hatten."

lasting peace: realism. In recognizing Spartan hegemony on the mainland and Athenian control of her empire, the peace took a long step toward eliminating a major cause of unrest in the Greek world since the Persian War. The events of 479–477 had created a split in the leadership of Greece. Until Cimon's dismissal from Sparta in 462, the fiction of unity under Spartan hegemony had been maintained with much difficulty. The war of 461–446 would either make unity a reality, whether under Spartan or Athenian hegemony, or compel both states to recognize dualism as the new reality. Since neither proved strong enough to defeat the other in its own element, a peace that recognized dualism conformed to the facts and so gave hope of future stability.

Like any settlement, this one had elements of potential instability. Mutual distrust had by no means disappeared. Many Athenians had not given up their dreams of Athenian domination, of unchallenged hegemony, of expansion in all directions. Many Spartans and Peloponnesians continued to fear these ambitions, and perhaps others felt that the very existence of a powerful Athens threatened the safety and independence of the Greek states and the prestige and power of Sparta. Athenians may well have feared that Spartan jealously awaited only the right moment to destroy the Athenian Empire. Corinth could not have been delighted to find Athens retaining a foothold on the Corinthian Gulf at Naupactus. There was potential trouble in the fact that the Athenian Empire included states with special claims on the friendship of Sparta, like Aegina, and on Corinth, like Potidaea. There was a chance that the right of neutrals to join either side might lead to conflict. All these were possible sources of danger and instability, but they need not lead to a renewal of war if all parties were truly willing to keep the peace and to avoid adventurous policies. This willingness would be tested in the next decade.

Part Three

The Years of Peace

8. *Athenian Politics: The Victory of Pericles*

One of the great dangers to peace in a world divided into mutually suspicious powers is political instability within each state. We have seen how internal political conflicts in both Athens and Sparta contributed to the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War. If a renewal of that war was to be avoided, each side must pursue a steady policy of restraint and mutual reassurance, and such steadiness is very difficult to achieve under any constitution. It was the good fortune of Athens, however, that within a few years after the conclusion of peace, she attained a degree of political stability that enabled her to conduct her foreign affairs with consistency and restraint.

If we have interpreted events correctly, the policy of aggressive war on land that produced the defeat at Coronea was not the policy of Pericles, but of the more ambitious element led by Tolmides, which he had not been able to control. The death of Tolmides and the disastrous consequences of his policy freed Pericles from this source of political opposition. The left, to use an anachronistic but useful term, would not trouble him for some time. Without losing the devotion of the demos, whose loyalty was guaranteed by his domestic program, Pericles relied very heavily on the moderates who had supported Cimon and followed him into the coalition with Pericles. Their fondness for Pericles could only have grown as the memory of Cimon faded and as Pericles became more and more the voice of moderation among the democrats. It is no coincidence that

the trusted Callias, symbol of the alliance between Cimon and Pericles, was one of the negotiators who concluded the Thirty Years' Peace.[1]

But the very forces that destroyed the opposition on the left raised up a new opposition on the right. It was led by Thucydides, son of Melesias, probably the brother-in-law of Cimon.[2] This relationship has led some scholars to think that he inherited the mantle of Cimon and simply carried on as leader of the aristocrats (*kaloi kagathoi*), and again Plutarch is preserving an important and accurate tradition,[3] but not everyone has been convinced. Hignett's view of the nature of the opposition to Pericles is typical.

> Plutarch calls them the aristocratic party, but his views on Athenian political history are distorted by the conditions of his own day, and he habitually fails to realize that in the fifth century there were not two but three parties in Athens. The new leader of the opposition, Thucydides the son of Melesias, is called Kimon's κηδεστής and may have been his brother-in-law, and his adherents were probably composed in the main of Kimon's old following, the hoplite class.[4]

Plutarch may well have failed to understand fifth-century politics, but Hignett's own understanding lacks nuance. The evidence seems to show that there were, broadly speaking, two major political groups in Athens. One took its roots in the agitation against the Areopagus carried on by Ephialtes and Pericles beginning in 463. At its inception it would have deserved the title radical, but the passage of time, the success of its program, and the experience of power had tamed it, so that in modern terms we might call it liberal. It is not in the nature of all men to mellow with age; nor do all members of a political group agree as to its aims. No doubt some followers of Ephialtes had been attracted more by his attacks on Sparta than on the Areopagus. Their ranks may have been swelled during the First Peloponnesian War. Tolmides seems to have been one of them, and his death deprived them of leadership. Yet there remained this radical wing of the old Ephialtic group that was dissatisfied with the new Periclean policy of peace and accommodation with Sparta. The

[1] Diod. 12. 7.

[2] Wade-Gery, in *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, 1958), 246–247.

[3] *Per.* 11. 1.

[4] Hignett, *Athenian Constitution,* 256.

other major political group sprang up after the Persian War in the coalition against Themistocles. It created the Areopagite constitution and fought against the reforms of Ephialtes under the leadership of Cimon. We might call it a conservative party.

Cimon had adapted himself to the new conditions, joined with Pericles in his policy of maintaining the empire and seeking an understanding with Sparta, and brought most of his followers along with him. There had always remained, however, a number of die-hards who would not accept the new democracy. They had planned treason before Tanagra but had been thwarted by Cimon. His death made it possible for them to organize as an opposition to Pericles. In all this time the moderate wings of both parties had grown closer together as their community of interest became more apparent. Thus, it could appear that there were three parties, radical, moderate, and oligarchic, but in fact there were two major groupings, one liberal and the other conservative, each with a radical wing. When the aggressive radicals of the left were discredited by the debacle of 446, the entire political spectrum shifted to adjust to their departure from the scene. The moderate coalition led by Pericles appeared to have moved to the left, although its policy was unchanged. The vacuum that was created to its right was filled by the oligarchic faction, which now emerged from the disgrace that their suspected treason had produced a decade earlier.

The group led by Thucydides consisted of those oligarchs who had refused to come to terms with the Periclean democracy. His political genius converted it from a suspected political faction to a respectable party that could present itself as a loyal opposition and come close to defeating Pericles and his policies. One of his great innovations was in the realm of political organization. Heretofore we have used the term party to describe political groups in Athens, but it should be clear that it is used loosely for lack of a more accurate description. Of political organization along party lines there was very little. Even after the Cleisthenic reforms the old politics of the great families and their clients had continued. The reforms of Ephialtes, to be sure, had crystallized political life along ideological, and perhaps along class, lines for a time, but the moderation of Pericles and the cooperation of Cimon had helped blur them again. The political position of Pericles was not very different from the one enjoyed by Cimon

during his period of ascendancy; both relied on a combination of personal popularity, largesse to a clientele, and combinations with powerful noble families. The great difference was that Pericles paid his largesse out of public instead of private funds and so had an immensely larger clientele. Neither had anything that might be called a political party or the disciplined following and organization that go with it.

These were the invention of Thucydides. Party politics in Athens were so undeveloped that up until this time political groups did not even sit together at meetings of the assembly. Thucydides changed this, "for he did not allow the men called *kaloi kagathoi* to be scattered and mixed with the people as they had been before, their merit being eclipsed by numbers, but selecting them out separately and bringing them together into a single body, he made the power of all of them weighty, like a counterweight in a balance." [5] This organization was not only effective in itself but was also valuable in bringing to light the conglomerate nature of Pericles' political support. The marriage between Periclean liberals and Cimonian conservatives was one of convenience, and many differences remained that Pericles would have preferred to leave obscure. The new political organization, with its policy of concerted opposition, made ambiguity difficult. Plutarch's description of the new situation is very persuasive:

From the beginning there had been a sort of flaw under the surface, as there might be in a piece of iron, which hinted at a difference in the popular and aristocratic policy, but the rivalry and ambition of the opponents cut a very deep wound in the state and caused one part of it to be called "The People" [δῆμος] and the other "The Few" [ὀλίγοι].[6]

Organization alone is not enough to destroy as powerful a coalition as Pericles commanded. The *oligoi* needed a political program to lure the moderates away from Pericles. What Thucydides would have liked to proclaim was a program to roll back the democratic revolution of Ephialtes. This is a bold statement, but the scanty evidence we have seems to support it.[7] We know that he was an

[5] Plut. *Per.* 11. 2–3.

[6] *Per.* 11. 3–4.

[7] For a list of the ancient references, see Fiehn, *PW*, VI A, 1937, *s.v.*

aristocrat of the bluest blood. In Plato's *Meno,* Socrates praises him for giving his sons a good general education and for making them the best wrestlers in Athens, and uses him as an example to show that even the best men cannot pass on virtue to their sons. He had many friends in Athens and among the allies; he "came from a great house and possessed great power in Athens and in the rest of Greece." [8] Wrestling, of course, was the most aristocratic of activities, and Plato himself was a famous wrestler. The palaestra served as a splendid meeting place for the noble youths of Athens, their trainers, admirers, and friends. If the conversations Plato reports in his dialogues are typical, little good was spoken of democracy. If Wade-Gery is right, Melesias, Thucydides' father, was the greatest wrestling master of his time, the subject of an epinicion by Pindar, and the subject also of "the last words of praise for any Athenian" uttered by that most aristocratic of poets. We must agree that "no one who knows much of Pindar or indeed of the structure of early fifth-century Greek society will doubt that poet, trainer and athlete alike belong to the same class, the international aristocracy of Greece." [9] To that same class, of course, belonged the son of Melesias.

Aristotle also had a good opinion of him. He says that the best statesmen Athens had, after remote antiquity, were Nicias, Thucydides, and Theramenes. About Nicias and Thucydides almost everybody, says Aristotle, agreed that "they were not only gentlemen [*kaloi kagathoi*] but also statesmen and ruled the state in all matters as a father rules his household [*patrikos*]." [10] We can get some idea of Aristotle's idea of good statesmanship from his inclusion of Theramenes and the defense he offers for him. Whatever we may

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Thukydides (2), 625–627, who also includes what amounts to a survey of modern German scholarship on the subject up to his time. The most important and interesting study of Thucydides is Wade-Gery's article, cited above. Although I disagree with most of its conclusions, it is a pioneering work which has helped us to a better understanding of the man and his political milieu. See also A. E. Raubitschek, *Phoenix,* XIV (1960), 81–95.

[8] 94 c-d.

[9] For Melesias, see Wade-Gery, *Essays,* 243–247.

[10] *Ath. Pol.* 28. 5, πάντες σχεδὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἄνδρας γεγονέναι οὐ μόνον καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ πολιτικοὺς καὶ τῇ πόλει πάσῃ πατρικῶς χρωμένους. For my translation of *patrikos,* see J. E. Sandys, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens* (London, 1893), 114–115.

think of his motives, we must not forget that Theramenes was involved in the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred in 411, that he invented the strategem whereby the Athenians were starved into accepting unconditional surrender from Sparta in 404, and that he saw fit to join the Thirty Tyrants before falling victim to their excessive zeal. None of the evidence seems to contradict Plutarch's belief that Thucydides led a party of aristocrats who pursued an aristocratic program and were called "The Few" as opposed to "The People," not a party of moderate democrats.

There is another document that may give us an insight into the ideas and wishes of Thucydides and his party. It has come down to us under the title *Athenaion Politeia* and the manuscripts attribute it to Xenophon. Everyone agrees that it cannot be by Xenophon, but there agreement on authorship ends, and it has been customary to speak of the anonymous author as the "Old Oligarch." Several scholars have believed it to be written by Thucydides, son of Melesias, himself. Such an assertion is impossible to prove, and the best course is to admit that we do not know the author.[11] Still, it is noteworthy that scholars have seen fit to associate the ideas of the Old Oligarch with those of Thucydides. If we compare those ideas with the program Thucydides put forth, we shall see that there is some reason to agree with that association.

The precise intention of the pamphlet and the circumstances of its composition are far from clear, but we may dismiss the suggestion that it is ironic or intended as a joke. It is a serious work written by an oligarch for oligarchs, but the author enjoys the paradox of an oligarch explaining to other oligarchs that the Athenian democracy is really a very sensible apparatus when viewed from the democratic point of view. He begins,

As for the constitution of the Athenians, I do not praise them for having chosen it, because in choosing it they have given the better of it to the vulgar people (πονηροί) rather than to the good (χρηστοί). That is why I do not praise it. But since they have made such a choice I want to demonstrate that they preserve that constitution well and that they also

[11] For the best discussions of the questions of authorship, date, and interpretation, see Gomme, *HSCP* Suppl., I, 1940, 211–245 and Hartvig Frisch, *The Constitution of the Athenians* (Copenhagen, 1942), with an extensive bibliography. My quotations come or are adapted from Frisch's text and translation.

do well in other matters in which the rest of the Greeks think they blunder.

From this point of view it is perfectly understandable that "the vulgar, the poor, and the people are given preference over the distinguished and the rich," because it is the navy that gives Athens its power and the lower classes who man the ships. They employ election by lot for positions that are safe and pay a fee, but leave the dangerous posts of general and commander of cavalry to "the best qualified men" (δυνατοτάτους). Some may wonder that the Athenians give the greater share of government to the mob than to the aristocrats, for

> in every country the aristocracy is contrasted to the democracy, there being in the best people the least licentiousness and iniquity, but the keenest eyes for morals; in the people, on the other hand, we find a very high degree of ignorance, disorder, and vileness; for poverty more and more leads them in the direction of bad morals, thus also the absence of education and in the case of some persons the ignorance that is due to the want of money.

But it is plain to the Old Oligarch that to prefer talent and virtue would soon lead to the destruction of democracy. The fact is that rather than be subordinate in an ideal constitution, the people prefer to live under a constitution where they are free and sovereign. "Whether the constitution is bad or no, they do not care very much. For what *you* think is no ideal constitution," he says to his oligarchic audience, "is just the condition for the people being in power and being free."

He makes very clear what he and his friends would consider a good constitution. The word which is translated ideal or good constitution is *eunomia*, a name given by Tyrtaeus to the ancestral constitution of Sparta and by Pindar to the oligarchy of Corinth and almost always associated with oligarchy or aristocracy. In the Old Oligarch's opinion such a constitution will see to it that the best and most qualified men will make the laws. The aristocrats (οἱ χρηστοί) will punish bad men (τοὺς πονηρούς); only the worthy (οἱ χρηστοί) will deliberate concerning affairs of state and will not allow madmen (μαινομένους ἀνθρώπους) to serve in the council or to speak in the assembly. In such a constitution the people, of course, will sink into slavery (τάχιστ' ἂν ὁ δῆμος εἰς δουλείαν καταπέσοι).

The Old Oligarch objects, too, to the free and easy life of Athens in which metics and slaves walk about freely, refuse to stand aside in the street, dress no worse than other Athenians, and are not to be beaten with impunity. The demos of Athens has destroyed the reputation of the old aristocratic training in gymnastics and music, replacing them with dramatic festivals, athletic contests, and naval expeditions in which the poor may participate since the rich are made to bear the cost.

A major subject of complaint is the Athenian treatment of the allies. The allies are forced to come to Athens for judgment in cases between Athenians and allies. This makes it more likely for the Athenians to win the case. It also enriches the Athenians who are paid for jury service, not to mention the profit to the tourist trade of Athens and the tax collected at the Piraeus. "Now every one of the allies has to cringe to the Attic people . . . and in court anybody is obliged to beseech and stretch out his hand to the casual person entering. Consequently the allies have more and more been made slaves of the people of Athens." As in their own state, the Athenians support the worst elements in the allied states because aristocrats everywhere oppose them while the worthless mob alone supports them.

Perhaps the central message the Old Oligarch wishes to convey to his oligarchic audience may be found in the following paragraph:

> The people itself I personally forgive its democracy; for everybody must be forgiven for looking to his own interest. But anybody who without belonging to the people prefers living in a town under democratic rule to living in one ruled oligarchically has prepared himself for being immoral, well knowing that it is easier for a bad person to remain unnoticed in a town under democratic than in one under oligarchic rule.

This paragraph seems to provide the clue to the intention of the author of the pamphlet and to the purpose of the oligarchic party at Athens. At another time, in Rome, the aristocratic Tacitus would use the experience of his illustrious father-in-law to show his fellow nobles that a good man can live even under a bad emperor. But by the time of Tacitus, many aristocratic plots had failed and monarchical rule seemed inevitable. In the Athens of Thucydides, however, the unbridled democracy was relatively new and had not been effectively challenged. Cimon had shown that subversion need not be

the only way for the Athenian aristocrats to rule. Intelligent political management combined with charismatic leadership could make what was a democracy in name into an aristocracy in fact. It would, of course, be utter folly to make any of these attitudes and aims public. Issues must be found which were acceptable to a democratic people, which would discredit Pericles, and which would attract support to the party of Thucydides.

The son of Melesias had a keen understanding of the nature of democratic politics, and he must have learned the lessons of the recent past well. To destroy a politician in a democracy it is well to discredit him personally, to attach to his name and person attributes that are generally disliked, distrusted, and feared. In Athens the most damaging charge that could be made against a democratic politician was that he aimed at tyranny. The memory of the Peisistratid dynasty had been blackened by the treason of Hippias, who brought a Persian army to Marathon to conquer his native land. Athenian drama abounds with attacks on tyranny as the polar enemy of democracy.

Pericles was peculiarly vulnerable to charges of tyranny. As a young man, we are told, he was reluctant to face the public because of his resemblance to Peisistratus. "Very old men, noticing the sweetness of his voice and his glib and swift tongue in debate, were amazed by the similarity." [12] His wealth and nobility, coupled with his espousal of the popular cause, also brought to mind the demagogic tyrant of the sixth century. As we have seen, Pericles was not the man to win the love and personal affection of the masses as Cimon had. He won no great military glory; he was proud and unbending rather than affable and friendly. He avoided public occasions, was the least convivial of men, and rarely made public speeches, delegating the responsibility of carrying out his program to his associates.[13] He associated with suspicious intellectuals, held uncommon religious views, and consorted regularly with foreign men and women. He was the sort of man whom the comic poets called Zeus or the Olympian, which indicate at the same time the stature of his reputation and the aura of arrogance that surrounded him. It was easy enough to persuade some people that such a man

[12] *Per.* 7. 1.
[13] *Ibid.* 7. 4–6.

was on the way to establishing a tyranny, and it is clear that when the son of Melesias set out to oppose him he had come forth "to blunt the edge of his power so that it might not be absolutely a monarchy." [14]

These personal attacks on Pericles were useful, but a more general program was also necessary. It is a credit to the acumen of Thucydides that he selected one that was politically effective, could be combined with the charge of Periclean tyranny, and gave promise of accomplishing the purposes of the oligarchic party: an attack on the use of imperial funds for the Periclean building program. Plutarch reports at least a reasonable approximation of the complaints made at meetings of the assembly:

> The demos is dishonored and in bad repute because it has removed the common money of the Hellenes from Delos to Athens. Pericles has deprived it of the most fitting excuse that it was possible to offer to its accusers, that it removed the common fund to this place out of fear of the barbarian and in order to protect it. Hellas certainly is outraged by a terrible arrogance [*hybris*] and is manifestly tyrannized when it sees that we are gilding and adorning our city like a wanton woman, dressing it with expensive stones and statues and temples worth millions, with money extorted from them for fighting a war.[15]

The shrewdness of this attack is made clear when we observe the subtlety and breadth of its appeal. The attack, we should notice, is not against the empire itself, which would have alienated the majority of Athenians. It is not even aimed at the tribute, which would have had much the same effect. Instead, it complains of the misdirection of that tribute from its proper use in the war against Persia to the domestic program of Pericles. This was a clever stroke aimed at the Cimonian element in Pericles' moderate coalition. It was a reminder of how the original Cimonian policy had been perverted if not altogether abandoned. It tried to split off the old Cimonians by suggesting to them that Cimon would not have sanctioned the continued collection of tribute without a Persian war to excuse it. The

[14] *Ibid.* 11. 1: ὥστε μὴ κομιδῇ μοναρχίαν εἶναι.

[15] *Per.* 12. 2; E. Meyer (*Forschungen*, II, 86) supports the view that Plutarch gives us à reliable account of the entire debate: "die von beiten Seiten vorgebrachten Argumente sind uns bei Plut. *Per.* 12 in authentischer Fassung bewahrt."

attack, moreover, took a high moral tone, employed the language of traditional religion and old-fashioned morality, and contrasted it not with the immorality of democracy, which would have been offensive, but with the arrogance of tyranny.

Nor was the attack on the abuse of imperial revenues chosen merely for its propaganda value. The son of Melesias was surely aware that the supremacy of Pericles rested on the loyalty of the demos, which was guaranteed by the expenditure of public money among the poor. The cost of such welfare programs always rises, as the modern world has learned. It may be that ordinary income might have been enough to sustain Pericles' program in the 450's, but rising expectations, and perhaps growing numbers, made that inadequate by the '40's. It is possible that Pericles was thinking of such things when he proposed the law restricting citizenship in 451/50. In any case, the welfare program depended on the tribute by the time that Thucydides challenged Pericles. If the oligarchs could put a stop to the use of imperial money for domestic Athenian purposes, at one stroke they would help their aristocratic friends among the allies who carried the major burden of paying the tribute and deprive Pericles of the resources that helped keep him in power. That accomplished, they might hope to defeat him as Cimon had defeated Themistocles and restore the state to the condition it had enjoyed under the Areopagite Constitution.[16]

There can be no doubt that the plan was effective. Thucydides was a formidable speaker and debater, whose attacks forced Pericles

[16] For an interesting discussion of the purposes and activities of Thucydides and his faction, see H. D. Meyer in *Historia*, XVI (1967), 141–154. Meyer rejects the interpretation of the political events offered by Plutarch and largely accepted here. Putting aside the possibility that the party of Thucydides might really have been anti-imperialist, he suggests that there was no real opposition to the empire, and that the dispute was over means rather than ends. He does not give great weight to the possibility that the oligarchs were eager to overthrow the democracy established by Ephialtes. In his judgment they were chiefly interested in defeating Pericles and the building program which would have guaranteed his supremacy. After his fall, they presumably would have continued the imperial policy. The evidence discussed above seems to me to point in another direction altogether. Meyer's argument is weakened somewhat by his overly simplified view of Athenian politics, which sees only two sharply defined parties. As we have seen, Athenian politics were more complicated.

openly to defend his policy. The result was a great debate between two brilliant orators. Unfortunately, only Plutarch reports it, and even he quotes just a few fragments of what must have been incomparable rhetoric. We get some idea of the spirit and fierceness of the competition from an anecdote reported by Plutarch. King Archidamus of Sparta once asked the son of Melesias whether he or Pericles was the better wrestler and received this reply: "When I throw Pericles in wrestling he argues that he has not been thrown and wins by persuading the very men who have seen the whole thing."[17] Thucydides, of course, was no mean wrestler himself, whether in the palaestra or in debate. He was not a military man like Cimon, but more of a parliamentary and political man (ἀγοραῖος δὲ καὶ πολιτικὸς μᾶλλον), who "by wrestling matches with Pericles on the bema soon brought the political situation to a state of equilibrium."[18]

Thucydides, however, had underestimated the political talents of his opponent. In answer to the main complaint Pericles offered no apology but rather a spirited defense. The Athenians, he said, need make no account of the money they receive from the allies so long as they protect them from the barbarian:

They furnish no horse, no ship, no hoplite, but only money, which does not belong to the giver but to the receiver if he carries out his part of the bargain. But now that the city has prepared itself sufficiently with the things necessary for war, it is proper to employ its resources for such works as will bring it eternal fame when they are completed, and while they are being completed will maintain its prosperity, for all kinds of industries and a variety of demands will arise which will awaken every art, put in motion every hand, provide a salary for almost the entire city from which it may at the same time be beautified and nourished.[19]

It was a brilliant rebuttal. The first part answered the moral attack and was directed chiefly at the Cimonian element in the moderate group who were most susceptible to it. The use of imperial funds for Athenian purposes was not analogous to tyranny, Pericles suggested, but to the untrammeled use of his wages or profits by a man who had entered into a contract. If there were any breach of morality,

[17] *Per.* 8. 4.
[18] *Per.* 11. 2.
[19] *Per.* 12. 4.

it must be on the part of such allies who shrank from paying the tribute, although Athens continued to provide protection as always. But the second part is even more masterly. It was aimed at the lower classes who benefited from the empire most obviously and directly and reminded them in the plainest terms what it meant to them. It stripped the veil from the arguments of Thucydides and showed what his program implied: the end of the use of allied money for Athenian programs, which meant the end of the Periclean welfare state. In this crisis he reminded the masses who formed the hard core of his political support that their interests were at stake and he expected them to vote for their interests.

Events proved his expectation sound. Hard pressed by charges of corruption in the handling of funds for his building program, he brilliantly turned the tables on his opponents. Did the people think, he asked in the assembly, that he had spent too much? Altogether too much, was the reply. "Well then," said Pericles, "let the expense of the buildings be mine and not yours. But the name inscribed on the monuments will be mine as well." The result was all that Pericles could have wished; there was a general outcry in his favor, and he was urged to spend whatever was needed from public funds.[20] It was, of course, a remarkably effective rhetorical trick. No one man could afford to pay for the buildings, and everyone knew it. To admit this, however, is not to dismiss the importance of the gesture and the meaning of the rhetoric. Perhaps it is not too imaginative to see in this story a message that Pericles meant to convey to any of his democratic supporters who might have forgotten the nature of his opposition. These buildings, he implied, are yours, not the property of a wealthy nobleman; they are symbols of your glory and evidence of the greatness of your democracy. Do you want to return to a time when the great nobles were all and the people nothing? Perhaps some of his audience thought back, in contrast, to the story of Miltiades, who in an earlier time asked merely an olive crown as a reward for his victory in battle. A certain Sophanes of Decelea is said to have risen in the assembly and said, without grace, "When you have fought and conquered the barbarian alone, Miltiades, then you may

[20] *Per.* 14. 1–2.

ask to be honored alone." [21] Such was the old democratic spirit that Pericles was able to evoke.

In this way Pericles was able to check the swift growth of the opposition party. The danger was by no means passed, but he still retained a reliable majority, and the Athenian constitution presented him with a means for restoring tranquillity to Athenian politics: ostracism. It was a weapon originally designed by Cleisthenes to protect the democracy against subversion while it was still in its infancy. It also gave the leader of the democracy a weapon with which he could rid himself of a leader of the opposition who had become too dangerous. It was, however, a double-edged sword and could only be used with safety if the proposer of an ostracism were confident of a majority. It had been of enormous value to Cleisthenes, who had never needed to use it, for the very threat was enough to cow his enemies. It had been employed to good effect by Themistocles in the 480's to rid himself of all his rivals. It had been turned against him by the coalition of Cimon in 474, and Cimon had been its victim in the democratic surge of 461. We must realize that no politician used the weapon of ostracism unless he was altogether confident that his opponent would be ostracized and not himself. The exception that tested the rule was the ostracism of Hyperbolus in 417. His ostracism was the only one that produced a surprise, for neither of the obvious candidates, Nicias and Alcibiades, was ostracized but instead a relative nonentity. This was precisely because both major candidates felt that the vote would be too close for comfort and joined forces against Hyperbolus. The experience showed the weakness of the institution, and it is no accident that it is the last ostracism of which we hear.[22]

These considerations support Plutarch's clear and unequivocal statement that it was Pericles who introduced the proceedings that ostracized Thucydides, probably in the spring of 443, and removed him from Athenian politics for ten years.[23] Athenian political parties

[21] *Cim.* 8. 1.

[22] On the origin and purposes of ostracism, as well as my interpretation of its history, see Kagan *Hesperia,* XXX (1961), 393–401. The standard monograph on ostracism is that of Jérôme Carcopino, *L'Ostracisme athénien* (2nd ed., Paris; 1935), but the discovery of many ostraca and a good deal of recent scholarship has made it somewhat out of date.

[23] It is surprising that such shrewd historians as Grote (IV, 506) and Busolt (*GG,* III: 1, 495, n. 3), among others, should have believed that it was Thucydides who brought on the ostracism. No persuasive argument is put

tended to be groups clustered around a leader, and the removal of that leader usually had serious consequences for the party. The son of Melesias more than most was the heart and soul of his party, which he had led from the political wilderness into a position close to victory by the force of his rhetoric, organizational skill, and personality. When he was ostracized, his faction was totally shattered.[24]

It is customary to date from the ostracism of Thucydides the change in the character of Pericles from demagogue to aristocrat, from champion of the poor to defender of property, from party leader to statesman.[25] But if we have understood him correctly, there was no great transformation either in the character or policy of Pericles. He was both a demagogue, which is to say a skillful politician in a democracy, and an aristocrat, both before and after the ostracism. Thereafter he continued to be the champion of the poor as he had been from the beginning of his career, but he also defended the property of Athenian citizens, which he had never dreamed of attacking. His success was based on the fact that he had always been both party leader and statesman, and he continued to be both. It is possible, even likely, that in his youth his foreign policy had been more aggressive, that he believed it possible for Athens to expand her empire, her influence, and her wealth by warfare, but if so, he had abandoned that policy and that belief well before the final struggle with Thucydides. The recall of Cimon, the Five Years' Peace, the

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forth to support that view, the nearest thing to it being Grote's remark: "Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydides, in order to procure the banishment of Pericles, the more powerful person of the two, and the most likely to excite popular jealousy." But this is to misunderstand the nature of the institution, which operated less by popular jealousy than by political power. If Thucydides thought that the more powerful man was more likely to be ostracized, he was more naive than the rest of the record shows. The words of Plutarch, moreover, are altogether unambiguous: τέλος δὲ πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην εἰς ἀγῶνα περὶ τοῦ ὀστράκου καταστὰς καὶ διακινδυνεύσας ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐξέβαλε (*Per.* 14. 2). Adcock (*CAH*, V, 166–7), De Sanctis (*Pericle*, 157) and Ehrenberg (*Sophocles and Pericles*, 137) are among those who believe Pericles initiated the ostracism.

[24] *Per.* 14. 2.

[25] The first transformation is noticed by Plutarch (*Per.* 9. 1–2 and 15. 1–2), the second by Beloch (*Die Attische Politik*, 19–21), the third by Hignett (*op. cit.*, 253–257). Raphael Sealey (*Hermes*, LXXXV [1956], 234–247) argues against the reality of such a major shift.

Peace of Callias, and the Thirty Years' Peace are all proof enough of that. Before the ostracism Pericles had decided on a conservative foreign policy, which meant the abandonment of expansion, coupled with the firm maintenance of control in the empire, and a democratic welfare state for Athens. The ostracism of Thucydides amounted only to a popular ratification of those decisions.

The removal of the son of Melesias did, of course, improve the political situation of Pericles and, for the moment, made him more independent of his supporters. But political victories in a democracy, no matter how overwhelming, are never permanent. A clever politician will begin planning for future troubles the day after his victory. Although Plutarch tells that the resolution of its political quarrels had unified Athens and made it "like a smooth surface," some ripples had not yet receded. The moralistic, anti-imperial propaganda of Thucydides could not have failed to make an impression on the Cimonian supporters of Pericles. The idealistic, Panhellenic appeal of Thucydides' complaints about Athenians tyrannizing over other Greeks must have been a major reason for the support many of them gave him. To win them back to his moderate coalition, Pericles must appeal to such sentiments. The destruction of the right wing, moreover, strengthened the left. To defend his imperial policy, Pericles had appealed to pure self-interest; he had emphasized the empire as a source of profit. For the moment he was in firm control of the aggressive imperialists, but one day they might insist on payment for their services in saving Pericles from defeat. Finally, the allies themselves might present a problem. The hopes of the many friends of Thucydides scattered throughout the empire must have rested on his success. No doubt they expected him to succeed and then to end, or at least reduce, tribute payments. The disappointment of his defeat could well lead them to revolt, as many of them had done only a few years earlier.

It was to this last problem that Pericles immediately turned. The tribute lists give evidence that troubles in the empire had not been completely ended by the suppression of the Euboean rebellion and the measures that followed it. In the year 447/6 some 171 cities are listed. The following year shows only 156 and the year after that 158. The year of the ostracism finds 163 cities on the lists, which climbs to 165 in 443/2. In 442/1 there is a rather marked increase

to 173. This drops to 164 in 441/40 but rises again to 172 in 440/39.[26] The rise from a low of 156 in 446/5 to 165 in 443/2 is evidence of the undramatic but steady tightening of imperial control that followed the Euboean rebellion, but the increase from 165 to 173 between 443/2 and 442/1 is striking, and it appears that the new higher figure became normal, for the dip of 441/40 may very well be the result of the Samian revolution of that year.[27] It seems very much as if something significant happened in the realm of imperial organization in 443/2. The rest of our evidence confirms this judgment. In the normal course of events a reassessment of the tribute was due for the year 442/1, but instead such a reassessment took place a year earlier. Not only was there an early reassessment, but for the first time the empire was formally divided into five districts: Ionia, the Hellespont, Thrace, Caria, and the Islands. Such a division was already implicit, but now it was made explicit and appears inscribed on the stones. It is also clear that significant changes were made in the tribute paid by some of the cities. In some cases substantial reductions took place; in others there was a restoration of a previous, probably normal, figure after fluctuation; in still others some intermediate figure between previous highs and lows was fixed. None of these changes were large enough to compare with the more important adjustments of 446/5, which often resulted from the establishment of cleruchies. They appear rather to be minor readjustments, part of a general but not radical reorganization.

Another fact that emphasizes the unusual character of the year 443/2 is that for the first time a co-secretary (*xyngrammateus*) is chosen to serve the board of Hellenotamiae. His name is Satyrus, and he is chosen for the same job in the following year, the only instance of a secretary of any kind ever chosen for consecutive years. Finally, it is worth noticing that the man elected chairman of the board of Hellenotamiae for the same year was Sophocles of Colonus, the tragic poet.[28] From all this information several questions arise:

[26] See the table provided by Ehrenberg, *Sophocles*, 130.

[27] *Idem*.

[28] The evidence for the foregoing account is collected and interpreted by Ehrenberg in the sixth chapter of his *Sophocles and Pericles*, (117–140). I have in general followed his interpretation. The texts of the relevant tribute lists are in the second volume of *ATL*, 13–22; *ATL*, III, 67–68 and 306–307 add some pertinent remarks. An argument for 443/2 as a year of reassess-

What were the purposes, nature, and results of this imperial reorganization? Why was the reassessment made a year earlier than usual? Why was it necessary to choose a second clerk and keep him on an unprecedented second year? Finally, what, if anything, is the significance of the appearance of the famous Sophocles as chairman of the board of Hellenotamiae?

The answers to most of these questions can only come from a proper understanding of the political situation in the aftermath of the ostracism of Thucydides. The first task for Pericles was to maintain imperial control where it existed and to restore it where it had been cast off. A closer analysis of the tribute lists shows that in the Hellespontine, Thracian, and Carian districts, particularly the more remote inland towns, there had been considerable defections.[29] It was imperative to act immediately to recover lost ground and to deter further defections. It must have been chiefly for this reason that Pericles moved the reassessment up a year and used the occasion for a thorough reorganization.[30]

But it was not enough to tighten up imperial control; it was also necessary to win back the moderates who had been impressed by the arguments of the son of Melesias. For this reason the reassessment and reorganization were gentle and, we must imagine, scrupulously fair. We hear of no new cleruchies, no harsh measures, but only of readjustments of tribute, usually downward. It was as though Pericles were harking back to his campaign speeches and refuting the charge of tyranny. Athens, he was saying, does not wish to dominate

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ment is made by Meritt in *AJA*, XXIX (1925), 247–273. See also Nesselhauf, *Untersuchungen*, 36ff.

[29] See Ehrenberg's table (*Sophocles and Pericles*, 130).

[30] The authors of *ATL* (III, 306) believe that Pericles intended to make the Great Panathenaea of 442, the normal occasion for a reassessment, "a demonstration that Athens was the center of the civilized world," and that he advanced the reassessment to the summer of 443 "to keep this celebration clear of business." Even if the evidence for Pericles' intentions were far better than it is, this explanation would be a very weak one. Ehrenberg also rejects it and offers one far more persuasive. "Pericles had finally silenced the opposition of the oligarchs who had been voicing the complaints of the allies. What was more natural than to remove some causes of discontent and thus secure the tribute from reluctant states, when concessions could no longer be regarded as a sign of weakness?" (*Sophocles and Pericles*, 129–130).

and exploit her allies, but merely to see that they observe the bargain they have made. If they did so they would find Athens fair in financial matters and careful of their rights. The reorganization required a good deal of work in addition to the usual labors of the committee, and so a second secretary was needed. When one year proved insufficient, Satyrus, who had no doubt become indispensable, was reappointed to finish the job. The reorganization was clearly effective, especially in the more difficult regions. Between 444/3 and 440/39 the number of cities paying tribute in the Hellespont went from twenty-five to thirty-two, in Thrace from thirty-eight to forty-three, and in Caria from thirty-five to forty-six. Although the Carian district ultimately proved untenable, the rest was saved.

The question of Sophocles remains. What are we to make of his chairmanship? To begin with, it is important to recognize that Sophocles came from a wealthy and respected family. By the time of his election he was about fifty and had been an important and popular public figure at least since 468, when he had won his first victory as a tragedian. There is a story that the prize was awarded by a jury composed of Cimon and his fellow generals.[31] However that may be, we may well imagine him to be a typical Cimonian. That he was in favor of Pericles and his program, like many other Cimonians, is made more than likely by his willingness to serve as chairman of the board of Hellenotamiae at such an important moment. Further evidence is provided by his election to the strategia in 441/40. It is possible to argue that he was elected to the board of Hellenotamiae before the ostracism of Thucydides, and so need not have been a Periclean candidate. Possibly one might even argue that so popular a man as Sophocles could have been elected to the generalship against the wishes of Pericles, even though the evidence shows such situations to be rare. Yet it is worth mentioning that Sophocles is one of only two men in the time of Pericles who held both positions, and the other's being a Hellenotamias is uncertain.[32] It is surely impossible to believe that Pericles, at the height of his power, would have been unable to stop the election of a political opponent to the generalship.

But there is even better evidence of the friendly relationship be-

[31] *Cim.* 8. 8.

[32] Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles,* 133.

tween Sophocles and Pericles. Ehrenberg has offered us a brilliant and persuasive interpretation of the epigraphic and historical data. He points out that the tribute list for 443/2, number 12 in the series, is the first to name a chairman of the board. Like all the previous lists, it has a prescript in wide-space large letters giving the number of the list and the name of the secretary. At the bottom of the list, the name of the second secretary and the chairman are inscribed in letters smaller than the prescript and only a little larger than the list itself. The prescript of list 13, which follows immediately, is written in the same smaller letters. "We get the impression that these three lines are somehow pressed into narrow space, perhaps as a result of an afterthought, after the spacing of the whole reverse side of the stele, which contains the lists 9–13, had been done." The prescript for list 13 contains the names of all three officials, two secretaries and a Hellenotamias. In future lists the Hellenotamias is always mentioned and the prescripts are once again inscribed in large, widely spaced letters.[33] Now the general opinion is that the Hellenotamiae were elected at the same time as the strategoi, in the seventh month of the Athenian year. The decision to have an ostracism was taken in the sixth, and the actual ostracism in the eighth. Thus, Sophocles stood for his office at the hottest moment in the struggle between Pericles and Thucydides, when it was clear that one of them would be ostracized. Whether or not he correctly anticipated the outcome, it is clear he did not suffer by it. The evidence seems to show that his selection as chairman came late.

It is easy to believe that the idea for this innovation came from Pericles after he was rid of his opponent. His influence over Athenian affairs could never have been greater than at the moment of his victory over the son of Melesias. It was then that the idea must have come to him of moving up the reassessment and using it for a significant reorganization of the empire. But it was not enough that the reorganization should be fair and equitable. As an experienced democratic politician, he knew that it was at least equally important that it should *seem* fair and honorable and should be recognized as such by one and all. It was no less important that it should seem to have the support not only of the radical imperialists but of the respectable, conservative elements as well. Nothing could have served his needs

[33] *Ibid.*, 132–133.

better than to have Sophocles available to head the board of Hellenotamiae at such a time. Whether by chance or design, he had been elected. It was certainly no chance that the position of chairman was first given a prominent listing at this moment and Sophocles chosen to fill it. In one stroke Pericles could accomplish the necessary imperial reorganization and demonstrate the respectability and moderation of his policy to the more restless element among his supporters. Perhaps they were not yet fully convinced, but this brilliant improvisation could not fail to help. Soon developments in the west would give him another opportunity to convince them.